MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School Certificate for Approving the Dissertation We hereby approve the Dissertation of Joshua Buchanan Candidate for the Degree:

Doctor of Philosophy

______Director (Amy Summerville)

______Reader (Allen McConnell)

______Reader (Amanda Diekman)

______Graduate School Representative (Eric Stenstrom)

ABSTRACT

I FEEL YOUR PAIN: SOCIAL CONNECTION AND THE EXPRESSION AND PERCEPTION OF REGRET

by Joshua Buchanan

People believe that expressing regret to others fosters social connection (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). However, it is unclear if this social closeness function is indeed served by expressing regret. Three studies test whether or not expressions of regret coincide with feeling closer to others relative to baseline or other emotional expressions. These studies examined feelings of closeness from the perspective of the recipient of the regret expression (Study 1) and the expresser of the regret (Study 2), and also examined both anticipated and actual feelings of closeness towards others (Study 2). Overall, the studies did not provide support for the social closeness function of regret. Study 2, however, provided evidence that regret expression is motivated by a social closeness goal. Limitations of the present studies and possible future research on regret expression are discussed.

I FEEL YOUR PAIN: SOCIAL CONNECTION AND THE EXPRESSION AND PERCEPTION OF REGRET

A Dissertation

Submitted to the faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Psychology by Joshua P. Buchanan Miami University Oxford, OH 2015

Dissertation Director: Amy Summerville

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1 The Experience of Regret ...... 1 The Expression of Emotion ...... 2 The Expression of Regret ...... 2 Goals of the Present Research ...... 4 Study 1 ...... 5 Study 1a ...... 6 Method ...... 6 Results ...... 8 Expression Characteristics ...... 8 Study 1b...... 9 Method ...... 10 Results ...... 10 Expression Characteristics ...... 11 Discussion ...... 12 Study 2 ...... 13 Method ...... 15 Results ...... 16 Expression Condition ...... 16 Expectations and Actual Closeness Perceptions ...... 17 Expression Characteristics ...... 18 Discussion ...... 18 General Discussion ...... 19 Limitations ...... 21 Future Directions ...... 22 Conclusion ...... 23 References ...... 25 Appendix ...... 41

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List of Tables

Table 1 ...... 30 Table 2 ...... 31 Table 3 ...... 32 Table 4 ...... 33 Table 5 ...... 34 Table 6 ...... 35 Table 7 ...... 36

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List of Figures

Figure 1 ...... 37 Figure 2 ...... 38 Figure 3 ...... 39 Figure 4 ...... 40

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Dedication

To my parents who have supported me from across the globe. To my teachers who have inspired me in so many ways. To my wife, Tonya, who encouraged me every step of the way. To my daughter, Olivia, who helped keep me sane as I crossed the finish line. To everyone in my life that has helped make this dissertation possible, words cannot express my gratitude.

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Introduction People make important decisions on a daily basis. Although the outcomes of these choices can have important implications, the possible outcomes that did not occur can often have a greater psychological impact. These thoughts of “what might have been” and the feelings of regret that result are critical components of the human psyche and are frequently experienced in daily life (Shimanoff, 1984; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Importantly, these thoughts and feelings are frequently communicated to others. For example, powerful songwriting often ruminates over past regrets, science fiction television shows regularly address regrettable decisions by returning to the past to change the outcome, and thought-provoking movies sometimes address life-altering decisions and the ways in which people cope with their regrets. But what motivations do people have for expressing these regrets publicly? Furthermore, are there any actual benefits to expressing these regrets to others? Although some research has begun to address the former question (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), no research has examined actual outcomes of expressing regret. Understanding the benefits of socially expressing regret could not only shed further light on why individuals express regret, but could also reaffirm why regret is mentioned so frequently in daily life (Shimanoff, 1984). The Experience of Regret In order to understand the implications of expressing regret, it is first important to define the emotion. Regret is a negative emotion driven by self-focused, upward counterfactual thoughts (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; 1995). That is, individuals experience regret when they consider a negative event that occurred in the past and think about how things could have been better if they had done something differently. The feeling of regret has a powerful influence on behavior, and individuals are frequently motivated to regulate the emotion through different means such as denying responsibility for a past decision, reversing a past decision, or utilizing other emotion regulation strategies (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Roese, Summerville, & Fessel, 2007; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007). Furthermore, regret is such an important emotion that individuals anticipate experiencing regret about future decisions and make choices driven by these anticipated feelings (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; McConnell et al., 2000). Although regret is pervasive in daily life (Shimanoff, 1984), much of the existing literature focuses solely on the consequences of the private experience of regret. This research has identified a wide variety of outcomes that can arise as a result of experiencing regret. Some of these outcomes are practical and adaptive, such as encouraging corrective action after a negative event (Zeelenberg, 1999), switching to a new product after a bad experience with a previous product (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg, Inman, & Pieters, 2001), improving future performance on a task (Roese, 1994), and facilitating logical causal reasoning (Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Other outcomes, however, can be considered dysfunctional. Regret can sometimes reduce well-being and quality of life (Torges, Stewart, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008; Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005), increase negative mental health outcomes such as distress and anxiety (Roese et al., 2009), lead to suboptimal decision-making strategies (Reb & Connolly, 2009; Ratner & Herbst, 2005), and decrease the likelihood of a successful negotiation between two parties (Larrick & Boles, 1995). Critically, a vast majority of these outcomes are limited to

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the individual experiencing the regret. That is, research has primarily focused only on how the individual experiencing regret is impacted by the emotion. Even though regret is one of the most frequently mentioned emotions in daily conversation (Shimanoff, 1984), research has not examined the implications of these expressions. The Expression of Emotion The public expression of other emotions, however, has been well documented. Much of the existing research has built off of Darwin’s (1872) seminal work on emotional expression and has focused on identifying the forms of emotional expression associated with each discrete emotion. While a large portion of this research has focused on the specific facial expression associated with several different emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1977; Dimberg, 1982; Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; Lewis, 1993; Russell, 1994; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tracy & Robins, 2004), research has also identified specific motivations or functions associated with the expression of discrete basic emotions. There is a general consensus that emotional expressions primarily exist to coordinate and communicate with others (e.g., Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1984; Keltner & Harker, 1998). Expressions of the basic emotions quickly and efficiently signal, among other information, an individual’s motivations, desires, and feelings to another person, and serve some form of social function. Expressing sadness can elicit help from other people (Hackenbracht & Tamir, 2010). Different emotional expressions during negotiations can have drastically different influences, with happiness promoting collaboration and anger yielding greater concessions from the other party (Forgas, 1998; Tamir & Ford, 2012). The expression of disgust signals to others that a specific stimulus should be avoided (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Each of these emotional expressions therefore helps people interact with others while often communicating unique information or intentions to other individuals. Research has also demonstrated that more complex emotions communicate important information when publicly expressed. Expressing contempt can facilitate distancing oneself from a target individual (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). The same can be said for comparative, self- focused emotions similar to regret (often referred to as self-conscious emotions; Lewis, 1993). An examination of athletes at Olympic and Paralympic Games found that expressions of pride or shame follow success or failure at an individuals’ respective event, even when the athlete is congenitally blind (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Furthermore, these expressions can elicit specific responses from others. Expressing embarrassment can reduce aggression from others following a transgression (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Individuals looking for forgiveness from others after a transgression often express shame (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008). Furthermore, people who have strong connections to certain social groups can also experience emotions related to the behaviors of their in-group members. These group-level emotions can serve important functions when publicly expressed. For example, expressing guilt over the transgressions of an in-group, such as the forceful colonization of a region of the world, can help ease the tension of hostile race relations (Minow, 1998; Doojse, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006). In fact, some have even suggested that every emotion has an important social function (Rimé, 2009). Even for emotions focused primarily on the self, the expressions of these emotions allow for communication with others and encourage specific shared responses in others. The Expression of Regret

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Recent work has begun to directly examine the social function of another self-focused emotion: the expression of regret. Within a consumer context, experiencing regret can promote social ties with others (Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). Experiences of regret appear to be more intense when about social domains such as family or romance compared to non-social domains such as education or career (Morrison, Epstude, & Roese, 2012). These social regrets have a greater impact on individuals who have a stronger need to have meaningful and close relationships with other individuals (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). These findings lay the foundation that regret has important social implications. People also appear to be aware of this connection, as people have a lay belief that regret generally serves a social closeness function (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008). That is, individuals believe that regret can be used not only to create social bonds, but to strengthen existing social connections. Precisely how people “use” regret to serve the social closeness function is unclear. Although simply experiencing regret may serve this function, it is more likely that, similar to other emotions, expressing regret is able to best serve this socially-relevant function (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Hackenbracht & Tamir, 2010). Some evidence supports this theory, suggesting that publicly expressing regret eases tensions arising from damaged relationships (Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). A recent examination speaks more directly to the relationship between the expression of regret and the perceived social closeness function of regret. The PEER model (Private Experience and Expression of Regret) distinguishes between two functions of regret (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). Specifically, learning from the past and preparing for the future is best served through the private experience of regret while connecting with other individuals is best served through the public expression of regret. Importantly, the social closeness function was more directly tied to the expression of regret, and was not merely an artifact of expressing any emotion. Expressing other negative emotions such as anger, shame, and disgust served other socially relevant functions (such as asserting power over others or eliciting help from others) more than regret, but did not serve a social closeness function as much as regret did. Other research has supported these findings, suggesting that while other emotions are sometimes expressed to signal dissatisfaction with a situation, regret is expressed in the same situation to promote social ties (Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). This research on regret coincides with findings that emotions are generally expressed to communicate with others and to trigger particular shared responses (e.g., Keltner & Harker, 1998; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008). Specifically, expressions of regret revolve around social connection (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). That is, individuals appear to express regret to communicate an intention to affiliate with others and also to trigger affiliation responses in others. In this way, expressions of regret could be utilized as a means of re-affiliation, such as after social exclusion (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). The recipients of regret expressions are therefore also greatly impacted by the expression. Broadly, when perceiving an emotional expression, people frequently use this information to learn about their environment, prepare for specific, expected behaviors, or respond empathically to the expresser (Frijda, 1953; Schwartz, Izard, & Ansul, 1985). Furthermore, as alluded to earlier, expressing specific negative emotions can elicit certain responses from others. For example, expressions of anger are frequently met with hostility whereas expressions of sadness

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often elicit sympathy (Hackenbracht & Tamir, 2010; Tamir & Ford, 2012). Precisely how people respond to regret expressions specifically is unclear. It is plausible that individuals may indeed sympathize with and form a stronger connection to people who express regret, however it is equally plausible that individuals become judgmental towards people and fail to connect with people who express regret. The former is more likely given that individuals believe that expressing regret helps them form and maintain social connections (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). However, the social influences of regret expression on recipients of these expressions have not been directly examined. There are, however, important limitations to the existing work on the expression of regret. First, researchers have not explicitly examined whether or not this social closeness function is indeed served by the expression of regret. Summerville and Buchanan (2014) established that people believe that regret serves a social closeness function, but did not directly examine if individuals who express regret feel closer towards others as a result. Although it is likely that individuals are making accurate assessments of the functionality of expressing regret, it is plausible that individuals might believe regret brings people closer even though it actually does not. Research on affective forecasting has consistently shown that individuals overestimate the impact of their emotional experiences (Lam, Buehler, McFarland, Ross, & Cheung, 2005; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005; Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James, Schneiderman & Salovey, 2007). Similarly, individuals could be overestimating the ability of regret expressions to bring people together. For this reason, it is important to determine if regret expression strengthens social bonds. Second, although individuals believe regret expression serves a social closeness function, it is unclear how this might occur. That is, are there certain characteristics of regret expressions that drive the formation of stronger social connections? Appraisal theory suggests that each emotional experience can be identified through how individuals appraise a given situation (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1988). That is, each individual emotion has a specific pattern of appraisals associated with it. Regret has appraisals associated with it that are derived from the established definition of regret (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Any or all of these appraisals or characteristics, such as feeling responsible for the present situation or appraising the situation as unpleasant, could drive the increase in social connection afforded by expressing regret. Pinpointing the precise characteristics of regret that allow it to serve a social closeness function can provide greater insight into how regret expressions are able to strengthen social bonds, and could help identify when regrets are more or less likely to be expressed.

Goals of the Present Research The goals of the present research were twofold. First, I examined if regret expressions bring people closer together. Given that people believe that regret expressions serve a social closeness function (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), individuals perceiving a regret expression should feel closer to the person who made the regret expression, and individuals expressing regret socially should feel closer to the recipients of the expression. Although it is possible that only the expresser of regret forms a stronger social bond, the social bonds can only strengthen so much if the recipient does not also feel connected to the expresser. Therefore, it seems more plausible that recipients would also form social connections, especially given people’s

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perceptions of regret expressions (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). Specific to the present research, I formulated the following complementary hypotheses: Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Thinking about a regret expression will increase feelings of social connection in the individual who perceived the regret expression. Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Thinking about a regret expression will increase feelings of social connection in the individual who expressed regret. Second, I examined several characteristics of regret that could be driving the social closeness function of regret expression. Given that I chose characteristics derived from previous research on regret (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Frijda et al., 1989), I believed that one or more of the characteristics of regret would predict social connection and be uniquely related to regret compared to other emotions. Therefore, I believed that one or more of the characteristics would mediate the predicted relationship between regret expressions and social connection. However, I did not have any specific predictions as to which characteristics would mediate the relationship. I examine these questions through three studies. Studies 1a and 1b test Hypothesis 1a, examining if expressing regret serves a social closeness function from the perspective of the recipient of the regret expression. Study 2 tests Hypothesis 1b, examining this relationship from the perspective of the expresser. Additionally, in line with the second major question, all three studies also examine several characteristics of regret and their relationship with feelings of social connection. Combined, these studies provide new insight into the social functionality of expressions of regret. Study 1 The goal of Study 1 was to test the hypothesis that expressions of regret bring people closer together. As mentioned earlier, research has established that people believe regret expressions serve a social closeness function (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). However, it is unclear if expressions of regret strengthen social bonds, and if so, if this change is greater than that of other emotional expressions. Study 1 examines this social closeness function from the perspective of the recipient of the regret expression. Research has yet to examine the impact that expressions of regret have on the recipients of these expressions. However, if regret expressions bring individuals closer together, recipients should also feel a stronger social connection to the individual that expresses regret. Thus, the primary goal of Study 1a is to determine if recipients of regret expressions form a stronger social connection to expressers of regret than baseline, or than other emotional expressions. Additionally, I also wanted to examine possible mechanisms of this social closeness function. If regret strengthens social bonds, then certain characteristics of regret expressions should encourage this connection. That is, a regret expression should be more likely to serve a social closeness function the more it has these certain characteristics. I examined four different qualities or characteristics of regret that could facilitate social connection. First, expressing regret often requires a person to disclose more information than they typically would in a normal conversation. People often feel more connected to others the more information they have about them, and simply disclosing personal information about oneself could strengthen social bonds (see Collins & Miller, 1994). Second, providing more information

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about the situation or decision-making process could encourage social connection. Similar to disclosing information about the self, divulging the exact thought process underlying behavior could help individuals understand the person’s actions, and make the person more relatable. Being able to better understand a situation or someone’s behaviors should in turn facilitate connection. Third, focusing on the negative feelings or ramifications of regret could encourage others to connect with them socially. A person exhibiting humility or frailty can often be seen in a positive light. The pratfall effect suggests that good people are liked more when they make a mistake, making them appear more human or more relatable (Aronson, Willerman, & Floyd, 1966). Furthermore, individuals often respond to displays of certain negative emotions with different forms of connection, such as helping or comforting. Because regret is a negative emotion (Frijda et al., 1989; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), it could have a similar impact. Finally, having a focus both on self-agency and future behaviors could encourage social connection. Admitting that one has made mistakes and is willing to do something about it is an adaptive mindset that might facilitate interactions. Portrayal of personal growth could make someone appear more confident, and can be perceived as a positive quality. Regret is not only driven by thoughts of personal agency (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), but can also encourage learning and preparing for the future (Roese, 1994; Zeelenberg, 1999). Therefore, Study 1 attempts not only to examine whether or not regret expressions serve a social closeness function, but also attempts to determine what qualities of regret expression might drive this function. After identifying an individual, participants were asked to recall and write about a time that the person they identified expressed an emotion to them. Participants were randomly assigned to think about a regret expression, negative expression, positive expression, or no expression at all. Participants then rated how close they currently felt towards the individual, and then participants in the expression conditions were asked to rate how prominent each characteristic was during the expression. Additionally, participants completed a measure of trait-level empathy (Davis, 1980). Given that empathy has strong associations with social connections and behaviors (e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), I wanted to account for individual differences in the tendency to connect with others when examining the characteristics of regret. I therefore used this measure of empathy as a covariate in some of the analyses. Using past research as a guide (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), I predicted that individuals who had regret expressed to them would feel closer to the individual than participants in the negative and control conditions. Comparisons to the positive condition were more exploratory, as were examinations of how the characteristics of regret related to ratings of closeness.

Study 1a Method. A total of 148 introductory psychology students (87 female) participated as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants entered the lab space and sat in front of individual computers in individual cubicles. Participants were first asked to identify an individual to whom they are moderately close and with whom they have regular interactions. I wanted participants to identify an individual with whom they had no pre-existing strong feelings towards; however I also wanted participants to be able to easily recall a past interaction that coincided with the type of emotional expression condition they would be randomly assigned to. Specifically, participants were presented with the following instructions:

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“First, we would like you to take a moment to think about an individual in your life who you interact with frequently, but do not consider an extremely close friend. Think of a person who you are moderately close to. However, make sure that you are thinking of a person with whom you have had many interactions.” Participants were then asked to write the initials of this individual in the provided textbox. This information was used to identify the individual in subsequent instructions/questions as a way of reminding the participant. Participants were then randomly assigned to condition. Participants were asked to either recall and write about a time in which the individual they identified expressed regret to them (regret expression condition), expressed a negative emotion to them (negative expression condition), or expressed a positive emotion to them (positive expression condition). The exact instructions are listed in the Appendix. A fourth subset of the participants did not complete this recall task at all (control condition). Participants in the first three conditions were asked to describe not only the content of the emotional expression, but the characteristics of the interaction with the individual expressing the emotion. After this, all participants were asked to rate how close they felt to the individual they identified. They first completed a 4-item measure of closeness (e.g., “I feel close to [the person]”) and rated how much they agreed with each statement (7-point Likert scale; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). Participants then completed an item assessing inclusion of other in self (IOS). All five questions were combined into a single measure of closeness (α = .91). The participants who wrote about a situation in which an emotion was expressed to them were additionally asked a separate set of questions. Specifically, they were asked to identify the presence of several characteristics in the emotional expression. Four subsets of characteristics were derived from established characteristics of regret: disclosing personal information (α = .72; e.g., “[The person] talked about personal information that he or she might not typically share with me.”), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (α = .67; e.g., “[The person] thoroughly described the precise details of the situation to me.”), expressing negativity and appearing humble (α = .28; e.g., “[The person] experienced negative feelings as a result of the situation.”), and assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (α = .64; e.g., “[The person] mentioned that he or she was responsible for the situation.”). Participants were presented with four items related to each subset of characteristics (see Appendix), and participants rated whether or not each of the characteristics was present in the emotional expression they described (7-point Likert scale; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). Because the scale reliability of the negativity and humility items was unacceptably low, I also examined the negativity (2 items; r = .35; α = .52) and humility (2 items; r = .43; α = .60) characteristics separately. To ensure that other qualities of the recalled expressions were not impacting ratings of closeness, participants in the emotional expression conditions also answered several questions assessing other possibly confounding characteristics of the expression. Specifically, they reported how common the situation was, how common the emotional expression was, how easily they could relate to the situation, how easily they could relate to the emotional expression, how appropriate the emotional expression was, how extreme the emotional expression was, and how sincere the emotional expression was (see Appendix). Each item was assessed using a 7-point

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Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). Finally, all participants completed the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), a 30-item measure of interpersonal reactivity (see Appendix). The empathic concern subscale (7 items; α = .77) was used as a covariate in several analyses. Participants rated the extent to which they resonated with several interpersonal scenarios (7-point Likert scale; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). Participants completed several demographic questions and were then debriefed and thanked for their time. Results. Expression Condition. I predicted that participants in the regret condition would report higher ratings of closeness towards the individual they identified compared to the other conditions. To examine the impact of condition on feelings of closeness, I conducted a One-Way ANOVA comparing ratings of closeness across conditions (Figure 1). Although the omnibus test was not significant, F(3, 144) = 2.09, p = .10, planned contrasts between the regret condition and each of the other three condition suggested that participants in the regret expression condition reported feeling less close to an individual than participants in the control condition, t(144) = 2.00, p = .05. Additionally, those in the regret expression condition did not report higher ratings of closeness than those in the negative expression condition, t(144) = 0.22, p = .83 or the positive expression condition, t(144) = 1.02, p = .31. These findings run counter to our initial prediction that people would feel closer to individuals who have expressed regret to them. Expression Characteristics. I next explored possible connections between the characteristics of emotional expression and feelings of closeness. First, I compared the mean- levels of each expression characteristic across conditions (Table 1). Not surprisingly, expressions of regret were rated as having higher levels of negative emotion, t(106) = 6.78, p < .001, and lower levels of humility, t(106) = 3.11, p < .001, compared to expressions of positive emotions. Also supported by past research, expressions of regret were rated as having higher levels of responsibility and learning from mistakes than expressions of negative emotions, t(106) = 2.97, p < .01. All other characteristic comparisons between regret expressions and the other emotional expressions were non-significant, ts < 1.35, ps > .18. These patterns suggest that participants in each condition were reporting the appropriate emotional expressions. More centrally, I also examined the relationship between the characteristics of the emotional expression and feelings of closeness. Overall, each characteristic other than expressing negativity (r = .04, p = .65) had a significant zero-order correlation with closeness: disclosing personal information (r = .29, p < .01), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (r = .35, p < .001), assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (r = .35, p < .001), and appearing humble (r = .38, p < .001). However, when regressing all four of the characteristics on to closeness, assuming responsibility and learning from the situation was the only characteristic that uniquely predicted feelings of closeness, β = .23, t(106) = 2.34, p = .02. This was the case even when breaking the negativity and appearing humble characteristic into sub-characteristics and including empathic concern as a covariate, β = .19, t(106) = 1.96, p = .05. I then examined the possibly confounding characteristic ratings of the expressions. There were significant differences between conditions in ratings of how relatable the situation was, F(2,105) = 3.86, p = .02, and how appropriate the emotional response was, F(2,106) = 5.84, p < .01. I therefore reanalyzed the data including both as covariates. Assuming responsibility and learning from mistakes was again the best predictor of feelings of closeness, however the relationship was only marginally significant, β = .19, t(106) = 1.86, p = .065.

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Looking solely at expressions of regret, there were no unique predictors of social closeness ratings, and zero-order correlations suggested that all four characteristics were significant predictors of closeness: disclosing personal information (r = .36, p = .03), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (r = .44, p < .01), expressing negativity and appearing humble (r = .38, p = .02), and assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (r = .40, p = .02). Descriptively, this was not the case for expressions of positivity or negativity, as there were differences by condition in the pattern of zero-order correlations between characteristics and feelings of closeness (see Table 1). However, the correlation of each of the characteristics with ratings of closeness did not differ between the regret condition and the other two expression conditions as an aggregate: disclosing personal information (Δr2 < .001, ΔF(2,103) = .006, p = .99), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (Δr2 = .001, ΔF(2,103) = .07, p = .93), expressing negativity and appearing humble (Δr2 = .005, ΔF(2,103) = .31, p = .74), and assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (Δr2 = .007, ΔF(2,103) = .42, p = .66). Study 1b As the results of Study 1a were unexpected, and in the opposite pattern of what was predicted, Study 1b slightly modified Study 1a to try to replicate these findings. These modifications attempted to eliminate possible outside influences or confounds inherent in the design of Study 1a. Although the primary structure, goals, and hypotheses of Study 1b were the same as Study 1a, three meaningful changes were made to the design of the study. First, a different population was utilized to recruit participants. Rather than recruiting undergraduate students from a Midwestern public university, I recruited a much more diverse sample online via Mechanical Turk. Although regret is one of the most frequently mentioned emotions in daily life (Shimanoff, 1984), it is plausible that the (primarily) freshman university student sample didn’t have enough life experiences to be able to effectively recall a time when regret was expressed to them, especially a time when someone they are moderately close to expressed regret to them. By utilizing a more diverse sample with a variety of life experiences, participants may be better able to properly complete the tasks of the study. Second, I slightly modified the emotion expression elicitations used in Study 1a to emphasize writing and thinking about both the content of the expression and the interaction itself. Many of the questions assessing the characteristics of regret focus on the actual expression of the emotional experience rather than just the content of the emotional experience being expressed. This lack of clarification in Study 1a may have discouraged individuals from appropriately responding to some of these items. I have therefore emphasized that participants should be considering both the content of the expression and the expression itself in Study 1b. Lastly, I added a manipulation check after the emotion expression elicitation to ensure that participants were recalling and writing about emotions that were appropriate given the condition they had been randomly assigned to. The reversal of the expected pattern of closeness ratings that we saw in Study 1a could be due to participants in the regret expression condition recalling and writing about emotions other than regret, and participants in the negative expression condition recalling and writing about regret. The manipulation check gives me the ability to ensure that unintended emotion expression recalls are not influencing the data.

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As in Study 1a, I hypothesize that individuals who had regret expressed to them would feel closer to the individual than participants in the negative and control conditions. Due to the limitations of Study 1a, the comparisons to the positive condition and examinations of how the characteristics of regret related to ratings of closeness were again exploratory. Method. A total of 101 individuals (39 female) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk worker pool (http://www.mturk.com). Because of institutional regulations, participation was limited to US workers only. Utilizing this population for psychological research has yielded a more demographically diverse sample than the typical undergraduate population, while still maintaining the reliability of data collected via traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). The procedure was identical to the previous study except for two modifications. Participants were first asked to identify an individual they were moderately close to but have frequent interactions with. Participants were then randomly assigned to condition. Participants were asked to either recall and write about a time in which the individual they identified expressed regret to them (regret expression condition), expressed a negative emotion to them (negative expression condition), or expressed a positive emotion to them (positive expression condition). The elicitation instructions for those in the three emotion expression conditions were modified compared to Study 1a (see Appendix). These instructions placed less of an emphasis on thinking about and describing the situation while also encouraging participants to think and write about both the characteristics of the emotion-eliciting situation and the characteristics of the emotional expression. Additionally, the instructions informed participants that they did not necessarily have to be impacted by the emotion-eliciting situation that was being expressed. A fourth subset of the participants did not complete this recall task at all (control condition). Participants were then asked to identify the emotion that best represented the emotion that was expressed to them. Participants selected one emotion from a list of 13 different positive and negative emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, happiness, regret). This question acted as a manipulation check to ensure that participants were thinking and writing about emotions appropriate for the condition they were assigned to. After this, all participants were asked to rate how close they felt to the individual they identified via the same 5-item measure of closeness that was used in Study 1a (α = .91). After providing ratings of closeness, participants in the three expression conditions answered questions about the characteristics of the expression they wrote about: disclosing personal information (α = .84), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (α = .70), assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (α = .72), expressing negativity (2 items; r = .41; α = .58) and appearing humble (2 items; r = .21; α = .34). These same participants then rated items assessing other possibly confounding characteristics of the expression, similar to Study 1a. Finally, all participants completed the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), with a focus on the empathic concern subscale (7 items; α = .92) for use as a covariate. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time. Results. Expression Condition. I again predicted that individuals in the regret condition would report higher closeness ratings about the person they identified relative to the other conditions. To examine this hypothesis, I conducted a One-Way ANOVA comparing ratings of closeness across conditions (Figure 2). As in Study 1a, the omnibus test was not significant, F(3,

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97) = 0.39, p = .76. However, unlike Study 1a, all of the planned contrasts were not significant: regret vs. control, t(97) = 0.06, p = .95; regret vs. negative, t(97) = 0.86, p = .39; regret vs. positive, t(97) = 0.16, p = .88. Although these data do not suggest that people feel less close to those who express regret (as in Study 1a), these data do support the notion that people do not feel closer to those who express regret. Additionally, I examined the manipulation check question to identify participants who did not follow directions. Specifically, I eliminated participants who did not report recalling and writing about the appropriate emotion for their assigned condition. That is, I eliminated participants in the regret expression condition who reported recalling any emotion other than regret, participants in the negative expression condition who reported recalling any positive emotion or regret, and participants in the positive expression condition who reported recalling any negative emotion. Although 8 total participants were eliminated using this method, the same pattern of results occurred in the reduced sample as in the original sample: F(3, 89) = 0.30, p = .82; regret vs. control, t(89) = 0.21, p = .83; regret vs. negative, t(89) = 0.55, p = .59; regret vs. positive, t(89) = 0.02, p = .98. Expression Characteristics. Finally, I again examined the relationships between the characteristics of emotional expression and feelings of closeness. I first compared the mean- levels of each expression characteristic across conditions (Table 2). Similar to Study 1a, expressions of regret were rated as having higher levels of negative emotion, t(68) = 10.01, p < .001, compared to expressions of positive emotions. However, unlike Study 1a, expressions of regret were not rated as having lower levels of humility, t(68) = 0.61, p = .55. Also similar to Study 1a, expressions of regret were rated as having higher levels of responsibility and learning from mistakes than expressions of negative emotions, t(68) = 4.72, p < .001. However, unlike Study 1a, expressions of regret were rated as having significantly higher levels of negative emotion than expressions of negative emotions, t(68) = 3.06, p < .01. All other characteristic comparisons between the regret expressions and the other emotional expressions were not significant, ts < 1.72, ps > .09. These patterns remained even after eliminating participants who did not report the appropriate emotion for their assigned condition. I then examined the relationship between the characteristics of the emotional expression and feelings of closeness. Only describing the situation and thought processes in detail (r = .32, p < .01) and appearing humble (r = .44, p < .001) had a zero-order correlation with closeness. After regressing all five of the characteristics on to closeness, appearing humble uniquely predicted feelings of closeness, β = .43, t(68) = 3.40, p = .001. Interestingly, when empathic concern was included as a covariate, both appearing humble, β = .36, t(68) = 2.90, p < .01, and describing the situation and thought processes in detail, β = .24, t(68) = 1.97, p = .05, were significant predictors. I then examined the possibly confounding characteristic ratings of the expressions. There were no significant differences between conditions in the ratings of any of the possibly confounding characteristics, Fs < 2.62, ps > .08, therefore none were used as covariates. Similar to Study 1a, I next examined if the pattern of relationships between characteristics and closeness differed by condition. As was the case in Study 1a, there were not significant differences between the regret condition and the other two conditions in the correlation of the characteristics and ratings of closeness: disclosing personal information (Δr2 = .02, ΔF(2,65) = .76, p = .47), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (Δr2 = .01, ΔF(2,65) = .52, p = .60), assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (Δr2 = .03,

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ΔF(2,65) = .99, p = .38), expressing negativity (Δr2 = .06, ΔF(2,65) = 2.07, p = .13), and appearing humble (Δr2 = .003, ΔF(2,65) = .14, p = .87). Discussion The goals of Study 1a and 1b were to examine if recipients of regret expressions feel closer to the people who express regret. The results of the studies suggest that the perceived social closeness function of regret expression is not actually served by expressing regret. Not only did participants in both studies not feel not closer to individuals who expressed regret compared to a baseline condition, but individuals in Study 1a actually felt less close after remembering a time when the other individuals expressed regret. This suggests that, although individuals believe that expressing regret helps bring people together (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), this does not appear to occur after recalling past expressions of regret. Additionally, I wanted to examine the possible characteristics of regret expression that help drive the social closeness function of regret expression. Although I did not find evidence in support of an overall social closeness function for regret in either study, certain characteristics of the expressions were predictive of feeling closer to the person expressing the emotion. In Study 1a, assuming responsibility for the situation and learning from the situation uniquely predicted feeling closer to the person expressing the emotion. Given that regret, more so than negative emotions in general or positive emotions, is characterized by self-agency (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) and learning from past mistakes (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg, Inman, & Pieters, 2001), the presence of this relationship supports the idea that regret expressions foster social connection. These findings are consistent with the possibility that the emotion expression manipulation used in Study 1a might not have been effective. Although those in the regret condition reported higher levels of this characteristic than those in the negative condition, it is possible that some individuals in the negative condition were also reporting instances in which regret was expressed to them, or that individuals in the regret condition were reporting expressions of emotions other than regret. The vague nature of the expression elicitation instructions used in Study 1a may in part account for the reversal of the predicted pattern of closeness ratings found in the data. In Study 1b, appearing humble and describing the situation and thought processes in detail both predicted feeling closer to the person expressing the emotion. The appearance of humility as a significant predictor may in part be due to the increase in mean-levels of the characteristic in regret expression relative to positive expressions compared to Study 1a. This provides tangential, albeit tenuous evidence in support of regret expression as facilitating social connection. Furthermore, the fact that other characteristics were significant predictors in one study but not the other (assuming responsibility for the situation and learning from the situation in Study 1a; describing the situation and thought processes in detail in Study 1b) suggests that strong conclusions cannot yet be drawn about which expression characteristics consistently predict social connection. Due to the moderate to low scale reliabilities for each of the characteristic measures, I examined the 16 items assessing the expression characteristics using a principal components analysis. I wanted to ensure that I was indeed measuring the characteristics I thought I was measuring, and that these characteristics did not group together in an unexpected manner. I

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conducted this analysis on three separate datasets: the data collected from Study 1a, the data collected from Study 1b, and a dataset combining both Studies 1a and 1b. Although there were minor differences in the factor loadings between the three datasets, the overall pattern generally remained the same. A visual inspection of the scree plots for all three analyses suggested the predicted four factor structure. However, after using a Varimax rotation, the items did not fit as neatly into the four factors as I had originally anticipated. Focusing on the analysis of the combined data set (Table 3), there appeared to be one factor devoted to each of the following characteristics: disclosing information, describing the situation and thought processes in detail, and assuming responsibility and learning from mistakes. Instead of measuring both negativity and humility, the fourth factor appeared to solely identify the negative emotionality characteristic. The appearing humble characteristic did not fit into one of the factors, and the two items measuring humility had moderate to low loadings across all of the factors. I therefore modified the item structure of the characteristics using the factor analysis as a guide, and again examined the relationships between the expression characteristics and ratings of closeness (see Tables 4 & 5 for correlations between characteristics and closeness). I first eliminated a low loading item from both the disclosing information (“I feel as though I know more information about [the person] as a result of hearing about this situation.” α = .80) and describing the situation (“I feel as though I know why [the person] did what he or she did because of how the situation was described to me.” α = .69) characteristics. Both characteristics again had zero-order correlations with closeness in Study 1a, however, describing the situation in detail no longer had a zero-order correlation with closeness in Study 1b. Additionally, because the two items assessing humility did not have strong loadings within the four-factor structure, I examined the relationship between closeness ratings and each individual item. In looking at the items, one appeared to assess concepts of humanity (“[The person] appeared more human as a result of the situation.”) and the other concepts of humility (“[The person] appeared to be humbled by the situation.”). Both items had zero-order correlations with closeness in Study 1a and Study 1b (Tables 4 & 5). When all of the new characteristics (along with empathy as a covariate) were regressed onto ratings of closeness, assuming responsibility was once again the unique predictor in Study 1a, however, perceptions of humanity was the unique predictor in Study 1b. Although the findings for the expression characteristics were once again not consistent across Studies 1a and 1b, it is interesting that the characteristic of appearing human was a strong predictor of closeness in Study 1b given that it was not originally identified as an important characteristic. Although some of the other characteristics may be driven by the desire to appear human (e.g., disclosing personal information or appearing humble), it appears that appearing human may be a strong driving force for building social connections above and beyond the other characteristics.

Study 2 Both Study 1a and Study 1b show preliminary evidence that recalling a past expression of regret does not increase feelings of closeness towards the person who expressed the regret. These studies also suggest that expressions of regret might not actually serve a social closeness function as previous research would suggest (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), running counter to the first proposed hypothesis (H1). However, H1 could instead be supported if individuals who think about a time they expressed regret feel closer to the recipients of those regrets. That is, although the recipients might not feel closer (H1a), the expressers might feel closer (H1b). Past research

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on the motivations behind regret expression has focused on the benefits of expressing regret, not the possible benefits of receiving a regret expression (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). That is, people believe that expressing regret serves a social closeness function, but it is unclear if there are any motivations underlying the perception of regret expressions. People may intentionally express regret to connect with another person, however, there may not be any reason to intentionally seek out others who express regret. It is plausible then that individuals who express regret feel closer to others as a result, but, in line with the findings of Studies 1a and 1b, the recipients of regret expressions do not confer any benefit. Therefore, Study 2 focuses on the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Thinking about a regret expression will increase feelings of social connection in the individual who expressed regret. Although the results of Studies 1a and 1b did not support H1a, it is unclear exactly why this was the case. After a closer examination, it is clear that both studies had two primary methodological characteristics that differed from previous research. Each of these differences in design could have accounted for that apparent failure to support previous research on the social function of regret. First, as mentioned earlier, past research on the social closeness function of regret has focused on the beliefs that individuals have about regret expressions, but not whether or not regret expressions actually bring people closer together (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). Therefore, it is possible that individuals believe that regret expressions bring people closer together, while in actuality they have no effect on social connection. Research on affective forecasting has demonstrated that individuals consistently overestimate the emotional impact of behaviors and events (Lam, et al., 2005; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005; Dunn, et al., 2007). This is impact bias has even been demonstrated in cases of anticipated regret (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004). Within the present line of research, individuals may be committing a similar type of affective forecasting error by overestimating the ability of regret expressions to bring people closer together. This discrepancy would therefore suggest that individuals are expressing regret with the expectation of connecting with others but are failing to do so in the process. The past research outlined along with the findings of Studies 1a and 1b thus suggests the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals will expect to feel closer than they actually feel towards others as a result of expressions of regret. Alternatively, regret expressions could instead have a different impact on the recipients of the regret expression compared to the expressers of regret. Past research on the social closeness function of regret has examined this function from the perspective of the expresser, asking participants what function expressing regret serves (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). Studies 1a and 1b, however, examined social connection from the perspective of the recipient of the regret expression. It could therefore be the case that the recipients of expressed regret do not feel closer to others (Studies 1a & 1b), but the people who express the regret do feel closer (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014).

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One plausible reason for this discrepancy is that, unlike the basic emotions, past research has yet to identify facial expression or body postures that coincide with the experience of regret (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; Lewis, 1993). Therefore, it may be difficult for individuals to identify when another person is experiencing, or to a lesser extent expressing, regret. Individuals may believe that expressing regret brings people closer together, and individuals may actually feel closer when they knowingly express regret, but individuals may not feel closer to others expressing regret because they are unable to identify when regret is being expressed. Alternatively, individuals may make negative attributions about people who express regret. Similar to how individuals confer status or certain characteristics onto people who express other negative emotions (Keating, 1985; Keltner & Buswell, 1997), individuals may confer negative characteristics, such as being self-absorbed, onto people who express regret. These negative characteristics may then counteract any social connection that may arise as a result of the regret expression. This discrepancy between expresser and recipient could have any number of consequences, ranging from the relatively harmless (e.g., the expresser feeling closer to the recipient and the recipient remaining blissfully unaware) to the socially undesirable (e.g., the expresser trying to connect to the recipient while the recipient actively dislikes the expresser). The past research outlined along with the findings of Studies 1a and 1b thus suggests an additional competing hypothesis: Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals who express regret will have a stronger social connection towards the recipient of the regret than the recipient will have towards the expresser. The goal of Study 2 is to not only examine if individuals who express regret feel closer to the people they express regret to, but to also disentangle the two competing hypotheses attempting to account for the unexpected findings of Study 1. I used a modified version of the previous studies to address these two important questions. Participants again identified an individual and then recalled and wrote about an emotional experience (or none at all) that they had expressed, rather than an emotional experience they had been a recipient of. I then measured expectations and actual outcomes related to the social connections of both them and the other individual. That is, participants were asked how connected participants expected to feel going in to the expression, how connected they felt after, how connected they believe the other individual expected to feel, and how connected they believe the other person felt as a result. Each of the hypotheses outlined specific to Study 2 would be supported by different patterns of how individuals respond to these questions about expectations and actual outcomes of regret expressions. In order for H2 to be supported, there should be a discrepancy between the expectations of closeness and the actual closeness experienced. This discrepancy could arise in ratings of how close the participant feels to the other person and/or ratings of how close the participant believes the recipient feels towards him/her. In order for H3 to be supported, there should be a discrepancy between how close the participant feels and how close the participant believes the recipient feels. This discrepancy could arise in ratings of expected closeness and/or actual closeness. Additionally, in support of H1b, given that regret serves a social closeness function more so than other negative emotions (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), I predict that individuals in the regret expression condition will report a stronger social connection towards the other person, and a belief that the other person holds a stronger social connection to them, relative to individuals in the negative expression condition. Method

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A total of 130 introductory psychology students (61 female) participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The procedure was similar to Study 1a but with a few important modifications. Participants were first asked to identify an individual they were moderately close to but have frequent interactions with. Participants were then randomly assigned to condition. Instead of thinking about a time when the participants had something expressed to them, participants were asked to recall and write about a time in which they either expressed regret (regret expression condition) or a negative emotion (negative expression condition) to the person they identified. The elicitation instructions for those in the emotion expression conditions were more similar to Study 1b than Study 1a, and placed less of an emphasis on thinking and describing the situation (see Appendix). A third subset of the participants did not complete this recall task at all (control condition). As a manipulation check, participants were then asked to identify the emotion that best represented the emotion that was expressed to them. Participants selected one emotion from a list of 13 different positive and negative emotions. After this, all participants were asked to rate how close they felt to the individual they identified via the same 5-item measure of closeness that was used in the previous two studies (α = .87). After providing ratings of closeness, participants in the three expression conditions answered questions about some of the expectations they had going into the interaction, and actual outcomes of the interaction (see Appendix). Specifically, participants were asked how close they expected to feel to the other person as a result of the expression (3 items; α = .85), how close they expected the other person to feel towards them as a result of the expression (3 items; α = .93), how close they actually felt towards the other person after the expression (3 items; α = .90), and how close the other person actually felt towards them after the expression (3 items; α = .91). Participants rated how much they agreed with each statement (7-point Likert scale; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). Participants in the expression conditions then answered slightly modified questions about the characteristics of the expression they wrote about (see Appendix), grouped into clusters as determined by the factor analysis described in Study 1: disclosing personal information (α = .85), describing the situation and thought processes in detail (α = .64), expressing negative emotion (2 items; r = .17; α = .28), appearing humble, appearing human, and assuming responsibility and learning from the situation (α = .57). Importantly, both the correlation and Cronbach’s alpha for the negative emotion measure were unacceptably low, therefore these results should be interpreted with caution. These same participants then rated items assessing other possibly confounding characteristics of the expression, slightly modified from the items included in Study 1a and Study 1b (see Appendix), Finally, all participants completed the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), with a focus on the empathic concern subscale (7 items; α = .78) for use as a covariate. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time. Results Expression Condition. Similar to the previous studies, I first examined the overall hypothesis of the research, that individuals in the regret condition should report higher levels of closeness towards the person they identified relative to other conditions. I conducted a One-Way

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ANOVA comparing the 5-item measure of current feelings of closeness across conditions (Figure 3). As in Studies 1a and 1b, the omnibus test was not significant, F(2, 127) = 0.52, p = .60. Similar to Study 1b, both planned contrasts were not significant: regret vs. control, t(127) = 0.38, p = .71; regret vs. negative, t(127) = 1.01, p = .31. These data complement the pattern found in Study 1b, suggesting that people who express regret do not feel closer to the recipients of the expression. Examining the manipulation check, only 18% of the participants in the regret expression condition (8 out of 44 participants) identified their responses as regret expressions. This suggests that the manipulation failed and individuals in the regret expression condition were not actually reporting expressions of regret. Because eliminating these participants from the regret expression condition would leave the condition underpowered compared to the other conditions, further data analysis did not use the manipulation check to eliminate participants. However, all analyses examining differences between conditions should be interpreted with extreme caution. Expectations and Actual Closeness Perceptions. I next examined the two hypotheses specific to Study 2: if individuals believed regret expressions foster social connection more than it actually does (H2) or if expressers of regret form a stronger social connection than recipients of regret expression (H3). First, I conducted a mixed models ANOVA to examine the three-way interaction between expression condition (regret vs. negative emotion), rating type (expected vs. actual), and perspective (expresser vs. recipient), and the two-way interactions (Figure 4). H2 would predict a significant condition by rating type interaction whereas H3 would predict a significant condition by perspective interaction. Neither the three-way interaction nor any of the two-way interactions were significant; three-way: F(1, 86) = 1.94, p = .17; condition X rating type: F(1, 86) = 2.15, p = .15; condition X perspective: F(1, 86) = 0.78, p = .38; rating type X perspective: F(1, 86) = 0.05, p = .83. The non-significant interactions do not support either H2 or H3. Although the interactions were not significant, I next conducted multiple paired-samples t-tests to more directly examine the proposed hypotheses. Overall, there were no significant differences between the expectations of closeness and actual outcomes of closeness in the regret expression condition, expresser: t(43) = 0.28, p = .78; recipient: t(43) = 0.96, p = .34, or the negative expression condition, expresser: t(43) = 0.80, p = .43; recipient: t(43) = 1.89, p = .07. These findings do not support the proposed hypothesis that expectations and outcomes would differ in reports of social closeness (H2). Similarly, there were no significant differences between participant expectations/outcomes and their beliefs about recipient expectations/outcomes in the regret expression condition, expectations: t(43) = 0.39, p = .70; actual closeness: t(43) = 0.83, p = .41, or the negative expression condition, expectations: t(43) = 0.10, p = .92; actual closeness: t(43) = 1.21, p = .24. These findings also do not support the proposed hypothesis that those who express regret and recipients of regret expressions would differ in feelings of social closeness (H3). I also conducted multiple independent-sample t-tests in order to examine possible differences between conditions on each of these measures. Participants in the regret expression condition reported that they expected to feel closer to the other person, t(86) = 2.19, p = .03, and that they expected the other person to feel closer to them, t(86) = 2.19, p = .03, compared to those in the negative expression condition. However, I did not see the same differences by

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condition for reports of actual feelings of closeness in the participant, t(86) = 1.08, p = .28, or actual feelings of closeness in the other individual, t(86) = 0.38, p = .71. Expression Characteristics. Additionally, I again explored possible connections between the characteristics of emotional expression and feelings of closeness. I first compared the mean-levels of each expression characteristic across conditions (Table 6). Similar to Study 1b, expressions of regret were rated as having higher levels of negative emotion than expressions of negative emotions, t(86) = 2.64, p = .01. However, unlike Studies 1a and 1b, expressions of regret were not rated as having significantly higher levels of responsibility and learning from mistakes than expressions of negative emotions, t(86) = 1.22, p = .23. All other characteristic comparisons between conditions were non-significant, ts < 1.73, ps > .09. I next examined the relationship between the characteristics of the emotional expression and participant feelings of closeness towards the other individual (Table 7). Only disclosing personal information (r = .27, p = .01), expressing negative emotion (r = .25, p = .02), and appearing human (r = .28, p < .01) had a zero-order correlation with closeness. After regressing the six characteristics on to closeness, there were no significant unique predictors, βs < .21, ts < 1.69, p > .10. This did not change even after empathic concern was included as a covariate, βs < .18, ts < 1.44, p > .15. I then examined the possibly confounding characteristic ratings of the expressions. There were no significant differences between conditions in the ratings of any of the additional characteristics, Fs < 1.60, ps > .21, therefore none were used as covariates.

Discussion The overarching goals of Study 2 were to examine if individuals who express regret feel closer to the people they express regret to. Complementing the findings of Studies 1a and 1b, and contrary to H1b, participants felt just as close to the recipients of their regret expressions compared to baseline. These findings once again run contrary to what previous research would suggest (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). However, it is important to consider that only 18% of the participants in the regret condition actually recalled and wrote about a time they expressed regret. Therefore, analyses comparing regret expressions to negative expressions or a baseline condition were not actually examining those emotions. These findings should therefore be interpreted with great caution. Additionally, I examined two specific hypotheses that attempted to account for the findings of Study 1 within the context of the existing research (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). First, because prior research focused on how individuals believe regret expression serves a social closeness function and Study 1 examined recollections of actual regret expressions, I predicted that there would be higher closeness ratings for predictions of closeness than actual outcomes of closeness (H2). This hypothesis was not supported by the data. Second, because Study 1 focused on the recipients of regret expression and prior research did not, I hypothesized that expressers of regret would report stronger levels of closeness than the recipients of regret expressions (H2). This hypothesis was also not supported by the data collected. Given the findings of this study, and the failed manipulation, it is still unclear if regret expressions serve a social closeness function as people believe. Importantly, the examination of H2 and H3 depended on participants being able to not only retrospectively recall their anticipated and actual feelings of closeness after an expression of

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regret, but also make assumptions about the anticipated and actual feelings of closeness of the recipient of the regret expression. It is unclear if being were able to do so effectively, and if people were able to differentiate between their (the expresser) feelings expected/actual closeness and the recipient’s actual closeness. I therefore examined the items assessing expected and actual closeness using a principal components analysis to determine if participants were able to differentiate these four concepts. A visual inspection of the scree plot suggested a four factor structure as predicted. However, the items were not divided evenly amongst the factors after using a Varimax rotation. Specifically, all six items assessing actual closeness had high loadings (>.80) on one factor, regardless of whether or not participants were to focus on the expresser or recipient. This suggests that participants might not have been able to mentally separate how they felt after the regret expression from how the recipient felt. Caution should therefore be used when making the claim that expresser and recipient feelings of actual closeness did not differ from one another. However, the data did provide preliminary evidence that regret expression is motivated by a social closeness goal (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). That is, individuals in the regret condition relative to the negative condition expected to feel closer to the recipient of the regret expression as a result of the expression, and also believed that the recipient would feel closer to them as a result of the expression. Although these findings should again be interpreted with caution given the failed manipulation, these data provide additional evidence that individuals are motivated to express regret in order to fulfill goals of social connection. Although I once again examined the characteristics of the emotional expressions, none of them were significant predictors of closeness ratings. This may be in part due to only 18% of the individuals in the regret expression condition actually reporting regret. Because all five of the characteristics identified are associated with regret, and not necessarily with expression of negative emotions more generally, there may have been very few participants who actually expressed emotions strongly characterized by these qualities. In fact, the means of each characteristic in the regret condition were within one standard deviation of the midpoint of the scale, suggesting no strong feelings about the presence or absence of any of these characteristics. This pattern, therefore, may have undermined many of the analyses examining the relationships between the characteristics and closeness ratings.

General Discussion Through three studies, I tested the hypothesis that expressions of regret facilitate social connection in both the recipients of regret expressions (H1a) and the expressers of regret (H1b). All three studies failed to provide evidence supporting these hypotheses, finding that individuals who were asked to think about a past regret expression did not report stronger social connections compared to individuals asked to think about a past negative emotional expression or individuals at baseline. This same pattern arose regardless of whether an individual was the recipient (Study 1) or the expresser (Study 2) of the regret expression. However, individuals believed that regret expressions would bring them closer to others compared to expressions of negative emotion more generally (Study 2). These combined findings suggest that, although individuals believe that expressing regret strengthens social bonds, these expressions do not appear to bring people closer together.

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In examining the situations that individuals in the regret conditions of all three studies described, several patterns emerged. When describing a situation in which regret was expressed to them (Study 1), participants frequently mentioned that the expresser talked about learning from their past mistakes, and several participants even mentioned counterfactual thoughts that the expresser had. These patterns provide evidence that many participants in the regret conditions of Study 1 were reporting expressions of regret. Interestingly, it appears that when participants were successfully recalling a time when regret was expressed to them, they thought about the regret in a similar fashion to someone who was privately experiencing the regret. The PEER model outlines that individuals express regret to connect with other people but experience regret privately in order to learn from past mistakes and draw causal inferences (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). If the recipients of regret expressions are focusing on using counterfactual thoughts to draw causal inferences and learning from past mistakes, they might be motivated by goals similar to those who are privately experiencing regret rather than those who are publicly expressing regret. This would help to explain why recipients of regret expressions do not report a stronger social connection after an expression of regret compared to baseline. Further research should examine how the recipients of regret perceive expressions of regret and whether they are motivated by privately or publicly oriented goals when thinking about the expressed regret. Additionally, in support of the social closeness function of expressing regret, a few participants reported that they tried to comfort the expresser after regret had been expressed, especially after the expresser had disclosed a somewhat personal or heartbreaking regret. In Study 1b, participants who comforted the expresser (M = 5.40) actually reported a stronger social connection than those who did not support the expresser (M = 4.01), t(19) = 2.07, p = .05. It may be the case that regret expressions need a certain social environment to be effective at bringing people closer together. Specifically, the recipient may not only need to be receptive to the regret expression, but also need to comfort or show empathy towards the expresser of the regret. However, only a few participants in these studies willingly reported comforting the expresser of regret, therefore future research should utilize a more direct examination of whether or not a comforting response is required for regret expressions to best facilitate social connection. When describing a situation in which they expressed regret (Study 2), participants described the regrettable situation but focused more on describing the interaction they had with the person they expressed regret to. Additionally, participants generally did not mention learning from mistakes or experiencing a lot of negative emotion. These patterns coincide with the finding that most participants in Study 2 did not self-report that they described a regrettable situation, even when they were in the regret condition. However, these findings are also generally consistent with the PEER model’s conceptualization of the public expression of regret (Summerville & Buchanan, 2014). The private experience of regret, not the expression of regret, should best serve the goal of learning from past mistakes and preparing for the future. Furthermore, people are motivated to express regret in order to connect with other people, and giving more focus to the interaction between them and the recipient of the expression is consistent with that motivation. It could be the case that focusing on the interaction with the recipient could strengthen social bonds when regret is expressed, but could instead build tension when other negative emotions such as anger or disgust are expressed. These distinctions should therefore be examined using a more established manipulation of regret expression.

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Interestingly, the present findings could also be better understood by examining research on affective forecasting and anticipated emotions. Individuals have a tendency to overpredict both the intensity and duration of their own affective reactions to future events, known as the impact or durability bias (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Gilbert & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). These biases are partially driven by focalism, or placing too much emphasis on the future emotionally-laden event without considering other occurrences that might be happening at the same time (Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000; Lam et al., 2005). A similar bias may occur for emotional expressions. Similar to how individuals predict future emotions will have a stronger affective impact than they actually do, individuals may also predict that future emotional expressions will have a stronger affective influence, or more effectively fulfill their goals than they actually do. This could occur because the emotional expression is not as affectively impactful as anticipated, meaning that the actual intensity and duration of the emotion that the individual expresses are muted compared to expectations. If an affectively impactful regret expression is required for it to serve a social closeness function, the affective forecasting literature would therefore predict what was found in Study 2; that individuals are motivated to express regret believing it will foster social connection even though individuals do not end up feeling meaningfully closer to the recipient of the expressed regret. Additionally, given that individuals frequently engage in goal-directed behavior based on how they believe they will feel in the future rather than how they actually feel in the present (Brown & McConnell, 2011), people should continue to express regret in order to connect with others regardless of the actual ability of regret expression to bring people together. Future research could examine how affective forecasting errors might influence expressions of emotion and the subsequent impact that these expressions have on the individuals involved. Limitations Although these findings suggest a discrepancy between how people believe regret expression functions and how it actually functions, there are several issues with the present methodologies that cause some hesitancy about drawing this conclusion. First, the emotional expression manipulation used in Study 2, and to a lesser extent Study 1b, was not effective. After adding a manipulation check starting in Study 1b, several participants in Study 1b did not recall the appropriate emotion, and an unacceptable number of participants (82%) in Study 2 failed to recall and think about the type of emotion they were assigned to write about. It is therefore difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about our hypotheses given that participants were not actually experiencing these emotions. Additionally, the elicitation instructions used in all three studies might not be the most effective way of examining expressions of regret. Originally, the recall design was utilized not only as an initial examination of a relatively new topic, but also to avoid any issues with trying to evoke natural expressions of emotion within a laboratory setting. However, asking participants to recall a time when regret was expressed to them or when they expressed regret to another person may not elicit the same feelings and responses as real-time expressions. Past research has successfully elicited regret by asking participants to think about a time from their past when they experienced regret (e.g., Roese & Summerville, 2005), however it may be less straightforward for expressions of regret. It may be the case that expressions of regret are only impactful in the moment, when they are expressed to another person. By asking individuals to recall, rather than experience, a regret expression, the present research therefore may have missed the point in time

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when the expression had an effect. Additionally, when individuals express regret or have regret expressed to them, they are inevitably interacting with another person. Recalling rather than experiencing one of these expression situations eliminates the actual presence of the other person, and could therefore dampen the possible social closeness function conferred by the expression of regret. Having actual interactions with individuals expressing regret or expressing regret to another person face-to-face might be a better test of whether or not regret expressions serve a social closeness function. There might also have been issues with the way individuals identified the subject of the regret expression recall. In all three studies, participants first identified an individual they were moderately close to but have frequent interactions with. Participants then recalled a past emotion expression involving this individual. I originally separated the identification of the target individual and the emotion expression recall into two separate tasks to ensure that participants were not identifying targets who were significantly different on other characteristics such as baseline levels of closeness or strength of the relationship between the participant and target. However, the instructions may have been so specific that participants were unable to effectively recall a situation that fulfilled the requirements of the study. For example, individuals may have been able to identify a person with whom they are moderately close and have frequent interactions with, but they might not have been able to recall a time they were both present during an expression of regret. This is reinforced by the fact that only 18% of participants in the regret condition of Study 2 actually wrote about a time they expressed regret. The target identification instructions could have therefore undermined the emotion expression manipulation that followed, and people in the regret condition may have been recalling an emotion expression other than regret. Finally, although Study 2 examined both beliefs about regret and actual outcomes of regret expression, the measures used to assess these constructs relied heavily on the ability of the participant to remember how they felt at the time of the expression. People are frequently biased in how they remember past thoughts and behaviors (e.g., hindsight bias, Fischhoff, 1975), and it is likely that participants have memories about both their expectations of the expression and the actual emotional expressions that differ from how the actual expression occurred. These discrepancies could arise not only in the details of the expression but also in the impact the expression had on both the expresser and the recipient. It could be the case that individuals are no longer aware of the positive social impact that the regret expression had when looking back at the expression in retrospect. Furthermore, the factor analyses mentioned earlier suggest that participants were not able to effectively distinguish between how they felt and how the recipients of the regret expression would feel. Therefore, a stronger examination of both expectations of closeness and actual feelings of closeness should come before and after an actual regret expression, respectively.

Future Directions Due to the limitations of the present studies, future research should more directly examine whether or not regret expressions serve a social closeness function. As mentioned earlier, encouraging participants to experience regret and/or express regret directly towards another person would be a more ecologically valid means of examining the social closeness function of regret expression. However, certain considerations should be made when determining how regret is expressed. Specifically, if an experimenter tells an individual to express regret to

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another person, it seems plausible that this type of expression would not function in a similar manner as a naturalistic expression. Recent work in my lab has found that people feel more negatively towards individuals who express insincere regret compared to sincere regret expressions. People directed to express regret in a laboratory setting might therefore not feel closer to others due to regret not serving a social closeness function, but due to the insincerity of the expression. Caution should therefore be taken when designing a study within a laboratory setting. Additionally, it would be interesting to examine if the social closeness function of regret is moderated by the roles that the expresser and recipient play within the regrettable situation. That is, does expressing regret more effectively strengthen social bonds if the expresser is the causal actor during the regrettable situation or if the expresser is discussing someone else’s regrettable situation? Talking in detail about thought processes during the regrettable situation and appearing humble both had significant relationships with closeness ratings in Study 1b. These characteristics should both be more common in regrets expressed by the individual who made the poor decision, suggesting that personally relevant regret expressions should more effectively serve a social closeness goal. However, this finding was not consistent across studies and could be attributed to some of the limitations outlined earlier. An examination of the regret situations that participants wrote about, however, suggests that participants exclusively mentioned regrets in which the expresser was the causal agent. Importantly, it is unclear how common it is to naturally express regrets that other people have rather than one’s own regrets, therefore this distinction may not be ecologically relevant. Furthermore, do feelings of social closeness differ if the recipient of the regret expression was transgressed against as part of the regrettable situation? Preliminary work in my lab has found no evidence that people express regret as a way of apologizing to another person. Furthermore, after examining the regret expression situations that participants wrote about in the present studies, very few participants discussed a time in which they had a regret expressed to them as a form of apology, and none discussed a time in which they expressed regret as a way of apologizing. The few times that participants received a regret expression as a form of apology, the participants wrote about how they felt the expression was insincere. These findings suggest that not only to individuals not express regret to apologize, but when they do it may have a negative impact. More research should be conducted before completely ruling this hypothesis out. Finally, as hinted at earlier, if regret expressions do serve a social closeness function, they could be used as a means of reaffiliation after being socially excluded. Research on social rejection has found that after being rejected, individuals sometimes look to create new social bonds with others (Maner, et al., 2007; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). If regret expressions do serve a social closeness function, then individuals could intentionally express regret to others in order to buffer against the negative feelings associated with social rejection. Furthermore, individuals with a high need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) might be more proficient than individuals with a low need to belong at not only expressing regret but also recognizing when expressions of regret are insincere. Conclusion

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In summary, although people are motivated to express regret in order to fulfill social closeness goals (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008; Summerville & Buchanan, 2014), neither the recipients of regret expressions, nor the individuals who express regret feel closer to the other person when recalling an instance when regret was expressed. Although these findings might suggest that peoples’ beliefs about regret expressions are not consistent with how regret expressions actually function, I am unable to confidently draw this conclusion given the design and limitations of the present studies. However, the findings of these studies do reiterate the importance of researching the impact that expressing regret can have on creating and strengthening social bonds.

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Table 1 Study 1a: Means and Standard Deviations of Expression Characteristics in Each Condition

Expression Characteristic Regret NA PA Disclosing personal information 4.55 (1.35) 4.18 (1.21) 4.34 (1.24) Describing situation & thought process 4.87 (1.08) 4.75 (1.18) 5.09 (0.98) Negativity & humility 4.57 (1.10) 4.25 (1.04) 3.96 (0.92)* Negative emotion 5.11 (1.40) 4.85 (1.41) 2.93 (1.30)* Appearing humble 4.04 (1.22) 3.65 (1.46) 4.99 (1.20)* Assuming responsibility & learning from situation 4.30 (1.31) 3.46 (1.20)* 4.27 (1.13)

Note. Study 1a means and standard deviations of each expression characteristic within each expression condition. Each characteristic was measure via a 7-point Likert scale. NA: Negative expression condition. PA: Positive expression condition. * represents significantly different (p < .05) from the regret condition.

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Table 2 Study 1b: Means and Standard Deviations of Expression Characteristics in Each Condition

Expression Characteristic Regret NA PA Disclosing personal information 5.10 (1.31) 5.23 (1.32) 4.45 (1.17) Describing situation & thought process 4.95 (0.82) 5.15 (1.13) 5.16 (0.84) Negativity & humility 4.93 (0.73) 4.43 (0.94)* 3.45 (0.79)* Negative emotion 5.29 (0.98) 4.32 (1.13)* 2.10 (1.07)* Appearing humble 4.57 (1.25) 4.54 (1.22) 4.78 (1.01) Assuming responsibility & learning from situation 4.62 (1.04) 3.01 (1.19)* 4.42 (1.20)

Note. Study 1a means and standard deviations of each expression characteristic within each expression condition. Each characteristic was measure via a 7-point Likert scale. NA: Negative expression condition. PA: Positive expression condition. * represents significantly different (p < .05) from the regret condition.

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Table 3 Studies 1a & 1b: Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Expression Characteristic Items

Item F1 F2 F3 F4 [The person] disclosed personal information to me. .80 .02 .12 .21 [The person] talked about personal information that he or she .78 .06 -.08 .02 might not typically share with me. I feel as though I know more information about [the person] as a .50 .07 .35 -.09 result of hearing about this situation. [The person] revealed sensitive information about him or herself .82 .05 .15 .18 to me. [The person] talked about the situation as a whole. .26 .15 .63 -.10 [The person] talked about his or her thought process during the -.03 .01 .78 .16 situation. I feel as though I know why [the person] did what he or she did .13 .47 .40 -.22 because of how the situation was described to me. [The person] thoroughly described the precise details of the .16 .14 .76 .13 situation to me. [The person] experienced negative feelings as a result of the .15 -.09 .22 .76 situation. [The person] talked about making a poor decision during the .18 .38 -.04 .71 situation. [The person] appeared to be humbled by the situation. .25 .43 .09 -.50 [The person] appeared more human as a result of the situation. .58 .18 .35 -.27 [The person] mentioned that he or she was responsible for the .05 .77 -.01 .07 situation. [The person] discussed how he or she had learned from the .21 .63 .27 .10 situation. [The person] identified what he or she would do in future .04 .60 .19 .07 situations. [The person] mentioned that he or she had control over the -.07 .70 -.06 -.15 situation.

Note. Studies 1a & 1b factor loadings of each expression characteristic item onto the four factors. High loadings onto a single factor are shown in bold.

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Table 4 Study 1a: Correlations between Expression Characteristics and Ratings of Closeness

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. Disclosing information .37** .33** .23* .54** .26** .28** 2. Describing situation .25** .17 .42** .33** .30** 3. Negative emotion -.19* .07 .11 .04 4. Humility .43** .38** .28** 5. Humanity .29** .36** 6. Assuming responsibility .35** 7. Closeness

Note. Study 1a inter-correlations between each expression characteristic and ratings of closeness. Each characteristic was measured via a 7-point Likert scale. Closeness was measured via four 7- point Likert scale items and the IOS. * p < .05 ** p < .01.

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Table 5 Study 1b: Correlations between Expression Characteristics and Ratings of Closeness

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. Disclosing information .27* .34** .07 .39** .07 .11 2. Describing situation .18 .12 .32** .22 .22 3. Negative emotion -.07 .09 .14 .11 4. Humility .21 .31** .29* 5. Humanity .20 .42** 6. Assuming responsibility .18 7. Closeness

Note. Study 1b inter-correlations between each expression characteristic and ratings of closeness. Each characteristic was measured via a 7-point Likert scale. Closeness was measured via four 7- point Likert scale items and the IOS. * p < .05 ** p < .01.

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Table 6 Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Expression Characteristics in Each Condition

Expression Characteristic Regret NA Disclosing personal information 4.50 (1.49) 4.36 (1.50) Describing situation & thought process 4.72 (1.09) 4.69 (1.06) Negative emotion 4.93 (1.39) 4.23 (1.10)* Appearing humble 3.98 (1.52) 3.66 (1.54) Appearing human 5.00 (1.26) 4.50 (1.46) Assuming responsibility & learning from situation 4.14 (1.08) 3.85 (1.15)

Note. Study 1a means and standard deviations of each expression characteristic within each expression condition. Each characteristic was measure via a 7-point Likert scale. NA: Negative expression condition. * represents significantly different (p < .05) from the regret condition.

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Table 7 Study 2: Correlations between Expression Characteristics and Ratings of Closeness

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 1. Disclosing information .43** .22* .44** .48** .32** .27* 2. Describing situation .38** .26* .43** .37** .20 3. Negative emotion .26* .32** .49** .25* 4. Humility .33** .46** .07 5. Humanity .34** .28** 6. Assuming responsibility .10 7. Closeness

Note. Study 2 inter-correlations between each expression characteristic and ratings of closeness. Each characteristic was measured via a 7-point Likert scale. Closeness was measured via four 7- point Likert scale items and the IOS. * p < .05 ** p < .01.

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7

6

5

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3 Connection to Individual to Connection

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1 Regret Negative Positive Control

Figure 1. Study 1a ratings of closeness towards the other individual identified by the participants earlier in the study. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

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7

6

5

4

3 Connection to Individual to Connection

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1 Regret Negative Positive Control

Figure 2. Study 1b ratings of closeness towards the other individual identified by the participants earlier in the study. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

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3 Connection to Individual to Connection

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1 Regret Negative Control

Figure 3. Study 2 ratings of closeness towards the other individual identified by the participants earlier in the study. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

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Closeness Ratings Closeness 3

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Figure 4. Study 2 ratings of expected closeness (Expect) and actual closeness (Actual) towards the other individual identified by the participants earlier in the study. Ratings are reported for how close the participants felt towards the other individual (Own), and how close the participants believed the other individual felt toward them (Other). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

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Appendix Study 1a Emotion Recall Instructions: Regret Condition: Keeping the person you have just identified in mind, we would now like you to think of a situation from your past in which [the person] expressed regret to you. That is, think of a situation in which you had a conversation with [the person], and [the person] began to talk about a regrettable situation that he or she was a part of. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about not only the characteristics of the conversation you had, but also think about the content of the conversation. Negative Emotion Condition: Keeping the person you have just identified in mind, we would now like you to think of a situation from your past in which [the person] expressed a negative emotion to you. That is, think of a situation in which you had a conversation with [the person], and [the person] began to talk about a negative situation that he or she was a part of. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about not only the characteristics of the conversation you had, but also think about the content of the conversation. Positive Emotion Condition: Keeping the person you have just identified in mind, we would now like you to think of a situation from your past in which [the person] expressed a positive emotion to you. That is, think of a situation in which you had a conversation with [the person], and [the person] began to talk about a positive situation that he or she was a part of. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about not only the characteristics of the conversation you had, but also think about the content of the conversation.

Study 1b Emotion Recall Instructions: Regret Condition: People often think about how the past might have been different. If they had done or said something differently, things might have turned out differently, better than they are now. Please think of an instance when [the person] TOLD YOU about a time that (s)he had felt regret in this way. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about both the characteristics and the content of the conversation you had. Please briefly describe this interaction and the content of the conversation in the text box below.

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Negative Emotion Condition: People often think about their negative experiences, for example, times when they have been hurt, frustrated, or angry. Please think of an instance when [the person] TOLD YOU about a time that (s)he had felt a negative emotion in this way. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about both the characteristics and the content of the conversation you had. Please briefly describe this interaction and the content of the conversation in the text box below. Positive Emotion Condition: People often think about their positive experiences, for example, times when they have been pleased, excited, or content. Please think of an instance when [the person] TOLD YOU about a time that (s)he had felt a positive emotion in this way. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about both the characteristics and the content of the conversation you had. Please briefly describe this interaction and the content of the conversation in the text box below.

Study 2 Emotion Recall Instructions: Regret Condition: People often think about how the past might have been different. If they had done or said something differently, things might have turned out differently, better than they are now. Please think of an instance when YOU TOLD [the person] about a time that you had felt regret in this way. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about both the characteristics and the content of the conversation you had. Please briefly describe this interaction and the content of the conversation in the text box below. Negative Emotion Condition: People often think about their negative experiences, for example, times when they have been hurt, frustrated, or angry. Please think of an instance when YOU TOLD [the person] about a time that you had felt a negative emotion in this way. Take a moment to think about the interaction you had with the person you identified. Think about both the characteristics and the content of the conversation you had. Please briefly describe this interaction and the content of the conversation in the text box below. Study 1 Emotion Expression Characteristic Items:

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Disclosed information: [The person] disclosed personal information to me. [The person] talked about personal information that he or she might not typically share with me. I feel as though I know more information about [the person] as a result of hearing about this situation. [The person] revealed sensitive information about him or herself to me. Described situation or thought process: [The person] talked about the situation as a whole. [The person] talked about his or her thought process during the situation. I feel as though I know why [the person] did what he or she did because of how the situation was described to me. [The person] thoroughly described the precise details of the situation to me. Expressed negativity or humility: [The person] experienced negative feelings as a result of the situation. [The person] talked about making a poor decision during the situation. [The person] appeared to be humbled by the situation. [The person] appeared more human as a result of the situation. Assumed responsibility over the situation: [The person] mentioned that he or she was responsible for the situation. [The person] discussed how he or she had learned from the situation. [The person] identified what he or she would do in future situations. [The person] mentioned that he or she had control over the situation. Study 1 Possibly Confounding Characteristic Items: How sincere was the emotion that [the person] expressed? How extreme was the emotion that [the person] expressed? How common is the situation that was described to you? How easily could you relate to the situation that was described to you? How common is the emotional reaction that [the person] had? How easily could you relate to the emotional reaction that [the person] had? How appropriate was the emotional reaction that [the person] had, given the situation?

Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980): Fantasy Scale When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught up in it. (R) After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.

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I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (R) When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character. Perspective-Taking Scale Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments. (R) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (R) I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. Empathic Concern Scale When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. (R) I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. (R) Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (R) I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. Personal Distress Scale When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (R) Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (R) I tend to lose control during emergencies. Study 2 Expectations/Actual Closeness Questions: Expectations of how close self feels Going in to the conversation, I expected to feel closer to [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. Going into the conversation, I expected to feel more connected to [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. Going into the conversation, I expected to have a stronger bond with [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. Expectations of how close other feels

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Going in to the conversation, I expected [the person] to feel closer to me as a result of talking about that situation. Going into the conversation, I expected [the person] to feel more connected to me as a result of talking about that situation. Going into the conversation, I expected [the person] to have a stronger bond with me as a result of talking about that situation. How close self actually feels I felt closer to [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. I felt more connected to [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. I had a stronger bond with [the person] as a result of talking about that situation. How close other actually feels I believe that [the person] felt closer to me as a result of talking about that situation. I believe that [the person] felt more connected to me as a result of talking about that situation. I believe that [the person] had a stronger bond with me as a result of talking about that situation.

Study 2 Emotion Expression Characteristic Items: Disclosed information: I disclosed personal information to [the person]. I talked about personal information that I might not typically share with other. I feel as though [the person] knows more information about me as a result of hearing about this situation. I revealed sensitive information about myself to [the person]. Described situation or thought process: I talked about the situation as a whole. I talked about my thought process during the situation. I feel as though [the person] knows why I did what I did because of how I described the situation. I thoroughly described the precise details of the situation to [the person]. Expressed negativity or humility: I expressed the negative feelings I experienced as a result of the situation. I talked about making a poor decision during the situation. I expressed feeling humbled by the situation. I believe I appeared more human to [the person] as a result of me describing the situation. Assumed responsibility over the situation: I mentioned that I was responsible for the situation. I discussed how I had learned from the situation. I identified what I would do in similar situations in the future. I mentioned that I had control over the situation.

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Study 2 Possibly Confounding Characteristic Items: How sincere was the emotion that you expressed? How extreme was the emotion that you expressed? How common is the situation that you described? How easily do you believe others could relate to the situation that you described? How common is the emotional reaction that you had? How easily do you believe others could relate to the emotional reaction that you had? How appropriate was the emotional reaction that you had, given the situation??

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