MEETING Authority AGENDA ITEM 17
MEETING DATE 21 September 2006 DOCUMENT NUMBER FEP 925 SUBJECT London Assembly 7 July Review Committee
REPORT (13.09.06) by The Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning.
Summary
The Authority was provided with an interim position in response to the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee report at its meeting on 22nd June 2006 (FEP 865). The Review Committee has invited detailed responses to be submitted by 30th September 2006. This report provides a detailed response to the Report for submission to the Review Committee.
Officers have also been requested to attend the Review Committee at its meeting scheduled to take place on 22 November 2006.
Recommendation
That the report be received and the Authority agrees the response contained with appendix A which will be forwarded to the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee by way of response to their report.
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Contents
INTRODUCTION...... 2 APPENDIX A - DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE LONDON ASSEMBLY 7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE..... 4 INTRODUCTION...... 4 TERMS OF REFERENCE ...... 4 REVIEW REPORT PUBLICATION PROCESS...... 4 FINDINGS OF THE REPORT...... 5 REPORT OF THE 7 JULY COMMITTEE – VOLUME 1 ...... 7 THE FIRST HOUR – ESTABLISHING WHAT HAD HAPPENED...... 7 THE FIRST HOUR – SITE BY SITE...... 10 ALDGATE...... 10 EDGWARE ROAD ...... 10 KING’S CROSS/ RUSSELL SQUARE...... 11 TAVISTOCK SQUARE ...... 13 THE FIRST HOUR – RESCUE AND TREATMENT OF THE INJURED ...... 14 CONCLUSIONS (7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT)...... 14 VOLUME 2 – VIEWS AND INFORMATION FROM ORGANISATIONS ...... 15 VOLUME 3 – VIEWS AND INFORMATION FROM INDIVIDUALS ...... 15
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INTRODUCTION
1. On 7th July 2005 the first suicide bomb attacks were carried out on the UK mainland. These events were anticipated as inevitable under the current threat climate and London Fire Brigade had been in preparation for this for a number of years. Over the preceding four years an extensive range of new vehicles, equipment, procedures, policies and training have been introduced to help us respond to this new threat. Lessons learned from previous incidents have been implemented and we continue to develop our response capability for terrorist events in the future.
2. Following the tragic events of 7th July 2005 the London Fire Brigade has fully engaged with the multi- agency debriefing and review process that has taken place.
3. In addition the Greater London Assembly set up a 7 July Review Committee chaired by Richard Barnes.
4. The terms of reference of the Review Committee were as follows:
To review and report with recommendations on lessons to be learned from the response to 7 July bomb attacks:
• How information, advice and support was communicated to Londoners,
• How business continuity arrangements worked in practice,
• The role of Broadcasting Services in communication,
• The use of Information and Communication Technology to aid in the response process
5. Evidence to the Review Committee was sought and provided by officers. The evidence included the attendance at a Committee hearing; a full written submission and providing supplementary questions from the Committee Chair. The Review Committee published its report at a media launch on 5 June 2006.
6. The Authority received an initial response to the 7 July Committee at its meeting on 22 June 2006 (FEP 865).
7. Concern was previously expressed to the Authority that (unlike the Parliamentary Select Committee process) the Review Committee did not provide officers the opportunity to check the accuracy and context of the evidence provided. In addition LFEPA received the report as it was placed on general public release which hindered our ability to check the report for accuracy and provide a detailed response to the concerns raised at the media launch.
8. The Review Committee has announced that the publication of its report does not represent the conclusion of its work. Responses to the report are invited (by 30 September 2006) and the Committee have stated that they intend to request progress reports against their recommendations in November 2006 and May 2007.
9. Attached at Appendix A is the proposed response to the 7 July Review Committee. The responses have been restricted to those points and findings on which the Authority wishes to express a view together with the report publication process previously reported to the Authority.
10. In addition officers have accepted an invitation to attend the 7 July Review Committee meeting scheduled to be held on 22 November 2006 to update the Committee on the outstanding matters raised.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
11. It is recommended that this report be received and the Authority agrees the response contained in appendix A which will be forwarded to the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee.
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APPENDIX A - DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE LONDON ASSEMBLY 7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE
INTRODUCTION
1. We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the findings of the report produced by the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee and look forward to having the opportunity to provide further comment for the November 2006 Review Committee update.
2. Following the tragic events of 7th July 2005 London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority officers have fully engaged with the multi-agency debriefing and review process. We have also provided information to the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee as well as to the London Regional Resilience Forum.
3. We are fully committed to the implementation of ‘lessons learned’ from incidents and exercises. We recognise the value in the early identification of lessons and continue to learn from such challenges to improve the service which we provide to Londoners
4. We acknowledge that the fire and rescue service should be and is, accountable to the communities which we serve. LFEPA has fully engaged with the Review Committee, to produce this full and honest response to the report.
5. We are rightly proud of the professionalism and conduct of LFEPA staff, both those involved in planning and preparing for such attacks as happened on 7 July 2005 and those who responded on the day.
6. For the purposes of this response, any point or finding numbers shown in bold type refer to the report of the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee.
7. Where the Review Committee’s findings make recommendations for response by other agencies no comments on the findings are made.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
8. The 7 July Review Committee has produced a report under the following terms of reference:
9. To review and report with recommendations on lessons to be learned from the response to 7 July bomb attacks:
• How information, advice and support was communicated to Londoners,
• How business continuity arrangements worked in practice,
• The role of Broadcasting Services in communication,
• The use of Information and Communication Technology to aid in the response process.
REVIEW REPORT PUBLICATION PROCESS
10. At its meeting held on 22 June the Authority noted that the publication process adopted by the
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Review Committee hindered officers ability to check the contents of the report for accuracy and to provide early detailed response to the concerns raised in the media launch.
11. LFEPA received the report as it was placed on general public release whilst it is understood that the report was issued to the media prior to the press conference to facilitate reporting arrangements.
12. If a process similar to a Parliamentary Select Committee had been adopted it would have permitted officers to comment on the accuracy and context of the evidence submitted. It would also have allowed the Authority to receive the report 24 hours prior to official publication to permit constructive comment to be made.
FINDINGS OF THE REPORT
13. Finding 5: We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on the rollout of digital radio systems within their services in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor progress towards full implementation of TETRA-based radio communications across London’s emergency services.
14. As part of the Department for Communities and Local Government national Firelink project the London Fire Brigade is planned to go live on the Airwave digital TETRA system third quarter 2008. LFEPA is also making an interim procurement of radios for some specialist staff by September 2006.
15. Finding 7: We recommend that emergency plans be amended so that, when an incident takes place in an Underground tunnel, the emergency services are deployed to the stations closest to the train in either direction.
16. This is existing practice within London Fire Brigade for which there are existing procedures and a pre- determined attendance for such incidents. However, it should be noted that the station closest to the incident may be identified without the line on which the incident is taking place being identified and there are frequently multiple lines running through the station. It is therefore not always possible to correctly identify at an early stage which station to mobilise a split-attendance to. At points 2.37 (Aldgate) and 2.53 (King’s Cross), the Review Committee acknowledge that London Fire Brigade despatched a split pre-determined attendance for these incidents. Since the events of the 7th July the London Fire Brigade, in conjunction with London Underground have introduced Unique Reference Numbers (URN’s) for all of the underground network. These enable the correct attendance to be identified for each of the locations in order that the correct split attendance is identified and automatically populated into the mobilising system thereby improving accuracy and attendance time. This will be available when the call is received from the London Underground control room and it will always ultimately require an operational decision following a dynamic risk assessment by the officers at the scene to determine the actual deployment of resources.
17. Finding 12: We recommend that the London Resilience Forum review the protocols for declaring a major incident to ensure that, as soon as one of the emergency services declares a major incident, the others also put major incident procedures in place. This could increase the speed with which the emergency services establish what has happened and begin to enact a co-ordinated and effective emergency response.
18. Major Incident Procedure has been previously jointly agreed and outlined in the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual which states that ‘Despite the fact that what is a major incident to one of the emergency services may not be so to another, each of the other emergency services will attend with an appropriate pre-determined response.’ Consequently, each of the emergency services is notified by the others that a Major Incident (by that service) has been declared and each will send an appropriate response. London Fire Brigade communicates directly with the Incident Commander at
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the scene to determine what the appropriate Brigade response is.
19. Finding 14: Members of the London Resilience Forum should put in place regular checks to ensure that key senior officers are equipped with ACCOLC-enabled mobile phones. We request that the emergency and transport services provide us with details of their plans to conduct such reviews, showing what will be done, and how frequently, to ensure that the technology can actually be effectively used if necessary.
20. London Fire Brigade regularly reviews ACCOLC distribution as a part of its operational readiness to ensure that key senior officers are equipped with ACCOLC-enabled mobile phones. The information requested will be available to the Review Committee at its meeting in November.
21. Finding 20: We recommend that the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel review its emergency plans with a view to identifying a lead agency for maintaining accurate records of the response to major incidents. At each scene, there should be a nominated individual who is responsible for carrying out this task.
22. This finding recommends that one person should be responsible to maintain records for all agencies at major incidents. This recommendation is not considered to be operationally practical. Decision making and event logging are part of the existing operational practices and an incident ‘observer’ would be unable to effectively capture this information accurately to add value to either the response or subsequent investigations.
23. Finding 22: We recommend that London’s emergency plans be revised to include an explicit provision for communication with people affected by a major incident as soon as possible after the arrival of emergency or transport service personnel at the scene.
24. This should be referred to the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel who may consider inclusion in the LESLP manual.
25. Finding 30: We recommend that London Underground Limited, train operating companies and Transport for London identify, in consultation with local authorities and the emergency services, at least two potential survivor reception centres close to Tube stations, overground rail stations and major bus stations in central London. They should then liaise with the owners/occupiers of those sites and involve them in emergency planning processes and exercises.
26. We suggest that this finding is considered by the London Regional Resilience Forum.
27. Finding 33: We recommend that the London Resilience Forum coordinate a review across the emergency services of protocols for identifying survivors of major incidents and ensuring that their names, once taken, are passed on to the Casualty Bureau and receiving hospitals.
28. We will participate in the London Regional Resilience Forum review; however we have some doubts about the practicality of the finding, not least as many survivors will have left the scene of major incidents before the arrival of responding emergency services.
29. Finding 34: We recommend that future resilience exercises include senior representatives from the media as participants rather than simply as observers.
30. It is recommended that this finding is considered by the LRRF Exercise Working Group and the London Media Emergency Forum.
31. Finding 44: We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with the London Media Emergency Forum, produce a guidance document on the establishment and running of an Version 8 6
effective media centre that meets the needs of the media, building on the lessons to be learnt from their experience on 7 July.
32. We will support the production of this guidance document, providing assistance where necessary through our membership of the London Media Emergency Forum.
33. Finding 45: We recommend that the London Regional Resilience Forum work with local authorities and business organisations to produce a standard communications package to facilitate effective communications between local authorities and businesses. We request that the London Resilience Forum provide us with an update on progress by November 2006.
34. We will support the production of this package through our membership of the London Media Emergency Forum and through our Emergency Planning role providing assistance to local authorities.
REPORT OF THE 7 JULY COMMITTEE – VOLUME 1
35. This section responds point-by-point to the comments made in Volume 1 of the report.
36. Point 1.5. ‘…this was the first time that London’s emergency plans – which had been completely recast following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 – had been put comprehensively to the test.’
37. The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure has been the agreed and practised multi-agency procedure for major incidents occurring in London developed over three decades. Following the events of 11th September 2001 in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania, we reviewed our strategic emergency planning and validated the major incident procedure through incidents and exercises. We are fully engaged with the London Regional Resilience Forum and participate in the sub-committees and working groups.
38. Point 1.17. ‘We argue in this report that London’s emergency plans should be re-cast from the point of view of people involved in a major or catastrophic incident, rather that focusing primarily on the point of view of each emergency service. A change of mindset is needed to bring about the necessary shift in focus, from incidents to individuals, and from processes to people.’
39. To successfully respond to a major or catastrophic incident it is important that procedures are in place to enable the Brigade to safely effect rescue and protect members of the public. These processes are implemented on a daily basis at incidents attended by the fire and rescue service and are brought together in a combined response when responding to large incidents.
THE FIRST HOUR – ESTABLISHING WHAT HAD HAPPENED.
40. Point 2.17. ‘Communications from the trains to the London Underground Network Control Centre and the emergency services were inadequate or non-existent on 7 July. As a result, transport and emergency service workers had to run from the train to the platforms and back again to communicate with their colleagues and supervisors.’
41. London Fire Brigade personnel are able to communicate with each other from platform to surface level. Between the platform and the train it is possible to continue the functionality of hand held radios through the utilisation of UHF repeaters. They are carried on each of the Brigade’s fire Command Units. We therefore have the capability to do this at five separate sites. A sound operational decision was taken by the incident commanders that the communication arrangements were sufficient to respond to the incident. The use of people conveying information from the platform to the train is an operationally safe and effective method of communication and this was used
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effectively on the day.
42. Point 2.19. ‘On arrival at the affected trains, emergency services personnel sought to establish what had happened, and needed to immediately communicate this information back to their control centres. The British Transport Police is the only emergency service equipped with radios that can function underground. All the other emergency services had to rely on individuals running back and forth from the train to the platform and from the platform to ground level, or use British Transport Police radios.’
43. London Fire Brigade hand held radios also operate from surface to platform level at all Section 12 London Underground stations utilising an infrastructure supplied and maintained by London Underground. London Fire Brigade Command Units carry UHF repeaters which are capable of extending radio coverage into the running tunnels.
44. Point 2.20. ‘At Russell Square, the ‘leaky feeder’ cable that enables the British Transport Police’s radios to function was damaged by the blast. Emergency and transport services personnel were therefore unable to communicate with their colleagues at ground level without making the 15 – minute journey back down the tunnel to the platform. A solution in the form of a temporary leaky feeder cable was installed…’
45. See 43 above.
46. Point 2.22. ‘CONNECT will enable emergency services equipped with TETRA-based radios, such as Airwave, to communicate underground and from the ground to the surface. These radios will be interoperable between the emergency services (though the extent to which this is desirable from their commanders’ points of view is a moot point), and will provide a more resilient, reliable form of communications within each service…’
47. The CONNECT project will also extend radio cover into the running tunnels for London Fire Brigade UHF hand held radios.
48. Point 2.23. ‘At present the City of London Police and British Transport Police are equipped with Airwave radios. The remaining emergency services will be putting in place TETRA-based digital radio systems as follows:
Metropolitan Police Service By the end of 2007 London Fire Brigade By March 2007 London Ambulance Service By the end of 2007’
49. As part of the DCLG national Firelink project the London Fire Brigade is planned to go live on the Airwave digital TETRA system third quarter 2008. LFEPA have initiated an interim procurement of Airwave terminals for use by specialist staff and senior officers by September 2006.
50. Point 2.24. ‘The official inquiry into the King’s Cross fire, published in 1988, included a chapter on communications. The report highlighted the lack of communications between the station surface and underground, and the inability of officers from the British Transport Police and London Fire Brigade to communicate underground unless they were within line of sight of each other…’
51. London Fire Brigade and British Transport Police communications were extended underground to platform level following this Kings Cross inquiry. London Fire Brigade personnel are able to communicate with each other using UHF hand-held radios from sub-surface platform to surface level. London Fire Brigade UHF radio communications are being extended into the running tunnels as part of the CONNECT project. At present, to extend coverage into the running tunnels the London Fire
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Brigade carry on each of their five Command Units UHF repeaters and leaky feeder cable. The London Fire Brigade is in the process of procuring replacement UHF repeaters with additional functionality and at the same time increasing the numbers to enable inter connection which will increase the communications range
52. The Fennell Inquiry’s recommendation for compatible BTP and LFB radios was considered but not implemented because existing systems are compatible with the principles of the LESLEP protocols and allow for communication within the command structures at local commander level and it was decided that front line police and fire officers communicate with each other verbally as a result of the close proximity of their work.
53. Point 2.27. ‘We intend to monitor progress towards this deadline in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, and will be publicly asking the emergency services to provide us with update reports setting out the progress that has been made and explaining any delays.’
54. See paragraph 14 above.
55. Finding 5. ‘We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on the rollout of digital radio systems within their services in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor progress towards full implementation of TETRA-based radio communications across London’s emergency services.’
56. See paragraph 14 above.
57. Point 2.30. ‘It is going to take at least another 18 months to implement digital radio communications underground. In the meantime, an emergency system of underground communications needs to be available, which is capable of being put in place much more quickly that a leaky feeder cable. So far as we can gather, no serious consideration has been given to alternative technologies as an interim measure pending the rollout of CONNECT and Airwave, or as a back up measure in the longer term.’
58. Paragraph 51 details the communication systems that are available to the London Fire Brigade together with the improvements being made.
59. Point 2.32. ‘The speed and effectiveness of the emergency and transport services in establishing what happened varied across the sites. This was to some extent inevitable given the location of the explosions. For example, at Aldgate the train had barely entered the tunnel, and passengers began to emerge from the tunnel shortly after the explosion; whereas at Russell Square it took much longer for passengers to make their way along a fifteen minute walk through the tunnel to the platform.’
60. This point recognises that each of the scenes were different and that this contributed to the early information. It is also important to recognise that as soon as the Major Incident procedure is implemented for one site, London Fire Control will inevitably become extremely busy mobilising additional resources whilst continuing to receive other emergency calls. It was necessary that Brigade Control established what had occurred before sending major incident attendances to these incidents as this would only further serve to hinder operations.
61. Point 2.33. ‘There are some inconsistencies between the timelines provided to us by the emergency and transport services…’
62. These inconsistencies have not been detailed in the Review Committee report and therefore. we are unable to comment on the point being made.
63. Point 2.34. ‘There are lessons to be learnt from the initial response of the emergency and transport
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services. We believe that, in future, communications during the critical initial period could be improved, especially in the event of another incident on the Underground, and that this could result in a slightly quicker and more effective emergency response.’
64. We recognise that it is important to maintain good incident communications to aid the emergency response, however it is not believed that this response could have been significantly faster or more effective bearing in mind the simultaneous nature of three of the bombs and the varied nature of the incidents (see 60 above). The location of the incidents (sub-surface) also greatly limited the number of emergency calls received and therefore the initial information provided to us by members of the public. Their sub-surface nature and non-specific locations meant that callers didn’t always know where they are. The noises of explosions travel in the tunnels and are refracted, making it appear that they had occurred in alternate locations. These factors combine to very early confuse the information flow. It is inevitable that it will take the emergency call handlers some minutes to establish the facts in these circumstances.
THE FIRST HOUR – SITE BY SITE
ALDGATE
65. In the report the following timings are documented in the incident timeline:
‘0900 Mobilisation message for ‘explosion’ sent. 0902 Mobilisation message for ‘smoke in tunnel’ sent. 0908 Mobilisation message for ‘major incident’ sent to all units in East London.’
66. It would be more accurate for the timings to be recorded as submitted by the London Fire Brigade to the Review Committee, i.e:
0856 Metropolitan Police Service call LFB to fire and explosion at Aldgate tube station. 0857 Appliances and firefighters mobilised. 0900 First appliances arrive at scene. 0905 Major Incident declared.
67. Point 2.37. ‘…Two fire engines and a senior officer were sent to Aldgate, and an additional fire engine was sent to Liverpool Street. The London Fire Brigade declared a major incident at 09.05 am, 15 minutes after the explosion.’
68. A fire appliance was mobilised to Liverpool Street as it is the next station on one of the tube lines running through Aldgate. This is done as a split attendance as part of the pre-determined attendance for ‘fire and explosion’. A major incident was declared quickly at this site because it was apparent to the firefighters and incident commander what had happened as the train was near the end of the platform when it came to a stop.
EDGWARE ROAD
69. Point 2.44. ‘At Edgware Road, we understand that the first 999 call was made at 8.58am by a member of the public from nearby Praed Street, reporting a fire and explosion. At 9.00am, the London Fire Brigade mobilised five units, including a Fire Rescue Unit and a Fire Investigation Unit, to Praed Street. The first units arrived at Praed Street (which turned out not to have been the site of any incident) at 9.04am.’
70. The London Fire Brigade responded to a call from the member of the public to the address given, as we would be expected to do. This was nearby to the Edgware Road incident, due to refracted noise
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from the explosion, or the explosion being felt in the street reported from nearby properties.
71. Point 2.47. ‘At 9.07am, Fire Control received a call alerting them to the location of the incident on the Hammersmith and City Line at Edgware Road station. Seven minutes later, at 9.13 am, four vehicles were mobilised to Edgware Road. Only one of these was a redeployed vehicle from Praed Street. Paul, a member of the public…told us that two appliances were still at Praed Street at 9.15 am, whilst he could see no emergency vehicle in attendance at Edgware Road station. The Fire Rescue Unit that had been sent to Praed Street was eventually redeployed to Edgware Road at 9.37am.’
72. It took seven minutes for appliances to be mobilised to Edgware Road as the Fire Control were very active dealing with the response to the major incident that had already been declared at Aldgate. Fire Control staff were actively determining whether this incident was the same incident as the fire and explosion that the Brigade were already attending at Praed Street. The initial incident officers always investigate the scene whenever called to an incident and it is not unreasonable that it would take longer than eleven minutes for officers at Praed Street to determine that there was no fire and explosion at that location and appliances from that scene would not be available for redeployment until it had been declared safe. When the Fire Rescue Unit was redeployed to Edgware Road other fire appliances were already in attendance.
73. Point 2.49. ‘ … The Network Control Centre called the emergency services to the scene at 8.59am, but the first Fire Engine did not arrive until 9.18am, 19 minutes later, and the Metropolitan Police did not declare a major incident until 9.32am, followed two minutes later by a declaration of a major incident by the London Fire Brigade.’
74. Delay in attendance to Edgware Road was caused by the investigations at Praed Street (the Brigade’s initial call to the Edgware Road underground station incident). This was also occurring at the same time that a major incident was declared at Aldgate.
75. Point 2.50. ‘We can only conclude that communications at the scene, and between the scene and control centres, was less effective at Edgware Road than it was at Aldgate. This could be a result of the emergency services focusing on the incident at Aldgate. Which was reported just a couple of minutes before the incident at Edgware Road.’
76. The major issue occurring at Edgware Road was the timing of the call to Fire Control, within minutes of a major incident being declared elsewhere. Fire Control operators were then determining if this was a separate or linked incident, to avoid mobilising duplicated major incident attendances.
KING’S CROSS/ RUSSELL SQUARE
77. Point 2.53. ‘The London Fire Brigade received its first 999 call, reporting smoke issuing from a tunnel at King’s Cross at 9.02am. At 9.04am, a ‘split attendance’ was mobilised, with three fire engines sent to Euston Square and one to King’s Cross. Fire engines arrived at Euston Square (which turned out not to be one of the sites where passengers were emerging from tunnels) at 9.07 and 9.11am. The first fire engine arrived at King’s Cross station at 9.13am. At 9.19am, and again at 9.36am, further fire engines were requested to King’s Cross. There is no information to show when these further appliances arrived.’
78. The split attendance was mobilised to Euston Square because it shares three of the tube lines that run through King’s Cross. A split attendance is mobilised in these circumstances. It is not recorded when the appliances arrived because a button has to be pressed in the appliance or a radio message sent to Brigade Control to report its attendance. Although the number of calls from members of the public was low, the volume of radio traffic generated by incidents such as these was high, causing Brigade Control to be extremely busy. Firefighters and officers will not delay their deployment at an incident to
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register their attendance at it. For command and safety purposes, the incident commander will maintain a record of appliances at the scene, but not their time of arrival.
79. Point 2.55. ‘It is unclear precisely when the London Fire Brigade became aware that there had been an explosion at King’s Cross. However, we do know that the ability of the London Fire Brigade to establish what had happened at King’s Cross was hampered by the fact that hand-held radios did not work effectively between the platform and control position at the top of the escalator, nor between the top of the escalator and outside the station. The Fire Brigade therefore had to use runners – individuals running up and down escalators – to communicate from below ground to the surface.
80. London Fire Brigade personnel are able to communicate with each other from platform to surface level. Between the platform and the train it is possible to continue the functionality of hand held radios through the utilisation of UHF repeaters. They are carried on each of our Command Units; therefore we currently have the capability to do this at five separate sites. A sound operational decision was taken that the communication arrangements were sufficient to respond to the incident. The use of people conveying information from the platform to the train is a tried and tested operationally safe and effective method of communication and this was used on the day. LFB hand held radios operate from surface to platform level at all sub-surface London Underground sites through virtue of leaky feeders having been installed following the King’s Cross Fire in 1987. An impression was created by the media reports that there was a widespread problem with Fire Brigade hand held radios. In fact, it was a single hand held radio which was faulty, rather than the system itself.
81. Point 2.56. ‘No Fire Rescue Unit was deployed to King’s Cross in the initial stages of the response.’
82. The deployment at King’s Cross was to smoke issuing from a tunnel. The Fire Rescue Unit is not part of the pre-determined attendance for this type of initial call. Pumping appliances can effect rescue and carry rescue and cutting equipment for the initial firefighting and rescue response.
83. Point 2.60. ‘We cannot glean from the information provided to us by the Metropolitan Police Service at what time they were aware of the incident at Russell Square, as their records treat King’s Cross and Russell Square as the same incident.’
84. The London Fire Brigade also considers this to be the same incident, with a number of separate sectors which was the rationale for the Brigade’s response and deployment.
85. Point 2.61. ‘From the information provided to us by the London Fire brigade, it would appear that no fire engines were sent to Russell Square at any point during the first hour following the explosions.
86. Fire appliances were deployed to Russell Square during this time, as a sector of the King’s Cross incident (see 84 above).
87. Point 2.62. ‘The initial deployment of ambulances and fire engines to Russell Square was much slower than at the other sites, and it took longer to establish what had happened. The first 999 call was not received until 25 minutes after the explosion and a major incident was not declared until 9.38am.’
88. The delay was due to the distance inside the tunnel that the train was at when the explosion occurred. There appears to be some misunderstanding in the Review Committee report suggesting that Russell Square and King’s Cross were two separate incidents. The London Fire Brigade, Metropolitan Police Service and London Ambulance Service considered King’s Cross to be one incident with multiple sectors, one of which was Russell Square (see 84 above).
89. Point 2.63. ‘There was no automatic deployment of the emergency services to Russell Square upon
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discovery of the train at the King’s Cross end of the tunnel. Had this happened, ambulances and other emergency services personnel might have arrived at the scene earlier. The London Fire Brigade did order a ‘split attendance’, but to a station which turned out not to have been affected (Euston Square).’
90. The split attendance was mobilised to Euston Square because it shares three of the tube lines that run through King’s Cross. A split attendance is always mobilised in these circumstances so that rescue can be effected from two points of entry. Appliances were mobilised to Russell Square as a sector of the King’s Cross incident (see 84 above).
91. Point 2.64. ‘In the absence of the Fire Brigade at Russell Square, the task of making the scene safe for other emergency services, and evacuating the injured at Russell Square, was instead carried out by the London Underground Emergency Response Unit…’
92. All emergency services have responsibilities for scene safety, not just the Fire Brigade. The London Underground Emergency Response Unit was therefore discharging London Underground’s responsibilities in carrying out this work.
TAVISTOCK SQUARE
93. Point 2.70. ‘… The first fire engines were despatched at 9.50am, but the records provided to us by the London Fire Brigade do not show the time of arrival at scene.’
94. At 0947 a call was received by Brigade Control from a member of the public to an explosion on a bus at Tavistock Square. The first fire engines were dispatched at 0950 from Holloway fire station and arrived 10 minutes later at 1000. The longer attendance time for this incident can be attributed to the considerable activity in the surrounding area and subsequent congestion due to the incident in progress at Kings Cross.
95. Point 2.71. ‘…The records provided to us by the emergency services do not show when a major incident was declared by the Metropolitan Police, London Fire Brigade or London Ambulance Service.’
96. The incident at Tavistock Square was not declared as a major incident for London Fire Brigade resources.
97. Point 2.75. ‘The London Fire Brigade’s debriefing report identifies communications between the emergency services as a point for further consideration. From the information we have seen, we believe that more effective communications between the emergency services in relation to each scene, and overall, could have reduced the duration of the period of uncertainty about the location and nature of the incidents and enabled the emergency services more rapidly to put in place a co- ordinated emergency response.’
98. The national Firelink project will assist by providing resilient interoperable communications at each scene. However, due to the volume of initial information as a result of multiple incidents there is inevitably a period of conflicting information.
99. Point 2.76. ‘…It is not clear to us why each of the emergency services found it necessary separately to declare major incidents.’
100. This is established in LESLP procedure. The reason being that a major incident for one organisation does not necessarily constitute a major incident for another, for example a large number of casualties may constitute a major incident for the London Ambulance Service but it they are above surface and
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not trapped, then the Brigade’s requirement at the scene is likely to be limited. The converse is also true, a major fire but with no injuries or loss of life.
101. Point 2.77. ‘It is common sense that one declaration of a major incident, by whichever service is first at the scene, ought to automatically mobilise units from ‘all three’ services – police, fire and ambulance – and activate major incident procedures within the services…’
102. Under LESLP procedures we will notify other emergency services and be notified ourselves when a major incident is declared. London Fire Brigade will send an appropriate response in conjunction with the LFB Incident Commander, see paragraph 100 above.
THE FIRST HOUR – RESCUE AND TREATMENT OF THE INJURED
103. Point 3.4. ‘ …Managers within… the London Fire Brigade relied to varying extents on mobile phones to communicate between the sites of the incidents and their Gold commanders.’
104. We use mobile phones for convenience; however operational effectiveness is not dependent on them. All senior officers have access to dedicated radios for operational command communications.
105. Point 3.8. ‘ The London Fire Brigade has told us that managers in fact relied upon mobile telephones to communicate with their control room, and that this caused problems on the day. The London Fire Brigade’s de-briefing report, presented to the London Resilience Forum in September 2005, states ‘Incident Commanders felt isolated as they were unable to get information about other incidents from Gold Support…as mobile phones weren’t working’.’
106. Individual Incident Commanders were not hindered from performing their specific role but were not necessarily wholly aware of the London wide events. Individual Incident Commanders do not need a detailed understanding of incidents occurring elsewhere as this is not operationally important.
107. Point 3.37. ‘…This failure to maintain records is not unique to the Ambulance Service; the London Fire brigade has also commented in it’s debrief report on the failure to record information about its response and the need to do so in future.’
108. We are reviewing the requirement to maintain the records referred to by the Committee.
109. Point 3.38. ‘ …A number of survivors from Edgware Road and Aldgate told us that they saw emergency services personnel outside the stations soon after the explosions, apparently having been instructed not to enter tunnels. We have received no explanation as to why this might have been the case, and the absence of records showing the times of arrival of the emergency services in the affected carriages means that we cannot investigate the anecdotal accounts we have heard.’
110. The deployment of crews is managed by the Incident Commander. It will not always apparent to members of the public why potentially available crews may not be committed to the incident, this can be because there is not enough physical space for more crews to deploy direct to the incident or because these crews are held back to provide a resilient response over a period of time. .
CONCLUSIONS (7 JULY REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT)
111. These comments have been addressed in the body of the report.
112. A follow up to this report will be conducted in November 2006 by the Review Committee. We will provide a progress update for the committee at this stage.
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VOLUME 2 – VIEWS AND INFORMATION FROM ORGANISATIONS
113. We have no comment on the views and information from other organisations.
VOLUME 3 – VIEWS AND INFORMATION FROM INDIVIDUALS
114. Page 13. Paul. ‘I will take you through shortly what my involvement was on the day, and my observations from that scene. I have been involved in the fire-service operations at one level or another for over 10 years. My last actual employment has been as a retained firefighter with Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue, which ended in 2002.’
115. Paul identified himself as a former part-time Fire and Rescue service employee during his submissions. Whilst his actions are commendable, it is necessary to establish that he was not operating within Fire and Rescue Service procedures and his comments are not representative of the London Fire Brigade.
116. Page 21 and 56. Michael. ‘…I walked up to the platform and apparently I was very polite, but I asked the first group of firemen why they were not down there. There were people dying down there…I asked the third group of firemen, and they spoke to me. They said they were worried about a second explosion…’
117. At any incident it is necessary to ensure a well controlled and co-ordinated deployment of emergency service staff to the scene. This will mean that it is inevitable that at times there will be emergency service staff awaiting to be deployed and to members of the public these staff may appear to be taking no effective part in the immediate response. It is also necessary to recognise that firefighters are unable to effect rescue without first establishing the correct level of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to wear which is dependent on the information available. Where there is concern about secondary explosive devices firefighters conduct a dynamic risk assessment. If the risk is high it may be appropriate to delay a commitment to the scene, to prevent firefighters becoming casualties themselves and not able to provide an effective response.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ACCESS TO INFORMATION) ACT 1985 List of background documents List the documents here Proper Officer: Contact Officer: 020 7587 e-mail:
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 – LFEPA Publication Scheme
This document appears in the Category: Management arrangements and decision making publication scheme under: Topic: Authority, committee and panel meetings
Class: List the class here
It also appears in the publication Category: List any other classes which the information falls into here scheme under: Topic: Class: Information Access Team [email protected] Contact: 020 7587 6275 FEP925 FEP 925 fep925 fep 925
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MEETING Authority AGENDA ITEM 17
MEETING DATE 21 September 2006 DOCUMENT NUMBER FEP 925A SUBJECT London Assembly 7 July Review Committee - Addendum
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT (21.9.06) by the Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning
The Authority is asked to note the following corrections to the report FEP 925 previously circulated:-
Introduction - Page 2 – Paragraph 7
Delete existing paragraph and substitute the following –
“Since the publication of the report, officers of the GLA have been liaising with officers of the Authority to ensure that there is a shared expectation of how evidence is submitted, collated and checked for London Assembly reports and procedures governing their publication.”
Appendix A – Page 5 – Paragraph 12
Delete the existing paragraph and substitute the following –
“Since the publication of the report it is welcomed that officers of the GLA have been liaising with officers of the Authority to ensure that there is a shared expectation of how evidence is submitted, collated and checked for London Assembly reports and procedures governing their publication.”
1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT (ACCESS TO INFORMATION) ACT 1985 List of background documents None Proper Officer: Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning Contact Officer: Ron Dobson, Assistant Commissioner Service Delivery 020 7587 4300 e-mail:
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 – LFEPA Publication Scheme
This document appears in the Category: Management arrangements and decision making publication scheme under: Topic: Authority, committee and panel meetings
Class: List the class here
It also appears in the publication Category: List any other classes which the information falls into here scheme under: Topic:
Class:
Information Access Team [email protected] Contact: 020 7587 6275 FEP925A FEP 925A fep925A fep 925A
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