Water Management in Naucalpan: Institutional Framework and Action Situation
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Water management in Naucalpan: institutional framework and action situation. By: Lourdes Amaya UAM Cuajimalpa INTRODUCTION Water properties as a CPR. One of the most important contributions of Elinor Ostrom to economic theory has been the identification of Common Pool Resources (CPR), a specific kind of goods with two main characteristics: 1. It is difficult to exclude individuals from benefitting from the good. 2. An individual consumption of a unit of the good diminishes the benefit available for others. For CPR’s “excluding potential appropriators or limiting appropriation rights of existing users is not trivial (but not necessarily impossible) and the yield of the resource system is subtractable” (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994: 4). In water case, excludability is possible, but it faces both technical and social constraints. From the technical point of view, for example, local management systems in Mexico do not have the capacities to efficiently monitor illegal connections. From the social point of view, the greater sanction of cutting the service to those who are not contributing to preserve water resources is not a socially acceptable decision, even less since United Nations has adopted the right to water. The use of a CPR links different actors who share the resource in a permanent way, being sometimes able of defining by themselves the rules for this sharing. Ostrom (2000 [1990]) points out the three challenges faced by CPR users: 1) the provision (definition) of a set of institutions; 2) the problem of establishing credible commitments in using the resource; 3) the creation of mechanisms of mutual monitoring. 1 1) Provision (definition) of a set of institutions. In the case of water management in Mexico, the set of institutions is already provided there are both a normative framework and an organizational structure created in order to govern water use. Nevertheless, in this case, the set of rules is not the result of a participation process, but it is part of a decentralization policy designed by national government in 1989. What is interesting is that this decentralization policy gave to local water authorities some new attributions and decision making capacities that resulted in the creation of a complex polycentric system for water management. That’s why it becomes important to think about water issues in terms of governance. The concept of governance implies coordinated efforts of governmental and non-governmental actors in order to achieve a common goal or solving a public affair. It implies “authority and power arrangements inside which actors take decisions and frame policies that oblige individual and collective participants inside different territorial boundaries, such as states, districts and municipalities” (Hanf and Cansen cited by Castro, 2006, 243). Governance implies the necessity of cooperation between a variety of actors, a collective construction of problems, and a context favoring participation of all those actors in the implementation of policy measures. Nevertheless, it is not clear in which measure this participation could be extended to constitutive decisions, including definition of rules shaping action. In the case of water management in Mexico, the decentralized institutional arrangement was not the result of social participation, but it was claimed that one of the main goals of the policy reform was to encourage users’ participation on water local systems. In any case, allowing the choice for local authorities between private or public management and considering the incorporation of users, decentralization opened the door to institutional diversity on water management. Water management is thus an example of the complex systems analyzed by Ostrom throughout her research work. 2) The problem of establishing credible commitments in using the resource. In analyzing contracts, Williamson (1989) mentions that a credible commitment promotes exchanges and alliances between actors interested in preserving a relationship. For CPR case, it implies that appropriators assume the responsibility of sharing the resource and using it in a collective way. Ostrom (2000 [1990]) identifies two conditions for achieving this credible commitment: 1) that appropriators be sure the other members of the collectivity will assume it in the same measure; 2) that the cooperation strategy be perceived as the one giving the 2 highest net benefits on the long term. As a result, the short-term strategy of non- cooperation becomes less attractive. Ostrom (2000 [1990]) shows also that the fact of the appropriators being the ones defining this commitments increase their legitimacy, and as a consequence the institutional design would be more robust. This credibility of commitments poses a real problem at the Mexican context, at least at the national level, being always possible to find differentiated situations at the local level. In an article about the institutional renewal of water sector in some developing countries, Meublat et Le Lourd (2001) outlined how fast Mexican authorities achieved the decentralizing reform, when the former president Salinas (1988-1994) published a new water law. This effectiveness in transforming the institutional design could be explained as a result of the centralized scheme prevailing at that moment, allowing a quick acceptation of new rules. As the control mechanisms of national government were stronger at the time, the commitments were stronger, local actors being interested in keeping budget support from national and state governments. An important contradiction derived from this situation: the decentralized model was based on the openness and democratization of water systems, but the credibility of the commitments was based on the loyalty toward central or state governments. Thus the new institutional arrangement emerged in tension with the system surrounding it, which explains in a great measure the difficulties for constructing credible commitments between participants in the water sector. 3) The problem of mutual supervision between users and water managers. The appropriators’ commitment is better enforced and more credible when it is supported by graduated sanctions on behalf of monitoring agents. In the experiences reviewed by Ostrom (2000 [1990]), this was also better achieved when those monitor agents were part of the community of appropriators. The last point is important since the fact of being appropriators themselves made the monitoring agents more interested in detecting and sanctioning the non-respect of the rules. In the specific case of water use, it is generally recognized that the difficulties of its provision could only be overcome through a vision of shared responsibility. According to the World Bank, Mexican National Water Law “establishes two institutional paths: user vis-à-vis other users (through users’ associations) and users vis-à-vis the water authority” (Banco Mundial, 2006: 50). However, only the National Water Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, Conagua) has supervision and sanction attributions concerning water use, users’ 3 participation through different associations was limited. Consequently, supervision goes only in one sense: from the authority to the users. At the local level, municipal authorities are responsible of water provision and hence in charge of supervising its management, particularly in the case of a concessionary contract with a private firm. Control and supervision mechanisms for water use are defined in each local water law. Sanctions are mainly conceived to punish users failing to pay the service which could be applied either by the municipal authority or by the private firm, in case of concession. Once again, monitoring is only considered from the authority towards the civil society, is not a mutual exercise; moreover, sanctions for misuse of the resource are rare. After this general review of how the three CPR dilemmas manifest in Mexican water sector our hypothesis is that the decentralized reform has not been enough to solve water issues, mainly because the new institutional design has not taken as a point of depart the social context in Mexico. Our main point in this paper will be the reflection about the design principles proposed by Ostrom (2000 [1990]) and the feasibility of their adoption for water management in Mexico, using the case of Naucalpan water utility. ACTION SITUATION IN WATER MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF NAUCALPAN, STATE OF MEXICO For water management, Mexican territory is divided in thirteen hydrological- administrative regions, the municipality of Naucalpan belonging to Region XIII, Valley of Mexico Waters (Aguas del Valle de México). It is the most populated region in the country, since it includes Mexico City, and the states of Hidalgo, México and Tlaxcala. Although Naucalpan has several water sources (rivers, basins and waterholes), the uncontrolled growth of its population has obliged the authorities to extract great quantities of groundwater in order to satisfy the users’ demand. The urban proportion of Naucalpan territory has increased because an uncontrolled population growth (Graphic 1). 4 Graphic 1 Population growth in Naucalpan (1950‐2010) The hydraulic infrastructure in Naucalpan has evolved in response to the urban growth with irregular settlements being the main management problem. In general, the quality of water service is considered good, while at the same time it is recognized that the infrastructure presents lack of maintenance and that the users’ census is incomplete. Naucalpan receives 3,150