VOLUME 41 NUMBER 2 DECEMBER 2017
Political Transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingya Muslim Minority
Md. Mahbubul Haque
Abstract Burma/Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse and largest countries of Southeast Asia. Since the early days of independence, Burma failed to establish multi-party democracy and a federal system of government. After the NLD’s landslide victory in 2015, it has introduced major positive changes especially the freedom of expression and association. Burma is currently undergo- ing a political transformation that could see the end of the decade-long conflict. However, the ethnic Rohingya Muslim minority are still marginalized from the society and have not been in- cluded in the ongoing peace and democratic development process. This paper explores the political transition in Burma/Myanmar and how Rohingya minority has been excluded from this process. In order to develop as a democratic country, Burma/Myanmar should incorporate all minorities into the political life. The Rohingya minority had strong involvement in the government before and after independence in Burma. Even in the last parliament (2010-2015), three Rohingya MPs were elected from the Muslim dominated constituency in Rakhine State. However, the situation changed for Rohingya and other Muslims after the 2012 Buddhist-Muslim riots. As a result, no political party nominated any Muslim candidate in the last parliamentary elections. Indeed, Aung Sun Suu Kyi and her NLD government failed to take any effective measures to protect them. In this context, democratic transformation will not be complete in Burma/Myanmar without the full participation of Rohingyas and other Muslims in the country’s economic, social and political life.
Keywords Political Transition, Rohingya, Muslim, Minority
Corresponding Author Md. Mahbubul Haque, Email: [email protected]
22 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority Introduction The status of Rohingya Muslims under the Myanmar state framework was not complicated before the 1982 Citizenship Law. At the time of independence, their separate identity was recognized by Premier U Nu who led the Anti-Fascist Peo- ple’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government (1948-1962). Historical facts and figures suggest that Rohingya Muslims have had a strong involvement in the gov- ernment since the British colonial period and their ethnic minority culture was nurtured by the Rangoon-based central government. Simultaneously, the ethnic Rohingya Muslim minority have been confronted by the ethnic Rakhine Bud- dhist religious majority since pre-independence days. Their situation worsened after the military takeover in 1962 leaving them subject to humiliating restrictions and harsh treatment by the State. After the 2012 riots, the situation worsened. Islamophobia is now being used against the existence of Rohingyas in Myanmar. The UN and other international bodies firmly believed that the situation would improve for the Rohingyas after the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi led the National League for Democracy (NLD) to a majority win in Myanmar’s first openly con- tested election in 25 years in November 2015. The present constitution forbids her from becoming the president because she has children who are foreign na- tionals. Suu Kyi is widely seen as a de-facto leader in Myanmar. The NLD gov- ernment has introduced major positive changes especially the freedom of expres- sion and association. Myanmar is currently undergoing political transformation that could see the end of the decades of conflict. However, the Rohingya and other ethnic Muslim minorities are still neglected in Myanmar’s political life and Buddhist extremists brand them as Islamist terrorists and a threat to national integrity. This paper argues, field work in Myanmar/Burma and other documentary rec- ords show that the circumstances for Rohingyas are not conducive as yet. In fact, the NLD-led civilian government has no clear position to address this longstand- ing crisis. Uncertainty looms large in Myanmar’s political transformation. The military is still the most powerful institution and meddles in all vital affairs while prolonging civil war and raising false security alarms. The NLD government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi lacks the guts to exercise its power to protect the mi- norities and bring about real peace through negotiated settlements of all ethnic issues, particularly the problems of unprotected Rohingya Muslims. Instead, she is whitewashing the atrocious crimes committed against the Rohingya people by the military and security forces.
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 23 Methodology This research article focuses on the status of Rohingya Muslims minority during the political transition in Myanmar. The nature of this research demonstrates an intensive review of the Rohingya Muslim’s participation in Burma/Myanmar politics and how they became excluded from the state framework. This research also incorporates the ongoing situation in Myanmar and the difficulties faced by the Rohingyas under the NLD-led democratic regime. During fieldwork, the researcher collected data from the Rohingya and other Muslim communities in Yangon, in April and October 2016 and May 2017. The researcher also inter- viewed ruling NLD leaders, 88 Generation leaders and members of Yangon- based civil society, international agencies and then checked with relevant experts on the subject. For security reasons, it was not possible for the researcher to di- rectly collect data from Rakhine (Arakan) State. Key informant interviews are helpful for qualitative research especially people who have in-depth knowledge about what is going on inside the community. The key informant technique is an ethnographic research method, which was original- ly used in the field of cultural anthropology and is now being used more widely in other branches of social science investigation. In this study, the researcher con- ducted ethnographic interviews with different Rohingya political groups based in Yangon including former lawmakers (two former MPs) and senior political lead- ers. All of them originated from Arakan (Rakhine State) and now reside in Yan- gon. The Rohingya leaders were from different professions and had different socio-economic backgrounds. The discussion was focused on the political status of Rohingyas during this democratic transition. Ethnographic interview with non- Rohingya Muslim community leaders were also carried out, including a Kofi Anan Commission member, about their perception on Rohingyas in the Myan- mar political discourse. It was necessary to understand the opinions of others Muslims on the issue of the Rohingyas in Myanmar because it is an ethnically diversified country. Myanmar’s Muslims views and their relations with the State are not uniform. Three non-Rohingya Muslims from different social-economic and professional backgrounds were also interviewed. The researcher got the bulk of the information from the exiled Rohingya leaders. Their valuable information enriched this study. All of them provided data as to how their ethnic identity was excluded in Burma/Myanmar. The researcher also got expert opinion from subject related experts, university teachers, government officials, human rights activists and journalists through the open-ended and un- structured interviews. Two key informants in each professional group were inter-
24 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority viewed. In this stage, researcher tried to get information as to why Rohingyas were excluded from this democratic transition and the role of NLD.
In addition, interviews were also conducted with the ruling NLD, 88 Generation leaders and members of Yangon-based civil society. Through the open-ended questions, the researcher explored the attitudes on Rohingya Muslims of the rul- ing party members and Yangon-based civil society. It was necessary to under- stand the viewpoints of mainstream communities on transitional democracy and the situation of Rohingyas in Myanmar. This research is also based on observa- tions of the political and socio-economic situation, which provided unique insights into the whole scenario of Myanmar. The overall research findings provided an overview of the Rohingya Muslims’ political life in Myanmar from the historical context and also explored the policy of exclusion against them.
Rohingyas in Myanmar’s/Burma’s mainstream political process The British Burma and independent Burma’s political history suggest that the Muslim-dominated Northern Arakan’s constituency was always dominated by the Rohingya Muslims until the 2010 election. The Rohingya Muslim minority has had a strong presence in mainstream politics since the colonial period. The par- liamentary government (1948-62) had officially declared Rohingyas as one of the indigenous ethnic groups of Burma. The declaration read by the then Prime Min- ister of the Union of Burma, Prime Minister U Nu, said “the people living in Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions are our nationals, brethren. They are called Rohingyas. They are at par in status of nationality with Kachin, Kyah, Karen, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. They are one of the ethnic races of Burma. ” i Many researchers, historians and journalists have elaborately discussed the role of Mus- lims in Myanmar’s/Burma’s electoral process. The former Israeli diplomat Moshe Yegar (1972 and 2002), AFK Jilani (2002), J. A. Berlie (2008) and various rights groups’ documents clearly stated that Rohingya Muslims have strong politi- cal involvement in Arakan State (present Rakhine State). Going back to the polit- ical history of Myanmar/Burma, Gani Maracan was the first Muslim legislator elected during the British colonial period in 1936. During the general elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1947, Sultan Ahmed and Abdul Gaffar were elected from Maungdaw and Buthidaung respectively and were affiliated with the Jamiat- e-Ulema, the political party of Muslims in Arakan. Sultan Ahmed was also a
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 25 member in drafting Constitution Committee of 1947 for three months while an- other Muslim leader U Rashid was in America on official visit (Min, 2012).
After the British colonial era, the first general election in Burmawas held in 1951. The Rohingya Muslim-led political party Jamiat-e-Ulema got four seats in Ara- kan. The members of the legislative council were Sultan Ahmed (Maungdaw North), Daw Aye Nyuntalias Zhura Begum (Maungdaw South), Abul Basher (Buthidaung South) and Abdul Gaffarfrom Buthidaung North (Jilani, 2002). Be- fore the general election of 1956, the U Nu government abolished Burma Muslim Congress and Jamiat-e-Ulema, branding them as religious parties. As a result, Muslim leaders had misapprehension with Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). The Rakhine Buddhist leaders had successfully utilized this political vacuum and took control of the AFPFL branches in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Soon after, Muslim leaders realized the necessity of political unity with the AFPFL. The Muslim leaders Haji Abul Khairfrom Maungdaw South, Sultan Ahmed from Maungdaw North, Abul Bashar from Buthidaung South, Ezhar- Meah from Buthidaung North and Abdul Gaffar were elected to the Upper House from the AFPFL in 1956 general election. It is noted that, Ezhar Meah’s candidacy was challenged after the election and the court verdict was against him. During the bi-election in 1957, Sultan Mahmud defeated U Po Khine, who rep- resented the Rakhine community. Mahmud was inducted into the cabinet of U Nu as Health Minister (Jilani, 2002). After independence, the condition of Arakan deteriorated rather than improved (Christie, 1996p: 169). The Arakan Muslims immediately discovered the disad- vantages of their peripheral status in a non-Muslim nation, when Muslims offi- cials were replaced by Buddhists. In addition, Buddhist people tried to settle in Muslim dominated areas in Arakan. As a result, tensions developed between these two different ethnic religious groups in Arakan. This tension continues even to- day. The Rohingya Muslims demanded that North Arakan be made autonomous and subject directly to the central government in Rangoon, having no Rakhinein- fluences (Jilani, 2002). A separate administration would also help the low standard of living of the Muslim communities and prevent abuses from the Rakhine Bud- dhists. On May 1, 1961, the central government created the “Mayu Frontier Admin- istration Area”. It comprised the Muslim-dominated Maungdaw, Buthidaung and the western part of Rathidaung townships. It was under the Ministry of Defense and controlled from Rangoon. A special police force known as “Mayu Ray” was formed and members recruited from local Muslims and the law and order situa-
26 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority tion improved. The total population of May Yu Frontier Area is nearly half a million. Most people there are engaged in agriculture and fisheries. The majority of the people are Rohingya and rests of the groups are Rakhine, Dai Nat, Myo, Khmee (Yegar, 2002). The headquarters of May Yu Frontier Area was in the border town of Maungdaw. The Rohingya Muslim dominated May Yu Frontier region was controlled by the central government before 1964. The Myanmar Encyclopedia (1964) on Pages 89 and 90 in Volume 9 discusses in detail that the Rohingyas populated May Yu Frontier Area. The Yangon-based Rohingya polit- ical leaders claimed that, it was the only administration, which favored Rohingyas during the post-independent history in Burma. The Rohingya representatives were invited on Union Day. Rohingya feasts and cultural performances were part of the celebration. Rohingyas were as happy as in 1942 to 1945 Peace Committee Period (interview, Yangon, 2016). ii Rohingya language was aired by the Burma Broadcasting Services twice a week till 24 October 1965 (cited in Nyein, 1976). This evidence shows that Rohingya language broadcasts stopped after the mili- tary coup in the 1960s. This paper argues that Rohingyas’ oppression and policy of exclusion started after General Ne Win took overstate power. During the par- liamentary era, the Rohingyas enjoyed and joined all government activities. In spite of political differences, the Rohingya Muslims had representation in Hlauttaw (parliament) under the Ne Win socialist regime. Abul Hussain, Dr. Ab- dul Rahim, Advocate Abdul Hai, Muzaffar Ahmed, Kyaw Thein, Mustaq Ah- med, Saleh Ahmed, Elias, Aman Ullah and many other Rohingya representatives were in Arakan State Council under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) periods (Jilani, 2002). From 1988 to 1997, the military government was known as State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which had replaced the role of BSPP. The new military government conducted general elections in May 1990. It was the first multi-party elections since 1960, after which the country had been ruled by military dictators. During that general election, associate and natu- ralized citizens were permitted to vote, but not allowed to contest the election. The Union Election Commission allowed the Rohingyas the right to vote and contest the general election. In fact, the Rohingyas were permitted to form politi- cal parties in 1989. Two parties were formed, the Students and Youth League for Mayu Development and the National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPH). The NDPH nominated four candidates, Fazal Ahmed, Chit Lwin alias Ibrahim, Tin Maung alias Noor Ahmed and Kyaw Min alias Anwarul Huq elect- ed from the Muslim dominated Maungdaw and Buthidaung constituencies as like previous election(Min, 2012, p:7).
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 27 The titles behind the names as well as the biographies of the four elected MPs show that most of them had got a university degree in Burma/Myanmar and had been in government services. Like most other parties, the NDPH was dissolved shortly after it was clear that the parliament would never be convened (cited in Bernd Zöllner, 2015). Many of their veteran politicians were forced to retire from politics and some of them were in jail during the military regime (interview, Yan- gon, October 2016). iiiThe Rohingyas again were allowed the right to vote in the 2008 referendum. Before the 2010 elections, two new parties were formed to represent the interests of the Muslims of Rakhine State, the National Democratic Party for Development (NDPD) and the Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP). In 2010 elections, two Rohingya candidates were victorious from the Muslim dominated areas under the banner of NDPD. Later, the Union Election Commission invalidated their candidacies. As a result, the runners up, the mili- tary backed USDP candidates became MPs from those constituencies. These parliamentarians were from Rohingya Muslim community and played an active role in the House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) from 2010 to 2015. As the minutes of the parliament show, these MPs were quite outspoken in advocating the interests of their electorate in the parliament sessions. iv They asked questions about the freedom of movement of Muslims in the Rakhine State which were answered by the concerned ministers. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in Myanmar after the general elections on November 8, 2015. It was the country’s first nation- al vote since a nominally civilian government was introduced in 2011, ending nearly 50 years of military rule. Surprisingly, no major political party nominated any Muslim candidates in any constituency. A Myanmar Muslim leader, who is now the member of Kofi Annan Commission, Aye Lwin, argues differently: “Aung San Suu Kyi and her party NLD still sympathizes with the Muslim issue. But after mid-2012 communal riots, the situation has changed. The military backed USDP and Rakhine ultra-nationalist forces using the communal card, started a hatred campaign against the Muslims. So it was not possible for NLD to choose any Muslim candidate for the 2015 parliament election” (interview, Yan- gon, October 2016). v The NLD has made a strong pledge to establish the rule of law and protect the ethnic minorities’ rights under the Union of Myanmar. Therefore, most of the non-Rohingya Muslim leaders are still optimistic and wait- ing for positive measures from the NLD government (interview, Yangon, October 2016 and May 2017). vi Herein, it must be mentioned that, Rohingya led the Democracy and Human Rights Party (DHRP) and National Democratic Party for Development (NDPD), which participated in the last parliament election and
28 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority contested both at the union and state levels. Most of the Rohingyas, though, lost their franchise in 2015 election. It will be discussed in the next part of this paper.
Exclusions of the Rohingya in Burma’s/Myanmar’s political sphere The Rohingyas have been systematically excluded from the Burma’s/Myanmar’s state framework. In Burmese post-independence history, since the early 1950s the Rohingyas as well as other ethnic minorities were in conflict with the Govern- ment of Myanmar. This became more pronounced when General Ne Win took power in 1962. From that time onwards, the entire machinery of the government adopted a series of policies against Rohingya existence in Burma. This started gradually and Rohingya identity was made as de jure stateless after the 1982 Citi- zenship Law. It should be noted that, in the aftermath of decolonization, Rohing- yas’ separate identity was recognized by the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League government (1948-1962). After militarization, the “Tatmadawvii govern- ment claims that most Arakan Muslims are illegal immigrants and has conducted more than a dozen major operations against them” (Berlie, 2008:p. 55). The mili- tary regime of Burma branded the Muslims as resident foreigners and effectively reduced them to the status of stateless (Ahmed, 2010). Various historical docu- ments, though, indicate that, Rohingyas are indigenous people of today’s Rakhine State. General Ne Win’s government made a list of national ethnicities in 1972 to conduct census. That was the first time. The military government treated them as “Chittagongian-Rakhine” (cited in Haque, 2014). According to that identity, it was easy to interpret these people were Bangladeshi settlers in the Arakan State. It can be said that, General Ne Win had a long-term plan to exclude the Rohing- yas from Burma. General Ne Win also changed the ancient name Arakan and named it the Rakhine State. Since that time, the Rohingyas were deprived of their identity under the Union of Burma. In 1978, the military government con- ducted Operation Nagamin to identify the Bangladeshi illegal settlers in Arakan. As a consequence of this operation, thousands of Rohingyas became refugees in neighbor Bangladesh. Within a year, Rohingyas were repatriated to Burma. Fi- nally, General Ne Win government passed the 1982 Citizenship Law. After the enactment of that law, Rohingya Muslims became de jure stateless in the home of their ancestors. Rohingya under quasi-democratic regime According to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) road map to- wards democracy, a constitutional referendum was conducted in Myanmar in
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 29 May 2008. Following the new constitution, the Union Solidarity and Develop- ment Party (USDP), the main military-backed party, was formed by Prime Minis- ter Thein Sein and other ministers on April 10, 2010 and approved by the Union Election Commission within five days. It has to be noted that, Rohingya- led Un- ion National Development Party has been scrutinizing the process under the Un- ion Election Commission since 2010, but the decision has not come yet (inter- view, Yangon, May 2017). viiiThe whole general election of 2010 was highly controversial. NLD and many other parties boycotted it. The United Nations and other international communities expressed concern over the fairness of the elec- tion. Despite this criticism, the military-backed Thein Sein led the USDP formed quasi-democratic government in Myanmar. President Thein Sein was widely praised for his reform policy. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stated that “his vision, leadership and courage to put Myanmar on the path to change” (cited in UN News Center, 2012). To some extent, the former General turned President of Myanmar came up with various policies to establish democracy. The new government released over 500 political prisoners in October 2011 and Janu- ary 2012. These releases included the most prominent civic leaders and pro- democracy and ethnic minority prisoners of conscience. Many of these individuals had been imprisoned for over 20 years (cited in Campbell, 2012). At the same time, the new government continued to commit severe human rights abuses against the ethnic minorities. After the 2012 Buddhist-Muslim communal riots, the political scenario changed in Myanmar. The consequences of communal riots and hatred campaign against Islamic identity in Myanmar will be discussed in the next part of this paper. The international community was highly critical about the role of the Union Government in not protecting the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State. It was in 12 June 2012. President Thein Sein stated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres in a meeting, “the solution to this problem is that they can be settled in refugee camps managed by UNHCR, and UNHCR provides for them. If there are countries that would accept them, they could be sent there” (Radio Free Asia, 2012). He also declared, “We will take care of our own ethnic nationalities, but Rohingyas who came to Burma [Myan- mar] illegally are not of our ethnic nationalities and we cannot accept them here” (ibid). The Rakhine ultra-nationalist group boldly supported Thein Sein’s state- ments. In addition, Buddhist monks throughout the country rallied in support of President Thein Sein’s proposal. It did not end here. The USDP government conducted a systematic plan for Rohingya’s to be excluded from the electoral process in 2015. Despite the demo- cratic transition, the Rohingyas were excluded from the UN sponsored national
30 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority census in March 2014, the first since 1983. Their National Registration Cards (NRCs) were seized earlier, and then all their ID cards given in place of NRCs as well as issued to the younger generations were invalidated on 31 March, 2015, depriving them of voting rights for the first time in Myanmar since the voting system was introduced during the British colonial period in 1936 (after about 80 years), and continue to be denied fundamental rights. This attempt was strongly opposed to the UNGA resolution adopted by consensus on 19 December, 2014 and urged the government to grant full citizenship to Rohingyas and to allow them self-identify (interview, Yangon, April 2016). ix Earlier, it was mentioned that Rohingyas enjoyed the right to vote during the referendum in 2008 and their representatives were in parliament from 2010-2015. If the Rohingya Muslims were disqualified from the right to vote and contest the election, the constitution should face the question of legitimacy. So Rohingya leaders argued that, “they use Rohingyas whenever they want and expel them whenever they don’t need them” (interview, Yangon, October 2016). x It is clearly shown that the Rohingya Muslims were used by the military rulers to legitimize their constitution and after the communal riots they were accused because of their religious identity.
NLD’s dilemma to address the Rohingya Muslims’ issue There were several momentous events which marked the socio-cultural-political landscape of Myanmar after NLD formed the government in 2016. Myanmar has entered a new era after decades-long military rule. Due to constitutional barriers, Aung San Suu Kyi is not eligible to be the head of the government. So the NLD government has created a new post of ‘State Counsellor’ under the present consti- tutional framework. Being a State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi is de facto head of the government, though key institutions remain under the army’s control. The present constitution guarantees one-quarter of seats in the lower house of parlia- ment and one-quarter in the upper house to serving military officers, the military will hold enough votes to veto any future changes in the constitution. The situation of the Rohingya Muslim minority is becoming worse under the democratic regime. In this part, the paper will elaborate how the NLD faces a dilemma in dealing with this matter and also will present the views of the Mus- lims. The international community and rights groups were frustrated with the NLD leader Suu Kyi’s response towards the persecution and were also not very encouraging. On the other hand, when the military-backed USDP government enacted four “protection of race and religion” laws championed by hardliner Buddhists of the Ma Ba Tha, xi which want to promote Buddhism as a national
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 31 religion and exterminate any other minority religions in the country, especially Muslims. The Ma Ba Tha had accused Suu Kyi of being too soft on the Rohing- ya Muslims. Historically, Muslims are closer to the national hero Aung San and tried to main- tain good ties with the NLD. After the emergence of Buddhist chauvinism in My- anmar, Suu Kyi and her party NLD is surprisingly silent. Apart from the Rakhine State, a sizable number of both Rohingya and non-Rohingya Muslims have been living in Rangoon and other major cities. Most of them are holding citizenships. According to existing laws, Rohingya Muslims cannot identify themselves as “Rohingya”. It is true that ethnic Rohingya Muslims have strong differences with other ethnic Muslims minorities regarding the political situation of their country. Non-Rohingya Muslims are still in good faith with NLD and supreme leader Aung San Suu Kyi. During the interview with non-Rohingya Muslims, it is clear that Non-Rohingya Muslims have no choice to leave the NLD side because the military backed USDP is more Burman nationalist oriented and reluctant about the equal rights of ethnic religious minorities (interview, Yangon, May 2017). xii After the NLD government was formed, Muslim minorities were trying to collab- orate with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, and two leaders were with the Kofi Annan Commission. This paper observes that, Non-Rohingya Muslims do not want to oppose the NLD government but rather are seeking solution for peaceful coexistence. In Myanmar’s political history, the Rohingya-Rakhine crisis is very old and vi- cious. In December 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi visited the Rakhine State, but she refused to visit Rohingya Muslim dominated northern part and speak about the Rohingyas. The greater Muslim community, which had supported Aung San Suu Kyi earlier became disappointed because she absolutely did not speak out on the issue shortly after the 2012 communal riots in Rakhine State. Even senior NLD member Win Htein dismissed questions on Rakhine as “stupid” and said, “Why do you only ask this question? We have 1, 000 problems in our country” (cited in Vrieze, 2016). David Mathieson, Myanmar researcher for Human Rights Watch, stated in his reaction that the NLD leadership had been “very weak on addressing Rakhine” and lacked openness in their deliberations (ibid). Even Aung San Suu Kyi was not comfortable in discussing the Muslim issue in the media. Suu Kyi lost her cool with BBC’s journalist Mishal Husain after being quizzed over violence towards the Muslims minority in Burma. She was reportedly heard to say angrily, “no one told me I was going to be interviewed by a Muslim” (The Daily Mail, 2016). She has lamented the violence in Rakhine state but has refused to endorse
32 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority the judgments of organizations such as Human Rights Watch, which have blamed Arakan’s Buddhists for the persecution of the Muslims.
In the aftermath of the last parliament election, many Rohingyas hoped that the situation would improve in their ancestral land of the Arakan/Rakhine State. Ayub Khan, a small Rohingya shopkeeper, stated that “when the NLD won the elections, I also got more hope that we could get equal opportunities”(cited in Vrieze, 2016). But the reality is different and seems to be getting worse. Kyaw Hla Aung, a Rohingya community leader from Thet Kel Pyinvillage, stated that the NLD’s recent decisions had lowered the spirits among Muslim communities (ibid). Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly instructed the diplomats includ- ing new US ambassador to Burma not to use the term “Rohingya”. The NLD government minister for religion, Thura Aung Ko, who is ex-general, stated that Muslims and Hindus are “associate citizens” in Burma without any legal interpre- tation. The Rohingya leaders are deeply concerned about the citizenship verifica- tion based on the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law, which deliberately exclude the Rohingyas. The NLD has made a strong pledge to establish peaceful co-existence among the people of Myanmar. As part of the initiative, the government organized the Un- ion Peace Conference 21 Century on the last day of August and it run for five days in the capital city Naypyidaw (Radio Free Asia, 2016). No Muslim or Roh- ingya representatives were invited to that conference. The two Rohingya-led po- litical party leaders were present at the inauguration but were not allowed in the working session (interview, Yangon, October 2016). xiii Burma-related expert, Ashley South highly criticized that, “without Rohingya participation the confer- ence will not be inclusive” (interview, Chiang Mai, August 2016). xiv Aung San Suu Kyi has been under international pressure, even from her fellow Nobel lau- reates, for not speaking out for the persecuted Rohingyas. Later, she had formed a nine-member Advisory Commission chaired by former U. N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to find lasting solutions to the issues in the Arakan/Rakhine State. The overall objective of the Commission is to provide recommendations on the complex challenges facing the Rakhine State. The Commission will initiate a dialogue with political and community leaders in Rakhine with the aim of propos- ing measures to improve the well-being of all the people of the State. During its work, the Commission will consider humanitarian and developmental issues, access to basic services, the assurance of basic rights, and the security of the peo- ple of Rakhine. The Commission is expected to submit its final report and rec- ommendations to the Myanmar government in the second half of 2017 (inter- view, Yangon, October 2016 and May 2017). xv Indeed, newly formed Annan
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 33 Commission created hope for the Muslims. As a result, Rohingyas and other Muslims expected that the Commission would make a comprehensive assessment of the decades-long Rohingya victimization in Myanmar (email conversation, Nurul Islam, President-ARNO, 2016). xvi Afterthe Commission was formed, Rakhine Buddhist nationalists rejected the news that former U. N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will head a commission to discuss ethnic conflict and clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state (Win, 2016). The Arakan National Party vice chairperson Aye Nu Sein stated that it was not neces- sary to form another commission, since the administration of former President TheinSein had created a Rakhine affairs investigating commission. She also stat- ed that, “I object because this makes the issue an international affair rather than domestic” (VOA’s Burmese Service, 2016). Members of the former ruling party and a splinter group from democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s party also re- leased a statement against this commission. Some federal and regional political parties met at the USDP headquarters in Yangon and signed a joint statement against the NLD’s initiative on Rakhine State. After the meeting, USDP spokes- person Khin Ye said, “The whole nation condemns it. So do the political parties. People demonstrated. However, the commission is still operating. We don’t denounce the establishment of the commission but we are pointing to the public concerns. We receive letters from the public saying they are worried. The government has responsibility for their concerns. Our statement is urging the government not to neglect the public concerns” (Win, 2016). The civil society members in Myanmar are optimistic about the Kofi Annan Commission. Throughout the various stakeholders’ discussions in Yangon, it can be argued that the military-backed main opposition USDP is trying to destabilize the democratic government and provoking ultra-Buddhist groups against the peace process in Rakhine State. A year after the historic election put a civilian government in charge, the military, the strongest institution of the country. is again using brutal methods to regain their popularity in theface of national integ- rity.
Current violence and the transition to democracy The whole democratic transition has been facing serious challenges after the Oc- tober 2016 violence in Rakhine State. The border district of Maungdaw has turned into a hell for the Rohingyas. Under the pretext of Rohingya insurgency, there has been a combined military and police crackdown on the civilian popula-
34 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority tion with a view to annihilating the remaining Rohingya population. At least 100 villagers were killed, hundreds of houses burned down or destroyed and more than 20, 000 people were internally displaced (BROUK, 2016). The military has prevented media persons as well as any supply of food, medicines and essentials from getting through even by the WFP creating a great humanitarian disaster that demands urgent attention of the international community (Arnold, 2016). This research finds some different interpretations from the various stakeholders meeting at Yangon in the aftermath of the October 2016 military operation in Rakhine (Arakan) State.
Generically, it can be said that the military, holding three powerful ministries, is behind the creation of ongoing human tragedies in order (i) to frustrate the Kofi Annan Commission so that the human rights situation in Rakhine state remains unaddressed, (ii) to keep the Rohingya majority area of northern Arakan under military control by raising false alarms of security or so-called terrorism; (iii) to produce IDPs in Maungdaw district was done in Akyab/Sittwe district with the aim of destroying them ultimately; (iv) to permanently divide the two sister com- munities of Rohingya and Rakhine on ethnic and religious lines; and (v) to divert the attention of the people away from the ongoing war in Kachin State. The Yangon-based Rohingya and other ethnic Muslim politicians agreed that the Rohingya issue should be resolved within the Myanmar constitutional framework. They denied any involvement with separatist-militant groups rather preferring to live in peaceful political co-existence in Myanmar (interview, April and October 2016, Yangon). xviiA section of the civil society members strongly believed that, NLD government has been trying to find a durable solution for Rohingyas but not in the name of ethnic Rohingyas. It is possible and does not necessitate an amendment of the 1982 citizenship law (interview, Yangon, May 2017). xviii A large section of Rohingyas accepts this proposal but others are fighting for their “right to self-identification”. Earlier, it was mentioned that all Rohingyas boycott- ed the 2014 census, when the USDP government offered to include them in this process and labeled them as “Bengali”. Therefore, it is not easy to create positive conditions for both sides within a year. The parliamentary politics has not been practiced much since independence in Burma. Due to long military rule, democratic institutions could not flourish. The country representative of Pyidaungsu Institute Dr. SaiOo clearly stated that there is no effective opposition party in the parliament, but the military played a de facto role of opposition (interview, Yangon, October 2016). xix Three major minis- tries are now controlled by the military and they are only accountable to the
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 35 Chief of Staff. On the other hand, mature political leadership could not develop as yet because of the decades-long military rule in Myanmar. According to the present constitution, major state machineries are not under the control of the democratic government. Open-minded progressive forces exist in the society but ultra nationalist groups are much stronger in both groups, making it easy for them to obstruct the peace process. Simultaneously, the ruling party NLD has dilemma in handling this crisis. Shortly after the attacks, State Counsellor and de facto government leader Suu Kyi flew to India. After one week, she visited Japan and spent nearly about week. Neither the President of Myanmar HtinKyaw, nor the State Counsellor Suu Kyi visited the Rakhine State. Even from the NLD side, there is no concrete report or any message to the nation. The Physicians for Hu- man Rights’ report mentions that, “there are really two governments in Myan- mar: the civil government and the military government” (cited in Mcpherson, 2016). Buddhist ultranationalist group like Ashin Wirathuagain stated Islam as an existential threat to Myanmar and tried to establish their link with international terrorist groups. This incident gives an opportunity for the military to establish their control over the government in the name of national integrity. It should be noted that that NLD government does not have much control in border areas of Rakhine State. According to the constitution, minister of border and defense is appointed by the military, and it is not accountable to the civilian government. In the light of this discussion, it can be argued that Rohingya and other ethnic Mus- lims are cordial to help the NLD’s formed Kofi Annan Commission. On the oth- er hand, some angered Rohingya youths tried to destabilize the Arakan/Rakhine State in the name of right to self-determination. At the same time, the military- backed political forces including Rakhine Buddhist nationalists also played an aggressive role and provoked fresh violence all over the country against the Mus- lims.
Conclusion Historically, the military ruled the country after independence. As a result, it does not want to share state powers with the politicians. It is the limitation of present constitution that the civilian government is not independent and has less control over the security matters. In Myanmar, most of the ethnic minorities have been struggling to establish their rights since decolonization. However, the case of the ethnic and religious minority Rohingya is more complex. All their rights were confiscated by the ruling elites especially the military. As a result, the Rohingyas are now treated as unwanted people in their ancestors’ land Arakan, which is now Rakhine State. Multiculturalism is one of the best approaches to accommodate
36 Political transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingyam muslim minority ethnic-national minorities in the mainstream society. The accommodation of multiculturalism is a major challenge in any nation state (see Kymlicka, 1995 and Modood, 2007). However, Myanmar has failed to accommodate their ethnic minorities in the nation-building process since independence. A number of inter- viewees of this study think that the military and military-backed government failed to accommodate national minorities in the mainstream politics. Specifically, the Rohingyas’ ethnic-religious identity was not only rejected, but they also perse- cuted by the state and non-state actors in Myanmar. The ongoing violence in the Rakhine State and the government\s unwillingness proves that Rohingyas are in the same situation as before democratization in Myanmar. More than a year after the parliamentary election, the NLD government has failed to take effective measures to protect the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. At the same time, political leaders including the civil society has failed to address the commu- nal issue, rather it has become a part of the ethnocentric politics in Bur- ma/Myanmar.
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South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 37 Modood, T., (2007), Multiculturalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Mcpherson, Poppy., (2016), The Public Loves Myanmar New War on Muslims, Foreign Policy, Available at :
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End Notes
iRadio speech by Prime Minister U Nu on 25 September 1954 at 8 pm and public speech by Prime Minister and Defense Minister U Ba Swe at Maungdaw and Buthidaung respectively on 3 and 4 November, 1959. iiInterview with Abu Tahay, Rohingya political leader, Yangon, April 2016. iii Iinterview with Chit Lwin, former MP in 1990’s election, currently working as civil society member, Yangon, October 2016. ivThis information taken from Arakan(News and Analysis of the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation) (http://www. burmalibrary. org/docs12/Arakanmag-2011-09-red. pdf; >[ac- cessed September 2016]. vInterview with Muslim leader Aye Lwin , member of Kofi Annan Commission, Yangon, October 2016. viInterview with Muslim leader Aye Lwin , Hossain Kader , Yangon, October 2016 and May 2017. viiThe Burmese armed forces officially are called Tatmadaw. Tatmadaw is the military organi- zation of the Union of Burma. The armed forces are officially under the Ministry of Defense and comprise different forces such as: the Army, Navy, and Air Force. viiiInterview with Rohingya political leader Abu Tahay, Yangon, May, 2017. ixInterview with Kyaw Min alias Shamsul Anwor, who was elected MP in 1990’s election from Rakhine State. Currently, he is the president of Democracy and Human Rights Party, Yangon, April 2016. x Interview with Chit Lwin, former MP in 1990’s election, currently working as civil society member, Yangon, October 2016. xiMyanmar’s nationalist Buddhist group known as The Committee for the Protection of Nation- ality and Religion (Ma Ba Tha). Some of their members are closely involve with the 969 ultra- Buddhist nationalist group. xiiInterview with Kaman and Chulia ethnic Muslim minority leaders, Yangon, May 2017.
South Asian Journal of Policy and Governance 39
xiii Interview with Rohingya political leader Abu Tahay, Yangon, October 2016. xiv Interview with Ashley South, Burma related expert and currently working as a research fellow in Chiang Mai University, August 2016. xvInterview with the Burmese Muslim leader Aye Lwin , member of Kofi Annan Commission, Yangon, October 2016 and May 2017. xvi Email conversation with Nurul Islam-Rohingya exile leader based in UK, President, Arakan Rohingya National Organization, October 2016. xviiInterview with Osman alias Ye Naing, an activist of 88 Generation and Wali Ullah, Secre- tary General of the National Democratic Party for Development, Yangon, April and October 2016. xviiiInterview with Soe Ye, civil society leader in Yangon, May 2017. xixInterview with Dr. Sai Oo, country representative of the Pyidaungsu Institute. This organiza- tion has been working on peace process in Myanmar, Yangon, October 2016 and May 2017.