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OSW Commentary OSW Commentary CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES NUMBER 351 16.09.2020 www.osw.waw.pl Coronavirus test for military organisation in Russia Jolanta Darczewska The Kremlin defines the role of the Russian Federation as a superpower in the international arena in terms of the strength it can bring to bear due to its resources, and this is the backdrop for the Kremlin’s plans to integrate the capacities of the ‘forces ministries’ into a coherent state military organisation. The system, which was created to mobilise the various resources, and develop a capacity for them to be used flexibly to further Russia’s strategic political goals, has also been put to the test in the current epidemiological crisis. One form in which this has manifested itself is marginalisation of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), which officially is in charge of coordinating crisis response operations. If the effectiveness of measures to deal with coronavirus is to be measured by performance of state institutions, the way their activities are coordinated, and public trust in the authorities, Russia has failed the test. Meanwhile, regardless of the flaws in military organisation of the country (the system being overregulated, chaotic management, multiple coordinating bodies, disjointed decision-making) the ‘forces ministries’ have affirmed their position as the beneficiaries under the system. The internal and external political goals (long-term survival of the regime, information war with the West) have taken precedence over social goals. The discord between propaganda and the true situation has exacerbated public distrust of the authorities. Civil crisis management at an end agencies involved in dealing with them, from in Russia? local government through the communications, transport, and health ministries and the Rospot- The body responsible for crisis management riebnadzor sanitary regulator to the Ministry is EMERCOM, which has an official headcount of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, Rosgvardi- of 288,500. The central apparatus controls the ya, etc. Its duties include monitoring threats, local structures spread around the Russian Fed- operating the threat notification systems, and eration’s administrative units. Since 2008, the organising paramedic services. Military rescue body responsible for coordinating their activi- units are also part of the civil defence forces ties has been the National Crisis Management under EMERCOM control, which are deployed Centre (NCMC). In emergency situations, the for instance to deal with radiological, chemical, NCMC also takes charge of the activities of the and biological contamination. EDITORS: Wojciech Konończuk, Tomasz Strzelczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska, Szymon Sztyk TRANSLATION: Jon Tappenden Centre for Eastern Studies DTP: Urszula Gumińska-Kurek ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] The views expressed by the authors of the papers www.osw.waw.pl do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. The crisis management system itself operates and Countering Special Situations, chaired by on the basis of federal law, for example laws the head of EMERCOM, nor the NCMC2 were up on ‘states of emergency’, ‘special situations’ and to the task. This led the president to order fur- ‘protecting the population against natural dis- ther reform – he submitted a legislative proposal asters’. A state of emergency is declared by the amending the ‘Act on Protecting the Population president in cases of large-scale natural disas- against Natural Disasters’, making the NCMC part ters (recently during the forest wildfires of 2010), of EMERCOM, and no longer a unit under his con- while a ‘special situation’ is a situation declared trol, to make it more effective. The prime minister by EMERCOM up to ten or even twenty times was also given additional powers with regard to a year in cases of natural and other disasters, and coordinating crisis response and declaring states when people’s lives and health are at risk from of high alert and special situations3. an epidemic (a ‘special situation’ was declared in June due to an environmental disaster in the When the pandemic broke out, Arctic; in the case of COVID-19, only a regime of EMERCOM structures responsible high alert was declared). Various ministries are for crisis management in Russia involved in enforcing compliance with procedures were not up to the task. and restrictions in this case. The decision to relieve the authority afforded During the pandemic, the EMERCOM crisis man- statutory jurisdiction of the power to coordinate agement and response system described above operations ran contrary to assurances that the was not activated for reasons for which both the crisis response system was well prepared. The Kremlin and EMERCOM itself were responsible. damage done to EMERCOM’s image was probably This was primarily due to structural reform of intended to be countered by a press conference EMERCOM, which essentially has been ongoing held by Putin with governors on 27 April 2020. since 2012, when Vladimir Puchkov took over as Zinichev also appeared in person at a residence in head of the ministry. Puchkov focused on the forc- Novo-Ogaryovo, and, together with the president, es and civil defence command system. In 2018, his analysed the situation regarding fires and flood successor, Evgeny Zinichev, continued the reform. prevention in the regions, emphasising the success Zinichev is a former bodyguard of Vladimir Putin, achieved by the ministry. At that time, he did not and later served as governor of Kaliningrad and raise the issue of dealing with COVID-19: according deputy director of the FSB. Upon taking office, to the public statements he has made since the he embarked on a cleansing of personnel (at beginning of March, at the moment EMERCOM that time the president dismissed six EMERCOM is primarily concerned with construction of crisis generals), and at the end of 2019 he announced response centres in the Arctic and safeguarding that more than 500 organisational units in the northern sea route shipping4. ministry would be closed1, and that this would go hand in hand with much emphasised measures 2 М. Солопов, ‘Почему в России до сих пор не объявили to fight corruption and the arrest of members of режим чрезвычайной ситуации — и как его будут вво- дить в ближайшее время’, Медуза, 31 March 2020, www. the management of regional structures (including meduza.io. Tatarstan and the Lipetsk, Kurgan, Tver, Kemerovo, 3 Source: TASS, RIA Novosti (22 April 2020). See Законопро- ект № 931192-7 О внесении изменений в отдельные зако- and Yaroslavl Oblasts). нодательные акты Российской Федерации по вопросам предупреждения и ликвидации чрезвычайных ситуаций, СОЗД ГАС «Законотворчество», sozd.duma.gov.ru. As a result, following the outbreak of the pandem- 4 This was EMERCOM’s response to the signing on 5 March ic, neither the Standing Committee for Prevention 2020 by President Putin of The Grounds for the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic up until 2035. See Т. Борисов, ‘Спасение при минус сорока и ниже’, Российская Газета, 11 March 2020, www.rg.ru; ‘МЧС 1 М. Бондаренко, М. Юшков, ‘МЧС России решило ликвиди- обеспечит безопасность реализации проектов в Ар- ровать более 500 своих учреждений’, РБК, 24 September ктике и мореплавания по Севморпути’, Север-Пресс, 2019, www.rbc.ru. 29 April 2020, www.sever-press.ru. Subsequently, Zinichev OSW Commentary NUMBER 351 2 The missing elements in the crisis management in Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defence system were provided by the Russian Federation Forces exercises. It has also built sixteen modular Government’s Coronavirus Coordination Coun- infectious disease hospitals in the regions at risk, cil5 (set up 14 March), headed by Prime Minister and four more are under construction. It also re- Mikhail Mishustin, which included the heads of all leases daily updates on the measures it is taking of the ‘forces ministries’, an operational staff cre- in a special bulletin on its website7. Meanwhile, ated additionally on 30 March, headed by Deputy for the purpose of foreign policy, it organises Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova, which includes an ‘facemask diplomacy’, one element of which is epidemic growth information centre, and a State the much-heralded convoys with medical aid Council task force appointed by the president and for Italy and Serbia. EMERCOM’s public activities headed by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Due principally amount to drafting recommendations to this task force, the ‘model’ activities of the and procedures to be followed during a pandemic, authorities of the capital, which is at the epicentre devising awareness-raising schemes to inform the of the outbreak (police and Rosgvardiya cordon public of the consequences of not complying with around the city, patrols to enforce the system of lockdown regulations, and disinfecting public passes limiting movement of residents, use of dig- infrastructure and facilities. ital surveillance technology to enforce quarantine and lockdown), could be duplicated by regional Military organisation of state and crisis authorities, which have been given responsibility management for the success of coronavirus countermeasures in their jurisdictions. One of the consequences of the The first indication that ‘civil’ crisis management panicked response on the part of some governors, might be at an end was a statement made by who stopped people entering their jurisdictions Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in April 2019 re- or parts of
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