THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN IRAN, THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP
A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of /\ 5 The requirements for The Degree 3k
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?0LI Master of Arts In - G*4(o Political Science
by
Payam Ghorbanian
San Francisco, California
December, 2017 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL
I certify that I have read THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN IRAN,
THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP by Payam Ghorbanian and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in Political Science.
Nicole Watts, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science
f t v Katherine Gordy, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM RULE IN IRAN, THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP
Payam Ghorbanian San Francisco, California 2017
The persistence of Khamenei’s leadership stems not only from his authoritarian rule but also from his ability to organize status groups in Iran. These status groups received prestige and recognition from Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei’s status groups consisted of young Islamists jurists, those Islamists who held no personal backing or history of resistance against the Shah regime, the IRGC’s new generation of generals, those who did not play a role in decision making at the times of the Iran-Iraq war or the consolidation of the Islamic regime, and new generation of politicians, those not in office during Khomeini's leadership. This paper is a qualitative case study. A qualitative approach is employed to explain how Khamenei’s status groups preserved Khamenei’s power in country’s political institutions. As such, Khamenei’s status groups contributed Khamenei to overcome his clerical weakness, eliminated the first generation of IRGC generals and dissuaded middle class Iranians from demanding political reform.
I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.
Date REFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
As a volunteer for 2009 Iranian presidential campaign, I had a chance to talk to many
ordinary Iranians. That experience gave me the better understanding Iranians’ social- political priorities. I realized that there is a deep gap between different Iranian social classes. The economic-social priorities for a minority of the Iranian middle-class were different from those who were trying to lift up themselves from poverty. I found that poverty-stricken areas of Iran are fertile soil for politicians like Ahmadinejad to sow the seeds of hatred, thereby deepening misunderstanding between Iranians. I would not have been able to finish this paper without that experience.
I would like to dedicate my paper to my family members in Torbat Heydarieh and
Mashhad (Khorasan, Iran), especially to my fathers in the Sarbedaran movement, whose courageous in the face of the Arab invasion of Iran, Teymour invasion of Iran (especially in the Battle of Zava) has always been a source of inspiration for me. I would like to thank my mother Saeide Assar, my aunt Nadia Ghorbanian and my grandfather
Abolghasem Ghorbanian for their eternal support. Finally, I would like to thank Dr.
Nicole Watts and Dr. Katherine Gordy for their guidance and advice. TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures...... vi
Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1
Conceptual Background...... 3 Necessary but Insufficient Variables...... 7 Methodology and Thesis Structure...... 22
Chapter II: Academic Insight on Persisted Authoritarianism in Iran...... 25
Durability of Khamenei’s Leadership...... 29 Conceptual Framework ...... 33
Chapter III: Marginalizing Khomeini's Inner Circle...... 36
Plan for Islamization...... 51
Chapter IV: The IRGC...... 56
Organizing Guards in Leaders’ Status Group...... 61 Political-Social Conflicts...... 62
Chapter V: Khamenei’s Status Group among Politicians...... 73
The Formation of Principlists...... 79 Dissuading the Middle Class Iranians from Demanding Political Reform...... 81
Conclusion...... 89
References...... 96
v LIST OF FIGURES
Figures Page
1. Figure la: Ayatollah Khamenei...... 6
2. Figure lb: Ayatollah Hashemi...... 13
3. Figure lc: Massive crowd...... 14
4. Figure Id: Khamenei’s organized thugs...... 15
6: Figure le: Ayatollah Yazdi...... 16
7. Figure 3a: Discussion-based classes...... 45
8. Figure 3b: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri...... 47
9. Figure 3c: Grand Ayatollah Saafi Gulpaygani...... 49
10. Figure 3d: Grand Ayatollah Kani and Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi...... 50
11. Figure 3e: General Rahim Mousavi...... 54
12. Figure 4a: Mohsen Rezaei...... 64
13. Figure 4b: Mohammad Ali Jafari...... 66
14. Figure 4c: Iran’s missile...... 68
15. Figure 5a: President Khatami...... 74
16. Figure 5b: Hijab patrol...... 83
17. Figure 5c: The security of neighborhood...... 84
18. Figure 5d: The Green movement...... 86
vi 1
Introduction
On June 3, 1989, one day after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian
Assembly of Experts, known as the Khobregan, convened a meeting to choose the
Ayatollah Khomeini's successor. Instead of choosing another Grand Ayatollah with significant clerical standing, the majority of members voted in favor of Ali Khamenei— the president of Iran from 1981 to 1989 (Gaietta 2015, 213). Khamenei had no religious authority over the other Ayatollahs and was known as a weak politician (Abrahamian
2008, Afkhami 2009, Sahimi 2010). Khamenei did little to resist the Shah’s regime and did not belong to Khomeini’s inner circle.
The existence of long-standing authoritarian rule in Iran begs the question as to why Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership persisted despite intense pressure from Iranian pro-democracy movements to overthrow his government. As the Arab Spring in 2010 and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising demonstrate, “repression, social control, and surveillance cannot, on their own, ensure the persistence of authoritarian rule” (Brien and Diamant
2014, 17). I argue in this thesis that the persistence of Khamenei’s leadership, then, stemmed not only from his authoritarian rule but also from his ability to organize status groups in Iran. These status groups received “prestige and recognition” (Weber 1922,
241) from the religious leader and in exchange assured Khamenei’s will continued throughout the regime’s institutions. 2
According to scholars, the Khobregan selected a leader with a weak position
among other Ayatollahs and the people to keep him accountable to the Assembly of
Experts and its members (Barzin 1995, Khan 2000, Keddie and Richard 2000,
Abrahamian 2008, Emery 2013, Mazhar and Goraya 2014). Contrary to what the members of the Assembly thought, Khamenei expanded the role of religious leadership.
Among his followers, Khamenei gained status as “a shadow of God,” the deputy of the hidden Imam whose decisions are infallible (Barzin 1995, 54). In 2017, Ayatollah
Khamenei led Iran with very significant power. Khamenei unconstitutionally empowered his office to be a shadow government to control and confine executive power in himself1.
He also extended his influence beyond the Iranian border. In at least three Arab countries
(Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), he had substantial power.
1 In addition to facing challenges from Iran’s pro-democracy movement, each Iranian president resisted Khamenei’s interference with their administration. 3
Conceptual Background
According to Weber, when a charismatic leader dies, “the charismatic leadership can be routinized into a traditional form of authority” (Weber 1922, 241) (Bouguerra
2013). Iran might have developed a traditional form of authority if Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution's leader, had given leadership to his son Ahmad after his death. Instead,
Ayatollah Khamenei became the religious leader (Gaietta 2015, 213). Khamenei’s lack of clerical standing, as well as his popularity among Ayatollahs and ordinary people, meant he did not possess what Weber calls (1922) “a certain elusive quality which could allow him to attract followers and inspire people to new heights.” (241). However, he did not show interest in creating a rationalized legal system either. In contrast to Ayatollah
Khomeini’s authority, which emerged from the revolution and was accepted by the majority of Iranians, the persistence of Khamenei’s leadership depended upon his ability to organize status groups in Iran. According to Weber (1922), a country’s weak leader will organize status groups to preserve the leader’s interests and positions. Inalcik (1992) usefully defines status groups as “communities framed by notions of proper lifestyles and by the social esteem and honor” that automatically granted to them as they become the members of leader’s status groups (Inalcik 1992, 51). These status groups are inclined to give the leader their loyalty. They want to support their leader instead of other political players because his position as a leader provides them “political recognition, prestige, and honor” (Weber 1922, 242). And this explains why Khamenei’s status groups usually 4
came from the lower class, those who desperately wanted to be taken seriously and be valued and recognized for their efforts and loyalty.
In this paper, I argue that Ayatollah Khamenei organized status groups in Iran, replacing them with those who were among Khomeini’s inner circle and in charge during
Khomeini's leadership. The confrontation between these two brands of politicians
(Khomeini’s inner circle and Khamenei’s status groups) continues to the present.
Khamenei’s formation of status groups, however, led his leadership to persist for more than twenty-eight years.
To accurately analyze Khamenei’s status group, some hypothesis and actors need to be defined:
Hypothesis
HI: Islamic seminaries with marginalized Grand Ayatollahs were less likely to oppose Khamenei’s leadership.
H2: The Guards without a strongman were more likely to be obedient to
Khamenei.
H3: The Principlists who owed their advancement in Iranian politics to
Khamenei’s leadership were more likely to preserve Khamenei’s interest. 5
Status groups
The first status group is the young Islamists Jurists (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001,
Kadivar 2004, Abghari 2007, Shomali 2012, Golkar 2012, Moghaddasi and Moharrami
2015, Cooper 2016, Forozan and Shahi 2017). These are Islamists with no personal backing or history of resistance against the Shah regime. The young Islamic Jurists replaced Khomeini’s inner circle in Iranian politics. Because of their close relationship with Khomeini, Khomeini’s inner circle (consisted of his leading students, such as
Ayatollah Montazeri, Hashemi, and Khoeiniha) saw themselves more qualified for the religious leadership position and could have rebelled against Khamenei’s authority. In
2017, the Islamic Jurists Khamenei brought into Iranian politics were in charge of
Khamenei’s office. They were also in charge of Iranian intelligence branches, the police, the Army, judiciary system, and the Guardian Council. More importantly, the jurists brought the Islamic seminaries in Qom and Najaf under the control of Khamenei, aiming to marginalize the Grand Ayatollahs who questioned Khamenei’s ability to rule the country. Islamic seminaries with marginalized dissident Grand Ayatollahs were less likely to oppose Khamenei’s religious authority. Figure la — Ayatollah Khamenei, the most powerful leader of Iran (Leader.ir)
The second status group that strengthened Khamenei’s authority is the IRGC’s new generation of generals ( Friedenfels 1998, Alfoneh 2008, Sazegara 2009, Woods,
Murray, Holaday and Elkhamri 2009, Safshekan and Sabet 2010, Harris 2013, Forozan and Shahi 2017). These are generals who played no role in decision making during the
Iran-Iraq war or the consolidation of the Islamic regime. They replaced the first generation of Guards, those close to Khomeini’s inner circle. The lack of strong men among the new generals led the IRGC to become a tool of suppression in Khamenei’s hands. 7
The third status group is the new generation of politicians, known as Principlists
(Arjomand 1997, Munck and Leff 1997, Foran and Goodwin 1997, Tarock 2001, Dabashi
2011, Fadaee 2012, Habibi 2013, Shabani 2013). These men did not hold office during
Khomeini's leadership. They mostly consisted of retired IRGC’s generals and officers.
They served to defeat Khamenei’s opponents in both parliamentary and presidential
elections by effectively blocking the reformists and moderates from political power.
Political competition between Principlists and moderates also helped Khamenei show off his regime’s confined democracy to Iran’s non-democratic neighbors. The Principlists were more likely to preserve Khamenei's interest because they owed their advancement in
Iranian politics to Khamenei’s leadership.
Necessary but Insufficient Variables
Several developments in Iranian political history laid the foundation for the
emergence of Khamenei’s status groups. They can be seen as necessary but insufficient variables in explaining Khamenei’s longevity in office and his influence. Such variables
“may increase or decrease the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables” (Kumar 2014, 86). Khamenei’s persistent leadership, and the
formation of his status groups, too, have been affected by such variables. These variables are relevant, but insufficient to solely explain the durability of the long-standing authoritarian rule in Iran. 8
According to Sazegara (2013), Khomeini held more of a sitting caliph position,
while Khamenei is a standing dictator. Khamenei asserted that no barrier or limitation
should stand between him and his divine right to run the country. Making this assertion
acceptable for all political players, and eliminated those who could have opposed to his
leadership (Khomeini’s inner circle, for instance), however, took Khamenei 16 years
(from 1989 to 2005). During these 16 years, several developments laid the groundwork
for the emergence of Khamenei’s status groups’ influence in Iranian politics. These
developments determined the degree to which Ayatollah Khamenei could practice his
formal power. According to Iran’s formal political structure, the government is run by the
Religious Leadership on behalf of the Savior, Imam Mahdi2. In this way, the Religious
Leadership should endorse all the decisions. Khamenei’s formation of status groups and his confrontation with Khomeini’s inner circle needs to be seen in the light of Khamenei’s tendency to conquer all political positions and overcome informal power in Iran. The
impact of Islamic Republic Party on Iranian politics, as it caused political polarization, helped Khamenei to form his status groups. Ayatollah Hashemi’s economic policy, as it
increased financial-social injustice and inequality, and the U.S Army return to the Persian
Gulf, as it helped Khamenei to keep the IRGC under his supervision, on their own, paved
2 “In the Shia belief system, the Hidden Imam, who is an ultimate savior of humankind—the final Imam of the Twelve Imams—will emerge with Jesus Christ and will set the kingdom of heaven on the earth to bring peace and justice to the whole world.” (Ghorbanian 2014, 2). 9
the way for the formation of Khamenei’s status groups. These variables together contributed Khamenei to stay in power for more than 28 years.
The impact of IPR
The impact of IPR and its various factions on Iranian politics is a first necessary but insufficient variable that I study in this chapter. The IRP caused political polarization in Iranian politics, thereby contributing Khamenei to channel political hostility among politicians towards the formation of status groups.
During Khomeini's leadership, religious leadership resembled the traditional
Marja3. Like other Maraji, Khomeini put his son in charge of his office. Khomeini’s son,
Ahmad, along with Ayatollahs Beheshti, Hashemi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Khoeiniha composed Khomeini’s inner circle. On issues concerning the country’s national security,
Khomeini’s inner circle played a role and advised him until his death in 1989.
Khomeini’s son usually took calls and managed meetings while the circle's members worked as employees and advisors. In the event of a political crisis, Khomeini played the role of mediator. He hosted left and right-wing politicians (Islamic Republic Party’s factions’ leaders) in his office to bring them closer to resolution.
3 Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq provides an excellent example of a traditional Marja. He holds power and influence to force politicians to follow his orders, but rarely utilizes this power. 10
Contrary to the aims of the Pahlavi regime, which wanted to increase popular political participation by creating a single-party system, Khomeini used his version of the single-party rule to advance his united agenda. Unlike the dictators in the MENA states,
4 who personally oversee the country’s ruling party , Khomeini stepped back from the head of IRP and let factions’ leaders such as Ayatollahs Khamenei, Hashemi, Beheshti,
Mousavi-Ardebili, Mahdavi-Kani, and Bahonar fight for leadership positions. Khomeini personally “encouraged the creation of competing factions” within the IRP (Wintrobe
1998, 213). This tactic prevented the emergence of political rivals who might have threatened Khomeini and his tendency to monopolize power since these factions focused on keeping each other away from leadership positions in the IRP than opposing the
Khomeini’s leadership. In this way, “factions within the IRP competed to gain
Khomeini's support, tattling on each other to demonize those on the opposite side”
(Wintrobe 1998, 214). The fight over IRP’s leadership in turn promoted political resentment, and political polarization among party members. However, their enthusiasm
to defeat leftists and nationalists in the elections made them move on, abandoning their resentment (Chapin 1987, 57).
4 Rastakhiz party during the Shah regime, for instance, emerged as “a cult of personality as the Shah became increasingly convinced of his identification with the principles of progress and national independence” (Ansari 2003, 71). Party leaders, too, played an important role in encouraging the Shah to accept the party’s leadership, since they could go back to their traditional roles—’’taking command and performing their duties without being questioned about their achievements” (71). 11
Like political parties in Western countries, IRP’s factions held different political agendas, platforms, and leaders. The left and right wings of IRP disagreed about the practice of Political Islam, including the proper economic doctrine for the future of Iran.
In Iran’s political system, both factions defined themselves as faithful followers of
Khomeini and the revolution’s principles.
According to Ashraf and Banuazizi (2001), in the second term of Khamenei’s presidency, political tension between party’s factions rose again. In 1984, Khamenei wanted to change the Prime Minister Mousavi; yet the Khomeini’s circle insisted on the necessity of political stability. They argued that it was not expedient for Iran to change its
Prime Minister when the country is at war (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001, 345). Even
Khamenei indicated his disagreement with Parliament’s candidate for prime minister, the absolute protection of Khomeini, and the majority of seats in the Islamic Parliament led
Mousavi to start his second term as a prime minister. Khamenei refused to defend
Mousavi’s picks for a cabinet, and later on, he did not participate in Parliament meetings to confirm Mousavi’s ministers.
The existence of political resentment between IRP’s factions perpetuated its influence even after “IRP dissolved itself in 1987” (Barzin 1998, 54). It this light, it was easier for Khamenei to channel such hostility among politicians towards the formation of status groups. Khamenei was able to organize the subordinates against those who led the
IRP’s factions. 12
Hashemi’s Economic Policy
President Hashemi’s economic policy (1989-1997) is a second necessary but insufficient variable. Hashemi’s economic policies resulted in financial-social injustice and inequality, thereby contributing Khamenei to channel the working class anger towards the formation of his status groups. When Khomeini’s inner circle controlled the executive power in the 1980s, they considered governmental authority as a tool to fill the wealth gap. Extensive destruction from eight years of war with Iraq made the inner circle change their economic beliefs5. They realized that healing Iran’s economy necessitated foreign money and investments. They also realized that international investing is subject to the transparent monetary policy. When Ayatollah Hashemi, the dominant member of
Khomeini’s inner circle, became the president of Iran, he enacted the privatization and liberalization of Islamic regime's economy.
The expansion of Khamenei’s status groups occurred while Hashemi turned his focus to resolving long-standing financial issues facing Iran. According to Pesaran
(2011), Hashemi’s economic reform crushed some people under its wheel. During the
1980s, the majority of Iranians grew accustomed to living as beneficiaries of subsidies on a variety of goods, including foods and energy, health insurance, and housing. What the
IMF dictated for the Iran economy, however, gave Hashemi few options. Hashemi had to
5 The war crippled Iran’s infrastructure. Saddam’s Army “wiped out 4,000 Iranian villages and damaged 52 cities (6 of the cities were completely leveled while another 15 sustained damage of 30-80 percent)” (Amirahmadi 1992, 1). 13
cut subsidies, encourage privatization, and change the sources of government revenue from full reliance on oil to a tax-driven economy6 (Pesiaran 2011, 98).
Hashemi’s economic policy resulted in rapid but unbalanced economic growth.
While the urban middle-class enjoyed the high salaries and benefits of economic growth, financial-social injustice and inequality caused sectors like “low-income” to suffer and be forgotten (Tiliouine 2016, 227).
Figure lb —Ayatollah Hashemi and Ayatollah Khomeini, photo by Alain Dejean
According to Keddie and Richard (2003), to channel the working class anger,
Khamenei and his organized groups politicised charities across the country. In addition to facilitating needy families with financial aids the Hashemi’s administration could not
6 Thus, Hashemi’s eight-year presidency can be summed up as follows: “Presenting the new economic approach as in keeping with the revolutionary spirit” (Pesaran 2011, 99). 14
provide, charities became part of the Khamenei’s propaganda, introducing Hashemi and
Khomeini’s inner circle as a source of the problem and frustration within the country.
Charities attracted poor people for massive pro-Khamenei demonstrations in the capital and other cities Khamenei usually visited (Tiliouine 2016, 227). Charities also dragged poor people into some violent activities. Charities identified “those with criminal records” and recruited them to attack political gatherings, events, and speeches where anyone challenged Khamenei’s authority (228).
Figure lc — A massive crowd gathered for Khamenei’s weekly speech (Leader.ir) 15
According to Ferdowsi (2014), Khamenei extended his power over the Iranian judiciary system by appointing his trustees as Islamic justices mainly to provide judicial
immunity for his organized criminal group. Decreasing the power and influence of
Khomeini's inner circle in the judiciary system, too, motivated Khamenei to implement
his comprehensive plan, bringing the judiciary system under his and his status groups’
control.
Figure Id — Khamenei’s organized criminal group (Flickr.com)
In 1989, Khamenei made Ayatollah Yazdi, an outsider in Iranian politics, head of
a judiciary system. Yazdi forced many justices who led the revolutionary courts during
the Khomeini era to retire. Khamenei’s new position of power gave Yazdi the ability to
empower jurists who showed loyalty to the Khamenei. As a result, the Iranian judiciary 16
system witnessed a massive influx of young, ambitious Islamic jurists who recently
7 finished school and followed Khamenei’s order .
Figure le — Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Yazdi (Leader.ir)
According to Keshavarzian (2009), the Khamenei’s readjustment of the judiciary system faced a barrier in the power and influence of the Bazaar’s political branch in the
Iranian Judiciary system. During the days of resistance against the Shah regime, bazaar provided financial support for Islamic Jurists and their families to help them continue their revolutionary movement. Pahlavi had labeled the Bazaaris a barrier to modernization since they wanted to monopolize Iran’s importing and exporting market,
7 During the reformist era, these justices helped Khamenei suppress his opponents by sentencing them to lengthy prison terms. 17
g putting it under their control without paying a fair share of taxes . By the fall of the
Shah’s regime, the political branch of bazar (Bazaaris), had joined the IRP, the revolutionary committees, and the IRGC to protect their interest in the formation of political institutions within the Islamic regime. They entered these organizations and, indeed, became part of the repressive power of the Islamic government while they did not give up their social status as the Bazaaris. In the IRGC, for instance, many of generals
9 came from the bazaar . The Bazaaris’ involvement in Iran’s Islamic judiciary system played the most vital role to preserve their institutional interest'0. As such, they executed bazaar’s rivals, the Baha'i, and Jewish merchants, previously empowered by the Shah’s regime to knock down bazaar and replace it with a free market (Chapin 1987). The
Bazaaris did not integrate into the Islamic Regime’s political institutions to practice politics or to gain government titles. Instead, they wanted to make a “structural link with regime’s elites” to keep their monopoly in Iran’s trade turnover (Keshavarzian 2009,
230). They possessed the political power to inspire the policy-making, which in turn, protected their socio-economic interest. In exchange for the Bazaaris’ resignation and collaboration, Khamenei offered the Bazaaris continued control of their monopoly in
8 The Shah considered “bazaars as symbols of backwardness" (Chapin 1987, 210). 9 For instance, “Muhsin Rafighdoost who worked in the vegetable market during the Shah regime”. Later one and after the victory of Islamic revolution, “Rafighdoost became the commander in chief of the IRGC” (Chapin 1987, 232). 10 For instance, “Asadollah Lajevardi, as a chief of justice, oversaw the mass murder of political prisoners for almost ten years” (Keshavarzian 2009, 233). Lajvardi ran a network of torture and execution aimed at killing a large number of the anti-regime protesters. 18
Iran’s trade turnover (Keshavarzian 2009, 233). Their monopoly in some areas of the
country’s importation continues to the present. Since Hashemi wanted to sell a new image
of Iran to the West and forced the retirement of those Bazaaris who were involved in a
mass murder of dissident could send the signal to the western powers of a reformed Iran,
President Hashemi approved Khamenei’s readjustment of the judiciary system (Tiliouine
2016,). Hashemi hoped to normalize Iran’s relationship with the West to access the
financial investments that Iran desperately needed.
First Persian Gulf War
The U.S Army’s return to the region is the last necessary but insufficient variable
which contributed Khamenei to keep the IRGC under his control, and formed a status
group among the second generation of guards.
During the 1990s, even though Khamenei’s intervention in Iranian politics and
Judiciary system paved the way for the formation of his status groups, his real power and
influence in Iranian politics paled in comparison to that of Hashemi and Khomeini’s inner
circle. In this way, Khamenei tried to improve his relationship with the IRGC and Basij.
Khamenei attempted to magnify the impact of IRGC’s deinstitutionalization on Iran’s national security when he faced Khomeini's inner circle, who wanted to deinstitutionalize the IRGC just as they deinstitutionalized the revolutionary committees (Dabashi 2011).
Khamenei’s status groups spread the belief through the network of media and charities 19
that an imminent US attack threatened Iran, and the Iranian Army could not defend Iran on its own (Walker 2008). If the country faced a permanent threat, Hashemi could not deinstitutionalize the IRGC. Due to the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, US troops returned to the region to secure the most strategic waterway (Ostovar 2016, 147). The
U.S Army’s return to the Persian Gulf allowed Khamenei to sell his rhetoric to ordinary people. As a result, the majority of Iranians disagreed with Hashemi’s decision about the deinstitutionalization of the IRGC. Fear of deinstitutionalization kept the IRGC close to the religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Increased political ties between the Guards and
Ayatollah Khamenei aimed at decreasing Hashemi’s power over the issues concerning the country’s military and security. In this way, the first generation of IRGC generals, who served the country during the war with Iraq and eventually grew close to Khomeini’s inner circle, stood as a barrier. By eliminating the first generation of Guards, the IRGC became the suppression tool in the hands of Khamenei. They suppressed Khamenei's opponents and extended his influence within and beyond Iran’s borders. In the last few years, IRGC generals and Islamic jurists competed to get closer to the Leader (Sazegara
2013). Eventually, the IRGC generals overtook the jurists on matters related to the country’s national security. For instance, in 2009, the IRGC General Vahid Haghanian replaced Asghar Mir Hejazi, an Islamist jurist who managed Khamenei’s intelligent department for almost 20 years (Khalaji 2009, 3). In 2017, the Guards sought out their institutional interests. They started to interfere in the Iranian economy in addition to their 20
role in Iranian politics. Even with the additional power in 2017, they were obedient to
Ayatollah Khamenei, and no strong man existed among them (Rahimi 2011). While
Khamenei enjoyed his upper hand in the IRGC and Basij, Khomeini's inner circle mobilized middle-class Iranians in the 1997 presidential election. More than 20 million people voted in favor of their candidate, Mohammad Khatami, and sought a real change in the country's power structure. Khomeini’s inner circle’s return to Iranian politics under the name of the reformist movement, made Khamenei realize he needed to form a status group among the politicians (Piri 2010). As a result, Iranian politics met the politicians loyal to Khamenei’s leadership, known as Principlists. They mostly consisted of the
IRGC retired generals and officers. More opportunities to run for offices such as the additional governmental funds and the possibility of having their candidacy qualified from Guardian Council favored the Principlists. These politicians first defeated Iranian reform movement and in 2017 stood as the Moderates’ opponents. Political competition between Principlists and Moderates help Khamenei show off his regime’s confined democracy to Iran’s neighbors with no political elections, like Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
If international observers stopped to consider the rights of independent parties to engage in Iranian politics, many might merely assume a democratic power shift in Iran occurred. In 2017, Power in Iran shifted between the regime’s two political wings and resulted in a situation where people were free to choose between those who already 21
proved their loyalty to the Islamic system (so-called the right and left-wing of Iranian politics). 22
Methodology
This paper is a qualitative case study. Data collection in qualitative case studies can be done in three different ways: “Unstructured interviews; Observations; and
Secondary sources” (Kumar 1999, 192). In this paper, I collect data from secondary sources such as “Government or quasi-government publication, Earlier research (books and scholarly papers), and mass media (newspapers, magazines, internet and so on)”
(197). The existence of bias in media and scholarly papers, especially those written by the regime’s opponents, should be taken seriously. In this regard, I examine their claims about the Khamenei’s status groups with multiple resources, including neutral observers, to decrease the existence of bias in this thesis.
Paper’s structure
In chapter II, the literature review, I review scholarship on Khamenei’s persistent leadership and his status groups. These articles shed light on the importance of my question concerning the persistence of authoritarian rule in Iran. The papers I review in chapter II discuss the variety of tactics that Khamenei’s status groups have used to ensure the continuity of Khamenei’s leadership. However, the role of Khamenei’s status groups to assist him to overcome his clerical weakness, and destroy his opponents’ influence in
Iran’s political institutions where Khomeini's inner circle had the upper hand lacks a cumulative amount of research. By identifying the weakness of such scholarly papers in 23
stating their questions, study design and collection of data, I try to avoid repeating the
same mistakes.
In chapter III, IV, and V, I analyze Khamenei’s status groups. These status groups
consisted of young Islamists jurists, those Islamists who held no personal backing or
history of resistance against the Shah regime, the IRGC’s new generation of generals,
“those who did not play a role in decision making at the times of the Iran Iraq war or the
consolidation of the Islamic regime” (Golkar 2012, 3), and a new generation of politicians, those not in office during Khomeini's leadership.
Chapter III analyses the role of Khomeini's status group, the young Jurists, in contributing to Khamenei’s ability to overcome his clerical weakness. I argue that the high council of the Islamic Seminaries institutionalized to bring together a variety of disciplines and methods of teaching in the seminaries, in turn, reduced the seminaries’ dependency on people’s religious tax, taken to the Grand Ayatollahs, and made it more dependent on the government’s budget instead. By bringing seminaries under the
Khamenei’s status group’s control and attacking the Grand Ayatollahs’ source of power, the religious tax, Khamenei’s status group indeed destroyed the political immunity and support that being affiliated with Grand Ayatollahs had provided for Khomeini's inner circle. As a result, eliminating and marginalizing the Khomeini’s inner circle from Iranian politics did not affect Khamenei. 24
Chapter VI analyses the role of the IRGC’s second generation of generals in
cutting ties between their institution and Khomeini’s inner circle. To eliminate the first generation of IRGC generals, close to Khomeini’s inner circle, Khamenei adapted the
same policy President Bouteflika modified in Algeria. In so doing, Khamenei empowered ordinary officers and replaced them gradually with those close to the circle. The lack of
strong men among the new generals led the IRGC to become the suppression tool in the hands of Khamenei.
Chapter V argues that the victory of the reformists in the 1997 presidential election encouraged Khamenei to form his status group among politicians. Some members of Khomeini's inner circle supported the Reformist movement, and its failure would be called the Khomeini’s inner circle’s failure. The Principlists’ victory over the reformists’ movement did not constitute a normal power shift. Rather, it replaced hope with fear. As a result, middle-class Iranians, who supported reformists movement, dropped out of politics. The marginalization of middle-class Iranians stands as the last chain of Khamenei’s battle to monopolize power in Iranian politics. 25
Chapter II, Academic Insight on Persistent Authoritarianism in Iran:
In this chapter, I briefly review the scholarship on durable authoritarianism in the
Middle East. I also present the conceptual framework that I used for this thesis.
To understand the conditions that preserve authoritarianism particularly in regions
such as MENA states, however, first, we need to define authoritarianism as a concept.
Authoritarianism is a “political system which bans constitutional opportunities for people to change the governing officials” (Lipset 1959, 71). According to Bryen (1992),
Haggard and Kaufman (1999), Beilin (2004), Chandra (2006) and Robinson (2006), such political system bans its citizens’ political engagement regarding socioeconomic-cultural conditions of the country. In addition to socioeconomic-cultural conditions, specific political factors, could play a role in strengthening the authoritarian rule (Lipset 1959,
Kitschelt 1992, O’Neil 1996, Anderson 1999, Beilin 2012). In the Middle East, for
instance, a political formula, which is a process by which an authoritarian rule is politically legitimized for those who are involved in politics is a specific factor which preserves authoritarianism. As such, the role of clergies in supporting and legitimizing an
authoritarian rule, as has occurred in Iran, is indeed a political formula. The impact of wealth, too, is a political formula. Wealth, especially as it increases among the elites and masses, provides more powerful political support for authoritarian rulers, thereby marginalizing extremist groups. For instance, in a rentier state with a high degree of wealth among both elites and masses, people may be reluctant to demand any significant 26
political change (Yates 1996, Khan 2003, Beblawi 2015). Besides the economic development, an authoritarian rule may be legitimized by particular historical circumstances. Jordan’s kings, for instance, were legitimized in part through their families’ lineage to the Prophet Muhammad's tribe (Anderson 1999).
The role of politicians in office in providing the rules of political play is another factor that preserves authoritarianism in the Middle East ( (Lipset 1959, Kitschelt 1992,
O’Neil 1996, Anderson 1999, Beilin 2012). This factor also comprises the real differences between scholars and their approaches. For structure-oriented scholars, politicians are indeed parts of the actual economic-social conditions of their countries
(Kitschelt 1992, Abrahamian 1993, Kuran 2012, Grigoriadis 2016). Those conditions impose “narrow choice sets on political actors,” and political actors cannot separate themselves from those conditions (Kitschelt 1992, 1028). Kuran (2012) and Grigoriadis
(2016), for instance, argue that Islam has significantly affected the actual economic-social conditions of Islamic countries. According to authors, Islam has contributed to authoritarian rule by defining brutality in terms of a divine design, justifying repressive power as a result (Kitschelt 1992, Kuran 2012, Grigoriadis 2016). Certain economic principles of Islam, too, may be used to explain the lack of democratic institutions
(Grigoriadis 2016, 786). These principles are “(1) low tax rate"; (2) Waqfs'2, and (3)
11 2.5 percent tax on savings and not gross earnings. 12 “The political weakness of Islamic trusts known as Waqfs” (allocating properties to be used for a religious purpose after the death of owners, Waqfs could be used for tax relief from inheritance tax). 27
negative thought towards a banking system” since it practices usury13(Grigoriadis 2016,
786). In contexts in which Islam could be used to provide barriers against the formation of a comprehensive tax system, authoritarian regimes came to depend on their natural resources, including oil and gas, to cover expenses. When such governments do not tax their people, it is more difficult for citizens to demand accountability. In addition to the
Islamic economic principles, the collectivist nature of Islam may be used to support a caste system, allowing one small group to gain supremacy, like the Prophet Muhammad’s family, Imams, Ayatollahs, and their followers or “brand of helpers” (Weber 1922 242).
In contrast to structure-oriented scholars, process-oriented scholars tend to consider “politicians as the makers of choice sets” (Kitschelt 1992, 1028, Gause 1998,
Lust 2009, Abrahamian 1989, Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001). Such scholars argue that politicians have abilities to change or affect their countries’ political-social conditions.
For instance, the rise of fascism in Europe constituted a transition from semi-democratic regimes to authoritarian ones. In such European countries (Italy, Germany, Spain, and
Austria) where this shift occurred, a significant industrialized economic structure had developed. Therefore, political-social conditions in such countries favored democratic transition (Lubbert 1991). In contrast, “the right-wing coalitions” were able to change the
13 Islamic principles illegalize the acceptance of specific interest or fees for loans of money from banks or individuals, thereby preventing the private sectors from fixing their problems in case they need monetary aid. 28
game, stabilizing their political agenda and destroying their liberal opponents (Kitschelt
1992, 1029).
In contrast to structure-oriented scholars who blame Islam for authoritarianism in
MENA states, the process-oriented scholars argue that Islam and democracy can be
compatible (Lust 2009, Abrahamian 1989, Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001). According to
authors, the political polarization over Islam, encouraged by such countries’ leaders, may be seen as a core factor of authoritarianism14. As such, political polarization over Islam caused a great deal of injustice and inequality in such societies. Moreover, It led the
Islamic regimes (like Iran under the leadership of Khamenei or Iraq under the direction of
Prime Minister Maliki) to draw a line between their supporters, the insiders, and opponents, the outsiders, with preference to their supporters’ political-economic improvement. According to scholars (William 2008, Simpson 2008, Haddad 2011, Davis
2013), such political polarization may cause subgroups within state-nations to identify themselves with the imaginary boundaries of their political culture, rather than integrating with a particular state's interest. This model, however, can evolve into violent sectarianism—as it evolved in Iraq in 2016. Davis (2013), for instance, argues that the
14 In addition to political polarization over Islam, the presence of oil rents, and the engagement of regional and international forces, too, are the primary concepts for understanding the delay in developing democracy in middle-eastern countries, like Iran. 29
main reason for ethnic violence in Iraq in 2016 was not ethnic diversity, but the way sectarianism was socially and politically contextualized.
Academic Insight on Durability of Khamenei’s leadership
Both structure-oriented and process-oriented studies can be helpful in understanding how Khamenei’s authority has persisted in Iran. Structure-oriented scholars (Arjomand 1984, Cohen 1982, Ganji 1999, Gellner 1994, Yazdi 1995, Namazi
2000, Doyle and Simpson 2006), might point to how “state-controlled civil society” formed and strengthened by its uses of political Islam (Doyle 2006, 763). This effect has undermined the ability of Khamenei’s opponents to oppose him and his status groups. For instance, Simpson (2006) argue that a formation of a state-controlled civil society in Iran constrained the Khamenei’s opponents’ political engagement by preventing them from mobilizing for political reform (769)15. The state-controlled civil society in Iran was able to affect civil society and its subsets. It allowed and encouraged NGOs to work on
“limited field[s] of interest” such as Iran’s environment, a topic NGOs were free and encouraged to study (Namazi 2000, 145). More importantly, state-controlled civil society has introduced activists to a new social-political role encouraging their participation in political-social activities of the Islamic regime. For instance, Afkhami (1984), Vatandoust
15 Although Iran’s scale of social control may not be comparable to that of “Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin,” it operationalizes a large-scale surveillance (Doyle and Simpson 2006, 753). 30
(1985), Afshar (1989), Najmabadi (2000) and Terman (2010) studied the political deprivation these activities have created for Iranian women. They argue that
state-controlled civil society led Iranian women to distinguish themselves from western
feminism, melding into each other to become a revolutionary unit16. In this light, the
creation of revolutionary Islamist woman did not return women to their traditional roles
as mothers and wives, but instead, Islamist women possessed the freedom to help
Khamenei consolidate his base of power and continue his leadership. Islamist women
served in the armed forces branch known as the “guidance patrol,” compelling women to wear clothes according to Iran’s Islamic dress code (Vatandoust 1985, Afshar 1989,
Najmabadi 2000 and Terman 2010, 299). Islamist women joined both the reformist and principlist wings of Iranian politics. They held positions as members of the Islamic
Parliament and the executive branch of government. Their political-social role helped
Khamenei to convince international observers that Iran tolerated the political engagement of women in civic activities and politics. This more open system in Iran contrasted other
Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that banned women’s political participation.
In contrast to structure-oriented scholars, the process-oriented scholars study the role of Khamenei, his status groups and their tactics in extending the Khamenei’s control and influence in Iranian politics (Mohajer 1994, Behdad 1995, Gheissari 1998, Kalathil
16 Islamic regime “called upon the figure of Fatima (daughter of the Prophet Muhammad),” who inspired the first Shia movement against the injustices of her time (Terman 2010, 298). Fatima wore a complete hijab while she protested against the deviation of her father’s successors. Fatima’s role as a wife, mother, and political activist at the same time made her an Islamist idol for female Shia Muslims. 31
2000, Ansari 2000, Parsa 2000, Menshari 2001, Ganji 2003, Esfandiari 2005, Dabashi
2011, Rahim 2011, Golkar 2012). Such scholars believe that Khamenei’s ability to keep dissidents isolated both from the outside world and from each other became the most critical mechanism he utilized to maintain authority. For instance, Rahim (2011) studies the Khamenei and his status groups’ efforts to promote their version of political reality through cyberspace, thereby keeping dissidents isolated from the outside world.
Regardless of the cohesion and effectiveness of the social identity that cyberspace provides for its users, Rahimi (2011) and Dabashi (2011) argue that social media can be seen as a potential resource for political mobilization. Several case studies, such as the
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Green Movement in Iran, highlight the ability of social media to mobilize civil society to rebel against authoritarian rule. During the Green
Movement, for instance, Khamenei’s status groups engaged in internet censorship aimed
17 at blocking dissidents’ contact through the internet . Although hacktivists’ effort in 2009 to unblock Internet access fuelled the opposition movement to continue, since the contact between the protesters became possible through a variety of websites and social networks
18, intensified surveillance and social control in cyberspace finally silenced the activists’ voices.
17 The Internet in Iran led dissidents to cooperate and communicate with each other during the heated days of Green movement” (Rahimi 20122, 168). 18 As a result, the movement could publicize the places of opposition gatherings, and organize more people to rebel against the Islamic regime. 32
The regime's control of cyberspace “resulted in the formation of the intelligence unit in the IRGC (Iranian Cyber Army)” (Rahimi 2011, 172). In this way, Iranian Cyber
Army spread rumors about the Green Movement’s leaders (Anderson 2013). This strategy forced the leaders of the opposition movement to play their cards with rules set by the
Iranian Cyber Army. Green movement’s leaders shifted their agendas from invasive war aimed at demolishing Khamenei’s leadership to efforts to address the rumors (Shabani
2013). Khamenei’s status groups inspired other authoritarian regimes as well as semi-fascist movements across the world to reshape their political agendas,
“delegitimizing their opponents through a network of accusations and online harassment”
(Rahimi 2011, 17, Dabashi 2011, Shabani 2013). More importantly, Khamenei’s status groups were able to engage dissidents in daily, bureaucratic struggles that confined them to a routine and, in the process, ignited a deep sense of frustration. As scholars observe, keeping dissidents isolated from the outside world led Khamenei and status groups took one step further, taking the initiative “to reform the educational system of universities”
(Butler 2009, Daragahi 2009, Elling 2009, Piri 2011, Golkar 2012, 1). This step aimed at keeping dissidents isolated from themselves, since it brought more “ideologically driven players” into the political game, and replaced them with those who grew and trained during the Shah regime or Khomeini’s era (Piri 2011, 115). Authoritarian rulers often believe that his opponents suffer from ideological and educational distortions, and subsequently, harshly suppress them. At the same time, the authoritarian regime enforces 33
a plan to train a new generation of people, with personalities similar to “the characteristics of a superior man” portrayed by such regime’s propaganda (Daragahi
2009, 55). The new generation of students that Khamenei tried to train was supposed to defend his so-called values and principles after they graduated and took their place within the Iranian society.
Conceptual Framework
This paper adapts process-oriented approaches by studying Khamenei’s status groups and their tactics to monopolize power in Iranian politics. The positive case of
Khamenei’s persistent leadership, the circumstances that led to his selection to a religious leadership could have confined his ability to monopolize power. Yet his ability to organize status groups in Iranian politics allowed him to conquer political barriers and stabilize his political platform in Iranian politics (Mohajer 1994, Behdad 1995, Gheissari
1998, Kalathil 2000, Ansari 2000, Parsa 2000).
This paper argues that the formation of Khamenei’s status groups changed political reality in Iran. It was Khamenei and his status groups that eliminated the
Khomeini’s inner circle from Iranian politics, although the socio-economic conditions were in favor of Khomeini’s inner circle. As such, the Khomeini’s inner circle’s upper 34
hand in all political institutions and Khamenei’s lack of religious authority could have prevented Khamenei from maintaining the power.
Under the condition that students, their teachers, activists, or political dissidents could not engage in politics, Khamenei’s status groups captured state institutions and undermined governmental services (Menshari 2001, Ganji 2003, Esfandiari 2005,
Dabashi 2011, Rahim 2011, Golkar 2012). Given the traditional Islamic dichotomy of believers versus non-believers from which Iran’s Islamic regime drew ideological support, those who believed in the revolution’s goals and values found more opportunities for financial enrichment. Iran’s nationally-directed resource distribution also aimed at subordinating those who did not believe in Islamic values and Khamenei’s principles by keeping non-believers at a distance from financial resources. As a result, the
Iranian regime’s economic resources only rewarded Khamenei’s status groups, a fact that made Khamenei’s status groups significant players in Iranian politics.
The financial structure of the Islamic regime, however, showed the inability of
Khamenei’s government to provide financial-social progress for all Iranians. In 2017, more than 20% of Iranians lived below the poverty line, while 70% of Iranians encountered financial problems in covering their monthly needs and expenses
(Kazemipur and Rezaei 2003, 349). Under Khamenei’s leadership, Iranian Sunnis, for instance, who mostly live in the Kurdish region of Iran, suffer from a high rate of unemployment, while Shia Muslims in same neighborhoods enjoy more enormous 35
benefits and opportunities in their daily lives (349). The formation of Khamenei’s status
groups and their roles in Iranian politics will be discussed in the next chapters. 36
Chapter III, Marginalising Khomeini's Inner Circle
A Crisis of Political Instability
According to Lipset (1959), the political stability of a regime depends on three factors. These factors are effectiveness, legitimacy, and the presence of various ideologies. These may be in correlation with the economic development of that regime, but they are separately important (86).
Effectiveness refers to the ability of a regime to satisfy its citizens and its institutions’ ambitions, making them believe that their expectations are destined to be achieved (86). Legitimacy can be discerned regarding prevailing impressions among citizens that the “current structure is the most appropriate form” (86). Such satisfaction can be derived from the solutions a government offers to resolve the country’s social, political, and economic problems (86). A modem state may also be challenged by unique sources of cleavage within societies. As such, different religious identities or social divisions may cause the political instability (92). The presence of ideologies that consider differences between a country’s political players as a source of supremacy can likewise threaten political stability (94).
In the case of Khamenei’s leadership, the lack of effectiveness or even legitimacy did not introduce his government to political instability. According to scholars, religious
Iranians considered the establishment of the Islamic guardianship, on its own, as an essential prerequisite of the Savior’s return (Moghaddasi and Moharrami 2015). In this 37
way, many considered the religious leader as the Savior’s deputy. In regards to the tribulations that Islamic Republic has been facing over the years—from beginning until the present—possessing guardianship justified any loss insofar since guardianship is thought to guarantee the the Savior’s safe return.
From 1965 to 1978, Khomeini resided in Najaf, teaching jurisprudence at the
Islamic Center of Najaf. Fourteen years of exile gave Khomeini enough time to formulate and explain his philosophy of Islamic Governance (Wilayat Faqih) at the Islamic Center of Najaf. Khomeini wrote several books theorizing this idea of Wilayat Faqih, offering his fundamentalist followers in Iran a new perspective for the future of Iran and the
Middle East. Similar to leftist philosophers such as Karl Marx, Khomeini first sought to tarnish the image of governments across the world. In Tahrir A1 Wasilah, for instance,
Khomeini labeled governments in Islamic countries as deputies of evil, reasoning that they deny jurists the authority to confirm or deny political decisions. Khomeini argued that politicians in Islamic countries cannot always have complete access to Islamic jurists to verify their choices. In this light, Khomeini theorized that politicians should allocate the power to Islamic jurists since allocating power protects politicians’ social status and maintains their respect. Later on, Khomeini expanded his theory in another book, called
Islamic Governance. In Islamic Governance, Khomeini purposefully downplayed an individual's right to vote and participate in political processes to justify monopolization of power by Islamic jurists. In Khomeini's belief, Iranians were not mature enough for 38
political self-determination. As such, the country needed a guardian to guide them and correct their mistakes. Khomeini argues that the “wall of separation between state and the experience of divine revelation” produces the adverse effect of the incomplete development of people’s minds (Kadivar 2014, 4). Because Islamic jurists play a role as an intermediary between the state and the divine, jurists are the only legitimate political
19 leaders of the country . In this regard, Khamenei’s government, as well as Khomeini's
20 government, did not face the crisis of legitimacy .
In addition to not facing the crisis of legitimacy, Khamenei’s government did not meet the crisis of lack of effectiveness. It was possible for him to blame elected presidents in case his regime’s effectiveness was denied. Khamenei could use the elected presidents as scapegoats should his regime’s effectiveness be questioned. As such, inability to extract resources from the population and implement policies that benefit the society as a whole was perceived as a sign of the Iranian elected president’s and his ministers’ ineffectiveness. Divisions over Khamenei’s clerical standing and his ability to run the country held the potential to cause political instability, as it did.
19 In Khomeini’s theory, neither the people nor the politicians can deprive jurists of this right to rule the state. Iran’s system's core value, based on the principle of Khomeini's Guardianship, defines itself not only within Iran’s territorial unit but also extends its power outside of the Iranian border. 20 Based on the country’s constitution, jurists do not need to be elected by popular vote; instead, they can run government by divine right. 39
According to Huddy (2003), political meaning of a social group can be found in its membership. If such social group’s members are forced to accept newcomers, they will resist. That dividing line gradually becomes a source of tension. Huddy’s argument correctly explains the tension between Khamenei’s status groups and dissident Grand
Ayatollahs in Qom. Khamenei’s lack of political support and religious authority stood as the main reasons Khomeini's inner circle supported his selection for the religious leadership of Iran. Khomeini's inner circle sought to maintain its political power in Iran and Khamenei’s political-religious weakness could ensure the continuity of their roles in
Iranian politics. According to Mirhosseini (2002), the religious polarization encouraged by Khomeini's inner circle led Iran’s Muslim community to divide religious matters with
Grand Ayatollahs in Qom on the one hand and Khamenei and his status groups on the other. Consequently, Khomeini’s inner circle and its head, Ayatollah Hashemi, became the dominant political players within Iran. The religious community and its members became distracted in a fight over Islamic seminaries’ leadership, and a right of Ulama to issue the fatwa. This superiority continued till Khamenei organized his status groups and brought Islamic seminaries under his total control. A day after Khamenei’s selection,
Khomeini’s inner circle started supporting any action to weaken the new leader’s political-religious status. These actions caused many to question the validity of 40
21 Khamenei’s Fatwa . Based on the interpretation of the Sharia that Khamenei’s trustees in
Guardian Council of Iran provided in favor of him, Khamenei started issuing Fatwa, despite the questions and the fact that he did not serve as a Grand Ayatollah. Khomeini’s inner circle took this as a pretext to divide the Iranian religious community. As a result, the Islamic seminaries and Grand Ayatollahs split into two opposing sides: Neutral
Ayatollahs, those who tended to remain silent in the face of Khamenei’s issuing Fatwa, and Dissidents Ayatollahs. In addition to releasing a Fatwa, Khamenei’s status groups started calling him the Grand Ayatollah in their political meetings and speeches. Such a fast promotion from the ordinary member of Ulama to a senior member of Ulama portrayed by Khomeini’s inner circle stood as another violation of the Grand Ayatollahs’ scope of authority. By placing the responsibility for people’s ethical misconduct on the
Grand Ayatollahs in Qom, especially those who tended to remain silent in the face of
Khamenei’s act of self-promotion, Khomeini’s inner circle raised the tension to its peak.
As a result, the majority of Grand Ayatollahs in Qom expressed their concern regarding
Khamenei’s ability to lead the society. According to their critiques, in times of crisis and confusion, the leader of Islamic community should be capable of issuing Fatwa, but the new leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei did not possess the ability to do so.
21 A fatwa is a command issued by Grand Ayatollahs on “the different aspects of society affairs regardless of the legal status of that society” (Moghaddasi and Moharrami 2015, 256). 41
According to Forozan and Shahi (2017), while dissident Grand Ayatollahs and
Khamenei’s status groups focused on keeping each other away from the country’s religious leadership, Khomeini’s inner circle infiltrated every political institution within
the state. Khomeini’s inner circle, consisting of Ayatollahs Hashemi, Karroubi, Khatami,
Ardebili, Saanei, and Khoeiniha wanted to prevent the emergence of a political rival who might threaten their so-called monopoly on Iranian politics. In this regard, Khamenei’s
lack of clerical standing became the first major problem that needed to be taken care of by his status groups.
All political systems have the same objectives, which are: “persistence;
Maintenance of core values, and Stability” (Smith 1996, 6). Each social group might
challenge the system by exposing two kinds of demands: systemic demands and nonsystemic demands. Systemic demands refer to those demands which accept the rule of the political game within the structure of the system. Systemic demands do not threaten the core values of a system; instead, they are consistent with the system’s core values.
Indeed, systemic demands insist on the core values of a political system to provide a
sense of legitimacy for their implementation (Tarrow 1994). In the case of Iran, dissident
Ayatollahs insisted that their demands be met to help Khamenei to maintain his
leadership status.
There are five possible systemic responses offered to each systemic demand. They are (Bensel 1990): neglect, symbolism, substantive policy, cooptation, and political 42
repression. Each of these responses can be seen in Khamenei’s reaction to the Grand
Ayatollahs’ demands and critiques.
Neglect is defined when a system neglects to do anything concerning a demand
that exposes the system. Although Khamenei’s status groups wanted to ignore the
Ayatollahs’ critiques and publish Khamenei’s Islamic Epistle, known as Tozih-Al-Masael
22 , formalizing Khamenei’s religious status, they deferred their final decision due to that
fact that his Islamic Epistle needed to gain one of the Grand Ayatollahs’ confirmations
23 before publication (Cooper 2016, 120).
A “symbolic response” occurs when systemic conditions that “gave rise to the
systemic demands have been left intact” (Smith 1996, 6). The system can create the
impression of revision among those who demand change without changing the reality on the ground. Khamenei’s status group applied a symbolic response "to silence Grand
Ayatollahs in the short term" (Katznelson 2002, 122). Khamenei’s status groups asked their followers to refer to Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Epistle for any questions on religious matters. This tactic, too, aimed at reducing tension between Khamenei and
Khomeini’s inner circle, since it apparently brought Khamenei under the shadow of
22 The Islamic Epistle, also known as Tozih-Al-Masael, is the Ayatollahs’ interpretation of Sharia. The Islamic Epistle is meant to provide a solution for a variety of issues that Muslims encounter in their daily lives. 23 In 1963 when Khomeini started to rebel against the Shah regime, a rumor emerged that the Shah intended to execute him to silence his voice before he inspired more people to rebel. To save Khomeini's life and in response to Khomeini’s students’ motion to intervene, “Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari elevated Khomeini from the rank of ayatollah to the exalted status of grand ayatollah” (Cooper 2016, 119). He confirmed the validity of Khomeini’s Islamic Epistle, consequently recognizing Khomeini’s status in the understanding of Islamic Jurisprudence and credited his ability to issue a Fatwa. 43
Khomeini and confirmed Khomeini's continued presence in Iranian politics even after his death. Khamenei’s struggle with Qom led him to realize that he could not compete with
Khomeini's political-religious figure (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001, 233). Khomeini held the status of a revolutionary character and his inner circle successfully used a series of exaggerated similes to depict Khomeini's personality, analogizing him to Imam Ali (the first Imam of Shia Muslims) and the Hidden Imam. During the Khomeini’s leadership, his sacred image scattered across Iran to manipulate ordinary people to consider
Khomeini as the deputy of the Hidden Imam, thereby accepting Khomeini’s role as the head of the Iranian government. Instead of taking a similar tactic that for a weak political figure like Ali Khamenei could not yield the same result, Khamenei’s status groups started portraying Khamenei’s leadership as a true successor to Khomeini, symbolically recommended and endorsed by him (Barzin 2001, 235). Khamenei and his status groups knew that they could not be free of Khomeini's shadow, yet they could destroy the political immunity and support that affiliation with Khomeini and Grand Ayatollahs provided for the circle. Subjugating the seminaries paved the way for Khamenei’s status groups to question Khomeini's inner circle’s commitment to Khomeini’s principles. As such, Khomeini’s inner circle faced accusations from Khamenei’s status groups of becoming agents for the United States and its interests.
In regards to the conservative characteristics of each political system, systemic demands, like the Grand Ayatollahs’ efforts to encourage Khamenei to show respect to 44
their religious authority, always take a long time to introduce real change within the legal
structure (Khalaji 2004). If systemic demands do not formulate practical challenges to a
system, the system will respond to demands regarding the “balance of power or resources
between itself and oppositions” (Smith 1996, 6). As a result, each opposition movement will need to foster the social crisis if it anticipates real change. If the balance of power
swings away from an oppositional force, the system will not tolerate political readjustment. Each system responds substantively to the opposition movement’s demands
only when faced with actual “protests, violence and disorders” (Walters 2003, 17). In the
case of Islamic seminaries, since the Grand Ayatollahs did not mobilize their followers to
stand up to Khamenei, Khamenei could try his other options, anything except a
substantive response.
To preserve stability, the systemic response to dissidents might include cooptation
and repression at the same time. Cooptation occurs when the system opens the door to the
opposition movement's leaders. By absorbing these new elements into the system, the
marginalization of radicals becomes possible. In contrast to Khomeini's initial order in
1997 placing the Islamic seminaries in Qom into an independent state from the executive budget, Khamenei took the initiative and reduced the autonomy of the seminaries. For a
hundred years, Islamic seminaries in Qom were dependent on money coming from people’s donations and their religious tax (Shomali 2012, 4). 45
No hierarchical structure existed in Islamic seminaries, and Grand Ayatollahs could provide discipline for their students, varying from one Ayatollah to another.
Ayatollahs also offered a variety of financial support for their students to help them
24 achieve their goals and lower their financial stress . Students, too, could choose, or even change, their teachers (Ayatollahs) during the educational process at seminaries. Figure
3a — Discussion-based classes at Islamic seminaries where students are encouraged to participate and lead the discussion, photo by Kaveh Kazemi.
24 To become an Ayatollah, each student needs to study at the seminaries “from twenty-five to thirty years” (Shomali 2012, 3). There are three levels at seminaries: (1) “The introductory level which usually takes three years; (2) The intermediate level which usually takes seven years, and (3) the advanced level which varies from student to student; since they have a determined attitude towards learning and is not one of the rushes to finish” (Shomali 2012, 3). 46
Weakening the power of seminaries and Grand Ayatollahs in both politics and the society of Iran occurred as Khamenei’s status group changed the seminaries’ educational and organizational structure. Khamenei’s status groups indeed targeted the Grand
Ayatollahs’ source of power and wealth. Khamenei and his trustees institutionalized the high council of the Islamic Seminaries to apparently bring together a variety of disciplines and methods of teaching in the seminaries. The council, in turn, reduced the seminaries’ dependency on people’s religious tax by taking it from the Grand Ayatollahs and making them more dependent on the government’s budget instead. The advancement of ordinary Ayatollahs in seminaries, then, becomes subject to their expression of their devotion to Khamenei and their heavy political attacks on Dissident Ayatollahs.
According to the council, only those Ayatollahs who admitted Khamenei's divine status should be allowed to teach in the Islamic seminaries. This restrictive ban on Dissident
Ayatollahs’ teaching in seminaries continues to present day. For instance, Grand
Ayatollah Montazeri served as the leading member of Ulama who opposed Khamenei. As a result, the government deprived him of receiving religious taxes until his death in 2005.
Such deprivation decreased his power and influence in Islamic seminaries. 47
Figure 3b — Grand Ayatollah Montazeri (amontazeri.com)
Bringing the Islamic seminary under Khamenei’s total control coincided with introducing dissenting Grand Ayatollahs to the climate of fear. According to Ferdowsi
(2014), “Machiavelli famously placed fear above loyalty” and called it the most critical factor in safeguarding the king's interest25 (39). By attacking gatherings, classes, and meetings, Khamenei's status groups endeavored to raise the cost of criticism against
Khamenei and his appointees in council. Besides this, these attacks aimed at intimidating
Grand Ayatollahs when their political-religious values and beliefs did not wholly
25 According to Machiavelli, fear can “persuade men to obey the state” (Ferdowsi 2014,40). 48
integrate into Khamenei’s political-religious values and beliefs. As a result, many of the
Dissident Grand Ayatollahs voluntarily left the Islamic Seminaries.
If Dissident Grand Ayatollahs wanted to resist the hegemony of Khamenei, they
26 would be arrested and sentenced to house arrest . Khamenei’s status groups froze
dissident Grand Ayatollahs’ bank accounts to prevent the transfer of money (religious
tax) from their supporters to them. Such tactic reduced dissident Ayatollahs’ influence
from both the political and religious atmospheres. This tactic, in turn, isolated the
majority of dissident Ayatollahs from the public sphere. The rule of the game, however,
convinced some conservative Ayatollahs to take side with those with money and power,
including Khamenei’s status groups who ran the council, to have their seats, and titles
protected. For instance, Ultra-orthodox Grand Ayatollah Saafi Gulpaygani who used to
question Khamenei’s ability to run the country became Khamenei’s main supporter
among other Ayatollahs. Since the council did not tolerate the Dissidents’ voices in
seminaries, especially those Ayatollahs who did not admit Khamenei’s divine status,
Khamenei’s religious authority continued its existence to the extent that many perceive
Khamenei’s clerical standing to be above all the Grand Ayatollahs (Nourizadeh 2012).
26Ayatollah Shirazi who opposed both Khomeini and Khamenei’s religious leadership and questioned his ability to issue the Fatwa spent 20 years under house arrest. 49
Figure 3c — Grand Ayatollah Saafi Gulpaygani (Leader.ir)
Reviewing the capacity of Iran’s imports since Iran imports more than 50 percent of its agricultural and food items, Khamenei allowed some conservative Grand
Ayatollahs to hold a monopoly over imported goods in exchange for their loyalty.
According to Abghari (2007), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei indeed “buys loyalty by distributing political-economic rent” among Ayatollahs in Qom and across the country to stay in power (250). Khamenei’s efforts to improve Iran’s financial structure, an objective of President Rohani’s administration, was dependent on his policy of “having more financial resources at its disposal to repress the opposition, as well as to buy more 50
loyalty” (Abghari 2007, 251). The more oil prices, a significant contributor to the regime’s revenue increased, the more the level of repression increased against
Khamenei’s opponents (Abghari 2007, 263). Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem-Shirazi, for instance, controls Iran’s sugar imports. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi controls
Iran’s tire business (both imports and exports). Yazdi also is the owner of Dena Tire in
Iran. Dena makes all type of tires for both light and heavy vehicles. By resolving the problem of division in the religious community, Khamenei’s status groups tracked
Khomeini's inner circle as they advanced in other country’s political institutions and eliminated the Khomeini's inner circle accordingly.
Figure 3d — Ayatollah Khomeini, Grand Ayatollah Kani and Grand Ayatollah
Makarem-Shirazi (Leader.ir) 51
The Plan for Islamization
According to Lust (2009), when a subgroup in the weak state loses its political
immunity, it may react with maximum intensity and provoke the social-political crisis.
Such potential threat needs to be taken seriously by scholars. President Saddam’s regime
after the first Persian Gulf war, for instance, treated the nationalists’ potential threat by
turning inward to tribe and religion. Before the wars with Iran and the U.S., Iraqi
nationalists tended to champion a form of nationalism to provide a peaceful path to
democracy and a better future for all Iraqi people. Their failure in the first Persian Gulf
War weakened the nationalists’ platform in Iraq. As a result, the Ba’ath Party, rooted in nationalism and secularism, took steps towards Islam and tribes to preserve the interests
of political elites, Saddam Hussein, his family and the country's high-ranking officials. In
Iran, when Khomeini’s inner circle lost its legitimacy, Khamenei’s status groups began to
treat them as a potential threat. As a result, the Khamenei’s status groups applied a plan
for Islamization. Khamenei’s status groups, those Islamic Jurists who Khamenei trained
in Islamic Seminaries as he marginalized Dissident Grand Ayatollahs, formed a protective umbrella for Khamenei by implementing the plan for the Islamization of the country’s
institutions. This plan aimed at identifying and eliminating those who belonged to the
circle and who were not obedient to Khamenei’s leadership. The plan for Islamization of universities and the Army is analyzed in this chapter since Khomeini's inner circle, who 52
held the upper hand in these institutions’ leadership, lost its power and influence in both institutions.
Universities
According to Golkar (2012), besides forcing students to take Islamic courses like the principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Iranian universities witnessed “an increase in the presence of Khamenei’s status group, the Islamic Jurists” (5). The Islamic Jurists appointed by the Religious Leader led the plan for Islamization, and also evaluated the teaching effectiveness of university professors. As a result of this plan for Islamization, academic discipline in Iran—especially courses related to liberal arts—synthesized a variety of non-Islamic course materials into the regime’s vision of Islam. For example, professors of psychology introduced new classes to consider the role of religiosity in the recovery of people with a mental health condition. In general, however, universities across Iran faced restrictive bans targeting students’ social activities. For instance, leadership banned music concerts, and campuses extended divided spaces between men and women. Students and professors found themselves encouraged, sometimes even forced, to participate in daily prayers. In addition to universities’ managers with loyalty to Khomeini’s inner circle, any of the professors who could not integrate with the regime’s plan for Islamization forced to resignation. Liberal and secular students, too, faced the same ending (Golkar 2012, 7). Since the network of fear in universities formed 53
a widespread distrust among the students and their instructors, Iranian students became reluctant to participate in any kind of civic activities within or outside of the campuses.
The Army
Given the fact that the Iranian Army betrayed the Shah and proved its loyalty to
Khomeini and his trustees by its declaration of neutrality in 1979, the close relationship between Army Generals and Khomeini’s inner circle could provide support in the event
anything jeopardized the circle’s interests. In this regard, Khamenei’s status groups tried hard to extend their control over all branches of the Iranian Army.
During the Pahlavi regime, the internal conflict among officers rendered the
Army incapable of fighting against the Islamists in 1979 (Cann and Danopoulos 1997,
274). Both Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, encouraged the internal conflict among Army’s generals the “divide and rule” policy. This policy did not bring political instability. Despite the effects on the Army’s capabilities, Khamenei
formed and institutionalized his repressive power in the IRGC and in its intelligence
services to be used in case a mass protest occurred. In 2009 and when the Green
Movement started opposing his leadership, the IRGC and Basij members violently
suppressed the opposition movement while the Army generals remained neutral, just as they did in the 1979 revolution. The plan for the Islamization of the Army, however, aimed at training the new generation of Army generals to be completely obedient to 54
Khamenei’s leadership and gradually replaced those trained during the Shah regime and loyal to Khomeini’s inner circle. General Rahim Mousavi, “the current Commander in chief of the Army, is indeed the product of Khamenei’s Islamization plan” (BBC 2016,
5). He served as an ordinary officer during the Iran-Iraq War. His advancement in the military rank accelerated as Khamenei’s status groups brought the Army under its total control and marginalized those Generals loyal to the inner circle.
Figure 3e — General Rahim Mousavi (Leader.ir).
Islamists’ suspicion of the Army’s intention in joining the Islamic revolution and betraying the Shah originated from the beginning days of the Islamic revolution (Alfoneh 55
2012, Rubin 2008). According to Rubin (2008), the suspicion of the Army led Jurists to organize their followers in the IRGC and the revolutionary committees to ensure the continuity of Wilayat Faqih throughout the body of armed forces. The way Khamenei organized his status groups among the Guards will be discussed in the next chapter. 56
Chapter VI, The IRGC
In this chapter, I argue that Khamenei empowered ordinary officers and replaced
them gradually with the first generation of IRGC generals who were close to Khomeini's
inner circle. In so doing, the second generation of guards purposely provoked many
political-social conflicts to justify a power transition for Iranian public.
A deep link existed between Khomeini’s inner circle and the founding fathers of
the IRGC (Forozan and Shahi 2017). Following the Islamic revolution in Iran,
Khomeini’s inner circle selected the first generation of Guards and then sent them to
countries like Libya and Palestine to train for guerrilla warfare. The quick and easy
victory of Islamists against the Shah regime did not need the Islamic movement to
transfer its agenda to the Armed conflict. The establishment of the IRGC led Islamic
guerrillas to occupy leadership positions in the IRGC (Alfoneh 2008). From then on, the
Guards and the Khomeini’s inner circle supported each other in the event anything
compromised either side. That relationship continued until Khamenei organized his status
group among the Guards.
The pioneers of the Iranian Revolutionary founded the IRGC shortly after the
Pahlavi regime ended. One of the keys to IRGC’s primary structure was that members are not paid; instead, IRGC is always prepared to be called on when the nation is in trouble.
In this regard, the pioneers sought to build IRGC in a way that was less stable in revolutionary terms but more dynamic than the Iranian regular army, which was shaped 57
during the Shah’s regime (Ostovar 2016). However, the pioneers’ non-ideological temperament held them back from entering the high ranks of the IRGC military system due to the incoming of the second generation IRGC members. Under the control of
Khomeini and according to the Islamic regime’s constitution, the organization deviated from its foundation basis (Sazegara 2015). Khomeini led the IRGC to become the permanent guard, characterized by a horizontal pattern of leadership like the Iranian
Army. During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC attempted to extend its military size. To do so, the IRGC established three military divisions within its structure: Military Ground
Troops, Navy, and Air Force. Later, the IRGC's leaders officially declared that the success of each of the new military divisions in war would be subject to the significant increase in the IRGC's budget and military size. Thus, the prolongation of war became the main reason that “procured a switch for the IRGC” (Woods, Murray, Holaday and
Elkhamri 2009, 7). Years of war also paved the way for the IRGC’s political intervention in Iranian elections. For instance, in 1988 during Iran's legislative election, the IRGC heavily supported candidates who called for the fall of Saddam’s regime. In April 1988, while the IRGC’s leaders switched focus from war to politics, the Iraqi Army retook its most strategic border city, Faw, previously occupied by Iran in 1986 (Alfoneh 2013). The
Iraqi mission started while the IRGC leaders held a political meeting with legislative candidates. By the end of the war, the IRGC finally halted its interference in Iranian politics. Khomeini personally felt threatened by the Guards’ political intervention and, in 58
the last year of his life, he tried to control the Guards’ political ambitions (Alfoneh 2008).
In his “Political and Divine Testament,” Khomeini warned the Guards not to interfere in
... 27 politic .
Algerian Case
A brief analysis of Algerian case is useful in understanding how Khamenei
organized his status group among guards.To eliminate Khomeini’s inner circle's power
and influence from the IRGC, Khamenei adapted the same policy that President
Bouteflika in Algeria adapted. In Algeria, the loyalty to the revolution and those who
participated in the Algerian War of Independence, also called the Algerian Revolution,
became a primary source of legitimacy for those involved in Algerian politics. The
Algerian Revolution united all Algerians in the movement to gain independence from
France. The revolution created a new national identity based on their victory over one of
the oldest colonial powers. According to Fanon (1963), Algerian national identity
emerged and consolidated through the guerilla warfare they used to defeat the French and
force them to withdraw from Algeria (168). For years, the Algerian Army and the
National Liberation Front (FLN), two of the major players of the War of Independence,
followed their political ambitions by destroying their opponents. In the process, they
27 Khomeini asked the Guards to “stay away from politics to preserve and maintain their military prowess” (Alfoneh 2008,6). 59
shaped a one-party system. In the face of the Algerian Civil War, the single-party system
needed to accept the limited participation of other political parties. The Civil War started
because of the army’s coup, aimed to cripple the Islamic movement, despite their success
in the first round of the parliamentary elections in 1991 (Silverstein 2002). During the
Civil War, both Islamists and the military claimed to sacrifice themselves to protect the principles of the Algerian Revolution to remain legitimate in the eyes of ordinary people
(653).
Algeria took steps towards a limited, competitive, multi-party system. With such measures in play, regime-backed parties compete in both parliament and government.
The Algerian Constitution requires the Army to protect the state’s independence and
sovereignty (Szmolka 2006, 47). In reality, the Army’s role continues to evolve
economically, chiefly through its intervention in the state’s oil and gas revenues (48). The
Army also ensures its vitality by placing retired commanders in specific political positions as well as in the main body of government (48). The presence of President
Bouteflika in Algeria should be seen in the light of the Algerian Generals’ tendency to
stay behind the scene and place an army-backed candidate, like Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power. The gap between formal and informal power in the MENA states could always be
a source of tension. Accordingly, Algeria and Iran do not exist as an exception.
Bouteflika overcame the informal power in Algeria by empowering the next generation of military generals with no personal backing and replacing them gradually with those 60
previously involved in the revolution and the Civil War. In this regard, the Army as an
institution remains powerful in Algeria despite no strong man among its commanders.
The last chain in the battle for power came when Bouteflika replaced Mohamed Mediene,
head of Military Directorates of Intelligence and Security, in September 2015 (Chikhi
2015). In this regard, some similarities exist between Iran’s revolutionary regime and that
of Algeria .
Article 1 of the Iran’s Constitution required the Revolutionary Guard to protect the Islamic Regime, both its sovereignty and its body of power. To do so, the first
generation of Guards did not recognize any limits in interfering in internal-external
affairs of the regime. During the 90s, the IRGC justified its intervention with its daily reminder network, its vast mass of media, claiming that its role in consolidating the
Islamic Regime and defending the country for many years saved ordinary people from
catastrophic situations. Also, the first generation of Guards always tried to keep their political allies in office. As such, Khomeini’s inner circle’s candidate for Prime Minister,
Mir Hossein Mousavi, could not start his second term without the Guards’ political
28 There are other similarities regarding the law-making process. In Algeria, the Council of Nation (CN) is above the parliament and aims to evaluate, accept, or veto laws passed by Parliament. The President choose one-third of CN members, and local assemblies have the authority to appoint the rest of the CN’s members (Szmolka 2006). The Guardian Council of Iran is similar to the CN. The Guardian Council of Iran interprets whether bills represent Islamic principles and the principles of Iran’s Constitution, accepting or vetoing laws passed by the Islamic Parliament (Naini 2006, 200). A religious leader appoints half of the members of Guardian Council of Iran, who must be Shia clerics, while Parliament confirms the other half of the members, introduced and nominated by the Chief Justice of Iran. The logic behind these institutions, like CN and GC, is to decrease the future threat of the opposition, who could occupy Parliament through an election, by offering a legal barrier against its rise. In 2000, when a coalition of reformists in Iran held the majority of parliament, the Guardian Council vetoed almost every bill passed by Parliament. 61
support. It was General Rezaei, the commander in chief of the IRGC, who warned the
right-wing politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei, that his institution could not
tolerate any change in country’s executive order (Pipes 1993).
Organizing Guards in Leaders’ Status Group
Like President Bouteflika, Khamenei empowered the second generation of
generals and organized status groups among the Guards. Previously, these generals held
no personal backing. To silence the first generation of generals, Khamenei urged his
status group to question the first generation of Guards’ record in the war with Iraq.
Huddy (2003) argues that “the existence of grievance” among a status group can be
channeled towards political hostility (761). As such, factors or symbols that caused the
grievance, or are perceived to be responsible, will be targeted by such status group’s members. The failure of Iran in its war with Iraq and the circumstances that forced
Khomeini to accept the ceasefire provided potential to navigate the Khamenei’s status
group towards political hostility against those who were in charge during the war with
29 Iraq . For instance, some argued that Ayatollah Hashemi wanted to drag the Iran-Iraq
war “to a lose-lose situation” for both Saddam and Iran and senior IRGC generals, such
as Mohsen Rezaei, helped him to do so (Woods, Murray, Holaday and Elkhamri
29 A failed-operation in Karbala 4 in 1986, for instance, cost Iran 12,000 soldiers without achieving any progress in battle. 62
2009,41). In 1987, Hashemi asked Rezaei to explain to Khomeini the IRGC’s need for
arms and munitions to defeat Saddam’s army (NIAC 2009, 1). Rezaei’s letter to
Khomeini mentioned a variety of military equipment that Iran could not supply. This
letter indeed forced Khomeini to accept the ceasefire despite his belief. In this regard, the
second generation of generals, mostly ordinary officers during the war, became a force that wanted to “fight to the last drop of blood” while their generals sought to promote their interest (41). Khamenei’s propaganda and the justification for the power transition in the IRGC was a narrative that showed the IRGC’s ordinary members had defended the country during the war with Iraq and saved Iranians from catastrophic situations, not the founding fathers of the IRGC.
Political-Social Crisis
Some scholars argue that in cases where “the exception becomes the norm, and when the sovereign defines the exception in a constant state of emergency as an exceptionless exception, the state of emergency can no longer be considered as an exception” (Schmitt 1982, Bartholomew 2014, 95). Instead, the exception and ensuing conflicts, phenomena that make the exception work, expose a new generality based on permanent lawlessness. In the case of Iran, such a model demonstrates why Khamenei’s status group preferred to provoke many political-social conflicts purposely. Lawlessness helped them create kind of invisible government which simultaneously enfolded and 63
controlled the elected government and eliminated both the first generation of generals and
Khomeini’s inner circle from Iranian politics.
The first conflict began as the result of the Khamenei’s status group’s interference in political issues that under the constitution should have been the president's concern. By organizing the IRGC Generals in Khamenei’s status group, Khamenei appointed many
IRGC Generals as his advisors. Khamenei took the generals’ advice and ordered the
Interior, Intelligence, and Security ministers to meet with his IRGC advisors (Hafezi and
Charbonneau 2011). He required they coordinate themselves and their ministries with the goals that the generals assigned them, including the murder of the exiled opposition leaders. These meetings, in turn, decreased the authority ofHashemi over security issues and intelligence services. The advancement of the second generation of IRGC generals also decreased the authority of General Rezaei, the commander in chief of the IRGC and someone close to Ayatollah Hashemi and the circle (Alfoneh 2013). In the face of a new generation of generals who quickly accelerated in military rank and ignored his authority,
General Rezaei resigned. In 2005, 2009, and 2013, he unsuccessfully ran three times for president of Iran and asserted that the potential use of IRGC could resolve the country’s problems, as it did during the war with Iraq. The replacement of Mohsen Rezaei, however, stands as the last chain in the Khamenei’s battle to organize his status group in the IRGC. 64
Since President Hashemi did not challenge Khamenei’s interference in the president’s constitutional duties perhaps diverted by the country’s devastated economic structure, Khamenei took one more step (Sinkaya 2015). He ordered his status group to monitor Hashemi’s other ministers’ decisions, analyzing whether the ministry made decisions in regards to what the IRGC defined as the revolution’s goals, like industrial self-sufficiency for the Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade. An IRGC General paired with each minister as their counterpart in Khamenei’s office and the respective General became responsible for guiding the minister and his ministry (Baktiari 1996).
Figure 4a— Mohsen Rezaei (Farsnews.com) 65
The second conflict began as a result of the IRGC’s participation in the financial market. The more extensive political involvement seen from the IRGC protected the
IRGC’s economic wing that in 2017 controlled more than 60 percent of Iran’s foreign trade (Harris 2013). In this way, Khamenei and his status group took steps to weaken the
Iranian private sector to gain control of Iran’s economy. Forozan and Shahi (2017) studied the IRGC’s commercial and economic branch during the leadership of Ayatollah
Khamenei, and his status group’s reinforcement (69). According to the authors,
Khamenei’s tendency to apply repressive power in social-political crises led him to organize a status group among the Guards. The ingroup of the new generation of
Generals gradually became “giant centers of power, virtually forming a state within a state” (Forozan and Shahi 2017, 70). As a result, the economy of Iran saw the destructive interference of the IRGC into its functions, contracts, and future perspective to form a hegemony of the IRGC and its branches in the Iranian finance system. Besides this, the
Iranian private sector ran the financial foundations in Iran, yet it contributed to the
IRGC’s financial branches to invest money in foreign markets. Since the U.S. blacklisted many of the IRGC generals, these foundations help the IRGC to bypass U.S sanctions. 66
For instance, “the Foundation for the Dispossessed controls assets worth $80 billion”
30 making it one of the biggest players in Iran’s economy today (Abghari 2007, 255).
In recent years, these foundations helped the Islamic regime to continue its nuclear program by purchasing materials and equipment that Iran’s atomic program desperately needed. For example, such foundations bought the first generation of Iran’s
centrifuges from the black market in Pakistan. These foundations also contributed to
Iran’s authoritarian rule by facilitating its repressive institutions with weapons, equipment, and technology the Islamic regime could not otherwise access due to
sanctions by the U.S and its allies (Golkar 2012, 627). Figure 4b — IRGC’s commander in chief, Mohammad Ali Jafari. He served as a commanding officer of a battalion during
Khomeini’s era (Leader.ir)
30 The foundation owns “about 25 percent of banking business in Dubai” (256). It is classified as part of Iran’s private sector, yet it is run directly by the former IRGC General Mohsen Rafighdoost. 67
The third “conflict began because of Khamenei’s status group's involvement in
Iran’s nuclear program” (Gaietta 2015, 213). The Iranian nuclear crises lowered ordinary
Iranians quality of life and impeded financial progress for more than twelve years
(Pesaran 2011).
During the Reformist Era, Iran moved close to achieve a deal with three European powers that could make it far more difficult for the U.S. and its allies “to send Iran’s nuclear program to the U.N” (Gaietta 2015, 213). The role of the IRGC’s second generation of generals in disturbing the deal as well as their role in encouraging
Ahmadinejad to apply his nuclear policy, even as everyone knew the consequences of
U.N. sanctions, needs to be seen in the light of their willingness to create more economic and political crises (Bymen 2001, 47). During the sanctions, the IRGC controlled oil sales and money transfers since the U.S. and its allies banned transaction with Iranian banks.
Although Iran and the U.S. finally reached an agreement, Khamenei’s status groups did its best and works, even now (in 2017), to destroy the deal. “Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth” written in Hebrew on IRGC missiles should be seen in the light of the Guard’s willingness to destroy the deal (CNN 2016). 68
Figure 4c— Iran’s missile (Farsnews.com)
As previously mentioned, Khamenei held power and influence to overthrow the government in some Arab countries. He gained this control due in part to his status groups’ interference in such countries’ domestic policies. As such, the IRGC’s mercenaries purposely undermined such countries’ regular armies, and the used power vacancy to justify the formation of Iranian proxies (Ehteshami 2010, 32). Hezbollah in
Lebanon or Hashd al-Shahbi in Iraq in part were justified by a claim that such country’s armies cannot defend its people on its own (Abbas 2017, 6). These proxies raised the cost of military encounters and, in turn, convinced the U.S. and Israel not to attack Iran. 69
Facilitating these proxies with military equipment and their salaries and bonuses, however, imposed additional costs on Iran. The IRGC participation in the Syrian Civil
War and its support for Assad’s Army cost Iran around thirty billion dollars (Rafizadeh
2017). In this regard, the IRGC’s role in Syria and Iraq and its goal in extending the war to Yemen and Lebanon could be considered the fourth devastating conflict since it swallowed all the country’s financial resources.
The fifth conflict began as the new generation of the Guards started promoting
Khamenei’s leadership as the deputy of the Hidden Imam (Diba 2011). Through their propaganda network, the IRGC spread rumors that the Hidden Imam contacted Khamenei and they meet regularly at the Jamkaran Mosque (Keck 2011). Portraying Khamenei as the true successor of Khomeini became the outcome of the formation of a status group among the Islamic Jurists and marginalization of Khamenei's opponents in Islamic seminaries. The extended power base Khamenei’s status groups brought for Khamenei, made him consider that a stretch in his role and title in Iranian politics, becoming the deputy of Hidden Imam, could be possible. According to Sazegara (2009), he did not want to be remembered as one who only succeeded Khomeini; instead, Khamenei wants to be recognized as a deputy of Hidden Imam who led the revolution towards the revival of Islamic civilization. Khamenei’s new title did not change his status in Iranian politics.
Although Khamenei’s status group propagated the deputy of the Hidden Imam and allowed the religious Iranians to believe that such rumors about the meetings between the 70
Leader and the Hidden Imam held roots, in reality3', Iranians, especially the middle-class
people, seemed reluctant to believe in such things. Like the middle classes in western
countries, the Iranian middle class, too, tends to want religion to leave the public sphere
(Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001, 237). Spreading rumors about Khamenei’s meetings with the Hidden Imam endorsed the IRGC’s interference in the country’s domestic and
international policies since it occurred in the name of the Hidden Imam (New York Times
2012).
In contrast to Khomeini’s inner circle, which pursued its political interest by
linking Khomeini to the Hidden Imam, Khamenei’s status group efficiently endorsed its use of violence by such an allegory (Friedenfels 1998). As such, many dissidents were accused of being barriers that prevented the Hidden Imam’s return. The assassination of opponents followed in large numbers and made the IRGC a tool of suppression for
Khamenei. When the IRGC applied the violence in the name of the Hidden Imam and his deputy, it rhetorically avoided the responsibility of bloodshed (Bodansky 1993). The
same justification led the IRGC’s new generation of generals to identify Khamenei’s opponents who escaped persecution in Europe in a constant state of fear 32 . Later,
31 According to Jurists Kazem Sadighi, on some Wednesdays Khamenei goes alone and camps on the desert around the Jamakaran Mosques; this is when his regular meeting with Hidden Imam takes place. 32 “State-sponsored mass murder of the regime’s opponents was applied accordingly” (France24 2010, 2). For each act of terror, the IRGC employed two different teams. The identification team consisted of the regime’s diplomats in Iran’s embassies. The identification team located the regime's opponents monitored their activities and facilitated the assassination team’s members to meet their needs (weapons, money, cars, etc). The assassination team consisted of IRGC specialists and international terrorists, both men, and women. Before carrying out an assassination, team members usually arrived 24 hours before the time of a 71
Khamenei’s status group organized its network of terror into a new division called Quds
Force. According to Levitt (2013), the fact that a status group organized by Khamenei to
preserve his interest organized another status group to maintain its interest and the
subsequent birth of Quds Force stand as a unique event in the history of Iranian social
groups. In 2017, the Quds Force and its commander, General Soleimani, took the
country’s foreign and domestic policies hostage. Soleimani insisted that if Iran does not use all its resources to fight its enemies outside of its border, for example in Syria or
Yemen, it will be forced to fight them within Iranian borders (BBC 2015).
Although the creation of Khamenei’s status group among the Guards helped him destroy Khomeini’s inner circle’s influence in Iran’s political institutions and monopolize power, the formation of a status group within Khamenei’s status group, like the Quds
Force in the IRGC, could cause instability for Khamenei’s leadership. Even though no
strongmen among a Khamenei’s status group existed, a strongman existed within the
Quds Force: General Soleimani. In contrast to IRGC’s second generation of generals who
owed their progress in military rank to Khamenei, General Soleimani’s development and
achievement owed to his competence (Sherefedin 2015). This explains why many
Iranians who dislike the Islamic regime, the IRGC, and its dictator, Ali Khamenei, show respect to General Soleimani. Safshekan and Sabet’s (2010) argued that the creation of
mission. “The assassination team’s members were deployed as crew members on Iran Air aircraft for flights all over the world” (Bodansky 1993, 81). 72
Khamenei’s status group among the Guards will result in the collapse of his regime since the second generation of Generals could eventually oppose Khamenei and try to grab power. In contrast to this claim, the only subgroup with the ability to resist Khamenei is the Quds force, and its commander, General Soleimani (BBC 2016). 73
Chapter V, Khamenei’s Status Group Among Politicians
In this chapter, I argue that the victory of the reformists in the 1997 presidential
election encouraged Khamenei to form his status group among loyal politicians. These
politicians are called the Principlists. The Principlists’ victory over the reformists’
movement did not constitute a normal power shift. Rather, it replaced hope with fear. As
a result, the middle-class Iranians, who supported reformists movement, dropped out of
politics. The marginalization of middle-class Iranians stands as the last chain of
Khamenei’s battle to monopolize power in Iranian politics.
In 1997, President Khatami won the Iranian election when he received more than
20 million votes, thereby breathing new life into the Khomeini’s inner circle
(Moghaddasi and Moharrami 2015, 260). According to Arjomand (1997), years of
marginalization helped Khomeini's inner circle and its supporters to reconsider their political-economic worldviews. During Hashemi’s presidency, for instance, politicians
who belonged to the circle enriched themselves with study abroad in the U.S. and
Europe, paid for with government funds. Studying abroad led many to understand the
West through the lens of their own experiences rather than from revolution-era texts and
sermons. These politicians had the opportunity to observe the Islamic Republic of Iran
from the perspective of outsiders, comparing Iran’s devastated economic structure and the
authoritarian rule with the western countries where they resided as students. As a result,
they came up with the idea of “Iran’s Glasnost.” Iran’s Glasnost became the “platform of 74
civil society and the rule of law” (Arjomand 1997, 507). The Glasnost directly responded
to Khamenei and his status groups; many perceived their interference in Iranian politics
as above the law and the constitution (Habibi 2013, 2).
Figure 5a — President Khatami and President Hashemi (Jafrianews.com)
Iran’s Glasnost absorbed the middle class in large cities. For the first time in the
Islamic revolution’s history, the threat towards Khamenei’s authoritarian rule and his
status groups came from those who peacefully won an election. The other reformist attempt (the Green Movement) in 2008 to challenge the legality of authoritarian rule was
suppressed by Khamenei’s status groups before the election results even came out. 75
According to Kitschelt (1992), social restrictions and norms imposed by status groups on
civil society could send the wrong signal to the country’s leaders that people who are
forced to remain silent and not daring to express their disagreement will act with the
same manner when such restrictions are lifted. Kitschelt (1992) also argues that social
conditions imposed by status groups “narrow the choice sets” for political participation of
ordinary people and restrict the maneuverability of civil society’s subsets (1028). Such
social conditions do not change people’s actual beliefs about such regimes' outcomes or
their leaders' legacies (Kitschelt 1992, 1030).
Following the 1997 Presidential Election, intense pressure on the Islamic regime
led the regime’s leaders, including the IRGC generals, Ayatollah Khamenei and his
delegates, to open up the presidential election to the left-wing of Iranian politics,
Khomeini’s inner circle33. Due to the circle’s political isolation for almost eight years,
they could not deliver their political message to ordinary people. Khamenei allowed them
to participate in the presidential election to return a sense of legitimacy to the Islamic
regime. Khamenei expected to confront limited political participation in favor of the
33 The IRGC’s network of terror in European countries finally stopped in 1997 because of the Germany's court decision in the Mykonos case (“gangland-style murders of 4 dissident Iranian-Kurdish leaders in a Berlin restaurant in 1992”) (CNN 1997, 1). After five years in trial, “deaths of Iranian-Kurdish leader Sadiq Sharafkandi and three of his colleagues in Berlin led the German Justice to contend that Iran's leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had personally ordered the killings” (CNN 2002). The court also “issued an arrest warrant for Iran's minister of intelligence” and the IRGC’s leaders who oversaw the operation (CNN 2005). Most EU members recalled their ambassadors from Tehran and ended their political-economic relations with the Islamic regime. They officially declared that their ambassadors’ return would be subject to the Islamic regime’s behavior change (both domestically and internationally). 76
right-wing candidate, Nategh Nouri. Instead, people mostly voted in favor of the reformists’ candidate, Mohammad Khatami. The reformists’ victory made Khamenei believe he needed to form his status group among the politicians.
Khatami’s victory led “Iranian newspapers to increase rapidly” (Tarock 2001,
585). In turn, reformist newspapers criticized both Khamenei and the IRGC’s extensive base of power, describing both as contrary to the Iranian Constitution 34 . Marginalized
Grand Ayatollahs in Qom, such as Ayatollahs Montazeri and Shirazi, issued similar statements against Khamenei and his status groups (593). Universities across Iran, too, hosted political debates that portrayed Khamenei and the IRGC’s leaders as opinionated individuals who could not tolerate dissenting voices. Iranian political participation led reformists to conquer political barriers and stabilize their political platform of tolerance and the rule of law. From 1997 to 2001, reformists won four nationwide elections: (1) the
1997 presidential election; (2) city council elections in 1998; (3) a parliamentary election in 1999; and (4) the 2001 presidential election (Shabani 2013, 47).
According to Tezcur, Gunes, Azadarmaki, and Bahar (2006), reformists’ victory dragged the middle-class Iranians behind Khomeini's inner circle platform, breathing hope in Iranian civil society that the peaceful reform within the structure of the regime
34 Yadollah Sahabi (the senior member of Iranian National Front) argued that an Iranian vote in favor of the reformists’ candidate in the presidential election indeed “called for the revision of the powers of the leader to reducing those powers” (Tarock 2001, 592). 77
led Iran closer towards democracy. As Munck and Leff (1997) observe, “the balance of power between elites and opposition, the degree of political institutions’ involvement in both economy and politics of the country, and the existence of democracy-oriented political culture” determine the chance of a democratic reform (352). According to
Munck and Leff (1997), five modes of reforms can be categorized, as follows:
“Reform through rupture” refers to a transition that occurs when the weak position of elites hinders them from possessing an essential role in transition (Munck and
Leff 1997, 352). In this scenario, counter-elites will be able to enforce their wills.
Khamenei’s status groups exerted enough power to prevent such mode of reform from happening in Iran.
“Reform through extrication” refers to a transition that occurs when both elites and the masses demand structural change within a country (Munck and Leff 1997, 352).
The transition in Hungary in 1989 provides an example of this mode of reform. The transition occurred when the reform wing of the Communist Party started to question the structure of the regime. As a result, the link between elites and the opposition facilitated a more peaceful transition to democracy, since all regime players remained involved in the transition. Khamenei’s status groups did not evolve from standard political fields, so they could not understand the need for the regime to reform. These status groups owed their existence and political progress to religious leadership. In this regard, neither Khamenei’s status group or circle could negotiate towards a peaceful transition. 78
“Reform through transaction” refers to a transition that occurs when the dominant position of elites convinces the opposition to sit at the negotiation table (Munck and Leff
1997, 352). The commanding position of the elites may keep the opposition from possessing adequate means of power during and after the transition. Despite the compelling elites in Iran, as seen in Khamenei’s status group, the occurrence of reform could not preserve their roles in Iranian politics.
“Reform from below” refers to a mode of transition that occurs when circumstances force the opposition “to define their platform within the structure of the regime” (Munck and Leff 1997, 346). It becomes difficult to advance democratic aims within the context of an old regime's political-social relations. Iran’s reform movement provides a good example of “reform from below,” allowing observers to understand this mode of transition (Guo and Stradiotto 2014, 153). The power of Khamenei’s status groups and the weakness of Khomeini’s inner circle required the circle to follow its platform within the structure of the regime. As a result, the reformist's platform could not achieve full democratic transition. Later, “conservative reform” replaced “reform from below” due in part to the formation of Khamenei's status group among politicians, the
Principlists.
“Conservative reform” refers to a mode of transition that leaves the political-social relations of an old regime intact. With “conservative reform,” the opposition does not participate in changes (Karl and Schmitter 1991, 269). Unification of 79
the Principlists’ agenda and their subsequent defeat of the circle in the 2001 Presidential
Election provides an example of this mode of reform. Although Ahmadinejad's presidency and his political platform excluded the circle from politics, he implemented reform in the country’s economic policy, such as his irrational subsidy reform that caused a high inflation in the country’s economy. He designed this reform to save the regime’s and Khamenei’s status groups’ interests.
The Formation of Principlists
To suppress the Reformist movement and their popular base of support, Khamenei relied on his status groups among the Islamist Jurists, the IRGC and, more importantly, on the formation of a status group among loyal politicians. In 1999, Khamenei appointed
Ayatollah Shahroudi to replace Ayatollah Yazdi as the head of a judiciary department.
With no history of resistance during the Shah regime and rumors that he originated from
Iraq, Shahroudi became an ideal candidate. A misrepresentation of the reformists’ political-social views, especially on the matters reformists used to try to promote the more compassionate face of Islam, such as tolerating the Baha'is or dissidents, convinced
Shahroudi to facilitate the IRGC with judicial influence and power35 . Shahroudi also allowed the IRGC to accomplish the eradication of free media. Any critiques to the
35 Concerning his ultra-conservative personality, Shahroudi could be easily manipulated by IRGC propaganda. 80
Leader could be considered a critique to the Hidden Imam and the Iranian Judicial system harshly suppressed them. The IRGC, too, reshaped its intelligence branch36, thereby helping Khamenei to form a state of fear within Iranian politics. The IRGC intelligence branch did not hesitate to apply torture and violence against reformists and their middle-class supporters.
In 2004, Khamenei allowed out of uniform, retired IRGC generals to explicitly engage in politics and run for office (Fadaee 2012, 89). Khamenei accepted the early retirement of those generals and officers politically close to him to legitimize their engagement in politics. This move solidified those politicians who were loyal to
Khamenei and formed them into a Khamenei’s status group. As a result, many IRGC generals and officers ran for parliamentary and presidential elections. The preparation of the IRGC’s legal-political interference polarized Iranian politics. According to Foran and
Goodwin (1997), retired IRGC generals whom the Leader brought into Iranian politics to defeat the reformist's movement in 1997 also made the right-wing politicians
36 “In late 1998, there was a case of serial murders of Iranian intellectuals, known as the chain murders of Iran” (Fadaee 2012, 88). Reformists realized that the general director of the Ministry of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, and his colleagues in Homeland Security took part in the murders. While the media talked about the role of the IRGC and the office of Religious Leadership in the murders, Khamenei ordered “Muhammad Niyazi, the head of Iran's military tribunals,” to cut corners in the Leader’s office (Los Angeles Times 1999, 1). Emami committed suicide “by swallowing a hair-removal substance while taking a bath in prison, and his colleagues were permitted to get away without any consequences” (1). Although reformists wanted to drag the case to the court, the Leader’s office argued that the case could blacken the image of the Iranian regime in the eyes of international observers. The case closed without identifying those who ordered the murders. 81
(conservative) transform their political platform from conservatism to fundamentalism.
This aimed at reviving the Islamic Revolution’s values in the process. The IRGC’s political intervention also “reduced the political role” of the Islamic jurists in leading the right-wing of Iranian politics. As of now, IRGC retired generals lead right-wing politicians.
With Khamenei’s power and influence on their side, the Principlists could defeat the reformists in 2004, 2008, and 2012 Parliamentary Elections. Ahmadinejad’s victory, a former member of the IRGC, in the 2005 and 2009 Presidential Elections and the
Principlists’ victory in the Parliamentary Elections provided Khamenei with a clear proof that the reformists’ political platform has failed. The reformists' failure in elections did not mean the Principlists’ political platform appealed more to the Iranian people. Instead,
Khamenei and his status groups dissuaded middle-class Iranians from participating in elections to precipitate a win for the Principlists. While the middle-class Iranians saw their candidates in prison or exile, the IRGC and Basij mobilized their followers to vote in favor of the Principlists.
Dissuading the Middle-Class Iranians from Demanding Political Reform
In 2005, Khamenei’s status group supported Ahmadinejad over the other candidates. They believed Ahmadinejad shared the same values as Khamenei’s status groups, like being obedient to Khamenei and his trustees (Habibi 2013, 2). 82
Ahmadinejad’s victory intensified the long-standing tensions between two brands of
Iranian politicians, Khamenei’s status groups, and Khomeini’s inner circle since it
accelerated Khamenei’s plan to remove Khomeini’s inner circle from both Iranian politics
and society. Ahmadinejad’s victory also proved that in Third World countries, economic reform might cause the demand for political reform—as the financial reform in
Hashemi’s era resulted in the reform era. At the same time, unsuccessful political
improvement, reflecting the long path ahead for legal, political readjustment, may cause the rise of populism, since ordinary people prefer to hear the fast solution, especially when political fights exhausted them. As a president of Iran, Ahmadinejad appointed many of Khamenei’s status group, the Principlists, as “key positions in his cabinet” (2).
According to Habibi (2015), Ahmadinejad’s plan for privatization of Iran’s economy mostly benefited the IRGC, especially its economic wing. Besides the IRGC, the Leader, too, continued his advancement as an omnipotent presence in Iranian politics. His
enemies, Khomeini’s inner circle, lost both presidential and parliamentary elections and no longer held political power in the country’s political institutions.
According to Munck (1997), when a social class engages over non-political
issues, the political platform, the priorities and the goals that its members defined itself with, will lose its motivations for members’ further political engagement. In this regard, the Khamenei’s status groups targeted middle-class Iranians to prevent the circle from reemerging in Iranian politics. During the first term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, 83
Khamenei’s status group initiated two major social projects, to dissuade the middle class from demanding political reform (Dehghanpisheh 2013). The first project was known as
"Gashte Ershad" or “guidance patrol,” enforced a dress code for Iranian women, treating them as a sinful species who needed to be protected from themselves (Zibakalam 2014).
Figure 5b—Hijab Patrol (ISNA.ir)
The second project was known as “the security of neighborhoods” (BBC 2014). It aimed to provide security within the neighborhoods of large cities with high crime rates. 84
As a result of these state-sponsored policing efforts, those who were involved in gang activities were caught and tortured by police officials in front of the public. For the
Iranian people, such methods of control transgressed all limits of human dignity. While certain individuals participated in criminal activities, torturing them as part of a public spectacle became understood as the means of extending control over the lives of Iranian middle-class, deemed unacceptable by many citizens.
Figure 5c—the security of neighborhoods (Isna.ir)
According to scholars, the protest movement called the Green Movement, “was precisely an attempt to put an end to those projects which aimed to treat citizens, not as people who have universal rights” (Dabashi 2011, 12). This movement joined the 2009 85
Presidential Campaign of Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the circle's last hope to survive. The
Green Movement largely mobilized its followers across the country. Large Iranian cities
witnessed massive rallies aimed at overthrowing Khamenei and affecting the influence of
Khamenei’s status groups on Iranian politics. The Green Movement did not anticipate the
outcome of the election. The circle lost the election, though they still believe that the
election was rigged in favor of Khamenei’s candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. More
importantly, they lost their political agendas, since the IRGC detained most of their
leaders. As Shabani (2013) observes, “Khamenei’s response—which was applied by
status groups—to the movement’s demands was extremely violent” and included
arresting leaders and quelling protests in the street (347). At the same time, the
engagement over non-political issues that the Khamenei’s status groups implemented and
social projects previously imposed on Iranian civil society made the Iranian middle class reluctant to resist. As such, and when Khamenei started to oppose them with his
suppression tool, the IRGC, and the Basij members, they did not know how to shift
tactics to avoid being annihilated and forgotten. According to scholars, neither the movement’s leaders or the protester formed a political plan to fight the Khamenei’s status
groups (Dabashi 2011, Shabani 2013). For instance, on June 15, 2009, when three million
Green Movement supporters rallied, both Mousavi and Karroubi asked for a silent protest without massing in the "Azadi Square" where the protest began. Staying in the square
showed its influences on upcoming changes in Egypt, a few months after the Green 86
Movement's failure. Their inability to pursue their political goals became apparent when
Khamenei and his status groups linked the movement to the U.S. and Israel and justified
“the house arresting of Movement’s leaders” (Rubin 2012, 54).
Figure 5d—For the first time in the history of social movements, people wore the distinguishing green wristbands instead of making it (Kalame.org)
In the case of Egypt, shifting tactics in the face of Mubarak’s brutality led the
Muslim Brotherhood to become members of Parliament. In the process, they used the parliamentary bloc to develop their broad policy inclination, guiding political, social reform as a result. They also tried to reshape the network of charitable institutions and 87
service provision centers throughout civil society. This network offered the Brotherhood
access to direct participation by ordinary people and became instrumental in the party's
future need: incorporating protection into mainstream practice. Like other social
movements in the MENA region, the Green movement finally metamorphosed into a
variety of goal-oriented processes, including widespread demands for secular democracy.
In the case of Iran, none of these goals came to fruition.
The Future of Principlists
The collapse of the Green Movement and the support of Khamenei’s status groups made Ahmadinejad believe an unrealistic assessment of his base of power. Two years
after the collapse of the Green Movement in 2011, Ahmadinejad opposed Ayatollah
Khamenei due to the Khamenei’s support for a different candidate to the Ministry of
Intelligence Services. The threat of impeachment forced Ahmadinejad to accept
Khamenei’s decision, yet his apparent display of disagreement stood as a rare event in
Iranian politics. Later, his political bloc, the Principlists, rejected him and he lost the
support of the Leader and his status groups. Concerning Ahmadinejad's lack of political base and supporters, he could not form a new political bloc in Iranian politics. He became an outsider in Iranian politics.
According to scholars, Ahmadinejad’s opposition to the leader made Khamenei not invest in the Principlists anymore (Birgani 2010, Kurzman 2012). As a political bloc, 88
Principlists continued their existence and somehow kept their majority in the Iranian
Parliament. They remained part of Khamenei’s status groups. However, Khamenei no
longer fully supported them. Khamenei allowed the moderate forces of Khomeini’s inner
circle, those who condemned both the circle’s leaders (Ayatollahs Hashemi, Karroubi,
Khatami) and the Green Movement, to get back to politics and run for office. The victory
of President Rouhani that, in turn, formed a bloc of moderates in Iranian politics, should be seen in the light of Khamenei's tendency to control his status group’s political
ambition and not face another Ahmadinejad. By suppressing the circle and Green
Movement, controlling the Principlists, and allowing the moderate side of the Khomeini's
inner circle to engage in politics, Khamenei made politicians compete for his favor. In
2017, both Moderates and Principlists were loyal allies to Khamenei's leadership. 89
Conclusion
Khamenei’s status groups played an important role in contributing to his elimination of Khomeini’s inner circle from Iranian politics. These status groups that
Khamenei formed in Iranian politics were inclined to give Khamenei their loyalty. They wanted to support him instead of other political players because Khamenei’s position as a leader provided them “political recognition, prestige, and honor” (Weber 1922, 242). This explains why Khamenei’s status groups came from the lower class, those who desperately wanted to be taken seriously and be valued and recognized for their efforts and loyalty.
Step by step, these status groups helped Khamenei to form a monopoly in Iran and stay in power for more than 28 years. Khamenei overcame his lack of religious authority by building a status group among young and ambitious Jurists. Khamenei’s status group institutionalized the High Council of Islamic Seminaries in Qom to lower the power of the Grand Ayatollahs who voiced opinions against Khamenei. The council, in
turn, reduced the seminaries’ dependency on people’s religious tax by taking it from the
Grand Ayatollahs and making them more dependent on the government’s budget instead.
By bringing seminaries under Khamenei’s status groups’ control and attacking the dissident Grand Ayatollahs’ source of power, the religious tax, Khamenei’s status group destroyed the political immunity and support that being affiliated with Grand Ayatollahs provided for Khomeini’s inner circle. 90
Khamenei’s status group also trained a new generation of Jurists obedient to
Khamenei’s leadership. These well-trained jurists supervised Khamenei’s plan for
Islamization of country’s political institutions and reduced influence and power of
Khomeini’s circle in such institutions.
Repressive power also led Khamenei to form a status group among the IRGC’s
guards. The first generation of guards and Khomeini’s inner circle used to support each
other in the event anything compromised either side. Khamenei broke that relationship.
Khamenei adapted the same policy that President Bouteflika in Algeria adapted. As such,
Khamenei empowered the second generation of generals and organized status groups
among thems. Previously, these generals held no personal backing. To silence the first
generation of generals, Khamenei provoked his status group to question the first
generation of guards’ record in the war with Iraq. Khamenei’s propaganda and the justification for the power transition in the IRGC said the IRGC’s ordinary members
defended the country during the war with Iraq while the first generation of Guards sought
out to preserve Khomeini’s inner circle’s interest. In the face of a new generation of
Generals quickly accelerated in military rank and ignored the founding fathers’ authority,
the first generation of generals resigned. Their resignation also cut the link between
Guards and Khomeini’s inner circle.
Although there is no strongman among the second generation of Guards and they
are obedient to Khamenei’s leadership, someone like General Ghasem Soleimani has the 91
potential to oppose Khamenei in the future. On the contrary to generals in the
Khamenei’s status group, Soleimani progressed in the Quds Force, the ingroup that the second generation of Guards formed to preserve their interests beyond the Iranian border.
General Soleimani’s figure in Iranian politics needs to be studied in the future.
The Principlists became the last status group Khamenei formed in Iranian politics.
The most significant impact of the Principlists can be seen in dissuading the middle-class
Iranians from demanding political reform. As such, social projects aimed at humiliating the middle-class lifestyle convinced them that demanding reform could not change the political reality of Iran. Instead, it could put their existence in jeopardy. In 2017, middle-class Iranians were mostly engaged over non-political issues. While the IRGC suppressed all dissident voices, two loyal wings of Iranian politics, the Principlists, and the Moderates, participated in politics with relative freedom. Since the Ayatollah
Khamenei included Principlists to his status group, they exercised more freedom to engage in politics than their moderate counterparts. In 2017, the competition between the right and left of Iranian politics was a vital component of the regime’s social control as the repressive power of IRGC, and the religious authority of Khamenei was concerned.
Such regime-orchestrated power shifts within Iranian politics served as a safety valve whereby the anger and frustration of ordinary people in the face of the regime’s financial achievements were replaced by hope. In 2013, for instance, when inflation rose to almost
40 percent, and the rate of unemployment rose to more than 30 percent, people vented 92
their anger and voted in favor of a moderate candidate, Dr. Hassan Rohani, since he promised financial improvement in his first 100 days in the office.
While the government encouraged the political participation of the two new political wings, Khamenei considered the independent political parties in general as a threat and, therefore, tried to undermine them at all costs. The history of the Islamic regime shows that neither Khomeini nor the Khamenei’s government took kindly to the presence of political parties with the power of mass mobilization that introduced challenges to the authority of their regimes. Disagreement as to the existence of political parties also reflects long-standing social norms within Iranian civil society. As such, the social life of Iranians equivocates any substantive efforts to deepen a practical party cohesion as a means of political power. An expression in Farsi, the "Party Bazy," refers to times when political parties play a role as sources of both information and power.
According to Razavi (2010), “the assassination of King Nasreddin Shah Qajar (1848-96)
and the constitutional revolution (1906-11)” resulted in the uncivilized practice of power by new political parties (80). As a result, the country faced a deepening infrastructural
chaos. Simultaneously, the increased more straightforward access to political
organizations resulted in more progress, both financially and politically, for individuals.
Living in today’s Iran, people utilize this expression often during the day as a means to
criticize mismanagement and disorder. 93
It was King Nasereddin Shah who initiated a period of reform in Iran. Europeans’
entry to Iran led him to rationalize the legal system in Iran, transferring the social status
of Iranians from subjects to citizens. As a result, religious identity provided by Shia Islam
for Iranians faced its modem counterpart. This confrontation polarized both politics and
society in Iran. As such, “the Enlightenment-derived norms” that build the West, forced
nations like Iran to re-evaluate their traditions in light of standards imposed by European notions of modernity (Abrahamian 1993, 298). Insofar as the Islamic world is concerned,
this process did not occur solely as a result of the cultural interaction between the west
and the Islamic world. Instead, specific dictators (Qajars and Pahlavis) forced their
nations to re-evaluate their political traditions. This process deserves more attention. In
Turkey, for instance, this governmental reevaluation policy converted the country into a
modem, secular nation-state. Comparatively, this process of political reevaluation
encouraged civil-religious resistance embodied in a revolutionary tendency in Iran. This
disturbing trend left a power vacuum and led the Jurists to grab power and, subsequently,
formed an Islamic dictatorship in Iran.
From its inception to present, the Islamic regime adopted a progressive foreign policy in the MENA region. As a result, the Middle East witnessed a confrontation
between Shia Safavids united by Iran on the one hand and Sunni Salafis united by Saudi
Arabia on the other. At the same time that I write this paper, these two fronts fight in
Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. A victory in this sectarian battle could affect the durability of 94
Khamenei’s leadership in Iran since such a success could affect the power of the regime’s leaders and its political institutions. For instance, if the Syrian Free Army defeats Bashar
Assad, the power of the IRGC as Assad’s main supporter could decrease. The impact of
Iranian foreign policy on the durability of authoritarian rule in Iran should be studied in the future since it could affect the Khamenei’s status groups’ base of power in Iranian politics.
According to rumors, Ayatollah Khamenei “has terminal stage leukemia and could die in a few months” (Haaretz 2017, 1). The fight for power between Khamenei’s status groups on the day after his death may also affect the durability of authoritarian rule in Iran.
The day after the selection of a new religious leader, a selected leader will encounter political competition among Khamenei’s status groups as a means of gaining more considerable power and influence. The new leader’s ability, or inability, to control the political ambitions of Khamenei’s status groups will determine the new Leader’s status and, more importantly, the status of authoritarian rule in the future of Iran.
The vacuum of power that the death of Khamenei will bring up to Iranian politics may bring new players into the game. As such, Khomeini’s inner circle could act differently when Khamenei’s death raises the suppression of Khamenei’s status groups.
Marginalised Ayatollahs, too, could play a role and lead the religious leadership towards 95
the more conservative version of Political Islam when the country’s leading political players become engaged in leadership positions. 96
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