A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of San Francisco State University in Partial Fulfillment of /\ 5 the Requirements for the Degree 3K
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THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN IRAN, THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of /\ 5 The requirements for The Degree 3k <5 ?0LI Master of Arts In - G*4(o Political Science by Payam Ghorbanian San Francisco, California December, 2017 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN IRAN, THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP by Payam Ghorbanian and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in Political Science. Nicole Watts, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science f t v Katherine Gordy, Ph.D. Professor of Political Science THE DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIANISM RULE IN IRAN, THE CASE OF KHAMENEI’S LEADERSHIP Payam Ghorbanian San Francisco, California 2017 The persistence of Khamenei’s leadership stems not only from his authoritarian rule but also from his ability to organize status groups in Iran. These status groups received prestige and recognition from Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei’s status groups consisted of young Islamists jurists, those Islamists who held no personal backing or history of resistance against the Shah regime, the IRGC’s new generation of generals, those who did not play a role in decision making at the times of the Iran-Iraq war or the consolidation of the Islamic regime, and new generation of politicians, those not in office during Khomeini's leadership. This paper is a qualitative case study. A qualitative approach is employed to explain how Khamenei’s status groups preserved Khamenei’s power in country’s political institutions. As such, Khamenei’s status groups contributed Khamenei to overcome his clerical weakness, eliminated the first generation of IRGC generals and dissuaded middle class Iranians from demanding political reform. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. Date REFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT As a volunteer for 2009 Iranian presidential campaign, I had a chance to talk to many ordinary Iranians. That experience gave me the better understanding Iranians’ social- political priorities. I realized that there is a deep gap between different Iranian social classes. The economic-social priorities for a minority of the Iranian middle-class were different from those who were trying to lift up themselves from poverty. I found that poverty-stricken areas of Iran are fertile soil for politicians like Ahmadinejad to sow the seeds of hatred, thereby deepening misunderstanding between Iranians. I would not have been able to finish this paper without that experience. I would like to dedicate my paper to my family members in Torbat Heydarieh and Mashhad (Khorasan, Iran), especially to my fathers in the Sarbedaran movement, whose courageous in the face of the Arab invasion of Iran, Teymour invasion of Iran (especially in the Battle of Zava) has always been a source of inspiration for me. I would like to thank my mother Saeide Assar, my aunt Nadia Ghorbanian and my grandfather Abolghasem Ghorbanian for their eternal support. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Nicole Watts and Dr. Katherine Gordy for their guidance and advice. TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1: Introduction.......................................................................................................1 Conceptual Background......................................................................................... 3 Necessary but Insufficient Variables..................................................................... 7 Methodology and Thesis Structure...................................................................... 22 Chapter II: Academic Insight on Persisted Authoritarianism in Iran............................... 25 Durability of Khamenei’s Leadership.................................................................. 29 Conceptual Framework ...................................................................................... 33 Chapter III: Marginalizing Khomeini's Inner Circle........................................................ 36 Plan for Islamization............................................................................................. 51 Chapter IV: The IRGC................................ 56 Organizing Guards in Leaders’ Status Group....................................................... 61 Political-Social Conflicts...................................................................................... 62 Chapter V: Khamenei’s Status Group among Politicians................................................ 73 The Formation of Principlists............................................................................... 79 Dissuading the Middle Class Iranians from Demanding Political Reform.......... 81 Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 89 References........................................................................................................................ 96 v LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page 1. Figure la: Ayatollah Khamenei...................................................................................... 6 2. Figure lb: Ayatollah Hashemi.......................................................................................13 3. Figure lc: Massive crowd..............................................................................................14 4. Figure Id: Khamenei’s organized thugs........................................................................15 6: Figure le: Ayatollah Yazdi............................................................................................16 7. Figure 3a: Discussion-based classes............................................................................. 45 8. Figure 3b: Grand Ayatollah Montazeri......................................................................... 47 9. Figure 3c: Grand Ayatollah Saafi Gulpaygani............................................................. 49 10. Figure 3d: Grand Ayatollah Kani and Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi............... 50 11. Figure 3e: General Rahim Mousavi.......................................................................... 54 12. Figure 4a: Mohsen Rezaei.......................................................................................... 64 13. Figure 4b: Mohammad Ali Jafari............................................................................... 66 14. Figure 4c: Iran’s missile............................................................................................. 68 15. Figure 5a: President Khatami..................................................................................... 74 16. Figure 5b: Hijab patrol................................................................................................ 83 17. Figure 5c: The security of neighborhood.....................................................................84 18. Figure 5d: The Green movement................................................................................ 86 vi 1 Introduction On June 3, 1989, one day after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian Assembly of Experts, known as the Khobregan, convened a meeting to choose the Ayatollah Khomeini's successor. Instead of choosing another Grand Ayatollah with significant clerical standing, the majority of members voted in favor of Ali Khamenei— the president of Iran from 1981 to 1989 (Gaietta 2015, 213). Khamenei had no religious authority over the other Ayatollahs and was known as a weak politician (Abrahamian 2008, Afkhami 2009, Sahimi 2010). Khamenei did little to resist the Shah’s regime and did not belong to Khomeini’s inner circle. The existence of long-standing authoritarian rule in Iran begs the question as to why Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership persisted despite intense pressure from Iranian pro-democracy movements to overthrow his government. As the Arab Spring in 2010 and the 2011 Egyptian Uprising demonstrate, “repression, social control, and surveillance cannot, on their own, ensure the persistence of authoritarian rule” (Brien and Diamant 2014, 17). I argue in this thesis that the persistence of Khamenei’s leadership, then, stemmed not only from his authoritarian rule but also from his ability to organize status groups in Iran. These status groups received “prestige and recognition” (Weber 1922, 241) from the religious leader and in exchange assured Khamenei’s will continued throughout the regime’s institutions. 2 According to scholars, the Khobregan selected a leader with a weak position among other Ayatollahs and the people to keep him accountable to the Assembly of Experts and its members (Barzin 1995, Khan 2000, Keddie and Richard 2000, Abrahamian 2008, Emery 2013, Mazhar and Goraya 2014). Contrary to what the members of the Assembly thought, Khamenei expanded the role of religious leadership. Among his followers, Khamenei gained status as “a shadow of God,” the deputy of the hidden Imam whose decisions are infallible (Barzin 1995, 54). In 2017, Ayatollah Khamenei led Iran with very significant power. Khamenei unconstitutionally empowered his office to be a shadow government to control and confine executive power in himself1. He also extended his influence beyond the Iranian border. In at least three Arab countries (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), he had substantial