The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
chapter 1 The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai Lessons for Improving Afghan Women’s Status shireen khan burki Women are just like roses: A fresh rose is a happy sight. —Khushal Khan Khattak, Pashtun warrior poet, seventeenth- century C.E. Since in de pen dence in 1919, the Afghan state’s gender policies have in- volved a bewildering series of missteps, corrections, and more missteps,1 resulting in confusion, pain, and suffering for Afghan zan.2 Since the ouster of the Taliban regime, conditions for Afghan women improved under the Karzai government, but if history is any guide, gender policies and approaches are most likely to fail in Afghan i stan unless they incor- porate into the process the well-entrenched social and cultural norms of a traditional, patriarchal, primarily tribal society. In short, the historical record suggests that a gender template characterized by cautious, incre- mental efforts at improving female status stands the best chance of im- proving women’s lives in the long term. a lesson in caution— 1919 to 1929 Afghanistan’s “modernization” process— including the improvement of women’s status— was fi rst set in motion by Amir Amanullah’s grand- father, Amir Abdur Rahman (1880– 1901) and continued by his father Amir Habibullah (1901– 1919), albeit limitedly. During Muhammad Amanullah Khan’s reign (1919–1929), 3 ambitious efforts were made to 45 46 | Perceptions and Realities implement drastic social changes to improve women’s status. Amanul- lah’s views on women’s role in society were not a response to wide- spread societal demands; rather they were infl uenced primarily by his in- laws (the highly intellectual Tarzi family) and by unfolding events in the region. Amanullah’s gender policies, however, were completely di- vorced from the social realities of his extremely conservative, primarily tribal, and geo graph i cally remote country. Thus, under his father- in- law Prime Minister Mahmud Tarzi’s tutelage, he undertook an ambitious and controversial program meant to transform Af ghan i stan into a modern state in the same mold as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey.4 Amanullah’s government began by emphasizing secular- based (that is, non- madrassa) education and established the fi rst primary school for girls, Masturat School, in 1921 in Kabul, under the patronage of Queen Soraya.5 From 1920 to 1927, two primary schools and one middle school for girls were established in Kabul, with an estimated 700 stu- dents.6 These numbers, however, suggest that despite strong encourage- ment by the Amir, most Afghans were reluctant to send their daughters to obtain what was characterized as a secular education. Furthermore, the establishment of girls’ schools was limited to urban areas such as Kabul and Herat and thus failed to benefi t the provinces. Although many members of the urban elite welcomed such schools for their daughters, Amanullah’s promotion of a coeducational system— with the establishment of the Amaniya School in Kabul (named for the Amir)— was viewed with skepticism and/or disapproval. In 1928, fi f- teen female graduates of the Masturat Middle School, daughters of prominent Kabulis, were sent to Turkey for higher education.7 Sending young, unmarried girls out of the country was regarded with alarm in many quarters as yet another sign that the state, in its efforts to West- ernize, was willing to push against social and cultural norms. Queen Soraya, the Amir’s only wife,8 was viewed by most Afghans as a controversial fi gure. She publicly campaigned for drastic change in women’s roles and advocated for women’s rights to education, employ- ment, and divorce. Soraya’s behavior, however, perplexed most Afghans and frequently was seen as alien and “un- Islamic.” In a society where the dominant ethnic group, the Pashtun, adhered to the strictures of Pashtunwali,9 calls for women’s rights made publicly by a woman chal- lenged the embedded religious and cultural beliefs of a tribal society that did not view women as equals but only as property. Further- more, the queen’s advocacy on behalf of women impinged upon Afghan men’s carefully nurtured nang (“honor” in Pashto), as members of a The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 47 khel (clan) or qaum (tribal group). Across time, due to proximity to the dominant Pashtuns, other ethnic groups adopted cultural mores that mirrored the tenets of the ancient tribal codes, valuing family honor and its protection as a true measure of a man’s worth and status in society. Pashtunwali stressed the importance of protecting one’s zan (women), zar (gold/wealth), and zamin (land), in order to maintain izzat (respect). Women were viewed as property whose protection was essential for the preservation of the clan’s honor. The notion that women had “rights” was seen as a threat to the status quo and to Pashtunwali itself. Given the very limited support base for gender reforms— primarily concen- trated in Kabul among the educated elite— it was indeed a courageous, but overly ambitious, endeavor by the royal entourage to attempt to implement controversial, foreign changes within a short duration. In yet another controversial move, in August 1924, Amanullah intro- duced the Nizamnamah- ye- Arusi and Nikah wa Khatnasuri laws re- garding engagements and marriage. Although Amanullah’s father had instituted marriage reforms, these were considered far more radical. Whereas the Nizamnamah stressed gender equality and established the minimum age for marriage, the Nikah wa Khatnasuri specifi ed certain conditions within the marital agreement that were meant to ensure legal protections for brides. The state’s encouragement of Afghan women to take legal action if mistreated by their husbands was considered revolu- tionary and threatening to the cultural status quo. Both these mea sures were unpop u lar, but the provision in the Nizam- namah that encouraged girls to choose their own marriage partners without their parents’ interference was regarded as pushing the bound- aries of modernization at the expense of both tradition and religion. “Love marriages” threatened the alliance mechanism between families or clans, which was the key consideration in strengthening the clan or family’s position within the social, tribal structure. In more traditional provinces, especially the Pashtun belt, which in- cluded Kandahar, Nangahar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Ghazni, the new laws fell on deaf ears. They were also viewed with distaste by some of the more secular and better educated urban populace, who were the government’s only loyal constituency. Yet the state appeared to be oblivi- ous to the social pulse and continued its ambitious social reforms. These reforms were increasingly seen as the whims and fantasies of elites dis- connected from, and oblivious to, mainstream society. In its apparently overzealous stance, the Amanullah-led government sought societal changes that would ultimately fail because they were forced upon the 48 | Perceptions and Realities populace without consultation or regard for the tenor of the times. Al- though the leaders sought to replicate society along the lines of Ataturk’s Turkey by advocating for ambitious social change, they did not appreci- ate the inherent dangers of such precipitous efforts. They did, however, wisely invoke Islam and advocated Islamic due pro cess as delineated by Shari’a courts, which would have jurisdiction over such matters as they sought to transform women’s position in society. Thus the Nizamnameh stated: If the wife of a polygamist man feels that her husband has failed to treat all of his wives fairly and equally, she can fi le a complaint against her husband in a court of Shari’a, so that the unjust husbands should be punished accord- ingly. Moreover, punishment will be prescribed for husbands who would prevent their wives from petitioning against them. Article 18 of this document prohibits a forced marriage between adults; it calls the arranger of such a forceful marriage jabir (tyrant) and states that the qazi ( judge) who presides over this contract is to be reprimanded.10 Notwithstanding these attempts to rely on Islamic jurisprudence to make the case for female emancipation, the reality in Af ghan i stan’s Pashtun belt was clear: social interaction was fi rst and foremost delin- eated by the stipulations of Pashtunwali, which took prece dence over any Islamic tenets. However, Pashtunwali did not contradict Islamic strictures in matters related to preservation of “modesty,” which was, and is, leveraged by Pashtuns in restricting female interaction with the outside world, whether for purposes of attaining education, employment, or marriage. From the perspective of most Afghans, the efforts under Amir Amanullah were considered irresponsible and unnecessary med- dling in the internal (social) affairs of an in de pen dent people who re- sented intrusion by the Amir in the best of times. Af ghan i stan as a “state” still had a very brief history and was essentially a loose confederation under a weak central government that had extremely limited infl uence in its far- fl ung, relatively inaccessible provinces. The inability of Amanul- lah’s government to exert control over the periphery all but ensured that efforts to replicate the Turkish social model would fail. The fi rst wake- up call came in the form of a major rebellion in the province of Khost in March 1924. It was militarily suppressed, but the challenge brought home the threat posed by rapid reform mea sures that, coupled with the reduction of tribal subsidies, had become unten- able. Historically, what little infl uence any ruler in Kabul was able to exert over the periphery was due to the annual payments dispensed to individual tribes to maintain their allegiances. Amanullah was so caught The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 49 up in the importance of his social and economic plans, he believed that cutting the subsidies to pay for his programs would be understood, and accepted, by all Afghans.