chapter 1

The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai

Lessons for Improving Women’s Status shireen khan burki

Women are just like roses: A fresh rose is a happy sight. —Khushal Khan , Pashtun warrior poet, seventeenth-century C.E.

Since inde pen dence in 1919, the Afghan state’s gender policies have in- volved a bewildering series of missteps, corrections, and more missteps,1 resulting in confusion, pain, and suffering for Afghan zan.2 Since the ouster of the regime, conditions for Afghan women improved under the Karzai government, but if history is any guide, gender policies and approaches are most likely to fail in Afghan i stan unless they incor- porate into the process the well-entrenched social and cultural norms of a traditional, patriarchal, primarily tribal society. In short, the historical record suggests that a gender template characterized by cautious, incre- mental efforts at improving female status stands the best chance of im- proving women’s lives in the long term. a lesson in caution—1919 to 1929 ’s “modernization” process—including the improvement of women’s status—was fi rst set in motion by Amir Amanullah’s grand- father, Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) and continued by his father Amir Habibullah (1901–1919), albeit limitedly. During Muhammad ’s reign (1919–1929), 3 ambitious efforts were made to

45 46 | Perceptions and Realities implement drastic social changes to improve women’s status. Amanul- lah’s views on women’s role in society were not a response to wide- spread societal demands; rather they were infl uenced primarily by his in- laws (the highly intellectual Tarzi family) and by unfolding events in the region. Amanullah’s gender policies, however, were completely di- vorced from the social realities of his extremely conservative, primarily tribal, and geograph i cally remote country. Thus, under his father-in- law Prime Minister ’s tutelage, he undertook an ambitious and controversial program meant to transform Afghan i stan into a modern state in the same mold as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s .4 Amanullah’s government began by emphasizing secular-based (that is, non-madrassa) education and established the fi rst primary school for girls, Masturat School, in 1921 in , under the patronage of Queen Soraya.5 From 1920 to 1927, two primary schools and one middle school for girls were established in Kabul, with an estimated 700 stu- dents.6 These numbers, however, suggest that despite strong encourage- ment by the Amir, most Afghans were reluctant to send their daughters to obtain what was characterized as a secular education. Furthermore, the establishment of girls’ schools was limited to urban areas such as Kabul and Herat and thus failed to benefi t the provinces. Although many members of the urban elite welcomed such schools for their daughters, Amanullah’s promotion of a coeducational system— with the establishment of the Amaniya School in Kabul (named for the Amir)— was viewed with skepticism and/or disapproval. In 1928, fi f- teen female graduates of the Masturat Middle School, daughters of prominent Kabulis, were sent to Turkey for higher education.7 Sending young, unmarried girls out of the country was regarded with alarm in many quarters as yet another sign that the state, in its efforts to West- ernize, was willing to push against social and cultural norms. Queen Soraya, the Amir’s only wife,8 was viewed by most Afghans as a controversial fi gure. She publicly campaigned for drastic change in women’s roles and advocated for women’s rights to education, employ- ment, and divorce. Soraya’s behavior, however, perplexed most Afghans and frequently was seen as alien and “un- Islamic.” In a society where the dominant ethnic group, the Pashtun, adhered to the strictures of ,9 calls for women’s rights made publicly by a woman chal- lenged the embedded religious and cultural beliefs of a tribal society that did not view women as equals but only as property. Further- more, the queen’s advocacy on behalf of women impinged upon Afghan men’s carefully nurtured nang (“honor” in ), as members of a The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 47 khel (clan) or qaum (tribal group). Across time, due to proximity to the dominant , other ethnic groups adopted cultural mores that mirrored the tenets of the ancient tribal codes, valuing family honor and its protection as a true measure of a man’s worth and status in society. Pashtunwali stressed the importance of protecting one’s zan (women), zar (gold/wealth), and zamin (land), in order to maintain izzat (respect). Women were viewed as property whose protection was essential for the preservation of the clan’s honor. The notion that women had “rights” was seen as a threat to the status quo and to Pashtunwali itself. Given the very limited support base for gender reforms— primarily concen- trated in Kabul among the educated elite— it was indeed a courageous, but overly ambitious, endeavor by the royal entourage to attempt to implement controversial, foreign changes within a short duration. In yet another controversial move, in August 1924, Amanullah intro- duced the Nizamnamah-ye- Arusi and Nikah wa Khatnasuri laws re- garding engagements and marriage. Although Amanullah’s father had instituted marriage reforms, these were considered far more radical. Whereas the Nizamnamah stressed gender equality and established the minimum age for marriage, the Nikah wa Khatnasuri specifi ed certain conditions within the marital agreement that were meant to ensure legal protections for brides. The state’s encouragement of Afghan women to take legal action if mistreated by their husbands was considered revolu- tionary and threatening to the cultural status quo. Both these measures were unpopu lar, but the provision in the Nizam- namah that encouraged girls to choose their own marriage partners without their parents’ interference was regarded as pushing the bound- aries of modernization at the expense of both tradition and religion. “Love marriages” threatened the alliance mechanism between families or clans, which was the key consideration in strengthening the clan or family’s position within the social, tribal structure. In more traditional provinces, especially the Pashtun belt, which in- cluded , Nangahar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and , the new laws fell on deaf ears. They were also viewed with distaste by some of the more secular and better educated urban populace, who were the government’s only loyal constituency. Yet the state appeared to be oblivi- ous to the social pulse and continued its ambitious social reforms. These reforms were increasingly seen as the whims and fantasies of elites dis- connected from, and oblivious to, mainstream society. In its apparently overzealous stance, the Amanullah-led government sought societal changes that would ultimately fail because they were forced upon the 48 | Perceptions and Realities populace without consultation or regard for the tenor of the times. Al- though the leaders sought to replicate society along the lines of Ataturk’s Turkey by advocating for ambitious social change, they did not appreci- ate the inherent dangers of such precipitous efforts. They did, however, wisely invoke Islam and advocated Islamic due process as delineated by Shari’a courts, which would have jurisdiction over such matters as they sought to transform women’s position in society. Thus the Nizamnameh stated: If the wife of a polygamist man feels that her husband has failed to treat all of his wives fairly and equally, she can fi le a complaint against her husband in a court of Shari’a, so that the unjust husbands should be punished accord- ingly. Moreover, punishment will be prescribed for husbands who would prevent their wives from petitioning against them. . . . Article 18 of this document prohibits a forced marriage between adults; it calls the arranger of such a forceful marriage jabir (tyrant) and states that the qazi ( judge) who presides over this contract is to be reprimanded.10

Notwithstanding these attempts to rely on Islamic jurisprudence to make the case for female emancipation, the reality in Af ghan i stan’s Pashtun belt was clear: social interaction was fi rst and foremost delin- eated by the stipulations of Pashtunwali, which took prece dence over any Islamic tenets. However, Pashtunwali did not contradict Islamic strictures in matters related to preservation of “modesty,” which was, and is, leveraged by Pashtuns in restricting female interaction with the outside world, whether for purposes of attaining education, employment, or marriage. From the perspective of most Afghans, the efforts under Amir Amanullah were considered irresponsible and unnecessary med- dling in the internal (social) affairs of an in de pen dent people who re- sented intrusion by the Amir in the best of times. Afghan i stan as a “state” still had a very brief history and was essentially a loose confederation under a weak central government that had extremely limited infl uence in its far-fl ung, relatively inaccessible provinces. The inability of Amanul- lah’s government to exert control over the periphery all but ensured that efforts to replicate the Turkish social model would fail. The fi rst wake-up call came in the form of a major rebellion in the province of Khost in March 1924. It was militarily suppressed, but the challenge brought home the threat posed by rapid reform measures that, coupled with the reduction of tribal subsidies, had become unten- able. Historically, what little infl uence any ruler in Kabul was able to exert over the periphery was due to the annual payments dispensed to individual tribes to maintain their allegiances. Amanullah was so caught The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 49 up in the importance of his social and economic plans, he believed that cutting the subsidies to pay for his programs would be understood, and accepted, by all Afghans. Widespread, growing discontent in the provinces fi nally convinced Amanullah of the need to temporarily halt some of his reforms and to modify others. Girls were suddenly directed to receive their educations at home, religious studies were encouraged, and men were once again allowed to have four wives without having to obtain the approval of the original spouse as stipulated in the Nizamnameh.11 This rapid back- pedaling on gender policy by Amanullah’s government served only to embolden those who sought to ensure the traditional status quo, while dashing the hopes of many young girls in the urban areas. Nevertheless, although the modernization program never resumed the same pace, the seeds of female empowerment certainly were planted, and credit for this must go to Amir Amanullah and Queen Soraya. A notorious incident in August 1928 highlighted how detached the royal family had become from the social pulse. Amir Amanullah, pre- siding over a Loya , a Grand Assembly of Tribal Elders (who had been forced to wear Eu ro pe an clothes provided by the government), brought Queen Soraya to the event along with nearly 100 other women, mostly wives of government employees who supported her. They re- moved their veils in the presence of the tribal elders, who were shocked, whereas proponents of modernization applauded.12 This theatrical and provocative act, which had been preceded by unpalatable economic demands, was the last straw. The elders at the Jirga reluctantly endorsed Amanullah’s proposals at this public forum but wasted no time mobi- lizing public opinion against him once they returned home.13 The countryside began to take up arms against Amanullah even as elements within the government turned against him. The Amir abruptly shelved his modernization program. Girls who had been sent to Con- stantinople were recalled and schools for girls in Af ghan i stan were closed. Women were again prohibited from appearing unveiled in pub- lic and from cutting their hair. The center was dissolving. Af ghan i stan was reverting to its original state as a loose tribal confederation by the time Amanullah was overthrown in March 1929 by a Tajik tribal leader, Habibullah Kalakani, called Bacha-e-Saqqaw (“The Water Carrier’s Son”).14 Amanullah’s fall from power can be directly attributed to the government’s overbearing demands for additional taxes and its reduc- tion of tribal subsidies in order to implement controversial po liti cal, social, and economic reforms. These controversial demands in turn led 50 | Perceptions and Realities to violence throughout the country, during which Amir Amanullah and the royal family managed to fl ee into exile.15 slow and steady progress—1929 to 1978 The state’s gender policy during the period prior to the communist takeover in 1978 initially refl ected a pragmatic, cautious approach to progress for women. Although Muhammad Nadir Shah (1929–1933), who took power from Bacha- e-Saqqaw, was cognizant of the repercus- sions of inciting the tribal populace and the mullahs, he nevertheless reopened some urban girls’ schools, but only after fi rst seeking ap- proval from the tribal and religious leadership. Nadir Shah removed any symbols of Amanullah’s era by renaming girls’ schools and convert- ing one to a nursing school, all the while justifying his actions as not being contrary to Islamic precepts and with the tacit support of the clerics, mullahs, and tribal leaders. Oversight of school curricula was returned to the clerics in order to ensure that the curricula were in ac- cordance with Islamic teachings. However, members of the royal family and the elite sent many of their children abroad for school. The Sunni Hanifi School of Islamic Jurisprudence (fi qh) became the arbiter for civil and criminal laws and repealed Amanullah’s ambitious marital and gender relations reforms. When Muhammad Zahir Shah (1933– 1973) assumed the throne after Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1933, he continued his father’s ap- proach of slow progression on gender and social issues, which would, by and large, remain the blueprint for matters related to female status until 1978. Social, economic, and po litical conditions for all Afghans improved during the forty- year reign of Zahir Shah. This period was one of development and progress for Afghan i stan as a whole, thanks in large part to relative internal tranquility and the absence of foreign ag- gression. A pragmatist like his father, Zahir Shah began empowering Afghan females by improving access to education through the establish- ment of elementary schools for girls throughout the country. In 1950, the fi rst women’s college was established in Kabul on the premises of Malalai School, formerly called Masturat. In 1957, the fi rst girls’ high school was established in Herat.16 In 1964, women were granted the right to vote and to run for offi ce under the third constitution. In January 1966, Kubra Nurzai became the fi rst female cabinet minister of public health, followed in 1969 by Shafi qah Ziyai. Meanwhile, three women— Dr. Anahita Ratibzad, Ruqiyyah Habib Abu Bakr, and Masumah Ismati The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 51

Wardak— became members of parliament, and Humaira Malikyar, Saljuqi Gardizi, and Azizah Gardizi were elected to the Senate. Employment for women, however, was only encouraged in fi elds such as education and health care where contact with males could be curtailed. When Zahir Shah’s cousin and brother-in- law, Muhammad Daoud Khan, was appointed prime minister in 1953, he accelerated the pace of social reforms. Nevertheless, it was a far cry from Amanullah’s precipitous efforts in the . Thus, in the 1950s began a period of female empowerment that continued until the Soviet-sponsored People’s Demo cratic Party of Afghan i stan was forced out of power in 1992. Also, starting in the early 1950s, thanks to large- scale external funding for developmental projects from the United States and the , Af ghan i stan began to experience unprece dented levels of infrastructure and non-infrastructure development throughout the country. As part of their economic packages to Afghan i stan, both superpowers expected “progression” in women’s status and funded girls’ schools and educa- tional programs that would include females. Under Prime Minister Daoud Khan (1953– 1963), the state again began to encourage women to seek out less traditional opportunities. They were offered positions confi ned to urban centers as air stewardesses for the national Ariana Airlines, receptionists in government offi ces, and telephone operators with the national service. 17 With no large-scale public protest, Daoud felt confi dent the time was right to implement a more ambitious modernization program, á la Amanullah. In what must have seemed like déjà vu, Daoud and the ruling elite, convinced that Af- ghan i stan had reached the point when the social climate was conducive to the abolishment of veiling, began a campaign to end the practice. At the country’s inde pen dence celebrations on August 24, 1959, wives of military offi cials and women from the royal house hold appeared at the review podium of the military parade unveiled. Those military offi cials who refused to allow their wives to attend unveiled were relieved of their duties and some were even arrested.18 Support for Daoud’s policies by women of the urban upper and middle classes, coupled with the absence of dissent, led Daoud’s govern- ment to expand the implementation of “empowerment” initiatives. As in Amanullah’s time, Daoud faced stiff opposition when he tried to rep- licate urban modernization efforts in the rural areas, especially in the eastern and southern Pashtun tribal belt. In places such as Pul-e-Khumri, the capital of the northern province of Baghlan, the predominantly Pash- tun population was incensed when the government pressured local taxi 52 | Perceptions and Realities and horse- drawn carriage drivers to refuse to transport veiled women. Failure to adhere to this stipulation resulted in fi nes. Meanwhile, wives of Baghlan factory workers who would not unveil were penalized by being prohibited from shopping at the factory’s cooperative society.19 Rebellion broke out in December 1959, led by the maliks, khans, and mullahs— tribal and religious leaders— in places such as Kandahar, , Khost, and . The factors attributed to this outbreak of violence at the local level included the elimination of tribal subsidies and/or taxation and the central government’s efforts to impose gender “equality.” The level of animosity and the social blowback took the government by surprise. Demonstrations and protests increased, espe- cially in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the east and south. Government buildings were attacked and destroyed and some women who dared to venture out unveiled were killed by mobs. It took lethal methods—the military against its own citizenry— to crush the uprising. Opposition leaders were executed and many others, including prominent clerics, were imprisoned. Although the state managed to crush any signs of overt rebellion, the experience, so reminiscent of what had transpired under Amanullah, rattled the royal family and the ruling elite.20 Daoud’s stubborn deter- mination to humiliate the clerics and tribal elders in the Pashtun belt only exacerbated the deep schism that had emerged between Kabul and the provinces over modernization schemes involving female empower- ment. The state’s version of empowerment, modernization, and devel- opment had morphed into an ambitious social agenda that included a vision of female rights that challenged the embedded social mores of the majority of the primarily rural populace. Such policy formulations— which refl ected an eagerness to get onto the regional Westernizing band- wagon led by Turkey and Iran—once again refl ected the whims and ideals of the educated urbanized elite at the expense of those outside of their social strata who struggled to make ends meet. Daoud’s unrelenting stance, in par tic u lar his refusal to back down on controversial issues involving zan, created ruptures and tension within the royal house hold and was a primary reason behind his dismissal in 1963 as prime minister by his cousin, Amir Zahir Shah. Daoud’s dis- missal, however, had to do with more than just controversial, ambitious social policy,21 so Zahir Shah continued the process of female empower- ment, giving women the right to vote and to hold public offi ce. In stark contrast to Daoud’s bullying tactics, Zahir Shah’s conciliatory and re- spectful stance toward the tribal maliks and khans in the Pashtun belt The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 53 helped mitigate the animosity toward Kabul that had emerged under Daoud’s leadership. When Muhammad Daoud Khan overthrew Zahir Shah in 1973 in a bloodless coup, regime consolidation concerns precluded a more ambi- tious gender program to end what he saw as extreme in e qual ity. By 1975, a new constitution was enacted that stipulated gender equality.22 Whereas Afghan i stan’s fi rst constitution had been ambiguous in its dec- laration that all Afghans were equal before the law, this document went one step further. Article 27 specifi ed that both women and men are equal. Signifi cant legislative changes were enacted again in 1977, in the civil code relating to relations between men and women, including the controversial legal stipulation that women would now be free to choose their spouses regardless of their families’ wishes or choices. In reality, however, the enacted laws that specifi ed women’s rights were only implemented and/or adhered to among the small elite population of Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif, outside the conservative Pashtun belt. The government had neither the means, nor perhaps the resolve, to implement the new laws, so tribal customs regarding marital and child- rearing issues remained in place.23 disparate approaches to zan—1978 to 2001 During the period of communist rule from 1978 to 1992, under the People’s Demo cratic Party of Afghan i stan (PDPA), the state actively sought the support of women in its desperate quest for legitimacy. In its efforts to enact—and implement—what were viewed as un-Islamic so- cial reforms, the state resorted to the use of force to compel females to attend literacy classes in rural communities.24 Fearing the curriculum intended to convert their daughters to communism and was therefore antithetical to Islam, tribal and rural elements burned schools and other government buildings. Again, the state’s use of repressive and autocratic methods only aggravated a volatile situation and led to rebellion in the provinces. Alarmed at the level of hostility, the government backed off and exclusively focused on implementing its version of “female empower- ment” policies in the cities of Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif, where the PDPA retained an iron grip. During this period, urban women be- came essential for the continued functioning of the state. Women com- prised more than 70 percent of the teachers, 40 percent of doctors, and 50 percent of university students; they were also prominent in other traditionally male careers, such as law and engineering, because many 54 | Perceptions and Realities urban males had either joined the Mujahedin (from the , muga- hid, meaning struggler) or had been conscripted into the Afghan Na- tional Army. Meanwhile, the social status quo in rural areas remained fi rmly in place. The PDPA was unable to mobilize adequate fi nancial and human resources for its social reform agenda. Furthermore, life in the rural areas was characterized by large-scale disruption due to internal dis- placement and forced immigration, as the Mujahedin-led against the PDPA and its Soviet allies. It is estimated that a quarter of Af ghan i stan’s population (around 5 million people) were forced to fl ee their homes due to Soviet military tactics that made no distinction be- tween combatants and noncombatants. In 1992, with the overthrow of the PDPA’s Muhammad Najibullah, urban women witnessed an overnight reversal of their status. As the country drifted toward failed-state status, the various Mujahedin mili- tias and the warlords (regardless of their ethnic affi liations) battling each other in Kabul, all targeted women. In August 1992, Burhanuddin Muhammad Rabbani of the Tajik-led Jamaat-i-Islami party gained con- trol of the Mujahedin- coalition government in Kabul and began insti- tuting a series of measures designed to “Islamize” an already conserva- tive society. In December, when Rabbani’s term ended, his Jamaat-i-Islami party refused to turn over the reins, leading to a brutal civil war between ethnic factions that lasted until the Taliban gained control of Kabul in September 1996. Rabbani’s rule was defi ned by large-scale violence toward women. Rape and killings were commonplace. Furthermore, draconian policies restricted female mobility, dress, and the ability to work outside the home. Urban women’s fortunes were dramatically reversed almost overnight. Under the PDPA rule, women had experienced unprece dented freedom that had advocated—at least conceptually— a more egalitarian, and in- clusive, role for the Afghan women within their physical sphere of infl u- ence. Now, under Rabbani’s Mujahedin regime, urban women’s gains vanished overnight, causing them and their families considerable eco- nomic hardship. Although not as impacted, women outside the cities also experienced large- scale violence and rape in conditions that refl ected the complete breakdown of law and order. In 1996, a relatively unknown group of Islamic madrassa students, calling themselves Taliban (plural of Talib, which in Arabic means “student” and implies those who seek Islamic knowledge), took over much of Afghan i stan. They drove Rabbani’s gov- The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 55 ernment from Kabul into the northern Panjsher Valley, where Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks formed the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Af ghan i stan, known as the Northern Alliance in the West. The Taliban, whose leadership is exclusively Pashtun, adhere to an austere version of Sunni Islam, infl uenced by Salafi - Wahhabi, with ori- gins in Deoband, India. Once in charge, they immediately enacted gender policies that were oppressive even by the standards of Pashtunwali and were based more on the rejectionist ideology of Arab “guests,” such as Osama bin Laden. Under the Taliban, girls’ schools were closed; women were prohib- ited from working and forced into seclusion. Adultery was punished with stoning to death. Widows with no male relatives were unable to venture outside, let alone seek work in order to feed their families. Many resorted to illegal work such as tutoring girls in their homes or prostitu- tion at the risk of execution. The Taliban justifi ed such misogyny—and based their legitimacy—on an argument that they were bound to pro- tect women’s sexual honor, which thereby also protected Pashtun male honor, a cornerstone of . Their denial of any rights spe- cifi c to women was designed to consolidate power and to control their young and impressionable rank and fi le, many of whom were orphans raised in Wahhabi-funded madrassas in .25 Although the Taliban brought a kind of order to a lawless country, their measures (increasingly restrictive with time) were considered op- pressive by most segments of society. Many of their cruel, brutal tactics were considered alien to Pashtunwali, which advocated acting to pre- serve honor. In their zeal to reverse what they saw as corrupting infl u- ences of socialists and communists, the Taliban expanded upon Rabbani’s already regressive gender policies as they embarked on tactics that were genocidal in nature by targeting those ethnic groups that supported the United Islamic Front. prospects for empowerment under karzai and beyond Afghan women—especially the non-Pashtun—witnessed an overnight improvement in their quality of life following the ouster of the Taliban from power in 2001. Under President ,26 the government of the Islamic Republic of Af ghan i stan took major steps to restore the dignity of its female populace and improve their quality of life with the ratifi cation of a constitution that to an extent mirrors Afghan i stan’s 56 | Perceptions and Realities fi rst constitution of 1964. Article 44 of the new document affi rms, “The state shall devise and implement effective programs for balancing and promoting of education for women.”27 Conditions for Afghan women (especially urban dwellers) have some- what improved since 2001, but the resurgence of the Taliban has cast serious doubt that this can be sustained.28 At the provincial level, the situation remains unchanged and/or is deteriorating notwithstanding the infl ux of billions of dollars of foreign aid to the Afghan government. Lack of security and few “respectable” employment opportunities hin- der the pace of progress in gender matters. The failure of an increasingly predatory government to eradicate rampant corruption at all levels, as well as the government’s inability or unwillingness to tackle the poppy cultivation industry, which encourages warlordism, criminal mafi as, and the , only emboldens the Taliban and their supporters. These developments are a growing cause for concern among many Afghan women.29

A comparative examination of the gender policies of varying Afghan gov- ernments since 1919 is a lesson in caution: controversial and/or unpopu- lar social measures have never succeeded unless applied with brute force, as during the Daoud, PDPA, and Taliban eras. In some cases—notably Amir Amanullah and the PDPA—they contributed to the overthrow of the regime. The fi rst lesson for bolstering the position of Afghan women is to no longer construct or attempt to execute social policy as it relates to female empowerment without the agreement of a broad social base. Sec- ond, the government must acknowledge cultural, ethnic, urban, and rural dichotomies in gender issues and bridge these gaps by identifying com- mon, unifying goals, such as provision of elementary education and ac- cess to health care. Government must be seen as an honest broker in its provision of social services and aid to urban and rural parts of the coun- try. Third, it is essential to understand what the realistic needs of most women are and to address these, rather than mandate incendiary policies such as unveiling, dress codes, coeducation, and other hot- button issues that are destined to fail at the outset and/or may be leveraged for propa- ganda purposes by those who resist such changes as being un- Islamic. Finally, if efforts toward gender justice are to be sustainable over the long term, they must be primarily homegrown, integrating external assistance only as needed—not the other way around. The pro cess of abolishing entrenched cultural traditions that limit women’s capacity to lead fuller, more productive lives must include The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 57 much internal, inclusive discussions among Afghans. An empowerment road map for females is needed that incorporates the culture, traditions, and religion of the Afghan people with one important caveat: certain embedded cultural norms that are cruel, inhumane, and widespread, such as domestic violence and child marriage, must be abolished cultur- ally, legislatively, politi cally, and through effective law enforcement mea- sures, however slowly. Afghan women are not a monolithic bloc. Since Amanullah, the gen- der policies of a Westernized elite based in Kabul have been completely disconnected from the issues and concerns of rural women, who have different social/cultural/tribal narratives and limited comprehension of the issues that concern their urban sisters. Furthermore, the empower- ment of Afghan women is seen as being a commendable, even essential, endeavor by outside observers in the West, who may never have visited an Afghan village, where there may be no access to, among other things, potable water, schools, or medical care. Destitute women and their men- folk in dire circumstances, more often than not, have different visions of what constitutes “empowerment.” Historically, the gender policies of Kabul have refl ected the perceptions, attitudes, and traditions of those in power. Whether the head of the Af- ghan state has been a Westernized Amir (Amanullah) or a mullah from Uruzgan (Mullah Omar), policies have always refl ected the ruler’s own social milieu at the expense of the wishes of the larger populace. The no- tion of compromising on sensitive gender policies has been notably absent amongst these leaders until, and unless, threatening social forces have challenged or confronted the implementation of specifi c social policies. Without tangible improvements in both the security and economic realms, Afghan women will continue to be pawns in endless cycles of violence and suffering. As history has repeatedly shown, pragmatic con- siderations must take prece dence over pure self-interest if there is to be a gradual but consistent move toward prosperity and opportunity for all Afghan women. notes 1. Af ghan i stan is considered to have attained complete autonomy from for- eign intrusion offi cially when it signed the Rawalpindi Treaty, which recognized sole Afghan jurisdiction over its foreign affairs, with Great Britain in 1919. 2. Zan is the Farsi, , and Pashto/Pukhto word for “woman.” In Pashto/ Pukhto it is singular and plural. 58 | Perceptions and Realities

3. Muhammad Amanullah Khan (1919–1929) was a from the confederacy. 4. Amir Amanullah and Queen Soraya visited Turkey and were impressed by the determined efforts of Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kamal, to enact precipitous social reforms that would disallow Muslim customs such as the veil, arranged marriages, and so forth, in order to establish a modern, secular Turk- ish state. 5. Prior to this period in Af ghan i stan’s history, the only form of education for girls was religious based at local madrassas or at home and focused on learning the Qur’an and Islamic history. 6. Hafi zullah Emadi, Repression, Resis tance, and Women in Af ghan i stan (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 63. 7. Ibid. 8. The fact that Amanullah took only one wife was unprece dented amongst the ruling elite of Afghan i stan. His prede ces sors not only had up to four wives (as allowed according to Islamic precepts) but also had harems full of concubines. If there was one aspect of his life/behavior that bolstered his progressive social ten- dencies, it was his marital status and his treatment of his wife, Queen Soraya. 9. For more about Pashtunwali (or Pukhtunwali), see Louis Dupree, Afghan- i stan (Prince ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 126–127. Pashtuns— variously called Pushtuns, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, and Pathans— are historically the dominant ruling ethnic group in Af ghan i stan, although they do not have a large majority. Af ghan i stan is a mosaic comprising Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Qazilbash, Balouchis, and the Farsiwan. 10. Helena Malikyar, “Development of Family Law in Af ghani stan: The Roles of the Hanafi Madhhab, Customary Practices, and Power Politics,” Central Asian Survey 16, no. 3 (1997): 393. 11. Emadi, Repression, Resis tance, and Women, 63. 12. Ibid., 64. 13. Ibid., 65. 14. Habibullah Kalakani, known as Bacha- e-Saqqaw, was a non- literate Tajik who held power for nine months in 1929. Along with Burhanuddin Rab- bani (1992– 1996), he is the only Tajik to have ruled Afghan i stan. 15. Amir Amanullah and Queen Soraya were exiled in , , where he died in 1960 and she died in 1968. They are buried side by side in Jalalabad next to Amanullah’s father, Amir Habibullah. 16. Emadi, Repression, Resis tance, and Women, 69. 17. Fahima Rahimi, Women in Af ghan i stan (Liestal: Stiftung Foundation, Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica, 1986), 74. 18. Emadi, Repression, Resis tance, and Women, 71. 19. Andrew Wilson, “Inside Afghan i stan: A Background to Recent Trou- bles,” Royal Central Asian Journal 47, nos.3–4 (July–October 1960): 287–288. 20. Hafi zullah Emadi, “State, Modernization and Rebellion: US-Soviet Poli- tics of Domination of Afghan i stan,” Economic and Politi cal Weekly 26, no. 4 (January 26, 1991): 176–183, http:// www .jstor .org/ stable/ 4397249 . 21. Although Prime Minister Daoud’s social reform policies were not the litmus test that led to his removal from offi ce in 1963, they did contribute. His The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai | 59 stoking of the “Pukhtunkhwa” (Pashtun State), due to the irredentist connec- tions with Pakistan, were also a factor. 22. For more details on Daoud’s rule, see Martin Ewan’s “The Return of Daoud and the Saur Revolution,” in Af ghan i stan: A New History (New York: Routledge, 2001), 128– 137. 23. For more on Daoud’s efforts to reduce gender ine qual ity, see Shireen Burki- Liebl, The Politics of State Intervention: State Policy and the Status of Women in Pakistan (1947– 2006) and Afghan i stan (1919–2006) (dissertation, University of Utah, 2007), 177–180. 24. Emadi, Repression, Resis tance, and Women, 102. 25. Burki- Liebl, Politics of State Intervention, 217– 218. 26. Hamid Karzai is a member of the Popalzai Durrani Pashtun clan based in Kandahar. 27. “Between Hope and Fear: Intimidation and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghan i stan” (Human Rights Watch Briefi ng Paper, October 2004), 10. 28. Jerome Starkey, “Under Taliban Rule: How Insurgents Run Shadow Gov- ernment in Helmand,” Times, October 3, 2010; http:// freedomsyndicate .com/fair0000/ times0036 .html 29. Bula Devi, “Afghan i stan: The State of Women’s Rights Is Still a Concern,” The Hindu, September 13, 2010, http:// www .thehindu .com/ opinion/ interview/ article627560 .ece.