IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI Egypt |Domestic policy |Authoritarianism delegative authoritarianism will never accomplish. of its duties, including providing security for its people, something which of armedforces canrendergovernment more effective inthedischarge an ideal modelfor thecountry’s foreign supporters of how civilian control to coups, coup-volutions andoutright revolutions. Sisi’s Egypt provides dictator, asaone-man bandhisregimeisinherently unstable andprone is that Sisi will continue for the foreseeable future as Egypt’s delegative to besuffusedwith adeepcynicism. Although themostprobable scenario more from institutions andpolitical forces, while causing theentire polity inconsistent and ineffective policymaking, which isolates thepresident yet the maincustodiananddefiner of its interests.” Thisresults inerratic, president, who perceives himselfasthe“embodiment of thenation and “delegative authoritarianism,” isthedecision-making autonomy of the The primaryfeature of what intheEgyptian casemight betterbetermed president, who rules unconstrained bybalance of institutional powers. institution building inwhich voters delegate theirauthority tothe prototype of “delegative democracy,” astalled phaseof democratic Sisi’s tougher authoritarianism is analogous to the Latin American differences betweenthesetwo presidents andtheir respective regimes. Abd al Fattah al Sisi. Bothautocrats, therearenevertheless important authoritarian regime,which isnow guidedbyhissuccessor, President The “coup-volution” of 2011removed President Mubarak but nothis ABSTRACT by Robert Springborg President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 2 No. 6 (16 February 2011), http://blog.nus.edu.sg/middleeastinstitute/?p=621. 2011), No. 6(16 February * 3 2 1 Egypt. change sothat everything canstay thesame,” seemsapposite incontemporary Tomasi di Lampedusa’s observation about Introduction by Robert Springborg* President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism . Postgraduate School (ret.) and senior visiting fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Internazionali Affari fellow Istituto at the visiting senior and (ret.) School Postgraduate Daily Daily in at All-time al Rates Security”, Sisi’s Worsening High Nader, Despite “President Emir See 30. under of those percent 55 with compared performance, his highly approving three over those of percent 72 found it all-time with at an polling percent, of high 89 organisation’s same when the 2015, up May by back bounced rating approval Sisi’s http://www.madamasr.com/node/12156. Poll”, Masr Mada Suggests in of Slipping, Signs Shows Rating Approval “Sisi’s See would vote for they Sisi. reported of Egyptians percent 82 poll November the In to 49 percent. 57 fell from which youths, among more substantial yet and percent to 66 58 from was responses approve” “highly fall in although the month, previous the in results poll organization’s same the slightly down from was rating approval overall The election. apresidential would in vote for him they reporting of respondents percent 79 with percent, of 86 rating approval overall an revealed successor, President Abd al Fattah al Sisi. to acommon lament, nothisauthoritarian regime,which is now guidedbyhis would vote for him weretheretobeanotherpresidential election. hovering inthe75-90percent range.About four fifths of thosepolled say they and hasnotsubsequently dropped noticeably, with hispresidential approval rating predecessor, President Morsi. That popularity soaredfollowing Morsi’s overthrow popular political figure in Egypt when servingasMinister of Defence underhis enjoyed agrudging, resigned acceptance.Bycontrast, Sisi wasalready themost prepared bythecoup d’état of July 2013.Never truly popular, Mubarak at best free andfairelection, whereas Sisi’s did,albeit with theground having beenwell regimes. Mubarak’s path tothepresidency, for example, didnotlie through a authoritarian rule lies inits details, which differ substantially betweenthesetwo despite theappearance of change may betrue inthebroadest sense, the devil of Paper produced within the framework of the New-Med Research Network, July 2015. Network, New-Med of the framework Research the within produced Paper Robert Springborg is professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval at Affairs of Security National Department the in professor is Springborg Robert

Giuseppe Tomasi di Leopard Lampedusa, The A December 2014 poll conducted by the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) (Baseera) Research Opinion Center for Public Egyptian the by conducted poll 2014 A December This apt term was coined by Nathan W. Toronto, “Egypt’s Coup-Volution”, W. Nathan Toronto, by coined was “Egypt’s Insights apt term Middle East in This 1 The“coup-volution” of 2011removed President Mubarak but, according , London, Collins and Harvill Press, 1960. Press, Harvill and Collins , London, 2 While thischaracterisation of stability Risorgimento Sicily, “everything must , 15 December 2014, 2014, December , 15 3 , IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 3 http://www.baseera.com.eg/pdf_poll_file_en/President%20approval-%201%20year%20-%20En.pdf. see methodology, its On poll. recent most the in percent 58 was which rate, low response relatively of a because and person in than phone by rather polls Baseera because government United States the by sponsored polls access restricted forthat than higher is findings Baseera’s in for error margin The all governorates. from drawn respondents 9,000 of almost on asample based are Sisi of ratings recent Its most opinion. public on Egyptian source public authoritative most the become rapidly has Baseera organisation, independent an as 2012 in Founded am/sisis_approval_ratings. https://infogr.see president, been has Sisi since polls five on Baseera’s based of data presentation For agraphic http://www.baseera.com.eg/recentpolls_en.aspx. website, organization’s on the Egypt News Intelligence Unit, for example, differentiates betweenfull democracies, flawed prototype, including as it did liberal, even democratic elements. The Economist these qualifiers was that the regime was not as tough as the pure authoritarian including hybrid, competitive, soft, durable andnew. Thecommon element in Several different adjectives wereusedtoqualify Mubarak’s authoritarianism, the trajectory of Sisi’s regime. species of the genus authoritarian and, if so, what might that difference imply for from theseobservations arewhether theirregimesarefundamentally different one andtheirautocracies have operated differently. The key questions that follow In sum,bothMubarak andSisi areautocrats, although the latter isamore popular for thepolitical opposition. in Western capitals, andhehaspresidedover aunidirectional shrinkageof space discourse on democracyhasbeenlimited toafew words, especially thosespoken political liberalisations with renewedrestrictions on political activities. Sisi’s forces toit. Finally, Mubarak paidlip service todemocratisation while alternating the army, hastaken theopposite course,subordinating security andintelligence the Ministry of Interior as a counterbalance. Sisi, confident of his ability to control presidents also differ. Mubarak distrusted the military, so elevated forces under has beencreated inaneffort todeal with it. Themethods of control of thetwo the country’s economic crisis,notasingle newcivilian governmental institution the executive while its jurisdiction hasbeeneroded bymilitary courts;anddespite independence of thejudiciary hasbeenfurthercurtailed through subordination to organisations (NGOs). No parliament hasbeenelected during hisrule; the in governmental institutions ashehas inpolitical parties andnon-governmental even legislative branches.Bycontrast, Sisi hasmanifested astudied disinterest such organisations or built altogether newones within thejudicial, executive, and governing institutions andinfactbothpresidents invigorated several existing favour. Mubarak, like hispredecessor, Anwar al Sadat, repeatedly spoke of building informally associated with any partyinthegaggle of thosenow competing for his refused toestablishanewregimeparty, or indeedeven toallow hisnametobe ran for thepresidencywithout any partisanidentification andsubsequently has the lineal descendant of theruling partyfirst founded byGamal Abdel Nasser. Sisi from hispredecessor. Mubarak presidedover theNational Democratic Party (NDP), Having beenelected andpossessingvoter appeal arenotSisi’s only differences President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism , 9 May 2015, https://shar.es/1raOg5. Data on polls conducted by Baseera are reported reported are Baseera by conducted https://shar.es/1raOg5. on polls Data 2015, , 9May IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 4 The World The in in 2007 Democracy”, of Unit’s Index Intelligence Economist “The Kekic, Laza see indices of the complete discussion index_2007_v3.pdf. of existingpower relations andbyaconstitutionally limited termof office.” feels “entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts a stalled phaseof democratic institution building, inwhich anelected president In contrast torepresentative democracy, delegative democracywas identified as democratisation that hadfirstwelled up in Portugal in1974 andthen globalised. states that bythenseemednolonger tobesurgingforward on the“thirdwave” of of 167countries. as authoritarian, hassunkyet lower intherankings,now beingplaced138thout com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf. O’Donnell, it from theMubarak hybrid predecessor. Coined intheearly 1990sbyGuillermo to qualify Sisi’s paradoxically tougher authoritarianism andtherebydifferentiate A possible solution istouseanadjective applied toLatin American polities inorder 1. Delegative democracy/authoritarianism Mubarak oscillated between hybrid and authoritarian status. participation, political culture andcivil liberties. BythesemeasuresEgypt under five dimensions –electoral processes, governmental functioning, political democracies, hybrid regimesandauthoritarian regimesbasedon scores along President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 8 7 6 5 4 1994), p. 55-69. p. 1994), characteristics of delegative democracyarealso thoseof “authoritarianism under to beapplied toSisi’s authoritarianism. Indeed, O’Donnell himselfnotesthat the strip away “democracy” from O’Donnell’s term,leaving “delegative” astheadjective definitively, but assumingtheanswerislikely tobe“no,” it seems appropriate to could really remove Sisi inasubsequent election. Unable toanswerthat question to, say, Argentina underCarlos Menim, inthevital senseof whether Egyptian voters powers. This,of course,begsthequestion of whether Egypt underSisi isanalogous authority tothepresident, who rules unconstrained byabalance of institutional which isthat imposed byvoters through theballot box. official,” is missing, sothe only constraint onthe executive is “vertical accountability,” and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given relatively autonomous powers (i.e.,otherinstitutions) that cancall into question, these systems “horizontal accountability,” which isthat imposed by“anetwork of in acompetitive, reasonably freeandfairelection? much greater popularity andthefactthat, unlike Mubarak, hewasvoted into office categorised asmore unremittingly authoritarian thanMubarak’s wasdespite Sisi’s

Ibid., p. 59. p. Ibid., Democracy Index 2014 Democracy Unit, Intelligence Economist Journal of Democracy of Journal in Democracy”, “Delegative O’Donnell, A. Guillermo Ibid., p. 61. p. Ibid., The World The publication, annual Economist’s the in included are rankings The 6 “delegative democracy”wasapplied primarily toLatin American 5 How thencanone account for theparadox of Sisi’s Egypt being , p. 1-11,, p. http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_ , January 2015, p. 27, p. 2015, http://www.sudestada. , January 8 Thevoters delegate their 4 Sisi’s Egypt, classified , Vol. 5, No. 1 (January , Vol. No. 1(January 5, . For the most most . For the 7 In In IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 5 alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2015/6/8/sisi-declares-himself-egypts-god-send. “legal action againstpersonal insults.” public morals, among otherthingsby“presenting God”correctly, andbytaking medicine heintends toprescribe. Duringhiscampaign Sisi promised toimprove suggest heviews assoft andweak,inneedof hisfirmguidinghandand thestiff It’s ablessing from God.” problem, hemademelike thissoIcould seeandunderstandthetrue state of affairs. expatriates inJune 2015heclaimedthat “Godmademeadoctor todiagnosethe cure theills hehasdiagnosed.And indeed,when speakinginGermany toEgyptian conflating the nation with himself while arrogating to himself the role of doctor to Sisi’s utterances suggest heisthe very embodiment of the delegative authoritarian, medicines that will restore thehealth of thenation.” the “delegative” president hastheright andtheduty toadminister“unpleasant main custodian and definer of its interests.” Because the body politic isin disarray, the president, who, asO’Donnell notes,is“theembodiment of thenation andthe The primaryfeatures of delegative authoritarianism arethoseof its key figure, what thenarethesecharacteristics anddo theyaccurately describe “Sisi-ism”? be mandatory.” interview: “I’mnotleaving achancefor people toacton theirown. My program will when applied toSisi, who shortly before assumingthepresidencystated inaTV 2014, http://nyti.ms/1ogMVAn. 2014, http://ti.me/1mP867l. be President of Egypt, soIresponded that Iknow Iwill bePresident too.” it in red… In another, I saw President Sadat, and he told me that he knew he would example, Ionce saw myself carryingasword with ‘No Godbut Allah’ engraved on 2013 leaked interview inwhich hedeclared:“Ihave along history with visions. For and associated with hisduty tolead the nation, werereflected intheDecember day?” make you walk on your own feet? WhenIwake you up at 5inthemorning every the rhetorical questions “You want tobeafirst-classnation? Will you bear it ifI 13 12 11 10 9 such namesascaesarism,bonapartism, caudillismo, populism, andthelike.” President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 16 15 14 understands’?” kill theson? Ordoes healways shelter himandsay, ‘I’ll bepatient until my son a son who isabit of afailure anddoes notunderstandthefacts.Doesfather and themilitary that we are“like thevery big brother, thevery big father who has

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

Ibid., p. 62. p. Ibid., The New York New The in Times Best”, Knows Sisi Strongman, New “Egypt’s D. Kirkpatrick, David Karl Vick, “Egypt’s al-Sisi: The Field Marshal Who Could be Pharaoh”, Time in be Could Who al-Sisi: Marshal Field The “Egypt’s Vick, Karl Alex Wright, “Sisi Declares Himself Egypt’s God-Send”, al-Araby in Egypt’s Himself Declares Wright, “Sisi Alex Ibid., p. 60. p. Ibid., 12 In another leaked recording from December2013, he stated about himself 13 11 By“son” heclearly meant theEgyptian nation, which thesequotes In aleaked conversation during theelection campaign heasked 16 14 His lofty self-image,suffusedwith religion 10 Thisdescription seemsapt , 8 June 2015, http://www. , 8June 2015, , 27 January 2014, 2014, , 27January 15 In sum, , 24 May May , 24 9 So IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 6 the figures andclaimed it ashis own. any otherclear plantopresent totheelectorate, Sisi dusted thisone off, multiplied Mubarak in1985,who rejectedit astoocostly andunworkable. Apparently lacking version of themap hadbeenpresented byits designer, Faruq al Baz,toPresident living abroad, according to the presidential candidate. As it transpired, a far smaller cost of 140billion dollars, of which 120billion would beprovided byEgyptians and renewable energyprojects togenerate 10,000Megawatts of power, with atotal for construction inthedesertof forty-eight newcities, eight newairports, fishfarms President isolates himselffrom mostpolitical institutions and organized interests, groups, or crowds inthestreets –hastobeignored.” According toO’Donnell, “The 18 17 he (or she)thinksbest?” the promises of hiscampaign –hasnotthepresident beenauthorized togovern as according toO’Donnell, “policies of hisgovernment needbearnoresemblanceto asserted it ishisbusiness alone –that is,thedoctor knows best.To startwith, O’Donnell’s delegative prototype, heprovided few specifics inhiscampaign, but How then does he propose to restore the health of the nation? Consistent with 2. Sisi’s prescriptions President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 21 20 19 2014, http://almon.co/23lr. 2014, Egypt’s poor. dollars in“social housing,” acampaign promise that hadenormous appeal among exception was his commitment relatively early in that campaign to invest 40 billion economic andforeign policies, Sisi avoided doing sofor mostof thecampaign. One development and effect a quantum leap inthe Egyptian economy.” he claimedwould guidehis administration and“achieve unprecedented rates of planks inhisplatform bydeclaringacolour-coded “Map of theFuture,” which election Sisi appeared torespond tomounting criticism of thelackof any specific reneging on adeal that apparently underpinnedtheproject. Several days before the leaving it tohissubordinates toaccusetheEmirati partner,Muhammad Alabbar, of built or even commenced. As president, Sisi madenofurtherreference totheplan, parties.” the whole nation” andsoavoid “thefactionalism andconflicts associated with party, thus exemplifying O’Donnell’s “paternal figure” having to “take care of mentioned, hedesistedfrom associating himselfandhisregimefrom any political identifying what would notbedone, rather thanwhat would be.As already subsequent behaviour aspresident essentially conveyed anegative message, Lacking specific, viable, positive policy proposals, the Sisi campaign andhis after theelection thanthat tobuild one million social housingunits. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/us-egypt-sisi-economy-idUSBREA4L0KL20140522.

Ibid. Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, cit., p. 60. p. cit., Democracy”, “Delegative O’Donnell, A. Guillermo Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, cit., p. 60. p. cit., Democracy”, “Delegative O’Donnell, A. Guillermo Stephen Kalin, “Sisi’s Economic Vision for Egypt: Back to the Future”, in Reuters in Future”, to the Back for Vision Egypt: Economic “Sisi’s Kalin, Stephen Tom Rollins, “Egypt’s Poor Expect Sisi to Deliver on Election Promises”, in Al-Monitor in Promises”, on Election to Deliver Sisi Expect Poor “Egypt’s Tom Rollins, 21 Moreover, “resistance–beit from congress, political parties, interest 18 In theevent, more thantwo years later nosuch housinghadbeen 17 Urged byhiscampaign advisors todeclaresome specific 20 Thispledge sankinto even deeperoblivion 19 The map called , 22 May 2014, 2014, May , 22 , 3June IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 7 be headed. analysis in an effort to shed some light on how Sisi’s operates and where it might has also described theinternal dynamics of such regimes,wecandraw upon his their president through theballot box, weretheytowant todo so.Since O’Donnell the type,except that Egyptian voters probably do not have thepower toremove of O’Donnell’s delegative democracy, inthat it manifests key characteristics of rare tonon-existent. In sum,Sisi’s Egypt appears tobeanauthoritarian version public political actors, who do nothave accesstochannelsof participation, are one, inthat theidentities of hisclose advisors remainunknown while inputs from Mediterranean coast,building at anestimated costof 45billion dollars anentirely total), construction of alarge-scale nuclear power plant along thenorthwest acres of agricultural land (thereby adding almost 20 percent to the existing string of boldnewinitiatives, including reclamation of aminimum of one million under President Sisi isacaseinpoint. Following hiselection Sisi announceda we call decretismo.” policy making[…]wewitness adecision-making frenzy, what inLatin America institutions, delegative systemshave the“apparent advantage of allowing swift incremental because policies aremadeandcarried out byrelatively autonomous Unlike representative democracies, where decision-making isslow and 3. Regime dynamics and bearssole responsibility for thesuccesses andfailures of ‘his’policies.” President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 24 23 22 shielded bythepresident. highly technical criteria,” which are understood only by “técnicos” recruited and the alpha andtheomega of politics.” Thenation’s problems “can only besolved by which “only theheadreally knows: thepresident andhismosttrustedadvisors are instead isconsistent with O’Donnell’s description of adelegative regimeasone in of the institutional context in which the decree was formulated. What is offered presidency and various constituencies impacted by those decrees, to say nothing be effected, or any otherinformation that would suggest engagement betweenthe behind adecree,thoseinvolved inits formulation, thetimeperiod inwhich it isto has thepresident or hisspokesperson offered anexplanation of thereasoning constitution draftedunderhisguidance,Sisi hasruled bypresidential decree.Never presidential origin. Governing without a parliament, hencein violation of the announced, typically byrelatively low-ranking officials, thereby implying their cotton, andinmany casestheirabrupt modification or cancellation, aresuddenly capital gainstaxes on share transactions, prohibition of importation of short staple such asreduction of energysubsidies, importation of gasfrom Israel, imposition of initiatives, for which hehassought noorganised support. Major policy initiatives, indeed, Sisi hasconsistently denigrated (even asterrorism), any resistancetohis

Ibid., p. 60. p. Ibid., Ibid., p. 61. p. Ibid., Ibid., p. 62. p. Ibid., 24 Thedrumbeat of announcements of major policy initiatives 23 TheSisi regimeisjustsuch ananonymous, apolitical 22 And IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 8 annually or substantially raisingship traffic for at least five years. and hasvirtually noprospect of increasing canal revenues bymore than4percent of themilitary intheform of “Suez Canal Certificates” paying 12percent interest, than 8 billion dollars of deposits out of the banking system and into the hands the second Suez Canal hasbeenplagued with technical problems, sucked more important andpolitically mobilized interests, theyareunlikely tobeimplemented.” ahead for Sisi. “Because such hasty, unilateral executive orders arelikely tooffend The dynamics of decretismo identified byO’Donnell suggest challenges that lie on thepresident.” of hazardous implementation, andof concentrating responsibility for theoutcomes swift policymaking comes “at theexpenseof ahigher likelihood of gross mistakes, authoritarianism identified byO’Donnell, which isthat the apparent advantage of But thisproject unfortunately illustrates anotherof thecharacteristics of delegative with themilitary takingchargeof digging aparallel canal “inless thanone year.” The only proposal actedupon wasaportion of thelargerSuez Canal Zone project, technical (e.g.,insufficient water for further landreclamation) orfinancial reasons. These proposed projects wererentirely fanciful or of marginal utility, either for the Suez Canal Zone into amajor transport, logistical andmanufacturing centre. new Cairo betweenthe existingcity andtheSuez Canal, andthetransformation of President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 28 27 26 25 class. The2015-16 budget wasdeclared,but afew days later disavowed by Sisi himself, rescinded, again because of a hostile reception, in thiscaseprimarily bythemiddle zagged with taxes, such asthoseon equities andproperty, being declaredandthen because of fear of backlash from poor consumers. Fiscal policies have zigged and of energysubsidies, for example, wascancelled without explanation, undoubtedly of socioeconomic structural constraints. Apromised second round of reductions everyday management of theeconomy hasalso fallen into disarray, mainly because suggesting theirwhimsical, decretismo nature. But yet more importantly, the high profile, pie-in-the-sky projects have stalled andpresumably beenabandoned, fate of Sisi’s decreesexemplifies theseconstraints andchallenges. Virtually all the tall order,” because “[t]hesetwo goals areextremely difficult toharmonize.” care about thefate of thepoor and[…]themiddle class.” This,however, is“avery “both control inflation andimplement social policies which show that […]they do reconcile competing class interests. Most notably, delegative authoritarians must the political andinstitutional isolation of thepresident isintensified bytheneedto slowed ifnotaltogether halted democratic transitions, policy stasisresulting from Moreover, because delegative systemstendtoariseineconomic criseswhich have Suez Canal Project”, in Al-Monitor in Project”, Canal Suez on Egypt’s Remain “Questions com//opinion/new-suez-canal-priority-time. Aman, Ayah also See Independent Egypt Time?”, in at this aPriority Canal Suez New the “Is Khalil, Hisham see studies, of feasibility lack of the indictment and investment on the rate of return projected of the analysis For an english.ahram.org.eg/News/120670.aspx.

Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, cit., p. 66-67. p. cit., Democracy”, “Delegative O’Donnell, A. Guillermo Ibid., p. 62. p. Ibid., “Leaks Halt Construction at Suez Canal Project”, in Ahram Online in Project”, Canal at Suez Halt Construction “Leaks Ibid., p. 65. p. Ibid., 25 Undertaken without feasibility or cost/benefit analyses, digging , 26 August 2014, http://almon.co/26kk. 2014, August , 26 , 2 July 2015, http://www.egyptindependent. , 2July 2015, , 19 January 2015, http:// 2015, January , 19 26 28 The 27

IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI 9 the already low standardof living of mostof thepopulation.” trust, particularly iftheirimmediate andmostvisible impact furtherdepresses immediately or shortly afterentering office […] doesnothingto promote public other good thingstocome with them,only toenactsevere stabilization packages with adeepcynicism. “Bypromising expansionist economic policies andmany from institutions andpolitical forces, and tocause theentire polity tobesuffused of policy swings and their hasty declaration, to isolate the president yet more policymaking are,according toO’Donnell, tofurtheraccentuate themagnitude The consequences of erratic, inconsistent andineffective president-centred wealthy, but notreally knowing how todo sogiven thelimited resources available. all, desperately tryingtoappease thepoor andmiddle class,andindeed,even the forgotten. Not anchored inany classor constituency, theregimefloats above them high-flying civil servant emoluments were declared, objected toandthenquietly prevent from risingfurtherasthecurrencydepreciates. Similarly, caps placedon its fear of inflation risingabove its chronic 10-13 percent, arate already hardto as the regime tries to balance its need to retain the loyalty of this huge sector with for theabrupt change.Even civil service salaries have beenadjusted up anddown now constitute more than40percent of thepopulation, wasthechief motivation and its impact on the poor, who if measured by incomes of 2 dollars per day or less as theeconomy stagnates. revenues from thenewVAT consumption taxwould increasebysome 50percent revenues bytheordered amount, without any accompanying explanation of how growth rate. Thetechnocrats duly complied, simply increasinganticipated deficit asapercentage of GDP by at least 1percent while raisingtheanticipated who ordered asecond budget tobeproduced that reduced thebudget’s projected President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 30 29 the doctor who knows best, prescribing all major policy initiatives. Mubarak, by with theformer’s beinginspirational innature, thelatter’s managerial. Sisi is softer style of authoritarian rule? Stylistically theyaredramatically different, How then,insum,does Sisi’s delegative dictatorship differ from Mubarak’s hybrid, from politics. reinstatement of aparliament –all thesearesigns of growing cynical detachment lack of any strong, popular push to try to repair the situation, say by demanding the among what isleft of thepolitical classthat lives undertheregime’s umbrella; and and of thecrumblinginstitutions of state, including thejudiciary; pettysquabbling remains popular. Widespread ridicule of thegrandiose plansthat come tonothing is increasingly distrustful of thesystem and alienated from it, even ifSisi himself of journalists, politicians andactivists of almost any description, the population regime’s imposition of ever more Draconian censorship andoutright intimidation News/135476.aspx. Ahram Online Budget”, in New the Understanding Masr

Mada in Mada is Unrealistic”, Deficit of Lower “Amr State’s Target Adly: Salah-Ahmed, Amira Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, cit., p. 66. p. cit., Democracy”, “Delegative O’Donnell, A. Guillermo , 9 July 2015, http://www.madamasr.com/node/19761. See also Ziad Bahaa-Eldin, “Egypt: “Egypt: Bahaa-Eldin, Ziad also See http://www.madamasr.com/node/19761. , 9July 2015, 29 Presumably thepresident’s fear of resulting inflation , 15 July 2015, http://english.ahram.org.eg/ July 2015, , 15 30 Despite theSisi 10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI endurance,” where, with thepartial exception of Peru, nocoups have taken place. Latin America henotesthat thesesystemsdemonstrate a“remarkable capacity for should “naturally” beterminated bycoups d’état, but typically arenot.Indeed, in According toO’Donnell, thisprogressive degeneration of delegative systems 4. Thefuture of Sisi’s delegative system any political legacy tobequeath, either personal or institutional. his power. Sisi isunlikely torule for anything like that period andwill have little if he presided outlived him, indeed became the baseupon which his successor built over, but that wasthirtyyears afterheinherited power andtheregimeover which institutions andpolitical actors. Ultimately Mubarak’s careful balancing acttopped and thepopulation. Indeed, hisappeal isdirectly tothemasses,circumventing failures. Sisi hasfelt nosuch need,andsohascreated noinsulation betweenhimself and thereby provide some distractions from his personal rule and scapegoats for pulling themup andpushingthemdown inorder tokeep thepolitical dramagoing state institutions, political organisations, NGOs andpoliticians andpublic figures, sought toclothe hisregimewith civilian legitimacy, playing thepuppeteer to the Chinese to provide counterbalances to Uncle Sam. Most importantly, Mubarak under theAmerican umbrella, whereas Sisi hasreachedout toRussia andeven with atotal price taginthehundreds of billions. Mubarak wascontent toremain first two years in office Sisihas launcheda half dozen orso suchundertakings southwestern desert, Mubarak did not push any high-profile initiatives. In his would have beenunlikely tocountenance. OtherthantheTushkaproject inthe even deploying F-16 aircraft to bomb his own citizens, an action which Mubarak Sinai, Sisi hasthrown histroops into amajor counterinsurgency campaign there, the oddscautiously. WhereasMubarak essentially avoided confrontations inthe policies hasalso differed. Sisi isahigh-stakes gambler, while Mubarak played disassociate himself from policies that failed conspicuously. Thecontent of their behind abevyof advisors andinstitutions, clearly intending tomake it easyto contrast, wasreluctant tobeidentified with major undertakings of any sort, hiding President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 32 31 altogether impossible, bytheeconomic crisis. “the arduous taskof institutionalization” isrenderedyet more difficult, ifnot the delegative president. But where thereislittle legacy of effective institutions, countries institutions gradually camebacktolife andassertedthemselves against democratic, those being Uruguay and Chile in his Latin American sample. In those systems areput backon thepath todemocracyarethosewhich werepreviously continue to indulge the delegative president. The only casesinwhich such sustaining one-man rule, andtosome sectors of thepopulation beingwilling to system, which seeks to prevent breakdown and disorder even at the cost of He explainsthisparadox with reference toassistanceprovided bytheinternational

Ibid., p. 67. p. Ibid., Ibid., p. 68. p. Ibid., 32 Sostates with little democratic 31

11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI of thesans culottes, or intheEgyptian context, thosewearing thegalabiyya, not This would notbehistory repeating as farce because this upheaval would be that countrywide breakdown of order intheface of amassupheaval continue to grow. with neutralisation of external actors, mostimportantly theUS, prospects for a political classinthefaceof Sisi andthemilitary, andtumult intheregion combined Given thedegreeof socioeconomic decay since2011,theabjectfailure of thecivilian the allegiance of themostpowerful component of thepresent Egyptian insurgency. maybe even the present Islamic State headquartered in Raqqa, Syria, and claiming breakdown, possibly coupled with theriseof acoherent radical Islamist challenger, the otherendof thespectrumarereal revolutions, madepossible bysystemic the latter from overwhelming theformer, it is at least apossible historical farce. At and any andall combinations of civilian political forces, which presently precludes Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1851coup, given thebalance of power betweenthedeepstate would behistory repeating itself as farce, asMarxobserved with regardtoLouise- political forces, possibly even including the Brotherhood yet again.While this nation,” thenpartnerat least temporarily with one or more of themajor civilian widespread demonstrations would againcause themilitary tostepin“save the experience. Onewould bearerunof the“coup-volution” of 2011.In thisscenario There areat least anothercouple of options that lie outside theLatin American vulnerable todisenchanted competitors inkey military command positions. footing, combined with Sisi’s ever more egocentric rule, renderhimincreasingly far tocontain theinsurgency or put theeconomy on anything resemblingasound by insurgents –all theseareindicators of tension inthehighest ranks.Failures thus on hisvisit tothetroops inSinai following thedramatic 1July 2015attack on them marginalizing of thepresent chief of staff, Sidqy Subhi, who didnotaccompany Sisi the second andthirdarmies, General Intelligence andMinisterof Interior; andthe turnover rates inkey military andintelligence positions, including thoseof headof Egypt of former presidential contender andairforce general Ahmad Shafiq;rapid Egypt. Thehousearrestof former chief of staffSami Abul Enan;thebanningfrom rebuff of that effort ispresumably thechief cause ofareduction of Saudi aidto working behindthescenestoreconcile Sisi with theMuslim Brotherhood. His quarter, including from Saudi Arabia andeven theUS.Theformer ispresently insurgents. Therecould beconsiderable external support for amove from this moderate alternative, especially with regardtorelations with Islamists, including and security services, thus opening up spacefor achallenger claimingtooffer a the wind.Sisi isstrongly identified with thehardline faction within themilitary seems notonly theoretically possible but supported bysome empirical straws in plausible one. Indeed, thelogical alternative identified byO’Donnell of acoup d’état Latin American scenario of persistingdelegative authoritarianism isnottheonly en masse or even identifying personal or institutional alternatives to Sisi, the and theunhappy population does notseemtobegoing over toquasi-insurgency trajectory? Although theinternational systemistryingtokeep Sisi’s regimeafloat But isEgypt’s delegative authoritarianism likely tofollow theLatin American ever more estranged,ifnevertheless still accepting. heritage stumble on underineffective presidents from whom populations become President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI disparate civilian political actors andeven elements of thecoercive forces could civilian control over thesecurity sector asawhole isathemearound which is such government that underpinsSisi’s delegative authoritarianism. Asserting under military dominated governments sinceit becamearepublic in1952 andit state’s meansof coercion and,mostespecially, its military. Egypt hassuffered chance of success inachieving both istheassertion of civilian control over the The one themethat might reconcile thecompeting objectives andhave some what theirintent is. theme toguideassistanceefforts andtomake clear to all, including President Sisi, tall orders for which thenecessaryifnotsufficient condition for success is acentral of rebuilding what ispresently amuch fragmented political community. Theseare of reconciliation betweencompeting political forces aspartof abroader process respect for therule of law andhuman rights and,mostof all, assistingtheprocess pressure toprizetheregimeopen while rebuilding institutions andengendering to counter theinsurgency. Thelatter objective demandsassistanceandindeed among otherthings,enhancing the state’s capacities, including coercive ones, support for aresponsive, inclusive government. Theformer objective necessitates, directions –helping tocounter theinsurgencywhile broadening anddeepening To have a chance of success it has to target two goals that seem to lie in different a path isdifficult tochart. Egypt andelsewhere. Amiddle path of qualified support seemspreferable, but such significant threat from violent extremistsrisksencouragingthose in that would bereinforced bysuch support. Abandoning theregimewhile it facesa stabilise it solong asits “delegative” nature remainsunchanged,amalignant nature of Egypt do? Unqualified, fulsome support for theregimewill do little ifanything to probably aslikely tocollapse astoreform from within, what should states supportive Given theinherent fragility of Sisi’s hardbut brittle authoritarianism, which is 5. What istobedone? will probably notoutlive Sisi. act andregenerating something like charismasuggest that delegative dictatorship of deteriorating circumstances with thechallenges of reprisingapreviously failed While anotherSisi could emergewerethepresent one tosuccumb, thecombination accompanied with Sisi’s profoundly reclusive habits dictated bysecurity concerns. inherently unstable, asimplied byconstant discussion of apossible assassination delegative dictator seemsthemostlikely scenario. As aone-man bandthough it is are probable. Indeed, at least for the foreseeable future, Sisi continuing as the decay from which Egypt suffers. But that theyareimaginable does notmeanthey are even imaginable issuggestive of themagnitude of political andeconomic existing radical Islamist organisations totryridethat tiger. That such outcomes uprising could throw up its own leadership, or it could provide the opportunity for the Westernised, middle-class liberals who orchestrated events in2011.Such an President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI up byoutside support, will never accomplish. people, something which delegative authoritarianism, however much it isbeefed more effective inthedischarge of its duties, including providing security for its region asawhole how civilian control of thearmedforces canrendergovernment from militarism of all sorts. Egypt would beanideal settingtoexemplify for the and Africa, although not in the Middle East, the region which has suffered the most are reasonably well known, having been employed in much of Latin America, Asia and meansof assistingtheprocess of developing civilian control of thearmedforces government, while also upgrading its abilities todeterviolent extremism.Theways unite. Enhancingthat control could inturnserve tobuild amore stable basefor President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism Updated 31July 2015 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI February 2011),http://blog.nus.edu.sg/middleeastinstitute/?p=621 Nathan W. Toronto, “Egypt’s Coup-Volution”, inMiddle EastInsights, No. 6(16 1960 Giuseppe Tomasi diLampedusa, TheLeopard, London, Collins andHarvill Press, Mada Masr,9July 2015,http://www.madamasr.com/node/19761 Amira Salah-Ahmed, “Amr Adly: State’s Target of Lower Deficit is Unrealistic”, in Monitor Tom Rollins, “Egypt’s Poor Expect Sisi to Deliver on Election Promises”, in No. 1(January 1994),p.55-69 Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”, in Journal of Democracy,Vol. 5, in Daily News Egypt, 9May 2015,https://shar.es/1raOg5 Emir Nader, “President al Sisi’s Rates at All-time High Despite Worsening Security”, Times, 24May 2014,http://nyti.ms/1ogMVAn David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egypt’s New Strongman, Sisi Knows Best”, inTheNew York priority-time 2 July 2015, http://www.egyptindependent.com//opinion/new-suez-canal- Hisham Khalil, “Is theNew Suez Canal aPriority at thisTime?”, inEgypt Independent, v3.pdf in 2007,p.1-11, http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_index_2007_ Laza Kekic, “TheEconomist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy”, inTheWorld idUSBREA4L0KL20140522 22 May 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/us-egypt-sisi-economy- Stephen Kalin, “Sisi’s Economic Vision for Egypt: BacktotheFuture”, inReuters, 2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24- Economist Intelligence Unit, DemocracyIndex 2014 , January 2015,p.27, July 2015,http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/135476.aspx Ziad Bahaa-Eldin, “Egypt: Understanding theNew Budget”, inAhram Online, 15 August 2014,http://almon.co/26kk Ayah Aman, “Questions Remain on Egypt’s Suez Canal Project”, inAl-Monitor References President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism , 3June 2014,http://almon.co/23lr , 26 Al- 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI god-send http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2015/6/8/sisi-declares-himself-egypts- Alex Wright, “Sisi DeclaresHimself Egypt’s God-Send”, inal-Araby, 8June 2015, January 2014,http://ti.me/1mP867l Karl Vick, “Egypt’s al-Sisi: TheField Marshal WhoCould bePharaoh”, inTime, 27 President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 26 - JULY 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-50-7 © 2015 IAI Latest IAIWORKING PAPERS President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. 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