High Politics Subject: History Unit

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Subject: History Unit: Independence and Partition

Lesson: High Politics

Lesson Developer Srinath Raghavan

College/Department : Senior Fellow, Center for Policy Research, New Delhi and Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College, London

Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

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Table of contents

Chapter 12: Independence and Partition  12.1: High politics  Summary  Exercises  Glossary  Further readings

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12.1: High politics

The Second World War ended in Europe on 7 May 1945. Five weeks later the Congress Working Committee was released from prison. Soon after, negotiations for the future of India commenced. By the time the Raj folded up in mid-August 1947, there were two dominions of India and Pakistan. The question of why Partition accompanied Independence has given rise to an enormous body of historical writing. Given its tremendous human cost and its continued implications for the subcontinent, it is not surprising that the subject invites exploration from newer angles and perspectives. The existing literature falls into four broad categories of works: the ‘high politics’ or the negotiations between the British and Indian leaders; provincial politics or the study of how the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan played out in Punjab, Bengal, and to lesser extent in UP, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Sindh; popular movements and their impact on political negotiations at various levels; and the human dimension of Partition with an emphasis on the victims of violence, especially women.

In this lesson, we will focus on negotiations between the British, the Muslim League and the Congress. But in doing so, we will also consider the impact of provincial politics and other developments outside of the negotiating chambers and committee rooms. The literature on the high politics of Partition is large and contentious. It is large because the causes of Partition can be traced back to several points after the mid-19th century. Indeed, if all of these are taken on board, Partition seems a massively over-determined historical event. The literature is contentious because of an excessive concern with the culpability, achievement, or failures of important actors.

Nationalist historiographies in Pakistan and India have offered explanations that are widely held in the respective countries. The former explain Partition by resorting to the ‘two-nation theory’, which holds that the Muslims of India were always a separate and distinctive national community. Indian nationalist accounts tend to trace it to the ‘divide- and-rule’ policies adopted by the Raj, and to the ‘communal’ demand for Pakistan propagated by Jinnah. Scholarly debates, however, have moved on—owing to more detailed and sophisticated studies of the decade preceding Partition.

The key debate

In an important book, Ayesha Jalal argued that Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a ‘bargaining counter’ and was deliberately vague about the actual character of the demand. Once the British accepted his demand for a separate state comprising the Muslim-majority provinces in the North-West and North-East, Jinnah was interested in securing one of two arrangements. Either a ‘confederation’ with other non-Muslim provinces on the basis of equal power (parity) in the central government; or, as a sovereign state, to conclude ‘treaty arrangements’ with the rest of India on matters of common concern. In either case, Jinnah hoped to incorporate safeguards for minorities. This was the only way to protect the interests of the large numbers of Muslims who would remain outside the boundaries of Pakistan. Hence, he also sought to retain, within Pakistan, undivided Punjab and Bengal with their large non-Muslim minorities. According Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

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to Jalal, Jinnah assumed that the new Muslim state would ‘continue to be part of a larger all-India whole’. In short, Jinnah did not really seek partition. (Jalal 1985, 241)

This thesis started out as a ‘revisionist’ perspective, but it has since become the new orthodoxy. Building on it, other scholars have asserted that if the Muslim League did not want partition, then it could only have come about because the Congress wanted it. (Roy 1990)

Jalal’s argument draws our attention to important aspects of Jinnah’s negotiating strategy. But it remains problematic on several counts. First, it is almost entirely based on inference, there being little direct evidence of Jinnah’s thinking along these lines. Besides, it ignores evidence that undercuts its own claims. For instance, as early as 1941, Jinnah was publicly and clearly stating that ‘we do not want under any circumstances, a constitution of an all India character, with one government at the centre’ (Dhulipala 2007). Furthermore, there are internal inconsistencies in the argument. Jalal’s argument about Jinnah wanting to situate Pakistan within an all-India arrangement does not square with her claim that he was ready to establish treaty- arrangements. Treaties can only be concluded by sovereign entities. And a sovereign Pakistan necessarily meant partition. Indeed, the assumption that Jinnah did want a sovereign state built around all of Punjab and Bengal may account better for his actions than the claim that he never sought partition.

The argument that it was the Congress that willed Partition rests on a flimsy base of evidence. The Congress’ approach certainly contributed to the eventual outcome. Nor could Partition have occurred without its approval. But the claim that it was solely responsible for Partition does not seem very convincing.

Bearing in mind these debates, let us now turn to the negotiations themselves.

Opening round and the elections

Towards the end of June 1945, the Viceroy, General Archibald Wavell, convened a conference at Simla. 22 Indian leaders were invited to the conference. The Viceroy sought their cooperation in reconstituting his Executive Council. He proposed ‘parity’ between the ‘Caste Hindus’ and the Muslims in nominating representatives to the Council. Although the Congress was not pleased with the idea of parity, it saw the measure as a step towards the formation of an interim government at the centre. The Congress agreed to enter an Executive Council consisting of 5 ‘Caste Hindus’, 5 Muslims and 2 ‘minor minorities’.

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Figure 12.1.1: Jawaharlal Nehru with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Sardar Patel, arriving for the Simla conference Source: http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=hub081108croniclesof_india.asp From History in the Making: The Visual Archives of Kulwant Roy, an exhibition at the IGNCA, Delhi, curated by Aditya Arya and Sabeena Gadihoke, with Indivar Kamtekar.

Wavell was prepared to agree with the Muslim League’s demand that the Congress should not nominate any Muslim representative. Jinnah, however, wanted more. He insisted on Hindu-Muslim parity in the Executive Council. Moreover, he claimed that all the Muslim members should be nominated by the Muslim League. In doing so, Jinnah sought to drive home two points. First, the Hindus and Muslims were two nations, and hence entitled to equal representation in an interim arrangement. Second, Jinnah should be the ‘sole spokesman’ for the Muslims of India.

This was a bold, not to say extraordinary, claim. For at the time of the conference, the Muslim League was out of office in all the Muslim-majority provinces with the exception of Sindh. Wavell stuck to his initial formula, but suggested that of the five Muslim members the Muslim League could nominate four. The fifth would be nominated by the Punjab Unionist Party, which ran the provincial government in Punjab. Faced with Jinnah’s persistent opposition, the Viceroy decided to call off the conference. The aborted conference proved a victory for the Muslim League. The party had shown that it was a critical player at the all-India level and held a veto on any move towards transfer of power.

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Figure 12.1.2: Viceroy Lord Wavell and M. A. Jinnah at the Simla Conference Source: http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A046&Pg=2

In the aftermath of the Simla conference, Wavell announced elections. The election would serve two purposes: form governments in the provinces, and create a central legislature that would work towards the constitutional structure for a free India. The outcome of the elections in 1946 was a major turning point. The Congress expectedly won the bulk of non-Muslim seats in the provinces and the centre. The Muslim League had presented the elections to the Muslim electorate as virtually a referendum on Pakistan. It reaped major rewards. In contrast to its poor showing in the elections of 1937, the Muslim League now proved to be a force to reckon with.

Value addition: interesting details The elections of 1946 The Muslim League’s performance in the elections was impressive. But its dominance was uneven. In the Central Assembly the League won every single Muslim seat with a total vote share of 86.6 percent. The League secured a majority of seats in the provinces too. The only exception was the North-West Frontier Province where the Congress had a decisive majority of 30 seats, including 19 Muslim seats, and the League managed only 17. Even so, the Muslim League found it difficult to form ministries on its own steam. In Assam and North- West Frontier Province, a Congress ministry was sworn in. In Punjab, the Unionist Party managed to hold on to power by forming a coalition with the Congress and the Akalis. In Bengal and Sindh, the League ministries had a tenuous majority in the assembly. Source: Original

The Muslim League’s performance gave substantial weight to its political position and to the demand for Pakistan. The party’s major achievement lay not in the number of seats won, but in the fact that it managed both to widen its appeal and to overcome the regional barriers that had blocked the emergence of a strong Muslim party. The League’s performance in provinces like Madras and Bombay was striking. These areas could in no conceivable scheme form part of a Pakistan; but the Muslim electorate did respond overwhelmingly to the call. In other provinces, too, Jinnah had succeeded in making the League an important force by careful power-broking with local politicians and grandees. Some scholars have argued that these outcomes were possible because of Jinnah’s refusal to spell out his conception of Pakistan clearly (Bose & Jalal 1998, 180). The Muslim League’s performance in provinces like Madras certainly lends credence to this argument. But in other places, like the UP, the electorate was well aware of the broad geographical contours of Pakistan. Indeed, this had been part of public debates for some years now (Dhulipala 2007).

In retrospect, the elections of 1946 were significant because they reflected and contributed to the communal polarization. In so doing, they cleared the path for Pakistan and set the stage for the carnage accompanying Partition.

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The Cabinet mission

By the time elections were held, a Labour party government led by Clement Attlee had come to power in Britain. Leaders of the Labour government were sympathetic to Indian demands for self-rule. But they were also keenly aware of Britain’s weakened imperial position following the Second World War. The Attlee government wished to rid itself of the nightmare of governing India and to restructure the imperial system for the exigencies of the post-war international order. As far as the subcontinent was concerned, its policies were mainly shaped by strategic considerations. The large standing army; the vast reservoir of potential military manpower; the rich natural resources and the industrial potential; India’s importance in securing sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, and in defending the Middle East and the Far East: all of these mandated both preserving Indian unity and ensuring India’s continued presence in the Commonwealth.

In pursuit of this aim, a Cabinet mission was sent to India in late March 1946 to create a constitutional package for a united India and to plan for the transfer of power. The Mission consisted of three senior members of the Labour government: Lord Pethick- Lawrence (Secretary of State for India), Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade), and A.V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty). The Mission spent three months in India, holding a number of meetings with the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League. Neither party was able to advance suggestions that met the other side’s approval.

The discussions, however, made it clear that Jinnah was averse to a Pakistan that involved partitioning Punjab and Bengal, both of which had substantial non-Muslim minorities. Jinnah’s stance reflected two considerations. The idea of partitioning Punjab and Bengal was unlikely to go down well with his supporters in both these provinces. Further, Jinnah himself attached great importance to the presence of substantial non- Muslim minorities within the boundaries of Pakistan. This would ensure that India would agree to provisions for safeguarding the rights of Muslims in the Hindu-majority provinces. In fact, this idea of reciprocal safeguards (or ‘hostage theory’ as it came to be called) had been a recurring theme in the Muslim League’s mobilization campaigns in provinces such as UP since the passage of the Lahore Resolution of 1940.

Following another ineffective round of negotiations with the two main parties in Simla, the Cabinet mission declared its own plan for a united India on 16 May 1946. Partition, on the basis of either a large or a small Pakistan was rejected. The Mission laid out a three-tier structure for the future Indian Union. At the top-most tier, the central government would deal only with foreign affairs, defence, and communications, and would have the powers to raise finances for these subjects. All other subjects would rest Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

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with the provinces. The idea of parity at the centre was dropped. But decision on any major communal issue in the central legislature would require a majority of each community as well as an overall majority.

The Constituent Assembly would be elected by provincial assemblies. The latter formed the lowest tier of the structure. The provinces would be free to form groups, and each group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common. These groups formed the middle tier of the structure. Members of the Constituent Assembly would divide up into three sections. Section A would consist of Bombay, Madras, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Orissa. Section B of Punjab, North West Frontier Province, and Sindh. Section C of Bengal and Assam. Each section would draw up provincial constitutions for the provinces included in that section. Each section could also decide whether any group constitution was required.

Any province could, by a majority vote of its assembly, call for a reconsideration of the union and group constitutions periodically after ten years. Any province could elect to come out of any group in which it had been placed after the first general elections under the new constitution. Till such time the constitutions were framed, an interim government having the support of the major political parties would be set up immediately.

The Congress and the Muslim League claimed to accept the plan. But in fact their ‘acceptance’ was based on their own interpretations of what the plan promised and how it would work. Anxious to secure an agreement, however weak, the Cabinet mission played along with both sides. Eventually, after the Mission left for London, its Plan would quickly unravel.

Revisionist historians have argued that Jinnah’s acceptance of the Cabinet mission plan demonstrates that he did not want a separate state. But it is equally plausible that Jinnah went along with the Plan because the alternative would have been a sovereign but truncated Pakistan with partitioned Punjab and Bengal. Further, it could be argued that Jinnah considered the Plan as a preliminary step towards an independent Pakistan with all of Punjab and Bengal. The Muslim League’s acceptance statement claimed that the provision of compulsory grouping laid the foundation of Pakistan and that the right of secession of groups was provided in the Plan by implication. Indeed, members of the Muslim League had written to Jinnah that ‘we work the Plan up to the Group stage and then create a situation to force the hands of the Hindus and the British to concede Pakistan of our conception’ (Moore 1983, 123).

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Figure 12.1.3: Members of the Cabinet mission and the Viceroy with M. A. Jinnah Source: http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/transfer/large14 227.html

Value addition: interesting detail Muslim League on the Cabinet mission plan The Muslim League’s acceptance statement of 6 June 1946 claimed that: ‘inasmuch as the basis and foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission’s plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces in Sections B and C, [the League] is willing to co-operate with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan’. Source: Mansergh, Nicholas, E. V. R Lumby, and Penderel Moon eds. 1970-83. Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942–7. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. vol. 7, 469.

The Congress, for its part, insisted from the beginning that the procedure of sections and grouping could not be mandatory. The Congress’ major concern was that the North-West Frontier Province and Assam (both of which had Congress governments) would be compelled to accept constitutions that would be drawn up by Sections B and C dominated by the Muslim League. The leaders of both these provinces had made it clear that this would be totally unacceptable to them. The Muslim League’s acceptance statement reinforced these concerns. On 25 June 1946, the Congress sent a cleverly worded letter of ‘acceptance’. It claimed that in the first instance, the provinces could choose whether or not belong to the section in which they were placed. However, the

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Congress did not make its acceptance of the Plan conditional upon the Mission’s acceptance of this interpretation.

Value addition: interesting detail Congress on the Cabinet mission plan The Congress sought to circumvent the procedure for sections by claiming that the Mission’s Plan lent itself to such an interpretation. Paragraph 15 (5) of the Plan stated that ‘Provinces should be free to form groups’. But Paragraph 19 stated that the sections would first meet to finalize provincial and if necessary group constitutions. Following Gandhi’s lead, the Congress leadership insisted that the provisions of Paragraph 19 were contrary to those of Paragraph 15 (5), and hence the latter should take precedence. Source: Moore, Robin. 1983. Escape From Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 134-41.

The Muslim League was right in claiming that the sectional procedure had to be followed; but it was wrong in insisting that grouping was compulsory and that the groups could secede subsequently. The Congress was right in claiming that grouping was not mandatory; but it was wrong in insisting that the provinces could opt out of the sectional procedure for provincial constitution-making. Each side’s interpretation unnerved the other. The fundamental problem was the lack of trust between the Congress and the Muslim League.

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Figure 12.1.4: Nehru and Jinnah during the Cabinet mission negotiations, 1946 Source: Gopal, S. 1976. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol.1. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 257.

Owing to the Congress’ open proclamation of its interpretation, Jinnah withdrew the League’s acceptance towards the end of July 1946. The League now insisted that it would settle for nothing less that the immediate establishment of an independent and fully sovereign Pakistan. The League observed 16 August as Direct Action Day. Three days later nearly 4000 residents of Calcutta were dead and over 10,000 injured. The violence quickly spread from Bengal to Bihar and to Garhmukhteshwar in UP. The resulting communal polarization made some form of Partition almost inevitable.

Towards Partition

The Interim Government proved as unworkable as the rest of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan. In early September 1947, Wavell swore in a Congress-led ministry. The League decided to join six weeks later, but continued to boycott the Constituent Assembly. Far from working as a coalition, the two parties were constantly at loggerheads with each other. Instead of acting as a bridge between the two sides, the Interim Government accentuated the gulf between them.

Faced with the continued impasse and with the rapidly increasing communal violence and other unrest in the country, Wavell advocated a breakdown plan for a phased British withdrawal from India. As a consequence, the British government decided to recall Wavell. On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee announced Lord Mountbatten’s appointment as Viceroy. In deference to the latter’s wishes, Attlee also announced that the British would withdraw from India no later than June 1948.

Figure 12.1.5: Clement Attlee with Louis and Edwina Mountbatten Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

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Source: http://www.timescontent.com/tss/showcase/preview-buy/13988/News/Earl- Mountbatten-Lady-Mountbatten-Clement-Atlee.html

Developments at the provincial level gave further momentum to the move towards Partition. The Muslim League’s agitation in Punjab forced the resignation of the Unionist- led coalition on 2 March 1947. Now the Shiromani Akali Dal made it clear that the Sikhs would press for the partition of Punjab. The province was soon engulfed in a spiral of violence and retaliation that would assume the form of ethnic cleansing as Partition neared.

By this time, influential sections of the Bengal Congress had begun advocating partition of the province. The ‘great Calcutta killings’ and the subsequent violence had marked an important turning point. More importantly, the upper-class Hindu bhadralok saw partition as a means to do away with the dominance of Muslims in provincial politics and to secure their own primacy. Further, the Muslim League had managed to mobilize the support of the province’s largely Muslim peasantry against the landlords and money lenders. This too threatened to undercut the bhadralok rentier class, and gave impetus to their call for partition. Some Bengal Congress leaders, like Sarat Chandra Bose and Kiran Shankar Roy, reached an agreement with Muslim League leaders, H. S. Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim, on a united independent Bengal. Although Jinnah approved of it, the idea failed to take-off owing to opposition from the Provincial Congress Committee and the Congress High Command.

When Mountbatten arrived in India in late March 1947, he still hoped to reach an agreement on the basis of the Cabinet mission Plan. After several rounds of meetings with Indian leaders, it became clear that Partition was the most realistic option. And it had to be done quickly. The Congress leadership, too, had reached the conclusion that a partition of Punjab and Bengal was inevitable. The mounting violence showed that the Muslim League could not be forced to remain within India against its wishes. The experience of the Interim Government reinforced this point. Besides, they believed that once a truncated Pakistan was conceded, the Muslim-majority provinces would realize that it was unviable and would individually come to terms with the Congress-led centre. Concerns about the growing violence and anarchy led the Congress to revive its demand for immediate grant of full power to the Interim Government while the constitution was being drawn up. Towards this end, the Congress agreed to accept Dominion status as a device for interim transfer of power.

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Figure 12.1.6: Nehru, General Hastings Ismay, Mountbatten and Jinnah just before the announcement of the partition plan, 3 June 1947. Source: http://www.hinduonnet.com/af/india60/stories/2007081560020200.htm

After tortuous and prolonged negotiations, Mountbatten presented the Indian leaders with the Partition Plan on 2 June 1947. In effect, the Plan called for a partition of Punjab and Bengal, and for plebiscites in North-West Frontier Province and in the Muslim- majority Sylhet district of Assam. The Congress agreed to the Plan. Jinnah accepted it very reluctantly, for it left him with the truncated Pakistan that he had wanted to avoid. Mountbatten also declared that the British would quit India on 15 August 1947. A boundary commission led by the British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, began its work with barely a month to go to Independence. In the event, the boundaries drawn up by the commission would be unveiled only on 17 August, after the new Dominions had come into existence. But in anticipation, rival communal groups had taken up arms and begun creating facts on the ground. The bloodbath of Partition was well underway.

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Summary

 The failure of constitutional negotiations and the eventual partition of the nation have been explained in a variety of ways: the ‘two nation’ theory of the Muslim League; the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British; the refusal of Congress to share power with the League. None of these by themselves provides a satisfactory explanation.

 The elections of 1946, in which the Muslim League won a majority of the Muslim seats, were a major turning point. The mobilization during the election considerably strengthened the movement for Pakistan.

 In 1946, the British government was keen to preserve a united India under the Commonwealth, mainly for strategic reasons. The failure of the Cabinet mission led them to consider Partition.

 The rapidly growing communal violence in Bengal and Punjab made the option of Partition seem more acceptable to all the players.

 The run up to Partition was also marked by a number of popular movements. The trial of officers of the Indian National Army resulted in an upsurge of protests across the country, forcing the British Indian government to tone down the sentences.

 The mutiny of the personnel of the Royal Indian Navy was important in convincing the British that their military hold over India was no longer assured.

 Peasant movements in east, west and south India posed additional challenges to the Raj. The most prolonged and powerful of these movements was the communist insurrection in Hyderabad. It continued even after India had attained independence.

12.1: Exercises

Essay questions

1) How convincing is the argument that it was the Indian National Congress that sought Partition?

2) What factors explain the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan?

3) What was the impact of communal violence on the constitutional negotiations?

4) Why did the RIN mutiny occur in 1946?

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5) What was the influence of the INA trials on the move to grant independence to India?

6) What was the cumulative impact of the peasant uprisings in the run up to independence?

7) How do we explain the strength and longevity of the Telengana revolt?

Objective questions

Question Number Type of question LOD

1 True or False 1

Question a) In the elections of 1945-46, the Muslim League won all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly. b) By dispatching the Cabinet Mission, the British Government sought to evolve a plan for partitioning India. c) The Muslim League chose not to join the Interim Government. d) Jinnah supported the plan for an independent and united Bengal evolved by Sarat Bose and H. S. Suhrawardy. e) The British Indian government prosecuted all INA personnel accused of torturing fellow soldiers. f) The Tebagha movement was strongest in southern Bengal.

Correct Answer / a) True b) False c) False d) True e) False f) False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer a) Under the separate electorates the Muslim League all the reserved seats in the central assembly, although the Congress had an overall majority. b) The Attlee government was keen to preserve the unity of India primarily for strategic reasons. The main proposal advanced by the Cabinet Mission was designed to avoid partition. c) The Muslim League initially refused to enter the interim government, but subsequently joined it.

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d) The plan did have Jinnah’s support – it also accorded with Jinnah’s attempt to weaken the Indian union by encouraging some princely states to stay out of India. e) The government decided to prosecute only those who were alleged to have committed crimes against fellow soldiers and officers. Eventually only three officers were tried. f) The movement was strongest in the eastern, central and western parts of the province.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer’s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

2 Multiple choice question 2

Question At the time of Partition, the government in North-West Frontier Province was from: a) Congress Party b) Muslim League c) Unionist Party d) A coalition of Congress and the Unionists.

Correct Answer / a) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Congress government led by Dr. Khan Sahib (brother of Ghaffar Khan) was dismissed by Jinnah once Pakistan came into existence.

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Reviewer’s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

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3 Multiple choice question 2

Question The Radcliffe Boundary Award was announced on: a) 18 August 1947 b) 13 August 1947 c) 17 September 1947 d) 17 August 1947

Correct Answer / d) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer It was announced on 17 August. The delay in announcement led to allegations of tampering with the boundary.

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Question Number Type of question LOD

4 Multiple choice question 2

Question The RIN Mutiny began in which of the following ships: a) HMIS Bahadur b) HMIS Talwar c) HMIS Himalaya d) HMIS Monze

Correct Answer / b) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

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The mutiny on the other ships followed and was inspired by the events in HMIS Talwar.

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Question Number Type of question LOD

5 Multiple choice question 2

Question Which of the following was NOT on the demands advanced by the Telangana rebels: a) Abolition of forced labour b) Removal of grain levy c) Increase in wages d) Two-thirds share of the produce

Correct Answer / d) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer This was the key demand of the ‘Tebagha’ movement.

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Glossary

Cabinet Mission: a three-member British mission sent to India in late March 1946 to create a constitutional package for a united India and to plan for the transfer of power Parity: the demand for equal representation for Muslims and Hindus in the interim government Plebiscite: a procedure to determine the wishes of the people of an area on whether they wished to be part of India or Pakistan

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Tebhaga movement: a peasant movement in Bengal aimed at securing for the sharecroppers two-thirds share of the produce as opposed to the customary half share of the produce Two nation theory: the theory advanced by advocates of Pakistan, which held that the Hindus and Muslims of India constituted two separate nations, and hence the Muslims were entitled to their own state