High Politics Subject: History Unit: Independence and Partition Lesson: High Politics Lesson Developer Srinath Raghavan College/Department : Senior Fellow, Center for Policy Research, New Delhi and Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College, London Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi High Politics Table of contents Chapter 12: Independence and Partition 12.1: High politics Summary Exercises Glossary Further readings Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi High Politics 12.1: High politics The Second World War ended in Europe on 7 May 1945. Five weeks later the Congress Working Committee was released from prison. Soon after, negotiations for the future of India commenced. By the time the Raj folded up in mid-August 1947, there were two dominions of India and Pakistan. The question of why Partition accompanied Independence has given rise to an enormous body of historical writing. Given its tremendous human cost and its continued implications for the subcontinent, it is not surprising that the subject invites exploration from newer angles and perspectives. The existing literature falls into four broad categories of works: the ‘high politics’ or the negotiations between the British and Indian leaders; provincial politics or the study of how the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan played out in Punjab, Bengal, and to lesser extent in UP, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Sindh; popular movements and their impact on political negotiations at various levels; and the human dimension of Partition with an emphasis on the victims of violence, especially women. In this lesson, we will focus on negotiations between the British, the Muslim League and the Congress. But in doing so, we will also consider the impact of provincial politics and other developments outside of the negotiating chambers and committee rooms. The literature on the high politics of Partition is large and contentious. It is large because the causes of Partition can be traced back to several points after the mid-19th century. Indeed, if all of these are taken on board, Partition seems a massively over-determined historical event. The literature is contentious because of an excessive concern with the culpability, achievement, or failures of important actors. Nationalist historiographies in Pakistan and India have offered explanations that are widely held in the respective countries. The former explain Partition by resorting to the ‘two-nation theory’, which holds that the Muslims of India were always a separate and distinctive national community. Indian nationalist accounts tend to trace it to the ‘divide- and-rule’ policies adopted by the Raj, and to the ‘communal’ demand for Pakistan propagated by Jinnah. Scholarly debates, however, have moved on—owing to more detailed and sophisticated studies of the decade preceding Partition. The key debate In an important book, Ayesha Jalal argued that Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a ‘bargaining counter’ and was deliberately vague about the actual character of the demand. Once the British accepted his demand for a separate state comprising the Muslim-majority provinces in the North-West and North-East, Jinnah was interested in securing one of two arrangements. Either a ‘confederation’ with other non-Muslim provinces on the basis of equal power (parity) in the central government; or, as a sovereign state, to conclude ‘treaty arrangements’ with the rest of India on matters of common concern. In either case, Jinnah hoped to incorporate safeguards for minorities. This was the only way to protect the interests of the large numbers of Muslims who would remain outside the boundaries of Pakistan. Hence, he also sought to retain, within Pakistan, undivided Punjab and Bengal with their large non-Muslim minorities. According Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi High Politics to Jalal, Jinnah assumed that the new Muslim state would ‘continue to be part of a larger all-India whole’. In short, Jinnah did not really seek partition. (Jalal 1985, 241) This thesis started out as a ‘revisionist’ perspective, but it has since become the new orthodoxy. Building on it, other scholars have asserted that if the Muslim League did not want partition, then it could only have come about because the Congress wanted it. (Roy 1990) Jalal’s argument draws our attention to important aspects of Jinnah’s negotiating strategy. But it remains problematic on several counts. First, it is almost entirely based on inference, there being little direct evidence of Jinnah’s thinking along these lines. Besides, it ignores evidence that undercuts its own claims. For instance, as early as 1941, Jinnah was publicly and clearly stating that ‘we do not want under any circumstances, a constitution of an all India character, with one government at the centre’ (Dhulipala 2007). Furthermore, there are internal inconsistencies in the argument. Jalal’s argument about Jinnah wanting to situate Pakistan within an all-India arrangement does not square with her claim that he was ready to establish treaty- arrangements. Treaties can only be concluded by sovereign entities. And a sovereign Pakistan necessarily meant partition. Indeed, the assumption that Jinnah did want a sovereign state built around all of Punjab and Bengal may account better for his actions than the claim that he never sought partition. The argument that it was the Congress that willed Partition rests on a flimsy base of evidence. The Congress’ approach certainly contributed to the eventual outcome. Nor could Partition have occurred without its approval. But the claim that it was solely responsible for Partition does not seem very convincing. Bearing in mind these debates, let us now turn to the negotiations themselves. Opening round and the elections Towards the end of June 1945, the Viceroy, General Archibald Wavell, convened a conference at Simla. 22 Indian leaders were invited to the conference. The Viceroy sought their cooperation in reconstituting his Executive Council. He proposed ‘parity’ between the ‘Caste Hindus’ and the Muslims in nominating representatives to the Council. Although the Congress was not pleased with the idea of parity, it saw the measure as a step towards the formation of an interim government at the centre. The Congress agreed to enter an Executive Council consisting of 5 ‘Caste Hindus’, 5 Muslims and 2 ‘minor minorities’. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi High Politics Figure 12.1.1: Jawaharlal Nehru with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Sardar Patel, arriving for the Simla conference Source: http://www.tehelka.com/story_main40.asp?filename=hub081108croniclesof_india.asp From History in the Making: The Visual Archives of Kulwant Roy, an exhibition at the IGNCA, Delhi, curated by Aditya Arya and Sabeena Gadihoke, with Indivar Kamtekar. Wavell was prepared to agree with the Muslim League’s demand that the Congress should not nominate any Muslim representative. Jinnah, however, wanted more. He insisted on Hindu-Muslim parity in the Executive Council. Moreover, he claimed that all the Muslim members should be nominated by the Muslim League. In doing so, Jinnah sought to drive home two points. First, the Hindus and Muslims were two nations, and hence entitled to equal representation in an interim arrangement. Second, Jinnah should be the ‘sole spokesman’ for the Muslims of India. This was a bold, not to say extraordinary, claim. For at the time of the conference, the Muslim League was out of office in all the Muslim-majority provinces with the exception of Sindh. Wavell stuck to his initial formula, but suggested that of the five Muslim members the Muslim League could nominate four. The fifth would be nominated by the Punjab Unionist Party, which ran the provincial government in Punjab. Faced with Jinnah’s persistent opposition, the Viceroy decided to call off the conference. The aborted conference proved a victory for the Muslim League. The party had shown that it was a critical player at the all-India level and held a veto on any move towards transfer of power. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi High Politics Figure 12.1.2: Viceroy Lord Wavell and M. A. Jinnah at the Simla Conference Source: http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A046&Pg=2 In the aftermath of the Simla conference, Wavell announced elections. The election would serve two purposes: form governments in the provinces, and create a central legislature that would work towards the constitutional structure for a free India. The outcome of the elections in 1946 was a major turning point. The Congress expectedly won the bulk of non-Muslim seats in the provinces and the centre. The Muslim League had presented the elections to the Muslim electorate as virtually a referendum on Pakistan. It reaped major rewards. In contrast to its poor showing in the elections of 1937, the Muslim League now proved to be a force to reckon with. Value addition: interesting details The elections of 1946 The Muslim League’s performance in the elections was impressive. But its dominance was uneven. In the Central Assembly the League won every single Muslim seat with a total vote share of 86.6 percent. The League secured a majority of seats in the provinces too. The only exception was the North-West Frontier Province where the Congress had a decisive majority of 30 seats, including 19 Muslim seats, and the League managed only 17. Even so, the Muslim League found it difficult to form ministries on its own steam. In Assam and North- West Frontier Province, a Congress ministry was sworn in. In Punjab, the Unionist Party managed to hold on to power by forming a coalition with the Congress and the Akalis. In Bengal and Sindh, the League ministries had a tenuous majority in the assembly. Source: Original The Muslim League’s performance gave substantial weight to its political position and to the demand for Pakistan. The party’s major achievement lay not in the number of seats won, but in the fact that it managed both to widen its appeal and to overcome the regional barriers that had blocked the emergence of a strong Muslim party.