Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University Vladivostok, Russia Asi a-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education Жу р н а л о м о рс ко й науке и образовании в АТР Founded and published two times a year by Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University Учрежден и публикуется два раза в год Морским Государственным Университетом имени адм. Г.И. Невельского, г. Владивосток
ADVISORY BOARD/Редакционный совет
Dr. Rouben Azizian, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawaii, Honolulu, USA Dr. James Boutilier, Maritime Forces Pacific HQ, Victoria, BC, Canada Dr. Oleg A. Bukin, MSUN, Vladivostok, Russia Dr. Sang Goog Cho, MSUN, Vladivostok, Russia Dr. Andrey I. Fisenko, Economics&Management in Transport, MSUN, Russia Adm.(Ret.)Victor D. Fyodorov, Deputy Director (Southern Branch), P.P.Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, Gelendjik, Russia Adm.(Ret.) Gennady A. Khvatov, MSUN, Vladivostok, Russia Dr. Dovchin Myagmar, Institute for Geopolitical Studies, Ulan Bator, Mongolia Dr. Boris V. Preobrazhensky, Pacific Inst.of Geography, Russian Academy Sciences Dr. Leonid P. Reshetnikov, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, Russia Dr. Naoyuki Takagi, Tokyo University of Marine Science&Technology, Tokyo, Japan Dr. Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia
EDITORIAL BOARD/Редакция Executive Editor / Исполнительный редактор Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev/Н.И.Переславцев
Editors/Редакторы Dr. Vladimir M. Lobastov, Dr. Vladimir A. Lazarev, Dr. Sergey V. Sevastianov, Dr. Sergey M. Smirnov, Dr. Vladimir F. Verevkin, Dr. Natalia G. Levchenko, Dr. Dmitry S. Kopyev. Dr. Alexey Yu. Strelkov, Rabia M. Newton, Pavel B. Kirichenko, Anastasia O. Barannikova.
The opinions expressed by authors do not necessarily reflect those of Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University or the Editors of Asia-Pacific Journal Of Marine Science&Education. Reproduction of the contents without permission is forbidden.
Address of the Founder and the Editorial Board: Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University 50a Verhneportovaya st., Vladivostok, Russia, 690059 Адрес Учредителя и Редакции: 690059, Россия, г. Владивосток, ул. Верхне- Портовая, 50а. E-mail/Эл.почта: [email protected], [email protected] Phone/Fax/Тлф/Факс: +7(423)230-1275
Aleksandr A.Dyda, Elena B.Osokina, Elena P. Chinchukova Algorhithms of ship parametrers’ identification via speed gradient method..…….4 Natalia G. Levchenko, Evgeniya Yu.Sobolevskaya, Sergei V.Glushkov Development of intellectual system for managing the Arctic and Sub-Arctic sea freight ………………………………………………………….…………………..10 Saangkyun Yi, Young-Hoon Kim The notation trends of marine names and the propagation aspects in the Commonwealth and the Francophone media – a case of the sea between Korea and Japan …….. ……………………………………………………………………... .23 Nikolai I.Pereslavtsev The significance and objectives of Russia’s policy in the Arctic on the example of cooperation in its development with the Republic of Korea………………………43 Valentin V.Sergienko About the possible construction of a bridge between the mainland and the SakhalinIsland……………………………………………………………………………....55 Maritime territorial disputes…………………………………………………...67 Anastasia O.Barannikova Dormant territorial disputes of China: challenges for neighbors………………....68 Nikolai I.Pereslavtsev Korean-Japanese dispute concerning Liancourt Islands and the position of Russia………………………………………………………………………..……75 Sergei A.Ponomarev Kurile Islands – Legal regulations and Modern Naming Activities...... 81 Peter Yu.Samoylenko Russian-Japanese economic cooperation in the Far East as a basis for solving territorial contradictions and the role of mass media……………………..……………………………………….…………..….89 Boris I.Tkachenko International legal problems of signing Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan ………………………………..…….…..……...... 96. Contributors……………………………………………………………………..105 Article abstracts in Russian……………………………………...………..…...108
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ALGORITHMS OF SHIP PARAMETERS’ IDENTIFICATION VIA SPEED GRADIENT METHOD Aleksandr A. Dyda, Elena B. Osokina, Elena P. Chinchukova Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: The base for design of the ship control system lies in its mathematical model. There are known different linear and nonlinear models of the ship’s movement direction. The application of linear models is explained by the simplicity of their practical usage. However, nonlinear models are often more adequate to show a ship dynamics and, as result, provide more accurate design of the ship control system. In this article there are proposed to use the power series as functions of angular velocity for describing a nonlinearity which presents viscous friction forces moments. Main idea includes the derivation of algorithm to adjust coefficients of power series that describe nonlinearity of ship’s model. Theoretical base of the research is a method of speed gradient. To illustrate an approach there are given examples with four linear and nonlinear ship models. Keywords: ship control, linear model, nonlinear model, parameter identification, speed gradient method, adaptation algorithms, power series, numerical simulation
The article is devoted to the problem of parameter identification of ship dynamics. Decision of this problem is important, in particular, for design of ship course control systems. Mathematical model of ship movement can be presented as a set of nonlinear nigh order differ rental equations. Direct usage of such common math model is a complicated problem.To solve particular practical problems, simplified linear and nonlinear models are often used. Obviously, linear ship dynamics models are more simplified than nonlinear ones, but the latter models can be more adequate to solve private tasks. In the paper, both versions of mathematical ship
4 models are used for to derive algorithms of parameter identification [1, 2, 3. 4]. Consider a simple nonlinear ship model of 1st order structural scheme of the model is given on Fig1. here f (.) is nonlinear function presenting viscous friction moments [1, 5].
Fig. 1. Nonlinear first order ship model. Simplified model of ship dynamic can be written in the following form: , (1) where: B – constant δ –rudder angle ɷ – Angular velocity To solve the identification problem, so called tuning models with structure, which is analogous to an object of identification, have been applied. , (2)
Where ɷ m – the model output; fm(ɷ ), Bm – the model function and parameter; V – the additional function to improve an identification quality, V = νsign, ν – const, e = x – xm – the difference between an object output and that of its tuning model. Present a function f(ɷ ) in the form of power series: (3)
Where n – is a number of series members taken into account. Analogously, present a function fm(ɷ m) of tuning model (4) Speed gradient method has been taken for identification [4, 6, 7]
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Choose an aim function in the form: (5)
To determine tuning law for adjustable parameters Am, Bm, calculate a time derivative of aim function taking into consideration equations (1), (2). Following to the scheme of speed gradient method, find the tuning law for parameter adjusting (6) Where constant γ defines a tuning speed.
Derived algorithm of identification was checked by numerical simulations in MATLAB. Computer experiments were carried out for a few cases.
Case 1. Consider a nonlinear function in the form: , (7)
Coefficients and parameter B are taken as following: A1=2, A2=0, A3=0. B=6. As a result, one has a liner ship model known as so called Nomoto’s model. Results of identification according to derived algorithm are given on Fig. 2. As seen, coefficients of tuning model tend to that of a ship model, i.e., the derived algorithm demonstrates an identification property.
Fig.2. First order linear system identification: parameters Аm and Bm
Case 2. Suppose now that nonlinear function of ship model is presented as
(8)
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So, series’ coefficients and parameter B are taken as A1=0, A2=0, A3=2, B=6. Simulation result presented on Fig.3 confirms that identification algorithm is effective for essentially nonlinear ship model.
Fig.3. Parameters identification: сase 2 Series coefficients Am1, Am2, Am3 and parameter Bm evaluated by identification scheme asymptotically tend to their reel values.
Case 3. Identification results for ship model with nonlinear function (9)
with A1 = 3, A2 = 0, A3 = 1, B = 6 are presented on Fig. 4. Again, one can see that derived identification algorithm successfully works.
Fig.4. Parameters identification: сase 3 The approach used above to identification algorithm design can be applied to a ship model of higher order [4, 8, 9] Fig.5 demonstrates successful identification of matrix coefficient for Nomoto’s ship model of second order.
In the article, an identification algorithm based on speed gradient method has been developed. It was applied to linear and nonlinear ship model. To present nonlinearity of ship model, approach using power series were proposed. Numerical simulations have confirmed an effectiveness of derived identification method. Further research is planned to be oriented on generalization of power series’ approach for other classes of ship mathematical models.
REFERENCES
1. Amerongen J. van. Adaptive Steering of Ship: PhD thesis of Job van Amerongen., Delft University of Technology, 2005, p.156. 2. Nomoto K. and Norbin N., A review of methods of defining and measuring the maneuverability of ships. ITTC, Maneuverability Committee Report, 1969 3. Nomoto K., Taguchi T., Hirano S. On the steering qualities of ship, International Shipbuilding Progress, v.4, № 35, 1957, p.56-64
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4. Dyda A.A., Dyda P.F., Osokina E.B., Oskin D.A. An adaptive identification of ship model parameters based on speed gradient algorithm, “Marine intelligent technologies”, 2016, v. 1, № 3 (33), p. 263-268 5. Andrievsky B.R., Fradkov A.I. Selected chapters of the theoty of automanic control, Spb, 2000, p.475 / Андриевский Б.Р., Фрадков А.И., «Избранные главы теории автоматического управления», СПБ «Наука», 2000, с. 475 6. Dyda A.A., Adaptive and neural network control of complex dynamic objects, Vladivostok, “Dalnauka”, 2006, p.149/Дыда А.А., «Адаптивное и нейросетевое управление сложными динамическими объектами», Владивосток, «Дальнаука», 2006, с.149 7. Dyda A.A., Chinchukova E.P., Shevchenko M.V. The using of power series for design of the ship’s adaptive control system, “Scientific transport problems of the Siberia and the Far East”, 2011, №1, p.121-124 / Дыда А.А., Чинчукова Е.П., Шевченко М.В., «Применение степенных рядов для построения адаптивной системы управления курсом судна», «Научные проблемы транспорта Сибири и Дальнего Востока», 2011, №1, с.121-124 8. Fradkov A.L. “Adaptive control in complex systems: non- search methods”, M., “Nauka”, 1990, p.296 / Фрадков А.Л., «Адаптивное управление в сложных системах: беспоисковые методы, М., «Наука», 1990, с.296 9. Osokina E.B. Parametrical identification of the ship control system based on the Nomoto’s model of second order, “Scientific transport problems of the Siberia and the Far East”, 2015, №2, p.120-123/«Параметрическая идентификация системы управления судном на основе модели Номото второго порядка», «Научные проблемы транспорта Сибири и Дальнего Востока, 2015, №2, с.120-123
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DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM FOR MANAGING THE ARCTIC AND SUB-ARCTIC SEA FREIGHT
Natalia.G. Levchenko Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok Evgeniya.Yu.Sobolevskaya State University of Economic and Services, Vladivostok Sergei V.Glushkov Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: The analysis of software designed to manage the processes of maritime freight was done in the article. A number of flaws in the existing software used for organizing work in specific navigation areas, such as the Northern Sea Route, were identified, in particular the lack of decision support systems, the lack of analysis to calculate the time and cost of cargo delivery. The architecture of the intellectual system of maritime freight organization has been designed, which takes into account the difficult conditions of navigation in the Arctic. Architectures of two modules have been developed: calculation of the cost of maritime transportation; calculation and analysis of a safe and faster route depending on the month (season). The process of simulation is considered, which is based on the methods of artificial intelligence - the neural network, expert systems, the mathematical apparatus of fuzzy logic. The architecture of the intellectual system for the organization of maritime cargo transportation, if successfully implemented, will provide forecasting analytics to the management team of a shipping company, support decision making process, monitor the process of transportation of goods in real time, carry out calculation schemes for the effective use of icebreakers, calculate the optimal delivery route, provide on demand the online forecast of the transportation process at a certain point in time, minimize the cost of goods delivery, transit delays as well as the risks to the safety of cargo. Keywords: sea freight, Northern Sea Route, Arctic, intelligent control systems, simulation modeling
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INTRODUCTION Promising transport routes including transit corridors pass through the Arctic zone of Russia. Subject to efficiently built management system and infrastructure modernization, these transport arteries may soon become a key element in ensuring the sustainable and geopolitically independent development of the country [1]. Quality transport services are principally important for successful development of national economy, especially in the remote and hard-to-reach regions such as the Arctic. Ensuring cargo delivery to Arctic territories depends on many intractable circumstances [2]: severe climatic conditions; the presence of ice covering the northern areas during most of the year, which create obstacles to navigation; the danger of pollution of the marine environment that could cause severe harm to the ecological balance; lack of infrastructure to support freight processes. Software evaluation. The evaluation of existing software products and information resources in the field of maritime transportation has been done for the following: Cabotage - a program for accounting of domestic maritime transportation of containers and cargoes, used to account for domestic sea freight shipped to the north of Russia. Sea voyage - Containers - program for accounting of sea transportation of containers and cargo to and from the sea (export / import). MultiMix - software for packing goods in boxes and pallets. Calculates the loading of pallets into a vehicle. Packer3d program calculates the optimal layout of goods, the creation of a database of goods, the formation of a 3D plan for filling the vehicle with cargo. Magaya Cargo is a logistics support program for International Freight Forwarders. CargoWiz – a software for planning of cargo loading. GOST 28806–90 “Quality of software. Terms and definitions" [3] was taken as the basis for the analysis of “software quality” and the allocation of evaluation criteria: functionality is a set of properties of a software tool, determined by the presence and specific features of a set of functions capable of satisfying specified or implied needs [3];
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reliability is a set of properties that characterizes the ability of a software tool to maintain a given level of suitability under given conditions for a specified time interval [3]; ease of use - a set of properties of a software tool, characterizing the efforts necessary for its use, and an individual assessment of the results of its use by a given or implied circle of users of the software [3]; efficiency is a set of properties of a software tool, characterizing those aspects of its suitability level, which are associated with the nature and time of use of resources necessary for the given operating conditions [3]; maintainability is a set of properties of a software tool, characterizing the efforts that are necessary for its modification [3]; mobility is a set of properties of a software tool, which characterizes the fitness for transfer from one functioning environment to others [3]. The presented software is evaluated on a five-point scale: ‘5’ fully meets the criterion, ‘4’ sufficiently meets the criterion, ‘3’ partially meets the criterion, ‘2’ meets the criterion, ‘1’ does not meet the criterion. The result of the comparative analysis of the software listed above is presented in Table 1. Table 1 - Analysis of software used in the organization and management of maritime transport
Software Functionality Reliability Ease Efficiency Maintainability Mobility of use
Cabotage 3 3 33 4 4
Sea voyage 3 3 33 4 4 - Containers
MultiMix 3 4 22 1 1
Packer3d 3 4 33 4 4
Magaya 4 3 23 1 1 Cargo
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CargoWiz 4 3 2 2 1 1
Also, a comparative analysis of software listed in Table 1 was carried out. The criteria for the consumer and for the shipping company specializing in maritime cargo transportation are highlighted in Table 2. The evaluation of software was carried out using two indicators: “+” is present, “-” is not present.
Table 2 - Analysis of software by criteria for users Software Intuitive GOST Online Analytical Online Online Multi- interface support access component cargo expenses language monitoring calculation support
Cabotage + + - - - - -
Sea voyage + + ------Containers
MultiMix ------
Packer3d + + - - - - -
Magaya - - + - - - - Cargo
CargoWiz ------
As a result of analyzing the state of affairs in this software domain the need to develop an intelligent system for organizing maritime freight in the Arctic and the sub-Arctic zone as a whole became obvious. Not one of the software products listed above provides a capacity for generating predictive analytics and even for calculating the cost of maritime freight in Arctic environment in real time, taking into account various factors. Justification of the necessity to develop an intellectual system. Considering the large number of factors involved which are influencing the shipping process, and the fact that the data is vague and the dimension of the task is large, it is necessary to resort to intelligent technologies when developing such system, In this regard, the processing of information acquires a new meaning, namely the processing and use of accumulated knowledge of experts in the field of navigation and maritime freight.
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Thus, there is a need to develop: Expert systems - a class of software systems that accumulate knowledge of specialists in specific subject areas and replicate empirical experience for consulting less qualified users [4]. A concept such as the ontology of knowledge appears. An important component of the expert system is the knowledge base, which has such definitions as the completeness and consistency of the knowledge presented in it, to obtain high-quality management decisions. Decision Support Systems - interactive automated information and analytical systems that help a decision maker use weakly formalized data and models to solve his professional tasks [4]. Self-learning systems based on the methods of automatic classification of examples of real-life situations [4]. Intellectual systems - automated systems based on knowledge, or a complex of software, linguistic and logical-mathematical tools for the implementation of the main task - supporting human activity and searching for information in the advanced dialogue mode in natural language [4]. The development and implementation of an intelligent system for organizing and managing maritime freight will formalize knowledge and automate the decision-making process. This in turn will ensure: For consumer: Online calculation of shipping cost and delivery time, taking into account the characteristics of the goods. Real time cargo tracking along the way in interactive maps with effective visualization. Online filling out the necessary shipment documents. Availability of multilingual service interface. Ordering and calculating the cost of icebreaker escort for indepeUsersndent transportation in the Arctic and in sub-Arctic regions. For shipping company: Development of new entries on the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Calculation of icebreaker escort cost. Calculation and analysis of the effectiveness of new transportation routes.
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Calculation and analysis of a safe and faster route depending on the month / season. Based on the above tasks, for designing an intelligent system it is necessary to form a general outline of semantic network which will show the information model of the domain (Figure 1). Users
Intellectual interface Uses Provides
WEB - Includ es interfac
Information Creates Creates environment Software & Hardware e
Defines Expert
Fig.1. Semantic network for the organization of maritime transportation based on intelligent systems Intelligent sea freight transport system architecture was developed on the basis of this semantic network (Figure 2).
Intellectual Executive interface system Expert Software&Har system dware Informati Control & on Online Prognosis Environ services ment Vector Communic …………. Us ative maps . er systems Visualizat Databas ion s Language e Navigationn interface ………… Help means Exp… systems Calculatio Knowleert ns Self-learning dge Logical systems base means Information Search database engines 15
Fig.2. Intelligent sea freight transport system architecture
It is also necessary to develop module architectures for: calculating the cost of maritime freight; online calculation of delivery dates; real-time tracking of cargo with efficient visualization on interactive maps; online filling out the necessary documents accompanying the goods; placing an order and calculating the cost of icebreaker escort for independent NSR transit; calculation and analysis of the effectiveness of new transportation routes; calculation and analysis of a safe and faster route depending on the month (season). Architectures of two modules have been developed: calculation of the cost of maritime freight and analysis of a safe and faster route depending on the month (season), which are presented in Figures 3 and 4. The proposed architecture of the cost calculation module will allow to calculate the cost of sea freight in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions depending on the type of cargo, type of vessel, characteristics of cargo handling, seasonality, density of cargo traffic and other factors. The architecture of the module for calculating and analyzing the route of maritime cargo transportation in Arctic environment will make it possible to predict a safer and faster route depending on the season, therefore, it will be able to reduce the risks associated with maritime cargo transportation.
Cost calculation module for the Arctic
Intelligent WEB- interface Expert Prognosis & system Analysis Cost calculation system Calculation Logical means means
Communication capacity
systems Natural language Context help interface systems Database Information storages 16
Fig.3. Cost calculation for the Arctic module architecture
Figure 4. Arctic transportation route calculation & analysis module architecture When analyzing the architectures of these two modules it becomes obvious that the expert system is the main component in both cases, since it produces data that will be taken for further calculations, analysis and forecasting, which require a more complex intellectual approach. Figure 5. Partial composition of intellectual sea freight system architecture It is becoming more and more obvious nowadays that none of the separately taken methods of artificial intelligence can successfully cope with all management problems [5]. The combination of methods works best. This means that it is very important to have an idea about intelligent methods, to know the advantages and disadvantages of each technology in order to use them properly [5]. Consequently, some blocks can be combined as shown in Figure 5, which will simplify the architecture of the two modules presented and combine them into a single detailed architecture. The specification of the modules and their combination clearly show which blocks are the same and which require special attention in further development. The final architecture of the intelligent system for organizing and managing the maritime transportation of goods will undergo significant changes in the future, when all the necessary modules are developed. The next step will be simulation modeling utilizing analytical or mixed modeling methods. The stages of simulation modeling (the development of a mathematical model, the simulation process itself, the analysis of the results obtained) will determine the necessity to develop a mathematical model, the implementation of which requires the use of real data. A modeling method including the construction of a model is used for the study of an information system, its properties and for the prediction of its behavior [6]. Since the model is a conditional image of the object of study, having a similarity with the prototype, which serves as a means of describing, explaining and predicting the behavior of the prototype [7].
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In the future we plan to implement AI based simulation model - a neural network that requires real data for learning. This will ultimately provide the most reliable intellectual system to support the decision-making process and analytics. Well - trained system will help to predict and reduce risks arising with new data input.
Arctic transportation route calculation module for calculating and analyzing the route of maritimeIntelligent cargo WEBtransportation- in Arctic interface Transit time calculation & analysis system Expert Neural system network Calculation system
Calculation Logical means means Communication capacity
systems Natural language Context help interface systems Information Database storages
Intelligent system for maritime cargo transportation planning transportation route calculationMaritime transportation module for calculating route calculation and & analysis
module analyzing the route of maritime cargo transportationIntelligent in A WEBrctic - hinterface Transit time calculation & analysis system Expert Neural system network Time calculation system Calculation Logical means means Maritime cargo transportation cost calculation module Intelligent WEB- interface Expert Forecasting system analysis Cost calculati oopoooosystem Calculation Logical means means Communication & Information Environment
module Intelligent WEB-
interface
Communication capacity
systems
Language Context help
interface systems Information environment Databa Knowledge se base
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Fig.5. Partial composition of intellectual sea freight system architecture
Artificial intelligence technologies can process a large amount of information at the same time, and the processing takes shorter time compared to conventional simulation. Figure 6 shows the general scheme of conducting simulation experiments using an intelligent system [7].
Control parameters Simulation and model algorithms models Intelligent of business systems processes
Experts Analysis results decision options
Figure 6. The typical scheme of simulation experiments The results of simulation experiments come to the input gate of intelligent systems, then analysis is carried out and several decision options are developed to choose from. Further, experts can opt for a more rational decision, or reconfigure the parameters guided by the results of intellectual analysis, and continue the experiments.
CONCLUSION Taking into account modern realities, the actual implementation of the intelligent system interface will utilize WEB technologies which are most convenient for the end users. The WEB - interface will allow real-time implementation of: decision taking support; real time monitoring of cargo transportation process; effective use of icebreakers estimation; optimal delivery route estimation; ‘on demand’ online forecast for the transportation process at a certain point in time, etc. The intelligent system of organizing and managing the transportation of goods by sea taking into account the Arctic specific conditions will allow the management team of shipping and logistics
20 companies to make effective decisions in a timely manner for the benefit of the company and for attracting new customers.
REFERENCES
1. Official WEB-site of the Arctic & Antarctic Research Unstitute / Официальный сайт Арктического и Антарктического научно-исследовательского института, URL: http://www.aari.nw.ru 2. Lentarev A.A., Levchenko N.G. The prospects of using intellectual systems for managing the Northern Sea Route, Marine Intellectual Technologies, Scientific Journal, #3 (33), T1, 2016, pp. 355-359/Лентарев А.А., Левченко Н.Г. «Перспективы использования интеллектуальных систем в управлении Северным морским путем», Морские интеллектуальные технологии, Научный журнал, № 3 (33), T1, 2016, с. 355-359 3. GOST 28806–90, “Quality of software. Terms and definitions” / ГОСТ 28806-90, Качество программных средств. Термины и определения, URL: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200009077 4. Ostroukh A.V. Intellectual Systems. Tutorial / Остроух А.В., Интеллектуальные системы, Учебное пособие, URL: http://lib.madi.ru/fel/fel1/fel16E379.pdf 5. Glushkov S.V., Levchenko N.G. Aspects of the use of intelligent information technologies in the management of maritime transport, Marine Intellectual Technologies, Scientific Journal, #3 (33) T1, 2016, pp. 325-332 / Глушков С.В., Левченко Н.Г. «Аспекты применения интеллектуальных информационных технологий в управлении на морском транспорте», Морские интеллектуальные технологии, Научный журнал, № 3 (33), T1 2016, с. 325-332 6. Shumskiy A.A., Shelupanov A.A. Basics of System Analysis, Tutorial, Tomsk, V-Spectr, 2007, 218 pp. / Шумский А.А., Шелупанов А.А. «Основы системного анализа», Учебное пособие, Томск, В-Спектр, 2007, 218 с. 7. Levchenko N.G., Syasin D. Yu. Aspects of building the information system for water transport enterprise, Operations of Maritime Transport. Scientific publication, #3 (61), 2010, pp. 3 – 8
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/ Левченко Н.Г., Сясин Д.Ю. «Аспекты построения информационной системы предприятия водного транспорта», Эксплуатация морского транспорта, Научный сборник, № 3(61) 2010, с. 3-8 8. Cargo Wiz., URL: http://www.softtruck.com/ 9. Dr. Bjorn Gunnarsson. Managing Director, Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL) Nord University, Norway, Future Development of the Northern Sea Route, URL: https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/future-development- of-the-northern-sea-route 10. Magaya Cargo System, URL: http://siconcrm.com/magaya- cargo-system/ 11. MultiMix. – URL: http://www.multiscience.de/ 12. Giarratano, Joseph, Rylee Gary. Expert systems: principles of development and programming. M., Williams Publishing house, 2007, 1152 pp. 13. Kuzmin G.M. About fees and charges for the passage of the Northern Sea Route, Transport Herald, #7/2010 / Кузьмин Г.М. «О сборах и платежах за проход Северным морским путём», Вестник транспорта, 7/2010, URL: http://www.transrus.ru/vestnik 14. Software for Transportation, URL: http://zhikharev.weebly.com/progs.html 15. Рacker3d., URL: http://www.packer3d.ru/
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THE NOTATION TRENDS OF MARINE NAMES AND THE PROPAGATION ASPECTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE FRANCOPHONE MEDIA – A CASE OF THE SEA BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN
Yi, Saangkyun Northeast Asian History Foundation, Republic of Korea Kim, Young-Hoon Korea National University of Education, Republic of Korea
Abstract: Previous studies related to the notation of the East Sea/Sea of Japan have been dominantly focused on the map publishers. However, in the academic world of Korea, recently, some researchers became interested in the media outlets, which work relatively autonomously and dynamically in dealing with the maps and the place names. The purpose of this study is therefore to derive the present state and the propagation paths of name-marking in each language area, the preferences for the name of the East Sea by language area, and the features of name-marking in overlapped language areas in the case of the Commonwealth and the Francophone Media. As a result of the study, the preferences for the name of the East Sea appear different by region even in the same language area. Also, in the region where the different language areas overlap, it is notable that they tend to accommodate the name-marking methods of the large media outlets in other language areas. Keywords: East Sea, Sea of Japan, Marine Names, Media, Commonwealth, Francophone, Notation Trends, Propagation Aspects
1. Introduction
Today, Korea and Japan are engaged in fierce diplomatic war over the name of the sea, which is widely known. Since South and North Korea joined the United Nations at the same time in 1991, the Korean government has been making various efforts to promote the worldwide spread of the name of the East Sea in earnest. There have been many difficulties, due to the obstacles and impediments of the Japanese
23 government claiming the single name the Sea of Japan. However, with the efforts of the government and the private sector, many countries around the world have come to understand Korea's position, and the cartographers are also gradually beginning to mark both the East Sea and the Sea of Japan. Today, the East Sea can be seen as a place name that is creating new discourses by competing with the Sea of Japan. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the government-led policies were implemented uniformly and identically. Recently, however, various voices of the private sectors have been freely raised and in some cases, even the existing policies of the government are following the trends of the private sector. This tendency is no exception to the field of cartography. In other words, as commercial interests of individual economic entities are taking priority rather than the positions of the governments, various versions of maps are being produced in accordance with the needs and expectations of customers. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the interest and the name-marking trends of various mapmakers who belong to the private sector, rather than keeping focused on the public sector, in researching on the name of the East Sea. Previous studies on the name of the East Sea are roughly classified into researches on the ancient maps and documents [1]; the place names [2]; the textbooks [3]. Early studies largely tended to deal with the unfairness of the name of the Sea of Japan, but the researchers have gradually turned to seek the legitimacy of the name of the East Sea. In addition, the source materials used in the researches have become diversified from the previous analyses of the ancient maps and documents into the form of the textbooks and the underwater names. Recently, researchers are attempting to study on the indigenous place names, and the place names as the cultural heritage [4]. Lee (1998) suggested that not only atlases but the main media of the world should mark the name of the East Sea in order to efficiently spread the name [5]. However, related researches are mainly on the geography textbooks and the civil map producers of overseas countries [6], and it is relatively recent that researches on the naming of East Sea on foreign media have been conducted [7].
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Fig.1. Research area
The researches on the name of the East Sea in foreign media promoted to date have led to the discovery of considerably high-level information beyond the previously known findings of the current state of name-marking, to the decision-making process about it. It has become necessary to review the results of partial researches conducted so far on a global scale. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to derive 1) the present state and the propagation paths of name-marking in each language area, 2) the preferences for the name of the East Sea by language area, and 3) the features of name-marking in overlapped language areas in the case of the Commonwealth and the Francophone Media. Given the rapidity and dynamism of the media, it is the limitation of the research that the monitoring of marking the name of the East Sea in foreign media has been promoted over several years from 2014 to 2017. Nevertheless, according to the results of the researches and the follow-up monitoring, it is found that the methods and the patterns of the marking in each media outlet do not change easily in a short period of time as a cultural attribute.
2. Characteristics of Media and the Trends of Notating Place Names
1) Change of Perspective in Place-Naming: from Unity to Diversity Place names primarily have geographical, linguistic and cultural elements simultaneously. Place names, as cultural elements created by human beings, demand respect and understanding for diversity that
25 overcomes the unity of place names, with the emergence of multiculturalism which emphasizes the pluralism of culture. The idea of this pluralistic culture is based on the mutual coexistence of contrary and diverse cultures within Europe, and has become a source of multiculturalism which has characterized cultural studies since then. In addition, place names function to reproduce the identity and ideology of a specific social group and divide the boundary and the area through it. Thus, the process of standardizing place names causes many conflicts and disputes, in the case that the relevant area is distributed over the boundary of another social group of the different geographical entity or the region of another country. Nationally, the centralized administrative systems have been transformed into a decentralized local governments, and internationally, the Third World countries have raised their political, economic and cultural voices as they gained independence from colonial rule [8]. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the rationalist and enlightened modernist ideology that was represented as "modern" has been transformed into postmodernism that emphasizes diversity and difference, as the monolithic and unified authorities of the past imperialist powers have been diversified into various economic and political blocks. Such domestic and foreign political environments, changes of ideological trends, and the development of computer technology have caused some doubt and resistance against existing discussions related to "standardized" place names, and furthermore, they are demanding reconsideration of the "diversification" of place names. In view of this, Resolution III/20 from United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names suggests that countries with a shared geographical feature with different names strive to reach a consensus on a single nomination, and that if they cannot agree to one, they accept names in each language. In the case of marine names, the same resolution was adopted by the International Hydrographic Organization as Technical Resolution A.4.2.6. The discussions on place names as intangible cultural heritage have attracted attention recently due to regional conflicts and various culture wars over place names that have been increasing since the collapse of the Cold War. Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and discussions on place names as
26 intangible cultural heritage are important cases in terms of the cultural diversity and the diversification of nominating place names that have been overlooked or ignored due to the uniformity and unity of modernity. Particularly, in 2005, the Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents was adopted to recognize and preserve the cultural diversity of countries around the world. The Convention provides an institutional means to protect and preserve the diverse cultures of many countries, especially politically and economically weak ones that are threatened with extinction due to the encroachment of the mainstream or dominant culture. As an extension for this, there were discussions to include the place names of small regions and double nominations, which had been damaged or vanished, in the main elements of the Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents, as a culture or intangible cultural heritage. In this regard, UNESCO has taken a keen interest in the protection of intangible cultural heritage since the late 20th century. The 29th General Assembly in 1997 issued the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity in order to protect intangible cultural heritage that is rapidly disappearing in industrialization and globalization. Subsequently, in 2003, the UNESCO General Assembly adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage as the international community became aware of the importance of intangible cultural heritage. In particular, at the 10th General Assembly of United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names in 2015, many countries reported the academic research contents and the results of diverse projects related to place names as intangible cultural heritage. Whereas the place-naming of the 20th century was the logical development led by several powerful countries, that of the 21st century should begin with an understanding of the notation based on "diversity" and "uniqueness". The philosophical and ideological changes in looking at the nomination and the recognition of such place names can also serve as a persuading logic for marking the East Sea/Sea of Japan together in the international community. While the 20th century was an era of modernism represented by "unity" and "standard", the 21st century is a time when "diversity" and "difference" are recognized mutually and various "differences" coexist and live together. In particular, various differences and
27 changes in the nomination and the recognition of place names in the 21st century should be mutually respected. This is also closely related to the aggressive application of the one-object-multi-toponymy principle in consideration of multiculturalism and so-called multi- toponymism, which recognizes the diversity of culture in the notation of the East Sea. Short-term ways of practice for this are the electronic maps and marine charts. Unlike the paper maps, the electronic maps can represent and express many place names on various scales and screens. Hence, the approach of the multi-toponymy principle presents new alternatives for the name-marking and the multi-naming on the electronic maps. Although multi-names in the electronic maps may not be available by location of the users, the technical environment of the general electronic maps and the map portal services can overcome limitations and disadvantages in the paper map environment. The technical characteristics of the electronic maps will provide many opportunities to suggest notating several place names together in various ways, since they can actually represent the philosophical and theoretical multi-toponymism, which is suggested in this study.
2) The Characteristics of Media and the Importance of Marking Place Names Why should we turn our attention to the media at this point? Everyday news in broadcasting and articles in the press are the easiest and fastest way to communicate the news to the general public. In addition, even ordinary people hear the latest news and information at home and abroad almost in real time through broadcasting and newspapers. In recent years, the role of media in the mobile environment is increasingly focused on the speed and accuracy of news delivery in real time and thus is gaining more importance. In daily life, newspapers and broadcasting are the channels through which news and articles can be instantly heard in real time. For that reason, how Korea is dealt with in the media is an indirect means of understanding the status and role of Korea in the world. Therefore, looking into how the news and articles about Korea are expressed in the world's leading media companies can be important data for comparing and analyzing objective facts about Korea.
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The public tend to accept the news and articles from the media without any doubt. Therefore, the notation of place names transmitted from the media is not only important in marking exact place names but also closely related to the accurate understanding of the news contents on those places by the public. For example, when North Korea fired a missile into the East Sea, a newspaper reader could mis- read the article as North Korea provoked Japan with the missile launch, if the article only notated the single name the Sea of Japan instead of marking the East Sea together. This could lead to serious misunderstandings about the article. Therefore, it is also important to analyze the notation of the name the East Sea in the media to deliver accurate facts and correct misunderstandings of the general public about news articles. Thus, when dealing with place names in the media, it is necessary to review the contents even more closely and carefully than before in consideration of the real-time information delivery and the power and speed of today’s media to the public. In particular, information in the mobile and digital environments is diffused through even faster and more diverse channels than before. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the notation of place names of the media in order to minimize the misreading and misunderstanding of readers and to transmit accurate information.
3. Current Name-Marking of the East Sea in the Commonwealth Media
The Commonwealth study is conducted by analyzing trends in marking the name of the East Sea, focusing on major daily newspapers and broadcasters with nationwide networks in four countries including Canada, Australia, India and Singapore. As the Commonwealth countries, Canada and Australia are among the ones leading public opinion in the world. Thus, they can be considered as the countries that can affect the spread of marking the name the East Sea around the world, along with the United States and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, India and Singapore are the countries that were influenced directly by the UK in the past and have adopted English as their official language so far. At the same time, they are affecting the spread of public opinion in the neighboring countries in the Southeast Asia. This study selects these four countries, Canada,
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Australia, India and Singapore, to research into, as they have a strong influence on world public opinion as advanced countries, and can affect Southeast Asia and neighboring regions of Asia, respectively. This study tries to find out what aspects are shown in the name- marking of the East Sea in newspapers and broadcasters in these four countries, and how the notations are different among related articles. In addition, interviews are conducted with the reporters who are involved in the production of the articles. Overall, these media tend to be more influenced by AP, AFP, and Reuters than by the US and the UK. All the media from four countries receive articles, maps and photographs from AP, AFP, and Reuters as needed. Therefore, they are under the influence of the notations of major media companies rather than articles of major newspapers in the US and the UK.
Citations from Other Media and Notations for the East Sea: Cases of Articles in Canadian and Singaporean Media Non- Press East Sea Sea of Japan Both Names Marking AFP 2 (4.7 %) 4 (9.3 %) 37 (86.0 %) 0 AP 7 (4.3 %) 145 (90.1 %) 9 (5.6 %) 0 Bloomberg 0 0 5 0 DPA 0 1 0 0 New York 0 3 0 0 Times Reuters 2 (2.3 %) 17 (53.1 %) 12 (37.5 %) 1 (3.1 %) The Canadian 0 3 0 0 Press The Washington 0 3 (60.0 %) 2 (40.0 %) 0 Post Yonhap 0 0 1 0
As shown in Table 1, the positions of the three major news agencies for the notations of the name of the East Sea differ markedly. For example, in the case of AP, the proportion of marking the single name the Sea of Japan is about 90%, a considerably high figure. In contrast, AFP has a 4.7% and 86% share of marking the name the East Sea alone and with the other name, respectively. The
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Reuters also shows a high rate of 37.5% in marking both names. Therefore, this study tries to interview the reporters of AP, AFP, and Reuters as well as those from media in Canada, Australia, India and Singapore. However, most reporters declined face-to-face interviews, and only a few gave interviews by phone or email. The followings are representative contents of the interviews. In the case of Channel News Asia (the national broadcaster of Singapore), the reporter replied "When showing a map of Korea, most reporters create their own graphics, or use visual materials from the AP or AFP rather than those from the US or the UK." Also, for articles, the reporter answered, "... When marking the East Sea, the correspondents in Japan write it as the Sea of Japan, and the head office also does the same because they think it is more internationally used. However, since I am a Korean person working in Korea, I mark the East Sea and the Sea of Japan together on news coverage." These responses indicates that in Singapore the reporters who write the articles use their own discretion considerably, rather than the guidelines from headquarters, so the inclination of reporters can affect marking the names of the East Sea. In the case of Reuters News Agency, the reporter replied "... According to the company policy, it is written as the Sea of Japan, which is a kind of company reference." However, “Depending on the articles, it is sometimes marked as the Sea of the East Coast of the Korean Peninsula or the Sea between Korea and Japan for those who do not know the location of the East Sea”. In this case, it is confirmed that the company policy is set as "the Sea of Japan". However, the result of analyzing notations in the articles and maps shows that a considerable number of contents sourced from Reuters include examples of marking the name East Sea together, which indicates that the company policy does not act as a crucial factor as it does in AP. As mentioned in the interview with the reporter, the company policy is to mark “the Sea of Japan”, but it seems possible to notate differently to some extent using the discretion of reporters. As a result, the articles and the maps in Indian and Singaporean newspapers indicates both the names of the East Sea and the Sea of Japan. As a result of interviews with the reporters who write articles, the tendencies can be classified into three categories: “to follow the guidelines of the head office”, “to respect the discretion of the
31 reporters rather than the guidelines from the head office”, and “to leave to the discretion of the reporters”. While some media companies faithfully follow the guidelines of their headquarters, like AP, other media outlets, such as AFP and Reuters News Agency, have their company policies (to mark “the Sea of Japan”), but release articles relying on the discretion and judgment of the reporters to some extent. When the latter is the case, reporters tend to mark “the Sea of Japan” alone because it is more recognizable than “the East Sea”, as the Canadian reporter responded. In other words, the preference for “the Sea of Japan” is still an important index in terms of the educational experience and the general awareness of individual journalists. That is to say, it is necessary to take the comments into consideration when promoting the name East Sea to foreigners, that Japan is better known to Canadians than Korea and that it is easier to recognize a certain region if it is marked as “Sea of Japan”, rather than “East Sea”.
Notations of Major Media Outlets in Researched Nations
Canada Australia India Singapore
Numb Perce Num Percent Num Percent Num Percent er ntage ber age ber age ber age East 16 5.6 24 6.6 31 9.2 6 5.6 Sea Sea of 256 89.8 217 59.6 156 46.4 20 18.5 Japan
Both 13 4.6 123 33.8 149 44.3 79 73.1
Others 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 2.8
Total 285 100.0 364 100.0 336 100.0 108 100.0 * Others refer to cases in which only the rough direction is described in place of the clear sea name "East Sea", such as "the East Sea of Korea" or "the Nearby Sea in the east" in the text.
Table 2 shows the notations of East Sea in major media outlets in Canada, Australia, India and Singapore. As shown in the table,
32 there is a difference in the notations by country. In the case of Canada, the rate of notating only the Sea of Japan is much higher than those of other countries. The Canadian media also has the lowest rate of marking both names of the sea. On the other hand, Australia has almost 40% of marking the East Sea alone and with the other name. In the case of Singapore, notating both names are about 73%, suggesting that it is a general tendency to use both two names together in the country. As a result of the study, there is a deviation in notations of the media outlets by country. In the case of English-speaking Canada, the single notation of Sea of Japan was most frequently used in general, as the rate of using the single name was high throughout various fields such as culture and environment as well as politics, military and diplomacy. On the other hand, Australia and India have a relatively high proportion of notating the East Sea together, and Singapore shows more frequent cases of marking the East Sea together over the single notation of Sea of Japan in general.
Canada Australia
India Singapore
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Figure 2. Results of Key Words Analysis in Headlines Using Word Cloud
The main reasons why foreign media have much comment on the East Sea and the Sea of Japan are related to the issues of North Korea: North Korean nuclear weapons, military drills, and North Korean missile launches. For example, most of the maps of the East Sea represent the situation of North Korea's missile launches. This pattern is also evident in Word Cloud results that visualize the headlines of news articles (Figure 2).
4. Current Name-Marking of the East Sea in the Francophone Media
The four francophone countries selected for the study are Belgium and Luxembourg in Western Europe, Quebec of Canada in North America, and Algeria in North Africa. Media outlets to be researched on are three Belgian (two newspapers and one broadcaster), two Luxembourg (one newspaper and one broadcaster), two Quebec (one newspaper and one broadcaster) and two Algerian (one newspaper and one broadcaster). The purpose of this chapter is to find out the current state of the notation of the East Sea and to understand the propagation aspects how the way of place-naming and related discourses started in France spread toward the francophone countries, by analyzing the contents of the articles and broadcasting in the major francophone countries except France. This study conducts quantitative and qualitative analyses on the related place names of the East Sea by analyzing press releases dealt with by private media outlets (newspapers, broadcasting companies) in Belgium and Luxembourg in Western Europe, Quebec of Canada and Algeria in North Africa. Also, research data related to the process of the notating place names are looked at by interviewing reporters from these media outlets. As a result of the study, approximately 60 articles and broadcasting materials were searched for related to the East Sea. The single name the Sea of Japan was the most common with 35 cases. There are twelve cases with the East Sea and the Sea of Japan together, and five cases with the Sea of Japan and the Oriental Sea
34 together. Non-marking of any names came out for eight cases, and the East Sea of North Korea for one case. In the cases when the East Sea was mentioned, the overwhelming majority (71%, 41 cases) of the articles dealt with issues related to North Korea, and most of the contents were about the missile launch of North Korea. According to the interview with an AFP reporter about why articles about North Korea are so large in number, North Korea has received more attention than South Korea because various countries in the world is more curious about and interested in North Korea.
Figure 3. The Number of Notations by Type of the Name- Marking of the East Sea
In the process of this study, it is found out that most of the media outlets have their own basic policy for the notation [9]. The table 3 shows a case of the policy of AFP for the notation (table 3).
A case of the policy for the notation (Style book of AFP)
Dokdo: Japan and South Korea dispute the ownership and name of these small rocky islands in waters controlled today by
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South Korea. Give Dokdo islands (the Korean version) first, then Takeshima (the Japanese version).
Sea of Japan (East Sea): Write it thus.
The analysis by country is summarized as follows. Approximately 20 names were found related to the East Sea in articles of Belgian leading newspapers (Le Soir, La Libre Belgique) and broadcaster (RTL-TVI). Among these, eleven cases (55%) marked the Sea of Japan (mer du Japon), eight cases notated the Sea of Japan first, followed by the name the East Sea enclosed in parentheses with further explanations such as the East Sea for the Koreans (mer de l'Est pour les Coréens), and so on. Three of the latter notated the Oriental Sea (mer Orientale) and the Sea of Japan (mer du Japon) together. Since 2013, the number of notating both the East Sea and the Sea of Japan has been increasing consistently. However, interviews with people in charge from Le Soir and La Libre Belgique, which are Belgian newspapers, reveal that there is no principle in the newspaper companies regarding the name of the East Sea.
Fig.4. Topics of the Articles that mention the East Sea
In Luxembourg, about nine articles related to the East Sea were searched for, all of which wrote the name the Sea of Japan (mer du Japon) alone. Like Belgian media outlets, Luxembourg ones receive
36 most press releases from AFP in France. While in some Belgian articles the East Sea and the Sea of Japan were marked together with the will of the press, Luxembourg press intentionally indicated the name the Sea of Japan alone, even when they receive and utilize the same articles from AFP. Denis Berche, Chief Editor of L’Essentiel in Luxembourg, stated that they have no principle in notating the East Sea and utilize the articles they receive from AFP as they are, but analysis of the articles actually reported shows that all of them are notating the name the Sea of Japan alone. Looking at the notating aspects of the francophone media based on the AFP guideline, AFP and the francophone media outlets do not follow this policy unconditionally, although what it says is to mark both names the Sea of Japan and the East Sea together.
Table 4. Notations of Place Names by Country from the Same AFP Articles Date of Source of Media Nation and Type Type of Article Article Outlets of Media Outlets Notation Jun 29, AFP La Libre Belgian mer Orientale, 2014 Belgique newspaper mer du Japon RTL-TVI Belgian mer Orientale broadcaster L’Essentiel Luxemburg mer du Japon newspaper Aug AFP RTL-TVI Belgian mer du Japon broadcaster 25, L’Essentiel Luxemburg mer du Japon 2015 newspaper La Presse Canadian non-marking newspaper
In Quebec's newspaper (La Presse) and broadcaster (TVA), about 17 articles related to the East Sea area were retrieved. Seven of them marked the Sea of Japan (mer du Japon) alone, and three marked the Sea of Japan and the East Sea together. Also, non- marking was in four cases. In one particular case, the East Sea was marked as the East Sea of North Korea (la mer sur la côte orientale de la Corée du Nord) in an article about the missile launch of North Korea.
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Algerian newspaper (El-Watan) and broadcaster (Ennahar TV) had twelve articles related to the notation of the East Sea. In the case of El-Watan, one of the private newspapers, all articles except one used the single notation of the Sea of Japan. In Algeria, they also seemed to be provided with many articles by AFP, but it is hard to find out the information about their relationship with other news agencies, as some articles mentioned agencies only without explicitly disclosing sources of top news agencies. In summary, the regions of Algeria in North Africa and Luxembourg show the most unfavorable tendency to the notation of the East Sea, while Belgium and Quebec are relatively flexible in the notation. The media outlets in the subject countries of the study are commonly receiving press releases from AFP in France. This shows that the influence and dominance of the French notation of place names are very powerful. However, there are some media outlets that try to stick to the sole name of the Sea of Japan, and some show the will to mark the East Sea together.
5. Conclusion
Previous studies related to the notation of the East Sea have been dominantly focused on the map publishers. Recently, however, researchers need to take note of the media outlets, which work relatively autonomously and dynamically in dealing with the maps and the place names, in the study for spreading the name of the East Sea. Generally speaking, small media outlets often receive and utilize articles produced by large media companies, and they are especially dependent on large media companies of the same language area. The findings of this study show that the preferences for the name of the East Sea in the researched Commonwealth and francophone countries differ, depending on the regions, even in the same language area (See Figure 5.). For example, even among the Commonwealth countries, English-speaking Canada is negative for the name of East Sea, while Australia and India are positive and Singapore is favorable. Among the francophone countries, Belgium and Quebec are positive for the name of East Sea, while Luxembourg and Algeria are negative. It is a very interesting phenomenon that the preferences for the name of the East Sea are clearly different in the English-speaking
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Canada and the French-speaking Canada, even in the same country. The francophone media outlets seem to be influenced by the fact that most of the French media and AFP have a name-marking guideline to notate the East Sea and the Sea of Japan together. Likewise, English- speaking Canadian media outlets is considered to be under the influence of AP, which favors the single name the Sea of Japan. In the case of the media in Quebec, Canada, there are a number of articles received from AFP, but they are found to be closely related to English-speaking Canadian and American media, as they are geographically close. In searching for articles actually, it is confirmed that they receive CNN news, AP, etc.
Fig.5. Preferences for the name of the East Sea
In the case of Singapore, marking the name of the East Sea (alone and together) is far more frequent than marking the name of the Sea of Japan. What are the major factors for this? AFP and Reuters mark the name of the East Sea together relatively at a higher rate than AP, and Singaporean media seem to be under the direct influence of the former two agencies in notating the name of the East Sea. The interviews with reporters are conducted to figure out the process of place-naming in individual media outlets. The results of the study reveal that there are guidelines in the format of "stylebook" in large media companies such as AFP and AP. While AFP has a policy to mark the name of the East Sea with the name of the Sea of Japan, AP’s policy is to notate the name of the Sea of Japan alone. On
39 the other hand, the inclination of the reporter who writes articles also has an influence on the notation of the single name, even though notating both names is the internal policy of AFP. Small media outlets report the articles received from AFP or AP as they are, or change the notation from the single name to both names or from both names to the single name, depending on the tendency of the reporters in charge. Through this study, detailed information is obtained on the relationships between large and small media outlets, guidelines for the notation in large media outlets, the process of notation in each media outlet, the propagation aspect of the notation by the same language area, and the current state of the notation by region.
REFERENCES
1. Yang, Bo Kyung, 2004, The Name of the East Sea on the Korean Old Maps, Journal of cultural and historical geography, 16(1), 89-111; Jung, In-Chul, 2010, Survey on the place names of East Sea in the western old maps preserved at the Bibliotheque Nationale de France, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 10(2), 13-27; Kim, Jong Yeon, 2011, A Study on the Role of British Geographic Societies on Formation of ‘Conventional English Names’ on Korea, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 11(1), 13-24; Yi, S., 2014, ‘The Geopolitics of Seas and the Cartography of Naming Seas: The Name "Sea of Japan" Reflecting an Imperialist Ideology’, Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education, 4(1), Bladivostok, 29-43, etc. 2. Lee, Ki Suk, 1998, The Historical Precedent for the Geographical Name of the `East Sea` and A Strategy for International Standardization, Journal of the Korean Geographical Society, 72, 541-556; Choo, Sungjae, 2010, Geopolitics of the East Sea and the Issue of Its Naming, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 10(2), 1-11; Choo, Sungjae, 2007, Recent Progress for Restoring the Name East Sea and Future Research Agenda, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 7(1), 1-9; Choo, Sungjae, 2012, Recent Discussions on the Naming of the Sea between Korea and Japan and Topics of the Geographical Toponymy, Journal of the Korean
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Geographical Society, 47(6), 870-883; Kim, Shin, 2011, Review of the Limit and Name in East Sea, The Journal of e-Business, 12(1), 111-133; Shim, Jeongbo & Jung, Inchul, 2011, A Case Study of Dual Name Usage for the East Sea Area in Old Maps, Territory and Seas, 2, 6-29; Kim, S.B., Kim, Y.H., Yi, S., 2015, Exploring Rationale and Approach for Dual Naming of East Sea: From Unity to Variety Perspectives, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 15(1), 1-14, etc. 3. Choi, Jongnam, Shim, Jeongbo and Yoon, Okkyong, 2011, Labeling and Principles of Geographic Naming of the Sea Between Korea and Japan with Reference to the Atlas and Geography Textbook Publishers of the United States and the United Kingdom, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 11(2), 27-37; Shim, Jeongbo, 2013, Exploration of the Geographical Name of the East Sea Area in Modern Japanese and Korean Geography Textbooks, Journal of cultural and historical geography, 25(2), 37-55, etc. 4. Choo, Sungjae, 2009, Endonym, Geographical Feature and Perception: The Case of the Name East Sea/Sea of Japan, Journal of the Korean Geographical Society, 44(5), 661-674. 5. Lee, Ki Suk, 1998, The Historical Precedent for the Geographical Name of the `East Sea` and A Strategy for International Standardization, Journal of the Korean Geographical Society, 72, 541-556. 6. Choi, Jongnam, Shim, Jeongbo and Yoon, Okkyong, 2011, Labeling and Principles of Geographic Naming of the Sea Between Korea and Japan with Reference to the Atlas and Geography Textbook Publishers of the United States and the United Kingdom, Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association, 11(2), 27-37. 7. Yi, Saangkyun & Kim, Younghoon, 2015, Review and trends of the naming of the East Sea in French mess media: Private map publishers, broadcasting and newspaper companies, Territory and Seas, 10, 132-167; Lim, Eunjin & Yi, Saangkyun, 2016, A Study on the Name of East Sea in the Francophone Media Source, Journal of The Korean Association of Regional Geographers, 22(4), 745-760; Yi, S. & Lim, E., 2016, The Pattern of the Names of the Sea in the Mass Media and its propagation Aspects: a Case of the Sea between Korea and Japan in the Francophone Newspapers and Broadcasters, Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education, 6(2), pp. 37-52. 8. Yi, S., 2016, The nature of the ocean name dispute and
41 exploring the solutions, International Journal of Korean Studies, 16, 463-493. 9. The following are statements from the AFP reporter. “Global media outlets with networks around the world usually have a sort of stylebook for marking geographical names and other proper nouns. The name-marking principle of Dokdo and East Sea in our guideline, AFP Stylebook, is as follows. As you can see, Both Korean and Japanese names are supposed to be marked together. So, all relevant AFP articles are written following this notation guide. However, we do not know how the clients who take our articles edit or correct them.”
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THE SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF RUSSIA’S POLICY IN THE ARCTIC ON THE EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION IN ITS DEVELOPMENT WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: In the article the author specifies and analyzes, basing on his own views and positions, some aspects of Russian- Korean cooperation and Republic of Korea’s policy concerning the use of Northern sea route. Omitting the details, repeatedly described by other authors and researchers, he indicates geopolitical and economic significance of this region and designates the possible points of agreement between Moscow and Seoul. At the same time it is emphasized that they might be legally fixed in the interests of both partners. Keywords: Arctic, Russia, South Korea, icebreaking support, Northern sea route
As is commonly believed, Republic of Korea is considering the objectives for polar research in the Arctic from three directions. First – struggle for the right to control natural resources The Arctic deposits contain, according to various estimates, from 20% to 45% of the world's hydrocarbon reserves (including not yet discovered), as well as other minerals [4,13]. Republic of Korea is an importer of oil, gas and most of other natural resources, their importance in Korean economics and, speaking in general, in country’s existence is increasing every year. For this reason, there is a direct interest in finding and providing alternative sources of energy, including prospective ones, and ensuring the diversification and stability of the relevant flows in any geopolitical scenario. Second – the problems of fast and safe transportation of goods from Asia to Europe South Korea is now among the top ten countries in Maritime transport, controls about the half of the orders portfolio on the world shipbuilding market [15]. Ships are among the five most important Korean export products - along with cars, computers, semiconductors,
43 and petrochemicals. Any crisis in the industry inevitably affects the economy as a whole, so the search for additional cargo directions is appropriate and very important for Korea. Alternative routes mean orders from shippers and additional loading of shipyards, and in this case it does not matter whether these ships are built for domestic or foreign cargo carriers. Third – geopolitical reasons Taking into account the current and future importance of the Arctic region on a global scale, direct involvement in the solution of issues related to it becomes akin to participation, for example, in the UN Security Council, in other words, raises the country’s prestige and strengthens its position on the world stage. In this case, it is of secondary importance under what pretext (for example," concern about the impact of Arctic warming on climate changes", etc.) and due to what it is possible to achieve such involvement, positive result is the main thing. In accordance with this, Republic of Korea has designated participation in the development of the polar areas as part of the State development strategy, is carefully studying the Arctic resource potential, since 2013 takes part as an observer in the work of Arctic Council (an international organization). Currently, the Arctic issues on the administrative and legal level in South Korea are being managed by: - Ministry of Foreign Affairs; - Ministry of Science and Technology; - Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; - Ministry of Environment; - Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; - Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; - Korea Meteorological Administration; - Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation [6] As for scientific institutions: - Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology – KIOST (till 2012 Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute); - Korean Polar Research Institute (KOPRI); - Korean Maritime Institute (KMI); - Research Institute for Gangwon [6]
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Polar researches both in Arctic and Antarctic are being supported for almost 10 years with the help of icebreaker “Araon”, which is used as “delivery system”. The ship has the sizes 111x19.05 m, tonnage 3070 ton, includes 35 crewmen and 60 researchers, breaks the ice up to 1 meter thick and is able to perform autonomous navigation for 70 days. Its equipment consists of modern diesel- electric power plant and 11 laboratories of different profiles (hydroacoustic/geophysical, oceanographic, meteorological, electronic measurements, gravitometric, soil analysis, "baltic", hydrological, chemical, biological, water salinity). There is also the space for permanent basing of helicopter and barge, which help to deliver 20-foot containers to the shore [22].
Fig.1. Icebreaker “Araon” in the Arctic
Taking into account that one icebreaker is clearly not enough, the South Korean government since 2013 announced from time to time plans to build a special icebreaker for the Northern sea route [14, 21]. It is clear that sooner or later such vessel will appear and will be fully serviced by professionally prepared South Korean crew. In addition, it is planned to establish the Korean pilot service, in order to provide cargo vessels’ routes through the North Pole. In other words, these are steps aimed at getting rid of dependence on other countries in the future by: - construction of its own icebreaking fleet;
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- education and training of the skilled polar specialists
Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Transport suppose that by 2020 the freight traffic across the NSR may increase (in the most optimal conditions) up to 65 million ton a year. [3]. As for experts, they designate the expected annual volume of transit traffic within the limits between 8 and 20 million tons. [8]
Fig. 2 Cargo transshipment across the Northern sea route
For the comparison: averagely 950 million - 1 billion tons [12] are transported annually through the Suez channel and there are no tendencies to decrease this number. If you count the bulk carriers and tankers, then per day it is more than through the NSR for the whole year. From this we can conclude that shippers and receivers of freight (consignors and consignees) in the Asia-Pacific countries are not in a hurry to ensure the cargo base of the "northern" routes. For this to happen, businessmen need to make sure that the cost of transportation through Arctic area is relatively low, and the profits from the work there are greater than the costs and global risks. The vessel chosen for the long voyage has to be provided with stable icebreaking support, logistics and technical aid, guaranteed
46 opportunities for assistance in an emergency, for replenishment of fuel reserves, ensuring the daily safety of the crew. The provision of regular weather forecasts based on hydro- meteorological observations is of particular importance for the full navigation through the NSR. At the first stage foreign states can really announce (if there is a sufficient number of specially equipped vessels) the implementation of some independent actions, for example, the own icebreaking escorting of ship caravans through the North Pole and adjacent areas. Using this route it is quite possible to operate with the help of American (Alaska), Canadian (Arctic Archipelago) and Danish (Greenland) forecasts. However, if there is a need to use the Northern sea route (which is the part of Russian territorial waters) it'll be necessary to base on the information of Russian shore weather stations. The Arctic Ocean has a great length, the situation is changing rapidly, and only shore stations (satellites can not do so) provide comprehensive weather forecast for different local areas, taking into account all small details. Rather developed air transport and also scientific and technical infrastructure have remained in Russian Arctic region since the days of the USSR. This infrastructure is under systematic process of renovation and modernization, the financing of polar programs is being increased, the state assists scientists in the acquisition of more modern equipment. Therefore, at this stage of the NSR development it is more convenient for South Korea to rely on bilateral agreements with Russian Federation and, thus, to use Russian icebreaker fleet, professional experience and technological capabilities in order to perform tasks on meteorological monitoring, geo-navigation information, etc. In January 2014 the partners have concluded Memorandum on Understanding and Cooperation in joint development of the Arctic ports [2]. The article about coordination of actions in the Arctic was included in the plans of the Korean-Russian exchanges approved by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs for the coming period. In 2016, there has appeared a Memorandum of understanding and cooperation in the implementation of investment projects in the field of shipbuilding, ship repair and construction of trade and logistics centers. South
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Koreans have carried out several test voyages across the NSR [21] in both directions, during which port, gas processing and oil production equipment was transported. Scientists and researchers from Republic of Korea have established and maintain contacts with partners in Saint-Petersburg (Saint-Petersburg University, Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, Admiral Makarov State University of Maritime and Inland Shipping, Central Research Institute of Maritime Fleet), Moscow (P.P.Shirshov Institute of Oceanology), Yakutsk (North Eastern Federal University), Tomsk (Tomsk State University), Vladivostok (Far Eastern Federal University, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Far Eastern Regional Hydro-meteorological Research Institute, V.I. Ilyichev Pacific Oceanological Institute) [6]. Special mention should be made of joint research centers which study, among other things, the directions of the NSR use. One of such centers has been opened in Vladivostok by joint efforts of Korean Maritime Institute and Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Acting both on international basis (the open framework program for the development of scientific research and technology "Horizon 2020", initiated by the European Union) and within the limits of bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea seeks to declare itself as an active and interested participant in the Arctic research. Together with Russian partners, South Koreans are actively studying climatic, geological, natural-geographical, logistic features of the circumpolar areas in Yakutia, Magadan region, on the Peninsula of Taimyr and in the Sea of Okhotsk. For several years, Republic of Korea has been announcing plans to open the second (the first is Dasan station on Spitsbergen archipelago) Arctic research center in the Russian port Tiksi [5,20]. Russian-South Korean polar cooperation received a new impetus after the announcement of the "9 bridges" program and high- level meetings of the leadership of the Russian Federation and Korea in Vladivostok and Moscow in 2017 and 2018. Taking into account the Western sanctions, the involvement of Asian investments in order to solve the problems of infrastructure development in strategically important Russian Polar regions is a critical goal for Moscow. The factor of competition between applicants for the use of polar routes is beneficial as well: it allows
48 not only to provide economic advantages, but also to achieve unconditional recognition by foreigners of the national sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the adjacent polar areas. Given the actual denial by Washington of Russian exclusive rights to the NSR, this seems to be very significant. The strategic value of the Arctic for the Russian Federation is determined by the following factors: Natural resource factor – the most important, since it is the base for the well-being and development of the Russian economy. If Russia loses control over the production, processing and transportation of existing and potential energy resources across its territory, this will directly affect the country's life priorities. It will be relegated to the level of a third-rate “raw material appendage” of the West, and only in this form it will not pose a threat to the global interests of the United States. Realizing this, they will always seek different political and economic means to encourage Russia to make concessions, to agree to international access to its hydrocarbon resources and maximum liberalization of the energy market in order to obtain the levers for political and economic pressure on the formation of Russian foreign policy. Defensive factor means the need to maintain the combat-ready nuclear component of the armed forces. The maintenance of control over nuclear forces has a great significance, otherwise Russian Federation ceases to be one of the largest “actors” in the world and again loses the opportunity to defend the right to monopolize its energy resources. In this regard, it is extremely advantageous to control the Arctic waters: the route through the North Pole is the shortest distance to the vital centers of Russia, the probable attack on which should be neutralized by the possibility of a retaliatory strike. That is why Russia's defensive measures in the Arctic are fully appropriate and necessary to ensure national security [17]. Finally, real control over the polar transport routes implies, among other things, an economic factor, in particular, an increase in financial revenues to Russian state budget. Taking into account the above, it can be assumed that the Russian Federation will be planning its Arctic policy on the basis of
49 the following aspects (specific steps are already being taken in some areas). Geopolitical and economic aspects Further researches of the continental shelf in Russian polar sector with a purpose to justify legally, on the basis of international law, the exclusive rights of Russian Federation to its natural resources and waters along the Arctic coast and all islands belonging to Russia, from the border with Norway to the border with the United States. Foreigners should not put in claims for territorial sovereignty in the Russian Arctic sector and in this connection they have no right to develop natural resources without approval from the Russian Federation as well as the right to conduct military activities here. Transport and logistics aspects Establishment of sorting centers on the endpoints of the Arctic route for the storage, sorting and shipment of goods from Asia to Europe, reconstruction and expansion of transit ports and service points along the NSR for the maintenance of icebreakers, cargo ships, tankers etc. According to available data, it is planned to equip at the modern level at least 10 search and rescue stations, 16 deep-water ports, 13 airfields and 10 radar stations [11]. Technical aspects Replenishment and modernization of the icebreaker fleet, airfields (polar aviation), meteorological (coastal weather stations) and logistics (warehouses for bunkering) chain along the route of NSR, as well as technical control network (radars). The compensatory nature of the services provided on this basis (for example, the provision of weather forecasts for passing vessels) can be confirmed in written form. Aspects of international cooperation Interaction with foreign partners in the creation of favorable conditions for investments in the Arctic as well as cooperation in shipbuilding, training of skilled polar specialists and preservation of polar ecology, flora and fauna. Information aspects Wide popularization of Russian historical merits in the Arctic researches among ordinary citizens through printed and electronic media. Explanation of tactical and strategic advantages for Russia caused by development of the Arctic, coordination of actions carried out within this framework by the Russian leadership and relevant
50 authorities with the objectives of national patriotism and strengthening of the country. When planning the cooperation with foreigners, it is advisable to proceed from the above, taking into account the Russian "Strategy for the development of the Arctic until 2020" and the projects of the international "Polar code". The conclusion of agreements (based on above mentioned aspects) with the Republic of Korea on cooperation in polar research and equipment of the NSR route would not only strengthen bilateral relations between Russia and Korea, but would also become a precedent for the conclusion of similar agreements with other candidates for access to the Arctic.
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14. South Korea is ready to construct an icebreaker for the development of the NSR / «Южная Корея готова построить ледокол для развития Севморпути», 07.11.2017, URL: http://ria.ru/world/20171107/1508284557.html, 02.08.2018 15. Today South Korea is an unconditional leader of the world shipbuilding / «Южная Корея сегодня – безоговорочный лидер мирового судостроения», «Korean Space», русскоязычный корейский форум, URL: http://koreanspace.ru/index.php?showtopic=9589 16. Korea will expand participation in the programs of the Arctic development / «Южная Корея расширит участие в программах освоения Арктики», 12.12.2013, URL: http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/823046 17. Pereslavtsev N.I. About the framework of Russia’s Arctic cooperation with Republic of Korea // Materials of the science practical seminar “The issues of the Arctic development: life and work in the ice”, Vladivostok, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, 2015, p.34-47 / Переславцев. Н.И. О рамках Арктического сотрудничества Российской Федерации с Республикой Корея, Материалы научно-практического семинара «Проблемы освоения Арктики: жизнь и работа во льдах», Владивосток, МГУ им. Невельского, 2015, с.34-47 18. Tolstokulakov I.A. Interests and policy of Republic of Korea in the Arctic region // “Overcoming the cold. Interests and policy of Asia-Pacific countries in the Arctic: challenges and opportunities for Russia”, Vladivostok, IHAEFE, 2017, p. 291-316 / Толстокулаков. И.А. Интересы и политика Республики Корея в Арктическом регионе // «Преодолевая холод. Интересы и политика стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона в Арктике: вызовы и возможности для России», - Владивосток, ИИАЭ ДВО РАН, 2017, с. 291 – 316 19. History and the modern situation with the scientific station Dasan / «Дасан» квахаккичжи ёксавахёнхван» (История и современная ситуация с научной базой «Дасан»), 08.11.2016, URL: http://www.arctic.or.kr/?c=27/30/31 20. INTERACT project on the joint use of the Arctic scientific stations / «Пуккык кичжирыль кондон хварёнханын Интерэкт проджект» (Проект INTERACT по совместному
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использованию арктических научных станций), 08.11.2016, URL: http://www.arctic.kr/?c=29/58/66&idx=1282 21. In the new month the test voyage across the Northern sea route…To build the second icebreaker “Araon” / «Пуккык ханно сэдаль сибом унхан…чеи араонхо мандында» (В новом месяце пробный проход по Севморпути…Построить второй ледокол «Араон»), 26.07.2013, URL: http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/seoul/Print.php?id=20130726018020 22. ARAON – Icebreaker: current position and details/ IMO 9490935…13.11.2015, URL: http://www.marinertraffic/com/ru/ais/details/ships/shipid:674189/m...
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ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION OF A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND THE SAKHALIN ISLAND
Valentin V.Sergienko Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: the author of the article is a labor veteran, deep-sea captain and a pilot with many years of the navigational experience, including in polar latitudes. He is well aware of Sakhalin because he lived there for a long time. And finally, the author of the article is an expert in construction of large-scale bridges and sea tunnels, for example he was a key figure in the practical implementation of marine component in the bridge project to Russky Island in Vladivostok in 2018-2012. Basing on his experience and wide-range knowledge he expresses his personal opinion about the possible construction of the transport route between the mainland and Sakhalin Island, designates the existing obstacles and ways to overcome them. This is an interesting topic in connection with its discussion in economic and public circles, including in terms of usefulness for Russia's interests in the Far East. All conclusions and views belong strictly to the author and express only his personal opinions. Keywords: Strait of Nevelskoy, Sakhalin, tunnel, bridge, Tatar Strait, cyclone, Cape of Lazarev
In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin has instructed the government to assess the probable cost and to work out in detail the project of a bridge or tunnel route from the mainland across the Strait of Nevelskoy to the Sakhalin. The fact, that this issue continues to be studied, the President confirmed in July 2018 at a meeting with the governor of the Sakhalin region. The research is carried out, in particular, by “Russian Railways” company and its subordinate organization - Institute of Economics and Transport development. In this regard, the author would also like to express his own views and opinions, basing on his Maritime experience and without excessive theoretical conclusions in favor of any method of communication between the mainland and the Sakhalin Island.
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It is strange but many experts put the strategic importance of the proposed project in dependence on its economic payback. Of course, its implementation will require a lot of finance. But it seems that this is not the case the case to think about immediate benefits. In fact, bridges, railroads and land routes are a means for integrating the territorial parts of a large country, are becoming an impetus for increasing migration to its remote regions, increasing trade and, ultimately, ensuring national security for the near and distant periods. For the Russian Far East, due to its slow but steady depopulation and, thus, a decrease in the volume of the regional domestic market, any project that can stop these phenomena by attracting federal and foreign investments, production capacities and labor, is, so to say, an urgent need. The first actual steps for connecting the Sakhalin Island with the mainland began to be performed in the early 50-ies of the 20th century. It was decided to build a tunnel, not a bridge - the experience of the construction the tunnels (for example, the Moscow subway) had been already available, but as for the building of large-scale bridges across the sea straits such technology had not still exist. Currently, the available technical resources allow specialists to construct efficiently both tunnels and bridges of any complexity and in a short time. For example: in Vladivostok in 2008 – 2012 three bridges have been built, one of them - across the Eastern Bosphorus Strait to the Russky Island. The height of the bridge’s supports (pylons) – 324 m, the length of span, suspended on metal cables (shrouds) – 1104 m. Depth of drilling for bridge supports reached 78 m and all this has been done in complicated meteorological conditions, including fog, stormy weather and heavy ice situation. However, it is necessary, after all, to determine what to build from the mainland to the Sakhalin - a tunnel or a bridge, since this will determine the cost of construction and, in the future, the volume of operating costs.
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Pic.1 The area of the Sakhalin Island, the river Amur and the Sea of Japan
Variant of a tunnel’s construction The main advantages of the construction of a double-tube tunnel (for automobile and railway transport) are based on the following factors: a) small dependence on weather conditions. Considering the fact that the temperature at the construction project is relatively permanent, the work is carried out continuously and with a stable speed. The temperature allows the professionals to carry out the internal concreting during the construction of tunnels and vertical shafts from both sides of the Strait of Nevelskoy. Concrete-mixing plants and reinforcement shops, including compressor stations with mechanical and other units, can operate smoothly. Also, it is possible to use effectively diesel-power plants in the winter at a gentle temperature, that is, with higher efficiency rate.
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Pic.2. Area of the township Lazarev – Cape Sredniy (left or mainland coast, Strait of Nevelskoy) and the township Pogibi – Cape Pogibi (right or Sakhalin coast, Strait of Nevelskoy)
It should be taken into consideration that in the autumn and in the winter over Siberia there is being formed an area of Arctic high pressure, the temperature drops sharply (so the continental climate implies severe winters). When shifted eastward, this area meets low - pressure centers - cyclones that are being formed mainly over mainland China or in the Northern part of the East China Sea. Further, the cyclones begin to deepen, gain speed (rapid decrease in pressure) and move in the northeast direction, which causes a sharp increase in wind. When they come out of the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, they can form a "double cyclone" ("twin cyclone"), named so because it has two centers. Each center includes cold and warm fronts as well as storm winds, sometimes up to 30 m/s and heavy snowfalls caused by the mixing of cold Siberian air with warmer and wetter sea air. Forming sea weather “twin cyclones” repeatedly led to the death of ships. They often change their direction to the north or northwest, and may suspend their movement in the northern part of the Sea of Okhotsk. Then, so to say, the winter monsoon with a steady wind direction begins to have an effect. In these cases, the entire water area of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sakhalin, Kurile Islands and Hokkaido is under the influence of this monsoon and, as a rule,
58 isobars in the weather maps near the entire Tatar Strait are formed in the direction from north to south. Below there are the characteristic figures from the Japanese facsimile weather maps that describe the weather throughout the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Tatar Strait, as well as in the area of the Kurile Islands (fig. 6-7, 9-10).
Fig. 6 – the high pressure of 1050 millibars of the Arctic anticyclone (H) (West) is spreading over a vast area. At this time the Kuriles are under the influence of a deep cyclone (L) that forms a persistent monsoon with northwest winds of over 30 m/s, which sometimes reach hurricane force. Fig.7 shows a cyclone (Taiwan-Bozu), which was originated in the northeast of Taiwan and is developing rapidly and with a sharp decrease in pressure in the center - 20 millibars in 24 hours. This causes a high speed of its advance and strong storm winds. In the southern part of Kyushu Island it usually changes direction sharply to the northeast, the pressure reaches 990 millibars. Further, during next 24 hours it moves up at high speed to the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk. Here it can have at the final stage the pressure in the center of 964 millibars and cause severe storms. Fig.9 shows a cyclone moving to the Sea of Japan in the direction from WSW to ENE. In wintertime the high pressure persists in the west part, low pressure persists in the east. In the west part of the Yellow Sea also may be the area of the minimum high pressure - 1004 millibars. This pressure may further decrease and become a cyclone, rapidly moving to the Sea of Japan. There it is being
59 transformed into severe storm, which includes cold and warm fronts and heavy snow, and then may abruptly shift to the area of the Sea of Okhotsk (or Kurile Islands). Fig.10 shows the so-called “twin cyclone” (Japanese name “Futatsudama Teikiatsu”). One of its parts appears on the coast of China near the Yellow sea (where this sea adjoins to the Sea of Japan), then is moving into the Sea of Japan where begins to deepen sharply. At the same time the area of low pressure, which had been originated in the South China Sea and moved to the region of Kyushu, formed the second center of low pressure. Both of them are gaining strength, the pressure in the centers decreases, and they begin shift quickly in the eastward direction. It turns out that at the same time two cyclones are being formed with the same pressure in the center and with the inclusion of warm and cold fronts. They
reinforce” each other and move together, gradually reaching the strength of typhoon. As a rule, in wintertime cyclones move in the northeast direction, towards the north of Primorye, then the Khabarovsk region and the Sakhalin. In the Tatar Strait and in the Strait of Nevelskoy at this period the northern winds are mainly blowing. In other words, wind, snow and ice are the determining factors that will affect the proposed construction in the area, in addition to the fact that after the passage of cyclones the frosty weather is usually set, and the temperature sometimes reaches 27- 30 degrees below zero. b) Strait of Nevelskoy will not be blocked.
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c) there is no need to maintain an expensive icebreaker fleet during the construction of the bridge supports (pylons) and the implementation of the project’s transport component. d) rocky ground from the work inside tunnels may be used for the construction of technical berths, piers, roads, buildings’ foundations, both on the mainland and on the Sakhalin side, near the township Pogibi. In the northern part of the Sakhalin there is a lot of the sand, which may be used both for technical needs and for concrete works. e) military-strategic security – against any aggression etc. f) during the process of region's development (in the future) there can be organized sea cruises with access to the Sea of Okhotsk, to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, city of Okhotsk, Magadan and the Sakhalin. In particular, even sailboats with a small draft and masts of more than 40 meters height will be able to pass through the Strait of Nevelskoy.
Variant of a bridge’s construction What problems the builders may face: 1. In the autumn-winter period, during the passage of cyclones, in the area of the proposed bridge’s construction the strong and prolonged northern winds with heavy snowfalls are blowing. Because of them the work will need to be suspended, and hard frosts form the desalinated ice cover (which is much stronger than the ice from sea-salted water) up to 1 meter thick, Here is a brief reference to the navigation periods in the area of the river Amur estuary. The navigation here begins from the ice drift on the river Amur. Near Khabarovsk it usually takes place on April 17-23, then during 21 day the ice drift is moving towards Nikolaevsk- on-Amur. After passing through Nikolaevsk (it usually happens on May 5-12) the ice drift moves to the south part of the river Amur estuary. Navigation usually begins here on May 20-26. For more than 30 years of observations the southern fairway (the Strait of Nevelskoy) always got free from ice not later than May 31. At the same time the process of getting rid of the ice begins to occur from the Tatar Strait. The fairway up to Cape of Lazarev begins to get rid of the ice and there were the precedents when on May 8-9 ships arrived at the port station Cape of Lazarev for loading timber. Although the ice is still moving within the fairway but it can be passed through. At this time to the north of the Cape of Lazarev the
61 ice continues to remain stable (this period lasts no more than 10 days), then begins to be shifted out of the southern part of the Amur estuary. The movement of the vehicles to the Cape Pogibi (distance of about 7 km) begins from around mid-January and can be carried out for about a month. Before that, transport goes to the Cape of Pogibi along the edge of the fairway then turns towards the Sakhalin (about 42 km). The Northern part of the Amur estuary and the Sakhalin Bay begin to get rid of the ice since around the middle of June. Although, according to observations, in severe winters there happened to be movements of ice from the Shantar Islands (to the northwest of Sakhalin) even in August. Ice formation begins in early November, first on shallow water, then the ice mass is moved towards the fairway. There can be observed the formation of ice hummocks and layers. Although it is strange, during last 5 years the ice in the area of the Cape of Lazarev is being formed sooner than on the river Amur near Nikolaevsk, although the water there is mostly unsalted. In the area of the Cape Lazarev the winters are warmer than in Nikolayevsk – about minus 20. The lowest temperature in January is up to minus 27, and with strong Northern winds – lower than minus 30. Tides in the area of the Strait of Nevelskoy are normal and regular (the landmark for the calculating of the tide beginning is Aleksandrovsk-Sakhalinsky). About 75% of the tidal wave reaches the Cape of Lazarev, full water comes in 3 hours 40 minutes, taking into account the time difference (one hour) between Khabarovsk and Sakhalin. The strongest ebb current reaches the velocity up to 4 knots (7 km per hour) and may be directed, according to the changes in fairway, almost entirely to the south. When navigating at this time, even in the case of a small error, the ship can be thrown away due to low tide to the shallow water near the Cape Warke. 2. If it is planned to build a road bridge, the terms of implementation of the project's marine component and its costs will increase significantly. The fact is that for breaking the meter-thick desalinated ice it'll be necessary to use an icebreaker with a horsepower of up to 20 thousand plus to have two tugs of ice class with a horsepower of 4.5 - 5 thousand for operations with the technical fleet (floating cranes, pontoons, etc.).
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3. The work of the fleet in such conditions will hardly be possible because the broken ice in such conditions will become pressed (one block of ice over another) and get frozen. The tidal current will not be able to shift the ice, although the strength of current in the moments of syzygy (spring tide) can reach 4 knots in this narrow part of the Strait of Nevelskoy. Actually, the entire Strait up to the parallel of the port Vanino and to the south is a solid, frozen ice. In wintertime the tankers with the carrying capacity of 100 thousand ton are escorted by powerful icebreaker only to the port point De-Castri. In this area the distance between the mainland and the Sakhalin is about 80 km, northwest winds reduce the pressure on the mainland coast and the certain ice movements become possible. Sometimes there happen to be such phenomena as the “ice river” (length up to 20 km) and the “ice swelling” in the area of several hectares, especially when the strong wind is changing from northwest to northeast and vice versa. 4. The using of the bridge will require the construction of the dikes from both sides (the mainland and the Sakhalin), which may influence on a partial change of the navigable fairway. Due to the narrowing of the Strait, the current's strength (not small before that) will increase. As well it is necessary to take into account an impact of the ice drift when the ice is moving to the bridge supports, when they are not yet locked by an arched girder or reinforced concrete beam. 5. It is also necessary to take into account such factor as setting of "mooring anchors" and the positioning of the floating system with the beam on the board. Since the floating system is located strictly perpendicular to the current and has a large area of its underwater part, then in case of a strong current it will experience significant pressure not only because of the current, but also because of the small space of the water under the bottom. It should also be taken into consideration that the water current is being changed twice a day, which complicates the accuracy of the positioning. This distinguishes the construction of hydraulic structures across the sea straits from the construction of the bridges across the river. 6. If we take into account the nature of the ground in the Strait of Nevelskoy and the weight of the used “mooring anchors” (about 100 tons), it becomes obvious that there’ll be necessary to
63 provide appropriate crane equipment for the separation of these anchors from the ground.
General assessment of the situation
During the practical implementation of the marine part of the project, it will be required to replace regularly tugs, floating cranes, pontoons, etc. in order not to interrupt the working process. Meanwhile, the construction area is remote from railways and quality transport routes. Period of navigation (within 5 months) is short. There are no contracting companies that could provide the required services (rent, replacement, ship repair). Moreover, we do not actually have a specialized technical fleet of ice class. A term of service of available vessels is almost expired. Thus, I assume that millions of tons of inert cargo, cranes, drilling equipment and various structures will have to be transported to the construction area by the sea. From Khabarovsk, along the river Amur, with cargo transshipment in Nikolaevsk, maybe from the port of Vanino and even from Vladivostok and Nakhodka (Primorsky Region, the distance is about 1400 km). Taking into consideration the complicated natural and weather conditions described above, it will be extremely difficult to carry out the transportation, and then the technical implementation of the project itself.
Thus, in order to ensure the beginning of the construction of the transport route from the mainland to the Sakhalin Island, it seems necessary and appropriate to carry out preliminarily the following steps:
а) to build a railway to the mainland point of construction of the transport crossing to the Sakhalin; b) to build a pier in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur for winter transportation of necessary cargo to the construction point. At the same time it is necessary to reconstruct and modernize the normal automobile road (approximately 179 -180 km to the Cape of Lazarev, from Nikolaevsk to Khabarovsk along the river Amur – about 900 km); с) to construct the own floating crafts, for example, the special pontoons for long and heavy cargoes. Perhaps they will simply need
64 to be delivered to the construction point of the transport crossing to the Sakhalin Island; d) to provide the construction of the transport crossing with electricity. The above points depend on organizational and management decisions, taking into account the influence of climatic factors.
The Author of the article, Valentin Vasilyevich Sergienko is a labor veteran and honorary worker of the Russian Fleet. He has 25 years of trouble-free operations in the position of deep-sea captain in the Far Eastern Shipping Company, for which he was awarded professional badge and got several awards. Also he has 14 years of working experience as a senior pilot, both abroad and in Vladivostok seaport, rich experience in ice navigation. .
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REFERENCES
1. Kulagin N., Maslak V., Bezrodniy K., Lebedev M., Project of a tunnel to the Sakhalin Island / Кулагин Н., Маслак В., Безродный К., Лебедев М., «Проект тоннельного перехода на остров Сахалин»//Инженер и промышленник сегодня, 2018, №5 (35). с. 36-43 2. Putin instructed to assess the feasibility of building of a bridge to Sakhalin / «Путин поручил оценить целесообразность строительства моста на Сахалин», 24.07.2018, URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/07/24/776411-put... 3. For the safe navigation in Japanese coastal waters, March 1990, Navigation Safety Division, Guard and Rescue Department, Maritime Safety Agency, p. 15-17
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MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES Foreword to the issue’s further articles
Sergei M.Smirnov Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University,Vladivostok
Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University has been actively participating in the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts network since its creation. Not one region on the Earth is absolutely secure of armed conflicts. Each region has its specifics which defines the dominant roots of potential conflicts. The grossly overpopulated East Asia is experiencing a lack of natural resources. As a result, the territorial disputes especially in maritime domain represent a serious threat to regional stability and security. Territorial dispute in fact is a problem that periodically arises in relations between states, sometimes reaches the level of an “almost armed” conflict, then gradually smoothes out, disappears from the view of the media - and so on until the next escalation. It is difficult to predict when this escalation will occur, and why. Is it possible in any way to avoid unwinding the "spiral" of territorial disputes? What role the international organizations and civil society should play in the process? Should we deify the international law and believe that its norms decide everything? The answers are not obvious. We hosted a number of conferences, workshops and round table discussions at MSU(N) trying to find the answers or at least, to understand the strings and mechanisms of conflict escalation and propose reasonable measures for its preventing. Judging from what we see in the world today, this activity must be continued… The materials of the latest round table discussion “Non- governmental dialogue on territorial disputes in Asia – Pacific” which was held November 23, 2018 are included in the following Special Chapter of the Journal.
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DORMANT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES OF CHINA: CHALLENGES FOR NEIGHBORS
Anastasia O. Barannikova Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: The article analyzes the problem of dormant territorial disputes of China. Reassessment of the role of China and intensification of its foreign policy strategy has had a significant influence on his approach to the solution of territorial disputes. It can create challenges not only for countries currently involved in territorial disputes with China, but also for those whose disputes with China were considered settled. Keywords: China, dormant territorial disputes, uncertain borders, foreign policy, security
People’s Republic of China has territorial disputes with almost all of its neighbors. Some of them are well-known (such as disputed territories in the South China Sea, China-India and China-Japan disputes), others are not. The most of the latter are considered as resolved or ostponed. But they also can be considered as dormant. With the further growth of China’s influence and foreign policy strategy evolution these dormant disputes will likely be revitalized. Currently it is known about territorial disputes1 of China with India, Bhutan, DPRK and ROK, Japan, ROC, Vietnam, the Phillipines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. China claims not only the islands around Taiwan but also Taiwan itself considering it an integral part of PRC. As for Tibet, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Inner Mongolia, these territories should be considered separately. They are all Chinese provinces and from time to time demand independence. These are rather the cases of separatism than territorial disputes as no other country is officially involved (while supporting separatism sentiments though). Currently, Chinese government carries out strict control over these domestic tendencies.
1 It is not the full list of territorial claims involving China. There are also opinions that China intends to return all territories of the former Qing Empire – more than 10 mln. sq. km.
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Researchers note that despite the fact that China declares the sovereignty of the state and its territories as one of the sacred concepts and underlines unacceptability of any concessions on this issue, in fact it is ready to re-draw state borders on the map for certain purposes [10]. Since 1949 the most of the territorial conflicts have been resolved by China through diplomatic channels. It is also noteworthy that China received less than 50% of the disputed land. In 1960-1965, border treaties were signed with Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Mongolia and Afghanistan, after China ceded respectively 82%, 94%, 60%, 65% and 100% of the disputed territory. Border treaties were also signed with Kazakhstan in 1994, Kyrgyzstan in 1996, Laos in 1998, Vietnam in 1999 and Tajikistan in 1999. In these cases China conceded 66%, 68%, 76%, 50% and 96% of disputed territories respectively [5]. Such unusual pliability allowed the experts to assume that the rapid economic growth of China is compensated by its peaceful foreign policy and the refusal of expansion [6]. However, the national interests of the country are not limited to expansion. Moreover, China, while offering compromises to the Central Asian states was far from being disinterested. Its flexibility laid the foundation for large- scale trade and economic cooperation and allowed China to enter oil and gas markets of Central Asia [3]. Since 2008 China’s foreign policy has changed drastically. The role of China was revised both inside the country and in the world. Strategist and historian Edward N.Luttwak points that these changes were caused by the «abrupt elevation of China’s relative standing in the world caused by the Western economic crisis, which seemingly validated Chinese practices (The “Beijing Consensus”) while badly eroding the prestige of Western-style Democratic Capitalism». Ultimately China began shifting «from reaction to action, from “rule taking” to “rule-making”[6]. Its approach to the national interests promotion became more aggressive and official statements of Beijing on territorial disputes became more sharp if not arrogant. This new approach can be illustrated by the case of South China Sea disputes. It is known that China took part in drafting of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and ratified it. By putting forward claims to the archipelagoes of the South China Sea, China violated the one of the main international principles – freedom of seas [1] and some other UNCLOS provisions. The full list of
69 violations was listed by Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration, which issued a ruling on the claim of the Philippines against China on July 12, 2016. Among other things PCA award states: «China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein» [8]. The Court found the territorial claims of the PRC to the Spratly archipelago illegal. The court’s decisions states that China has no right to fish there, to extract minerals and to carry out economic activities, since none of these islands and reefs are its exclusive economic zone. However, China have not recognized the ruling of the Court. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC published a statement where declared that «the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it» and «China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards»[9]. Indeed, China has continued to carry out activities in the disputed territories, being guided only by its own considerations and toughening further its stance on territorial disputes. As President Xi Jinping told U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis in June of 2018: “Our stance is steadfast and clear-cut when it comes to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”, adding that “any inch of territory passed down from ancestors can not be lost while we want nothing from others” [7]. It was sounded in the context of South China Sea disputes but can easily be applicable to all other territorial disputes of China. Along with China’s foreign policy and diplomacy activation its long-dormant territorial disputes with India and Japan were revived. Moreover, China started putting forward claims to the countries it signed border treaties and once settled territorial disputes with. Despite the fact that the borders demarcation and territorial disputes with Russia were considered settled with the signing of bilateral agreements in 2000s (according to which Tarabarov Island and almost half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island came under Chinese
70 jurisdiction), China started putting forward new claims to Russian territories. Representatives of the PRC proposed Moscow reconsider the state border line between the two states at least at 160 sites near the Amur and Ussuri rivers in the course of the meeting of the Russian-Chinese commission on border issues on June 20, 2010. Two years later, during the bilateral demarcation activities of Russia and China on the territory of the Altai Republic, the Chinese side voiced the need to shift the state border to the depths of Russia, so that China could receive “native Chinese” 17 hectares of the Altai highlands. No documents that would at least somehow support these claims were submitted. Taking into account the fact that China still considers the Treaty of Aigun of 1858 and the Treaty of Beijing of 1860, establishing the border along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, “unfair” and “inequitable”, new «proposals» and claims of China to Russia should be expected in future. The territorial disputes of China with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia cannot be considered resolved as well. There are still “uncoordinated areas” along the border between PRC and Kazakhstan, and some experts point that China claims to 1000 square km of the territory of Kazakhstan. Although currently China does not put forward territorial claims to Mongolia at the legal level, there are such cases as printing maps with Mongolia as a Chinese territory or naming Genghis Khan «Chinese emperor» [3]. As for Tajikistan, it conceded a disputed area of about 1 thousand square km in the Eastern Pamirs to China in 2011. The debates on possible Chinese sovereignty of the Beshkent valley and Dangar revived in 2013. China also maintains military presence in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) raising concerns among local population about this area future ownership. Scholars, studying problems of territorial disputes, specify the set of drivers that can turn dormant disputes into cross-border armed conflicts: combination of material and/or cultural interests, needs for resources mixed up with geopolitical rivalries, economic interests combined with nationalist ideologies. In Asia, the current territorial disputes might escalate to armed conflict mainly due to three factors: geopolitical shifts, competition over scarce natural resources (e.g., oil, gas, and in particular, water), and environmental degradation [4]. From the point of realist any territorial dispute is an expression of power, since territory is seen as a fundamental power base. It can
71 explain why rising powers have more aggressive postures toward disputed territories than declining ones. According to normative explanations approach, the value of territory not only derives from political or economic interests, but also serves as source of sovereignty and identity both for the states and the people involved. Respect for territorial integrity is one of the first principles of international law, the idea that a piece of land or water has been unlawfully stolen is a potential and powerful motive for claim. On the other hand, from the point of historical justice, the claims have to be perceived by the country currently owning the disputed area in the same way. The role of resource scarcity is another factor able to revitalize dormant territorial disputes. Asia currently has the most of the mentioned above factors. On this basis it can be assumed that all agreements, mechanisms and even territorial integrity are valid only as long as they meet the interests of the “strong”. From this point all resolved territorial disputes, especially the cases when China conceded territories, can be considered dormant and we should expect their reanimation in certain conditions. Scholars point that internal threats to regime stability and security best explain China’s willingness to compromise in its many territorial disputes. China has offered concessions in each and every dispute along its land border but not in any homeland disputes, and in only one offshore island dispute [11]. But China is gradually tightening domestic control and once the level of this control is sufficient and domestic threats are eliminated China can turn its attention to the neighbor states. International affairs practice shows that there are no eternal friendship, treaties and mechanisms. Analogically, decisions and agreements on border demarcation concluded between countries should not be considered as something final and constant. The very definition of the territorial dispute proves it: «a territorial dispute is understood as a dispute in relation to a certain part of a territory that at the time of the dispute is under the jurisdiction of one of the disputing states and claimed by another state, influenced by its own considerations and arguments» [2]. In this case all other, including historical and legal truth and untruth, justice and injustice make no sense. Modern reality is that agreements and international law are ignored by strong countries since the moment they limit or contradict promotion of this country’s own national interests. It is predetermined
72 by the very nature of national interest which is egoistic. Сonsidering this, new claims of China to neighbors should be expected as external and domestic factors gain strength. Though military conflicts between countries are hardly possible, in general conflict potential of the regions involved will grow further.
REFERENCES
1. Васильев Л.Е. «К вопросу о территориальных спорах Китая» // Китай в мировой и региональной политике, История и современность. 2017, №22 2. Султанова Н.Т., Айдарбаев С.Ж. «Понятие и признаки территориального спора», Вестник КазНУ. 2014 3. Ястремский А.М. «Отношения Китая с соседями в контексте его территориальных притязаний», Мировая политика, 2015, № 3, c.23-51 4. Francesco Mancini. Uncertain borders: territorial disputes in Asia. Analysis No. 180, June 2013. 5. Luttwak, Edward N. 2002. Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, Massachussetts, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 6. Luttwak, Edward N.,“Why China Will Not Become the Next Global Power...But It Could”, Infinity Journal, Issue No. 4, Fall 2011, pp. 8-11 7. Mu Xuequan. Xi meets with U.S. Secretary of Defense 8. PCA Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). 12 July 2016, URL: https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/pca-press-release- the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the- peoples-republic-of-china/ 9. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines. 12 July 2016, URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20180127155530/http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml
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10. Taylor Fravel M., Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 11. Taylor Fravel M. Territorial and Maritime Boundary Disputes in Asia. In Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (Eds.). Oxford handbook of the International Relations in Asia, New York, 2014
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KOREAN-JAPANESE DISPUTE CONCERNING LIANCOURT ISLANDS AND THE POSITION OF RUSSIA
Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: the author considers and analyzes modern situation in territorial dispute between Korea and Japan about Liancourt (Dokdo/Takeshima) Islands. This article continues more detailed materials on the above topic with historical review of the problem and the directions of its possible solution which were published in the “Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine science& education”, vol.5, № 1, 2015, vol.6, no, 1, 2016. An objective analysis shows that the arguments of the Korean side in this dispute seem to be more weighty and justified. Generally speaking, the situation around Liancourt and the position of the Republic of Korea about it are very similar to some problems faced by Russia, for example the territorial dispute with Japan about the South Kurile Islands. So, it should be considered: does this not create a basis for expanding traditional political and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea? In particular, our countries could cooperate in the questions of mutual security, for example to establish the demilitarized status of the Sea of Japan or, at least, to limit dangerous military activities in this area. Keywords: territorial dispute, Dokdo, Takeshima, Liancourt Islands, Korea, Japan, Russian Federation
The topic of maritime territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region is of continuing interest to regional researchers not only because these disputes are able to develop into a "hot" military conflict in the near or distant future. Each of these disputes is a kind of precedent for application of the provisions of maritime law and international law in general. In turn, efforts to resolve territorial disputes often determine changes in legal provisions which are designed to regulate relations in the international community for a long time. All this is fully applicable to the Japanese-Korean dispute over the Liancourt Islands, which has been going on for many years. For
75 the sake of neutrality we‘ll call them this way (Europian designation of the Archipelago), though they have also Korean and Japanese names, respectively Dokdo and Takeshima.
Pic. 1. Korean photo of the Liancourt Islands
Pic. 2. Japanese photo of the Liancourt Islands
It is necessary to answer the question: what is the reason, and what is the basis of the Korean-Japanese dispute? The Liancourt Islands are the small territory which does not include permanent population. But, however, they are located in the center of the Sea of Japan, at the intersection of waterways, to the South (Strait of Tsushima) and to the North (Sakhalin and Primorye). Some time ago, there have been found here the considerable reserves of gas hydrate. In addition to this, the adjacent marine area includes significant number of fish resources. That is, as often happens, the decisive arguments are the national security and the economy. National pride and respect for prestige, historical, ethnic and cultural
76 contradictions do not justify, but only add to each party stubbornness or propensity to compromise. In previous works the author noted that periodic voyages to certain lands and even regular production of land and marine resources do not yet mean legally and permanently secured sovereignty or rights to such sovereignty over a particular territory [4]. To justify the position on territorial jurisdiction is legal and reasonable only on the basis of the principles of acting international law and multilateral and bilateral agreements. In this regard, the positions of the Republic of Korea (ROK has been exercising de-facto control over the Liancourt Islands since 1952) seem to be more reasonable and well-founded. Let’s list some of them once again.
а) The principles of international law are usually determined multilaterally and not by one single country. It is implied that American rejection to include Liancourt in the list of territories, excluded from the governance of Japan in accordance of San Francisco Treaty (concluded in 1951), reflects only the position of the United States, but not the collective opinion of the Allied powers [5]. Does this item not coincide with the point of view of Russia? Our country has repeatedly pointed to the US desire to replace international institutions with its own decisions (based on the right of the strong) and to act on their own. b) Tokyo shows the apparent inconsistency and the absence of logic. In the past the Japanese denied obligatory provisions of the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam Declarations, because they did not participate in their drafting and implementation. However, Japan could not participate, as it had been an aggressor, was defeated and agreed to the terms of unconditional surrender. After that the country fully lost international legal rights. The former Japanese state was dismantled and in its place – and now subject to international law – the modern Japan has appeared, which could not claim to be the owner of territories in addition to those that were granted by the victorious powers. As for San-Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan also played no role in its drafting but nevertheless considers necessary to refer to it in proving its claims, allegedly, on the grounds that Liancourt
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Islands are not mentioned in the list of territories that Japan should abandon. Incidentally speaking, in the Treaty there are mentioned the South Kurile Islands, which have been acquired by Russia after WW2, but Tokyo disputes their status, referring to US reservations before the ratification of San-Francisco Peace Treaty [6] or other superficial explanations (for example, that four southern islands are not the part of Kurile Archipelago). c) Liancourt Islands were transferred by the United States to the Republic of Korea since its establishment in 1948 [4].
In general, the following conclusions can be drawn from the above: 1. Both countries, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, believe that the principles of international law are to be determined on multilateral basis. From this point of view, it is unacceptable when any great power substitutes the above principles for its individual decisions and actions. 2. Both countries, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, for a long time have been exercising de-facto control (for Republic of Korea – Liancourt, for Russia – the Kuriles and the Crimea) over the national territories, previously ruled by neighboring country and don’t intend to give up such control in future. 3. Both countries, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea have met with Japanese territorial claims to part of their national territory during negotiations on bilateral treaties with Japan. But if in 1965, Korea and Japan signed a " Basic Treaty" on the principles of relations, in which the problem of Liancourt was not mentioned at all (at the same time, Seoul denies the existence of the subject for discussion), then Russia and Japan still can not conclude the so-called "Peace Treaty" because of Tokyo's tough position about the Southern Kuriles (although Russia made concessions, having agreed to discuss the problem). 4. At present, the prospects for the settlement of territorial disputes on both the Liancourt and the Kurile Islands are very vague. The country which owns the territories will never give them away, and Japan which declares its claims will never obtain them.
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It is clear that, neither in Russia, nor in Korea, will not go, for political reasons, to the official recognition of the territories, which de-facto belong to each of them. Republic of Korea will not want to contradict with the US (main economic and military partner), and Russia also does not have plans to get an additional reason for the deterioration of relations with Japan. Most likely, the situation will remain the same: both parties pretend not to notice the existing problem (Liancourt and Kuriles - Crimea), but in fact agree with the status quo and follow it. Interstate discussions about the power over territory have always been and will remain in the future. Another question is: how to prevent these disputes from escalating into "hot" armed conflicts which impede international trade and economic exchanges and affect the national interests of neighboring states? With regard to the basin of the Sea of Japan, the author has already proposed in previous works the idea of multilateral agreement on the legal approval of the peace regime in the region, including the entire Korean Peninsula. Within the agreement it is possible to discuss the security of aviation flights and sea transport cruises (commercial, passenger and fishing fleet), the introduction of mandatory notifications on the launches of missiles, carried out outside territorial waters, on the implementation of military exercises, etc. The next stage could be the implementation of international integration projects in the area of the Sea of Japan in which the coastal states can actively invest. The meaning of such actions is that integration will gradually make the economic motives of maritime territorial conflicts irrelevant and will significantly reduce the probabilities of their aggravation. Thus, without directly touching the possession of the problem territories, the countries of the region could find common ground in other aspects of regular interaction and, in general, reduce the risk of a military escalation that could arise here. In this regard, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, basing on the moments of commonality of interests, have a chance to increase their international prestige, becoming the initiators of joint actions for the benefit of peace and security of not only their own, but also of neighboring peoples
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REFERENCES
1. Ignatov A.A. The modern stage of the terrirorial dispute of the Republic of Korea around the Dokdo Islands and its influence on interstate relations, MGIMO / Игнатов А.А. Территориальный спор Республики Корея и Японии вокруг островов Токто на современном этапе и его влияние на межгосударственную политику, МГИМО, URL:https://mgimo.ru/upload/docs.3/ignatov.doc, 15.10.2018 2. Ivanov A.Yu. Korean-Japanese relations through the territorial contradictions around the Dokdo Islands, Russian Association of University Korean studies / Иванов А.Ю. Южнокорейско-японские отношения через призму территориальных разногласий вокруг острова Токто, Российская Ассоциация университетского корееведения (РАУК), URL: http://www./rauk/ru/index.php?view=article&catid=21:2011-04-02..., 12.11.2018 3. Sevastyanov S.V., Kravchuk A.A. Territorial dispute between Japan and Republic of Korea: the arguments of each side and prospects for its solution, “News of Oriental Institute” / Севастьянов С.В., Кравчук А.А. Территориальный спор между Японией и Республикой Корея: аргументы сторон и перспективы разрешения, «Известия Восточного института», 2017, Киберленинка, URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/territorialnyy- spor-mezhdu-yaponiey..., 12.11.2018 4. Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev. Korean-Japanese discord concerning the Liancourt Islands, “Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education”, vol.5, no.1, 2015, p.43-52 5. Nikolai I. Pereslavtsev. Japanese-Korean territorial dispute and the prospects for its resolution, “Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science&Education”, vol. 6, no,1, 2016, p. 23-36 6. Provided that the provisions of the Treaty did not mean recognition of any rights or claims of the USSR for the territories that belonged to Japan on December 7, 1941, which would impair the rights and legal base of Japan for these territories, as well as recognition in favor of the USSR on any provision concerning Japan in the Yalta agreement.
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KURIL ISLANDS - LEGAL REGULATIONS AND MODERN NAMING ACTIVITIES
Sergei A. Ponomarev Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok
Abstract: The Kuril Archipelago is still one of the least explored regions in the Far East of Russia. Even the number of islands and islets composing the archipelago has not been properly estimated, and more than half of them do not have geographic names. The voluntary efforts of Sakhalin citizens supported by regional authorities have managed to change the situation for the better. Keywords: Kuril Archipelago, Sakhalin Regional Charter, naming expedition, territorial claims
The term "Kuril Islands" was not debatable until the mid - XX century and was commonly understood as an island archipelago of 1200 km in length between the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia and the island of Hokkaido in Japan. The author adheres to this understanding of the term. Geographically, Russia and Japan are closest to the Kuril Islands. However, the first claim to the two Kuril Islands was put forward by a European country of seafarers and traders - the Netherlands, which was on the rise in XVII century. Russia at this time had not yet completed the development of continental Eurasian lands, Japan was in the process of self - isolation, did not possess a sea - going fleet, and had only started to develop Iezo (Matsumai) Island - now Hokkaido, located south of the Kuril Islands. The Netherlands Ost India Company (founded 1602) dispatched a sea expedition in 1643 to explore the unknown east coast of ‘Tartaria’, the Kingdom of China and the west coast of America, and also “islands east of Japan, rich in gold and silver”. The expedition leader Maarten Gerritszoon Fries (02.28.1589 - June 1647) landed on the island of Urup (mistakenly regarded by him as part of the America) in June 1643, installed a cross, called the island “the Land of the Company” and declared its possession by Netherlands. Next, Fries landed on the island of Iturup and declared it ‘the Land of [Dutch] States’. The final map of the expedition became known in Europe after its publication in Netherlanda in 1658, and the
81 expedition journal filled by navigator Cornelius Janson Kuhn with a detailed description of the discovery was published in 1858. Russian expedition led by I.M. Yevreinov and F.F. Luzhin (1719 - 1722) handed over to Emperor Peter the First a map of the Kuril Archipelago with 14 major islands specified on it. La Perouze at the end of the XVIII century and Krusenstern in the XIX century described the composition of the Kuriles, but soon V.Golovnin thoroughly specified them, bringing the number of explored islands from 22 to 28. In the middle of the XX century geographical science characterized its number as "over 30 islands of the Kuril ridge." Later, the Soviet official sources included 56 islands in the Kuril archipelago. At the beginning of the XXI century, Russian geographical science accounted no more than 60 Kuril islands with 54 of them belonging to the Great Kuril ridge, and six - to the Small Kuril Ridge. Recently, however, some authors (Vishnevsky, 2010) have written about a somewhat larger number of islands, attributing 65 islands and 20 rocks to the Great Kuril Ridge, and 19 islands and 5 rocks to the Small Kuril Ridge.
The List of Kuril Islands in the Charter of Sakhalin Region The basic document of the region, its Charter (as amended in 2001) described the composition of the Sakhalin region in the most general form: "The territory of the Sakhalin region includes the territories of Sakhalin Island with the adjacent islands, the Kuril Islands with the islands of the Small Kuril Ridge". A new stage in the inventory of the Kuril Islands has begun in the spring of 2010 when I received an approximate list of islands, rocks, shoals and kekurs located on the territory of the Sakhalin Region and their coordinates from ROSREESTR. After a number of corrections this list included 88 objects adjacent to Sakhalin Island and 359 objects of the Kuril Archipelago (North Kurilsky District - 117, Kurilsky District - 94, South Kurilsky District -148). It seemed logical and necessary to attach the list of the islands of the Sakhalin region including the Kuril Islands to the Sakhalin regional Charter. The Sakhalin Regional Branch of the Russian Geographical Society (RGS) on April 21, 2010, addressed the Acting Governor K.M. Stroganov with such a proposal, submitting the initial materials. In the explanatory note to the bill submitted by the governor to the
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Sakhalin Regional Duma (parliament) on August 31, 2010 it was pointed out that the absence of island names in the Charter of the region “... does not allow the prospect of the Kuril Islands to be included in the future socio-economic development programs.” On December 23, 2010 the Sakhalin Duma has amended the Charter of the Sakhalin Region, stating in clause 1 of its Article 3 that “the Sakhalin Region includes the territories of the Sakhalin Island with the adjacent islands, the Kuril Islands, which include the islands of the Great Kuril Ridge and the Small Kuril ridge according to the description provided by the annex to this Charter.” The Governor of the region put his signature on December 24, 2010 and the Law No. 126-ZO was published and entered into force on December 29, 2010. Initially 77 out of 81islands and island groups listed in the main regulatory legal act of Sakhalin Region, the Charter, belonged to the Kuril Islands, with 59 of them composing the Great Kuril ridge and 18 - the Small Kuril ridge. As a result it can be stated that for the first time in the Russian legislative history (in the Law of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation incorporated in the general legal framework of the country), the minimum composition of the Kuril archipelago has been legally defined. From this point on, discussions about the composition of the Kuril Islands are simplified. In addition, the author initiated an appeal to the Far Eastern AeroGeodetic Enterprise (Khabarovsk) and prepared a technical task for determining the area of the Sakhalin Region, including the area of the Kuril Islands. In 2011-2012 this work was carried out. According to the DV AeroGeodetic report, there are 1,671 objects in the Great and Small Kuril ridges, including 554 areal objects of which 103 are named and 1117 point objects, only 48 among them having geographical names.
New names on the maps of Russia and Sakhalin region Expeditions organized by the Sakhalin branch of the Russian Geographical Society supported by the Government of the Sakhalin region and the Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University have submitted about 40 proposals to the Sakhalin Regional Duma since 2012 on the naming of previously nameless geographic objects in the region, mainly on the Kuril Islands.
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It is necessary to deal only with the names that have passed the state expertise and have been approved by decrees of the Government of the Russian Federation. Table 1. The names of geographical objects approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on the initiative of the Sakhalin Regional Branch of the Russian Geographical Society Object Name Location Decree Date of North East № signing Latitude Longitude island Derevyanko Anuchin 223-р 08.02.2017 43о 146о Isl. 22,8” 01,3” island Gnechko Shikotan 223-р 08.02.2017 43о 146о Isl. 48,5” 52,1” island Gromyko Urup 223-р 08.02.2017 46о 150о Isl., 14,1” 36,1” Taira Islet island Farhutdinov Shikotan 223-р 08.02.2017 43о 146о Isl. 48,5” 53,2” island Shetinina О Urup 223-р 08.02.2017 46о 150о Isl., 13,7” 34,6” Taira Islet cape Marshal Urup Isl. 2144-р 03.10.2017 45о 149о Krylov 34,9” 27,4” cape Gnechko Urup Isl. 2144-р 03.10.2017 45о 149о 35,5” 24,8” cape Purkaev Urup Isl. 2144-р 03.10.2017 45о 149о 34,9” 34,9” cape Raduzhanov Urup Isl. 2144-р 03.10.2017 45о 149о 39,5” 28,7” island Zenkovitch О. 2144-р 03.10.2017 52о 143о Сахалин 05,7” 08,9” rock Knorozov О. 2144-р 03.10.2017 45о 147о Итуруп 18,2” 52,0” rock Arc Urup Isl. 2187-р 11.10.2018 46о 150о 11,6” 30,5” rock Sea Lions Urup Isl. 2187-р 11.10.2018 45о 34,1 149о 24,5” island Fin Urup Isl. 2187-р 11.10.2018 45о 149о 36,6” 26,4” rock Pologaya Urup Isl. 2187-р 11.10.2018 45о 149о 34,1” 25,2” rock Ponomarev Urup Isl. 2187-р 11.10.2018 46о 149о 03,9” 58,8” cape Poklonny Urup 2188- 11.10.2018 45о 149о
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Isl. р 34,5” 24,5” cape Voronov Urup 2188- 11.10.2018 45о 149о Isl. р 38,5” 27,7” cape Admiral Urup 2188- 11.10.2018 45о 149о Yumashev Isl. р 34,7” 26,6”
Seven expeditions on geographic naming have been conducted so far. The first one organized by the Government of the Sakhalin Region and the RGS Sakhalin Branch was conducted September 5–7, 2012 on the ship “Igor Farkhutdinov”. It was attended by 140 people, including a large group of journalists from federal and local media. The expedition was preceded by a general meeting of the RGS Sakhalin Branch held on September 3, 2012. The report “On the results of rating voting and the approval of three names for small islands near Shikotan Island in the Small Kuril Ridge”, was presented by .I. Kostanov, the chairman of the toponymic commission. He informed that three definitely leading names were identified during the open internet voting and proposed to assign the following names to three small islands in the bays of Shikotan Island (See Fig. 1): - Kapitsa Island — with an area of 0.0286 sq. km.; - Farhutdinov Island – with an area of 0.0307 sq. km.; - Gnechko Island – with an area of 0.0204 sq. km. During the expedition the flags of Russia and the Sakhalin Region were fixed, capsules with documents on the name nomination, a description of the merits of historical persons buried, land and water samples taken on two small islands – [Sergei] Kapitsa - and [Alexey] Gnechko.
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Kapitsa Isl.
Gnechko Isl. Farhutdinov Isl.
Fig.1. New islands near Shikotan Island
The first expedition was more a PR-event and it has achieved its goal. The public opinion in Sakhalin Region embraced the idea of name nomination and readily supported it. The following expeditions were conducted once a year, in summer – autumn season, with limited number of participants (usually 7 – 9 persons) who were enthusiasts and experts. Once the expedition used the training ship ‘Professor Khlyustin’ with the Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University cadets onboard as its research base, and the experience of combined efforts was impressive. In other cases expeditions used private boats and catamarans for exploring the islands. The selection of names for the explored geographic objects is performed after thorough evaluation by RGS Sakhalin Branch, public discussion and approval by regional Duma. All historic persons whose names are immortalized had undeniable merits to Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. The practice of ‘naming expeditions’ will be continued.
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Fig.2. Expedition participants on the Voronov Cape, Urup Island. 2015
Conclusion. It is noteworthy that Japan voicing the territorial claims to Russia is actually downplaying the volume of these claims, positioning the Small Kuril ridge as two islands (“Shikotan” and “Habomai”), obscuring the fact that the so-called ‘Habomai’ includes Signal, Watchtower, Reef, Tanfiliev, Yuri, Anuchin, Zeleny, Polonsky, Grieg, Dalny, Middle, Ninth Val, Aivazovsky, Derevyanko, Gnechko, Farhutdinov islands and four groups of small islets - Shishki, Demina, Lisia , Shards. This version, replacing 17 islands and four islet groups with the myth of the “two” of the “four” islands desired by Japan, is quite popular even in the Russian media, which use foreign maps uncritically. As a result, the term “Habomai”, which has no place on official Russian maps, wanders from publication to publication. Currently (since 2010) there is a legally defined concept of the Kuril Islands, which should be taken into account in international relations and negotiation process. The list of the Kuril Islands is regularly updated as a result of Sakhalin region public activities. The official list is an integral part of the Charter of the Sakhalin Region - the main document of the subject of the Russian Federation.
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REFERENCES
1. Vysokov, M. Dutch sailors off the coast of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin / Western European seafarers off the coast of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (XVII-XVIII centuries), Yuzhno- Sakhalinsk: Lukomorye, 2010, p. 21 2. From "Kastrikum" ship journal by senior navigator Cornelius Janson Kuhn, June 13-July 31, 1643. (Amsterdam, 1975). // Western European seafarers off the coast of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (XVII-XVIII centuries), Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Lukomorye, 2010, p.33-36 3. The abbreviated notes of the lieutenant -captain (now the captain of the first rank) Golovnin about his voyage on the sloop "Diana" for an inventory of the Kuril Islands in 1811, // Golovnin, V.V. The Notes of Navy Captain, M.: EKSMO, 2012. 4. Butovsky, V.G., Gizenko, A.I. Geographical sketch of the Sakhalin region. // Sakhalin Region, Digest of Articles, Yuzhno- Sakhalinsk, 196, p. 9. 5. Farhutdinov, I.P. The Kuril Islands - some lessons learned of exploration and policy 6. Kuril Islands (Nature, geology, earthquakes, volcanoes, history, economy. Edited by Zlobin, T.K. and Vysokov, M.S. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 2004, p. 228. 7. Technical report on the work performed to determine the total area of the Sakhalin region, including the area of all the islands, rocks and stones, as well as the Kuril Archipelago, separately determining the area of the Great Kuril Ridge and the area of the Small Kuril Ridge. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Far Eastern AeroGeodetic Enterprise (Khabarovsk)”, 14.09.2012, in 2 volumes, Copy in the Author’s personal archive.
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RUSSIAN-JAPANESE ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE FAR EAST AS A BASIS FOR SOLVING TERRITORIAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA
Peter Yu. Samoylenko Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow
Abstract: Article deals with the problems of modern Russian- Japanese relations. The author researches possible new ways of cooperation between the two countries, which go beyond the traditional disputes about the so-called “northern territories”. The author puts forward the strategy of mutual interests and within its frames proposes to develop interstate relations on the basis of key perspectives in modern economic projects, which are of interest for both countries. Acting by such means Russia and Japan can help each other and supplement each other in bilateral relations. One of such opportunities can be the Russian Far East and the projects of the so- called “Eastern Vector”. Keywords: Asia-Pacific, Northeast Asia, Russia, Japan, territorial conflicts, international economic cooperation, Russian- Japanese relations, territories of advanced economic development, Porto Franco, mutual interests, mass media
Since long ago Asia-Pacific region and Northeast Asia as its part include a lot of territorial conflicts and political contradictions, which have a negative influence on security architecture nowadays and are an obstacle for developing international economic relations among the countries of the region. The fact is that the key countries in the NEA region are Russia and Japan, the subjects with rich economic and raw resources, but their bilateral relationships are largely limited. At the same time both countries have serious potential for development relations on the junction of political and economical interests. The main problem in Russian-Japanese relations at present days is the so-called problem of «Northern territories» [3]. In fact, in Japan
89 it is more political and ideological topic, which hampers political, economic and cultural dialogue between the two countries. Thus, Russia and Japan have serious and historical contradictions in bilateral relations, and non-government dialogue can help to solve this problem. In turn, Russia is interested in implementation of the so-called “Turn to the East” (“Eastern Vector”), i.e. to strengthen its influence in Asia-Pacific by the way of deepening and diversifying relations with the countries of the region [1]. Today Russia develops international economic projects in the Far East. These projects cover investments, trade and logistics between Europe and Asia through Russia and its Far Eastern seaports. Conceptions of “territories of advanced economic development” and “free port of Vladivostok” (“Porto Franco”) provide opportunities to Asian investors, including Japanese businessmen. Now the key regional partner for Russia is China, both countries have stable relations and interests of cooperation, but Russia is predisposed to full cooperation with other regional countries as well. And thus Japan has a chance to become a prior counterpart for our country. At present time Japan has two main economic goals in Northeast Asia – to widen the abroad markets for domestic goods and to strengthen the base for investments to foreign economics. Today Russia and its Far East region use the services of the Japanese service sector in such fields as hotels and catering, obtain the spare parts for cars, various equipment and instrumentation. In turn, Russia exports to Japan raw materials, such as timber, coal, oil etc. Subject to investment privileges in the Far East Japan and Russia have got new prospects for cooperation. The main idea is to use a non-government dialogue for mutual benefit of both countries. Russia has a big territory and a lot of natural resources. Japan has high technologies and financial capital to help in their development [6]. The author supposes that in certain degree Russian-Japanese relations at present days are based on definite stereotypes, which have been formed during Cold war era and in the latest periods of present history. Besides, both countries do not have enough mutual interests in foreign policy and economic cooperation. If such factors should be, bilateral relations will probably get new quality development vector.
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In turn, for Russia the main priority is development of economic relations with the countries of the region, including Japan. Now Japan is one of the biggest regional and world economics. Taking into account Russian Far-Eastern strategic initiatives, such as “territories of advanced economic development” and “Porto Franco” Japan can become one of the key Russian economical partners in Asia-Pacific region. For example, cargo transit from China to Asia- Pacific through North Korean port Rajin and through transport routes in Russian Primorsky Region open prospects for more active cooperation with Japan. As for Japanese businessmen, they can use the territory of Primorsky Region with favorable tax and custom regimes to organize the installation of machine productions and export of manufactured goods including transit transshipment of cargoes through Russian seaports and railways. Thus, the main goal and prospect for Russian-Japanese relations in Northeast Asia is economic cooperation [2]. It is necessary to point out, that the development of Russian-Japanese relations in present time in the regime of such multilateral dialogue will influence positively on security in Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia. As well as it will strengthen peace in the region and will let go out from present bi-way system of regional cooperation, based on lines of international relations “USA-Japan-South Korea” and “Russia-China-North Korea” to multi lateral dialogue and diversification of economical dialogue [4]. Development of international economical projects in Asia- Pacific and Northeast Asia with Russian participation can have good influence on regional security systems and reduce the probabilities for territorial conflicts. For example, cargo transit from China through North Korean port Rajin and through Russian ports’ capabilities to Asia Pacific, first of all - Japan. Consequently, economical cooperation will reduce the level of political contradictions and territorial conflicts, including problem of «Northern territories» [9]. As a result, perhaps the best way to solve territorial problems in the Asia-Pacific region is the economic cooperation between their participants. Mutual economical interests and using of disputable territories for the organization of joint companies, concessions, production of oil, gas and fishing can play positive role for solving territorial contradictions.
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It is important to say that development of Russian-Japanese relations in form of such dialogue needs to have adequate humanitarian and informational support. The problem for Russia and Japan is, first of all, in an absence of mutual media projects as well as the appropriate reviews of economical and cultural relations between two countries. Traditionally, their mass media usually writes a lot about situation in Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia. It is necessary to tell the truth about regional problems and affairs in the interests of Russia and Japan, and media must do it regularly. And such activity of Russian and Japanese mass media is a key case for both counterparts. For example, these problems in the Russian media are looked for rather rarely. And it determines opportunities for cooperation between Russia and Japan as very small and low [5]. Thus, we can say that the development of Russian-Japanese dialogue should be based on the following main principles: - More close interaction, including widening of real economic cooperation between Russia and Japan; - Development of mutual bilateral initiatives and business projects in the Far East, using the possibilities of the territories with privileged economic rules, such as “Porto Franko” and “territories of advanced economic development”; - Joint work based on traditional mutual economic interests in such areas as oil and gas production in Sakhalin or fishing. Main strategic ways in the process of relationships development must be the following: - Rapprochement of positions between Japan and Russia in the problems of economic cooperation; - Avoidance of the traditional conflict rhetoric (for example about so-called problem of “Northern territories”) in different formats of bilateral dialogue; - Cooperation for increasing political and economic influence of both countries in North-East Asia, on the base of creating mutual or consolidated position about regional problems which are important to both countries (for example, regional ecology). During Vladivostok Economic Forum in September 2018 leaders of two countries have been discussing the problem of Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan. President Putin has made a proposal to conclude such agreement without any terms.
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It is important that Russian business understands benefits caused by cooperation with Japanese colleges. For example, leader of “Delovaya Rossiya” Alexey Repic, one of biggest national business unions said that “we have problems but nevertheless have a lot of perspectives in two-way economic cooperation” [7]. According to his opinion, decline in exchange rate of Russian ruble (monetary unit) makes the Russian economy attractive for Japanese business, which has interests in big investment projects, planned for implementation during nearest 10-20 years. Today Japanese investors have already took part in such economic initiatives in Russia as car assembly, energy, native minerals output. Nowadays there are opportunities for Japanese businessmen in such economical sectors as medicine, pharmacy, chemistry production and agriculture. According to A.Repic’s opinion, Japan could invest in Russia to the creation of new industries with high technology, first of all, in the Russian Far East, within the territories of advanced economic development. The fact is that Japan today has some serious problems, which can be solved with Russian participation. Japan, which had image of high technology country in 1980s and 1990s, now is going through competition with South Korea, Taiwan and some other Asian growing economies. There are projections about world economy trends for nearest 20-30 years, and they indicate that in nearest future Japan will loose advantages in this sphere. The main problem points are ageing of population and lack of own resources. In turn, Japan is interested in using exterior possibilities for domestic economy [8]. Another reason is interior consumption. Japan has very high standards of living, so every year there are needed various resources, such as fuel, raw materials etc. Basing on economic reality of 21st century Japan seeks to locate production in other countries where there are many cheap natural and labor resources. Today, the main trend is the movement of industrial capacity from Japan to other countries, such as China and other South-East Asian countries. However, this does not include, for example, precision engineering products.
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Since recently Japanese businessmen began declare plans of occupying world food markets with own original foodstuff – tuna fish, candies vagacy (traditional Japanese sweets), etc. In this way it becomes necessary to have stable partners abroad with appropriate opportunities and resources. At present time Russia has a definite potential to become such partner for Japan, first of all, in the Far East. For example, Russia can produce ecologically pure foodstuffs, such as rice, beans, sugar, which may serve as components for Japanese food products. Russia with its Far East is a promising market for Japanese goods. A lot of Japanese technologies can be used in the Far East, including municipal communal, ecological technologies and others. Thus, Russia and Japan have a lot of mutual interests and opportunities for cooperation and development. Economic initiatives can reduce political and territorial contradictions between both countries and can be used as non-government way for solving such problems. Both countries must realize such perspectives and seek for their implementation. First of all, we can point to joint projects in the territories of advanced economic development of the Far East in agriculture, logistics, food industry and municipal services. The media of two countries can play now the positive role in bringing together Russian and Japanese business. In particular, it would be good if they publish regular economical and expert reviews, which show counterparts the opportunities of bilateral cooperation and tell about successful instances of such interaction.
REFERENCES
1. Krichevsky N., Territories of advanced economic development: problem of formatting / Кричевский Н. «Территории опережающего развития: проблема формата», URL: http://www.regcomment.ru/articles/territorii-operezhayushchego- razvitiya-problema-formata/, 18.10.2018 2. Kuzminkov V. Prospects of the development of Russian-Japanese relations / Кузьминков В. «Перспективы
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развития российско-японских отношений», Свободная мысль, URL: http://svom.info/entry/472-perspektivy-razvitiya-rossijsko- yaponskih-otnoshen/, 16.10.18 3. Kurile problem in Russian-Japanese relations / «Курильский вопрос в российско-японских отношениях», URL: https://www.foreignpolicy.ru/analyses/kurilskiy-vopros-v-rossiysko- yaponskih-otnosheniyah/, 07.10.2018 4. Problems of the security strengthening in Asia-Pacific region / «Проблемы укрепления безопасности в АТР», URL: http://idetperformance.com/sovremennye-mezhdunarodnye- otnosheniya/671-problemy-ukrepleniya-bezopasnosti-v-atr.html, 21.10.2018 5. Russian-Japanese relations: yesterday and today / «Российско-японские отношения: вчера и сегодня», URL: http://www.ifes-ras.ru/massmedia/21/262-rossijsko-yaponskie- otnosheniya-vchera-i-segodnya, 02.11.2018 6. Russian-Japanese relations: what lies ahead?, URL: http://valdaiclub.com/opinion/highlights/russian_japanese_relations_ what_lies_ahead/, 03.11.2018 7. Japanese business has interests in investment projects in Russia, “Business in Russia” / «Японский бизнес интересуется инвестпроектами в России», «Деловая Россия», URL: https://deloros.ru/eto-novoe-vozrozhdenie-yaponskogo-fokusa.html, 06.11.2018 8. 13 facts about economics of Japan, which fell into a crisis due to the West and is now climbing out of it / «13 фактов об экономике Японии — страны, которая благодаря Западу впала в кризис и теперь из него выходит», URL: https://businessviews.com.ua/ru/economy/id/ekonomika-japonii- 1492, 10.10.2018 9. Despite perceived progress, Japan and Russia remain far apart in territory dispute, URL: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/17/national/politics- diplomacy/despite-perceived-progress-japan-russia-remain-far-apart- territory-dispute/#.W_D1ZzFoSUk, 30.10.2018
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SIGNING PEACE TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN
Boris I. Tkachenko Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography,Vladivostok
Abstract: International legal aspects of territorial dispute between Russia and Japan are analyzed in connection with claims of Japan to the Russian Southern Kurile Islands and possible conclusion of the peace treaty. It is shown, that the Joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956 is similar to the peace treaty by its content. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 is studied and international legal consequences of transfer of Southern-Kurile islands to Japan are specified. Keywords: Russian Federation, Japan, Kuriles, World War II, San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956, territorial problem, peace treaty, international law.
Russian President Vladimir Putin made a proposal to Japan during the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2018 to sign a peace treaty without any preconditions by the end of 2018. President Putin is a supporter of the “compromise” on the territorial issue, which is recorded in Part 2 of Article 9 of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956. According to the Declaration prior consent was given to transfer the Lesser Kurile Chain (the Shikotan Island and the Habomai islands group) to Japan as a gesture of goodwill after signing peace treaty between two countries. But even the consent of the Russian side to transfer the islands of the Lesser Kurile Chain after signing peace treaty does not satisfy Japanese side, since it pursues receiving not only the islands specified by Part 2 of the Article 9 of the Declaration of 1956, but also the Kunashir and Iturup islands. It is notable that current position of Japan is “return of the four islands [Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and other islands of the Lesser Kurile Chain. - B.T.] before signing peace treaty "[1]. The goal of negotiations with Russia for Japan is not signing peace treaty itself, but receiving satisfaction of its territorial claims.
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In this regard, it is necessary to note the presence of international legal problems preventing conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan according to the results of the Second World War. The territorial issue between the USSR and Japan was resolved on a legal and fair basis after the Second World War and was provided by relevant international agreements of the war and post- war periods, which meet modern norms of international law, including the UN Charter. The continuation of negotiations on this far-fetched "problem", which in present conditions is a clear anachronism, does not meet national interests of Russia. The problem of signing bilateral peace treaty 73 years after the end of war has no practical meaning and pragmatic sense from the point of relations between Russia and Japan. The latter insists on the need for a peace treaty because the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 provides for the transfer of part of the South Kurile Islands to Japan after signing such a treaty. While Japan needs peace treaty, Russia does not need it. For Russia, there is no unconditional need for a peace treaty with Japan, just as there was no need for the peace treaty with Germany. The state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany was finihed unilaterally, and peaceful relations were established between them in accordance with the Decree “On ending the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany” of the Supreme Council Presidium of the USSR of January 25, 1955 [2]. If Russia signs peace treaty with Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany (unified Germany) can put forward a proposal or demand to conclude a peace treaty with Russia as the successor of the USSR in the sphere of international relations. After that the question of the sovereignty over the Kaliningrad Region (East Prussia with Koenigsberg) will arise. The joint Declaration of 1956 [3] by its content (Articles 1-6) is similar to both preliminary and final peace treaty, since not only the state of war between the USSR and Japan was stopped mutually, but peace and good-neighborly relations were restored (Article 1). Moreover, other issues, common to peace treaties were resolved. Since the peace treaty had not concluded due to disagreements of the parties on its content for more than 60 years after the signing Declaration of 1956, this Declaration actually becomes a final peace treaty.
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The conclusion of Russia-Japan peace treaty would make sense if the proposals of the Soviet Union made in the speech of A.A. Gromyko, the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the conference in San Francisco on September 5, 1951 were reflected in the text as the following amendments to the USA-Great Britain draft peace treaty [4]: “Japan pledges to join no coalitions or military alliances directed against any power that took part with its armed forces in the war against Japan” [i.e. from the point of present conditions Japan pledges to withdraw from the US-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security of January 19, 1960, directed against the USSR and Russia, as well as the PRC and the DPRK, and become a neutral state in relation to Russia]. “The Straits of La Perouse (Soya) and Nemuro along the entire Japanese coast, as well as the Straits of Sangarsky (Tsugaru) and Tsushima shall be demilitarized. These Straits shall always be open for the passage of merchant ships of all countries". «The specified Straits shall be open for the passage of only such warships as belong to the powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan» [i. e. Russia, Japan and Korea]. The implementation of these proposals by the USSR in a possible peace treaty between the Russian Federation and Japan would meet the principles of mutual security of the Far Eastern states. At the same time, any mention of a “territorial problem” should be avoided in this peace treaty. The Japanese government admits the possibility of deploying US military bases on the southern islands of the Kurile Ridge once they are transferred to Tokyo. It will focus primarily on the missile defense systems and creation of a new missile defense position region in the Far East. As it became known before Vladimir Putin's visit to Japan in 2016, the representative of the Japanese side stated about possibility of deployment of US military forces on the Kurile Islands which have being acquired by Japan, in accordance with the US- Japan Security Treaty. The Asahi newspaper reported on December 14, 2016 that Secretary General of the National Security Council of Japan, Shotaro Yachi, announced it in the course of meeting with Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of Security Council of Russia in Moscow on November 9.
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Formal peace treaty with Japan is a clear anachronism. The state of war between our countries stopped 62 years ago. All agreements necessary for the development of normal good-neighborly relations, including economic ones, have been concluded. At the same time, Japanese business is not subject to Tokyo politicians and diplomats. The business has its own interests - profit, and economic cooperation with Japan is possible on the basis of mutual benefit independently from political requirements and references to the past. Any concessions to the Japanese territorial claims or promises of those in the future will encourage certain forces in Japan, which are claiming not only the islands of the Lesser Kuril Chain, but also the entire Kurile Archipelago, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin. Any peace treaty with Japan does not make sense. It is also necessary to note one important international legal circumstance of the possible transfer of the South Kurile Islands to Japan. According to the Article 26 of the San-Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, «Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942… which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty» [5, pp. 357]. It is known that Soviet Union is not a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. And according to the Article 2 of the Treaty Japan renounced all rights to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin with the adjacent islands, but not in favor of any specific country. Therefore, if a bilateral peace treaty between Russia and Japan is signed with recognizing Russia's sovereignty over the Kurile Islands (except for some areas in the south of the Kuril chain) and South Sakhalin, the Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty quoted above will automatically come into effect and territorial acquisition of the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin by Russia will be extended to all parties to this agreement with the exception of Japan. Therefore, these territories will be declared jointly owned (condominium) by 48
99 countries that signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty (with the exception of Japan), and Russia, which signed the peace treaty with Japan more than 73 years after the end of the war. These countries are Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Great Britain, Venezuela, Vietnam, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Greece, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Cambodia, Colombia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Laos, Liberia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United States of America, Turkey, the Republic of the Philippines, Ceylon, France, Chile, Uruguay, Equador, Ephiopia, South African Republic [5, pp. 358–359]. The ways of many countries of this group diverged after the World War II. At the same time, many of them would want to have their piece of land on the islands in the northwestern Pacific, establish trading stations and bases there, use the resources of the islands and adjacent 200-mile economic zone and continental shelf. The territories of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, which are currently Russian de facto, will become territories under international control de jure. From the point of international law condominium is a territory over which two or more states exercise governmental authority. From the point of practice of international relations, condominium is considered as a temporary, transitional form of exercising state sovereignty over a particular territory until this issue is resolved in its final form [6]. This international legal conflict must be borne in mind when negotiating with Japan on "territorial issue". International legal position of that part of the Kurile Islands in the south of the archipelago, which Russia would agree to “return” to Japan under Russian-Japanese peace treaty and which would cease to be Russian de facto, would become the subject of special international conference of the parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, there would be no participation of Russia, since the USSR did not sign this treaty, and the document itself is closed for signing. These territories would become "ownerless", and their future would be determined by 48 countries that had signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty (with the exception of Japan, which, according to the Article 2 of the Treaty, renounced "all right, title and claim" to them). Subsequently, according to the Article 22 of the Treaty, «if in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has
100 arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice» [5, p. 355]. Apparently, the discussion will deal with international legal regime of a condominium. Therefore, Japan will get nothing in this situation. After all, the San Francisco Peace Treaty is a valid and permanent international treaty. Japan renounced its rights to Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin with the adjacent islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but it did not name the country - new owner of these territories. As a result, from the point of view of the formal norms of international law, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin are in a legal vacuum and ownerless. The main co-author of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the United States of America, planned this situation for the future. Indeed, there are no bad lawyers, politicians, and diplomats in service and any giveaway in foreign policy in the Western world. The United States themselves would like to own the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin, initially at least under the conditions of the condominium or under international trusteeship. And the current situation was forecasted and planned by American lawyers and politicians in the post-war period. Moreover, American "allies" laid many mines and pitfalls on this path of international politics that must be kept in mind. In an effort to legally confuse the territorial issue, the United States achieved non-inclusion of article concerning transfer of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union into the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, as it was fixed by Yalta “Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East”, with the US and GB guarantees, subject to the entry of the Soviet Union on the side of the Allies in the war against Japan and after defeating it [7]. As a result, the USSR did not sign this treaty. Japan has no rights either to South Sakhalin or to the Kurile Islands in accordance with Article 2c of the San Francisco Peace Treaty [5, p. 338–339]. However, it is necessary to agree with such a legal position that the formally specified territories were not acquired by the USSR (Russia) as well, that is, the legal title of Russia to them was not completed, since this issue was not settled in the treaty
101 international legal order. On the other hand, Russia cannot negotiate the finalization of title to these territories with Japan, since it is expressly prohibited for Japan by Articles 2c and 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia also cannot join the San Francisco Peace Treaty by signing and ratifying it, since the treaty has entered into force and is closed for signature. Moreover, accession to this treaty does not mean that Russia will be granted legal rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles, since it is not provided for by the treaty itself. As for the right of Japan «to conclude a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty» with any state «which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty», «this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty». This obligation on the part of Japan expired in 1955 and in 1956, according to Article 1 of the joint declaration of the USSR and Japan, the state of war between the USSR and Japan was terminated once this declaration entered into force and “peace and good-neighborly friendly relations were restored between them”. Consequently, this solution of the “territorial problem” also disappears. There is a kind of stalemate, a legal impasse that cannot be resolved within the framework of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This problem could be solved by amending relevant articles of the San Francisco Treaty, which is hardly possible, since such a procedure is not provided by this document, and the treaty itself is valid and permanent. However, it should be kept in mind that Russia as a part and successor of the USSR owns South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, although not de jure, but de facto, while effectively occupying these territories. At the same time, Japan, under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, renounced these territories completely and finally. However, in customary international law there is a principle: long-term and permanent effective occupation (availability of existing institutions and public authorities, permanent and economically active population in the territory, its economic development) of a territory conquered by force of arms leads to the transition of a given territory to its new owner, even without a peace treaty, if the previous owner renounced right to it [8]. Consequently, long-term de facto ownership of these
102 territories since 1945 (more than 40 years for South Sakhalin, more than 70 years for the Northern Kuriles and more than 90 years for the Southern Kuriles) results in securing Russia's rights to them in accordance with the customary international law norms and the state border between Russia and Japan in this case acquires the status of rather historically established border than contractual one. Time works for Russia. However, the transfer of the islands of the Lesser Kurile Chain to Japan in accordance with the Declaration of 1956 is possible, but after fulfillment of indispensable precondition – removal of foreign military bases and foreign military presence on Japanese territory in any form and transformation of Japan into neutral, friendly state in relation to Russia. In this case all the requirements of internal constitutional legislation relating to the change of the territory of Russia should be complied with. According to Paragraph 8 of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR of June 12, 1990, “the territory of the RSFSR cannot be changed without the will of the people, expressed through a referendum” [9]. Therefore, for the transfer of the South Kuril Islands to Japan, the Kuril and South Kurile district local referendums should be carried out, as well as the Sakhalin regional referendum and All-Russian referendum.
REFERENCES 1. The global game of Shinzo Abe: following the entourage of the Prime Minister of Japan in Sochi, RISS / Глобальная игра Синдзо Абэ: по следам визита Премьер- министра Японии в Сочи / РИСИ, URL: http://riss.ru/analitycs/30226/, 10.06.2016 2. On the termination of the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR dated January 22, 1955 / Vedomosti of Supreme Council of the USSR. 1955. № 2. Art. 34 / «О прекращении состояния войны между Советским Союзом и Германией», Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР от 22 января 1955 г. // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР. 1955. № 2, ст. 34. 3. Joint Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan // Pravda, 1956, Oct. 20 No. 294, p.1 /
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Совместная Декларация Союза Советских Социалистических Республик и Японии, «Правда», 1956, 20 октября, № 294, с. 1. 4. Speech by Alexander A. Gromyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at the conference in San Francisco on September 5, 1951, Pravda, 1951, September 7th / Выступление первого заместителя министра иностранных дел СССР А. А. Громыко на конференции в Сан-Франциско 5 сентября 1951 года, «Правда», 1951, 7 сентября 5. History of the Pacific war (in five volumes), vol. 5, Peace treaty, M.: Publishing house of foreign literature, 1958, 508 p. / История войны на Тихом океане (в пяти томах). т.5, Мирный договор, M.: Изд-во иностр. литературы, 1958. 508 с. 6. Condominium // Diplomatic Dictionary: In 3 volumes. 4th ed., edited and added, vol. II. M .: Science, 1985. p. 75 / Кондоминиум, «Дипломатический словарь», в 3-х т., 4-е изд., перераб. и доп. Т. II. М.: «Наука», 1985, c. 75 7. Crimean Agreement of the Three Great Powers on the Far East, Pravda, 1946, February 13, № 37, p. 1 / Крымское Соглашение Трех Великих Держав по вопросам Дальнего Востока, «Правда», 1946, 13 февраля, № 37, с. 1. 8. Fedross A. International law. M., 1959 / Федросс А. Международное право. М., 1959 9. Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Vedomosti Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, 1990, June 14th, № 2, Art. 22. p. 45 / Декларация о государственном суверенитете Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики, Ведомости Съезда народных депутатов РСФСР и Верховного Совета РСФСР, 1990, 14 июня, № 2, ст. 22. с. 45 10. Tkachenko B.I. The Kuril problem: history, law, politics and economics, Vladivostok: Maritime State Univ., 2009, 312 p. / Ткаченко Б.И. Курильская проблема: история, право, политика и экономика. Владивосток: Морской гос. ун-т, 2009. 312 с.
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CONTRIBUTORS
Alexander A. Dyda – DSc. (technical sciences), since 2003, full Professor of Department of Automatic & Information Systems and head of the laboratory of Nonlinear & Intelligent Control Systems, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Main fields of scientific interests: technical cybernetics, informatics, mathematics. Author of research works concerning adaptive and neural network control and neural network control systems for complex dynamical objects and underwater robots. Phone: +7 924 2428420, e-mail: [email protected]
Elena B. Osokina – PhD in technical sciences, associate professor of the electronic and microprocessor technics department, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Phone: +7-924- 5250115, e-mail: [email protected]
Elena P. Chinchukova – principal lecturer of the theoretical mechanic and strength of materials department, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Phone: +7 914 7084129, e-mail: [email protected].
Natalia G. Levchenko – Ph.D.(Technical Sciences), Associate professor of Automated and Information systems Department, Science secretary of the Dissertation Council of Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, postgraduate research fellow. Author of more than 20 publications in the fields of information systems technology in maritime industry, neural network&fuzzy logic technology, mathematical modeling systems. Phone: +7(423) 230- 12-42. E-mail: [email protected]
Sergei V.Glushkov – D.Sc (Technical Sciences), professor, Head of Electric Engineering Department of Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. E-mail: [email protected]
Evgeniya Yu.Sobolevskaya – Senior tutor in Vladivostok State University of Economics and Services. E-mail: [email protected]
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Saangkyun Yi – Ph.D (Geography and education), Research Fellow at the Northeast Asian History Foundation in Seoul. Research interests: historical geography, geographical education curriculum, history of school geography, French geographical education. He is the author of many publications in various directions of geographical sciences. E-mail: Saangkyun YI [email protected], tlph. +82(02) 2012-6087
Nikolai I.Pereslavtsev – researcher, Head of information and analysis bureu, Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Main areas of research: situation on Korean Peninsula and neighboring countries, the influence of this factor on Russia’s plans and interests, problems of international maritime cooperation and interaction in the Far East. Author of more than 15 published articles and studies on these topics, E-mail: [email protected]
Valentin V.Sergienko – fellow-researcher in the Center for investigations of marine accidents and incidents, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. As a labor veteran and honorary worker of the Russian Fleet he has 25 years of trouble-free operations in the position of deep-sea captain in the Far Eastern Shipping Company, for which he was awarded professional badge and got several awards. Also he has 14 years of working experience as a senior pilot, both abroad and in Vladivostok seaport, rich experience in ice navigation. E-mail: [email protected], tlph: +79149704876
Sergei M. Smirnov – Ph.D (technical Sciences), Director of International Department, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Scientific interests: maritime and regional security, Arctic exploration, transport and logistics, international education. He is the author of about 50 publications, including 4 monographs. E-mail: [email protected], phone: +7-9242394924.
Anastasia O.Barannikova – Ph.D (history), researcher in the Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Main scientific interests: all aspects of interactions among the Asia-Pacific countries, Russian Far East in the system of Russian national interests. She has many publications about
106 these issues, especially about the questions of political and military situation in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. E-mail: [email protected], phone: +7-9242414737
Peter Yu.Samoylenko – Ph.D (political sciences), Associate professor, Department of public relations and advertising, School of Humanities of Far Eastern Federal University. An expert in Asia- Pacific Studies Center, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Scientific interests: international processes in Asia-Pacific, information security and international relations, problems of security and transparency on Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and modern trends of foreign relations. E-mail: [email protected]
Sergei A. Ponomarev - Chairman of the Sakhalin Regional Branch of Russian Geographic Society. Senior research fellow at the Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Author of 350 scientific and media publications. Former vice-chairman of Sakhalin Regional Duma (Parliament). Participated in the Constitutional Convent of Russian Federation in 1993 which developed the acting Constitution. E-mail: [email protected], tlph: +79147586295
Boris I. Tkachenko – Ph.D. (Economic Sciences), Arsenyev Prize laureate, Principal Researcher of the Center for Maritime International Studies, Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University. Author of more than 460 scientific works, including 15 individual monographs in such areas of research as international relations, economy and organization of science and modern Russian political science. He is a member of Association de Comptabilite Nationale (France), Russian Geographical Society and Russian Association of International Studies. Phone: +7(423)2-301-275. E-mail: [email protected]
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ARTICLE ABSTRACTS IN RUSSIAN Аннотации и ключевые слова
Дыда, Александр Александрович; Осокина, Елена Борисовна; Чинчукова Елена Павловна Алгоритм идентификации параметров судна методом скоростного градиента
Основу построения системы управления судна представляет его математическая модель. Известны различные линейные и нелинейные модели движения судна по курсу. Применение линейных моделей объясняется простотой их практического использования. Однако, нелинейные модели часто боле адекватны для представления динамики судна и, как результат, обеспечивают более корректное проектирование системы управления судна. В статье для описания нелинейности, представляющей момент сил вязкого сопротивления, предложено использование степенных рядов как функций угловой скорости. Основная идея состоит в разработке алгоритма настройки коэффициентов рядов, которые описывают нелинейности в модели судна. Теоретической базой исследования является метод скоростного градиента. Для иллюстрации подхода даны 4 линейных и нелинейных модели судна. Ключевые слова: управление судном, линейные и нелинейные модели судна, степенные ряды, параметрическая идентификация, метод скоростного градиента, алгоритмы адаптации, численный эксперимент. Левченко, Наталья Георгиевна; Соболевская, Евгения Юрьевна; Глушков, Сергей Витальевич Разработка интеллекутальной системы управления арктическими и субарктическими мосркими перевозками
Проведен анализ программных средств, предназначенных для управления процессами морских грузоперевозок. Выявлен ряд недостатков в существующем программном обеспечении, используемом для организации работы в специфических районах плавания, таких как Северный морской путь: отсутствие систем поддержки принятия решения, отсутствие анализа для расчета
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времени и стоимости доставки груза. Разработана архитектура интеллектуальной системы организации морских грузоперевозок с учетом сложных условий плавания в Арктике. Разработаны архитектуры двух модулей: расчет стоимости морских грузоперевозок; расчет и анализ безопасного и более быстрого маршрута в зависимости от месяца (времени года). Рассмотрен процесс имитационного моделирования, основу которого составляют методы искусственного интеллекта – нейронная сеть, экспертные системы, математический аппарат нечеткой логики. Архитектура интеллектуальной системы организации морских грузоперевозок при удачной реализации позволит: предоставить руководящему составу судоходной компании прогнозную аналитику; осуществить поддержку принятия решения; проводить мониторинг процесса перевозки груза в режиме реального времени; проводить схемы расчетов эффективного использования ледоколов; производить расчет оптимального пути доставки; предоставлять по требованию онлайн прогноз процесса перевозки на определенный момент времени, минимизировать стоимость доставки груза, время задержки в пути, риски по сохранности груза. Ключевые слова: морские грузоперевозки, Северный морской путь, Арктика, интеллектуальные системы управления, имитационное моделирование.
И Сан Гюн; Ким Ён Хун Тенденции обозначения морских имен и аспекты их распространения в странах Содружества и во франкоязычных СМИ – вопрос о морском пространстве между Кореей и Японией
Предыдущие исследования, касавшиеся отображения Восточного/Японского моря, были сосредоточены, главным образом, на картографических аспектах. Однако, в академических кругах Кореи с недавних пор пробудился интерес к работе масс-медиа, относительно автономной и динамичной, касательно проблем картографии и географических названий. Целью данной статьи является, поэтому получение выводов: - о текущем состоянии и путях распространения присвоенных наименований в различных языковых регионах;
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- о предпочтениях в отношении наименования «Восточное море» в зависимости от каждого региона, об особенностях присвоения наименований в перекрывающих друг друга языковых регионах, на примере стран Британского Содружества и во франкоязычных СМИ. В качестве результата приводится заключение о предпочтениях в отношении названия «Восточное море», которые различаются по районам даже в одном языковом регионе. Также отмечено, что в районах пересечения различных языковых регионов заметны признаки предпочтения в употребления СМИ одного региона методов присвоения названий, принятых в крупных СМИ другого языкового региона. Ключевые слова: Восточное море, Японское море, морские наименования, средства массовой информации, Содружество, франкофоны, тенденции обозначения, аспекты распространения
Переславцев, Николай Иванович Содержание и задачи политики России в Арктике на примере сотрудничества в ее освоении с Республикой Корея
Автор конкретизирует и анализирует в статье с собственных позиций некоторые аспекты российско- южнокорейского сотрудничества и политики РК по использованию Северного морского пути. Опуская многократно описанные другими авторами и исследователями детали, он указывает на геополитическое и экономическое значение указанного региона и намечает возможные точки соприкосновения между Москвой и Сеулом. При этом подчеркивается, что их желательно закрепить в юридическом порядке в интересах обоих партнеров. Ключевые слова: Арктика, Россия, Южная Корея, ледокольное сопровождение, Северный морской путь
Сергиенко, Валентин Васильевич О возможности сооружения мостового перехода между материком и островом Сахалин Автор – заслуженный ветеран труда, капитан дальнего плавания и лоцман с многолетним опытом навигации, в том
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числе, в полярных широтах. Хорошо знаком с Сахалином, так как долгое время жил там. Являлся ключевой экспертной фигурой при осуществлении проекта строительства моста на остров Русский во Владивостоке в 2008-2012 гг. На основе своего опыта и обширных знаний он высказывает личное мнение о возможности возведения транспортного перехода между материком и островом Сахалин, указывает на имеющиеся препятствия и вероятные пути их преодоления. Тема представляет интерес в связи с ведущимся в экономических и общественных кругах ее обсуждением, в том числе с точки зрения полезности для интересов России на Дальнем Востоке. Ключевые слова: пролив Невельского, Сахалин, туннель, мост, Татарский пролив, циклон, мыс Лазарева
Баранникова, Анастасия Олеговна Спящие территориальные споры Китая: вызовы для соседей
Статья анализирует проблему «спящих» территориальных споров Китая с соседними странами. Переоценка роли и интенсификация его внешнеполитической стратегии оказывают значительное влияние на формирование китайского подхода к решению территориальных споров. От этого могут возникать вызовы не только для стран, в настоящий момент имеющих территориальные проблемы с Китаем, но также для тех, чьи споры считаются уже урегулированными. Keywords: Китай, спящие территориальные споры, неустановленные границы, внешняя политика, безопасность
Переславцев, Николай Иванович Корейско-японский спор вокруг островов Лианкур и позиция России
Автор рассматривает и анализирует современную ситуацию в территориальном споре между Кореей и Японией вокруг островов Лианкур (Токто/Такесима). Статья продолжает более детальные материалы по вышеуказанной теме с историческим обзором проблем и направлений ее возможного решения, которые были опубликованы в журнале “Asia-Pacific
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Journal of Marine Science&Education”, том 5, № 1, 2015, том.6, № 1, 2016. Объективный анализ показывает, что аргументы корейской стороны в данном споре могут быть названными более весомыми и обоснованными. Говоря в общем, ситуация вокруг Лианкура и позиция по этому поводу Республики Корея весьма схожи с некоторыми проблемами, стоящими перед Россией, например, с территориальным спором с Японией вокруг Южно-Курильских островов. Поэтому, следовало бы подумать o том, не создает ли это основу для расширения традиционного политического и экономического сотрудничества между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Корея? В частности, наши страны могли бы взаимодействовать в вопросах международной безопасности, например, по установлению демилитаризованного статуса Японского моря или, по крайней мере, по ограничению опасной военной активности в данном регионе. Ключевые слова: территориальный спор, Токто, Такэсима, острова Лианкур, Корея, Япония, Российская Федерация
Пономарев, Сергей Алексеевич Курильские острова – правовое регулирование и работа по присвоению названий
Курильский архипелаг все еще является одним из наименее исследованных российских регионов. Даже количество островов и островков, входящих в его состав, до сих пор должным образом не подсчитано и более половины из них не имеют географических названий. Добровольные усилия граждан Сахалина при поддержке региональных властей призваны изменить ситуацию к лучшему. Keywords: Курильский архипелаг, Сахалинская региональная хартия, экспедиции по наименованию, территориальные притязания
Самойленко, Петр Юрьевич Российско-японское экономическое сотрудничество на Дальнем Востоке как основа для решения территориальных противоречий и роль СМИ
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В статье рассматриваются проблемы современных российско-японских отношений. В рамках материала исследуются возможные новые пути сотрудничества двух стран, которые выходят за пределы традиционной риторики обсуждения проблемы «северных территорий». Автор предлагает использовать стратегию взаимных интересов – то есть развитие отношений между Россией и Японией на основании тех общих интересов, которые есть у двух стран. Это, прежде всего, совместные экономические проекты, требующие соответствующей информационной поддержки. Таким образом, Россия и Япония могут помочь друг другу, используя свои сильные стороны и, соответственно, дополняя противоположную сторону в двухсторонних отношениях. Одной из «площадок» для такого диалога могут быть Дальний Восток России, а также реализуемые в этом регионе и ориентированные на иностранный капитал проекты так называемого «Восточного вектора» - «порто-франко», территории опережающего развития (ТОРы) и другие. Ключевые слова: Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион, Северо- Восточная Азия, Россия, Япония, территориальные споры, внешнеэкономическое сотрудничество, российско-японские отношения, территории опережающего развития, порто-франко, взаимные интересы, средства массовой информации
Ткаченко, Борис Иванович Международно-правовые проблемы на пути заключения мирного договора России с Японией
В статье анализируются международно-правовые аспекты проблемы территориального спора между Россией и Японией в связи с претензиями Япония на российские Южно-Курильские острова и возможным заключением мирного договора. Показано, что Советско-японская совместная декларация 1956 года по своему содержанию аналогична мирному договору. Рассмотрен Сан-Францисский мирный договор 1951 года и показаны международно-правовые последствия в случае передачи Южно- Курильских островов Японии.
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Ключевые слова: Российская Федерация, Япония, Курильские острова, Вторая мировая война, Сан-Францисский мирный договор 1951 года, Советско-японская совместная декларация 1956 года, территориальная проблема, мирный договор, международное право.
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Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine Science & Education (Журнал о морской науке и образовании в АТР)
VOLUME 8, No. 1, December 2018
ISSN 2221-9935 (Print) ISSN 2306-8000 (Online)
Signed for printing December 14, 2018/ Подписано в печать 14 декабря 2018 г.
Registered with the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications. Registration certificate ПИ № ФС 77-44105 of March 09, 2011
Зарегистрировано Федеральной службой по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций Свидетельство о регистрации ПИ № ФС 77-44105 от 9 марта 2011 г.
Executive Editor Nikolai. I.Pereslavtsev/ Исполнительный редактор Н.И.Переславцев
Founded and published two times a year by Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University/ Учрежден и публикуется два раза в год Морским Государственным Университетом имени адм. Г.И.Невельского
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