Sakhalin's Governors and the South Kuril Islands : Motivating Factors Behind Involvement in the Russo-Japanese Title Territorial Dispute

Home , Sakhalin, Sakhalin Oblast

Author(s) Williams, Brad

Citation Acta Slavica Iaponica, 22, 299-310

Issue Date 2005

Doc URL http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39451

Type bulletin (article)

Note Research Notes

File Information ASI22_013.pdf

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Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers : HUSCAP ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA, TOMUS 22, PP. 299-310

Research Notes

SAKHALIN’S GOVERNORS AND THE SOUTH KURIL ISLANDS: MOTIVATING FACTORS BEHIND INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSSO- JAPANESE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

BRAD WILLIAMS

In the former Soviet Union, foreign poli- the South Kuril Islands and, in the process, cy decisions were largely made at the dis- remove a perceived key obstacle to Russian cretion of the General Secretary of the Com- territorial concessions. munist Party, with some input from other Politburo members. Generally speaking, THE FIRST GOVERNOR: VALENTIN public opinion and pressure were not im- FEDOROV portant factors in the policy making process.1 However, with the introduction and The emerging salience of the “Sakhalin advancement of political liberalization in syndrome” became synonymous with the Russia, the leadership increasingly began thoughts and actions of one individual – to depend on public support in both the Valentin Petrovich Fedorov – the first Gov- domestic and foreign policy spheres. This ernor of Sakhalin. Fedorov came to Sakha- introduced a limiting effect on the govern- lin with the aim of turning the island into ment’s ability to set foreign policy goals and “an experiment for market reforms.” He implement these decisions. Pressure from was elected as a member of the Russian domestic forces, in particular, has prevent- Congress of People’s Deputies on 18 March ed the leadership from making concessions 1990.3 The following month he was elected to Japan over the disputed South Kuril Is- chair of the oblast Soviet Executive Commit- lands/Northern Territories. Prominent tee (Ispolkom). He was initially seen as a amongst these domestic forces is the posi- radical reformer in the economic field with tion of the Sakhalin leadership and local a particularly keen eye on developing rela- public opinion regarding the territorial dis- tions with the neighboring Japanese island pute: the “Sakhalin factor.”2 of Hokkaido. The local Hokkaidô Shimbun This article examines the first element even called Fedorov “Sakhalin’s Yeltsin.”4 of the “Sakhalin factor”: Sakhalin’s gover- The important question for those involved nors, and elucidates their relationship with in the Japanese movement for the return of the aforementioned territorial dispute. The the Northern Territories was whether Fe- article explores the underlying motives be- dorov’s “radical” views would be limited hind their attempts to intervene in bilateral to economics or if they would apply to the territorial negotiations. It argues that, a political sphere as well.5 genuine desire to maintain Russia’s terri- This question was soon answered in Fe- torial integrity notwithstanding, a signifi- dorov’s controversial proposal of a “Fourth cant reason behind this involvement lies in Way” (chetvertyi put’) to resolve the territo- the Sakhalin governors’ perception of the rial dispute with Japan. The plan, an- territorial dispute as an important weapon nounced whilst he was on a visit to Hok- to be exploited for political and economic kaido in August 1990 at the invitation of gain. municipal authorities in Wakkanai, called The disputed islands’ value for Sakha- for turning the four disputed islands, along lin’s governors escalated as a result of Rus- with Sakhalin and the northern part of Hok- sia’s troubled attempts at state-building, kaido, into a free economic zone and de- which facilitated center-periphery bargain- veloping them jointly with Japan.6 It was ing and the struggle for power between the initially hoped that the establishment of a executive and legislative branches of gov- free trade zone would lead to an influx of ernment throughout the country. The per- foreign, mainly Japanese, capital, which ceived gains derived from exploiting the would improve the regional economy and, territorial dispute have reduced the effica- as a result, strengthen Russia’s control over cy of Japanese policies designed to allevi- the islands.7 The proposal was unaccept- ate Sakhalin governors’ hardline stance on able to the Japanese as it called for the is-

299 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA lands to remain under Soviet sovereignty. be cognizant of and responsive to any pro- Fedorov was critical of the “Third Way” of posals put forward by his political rivals resolving the territorial dispute, put for- regarding the South Kuril Islands. As will ward by Aleksandr Iakovlev, a Central be discussed shortly, Fedorov’s less than Committee secretary and one of the archi- comprehensive victory in the March 1990 tects of perestroika, during a visit to Japan in elections to the Russian Congress of Peo- November 1989. The “Third Way” was not ple’s Deputies heightened his awareness of a choice between returning the four islands the territorial dispute’s political value. (“Second Way”) or a continuation of the Having had his “Fourth Way” proposal status quo (no islands or “First Way”), but rejected by Moscow and Tokyo, Fedorov called for both sides to reach a compromise launched a vocal campaign aimed at main- – either selling the islands to Japan or joint taining Russian sovereignty over the South administration. Fedorov, on the other hand, Kuril Islands. Some of his more notable acts stressed that a lesson must be learnt from included cutting short a visit to Japan in Tsarist Russia’s sale of Alaska (to the Unit- April 1991 in protest at what he believed ed States in 1867 for $7.2 million), which was Mikhail Gorbachev’s overly concilia- brought Russia little economically and also tory response to Japanese territorial de- no peace with the United States. Accord- mands; threats to create a Far Eastern Re- ing to Fedorov, if Russia were to receive public should the Soviet Union transfer the billions of dollars from Japan for the islands, disputed islands to Japan; a plan to estab- “that would be a drop of freshwater in the lish Cossack settlements on the islands; the saltwater sea of our problems. Our ineffi- announcement in September 1992 that a cient system will consume the money, and Hong Kong company, Carlson-Kaplan, had in a couple of years Russia will have nei- signed a US$7.8 million contract with the ther money nor islands.”8 regional administration to build a resort Fedorov’s “Fourth Way” proposal was and casino complex on Shikotan Island; unique and certainly contrary to the com- threats that “patriots will overthrow the mon practice of Soviet regional elites toe- government and block the return [of the is- ing the party line and refraining from be- lands]” should Yeltsin accede to Japan’s ter- coming involved in foreign policy matters, ritorial demands; and extensive lobbying of and particularly issues of territorial sover- the Kremlin and other regions in the Rus- eignty. Fedorov’s initial – and as it turned sian Far East. out not the last – foray into a policy-area Fedorov’s opposition to Yeltsin’s pro- commonly perceived as the state’s exclusive posed visit to Japan and other attempts to preserve may well have been a politically complicate Russian policy towards Japan calculated move. Kimura Hiroshi, an ex- regarding the territorial dispute contrast- pert on Japanese-Soviet/Russian relations, ed with the position of the chairman of the suggests that Fedorov made this proposal Sakhalin People’s Deputies Council, Ana- in response to one by his rival Vitalii Gulii, tolii Aksenov. In the early post-Soviet pe- a journalist and member of the USSR Con- riod, many regions had become arenas in gress of People’s Deputies representing the struggle for power between Yeltsin-ap- South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which pointed executives (Heads of Administra- called for joint management of the islands tion or glava administratsii) and the regional in order to create a favorable environment legislatures. Perceptions of popular legiti- for resolving the territorial dispute.9 Gulii macy were at the root of this conflict. The even went as far to say that both the Soviet regional legislatures believed they had been Union and Japan had a strong legal case to given popular mandates as a result of the the disputed islands.10 Gulii’s political cre- 1990 elections, whereas they viewed the dentials were earlier boosted by winning a glava administratsii less favorably. Their landslide victory over the oblast’s First Sec- power derived from Moscow’s or, more retary V. Bondarchuk11 in local elections in precisely, Yeltsin’s fiat. Whilst Fedorov was 1989, running on a platform of creating a trying to arouse local opposition to any ter- “salmon-trout kingdom,” which opposed ritorial concessions and refused to partici- the unchecked development of Sakhalin. pate in any discussions where Russian ju- Gulii reportedly received 90% of the vote risdiction over the South Kurils was ques- on the disputed islands.12 Yeltsin later ap- tioned, Aksenov, on the other hand, dis- pointed him as presidential representative played a willingness to cooperate with cen- (predstavitel’ prezidenta) for Sakhalin.13 As a tral authorities. After visiting the Tatar politician, it was necessary for Fedorov to Republic in July 1992 for a meeting of re-

300 RESEARCH NOTES gional parliamentary leaders hosted by the ki, the acting LDP Secretary-General, who Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, was often dispatched abroad to conduct Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aksenov traveled on delicate diplomatic assignments, the dele- to Moscow to participate in the Burbulis gation’s primary purpose was to change Commission (chaired by the then-State Sec- Aksenov’s position regarding the territori- retary and former First Deputy Prime Min- al dispute, thereby neutralizing the Sakha- ister Gennadii Burbulis) that was prepar- lin administration’s negative pressure upon ing for Yeltsin’s visit to Japan.14 Gorbachev in the leadup to the Soviet-Jap- Signs began to emerge of a difference of anese summit in April 1991.18 Fedorov’s opinion amongst the Sakhalin leadership re- actions during and after Gorbachev’s visit garding the South Kuril problem. This was to Japan, however, suggest the delegation highlighted in an interview Fedorov and was unable to achieve its objective. Aksenov gave to the Hokkaidô Shimbun in Astrid Tuminez argues that elites, in Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk after Fedorov’s tour of general, are likely to resort to the use of the disputed islands. In the interview Fe- nationalistic propaganda if they believe dorov repeated earlier assertions that a ter- there are benefits to be derived from such ritorial problem did not exist in Russia, an undertaking.19 Before arriving on Sakha- which was reminiscent of the Soviet attitude lin with a pledge to carry out a “market during the Brezhnev period, and also that experiment,” Fedorov gave few indications the 1960 Gromyko memorandum had put of the vitriolic, nationalistic campaign upon an end to any discussions regarding the which he was about to embark. Indeed, the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. Akse- first item of Fedorov’s five-point proposal nov disagreed, declaring that the territori- to conduct an “experiment” on Sakhalin al problem did exist and if a special deci- called for all state authority, except in the sion was given concerning the Joint Decla- areas of diplomacy and defense (emphasis add- ration, the territorial problem could be re- ed), to be transferred to Sakhalin.20 More- solved.15 However, he did not explain what over, Fedorov was reported to have pro- such a “special” decision would entail. As posed the islands’ partial return at an eco- will be discussed shortly, if any difference nomic forum held in Tokyo in January of opinion between the regional executive 1991.21 This suggests that at this stage Fe- and legislative branches regarding the ter- dorov was not cognizant of the perceived ritorial dispute existed at this time, it would gains to be made by exploiting the territo- soon disappear. Both branches of govern- rial dispute. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ment are now vehemently opposed to Rus- argue that he was not a sincere patriot deep- sia transferring the South Kuril Islands to ly committed to maintaining Russian terri- Japan. torial integrity. It was previously noted that It has been suggested that Aksenov, seen Fedorov certainly went to extreme lengths by many as a reformer, was attempting to to display his patriotic credentials, which, gather the support of anti-Fedorov depu- in effect, led to a de facto localization of dip- ties in the regional legislature to put an end lomatic channels and complicated Soviet to the governor’s recklessness and strength- and later Russian policy towards Japan vis- en his own power base.16 Aksenov was thus à-vis the Northern Territories problem.22 trying to distance himself from Fedorov’s He was even a member of the People’s Pa- hardline position and present himself as a triotic Party (Narodno-patrioticheskaia parti- reasonable and rational alternative to the ia).23 fiery Sakhalin Governor. The South Kurils At the same time, however, there also issue was becoming a tool in the political appear to be economic and political consid- struggle in Sakhalin. Later, however, Ak- erations underpinning his campaign to senov, perhaps sensing the prevailing po- maintain Russian sovereignty over the litical current in the region, was not pre- South Kuril Islands. According to Iakov pared to go any further than to recognize Zinberg, Fedorov initially began opposing the existence of the territorial dispute, Moscow on purely economic grounds.24 agreeing that Yeltsin should not hurry a Upon arriving in Sakhalin, Fedorov began resolution.17 Aksenov’s position within the calling for more economic autonomy from Sakhalin leadership did not go unnoticed Moscow. In order to implement his plan to in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party develop the South Kurils economy, it was (LDP). In March 1991, the LDP dispatched vitally important to control the islands and a four-member delegation to Sakhalin to subsequently the rich fishing grounds lo- meet with Aksenov. Led by Satô Takayu- cated in their exclusive economic zone

301 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA

(EEZ). The prospect of returning the islands opportunity for Fedorov to exploit. to Japan has raised fears that the inevitable Fedorov’s outspoken criticism of the increase in Japanese fishing activities in the government’s economic reform program, South Kurils EEZ would result in a reduced his interference in territorial negotiations catch for local fishers. with Japan and, perhaps most important- With the failure of his “experiment” to ly, the failure of his own “experiment” with deliver the promised results and the eco- the Sakhalin economy led to calls from nomic crisis that had befallen the island, within and outside the region for his dis- Fedorov came under increasing attack from missal. Whether he was compelled to or his political opponents in the regional leg- not is unclear, but on 2 April 1993 Valentin islature and from Moscow.25 Stirring up Fedorov resigned.30 Yeltsin nominated Yev- nationalist opposition to a transfer of the genii Krasnoiarov, the general manager of disputed islands to Japan thus became a the Russo-Japanese fisheries joint venture, convenient tool to divert attention from Pilenga Gôdô, as Fedorov’s successor. Fedorov’s failing economic program and to strengthen his political position vis-à-vis his THE SECOND GOVERNOR: YEVGENII local and federal opponents. As mentioned KRASNOIAROV previously, Fedorov was elected by his peers in the regional soviet as chairman of the oblast Krasnoiarov was initially known as Ispolkom in April 1991. Boris Yeltsin later someone who avoided political struggles appointed him to the post of glava adminis- and, generally speaking, his brief tenure as tratsii in October 1991 – thus essentially trans- Governor of Sakhalin was not particularly forming Fedorov from an elected official into significant – at least as far as trying to com- an appointed one. As a result, he became plicate Russo-Japanese territorial negotia- vulnerable to dismissal by the capricious tions. Russian President who, throughout his pe- Unlike his predecessor, Valentin Fedor- riod of office, would display a proclivity for ov, Krasnoiarov admitted the territorial dis- sacking political appointees. pute existed, but ruled out transferring the Moreover, although Fedorov was elect- islands to Japan until the domestic econo- ed as one of Sakhalin’s five deputies to the my stabilized and there was parity in Rus- Russian Congress of People’s Deputies in so-Japanese living standards.31 Krasnoiar- March 1990 – his only opportunity to re- ov made grandiose plans to establish a ceive a direct mandate from the people – South Kurils Investment Bank which, not the election result was not entirely clear-cut. surprisingly, failed to get off the ground due As Iakov Zinberg notes, Fedorov only fin- to insufficient capital and, in December ished second out of nine candidates in the 1994, tried to strengthen Sakhalin’s control first round of voting, receiving 12.57% of of the South Kurils by reorganizing the re- the votes, compared with Bok Zi Kou, an gional government’s administrative system economics professor of Korean descent at so that all the Kurils were to come under a the Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk Pedagogical Insti- newly created Department of the Kurils.32 tute, who received 17.65%.26 Although Fe- Krasnoiarov also demonstrated that, when dorov was victorious in the run-off, he re- necessary, he could play the role of defend- portedly did not obtain an absolute major- er of regional interests. Concern over an ity and only finished nine points clear of escalation in “illegal” Japanese fishing in his challenger Bok.27 It is worth noting that the disputed islands’ EEZ led to the estab- during the election campaign to the Rus- lishment of a five-kilometer security zone sian Congress, the territorial problem was along the maritime border in January 1994. hardly raised. Fedorov mostly emphasized He also tightened foreign access to the area the economic reform program he had and expressed support for the continued planned for Sakhalin, whilst Bok Zi Kou deployment of Russian forces on Sakhalin spoke of “sincerely hoping for the devel- and the South Kurils later the same month.33 opment of the homeland.”28 The reason As far as the South Kurils are concerned, why the territorial dispute was not a major perhaps the most significant aspect of Kras- topic during the election campaign was noiarov’s governorship, or at least the most because the seeds of the conflict between documented, was a jurisdictional challenge the Russian Republic and the federal gov- launched by Primorskii krai Governor, Yev- ernment over the “Kurils problem” had not genii Nazdratenko. In April 1994, yet germinated.29 At this stage, the territo- Nazdratenko announced that he wanted rial dispute had not presented itself as an control of the Kuril Islands to be transferred

302 RESEARCH NOTES to Primorskii krai. In addition, he promised standing in the way of Russian territorial increased investment in the islands’ fishing concessions. If the Russian government enterprises and claimed that Sakhalin was thought that transferring the islands to Pri- unable to support them.34 Nazdratenko’s morskii krai’s jurisdiction would alleviate proposal was roundly criticized by Sakha- the burden of its expected financial assis- lin authorities who believed, quite under- tance, it was mistaken. The economic situ- standably, that the Primorskii krai Gover- ation in Primorskii krai was just as severe, nor had no right to meddle in Sakhalin’s if not worse, than Sakhalin oblast. As a re- internal affairs. In response to the outcry sult, Kuril authorities and the embattled from Sakhalin, Nazdratenko argued that islanders could expect little in the way of incorporating the Kurils into Primorskii krai financial assistance from Primorskii krai. was not a political move and not a territori- Nazdratenko’s proposal was not imple- al claim, but was motivated by the desire mented and was quietly shelved. to recreate the single economic complex The issue surrounding control over the which existed earlier in the Far East.35 He South Kurils has not only led to jurisdic- also fired a broadside at Sakhalin authori- tional quarrels at the regional level, but has ties claiming that the residents of Iturup’s also created tensions in Sakhalin’s relations appeal to the Japanese government, and not with local authorities on the disputed is- the Sakhalin administration, for economic lands themselves. The four islands over assistance was a national disgrace.36 which Japan lays claim are divided into two Despite Nazdratenko’s claims to the administrative districts or raiony: the Kuril contrary, the proposal was a politically cal- District, which comprises Etorofu, and the culated move designed to appeal to local South Kuril District, which encompasses the fishers, who would benefit from integrat- islands of Kunashiri, Shikotan and the un- ing the Kurils into Primorskii krai, ahead of populated (except for a border guard de- the first gubernatorial elections to be held tachment) Habomai islets. Both raiony are the following year. As his very public cam- under the jurisdiction of Sakhalin oblast. paign to oppose the 1991 Sino-Russian bor- The islands’ residents, quite justifiably, feel der demarcation agreement demonstrates, they have been neglected by regional au- Nazdratenko never hesitated to exploit na- thorities in Sakhalin who, as a result of tionalist sentiments for political gain. The chronic shortages in the federal budget, re- Kremlin’s initial response to the proposal ceive fewer funds from Moscow and in turn was not to reject it outright. Rather, it rec- pass down even less to the locales. This has ommended that the government, Federa- left local administrations on the disputed tion Council and Federal Counter-Intelli- islands with insufficient financial resourc- gence Service examine the question. If all es to carry out their ever-increasing social- parties agreed, a referendum would be welfare responsibilities. The islands’ geo- held. If two-thirds of the residents of Pri- graphic isolation – only accessible by air and morskii krai and the Kurils, in addition to a sea links, which are frequently disrupted two-thirds majority of the Federation Coun- by harsh and unstable weather conditions cil agreed, a transfer could be carried out.37 – has further compounded the economic It has been suggested that the proposal crisis. The shortfall in funding has com- might not have been a complete surprise to pelled local authorities in the South Kuril the federal government. According to V. District, in particular, to launch a series of Venevtsev and D. Demkin, Moscow’s pre- appeals and proposals independently of occupation with maintaining the state’s ter- Sakhalin in an attempt attract economic as- ritorial integrity was believed to be behind sistance. These include turning the South Nazdratenko’s proposal as it would not Kurils into a free economic zone, leasing the only strengthen Russia’s political assets islands and allowing Japanese fishers to against Japan, but also allow Moscow to operate in the disputed islands’ EEZ in re- make cuts in previously promised subsidies turn for fishing fees. The most blatant chal- to these territories.38 lenge to Sakhalin’s jurisdiction over the Nazdratenko’s proposal had the addi- South Kuril District was former mayor tional effect of signaling to the Japanese that Vladimir Zema’s threat to secede in 1997 if authorities in Sakhalin were not alone in economic assistance was not forthcoming. their opposition to returning the disputed The District’s charter, adopted in October islands. This gave more credence to claims 1996, contains a number of clauses that ap- by the Russian government that strong do- pear to have provided a further boost to the mestic factors, notably public opinion, were secessionists’ cause.39 These acts have not

303 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA only drawn attention to the economic plight dispute in Japan, he soon moved to dispel of the South Kurils, but have also cast this notion. In the lead up to the first-ever doubts on the ability of regional authori- gubernatorial elections scheduled to be held ties to administer the islands and, in the on 20 October 1996, Farkhutdinov found it process, resulted in acrimony between the necessary to pander to the nationalist vote oblast and raion. when he asserted in an article in Sovetskii Despite weathering Nazdratenko’s chal- Sakhalin that “all the Kuril Islands have been lenge, Yevgenii Krasnoiarov’s tenure as and will remain Russian territory.”44 A fur- Governor of Sakhalin was to be relatively ther hardening of Farkhutdinov’s position short-lived. He was forced to resign on 24 was reflected in an article in Rossiiskaia gaze- April 1995 due to a combination of health ta: “The Kuril problem does not exist. The problems, a desire to take up alternative Kurils, by rights of the first settlers and the employment, as well as criticism of his lack results of the Second World War, is Rus- of leadership in formulating a reconstruc- sian territory from a long time ago.”45 This tion package for the South Kurils after the comment clearly contradicted an earlier devastating earthquake that struck the is- statement by Boris Yeltsin, contained in an lands in October 1994.40 official letter brought to Japan in Septem- ber 1991 by Ruslan Khasbulatov, that rela- SAKHALIN’S THIRD GOVERNOR: IGOR tions between Russia and Japan would no FARKHUTDINOV longer be perceived in terms of victor and vanquished. Yeltsin chose as Krasnoiarov’s successor Farkhutdinov went on to win the elec- Igor Pavlovich Farkhutdinov,41 the mayor tion, but did not obtain an absolute majori- and chairman of the Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk ty, receiving only 39.47% of the vote – a lit- Ispolkom. Soon after taking over the guber- tle more than 10 points clear of his closest natorial reins, Farkhutdinov, in an inter- rival, the chairman of the Sakhalin Center view with the Hokkaidô Shimbun, signaled for Standardization and Meteorology, Ana- he would follow Krasnoiarov’s basic ap- tolii Chernyi.46 To what extent Farkhutdi- proach of seeking to delay a resolution to nov’s hardline stance on the territorial is- the South Kurils dispute until the econom- sue contributed to his election victory is ic gap between Japan and Russia was elim- unclear. In the harsh economic climate that inated, after which he was prepared to ex- made the struggle for survival a priority for amine the issue.42 He was, however, more local residents it would be an exaggeration explicit than his predecessor in his expec- to say Farkhutdinov’s position regarding tations that Japan might contribute to re- the territorial dispute was a contributing ducing this gap through joint development, factor. In fact, just before the gubernatorial arguing “the most important thing is Japa- elections, he traveled to Moscow to meet nese cooperation for the economic devel- with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin opment of the islands. We welcome the and Anatolii Chubais, then head of the pres- advance of Japanese companies.”43 Al- idential administration, and extracted a though far from an expression of support promise of 60 billion rubles in central fund- for returning the islands, Farkhutdinov’s ing for Sakhalin’s development – a move announcement offered a glimmer of hope which is thought to have boosted his elec- as it identified the necessary preconditions tion chances.47 However, fishers, whose for Russia to reconsider its position regard- livelihood would be threatened as a result ing the disputed islands. For Japan, some of transferring the islands to Japan, and oth- solace could be gained from the fact that er social groups who have a vested interest Farkhutdinov, at least for the time being, in Russia’s continued control of the South did not regress to Fedorov’s hardline posi- Kurils would have taken careful note of the tion of refusing to recognize the territorial governor’s comments. Despite obtaining a problem’s existence and to take part in any popular mandate, which theoretically in- discussions to decide the issue of the is- creased his powers within the region and lands’ ownership. The idea of jointly de- vis-à-vis Moscow and made him no longer veloping the islands was, in fact, not a new indebted to the President for his position, one, having been first proposed in negotia- Farkhutdinov backtracked somewhat from tions during Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in his pre-election rhetoric and showed a pre- April 1991. paredness to follow the Kremlin’s line by If Farkhutdinov was initially seen as at least recognizing the existence of the ter- having moderate views on the territorial ritorial dispute.48

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Despite his somewhat reluctant and be- In particular, the position of the Sakha- lated recognition of the Northern Territo- lin oblast Duma vis-à-vis the territorial dis- ries problem’s existence, Farkhutdinov pute necessitated a hardline response from showed the Sakhalin administration was the Governor. It has consistently taken an unwilling to stand by idly and watch Mos- uncompromising stand over the South cow negotiate with Tokyo over the islands’ Kuril Islands. The regional Duma has pro- fate. Although certainly not as pugnacious tested against foreign companies using and critical of the Russian government as maps that show the disputed islands to be Valentin Fedorov, Farkhutdinov also dem- Japanese territory and has also lobbied onstrated an ability to complicate matters Moscow and the Far East and Lake Baikal involving the South Kuril Islands. For in- Interregional Association for Economic Co- stance, Farkhutdinov actively sought to in- operation to take steps against any further troduce foreign capital for the reconstruc- “cartographic expansion into Russian ter- tion and development of the disputed is- ritory.” Moreover, in September 2001, the lands; authorized and financed the joint regional Duma organized a public parlia- construction of a cross with the Orthodox mentary hearing to discuss the territorial Church on Ostrov Tanfileva in the Mala dispute. The recommendation of the two- Kuril’skaia griada (which the Japanese call day hearing, made to the Russian govern- Suishô Island – part of the Habomai islets) ment, State Duma and President Putin, held immediately after the November 1997 no surprises: do not return the Kuril Islands Yeltsin-Hashimoto summit to commemo- to Japan.52 It should also be noted that it rate the deeds of Russian settlers who first was also the regional legislature that adopt- discovered the islands 300 years ago; and ed the oblast charter (ustav), which precon- in a move ostensibly to preserve the islands’ ditioned any transfer of the islands upon a unique and precious natural environment referendum, debated in May 2001 whether but essentially designed to force interna- to propose a revision of the federal Consti- tional recognition of Russian sovereignty tution that would make relinquishing the over the disputed islands, he sent a proposal disputed islands legally impossible and has to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs periodically issued declarations and reso- to put Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habo- lutions in support of continued Russian mai islets on the World Heritage List. control of the islands.53 There appear to be two fundamental rea- Nationalist sentiments are not the only sons that can explain why Farkhutdinov factor behind the attachment to the South sought to block any moves by the Russian Kuril Islands. As discussed previously, the government to hand the disputed islands islands’ EEZ is blessed with abundant ma- to Japan. According to Steven Solnick, rine resources and is said to be one of the “First, he seems to be using the populist is- world’s three great fisheries, containing the sue of Russian sovereignty over the territo- spawning grounds for several commercial- ries to solidify his domestic political base ly viable fish species. Powerful regional in- within the oblast.”49 As discussed previous- terest groups in the form of the military and ly, although Farkhutdinov won Sakhalin’s the fishing industry are viscerally opposed first gubernatorial elections in October 1996, to Russia transferring the South Kuril Islands his total percentage of the vote was just to Japan. The fishing industry, which is the under 40% – sufficient to defeat his closest mainstay of the regional economy, stands challenger, but certainly not enough to war- to lose hundreds of millions of dollars if the rant any complacency. Farkhutdinov was disputed islands are transferred to Japan. re-elected in October 2000, receiving ap- The industry’s contribution to regional cof- proximately 57% of the vote.50 Moreover, fers and representation in the oblast Duma given that public opinion polls have con- makes it a voice to be heard on matters consistently shown that an overwhelming ma- cerning any possible negotiated settlement jority of oblast residents are opposed to to the territorial dispute. Similarly, Russia’s transferring the South Kuril Islands to Ja- law enforcement agencies and armed forc- pan,51 Farkhutdinov’s high profile stand es, which have been adversely affected by against a return of the islands resonated economic reforms, receive various materi- with nationalist sentiments in Sakhalin, al benefits from participating in the legal which, like most of Russia, have been trig- and illicit trade in fish and marine prod- gered by, inter alia, poor socio-economic ucts that has flourished under Russian con- conditions and an identity crisis following trol of the South Kuril Islands. They also the traumatic loss of empire. act as an impediment to the regional polit-

305 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA ical elite adopting a more conciliatory po- the visa-less exchanges.59 However, this sition on the territorial dispute.54 was in response to what he correctly per- In addition, Farkhutdinov’s outspoken ceived as Japanese efforts to link cross-cul- opposition to Russian territorial concessions tural exchange with the movement to de- has also served as an important means of mand the Northern Territories’ return. extracting greater economic resources from Farkhutdinov was not opposed to the pro- Moscow.55 The Soviet command economy’s gram per se. On the contrary, he would collapse and the failure to develop a con- have preferred to see it expanded to include sensus-based integrated financial frame- Sakhalin residents. Such a “hardline” ap- work in Russia have led to a large number proach – if one were to hypothesize that for of regions concluding special arrangements the Russian government, improving rela- with Moscow regarding tax allowances and tions with Japan is a sufficiently high pri- subsidies. Moreover, Russia’s development ority – would lead the Kremlin to ignore as a treaty rather than a Constitutional fed- Sakhalin and press ahead in negotiations eration, which has institutionalized the with Japan, thereby reducing Sakhalin’s principle of asymmetrical federalism, has influence. On the other hand, if Sakhalin provided an environment conducive to in- were to hand the Russian government ter-federal bargaining in post-Soviet Rus- “blank power of attorney” (hakushi inin) in sia. The arrangements differ from region to matters pertaining to the territorial dispute, region and depend on the strategic impor- Arai believes Moscow would not take into tance of the provinces for the center, value account Sakhalin’s position.60 Here it is of their natural resources and political as- necessary to re-emphasize that the politi- sertiveness of regional politicians.56 Sakha- cal and economic benefits regional elites lin oblast, as a whole, has benefited in the derived from exploiting the territorial dis- past with the announcement of a number pute virtually assured that Sakhalin would of multi-million dollar federal programs for not be prepared to hand the federal gov- the Kuril Islands’ socio-economic develop- ernment any of its perceived rights over the ment, although Moscow’s failure to make islands. good on most of its financial pledges raises Sakhalin’s position regarding the South doubts about the financial gains to be made Kuril Islands not only complicates Russian from pursuing such a strategy. Exploiting territorial negotiations with Japan, but is the territorial dispute has also proved ben- also believed to have the potential to cause eficial in other ways. Farkhutdinov signed difficulties for the federal government con- a power sharing agreement with former cerning the massive offshore oil and gas Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in development projects around Sakhalin. May 1996 between Sakhalin oblast and the Steven Solnick suggests Sakhalin might be Russian Federation which covered, tempted to use its potential veto over any amongst others, areas such as land use, ed- deal to resolve the territorial dispute as a ucation and international economic ties.57 bargaining chip to readjust the federal-re- According to Arai Nobuo, a Japanese ex- gional revenue split from the projects or re- pert on the political economy of the Rus- interpret Product Sharing Agreements sian Far East, Farkhutdinov, who had over (PSA).61 20 years experience in local politics and was Regional authorities have been critical an astute politician, adopted a “third posi- of Moscow, in particular the former com- tion” (dai-san no tachiba) on the territorial munist-dominated State Duma, for block- dispute in order to maximize Sakhalin’s ing the necessary legislation designed to influence. This “third position” “was fluid protect foreign investment in the region.62 and regulated by many variables including The lack of such legal provisions is one of the Russian federal government’s Japan the main factors that have limited foreign policy, the Japanese government’s Russia investment in Sakhalin during the first de- policy, the will of the islanders expressed cade of post-Soviet reforms. The expected through various elections and Sakhalin wealth generated from the oil and gas de- public opinion.”58 Contrary to Japanese velopment projects will benefit Sakhalin media reports, Arai doubts that Farkhutdi- enormously. These projects represent an nov was a “simple hardliner” (tanjun important opportunity for Sakhalin to kyôkôha), for if he was, he would have refuse emerge from its long-standing economic Japanese aid and opposed the visa-less ex- slump. There must be some doubts as to change program. It should be noted that whether regional authorities would delib- Farkhutdinov did in fact threaten to cancel erately destabilize the economic environ-

306 RESEARCH NOTES ment by seeking to readjust the federal-re- lin’s governors adopted an unyielding gional revenue split from the projects or stance in opposition to Russian territorial alter the PSA in order to thwart any resolu- concessions. It argued that Valentin Fedor- tion of the territorial dispute. That said, one ov and Igor Farkhutdinov, in particular, must also not underestimate the irrational- sought to exploit the Northern Territories ism that emotional attachments to territory dispute for political and economic gain by can induce in people. adopting very public, and sometimes inno- Given the federal government’s inabili- vative, campaigns to prevent the federal ty to make good on its promises of finan- government from transferring the disput- cial assistance to the region, one might ar- ed islands to Japan. The territorial dispute gue that it would be better for regional au- proved to be a useful tool for both gover- thorities in Sakhalin to come out in support nors, who have played the nationalist card, of Russia transferring the islands to Japan, in order to strengthen their sometimes-un- or in the very least stifle their own opposi- stable domestic political bases. As the case tion to this. Such a move would unleash a of former Primorskii krai Governor, Yevge- wave of much needed Japanese financial nii Nazdratenko, demonstrates, Fedorov support for Sakhalin. The political value and Farkhutdinov have not been the only regional elites have seen in exploiting the embattled Russian regional leaders to wrap territorial dispute is one reason such a stra- themselves in the nationalist cloak in order tegic shift has not been seriously consid- to divert attention and criticism away from ered. Moreover, there are probably reduced economic mismanagement and corruption. expectations in Russia that a decision to re- Local opposition to Russian territorial con- turn the islands to Japan would result in a cessions has also enabled Sakhalin to extract substantial bonus in terms of Japanese eco- economic concessions and benefits from nomic assistance for its embattled economy. both the Russian federal government and Economic assistance of this magnitude Japan where the “Sakhalin factor” is seen would be dependent upon improved Japa- as an important element in Russian domes- nese sentiments towards Russia and Japan’s tic affairs pertaining to the South Kuril Is- own ability to fund such a package. One lands. However, the former’s inability to cannot discount the possibility that Japa- make good on most of its promises of sup- nese gratitude for a possible Russian return port casts some doubts on the economic over the Northern Territories may be short- value of such a strategy. It is for these rea- lived, in a manner akin to Japanese appre- sons that the political elites in Sakhalin, ciation for America’s return of Okinawa in genuine nationalistic sentiments notwith- 1972 and the “China euphoria” following standing, have been unwilling to take a con- the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Trea- ciliatory stand on the territorial dispute. ty in 1978.63 This is an important reason why the strate- For many Japanese, the Russian occupa- gy proposed in some circles in Japan to pro- tion of the “Northern Territories” is both mote cooperative relations with Sakhalin as unjust and illegitimate. They would there- a means of alleviating opposition to Rus- fore probably see any Russian decision to sian territorial concessions has been large- return the islands as being a matter of course. ly unsuccessful. Any “Russia euphoria” that might follow a decision to return the islands would be rela- NOTES tively small in scale and short-lived. More- 1 Roger E. Kanet and Susanne M. Bigerson, over, the poor state of the Japanese econo- “The Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkage in my and Russia’s unstable investment envi- Russian Politics: Nationalist Influences on ronment further reduce the likelihood of a Russian Foreign Policy,” Communist and subsequent economic assistance package for Post-Communist Studies 3: 4 (1997), p. 335. Russia. Political leaders in Russia are more 2 Sakhalin’s influence on domestic policy than likely to be cognizant of the limits of making in the period immediately preced- Japanese largesse. ing the Soviet Union’s collapse was first brought to the attention of Japanese and CONCLUSION Western scholars through the writings of Iakov Zinberg. He coined the term the “Sa- This article focused on Sakhalin’s gov- khalin syndrome” to describe a situation in ernors and outlined their positions on the which “the Soviet leadership cannot decide dispute over the South Kuril Islands. It a position on the ‘Northern Territories’ prob- addressed the question as to why Sakha- lem whilst ignoring the position of Sakha-

307 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA

lin oblast deputies and local public opinion.” tic possibilities. See Valentin Fedorov, “Moia Iakov Zinberg, “Soren Hoppô Ryôdo Sei- Kontseptsiia: Sakhalinskii Eksperiment,” saku to ‘Saharin Shindoromu’[The Northern Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 1 (1991), p. 13. Territories Policy of the Soviet Union and 8 Valentin Fedorov, Yeltsin: A Political Portrait the ‘Sakhalin Syndrome’],” Soren Kenkyû 12 (Washington, 1996), p. 115. (1991), p. 136. Sections of the Japanese mass 9 Kimura, Hiroshi, “Ryôdo no Torihiki o Yu- media have also noted the importance of the rusanu Jûmin Kanjô [The Residents’ Emo- “Sakhalin factor” as it pertains to the Rus- tion Which Do Not Allow Territorial Trad- so-Japanese territorial dispute. See, for in- ing],” Asahi Jânaru 32:42 (1990), p. 29. stance, Asahi Shimbun, 14 December 1997, p. 10 Robert Valliant, “The Political Dimension,” 2; Hokkaidô Shimbun, 16 September 1995, p. in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economic 2; Saharin to Nihon 111 (1998), p. 2. It should in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with be noted that Saharin to Nihon is in fact a Asia-Pacific (London, 1997), p. 4. newsletter published by the Japan-Sakhalin 11 Bondarchuk was the successor to long- Society. In academic circles Arai Nobuo ar- standing local Party chief Petr Tretiakov who gues that “Russo-Japanese peace treaty ne- was forced to step down in the face of un- gotiations that have been formed and based precedented, large-scale street demonstra- on the assumption of the Russian federal tions in the wake of corruption charges in government as the sole concerned party and May 1988. Japanese domestic public opinion regarding 12 Nagoe, Kenrô, “Saharin kara mita Hoppô this is pressed to pay greater attention to the Ryôdo [The View of the Northern Teritories ‘Sakhalin factor’.” Arai, Nobuo, “‘Biza-nashi from Sakhalin]” Sekai Shûhô (May 1989), pp. Kôryû’ ni miru Roshia ni okeru Seifu-kan 71-72. Whether the residents of the South Kankei to Nichi-Ro Kankei e no Eikyô [In- Kuril Islands cast their votes in favor of ter-governmental Relations in Russia as Seen Gulii’s joint management proposal remains in the Visa-less Exchange Program and Its unclear. In the above article Kimura claims Influence on Japan-Russia Relations],” Sap- the proposal was met with widespread criti- poro Kokusai Daigaku Kiyô 31 (2000), p. 51. cism on the islands. Gulii challenges this Similarly, Duckjoon Chang states that “...the view, saying that the islanders supported his positions of provincial leaders may have joint management proposal. substantial ramifications for the territorial is- 13 Russian President Vladimir Putin later ap- sue. Insofar as the independent minded pro- pointed Gulii Deputy Presidential Represen- vincial leaders insist on their own adminis- tative for the Far East in May 2000. Some in trative rights over the disputed islands, bi- Japan saw the appointment of Gulii, known lateral relations between Japan and Russia for his flexible approach toward the territo- may face an impasse which would be diffi- rial problem, as an expression of the impor- cult to overcome.” Duckjoon Chang, “Break- tance Putin places on relations with Japan ing Through a Stalemate? A Study Focusing and also as a counter to the hardline ap- on the Kuril Islands Issue in Russo-Japanese proach to the problem exhibited by the Sa- Relations,” Asian Perspective 22:3 (1998), p. khalin regional administration. See Hokkaidô 182. Shimbun, 20 September 2000, p. 8. 3 Spisok narodnykh deputatov RSFSR na 12 fe- 14 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 9 September 1992, p. 3. vralia 1991 g. (Moscow, 1991), p. 97. 15 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 13 October 1991, p. 1. 4 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 2 May 1990, p. 8. 16 Vitalii Gulii expressed this view. See Hok- 5 It is worth noting that Fedorov’s economic kaidô Shimbun, 13 October 1991, p. 1. views were not as radical as many were led 17 Aksenov had even warned that there would to believe. He was a vocal critic of the early be riots if the islands were returned. Hok- economic “shock therapy” program kaidô Shimbun, 24 August 1992, p. 5. launched by the Gaidar-led Russian govern- 18 Yakov Zinberg, “Subnational Diplomacy: Ja- ment. He instead called for a social market pan and Sakhalin,” Journal of Borderlands economy and more gradual reforms. Studies 10:2 (1995), pp. 94-95. 6 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 29 August 1990, p. 1. 19 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Russian Nationalism 7 Fedorov was at best ambivalent toward the and the National Interest in Russian Foreign idea of establishing a free trade zone incor- Policy,” in Celeste A. Wallander, ed., The porating Sakhalin and the Kurils (at least Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold with foreign involvement), soon arguing War (Boulder, 1996), p. 44. that with the weakened state of the Soviet 20 Arai, Nobuo, “Gorubachofu o Seiyaku suru economy, an unrestricted influx of foreign Chihô no ‘Gekokujô’ [‘The Lower Dominat- capital and laborers would transform Sovi- ing the Upper’ in the Regions Restricts Gor- et territory into a foreign colony with irre- bachov],” Sekai Shûhô (10 March 1991), p. 123. versible consequences. He instead called for Democratic forces in Sakhalin who helped development to be oriented toward domes- Fedorov come to power claimed they had been

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deceived by a “political adventurer straight served a brief stint as a Deputy Minister of out of the pages of Russian fiction.” Sophie Economics until 1994. He then became Vice Quinn-Judge, “Hobbled by Old Habits,” Far President of the Russian Union of Industri- Eastern Economic Review 155:10 (1992), p. 16. alists and Employers and then returned to 21 Fedorov is quoted as saying “I think it is Sakha, becoming Prime Minister where he better to return part of the four islands to continued to be a headache for central offi- Japan. Further decades will be wasted be- cials, calling for a picket of government tween Japan and the Soviet Union if the ter- buildings in Moscow to protest an econom- ritorial dispute between the two nations re- ic blockade against the Republic in 1997. mains unresolved.” Japan Times, 5 February 31 TASS, 12 April 1993. 1991, p. 1; Anthony Rowley, “Japan Doubts 32 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories over Gorbachev’s Rapprochement: Islands Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, Volume of Uncertainty,” Far Eastern Economic Review 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998 (Berke- 151: 8 (1991), p. 11. ley, 1998), p. 493. 22 This is evidenced by the continual stream of 33 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 29 January 1994, p. 5; In- official Japanese delegations to Sakhalin to terfax, 28 January 1994; FBIS/SOV, 94/20, 31 discuss the Northern Territories dispute and January 1994, p. 38. gauge local public opinion, which is testi- 34 Segodnia, 6 September 1994, p. 3, cited in Ri- mony to Japanese recognition of the salience chard Wade, “Regionalism and the Russian of the “Sakhalin factor.” Federation: The Far Eastern Perspective,” in 23 Fedorov joined the party after he left Sakha- Vladimir Tikhomirov, ed., In Search of Iden- lin and became a Deputy Minister of Eco- tity: Five Years Since the Fall of the Soviet Union nomics in the Russian government. “Narod- (Melbourne, 1996), p. 55. no patrioticheskaia partiia: Lider-Anatolii 35 Nazdratenko stated that such a move would Gil’,” http://www.panorama.ru:8105/works/ also serve to strengthen Russia’s position in vybory/party/afgan.html, accessed 16 Janu- the Asia-Pacific region. Sovetskii Sakhalin, 12 ary 2001. August 1994, p. 1. 24 Zinberg, “Subnational Diplomacy,” p. 91. 36 TASS, 5 September 1994; FBIS/SOV, 94/173, 25 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 18 March 1993, p. 5. 7 September 1994, pp. 37-38. 26 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 8 March 1990, p. 1, and 21 37 Izvestiia, 13 August 1994, p. 2. March 1990, p.1, cited in Iakov Zinberg, 38 V. Venevstev and D. Demkin, “Zachem “Fyôdorofu no Kokusai Seiji ni okeru Han- ‘vozdelyvat’ Kuril’skuiu griadu?” Vladivos- ran to sono Genryû: Fyôdorofu no Saharin- tok, 15 September 1994, p. 4, cited in Peter shû Chiji Shûnin o megutte (2) [Rebellion Kirkow, “Regional Warlordism in Russia: and Its Origin in Fedorov’s International Pol- The Case of Primorskii Krai,” Europe-Asia itics: About Fedorov’s Taking Office as Gov- Studies 47:6 (1995), p. 935. The former head ernor of Sakhalin Oblast (2)],” Byuretin 21 of the Russian secret service, Sergei Stepa- (1992), p. 10. See also Hokkaidô Shimbun, 1 shin, mentioned the possibility of an admin- April 1992, p. 5. istrative merger of Sakhalin oblast and the 27 It must be pointed out that according to Rus- Kuril Islands with Primorskii krai at a meet- sian electoral laws, candidates need to ob- ing with entrepreneurs in Nakhodka in June tain more than 50% of the vote to be elected 1994. Rossiskaia gazeta, 1 October 1994, p. 2, to the Russian Congress of People’s Depu- cited in Kirkow, “Regional Warlordism in ties. Zinberg gives Fedorov’s total vote in the Russia,” p. 934. run-off as being only 47.78%, which is just 39 See Nakamura Itsurô, “Saharin to Minami short of an absolute majority. If Zinberg’s Kuriru Chiku no Jichi Seido [The Local Gov- figures are correct, Fedorov’s election to the ernment System in Sakhalin and the South Congress represents an exception to Russian Kuril District],” Surabu Kenkyû 45 (1998). electoral laws. Sovetskii Sakhalin, 22 March 40 Saharin to Nihon 37 (1995), p. 1. 1990, p. 1, cited in Zinberg, “Fyôdorofu no 41 Igor Farkhutdinov and a number of officials Kokusai Seiji (2),” p. 10. Fedorov’s seat in from the regional administration were trag- the Congress can be confirmed by examin- ically killed when the helicopter in which ing an official list of RSFSR People’s Depu- they were riding crashed while flying to the ties. See Spisok narodnykh deputatov, p. 97. Kuril Islands from the Kamchatka Peninsu- 28 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 14 March 1990, p. 1, cited la in August 2003. In the second round of in Zinberg, “Fyôdorofu no Kokusai Seiji (2),” gubernatorial elections held on 21 Decem- p. 10. ber to determine Farkhutdinov’s successor, 29 Zinberg, “Fyôdorofu no Kokusai Seiji (2),” former Sakhalin vice-governor Ivan Mala- p. 12. khov received just over 53% of the vote to 30 William Nimmo, Japan and Russia: A Reeval- defeat Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk mayor Fedor Si- uation in the Post-Soviet Era (Westport, 1994), dorenko who was preferred by about 34% p. 171. Fedorov returned to Moscow and of voters. Andrei Borodianskii, “Vtoroi tur

309 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA, TOMUS A22,CTA PP S.LAVICA 310-323 IAPONICA

v pol’zu ‘Edinoi Rossii:’ vybory glav chety- March 2003; V.K. Zilanov, A.A. Koshkin, I.A. rekh regionov vyigrala partiia vlasti,” Neza- Latyshev, A.Iu. Plotnikov and I.A. Senchen- visimaia gazeta, 23 December 2003, http:// ko, Russkie Kurily: Istoriia i Sovremennost’ www.ng.ru/regions/2003-12-23/4_er.html, (Moscow, 2002), pp. 184-241. accessed 23 December 2003. 54 See Brad Williams, “The Criminalisation of 42 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 8 May 1995, p. 4. Russo-Japanese Border Trade: Causes and 43 Ibid. Farkhutdinov preferred joint develop- Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies 55:5 ment of the islands to Japanese government (2003). assistance in the wake of the October 1994 55 Solnick, “Russian Regional Politics,” p. 4. earthquake. Similarly, regional authorities in Primorskii 44 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 19 October 1996, p. 5. krai, in particular, have campaigned against 45 Ibid. demarcation of the eastern Russo-Chinese 46 Robert W. Orttung et al., eds., The Republics border in order to attract subsidies from and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide Moscow. It should also be noted that some to Politics, Policies, and Leaders (Armonk, NY, Japanese observers believe Sakhalin has also and London, 2000), p. 479. sought to use the territorial dispute to ex- 47 Saharin to Nihon 77 (1996), p. 1. tract economic aid and cooperation from Ja- 48 Hokkaidô Shimbun, 25 October 1996, p. 3. pan. See Hokkaidô Shimbun, 8 November 49 Steven Solnick, “Russian Regional Politics 1998, p. 1. and the ‘Northern Territories’,” paper pre- 56 Peter Kirkow, Russia’s Provinces: Authoritar- sented for an international symposium, ian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? Miyazaki-Tokyo, November 1999, p. 3. (London, 1998), p. 63. 50 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 October 2000, p. 2. 57 Orttung et al., The Republics and Regions, p. 51 See, for instance, G.B. Borovskoi, Otnoshenie 481; Kyodo, 23 July 1996. zhitelei Sakhalinskoi oblasti k Iaponii 6 (Iuzh- 58 Arai, “‘Biza-nashi Kôryû’,” p. 51. no-Sakhalinsk, 1995), p. 24; Svobodnyi Sakha- 59 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 2 April 1998, p. 1; Gubern- lin, 7 May 1998, p. 1; Iuzhno-Sakhalinskaia skie vedomosti, 2 April 1998, p. 1. gazeta, 13 July 2001, cited in Saharin to Nihon 60 Arai, “‘Biza-nashi Kôryû’,” p. 51. 237 (2001), p. 4. 61 Solnick, “Russian Regional Politics,” p. 4. 52 “Parliamentary Hearing: Do Not Return 62 Floriano Fossato, “Sakhalin: Waiting for Oil Kurils to Japan,” The Sakhalin Times, 11 Oc- but Patience Running Out,” RFE/RL Newsline tober 2001, http://www.sakhalintimes.com, (1998), http://rferl.org/newsline, accessed 20 accessed 11 October 2001. August 2001. 53 Sakhalinskaia oblastnaia duma, “Ustav Sa- 63 Hiroshi Kimura, Islands or Security? Japanese- khalinskoi oblasti,” http://www.duma. Soviet Relations Under Brezhnev and Andro- Sakhalin.ru/Russian/Ustav.html, accessed 13 pov (Kyoto, 1998), pp. 19-20.

ÎÒÊÐÛÒÈÅ I ÃÎÑÓÄÀÐÑÒÂÅÍÍÎÉ ÄÓÌÛ: ÍÀÐÎÄÛ, ÐÅÃÈÎÍÛ, ÂËÀÑÒÜ

ÐÓÑÒÅÌ ÖÈÓÍ×ÓÊ

Â ðîññèéñêîé è îñîáåííî ñîâåòñêîé ñêîì ïàðëàìåíòå ïîñâÿùåíî âñåãî äâå èñòîðè÷åñêîé ëèòåðàòóðå ñîçâàííóþ â ñòàòüè, êîòîðûå âûøëè èç-ïîä ïåðà 1906 ã. Ãîñóäàðñòâåííóþ äóìó òðàäèöè- ñàìèõ äóìñêèõ äåïóòàòîâ, íàèáîëåå îííî ðàññìàòðèâàëè òîëüêî êàê àðåíó àêòèâíî âûñòóïàâøèõ ïî ýòîìó âîïðî- ïðîòèâîñòîÿíèÿ êëàññîâ è ïàðòèé, íå- ñó.1 Â îïóáëèêîâàííûõ ïîçäíåå èññëå- ðåäêî çàáûâàÿ, ÷òî îíà ñòàëà ïåðâûì äîâàíèÿõ è ñáîðíèêàõ, â êîòîðûõ áûëè ìåñòîì, ãäå â êà÷åñòâå çàêîíîäàòåëåé ñîáðàíû ìàòåðèàëû î ðàçâèòèè îòäåëü- âïåðâûå âñòðåòèëèñü âûáîðíûå ïðåä- íûõ íàöèîíàëüíûõ äâèæåíèé â íà÷àëå ñòàâèòåëè ïî÷òè âñåõ íàðîäîâ è ðåãèî- ÕÕ â., òàêæå íå äàâàëàñü îáîáùàþùàÿ íîâ Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè. Äàæå â ìíî- êàðòèíà îáñóæäåíèÿ ýòíîêîíôåññèî- ãî÷èñëåííûõ äîðåâîëþöèîííûõ ðàáî- íàëüíûõ ïðîáëåì â Äóìå.2 Ó÷àñòíèêè òàõ î I Äóìå (â îñíîâíîì, ïðàâäà, ïóá- è ñâèäåòåëè öåðåìîíèè îòêðûòèÿ Äóìû ëèöèñòè÷åñêèõ è íåðåäêî ñ ýëåìåíòà- è íà÷àëà åå äåÿòåëüíîñòè â ñâîèõ âîñ- ìè ìåìóàðèñòèêè) íåïîñðåäñòâåííî íà- ïîìèíàíèÿõ îáðàùàëè âíèìàíèå ïðåæ- öèîíàëüíîé ïðîáëåìå â ïåðâîì ðîññèé- äå âñåãî íà ðàçíîîáðàçèå íàöèîíàëüíûõ

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