Sakhalin's Governors and the South Kuril Islands : Motivating Factors Behind Involvement in the Russo-Japanese Title Territorial Dispute Author(s) Williams, Brad Citation Acta Slavica Iaponica, 22, 299-310 Issue Date 2005 Doc URL http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39451 Type bulletin (article) Note Research Notes File Information ASI22_013.pdf Instructions for use Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers : HUSCAP ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA, TOMUS 22, PP. 299-310 Research Notes SAKHALIN’S GOVERNORS AND THE SOUTH KURIL ISLANDS: MOTIVATING FACTORS BEHIND INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSSO- JAPANESE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BRAD WILLIAMS In the former Soviet Union, foreign poli- the South Kuril Islands and, in the process, cy decisions were largely made at the dis- remove a perceived key obstacle to Russian cretion of the General Secretary of the Com- territorial concessions. munist Party, with some input from other Politburo members. Generally speaking, THE FIRST GOVERNOR: VALENTIN public opinion and pressure were not im- FEDOROV portant factors in the policy making pro- cess.1 However, with the introduction and The emerging salience of the “Sakhalin advancement of political liberalization in syndrome” became synonymous with the Russia, the leadership increasingly began thoughts and actions of one individual – to depend on public support in both the Valentin Petrovich Fedorov – the first Gov- domestic and foreign policy spheres. This ernor of Sakhalin. Fedorov came to Sakha- introduced a limiting effect on the govern- lin with the aim of turning the island into ment’s ability to set foreign policy goals and “an experiment for market reforms.” He implement these decisions. Pressure from was elected as a member of the Russian domestic forces, in particular, has prevent- Congress of People’s Deputies on 18 March ed the leadership from making concessions 1990.3 The following month he was elected to Japan over the disputed South Kuril Is- chair of the oblast Soviet Executive Commit- lands/Northern Territories. Prominent tee (Ispolkom). He was initially seen as a amongst these domestic forces is the posi- radical reformer in the economic field with tion of the Sakhalin leadership and local a particularly keen eye on developing rela- public opinion regarding the territorial dis- tions with the neighboring Japanese island pute: the “Sakhalin factor.”2 of Hokkaido. The local Hokkaidô Shimbun This article examines the first element even called Fedorov “Sakhalin’s Yeltsin.”4 of the “Sakhalin factor”: Sakhalin’s gover- The important question for those involved nors, and elucidates their relationship with in the Japanese movement for the return of the aforementioned territorial dispute. The the Northern Territories was whether Fe- article explores the underlying motives be- dorov’s “radical” views would be limited hind their attempts to intervene in bilateral to economics or if they would apply to the territorial negotiations. It argues that, a political sphere as well.5 genuine desire to maintain Russia’s terri- This question was soon answered in Fe- torial integrity notwithstanding, a signifi- dorov’s controversial proposal of a “Fourth cant reason behind this involvement lies in Way” (chetvertyi put’) to resolve the territo- the Sakhalin governors’ perception of the rial dispute with Japan. The plan, an- territorial dispute as an important weapon nounced whilst he was on a visit to Hok- to be exploited for political and economic kaido in August 1990 at the invitation of gain. municipal authorities in Wakkanai, called The disputed islands’ value for Sakha- for turning the four disputed islands, along lin’s governors escalated as a result of Rus- with Sakhalin and the northern part of Hok- sia’s troubled attempts at state-building, kaido, into a free economic zone and de- which facilitated center-periphery bargain- veloping them jointly with Japan.6 It was ing and the struggle for power between the initially hoped that the establishment of a executive and legislative branches of gov- free trade zone would lead to an influx of ernment throughout the country. The per- foreign, mainly Japanese, capital, which ceived gains derived from exploiting the would improve the regional economy and, territorial dispute have reduced the effica- as a result, strengthen Russia’s control over cy of Japanese policies designed to allevi- the islands.7 The proposal was unaccept- ate Sakhalin governors’ hardline stance on able to the Japanese as it called for the is- 299 ACTA SLAVICA IAPONICA lands to remain under Soviet sovereignty. be cognizant of and responsive to any pro- Fedorov was critical of the “Third Way” of posals put forward by his political rivals resolving the territorial dispute, put for- regarding the South Kuril Islands. As will ward by Aleksandr Iakovlev, a Central be discussed shortly, Fedorov’s less than Committee secretary and one of the archi- comprehensive victory in the March 1990 tects of perestroika, during a visit to Japan in elections to the Russian Congress of Peo- November 1989. The “Third Way” was not ple’s Deputies heightened his awareness of a choice between returning the four islands the territorial dispute’s political value. (“Second Way”) or a continuation of the Having had his “Fourth Way” proposal status quo (no islands or “First Way”), but rejected by Moscow and Tokyo, Fedorov called for both sides to reach a compromise launched a vocal campaign aimed at main- – either selling the islands to Japan or joint taining Russian sovereignty over the South administration. Fedorov, on the other hand, Kuril Islands. Some of his more notable acts stressed that a lesson must be learnt from included cutting short a visit to Japan in Tsarist Russia’s sale of Alaska (to the Unit- April 1991 in protest at what he believed ed States in 1867 for $7.2 million), which was Mikhail Gorbachev’s overly concilia- brought Russia little economically and also tory response to Japanese territorial de- no peace with the United States. Accord- mands; threats to create a Far Eastern Re- ing to Fedorov, if Russia were to receive public should the Soviet Union transfer the billions of dollars from Japan for the islands, disputed islands to Japan; a plan to estab- “that would be a drop of freshwater in the lish Cossack settlements on the islands; the saltwater sea of our problems. Our ineffi- announcement in September 1992 that a cient system will consume the money, and Hong Kong company, Carlson-Kaplan, had in a couple of years Russia will have nei- signed a US$7.8 million contract with the ther money nor islands.”8 regional administration to build a resort Fedorov’s “Fourth Way” proposal was and casino complex on Shikotan Island; unique and certainly contrary to the com- threats that “patriots will overthrow the mon practice of Soviet regional elites toe- government and block the return [of the is- ing the party line and refraining from be- lands]” should Yeltsin accede to Japan’s ter- coming involved in foreign policy matters, ritorial demands; and extensive lobbying of and particularly issues of territorial sover- the Kremlin and other regions in the Rus- eignty. Fedorov’s initial – and as it turned sian Far East. out not the last – foray into a policy-area Fedorov’s opposition to Yeltsin’s pro- commonly perceived as the state’s exclusive posed visit to Japan and other attempts to preserve may well have been a politically complicate Russian policy towards Japan calculated move. Kimura Hiroshi, an ex- regarding the territorial dispute contrast- pert on Japanese-Soviet/Russian relations, ed with the position of the chairman of the suggests that Fedorov made this proposal Sakhalin People’s Deputies Council, Ana- in response to one by his rival Vitalii Gulii, tolii Aksenov. In the early post-Soviet pe- a journalist and member of the USSR Con- riod, many regions had become arenas in gress of People’s Deputies representing the struggle for power between Yeltsin-ap- South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which pointed executives (Heads of Administra- called for joint management of the islands tion or glava administratsii) and the regional in order to create a favorable environment legislatures. Perceptions of popular legiti- for resolving the territorial dispute.9 Gulii macy were at the root of this conflict. The even went as far to say that both the Soviet regional legislatures believed they had been Union and Japan had a strong legal case to given popular mandates as a result of the the disputed islands.10 Gulii’s political cre- 1990 elections, whereas they viewed the dentials were earlier boosted by winning a glava administratsii less favorably. Their landslide victory over the oblast’s First Sec- power derived from Moscow’s or, more retary V. Bondarchuk11 in local elections in precisely, Yeltsin’s fiat. Whilst Fedorov was 1989, running on a platform of creating a trying to arouse local opposition to any ter- “salmon-trout kingdom,” which opposed ritorial concessions and refused to partici- the unchecked development of Sakhalin. pate in any discussions where Russian ju- Gulii reportedly received 90% of the vote risdiction over the South Kurils was ques- on the disputed islands.12 Yeltsin later ap- tioned, Aksenov, on the other hand, dis- pointed him as presidential representative played a willingness to cooperate with cen- (predstavitel’ prezidenta) for Sakhalin.13 As a tral authorities. After visiting the Tatar politician, it was necessary for Fedorov to Republic in July 1992 for a meeting of re- 300 RESEARCH NOTES gional parliamentary leaders hosted by