BOOK REVIEWS 179 these vignettes which are sometimes disconnected, and sometimes not, which sometimes relate his personal experiences and sometimes the imagined experiences of others. Perhaps these brief inserts are labelled "fiction" primarily for the purpose of protecting individuals. Because of such uncertainties the usefulness of the device is debatable, and it detracts from the coherence and clarity of the book as a whole. University of Hawaii STEPHEN U. HALLEY Honolulu, U.S.A. David Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-1967. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1976. 303 p. $14.50 The chief issue examined by Professor Mozingo is why the Chinese People's Republic's policy (or policies) toward and in Indonesia failed between 1949 and 1967. That it failed is manifest, for diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in 1967 and remain so to the present. The author's viewpoint is chiefly from China's intentions and designs; Indonesia is a case study of the intrinsic pro­ blems-one wishes to say contradictions-that plagued China's effort to playa large power role in the Third World during this period. Both China and Indonesia achieved international recognition of independence in 1949, but under rather different circumstances. The Chinese People's Republic emerged victorious over internal opposition and external aggression to create a revolu­ tionary new social order under Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles. Indonesia had struggled for national independence against a former colonial master while suppressing revolutionary elements in its midst to create a social order that looked to a better life for all within an established context. In these circumstances China's initial attitude toward Indonesia was cool. Its main concern was extending its influence among the Chinese community in Indonesia, an activity that was bound to incur hostility from Indonesia's nationalist leaders and do little good for the Indonesian Chinese. But since China view­ ed the Indonesian leaders as imperialist lackeys it was prepared to continue its asser­ tiveness. Only after June 1953 when the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet came to power in Indonesia with needed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) support did relations be­ tween Peking and Jakarta begin to improve. Finally in April 1955, just before the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, the Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty which allowed for individual choice of citizenship within two years after ratification paved the way for the resolution of China's concern with its minorities in Indonesia. Alas, this was not the last of this issue, however. The Bandung Conference itself witnessed the emergence of China's peaceful-coexistence strategy which professed peaceful intentions toward countries of the Third World. China's chief interest was to prevent the Third World countries from being dominated by the world's chief im­ perialist, the United States. The new united-front-from-above strategy led to increasing differences between China and the Soviet Union which was seeking a relaxation of tensions at this time. Ultimately the total separation between the two communist powers would have some of its principal causes in this difference over relationships with the Third World. Mean­ while, in Indonesia the Guided Democracy concepts of President Sukarno raised pro­ blems for China's relations with that country, for, while on the one hand they seemed to offer new scope to the PKI, on the other they brought a strongly anti-communist ar- Journal of Asian and African Studies XIV, 1-2 180 BOOK REVIEWS my into a position of new prominence. Starting in 1959, local Indonesian army com­ manders began harrassing Chinese merchants; China found itself unable to do much to affect this situation. Its best line of action seemed to be a closer and warmer friend­ ship with President Sukarno, who now seemed to be the strong man in Indonesia. President Sukarno was interested in exploring avenues that would decrease his dependence upon both the United States and the Soviet Union and seemed, therefore, to be supportive of China's efforts at solidifying the anti-imperialist forces. This closeness was realized in 1963 when the confrontation with Malaysia seemed to leave Indonesia without great power support. But whatever successes seemed to follow China's anti-imperialist global policy-and anti-imperialism was the principal con­ tradiction she was concerned with-there was little in the way of internal Indonesian influence that accrued to China. China was forced to work with Sukarno and the In­ donesian army in order to achieve great power status internationally, but this was in no way advancing any revolutionary policies within Indonesian. These policies were the domain of the PKI which had a strange relationship indeed with Maoist communist doctrines. Not until 1963 did the PKI leadership swing from Russian revisionism to Maoist peasant-based revolutionary tactics to the embarrassment of China which wanted to maintain an undisturbed relationship with the Indonesian leadership group. China and the PKI seem to have been a source of problems for each other during the next couple of years, neither being able to effectively influence the other and each working different sides of the street. Eventually they were both the losers. So much for a synoptic overview of the subject matter of this book. How well does the author succeed in his quest to explain the failure of China's policy toward In­ donesia? At one level he succeeds very well. This is the doctrinal level which seeks, through retrospective analysis, to make sense out of Chinese Communist Party statements concerning their aims and plans. This level of analysis has some inherent problems, however. First and foremost among them being that one has to take Chinese policy in Chinese terms and by force must work within this framework. Alas this is a stultifying and abstruse atmosphere that has little relationship to reality as most of us grasp it. Unfortunately, Mozingo seems unable to function satisfactorily at any other level. Partly, but only partly, he seems to know that he is not really getting at the ques­ tions that should be raised. But he seems not to want to raise these questions because he wouldn't be able to answer them from the sources of communist doctrine which he has at hand and partly because he himself seems convinced of the long-term correctness of China's contradictions theory. The overall result is that one is left without any real explanation of why China's policy toward Indonesia failed other than that the Chinese were myopic. Or could it be that they were revolutionary innocents caught in the terrifyingly unpredictable Indone­ sian woods? One might wish to know just how much information China actually had about Indonesian personalities and events, what were the sources of this information, what plans were laid, and to whom in Indonesia were they conveyed. None of this emerges, of course, from analyzing high level policy statements. And yet this is what one wants to know, especially when approaching the cataclysmic events of September 30, 1965 and afterward. Can Mozingo really not do better than present us with a warmed-over version of the Cornell Paper to explain these events? Anyone reading this book for an understanding of the Indonesian side of the story is bound to be disap­ pointed by the stereotyping which the author feels impelled to give to events and peo­ ple. But by the time we reach the events of the last quarter of 1965 disappointment must turn to complete disgust. If this is the best our Pekingologists can produce in the Journal oj Asian and African Studies XIV, 1-2 .