!l EXEM PLAIRE COPY 349 ~ NATO SECRET SUMMARY RECORD LC-R( 68)31 Summary record of a meetinp of theCouncil held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, O-nMonday, PRESENT Chairman: Mr, Manlio Brosio BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY Baron J., Papeians I Mr. P.A. Cavalieratc NY~G. Kristiansen de Morehovel z ICELAND PORTUGAL CANADA Mr. N,P. Sigurdsson Mr. V. da Cunha Mr, Ross Campbell ITALY DEïViVlARK TURKEY Mr. C, de Perrariis Mr, O. Cankardes Mr. O. Bierring Salzano FRANCE LUXEMBOURG UNITED KINGDOM NIr, R, Seydoux Mr. L, Schaus Sir Bernard Burrows GERMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES Mr, W,G, Grewe Mr. H.M. Boon Mr@ Harlan Cleveland INTERNATIONAL STAFF DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Deputy Secretary General: MY, J,A, Roberts DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs: Mr. J. Jaenicke Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge ALSO PRESENT Chairman, Military Committee: Lt.Gen, Baron G,P, de Cumont NATO SECRET -2- NATO SECRET C-R(68)31 CONTENTS "...Item Subject Berlin 1 - 20 DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE -2- NATO SECRET -3- NATO SE CRET y1C-Rc68) 31 NATO SECRET BERLIN 1, The GERMAM RESRESEIVTATIVE wished to inform the Council on further developments in the Berlin questionand more specifically on the situation at the chockpoints,on his Government's political assessmentof the actions and on the concrete countermeasures enforcedor considered, in close consultation with the three Allied governments primarily responsible for Berlin, 2. Whereas, in the first few days after the introduction of the new measures, therebeen had delays on the demarcation line lasting toup six hours, it now appeared as though the Pankow régime was tryingto avoid anything which might serveto qualify its ueasuresas an obstruction to civilian access to Berlin. The attitude of the control personnel was correct, and efforts were no^ underway to increase the numberof personnel in orderto avoid traffic delays, This cautious way of proceeding was, however,in keeping with the "salami tactics" of the régime and should not mislead anyone about the purpose behind it, 3, The Federal Government was greatly concerned about the situation. After a first assessment, hadit adopted the view that the new steps formed parta long-preparedof plan which aimed, with obvious backing from the Soviet Union, at a step-by-step weakening of the statusof Berlin. The measures were bound to have a concrete effect on the traffic of individuals andgoods to Berlin, although it wasnot to be assumed that the Soviet Union was at present willingto run the risk of a serious Berlin crisis. However, East Berlin was trying to create an instrument which couldbe used at any time. 4. It was not possible to justify the measures with the emergency legislation recently adopted in the Federal Republic. DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Article 49 of the Soviet Constitution and the relevant DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE provisions enforced in the "DDR" went very much further,What was dangerous in this attempt at justification was that the Soviet Unionand the East Berlin régime were claiming a right of intervention in the Federal Republic. For thispurpose, any pretext - such as the alleged revivalof Nazism or the emergency legislation- was good enough. At the same time, the Soviet Union was demanding, with disarming frankness, the Federal Republic's signature under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had even said that the German signature was the only one of interest under this Treaty, -3- NATO SECEiET -4- NATO SECRET C-R( 68) 31 5. The Soviet Union, which did not accept the policy of detente pursued by the Federal Republic, was tryingto present the latter as the trouble-makerof Burope and to isolate her in this way, Since the Soviet Union was not succeeding in doingso, it was tryingto waken the Federal Republic by exerting pressureon Berlin, where she was particularly sensitive. 6. Under these circumstances, the Federal Government considered it necessaryto react not only by protestsbut also by energetic countermeasures, while realising the difficulty of balancing firmness with caution,As far as concrete measures were concerned, the Federal Government had already decided to take several stepso First, all appropriate German Ministries had been instructed to study urgently the constitutional and legal aspects of possible travel restrictions for Soviet Zone functionaries who intended visiting the Federal Republic. Secondly, a Federal law providing for a substantial increase of Federal aidto the Berlin economy, which was originallyto have been enactedin the autumn, would be considered by the Federal Cabinet at a meeting that afternoon so that Parliament could take it up immediately, if possible within the next two weeks. Thirdly, the payment of 140 million Deutschmarksto East Berlin, which wasto have been madein the context of the adjustment of postal and tax accounts, wouldbe postponed, Fourthly, the head of the Federal Interzonal Trusteeship Officehad been instructed to take the opportunity of his next discussion with his East Berlin counterpart to ask him about the compatibility of the latest measures vrith the Interzonal Trade Agreement of1960 and9 incase of an unsatisfactory answer, to launch a strong protest, The appropriate authorities of the Federal Government had studied the possible adverse effectson Berlin of measures against interzonal trade and the results of this study were now being considered at the political level, Finally, at the meetingof the Bundestag on 20th June, the FederalGoverment would make a statement about the East Berlin measures. DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7. The German Representative went onto say that DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE additional measures, especiallyin the field of travel regulations, were being actively considered by the Pour Power Group in Bonn, and it was hoped that these couldbe presented to the Council in the very near future. His Government had asked him to appeal urgentlyto all Allied governments to co-operate and support the measures after having studied the proposals of the Four. 8. He added that all German missions abroad hadbeen asked for a detailed report aboutall activities of the Pankow regime xhich wereto be expected in the near future, such as visitsof functionaries, participationin trade fairs and other events and intended journeysof high-ranking -4- NATO SECRET -5- NATO SECRET E-" E-" U personalities from abroadto the Soviet Zone, The missions had been asked wherever appropriateto propose, in close consultation with the authorities in the respective capitals, what measures couldbe taken with regardto such activities. In addition, the Federal Republic was appealingto all friendly governmentsto show the appropriate reservein all dealings with functionaries of the Soviet Zone (including functionaries of Chamber of' Commerce representations). His Government considered it absolutely necessaryto make the Pankow authorities feel that their neasuresof 11th June, as well as other recent measures, would not serve their purpose of pressing upon the community of nationsth.e so-called "DDR" as a sovereign member, but would, on the contrary, only result in a further deterioration of the regime's reputation. g, The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIPT said his Government fully supported the position of the Federal Government as outlined by his German colleague.He observed that close quadripartite consultations were continuing and believed that the outcome of these talks,in the form of possible individual or Allied countermeasures, wouldbe presented for the Council's consideration in the very near future, 10. As part of the co-ordinated diplonlatic effort, the United States Secretaryof State had strongly protested the East German restrictions aat meeting inHew York with the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister,Mr, Kuznetzov, on 15th June. Describing the East German measures as violations of the Pour Power Agreements asand affecting the viabilityof Berlin, the Secretary of State had suggestad, moreover, that the timing seemed to be calculated to sabotage the Non- Proliferation Treaty. Mr. Kuznetzov bad replied that the measures simply meant that West Germans wouldbe treated as citizens of a foreign country, while Alliedaccess rights to Berlin were not affected. He had added that the Soviet Union did not wishto aggravate relationsvjith the United States and its World WarII allies and hadsaid that any West German linking of the measures with signatureof the DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Non-Proliferation Treaty wouldbe a deliberate action on the DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE part of an opponentof the Treaty. 11, The United States Representativealso read out the text of a letter of support addressedto the West German Chancellor by President Johnson whichwas to be made public later that day. 12, Speculating next on the motives and intentionsof the Soviet Union, he said seemed it unlikely that the Soviets would allow the situationto escalate to crisis proportions or would permit the Ulbricht régimeto do SO. Nevertheless, it was clear that a new iy? phase the old campaign to decide the fateof Berlin was underwayt with Soviet