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NATO SECRET SUMMARY RECORD

LC-R( 68)31 Summary record of a meetinp of theCouncil held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, O-nMonday,

PRESENT Chairman: Mr, Manlio Brosio BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY Baron J., Papeians I Mr. P.A. Cavalieratc NY~G. Kristiansen de Morehovel z ICELAND PORTUGAL CANADA Mr. N,P. Sigurdsson Mr. V. da Cunha Mr, Ross Campbell ITALY DEïViVlARK TURKEY Mr. C, de Perrariis Mr, O. Cankardes Mr. O. Bierring Salzano FRANCE LUXEMBOURG UNITED KINGDOM NIr, R, Seydoux Mr. L, Schaus Sir Bernard Burrows GERMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES Mr, W,G, Grewe Mr. H.M. Boon Mr@ Harlan Cleveland INTERNATIONAL STAFF

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Deputy Secretary General: MY, J,A, Roberts

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs: Mr. J. Jaenicke Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge ALSO PRESENT Chairman, Military Committee: Lt.Gen, Baron G,P, de Cumont

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CONTENTS

"...Item Subject

Berlin 1 - 20

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NATO SECRET BERLIN 1, The GERMAM RESRESEIVTATIVE wished to inform the Council on further developments in the Berlin questionand more specifically on the situation at the chockpoints,on his Government's political assessmentof the actions and on the concrete countermeasures enforcedor considered, in close consultation with the three Allied governments primarily responsible for Berlin, 2. Whereas, in the first few days after the introduction of the new measures, therebeen had delays on the demarcation line lasting toup six hours, it now appeared as though the Pankow régime was tryingto avoid anything which might serveto qualify its ueasuresas an obstruction to civilian access to Berlin. The attitude of the control personnel was correct, and efforts were no^ underway to increase the numberof personnel in orderto avoid traffic delays, This cautious way of proceeding was, however,in keeping with the "salami tactics" of the régime and should not mislead anyone about the purpose behind it, 3, The Federal Government was greatly concerned about the situation. After a first assessment, hadit adopted the view that the new steps formed parta long-preparedof plan which aimed, with obvious backing from the Soviet Union, at a step-by-step weakening of the statusof Berlin. The measures were bound to have a concrete effect on the traffic of individuals andgoods to Berlin, although it wasnot to be assumed that the Soviet Union was at present willingto run the risk of a serious Berlin crisis. However, East Berlin was trying to create an instrument which couldbe used at any time. 4. It was not possible to justify the measures with the emergency legislation recently adopted in the Federal Republic.

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Article 49 of the Soviet Constitution and the relevant

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE provisions enforced in the "DDR" went very much further,What was dangerous in this attempt at justification was that the Soviet Unionand the East Berlin régime were claiming a right of intervention in the Federal Republic. For thispurpose, any pretext - such as the alleged revivalof Nazism or the emergency legislation- was good enough. At the same time, the Soviet Union was demanding, with disarming frankness, the Federal Republic's signature under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had even said that the German signature was the only one of interest under this Treaty,

-3- NATO SECEiET -4- NATO SECRET C-R( 68) 31 5. The Soviet Union, which did not accept the policy of detente pursued by the Federal Republic, was tryingto present the latter as the trouble-makerof Burope and to isolate her in this way, Since the Soviet Union was not succeeding in doingso, it was tryingto waken the Federal Republic by exerting pressureon Berlin, where she was particularly sensitive. 6. Under these circumstances, the Federal Government considered it necessaryto react not only by protestsbut also by energetic countermeasures, while realising the difficulty of balancing firmness with caution,As far as concrete measures were concerned, the Federal Government had already decided to take several stepso First, all appropriate German Ministries had been instructed to study urgently the constitutional and legal aspects of possible travel restrictions for Soviet Zone functionaries who intended visiting the Federal Republic. Secondly, a Federal law providing for a substantial increase of Federal aidto the Berlin economy, which was originallyto have been enactedin the autumn, would be considered by the Federal Cabinet at a meeting that afternoon so that Parliament could take it up immediately, if possible within the next two weeks. Thirdly, the payment of 140 million Deutschmarksto East Berlin, which wasto have been madein the context of the adjustment of postal and tax accounts, wouldbe postponed, Fourthly, the head of the Federal Interzonal Trusteeship Officehad been instructed to take the opportunity of his next discussion with his East Berlin counterpart to ask him about the compatibility of the latest measures vrith the Interzonal Trade Agreement of1960 and9 incase of an unsatisfactory answer, to launch a strong protest, The appropriate authorities of the Federal Government had studied the possible adverse effectson Berlin of measures against interzonal trade and the results of this study were now being considered at the political level, Finally, at the meetingof the Bundestag on 20th June, the FederalGoverment would make a statement about the East Berlin measures.

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7. The German Representative went onto say that DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE additional measures, especiallyin the field of travel regulations, were being actively considered by the Pour Power Group in Bonn, and it was hoped that these couldbe presented to the Council in the very near future. His Government had asked him to appeal urgentlyto all Allied governments to co-operate and support the measures after having studied the proposals of the Four. 8. He added that all German missions abroad hadbeen asked for a detailed report aboutall activities of the Pankow regime xhich wereto be expected in the near future, such as visitsof functionaries, participationin trade fairs and other events and intended journeysof high-ranking

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personalities from abroadto the Soviet Zone, The missions had been asked wherever appropriateto propose, in close consultation with the authorities in the respective capitals, what measures couldbe taken with regardto such activities. In addition, the Federal Republic was appealingto all friendly governmentsto show the appropriate reservein all dealings with functionaries of the Soviet Zone (including functionaries of Chamber of' Commerce representations). His Government considered it absolutely necessaryto make the Pankow authorities feel that their neasuresof 11th June, as well as other recent measures, would not serve their purpose of pressing upon the community of nationsth.e so-called "DDR" as a sovereign member, but would, on the contrary, only result in a further deterioration of the regime's reputation. g, The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIPT said his Government fully supported the position of the Federal Government as outlined by his German colleague.He observed that close quadripartite consultations were continuing and believed that the outcome of these talks,in the form of possible individual or Allied countermeasures, wouldbe presented for the Council's consideration in the very near future, 10. As part of the co-ordinated diplonlatic effort, the United States Secretaryof State had strongly protested the East German restrictions aat meeting inHew York with the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister,Mr, Kuznetzov, on 15th June. Describing the East German measures as violations of the Pour Power Agreements asand affecting the viabilityof Berlin, the Secretary of State had suggestad, moreover, that the timing seemed to be calculated to sabotage the Non- Proliferation Treaty. Mr. Kuznetzov bad replied that the measures simply meant that West Germans wouldbe treated as citizens of a foreign country, while Alliedaccess rights to Berlin were not affected. He had added that the Soviet Union did not wishto aggravate relationsvjith the United States and its World WarII allies and hadsaid that any West German linking of the measures with signatureof the

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Non-Proliferation Treaty wouldbe a deliberate action on the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE part of an opponentof the Treaty. 11, The United States Representativealso read out the text of a letter of support addressedto the West German Chancellor by President Johnson whichwas to be made public later that day. 12, Speculating next on the motives and intentionsof the Soviet Union, he said seemed it unlikely that the Soviets would allow the situationto escalate to crisis proportions or would permit the Ulbricht régimeto do SO. Nevertheless, it was clear that a new iy? phase the old campaign to decide the fateof Berlin was underwayt with Soviet support, The Soviet Unionand the Pankow r6gime were probing to see what the traffic would bear, and the natureof -5- XATO SECRET -6- UT0 SECRET C-R( 68)31

the reactionto the measures wouldbe inportant in their assessment of how farto carry their initiative. 13, As for the motives of the SovietZone, the rdgime's obvious interestin anything which might contributeto its desired identity as a sovereign state was no doubt reinforced by fears that the FederalRepublicss policy toward the East might undercut the East German rôle in 3urope and that developments in Czechoslovakia might find an echoin East Germany. The return to "salami tactics"also showed how difficult it was for the Bussiansto give up a hard line in Europe, how dedicated they wereto the atatus quo, how little taste they had for co-operation and how little they trusted the West's efforts atdGtente, Consequently, the West would be required to show great perseverance, patience and resolution in its pursuitof reconciliation and an eventual European settlement. In this connection, his Authorities especially applauded the reasonableness and moderation, as well as the renewed attachmentto the policy of d6tente, expressed by the Federal Chancellor and Government his in their public and private reactions, Thepresent situation also demonstrated how right and wise was the Allied policy, which underlay the post-Harmel Exercise,of remaining strong while seeking peace, 14, The UNITED KINGDOM REFRESENTATITE said his country was taking an active partin the discussions on possible countzrmeasures referredto by his German and United States colleagues, 15 The United Kingdom's general attitude could bebest characterised by an account of the conversation held on 14th June between the Ministerof State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Chalfont, in the absence of the Foreign Secretary, and the Soviet Ambassadorin London, Lord Chalfont had expressed grave concern and disappointment that East Germany was seeking to impose restrictive measures, presumably with the agreement of the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom took a serious viewof

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE the.measures, whichwent against the Agreementsof the Four DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Powers who were responsiblefor freedom of movement to and from Berlin, The measures were calculatedto raise tension at amoment when the Western Powers and the FederalGovernment were pursuing a policyof d6tente, Replying, the Soviet Ambassador had argued that the East German measures were a reaction to the new West German emergency legislation and had suggested that the Western Powers oughtto be concerned about the threat constituted by this legislation. He had claimed that the East German action represented an attemptto prevent and not to increase tension and that the changesin documentation were only procedural: there was no intentionof curtailing trafficor of limiting Berlin's economic and other relations. Lord Chalfont had welcomed the assurances given

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but had expressed regret that tension had been increased simply for the sake of procedural changes,He had rejected the Soviet Ambassador's remarks concerningthe West German emergency legislation, The Soviet Ambassador had challenged West Germany's desire for d6tente and hadcited the visit to Berlin of the West German Chancellor as wellas statements made there by the latter, Lord Chalfont had replied that the United Kingdom had no doubtsto as the Federal Government's desire for détente. 16. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said Fyance alsowas actively engaged in the consultations alyeady mentionedby his colleagues, 17, The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, Mr. Alphand, in the absence of the Foreign Minister, had told the Soviet Ambassadorin Paris on 14th June that the East German measures were contraryto existing practices, jeopardised the status quo and endangereddétente in Europe. He had also pointed out that the new measures had nothingto do with the West German emergency legislation, which was quite legitimate, and that East Germany shouldbe restrained in the course of action it had adopted,Ile had recalled, in this connection, that the SovietUnion had special responsibilities with regardto traffic to and from Berlin and could exercise a special influence for moderation, The Soviet Ambassador had replied that the policyof Viest Germany was a source of tension in Europe, which explained the East German reaction. He had claAmed that the measures themselves were normal on the part a of 'isovereign" state which was free to implement regulations on its borders:. The Soviet Ambassador had affirmed that there was no intentionto hinder traffic and that only procedural modifications were involved: the access rights of the Western Powerswere not being questioned, and any deterioration of the situation could only result from actionby the Federal Government, Mr, Alphand had said Prance regretted that, aat time when the Federal Republic was working towardsa relaxation of tension and the normalisation of relations with the Eastern European states,

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE steps had been takento hinder the processof détente.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 18. The French Representative wishedto add that his Authorities welcomed the moderation exhibi5edby the Federal Government and appreciated the latter's willingnessto persevere with its policy of encouraging détente,, 19, The CHAIRMAN, thanking the four Permanent Representatives who had spoken, notedthat specific proposals concerning possible countermeasul-es might soonbe placed before the Council for its consideration,

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(1) noted the statements of the German, United States, United Kingdom and French Representatives; (2) noted the German Representative's intention to circulate the fulltext of his statement; (3) agreed that no official statement on the subject shouldbe issued to the Press until the Council had considered the matter further at a subsequent meeting,

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OTBN/NATO, Brussels, 39.

NATO SECRET c CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD LI-Bleu - r.Il .NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL -"

:MPLAIRE

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PRESEETS ,."II ""..Y 3résiden-t :: M, Xmlio Brosio

GRECE _> LU"_ NORVEGE M. P.A. Cavalierato Me G. Kris-tlznsen

ITALIE TURQUIE "_." ". ".." ~ -.. .. M. C, de Ferrariis M. O Cadrardes Salzmo

LUXENBOURG ROYAUBIE-UITI m.." -._. Sir Bernard: Burrows BAYS-BAS ETATS-UNIS .P."-.I" ._..__j x'i. HON. Boon M. Harlan Clevelmd

SecrétaireGén6ral dBlégu6

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE Secrétaire GGnéral adjoint pour DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE les Affzires politlqu-3s M. J Jaeniclce Secrétaireexécutif LordColeridge

Lt. -Gén. Baron de Cwflon-t

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Point Objet I--L“S__L__. I Berlin

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I. BERLIN

1, Le REPRESEI?TlJ?TI de 1'ALLEIUGNE tient à informcr le Conseil ds la récente &volution de h, qucs'tion de Berlin, et plusparticuli&rement de la situation am points de contrôle, ~iel'évaluation politique des masures priscs, faitk par son Gouvcrmement et des contre-mesurespr2tiqu:s mises en application ou cnvisag&es, en consultationétroitc t?vec les trois gouvcr- nements alliés rcsilonsables deBerlin ELI premierchef. 2. Alors quepenciant les premiersjours qui ont suivi la miseen applicaticn d2s nouvelles mcsums, l'attente à la ligne de démarcation EL parfois été de sixheurEs; il sembl~ maintenantque le rdgimede 3wlkow ~'cfforced'éviter tout cc qui permettrait de qualifier les mesures qu'il a prises d'obstruction à l'rzccgs de la population civile à Berlin. Le yersonnclde contrôle a une attitude corrrcte et les autorit6s prennent des dispositions gour aumenter le nombre des 2i"onction- nz.ires aux points de pcssage, afin de ne ;m,s rzlentir la circulation.Cettc attitude prudente est cependant conforme 8. la tactique d~jclgrignota.gelf utilisde par le r6gime et nc dcvrzitleurrer personne, quant aux objectifs quil'inspirent. 3. Cette situation pr&occupesérieusement le Gouvernement fé<érdyqui, aprks un2 premiiireévaluztion, est Zirriv6 2~ la conclusionque les nouvcllesmesures font lmrtie d'un i2lm pSparé depuislong-temps qui vise,avec 1 (zppui manifest-c de l'Unionsoviétique, & imrterprogressivexent atteinte au stz*tut de Berlin. En effet, cr,s mesures mwont indvitc,blementdes inci- denccsconcrètes sur la circul3tj-on $-L.:;= personnes Gt d2.s marchan- diac:sen direction de Bcrlin, ct s'il nc semble pasque l'Union

soviétique soit actuel1c;mcat disposei:I. 2% courir le riscpc d'une cris2grave ds Berlin; les Pctorit6:; 6.2 Ecrlin-Ests'cfforccnt dc mettre au ;Joint ciic?s moyenssusce;Jtiblc:s 6'C;trc uti1isB.s à tout moment

$-. La législationGfurgence récmrncnt aüoptée ;Jar ln République fédérale: nc: murait justificr cos mesures; l'aticle 4<9 de 13, Constitutionsov56tique et les diqloaitionscorrcs;2ond-mtes envigueur en "R.D.IZlo li vont beryxou:;, @.-us loin. Le dmger, DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE dans

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE cctcssai de justification, ~stque l'Union soviétique et le régime Bst-sllemandrevcndiq-uent le droit d'intarvenir ~n République féd6rale. 4- cette fin; tous les prétextes sont bons - quece soit la soi-disant résurrection du nazismeou la législation d'urgence. L'Unionsoviétique domande, en même tempsp avecune nzfvet6 d6sarmante,que la B6imbliquEfédérrlc! sime le traité de non- p~olifération,st a m8mc déclaré que la slgnaturaO de l'l"Lllomagne &taitla seule qui l3résentaitrésllcmen-L un intérGt. 5. L'Union sovi6tiquequi n'acccptc pas la politiquede détentepoursuivie l32.r la Xépublique f6ddrde, s'efforce 62 pr6sentt;rcelle-ci ~GIIWIZ le trouble-fêtz de l'Europe afin dr3 l'isolc;.r. Rty parvenant pas, elle cosaic de l'zffaiblir cn exerçantune -;sression sur Berlin,qui constitue un point particulikrementsensible.

-3- NATO.UI SECRET ..4 6. Dans cesconditions, le Gouverncnent fédéral estime néceesaire de &agir non seulement par des protestations, mais aussi par des contre-mesuresénergiques bien qu'il reconnaisse combien il est difficile d'établir un équilibre entre la femcté et la prudence. Le G.ouvcrvlement fédéral T~ déjàdécidé de pendre un certain nombre clc mesuresconcrètcs. En isremierlieu, tous les ministres a11Gmands compétents ont été invités à étudisr d'urgence les espcctsconstitutionnels et juridiques que comporterait l'imposition éventuel12 .de restrictions à la circulationdes fonctionnaires de la zonesoviétique désirat se rendreen République fédérale. En second lieu, une loi fédérale accordantune augmqtntation importmtc de l'aide fédérale à l'économiede Berlm, qui devaitinitialement $%re promulguée à l'automnep sera étudide par le Cabinetfédéral 5 une réunion prévue pourcette aprbs-midi mgme, cfin que le Parlemat puisse s'en saisir sans délai, si possible au cours desdeux prochaines semaines. En troisième lieu, le paiement cle Deutschmarks 140 mïtlians à Berlin-Est, qui devait avoir lieu le. cadre &*us: rkglement descomptes postaux et tarlfaires seradifférg. En quatrième lieu, le Chef du Bureau fédéralpour 1"Lministration interzonale a ét6 invit6 à profiter fie sa prochainerencontre avecson homologue de Berlin&Est pour l'interroger sur la compatibilité des dernieres mesures avec llaccordcommercial interzonal de 1960, etémettre une protestpetion éncrgiquc m cas 06 sa réponsil: no scrait pas satisfniszmtE. LGS zu-torités compétentes du Gcuverncmevlt fédéralont étudié les effets d6favorablcs6ventuels sur Berlin dc rncsuresprises contre le commerce interzonal at le résultat dc ccttsétude zst à l'étude à l'échelcjn politique. Enfin, le Gouvcrncment fédércl fera le 20 juin uric 36ckurzaticnm Bundcstzg sur les mesures relatives à Berlin-Est e

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13. QuLtnt aux motifs de la zono sovicr?tiquo,llintér6i évidentque ICrégime y porte B tout CL quiycut contribucr à lui donner, comme clla ICsouhaita, IC statut d'un Etat souvorain est scans aucundoutc renforcé par IC cmintc dc voir 13..poli-biquc da la Ré;?ublique fédéralc à l'égard dc l'ïZst rnincr la situztion dc llAllomagncde l'Est cn Europc;s ct les derniers dvénements cn Tchécoslovaquictrouvcr un dch:, en PLllcm~.b~c.do l'Est. Le rotour à la t3ctiquc ?Lu figrignotageitmontrc egalcmcnt ctombian les Russeséprouvent dc difficultds B abmdonncr unc politiquc dure cn Europe, combien ils sont attachés ?'U statu quo,cornbicn ils ontpeu d~ goût ;)our la coopération c-t combimpeu ils SC ficnt izwi cfforts faits i2zr l'Ouest en faveur dc 12 détente.L'Oucst devra donc faire pxuve d'une grmdc ~~roévérancc,d'unc graxtdc i3aticncc et de beaucoup de volonté d,ms xes effortspour aboutir B une réconciliation ot à un règlement final de la situr-tion curopéennr:. cet dgard, les fu,xtoritds américaines SC félicitent particulièrcment dc la sagi;ssC9dc la rnod-hration ct di; llattachenmt rézffimé à la plitique de détcntcdont le Chancslicr fédéral at son Gouvernement ont fait lsreuvu dms lcurs réwtions publiques et privées. La situztion actuellemontrc égdcment la scgcsse ct IC bicnfondé de la i3olitiqucalliée, qui consiste dcncurcr forts tout enrecherchant la L?zixp sur laqucllc 8; fondont lcs Vtudcs consécutives au plan Harm~l'~. 1Lt9 Le REPWSZNTI1NT Cu ROYAUI1'IE-UDI d6clare que son issays prend une part activeaux échanges de vuus sur les contrc mc?sUms éventuellcs quz viemcntd'6voquer ses collègues allcm,.ylci ct américain.

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ct qu'il nc s'agi:ssai-t en aucunefaGon de rcstreindrc 12. circu- lation ou dc limitcr les relationséconomiques CU mtrcs dE Berlin.Lord Chdfon-t a rcmcrcié1'Pmbasszdeur de l'URSS dos assu-

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18. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE ticn à ajouter que ses Autorités ont accueilli avec satisfaction la modération doDt fait preuve le Gouvernement fédgral zllemmcl et sa volonté Ge poursuivre la politique qu'il mkne en faveur de la détente, -7- 19. Le PRESIDEN,Y.', pqsrks avoir rcrnercid les quatraï3zprésentmts pcrmmentsqui ont ilris la parcle, noti-?gus ds:s prol2ositions Précises relativescontre-ncsurcs dvcntuelles seront proba- blement à brcf ddlai soumises ?L llcxmcn du Conseil.

20. LC CONSEIL E

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