Article ID: AEN-2021-02-04-016 Agro-Terrorism

Shanjeevika.V1*, Balasubramaniam.P2 and Muhammad Iqshanullah .A3 1Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Sociology, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore. 2Professor and Head, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Sociology, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore. 3Assistant professor, Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Sociology, S.Thanghapazham Agricultural College, Vasudevanallur *Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]

Agroterrorism, also known as Agriterrorism, is a malicious attempt to disrupt or destroy the agricultural industry and/ or food supply system of a population through "the malicious use of plant or animal pathogens to cause devastating disease in the agricultural sectors". It is closely related to the concepts of biological warfare and entomological warfare, except carried out by non-state parties. Definitions A hostile attack, towards an agricultural environment, including infrastructures and processes, in order to significantly damage national and international political interests. It is the use of biological agents as weapons against agricultural and food-supply industries. Terrorist acts intended to disrupt or damage a country’s agriculture, especially the use of a biological agent against crops or livestock. The Origins of Agroterrorism Of all the acts of ‘terrorism’, agroterrorism is one of the least studied and till recently little considered by contingency planners. Many nation states including the US, Russia, UK and France had all invested in a variety of biological agents in the 20th century. Deploying these bioweapons against agriculture had though been for most nation-states a theoretical consideration. In the early 1990s the threat from biological attack came to be accepted by many policy makers, (particularly in the US) as the probable form of terrorist attack on the human population. Although there was little physical evidence to support this, beyond some past localised use by radicals. This concern at the threat of biological attack agents grew in the 1990s and included the concern that anti-livestock, anticrop and antisoil agents could fall into the hands of non-state aggressors. Initial concern with agroterrorism began in the US where focus lay firmly with biological agents including crop diseases, pests and animal diseases. The use of the latter raises further issues, as some may be transmittable to humans (Zoonotic). Whilst there are hundreds of potential pathogens, realistically only a few dozen is considered viable. When considering viability of an agent, livestock are considered to be more widely susceptible than crops to pathogens, principally because, livestock in industrialised countries – the UK, US, Australia, etc are generally considered disease free. They therefore make effective vectors of transmission, particularly, during live animal movements. Agriculture as a Target- Overview of the Threat About 21 incidents worldwide since 1952 had been considered as acts of terrorism against agriculture. The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is

Volume 2 – Issue 4 [April 2021] P a g e | 57 increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. In this context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability. Agroterrorism is a subset of the more general issues of terrorism and bioterrorism. People more generally associate bioterrorism with outbreaks of human illness (such as from anthrax or sallpox), rather than diseases first affecting animals or plants. Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems for managing the threat: 1. Agricultural production is geographically disbursed in unsecured environments (e.g., open fields and pastures throughout the countryside). While some livestock are housed in secure facilities, agriculture in general requires large expanses of land that are difficult to secure from intruders. 2. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations (e.g., feedlots with thousands of cattle in openair pens, farms with tens of thousands of pigs, or barns with hundreds of thousands of poultry). Concentration in slaughter, processing, and distribution also makes large scale contamination more likely. Live animals, grain, and processed food products are routinely transported and commingled in the production and processing system. These factors circumvent natural barriers that could slow pathogenic dissemination. 3. The presence (or rumor) of certain pests or diseases in a country can quickly stop all exports of a commodity, and can take months or years to resume. 4. The number of lethal and contagious biological agents is greater for plants and animals than for humans. Most of these diseases are environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries, and not harmful to humans – making it easier for terrorists to acquire, handle, and deploy the pathogens. Thus, the general susceptibility of the agriculture and food industry to bioterrorism is difficult to address in a systematic way due to the highly dispersed, yet concentrated nature of the industry and the inherent biology of growing plants and raising animals. The results of an agroterrorist attack may include major economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, loss of confidence in government, and possibly human casualties. Humans could be at risk in terms of food safety or public health, especially if the chosen disease is transmissible to humans (zoonotic). But an agroterrorist attack need not cause human casualties for it to be effective or to cause large scale economic consequences. The production agriculture sector would suffer economically in terms of plant and animal health, and the supply of food and fiber may be reduced, especially in certain regions. The demand for certain types of food may decline based on which products are targeted in the attack (e.g., dairy, beef, pork, poultry, grains, fruit, or vegetables), while demand for other types of food may rise due to food substitutions An agroterrorism event would cause economic losses to individuals, businesses, and governments through costs to contain and eradicate the disease, and to dispose of contaminated products. Economic losses would accumulate throughout the farmto- table continuum as the supply chain is disrupted, especially if domestic markets for food become unstable or if trade sanctions are imposed by other countries on U.S. exports. The economic impact can spread to farmers, input suppliers, food processors, transportation, retailers, and food service providers. Public opinion may be particularly sensitive to a deliberate outbreak of disease affecting the food supply. Public confidence in government could be eroded if authorities appear unable to prevent such an attack or to protect the population’s food supply. Because an agroterrorist attack may not necessarily cause

Volume 2 – Issue 4 [April 2021] P a g e | 58 human casualties, be immediately detected, or have the “shock factor” of an attack against the more visible public infrastructure or human populations, agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first choice of targets. Nonetheless, some types of agroterrorism could be relatively easily achieved and have significant economic impacts. Thus, the possibilities are treated seriously, especially in the post- September 11 world. In addition to concerns that biological weapons could be developed or used by states, recent technological advances increase the likelihood that these weapons could be acquired or produced by non-state actors, including individuals and terrorist organizations. There were also several false accusations of biological weapons use, highlighting the difficulty in differentiating between naturally-occurring disease, accidents, and deliberate use. Pest-Transmitted Plant Pathogens Fungi are responsible for 75% of crop diseases, and thus they have the greatest potential for use as an act of aggression against crop plants. Also, the introduction if plant-feeding pest insects or mites had been considered in pat as an act of aggression but is unlikely to be successful in creating significant crop damage in most instances given the complexities of delivery, uncertainty of success and the probable availability of control measures. The arthropod pests require sophisticated mass culture and delivery system if they are to be used as a destructive force. Some vectors are also used to deliver a pathogen with a high infectivity potential from a relatively small number of inoculums. Viruses are the most appropriate pathogens for intentional vector transmission. Major arthropod vectors are: thrips, aphids, whitefly or leafhopper. Other groups include Lepidoptera, Diptera and nematodes capable of transmitting potentially destructive pathogens. The biological attacks to agriculture aresimpler to carry out than attacks on humans and may be done with rudimentary knowledge and training without exposing the perpetrators to danger by organisms that are usually no threat to humans. Strategies for Combating Risks and Costs Associated In practice, should a suspicious disease event occur, it would be difficult to determine if it was caused by nature, an accident, sabotage, or an act of biological warfare or terrorism. Consequently, the response to a biological event, whether natural, accidental or deliberate, would involve the coordination of actors from many sectors who together possess the capability to determine the cause and attribute it to a specific source. Likewise, the preparedness for and prevention of such an event should also involve multi-sectorial coordination. Because of the wide spectrum of potential biological hazards, efforts to manage the risks should be multi-disciplinary, multi-sectorial, and above all, coordinated. As such, the Biological Weapon Commission relies primarily on a network approach based on coordination with international, regional, and non- governmental organizations and initiatives as well as other non-proliferation regimes in order to address the interconnected nature of biological threats in a holistic manner. Under the framework of the BWC, improved coordination would provide positive externalities for managing disease, whatever the cause. Such an approach ensures that resources are used optimally to provide benefits for many. In this sense, for example, building capacities across sectors to monitor disease would not only strengthen the ability to detect and respond to a biological attack, but it would provide states with the capacity to track and mitigate naturally occurring disease thus vastly improving public health worldwide.

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Reference  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2839819/  https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17388078/  https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32521.html

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