Political Pressures and Army Policies on the Northern Plains, 1862-1865
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SULLY'S EXPEDITION of 1864 (the year before events described in this article) set up wagon corrals near Fort Berthold in Dakota Territory. Political Pressures and Army Policies on the Northern Plains, 1862-1865 Richard N. Ellis LONG LINES of dusty, weary, disgruntled men, their feated the Indians in battle, he failed to crush them wagons creaking under heavy loads, moved west dur or to settle the Sioux problem. ing the spring and early summer of 1865. They were By 1865, however, the situation changed. The Civil part of the bustle and confusion that marked military War had ended, and there were ample troops available activity in the trans-Mississippi West during prepara for duty on the frontier. Now Pope would have all the tions for one of the largest campaigns yet undertaken men he needed, and he believed that he could solve against the Plains Indians. Indian difficulties on the Northern Plains.^ The men moved under orders of Major General Pope planned to send several expeditions against John Pope, commander of the Division of the Missouri the Indians in the vicinity of the Black Hills and of with headquarters at St. Louis. He had served in the the Powder River of present-day Montana and Wyo West since September, 1862, when he was transferred ming. Wisdom and experience guided his thinking, from Virginia to St. Paul to head the new Department and his strategy of a large-scale, co-ordinated cam of the Northwest during the Sioux Uprising in Minne paign was sound. But the Powder River campaign sota. Pope was in charge during the last stages of that would fail. Among the reasons for the disaster of 1865 conflict and in 1863 and 1864 sent punitive expeditions were the indifferent quality of the officers in the field, against the Sioux in Dakota Territory. Pope operated their lack of co-operation, and the contrary attitude of in the context of the Civil War then and was always the volunteer troops who constituted these expedi subject to the withdrawal of troops for service in the tions — but politics also contributed to defeat. Political South. Although his field commanders repeatedly de- pressure from Minnesota prompted Pope to send his Mr. Ellis is assistant professor of history as well as director ablest officer and most experienced troops on an unpro- of the American Indian Historical Research Project at the University of New Mexico. He has written a book on Gen ^ For a summary of Pope's years in the West, see Rich ard N. Ellis, "After Bull Run: The Later Career of General eral Pope that will soon be published by the University John Pope," in Montana, the Magazine of Western History, of New Mexico Press. August, 1969, p. 46-57. Summer 1970 43 ductivc march to the northeast away from the hostde other things, had given the Sioux provocation for the concentration west of the Missouri River. outbreak.* The political pressure causing Pope to modify his plans in 1865 was not a new phenomenon in the North DESPITE THE pressing needs of the Civil War, the west. It had, in fact, plagued his operations against the War Department authorized campaigns against the Sioux from the very beginning. Politics and warfare Sioux in 1863 and 1864, but Pope discovered that his have never been widely separated, and this was espe strategy of offensive movements against the Indians cially true during the Civil War years. General Pope was subject to mounting criticism. Political considera was well aware of this. He had played politics himself, tions and political rivalries were very much involved had sought influential friends, and, while commanding as Henry M. Rice, Democratic senator from Minnesota, the newly created Army of Virginia during the sum began to attack his old enemy Sibley and General mer of 1862, had hobnobbed with the Radical Repub Pope. Rice, a member of the Senate's influential com licans. Even after his defeat in the Second Battle of mittee on military affahs, sought to discredit his rival. Bull Run in August and his exile to the Department He apparently attempted to have Sibley removed in of the Northwest, he had sought to influence the selec the autumn of 1862 and evidently delayed the promo tion of army commanders through powerful friends. tion of the old fur trader and Indian fighter to the rank After he lost his command in Virginia, he bitterly at of brigadier general. These efforts failed, so Rice then tacked George McClellan and other Democratic gen sought to replace Pope as commander of the Depart erals in a series of letters to a friend and fonner ment of the Northwest. As a Democrat his chances for superior, Heni-y W. Halleck.- In Minnesota, however. re-election were slim, and the command of the military Pope discovered a different situation. There, prominent department would keep him in the public eye and opponents handicapped his efforts. place Sibley under his control.^ Minnesotans willingly expounded their views from When Pope learned of these developments, he the time the Sioux Uprising began in August, 1862. warned his old friend. General in Chief Henry W. They first demanded assistance and got it in the form Halleck, that "unscrupulous speculators and traders" of a military expedition led by Colonel (later Briga would use every means to have one of their number dier General) Henry H. Sibley, who had been the appointed to command the department. The appoint state's first governor. His force raised the siege of Fort ment of Rice, he said, would result in many years of Ridgely, defeated the Sioux under Little Crow at the border wars and "ruinous Indian treaties and frauds." Battle of Wood Lake on September 23, shortly there The senator was a "reckless and ruined speculator and after freed 269 white and half-breed prisoners, and took charge of Indians who surrendered. The people •' See T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 141- and their political and military leaders, including Gov 148 (Madison, 1941) for an extremely critical treatment of ernor Alexander Ramsey, Sibley, and Pope himself, Pope and his political maneuverings and bombastic state demanded not only the execution of some three hun ments during the summer of 1862. "If John Pope had pos dred prisoners convicted by a military commission but sessed a coat of arms," writes Williams (p. 6), "it would also the removal of all Indians from the state. The peo have been bombast rampant upon an expansive field of incompetence"; Pope to Halleck, September 30 and Octo ple were unhappy when President Abraham Lincoln ber 20, 1862, in United States War Department, The War reduced the condemned list to thirty-nine, one more of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of than the total eventually hung.^ the Union and Confederate Armies, series 1, vol. 12, part 3, p. 816-819, 821 (Washington: Govemment Printing Of Minnesotans approved of General Pope's decision fice, 1880-1901), hereafter cited as Official Records. to help settle the Sioux problem with a spring cam ""Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs" (Wib paign into Dakota Territory. Representative of news ham P. Dole), 37 Congress, 3 session. House Executive paper bitterness against the fndians was an editorial Documents, no. 1, vol. 2, p. 177, 213 (serial 1157); "In entitled "THE SIOUX WAR: WHAT SHALL WE dian Barbarities in Minnesota," 37 Congress, 3 session. DO WITH IT?" in which the St. Paul Press announced, Senate Executive Documents, no. 7, p. 1-6 (serial 1149). "now, in God's name, let the columns of vengeance For a short account of the outbreak, see Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862 (St. Paul, 1961). move on!" There should be no peace "until the whole 'St. Paul Press, October 21, 1862, p. 2 (quoted in the accursed brood are crushed — crushed as no band of Yankton Dakotian, November 11, 1862); St. Paul Pioneer these North American Sepoys have ever been punished October 23, 1862, p. 1. by mihtaiy force." Practically no voices at the time, ^= Erfing T. Jorstad, "The Life of Henry Hastings Sib except that of Episcopal Bishop Henry B. Whipple, ley," unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Wis spoke up to indicate that inept government policies consin, 1957 (copy in Minnesota Historical Society), 116- and white encroachments on Indian lands, among 147; WiUiam W. Folwefi, A History of Minnesota 1-240 260, 317, 369-372 (St. Paul, 1956). 44 Minnesota History old Indian trader" whose appointment would be based "upon a knowledge of Indians and Indian character, acquired during many years of unlimited concubinage with Indian women." ^ Rice faded to destroy Sibley or to remove Pope, but he and Repubhcan Senator Morton S. Wilkinson of Minnesota continued to interfere with military opera tions in the Department of the Nprthwest. They pre dicted the failure of the 1863 campaign and claimed that the troops should be retained in Minnesota to protect the settlements rather than sent on a fruitless march into Dakota Territory. They failed in their ef forts to block the Sibley expedition, but they did man age to secure authorization for a battalion of cavalry under Major Edwin Hatch of St. Paul, a friend of Rice. They apparently envisioned a military unit which would be independent of the regular military authori ties in the department, but Pope wisely demanded that Hatch be placed under his command. The War De partment agreed, and Sibley effectively removed this potential source of difficulty by sending Hatch to Pem bina near the Canadian boundaiy to establish a post in midwinter. Sibley wrote of the Hatch appointment: "The whole thing I regard as a miserable scheme got up by Rice & others who hate Gen.