1 ISBN 978-9934-564-11-6

THE DYNAMICS OF ’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN STUDY RESULTS

PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 2

ISBN 978-9934-564-11-6 THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AGAINST UKRAINE DURING THE SYRIA CAMPAIGN

Project director: Dace Kundrāte Text Editor: Brigita Stroda Research team: Center for International Studies (Latvia)

Production & Copy Editor: Linda Curika

The NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, based in Latvia, is a multinational, cross-sector organization which provides comprehensive analyses, advice and practical support to the alliance and allied nations. This report is a product of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO.

© All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. Cover photo: Christopher J. Fraser Flickr creative commons licence

Riga, November 2016

NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected] 3 INTRODUCTION

Two major geopolitical conflicts are at the • to soften and, in the nearest core of this research. Military conflict in Syria future, achieve the lifting of and the related rise of terrorism carried out the sanctions regime against by Daesh, in both the region and beyond, Russia. pose an enormous policy challenge for the From the ideological point of view, the governments of the United States of America information activities executed by Russia (US) and Europe. Simultaneously, Russia during the Syria campaign must be faces sanctions after it annexed Crimea – the observed in the broader context of Russia’s biggest and most serious geopolitical violation foreign policy strategy. Since November of national borders in the 21st century so 2013, when the uprising of the Ukrainian far. This paper provides an analysis of the nation set a wide spectrum of events and dynamics and changes in the level of Russia’s processes in motion, researchers and information activities against Ukraine before policy makers have been questioning the and after the commencement of the Syrian reasoning, consequences and international campaign. The analysis proves that, despite implications of those political processes, the geographical distance between them, both as well as their impact on the future of conflicts share mutually coordinated strategic the international environment at large. narratives promoted by Russia. This report Russia’s international ambitions are based argues that the strategic goals of the Russian not only on conquering new territories (the government’s propaganda are the following: Crimea case) but also on creating mental • to promote Russia as a crucial landscapes that are favourable for influence player in the polycentric world and political manipulation. Russia’s foreign in the process of international policy goals regarding the West are can be peace; defined in the following way - “to weaken the West economically, to split it politically, • to claim Russia’s superiority and to establish Russia as the hegemonic over the US; power on the European continent”1. For • to prevent Ukraine’s this reason, this research puts the parallel transformation into being part 1 A. J. Motyl, ‘The West Should Arm Ukraine. Here's Why—And of the external border of NATO How’, Foreign Affairs (10.02.2015), available at http:// and the European Union (EU); www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143056/alexander-j- motyl/the-west-should-arm-ukraine. 4

agendas for Ukraine and Syria together, 2) Western Europe and the US because this approach can be considered as (information broadcasted via a recent strategic propaganda manoeuvre English language information by the Kremlin. channels). The research on the dynamics of Russia’s This study covers analysis of the following propaganda against Ukraine during the selected audio-visual platforms: RT Syria campaign covers a time period that is (previously known as Russia Today)2, Pervy divided into two parts: kanal3, Sputniknews4, and information provided by EEAS Disinformation Review5. 1) the pre-Syria campaign period (partial ceasefire [26th Although television is not the only source February 2015] - military of news, which RT demonstrates clearly engagement of Russia in Syria by putting its biggest emphasis on the [30th September 2015]); distribution of its propaganda via YouTube, it should be underscored that television is one 2) the Syria campaign period of the most powerful tools of propaganda (military engagement of Russia for conveying messages linguistically, as in Syria [30th September narratives, visually and with special audio 2015] - announcement about editions. In addition, all of the analysed the withdrawal of Russian audio-visual platforms have well-developed forces; [15th March 2016]). social media networks, which significantly The selected time periods are analysed increases their socio-political impact. using the case study approach, i.e. selecting Quantitative and qualitative analyses of historically and politically significant dates Russia’s information activities have been and carrying out critical content analysis carried out, leading to an understanding of and narrative analysis. Forty-four cases were the content of propaganda and the effect analysed in regard to the pre-Syria campaign of propaganda in the media, on the mass period, and fifty-four cases were analysed in audience during the selected time period. regard to the Syria campaign period. 2 RT is a TV channel with a relatively low number of This approach provides a valid overview of viewers in Western countries but has bigger potential. Russia’s information activities and allows for 3 Pervy kanal is the leader among the top-viewed channels. In this study, the channel’s archive (www.1tv. the measurement of the intensity of Russia’s ru) was monitored, which covers news programs with a information activities and their content, wide reach, including Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic states and Europe. comparing two main audiences: 4 The project ‘Sputniknews’ has been recently launched; therefore, it’s important to research it in order to draw 1) Russia’s neighbourhood conclusions about its possible future influence. countries (information 5 This information product of the European External Action Service collects examples of Russian broadcasted via Russian disinformation attacks in real time. Its objective is to language information show the European public the high number of such channels); disinformation attacks that target European audiences every single day, to expose the number of countries targeted and, thus, to explain to the European audience the breadth of this problem. See more: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/ disinformation_review_02-11-15_en.pdf 5

The analyses were carried out using the mass communication procedure of content analysis, critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis, taking into account the frequency with which certain symbols (e.g. enemy, ally, peace, democracy, morality, superiority, weakness, security, suffering et al.) appear in a message, the direction in which the symbols try to direct the audience’s opinion and the intensity of the symbols used. The dynamics of narratives were analysed through the agenda setting perspective.6 These are revealed in the time- line, demonstrating how certain strategic narratives7 evolve while others are omitted.

6 S. Y. Park, K. J. Holody, X. Zhang, ‘Race in Media Coverage of School Shootings: A Parallel Application of Framing Theory and Attribute Agenda Setting’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 89(3), (2012), pp. 475-494. 7 Strategic narratives are tools for political actors to articulate a position on a specific issue and to shape perceptions and actions of domestic and international audiences (I. Khaldarova, M. Pantti, ‘Fake News: The narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict’, Journalism Practice, [2016], pp. 1-11; A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin, L. Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, [New York, Routledge, 2014]). The overarching strategies in all propaganda are positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the ‘other’ (T. van Dijk, ‘Discourse and manipulation’, Discourse and Society, 17[2], [2006], pp. 359-383.) The typical “West versus Russia” narrative in Russian foreign policy has been recently widely analysed in academic literature (see, for example, C. Cottiero, K. Kucharski, E. Olimpieva, R. W. Orttung, ‘War of Words: The Impact of Russian State Television on the Russian Internet’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 43 [4], [2015], pp. 533–555; O. Malinova, ‘“Spiritual Bonds” as State Ideology’, Russia in Global Affairs, [18 December 2014]). A strategic propaganda narrative is future-oriented, and propaganda always has certain goals. 6 LEVELS OF THE PROPAGANDA DYNAMICS: MESSAGING, SIGNALLING, ENGAGEMENT

The ultimate goal of the propaganda is a or suppress an individual’s adequately constant and unrelenting stream of managed informed, rational, reflective judgment.”9 narrative and discourse, while the interim Messaging is the lowest level of propaganda, goals are smaller steps towards achieving and it involves “the whole range of this goal. The overall assumption is that traditional communication media, to include the ultimate goal of Russian propaganda in pictures, text, and video, and all messaging the media is to achieve a situation where technology: print, radio television, mobile the US and other Western countries accept phone, portable digital assistant, two-way Russian strategy as its own, and to denigrate pager, and so forth.”10 This propaganda the West through parallel and managed level differs from the next two by one-way dynamics of media news about events in communication (without response and Ukraine and Syria. responding, without long-term relationships The interim goals are coordinated and non- and activities that back the communication). conflicting, and they manifest themselves in Signalling is the next level of propaganda, the following levels of dynamics8: and it is characterised by actions that also 1) Messaging; send messages. “It is easier to keep in mind that certain aspects of manoeuvres, such as 2) Signalling; a ship cruising off-shore or a patrol traversing 3) Engagement. a street, unavoidably signals something to those witnessing it.”11 Therefore, signalling All interim propaganda goals, which run includes non-verbal messages that transmit through different levels of propaganda, signals about the intended course of action or can be described as “the organized attitude towards a particular issue or event. attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent

9 R. Marlin, Propaganda & the Ethics of Persuasion, (Peterborough, ON, Canada: Broadview Press, 2002), p. 22. 10 C. Paul, Strategic Communication. Origins, Concepts, 8 See C. Paul, Strategic Communication. Origins, and Current Debates. Contemporary Military, Strategic, Concepts, and Current Debates. Contemporary Military, and Security Issues, (Praeger, 2011), p. 47. Strategic, and Security Issues, (Praeger, 2011), pp. 17-71. 11 Ibid, p. 46. 7

Engagement is the highest level of state and a superior Russia, a variety of propaganda, and it shows a clear action tools have been used in the RT stories. that demonstrates a strong determination These goals of propaganda serve as further to achieve certain goals to make an impact building blocks towards denigrating the on those who are being imposed on, in image of Ukraine and building a positive order to be influenced. Engagement is image of Russia in order to achieve the characterised by complex interactions lifting of both US and EU imposed economic and reaction by other parties. It also sanctions and hostility towards the state. It includes cultural context and “assumptions must be stressed that the news about the EU made by and about various parties extending its sanctions against Russia (17th communicating”12. As the highest level of June 2015) was not covered in the Russian- propaganda, engagement includes both speaking audio-visual platforms at all, while previous levels – messaging and signalling. in the English-speaking media, it reached the highest level of signalling. Russia’s information activities are analysed by indicating low (1), medium (2), or high (3) The example of the 26th of February 2015, intensity of a particular level of propaganda when Ukraine began withdrawal of heavy in each case during the selected time-period. weaponry as per the terms of the Minsk Agreement, serves as a good illustration of The case analysis shows massive signalling the afore-mentioned propaganda levels. In activity in English-speaking audio-visual regard to this event, the pro-Russian forces platforms, whilst a much lower level of were portrayed as more compliant and propaganda can be observed in Russian- superior through their neutrality towards speaking media that is aimed at Russia, the withdrawal of both pro-government Ukraine and regions with Russian language and anti-government forces. At the same proficiency, including the Baltic countries. time, Ukraine was shown as a failed state The most intensive level of anti‑Ukraine incapable of full cooperation with the propaganda in both – English-speaking and Western guidelines and, therefore, not Russian-speaking – audiences was aired being a worthy partner. In addition, images during September - October 2015. This time of military training in Latvia were added and period corresponds to Russia’s involvement described as “the flexing of military muscle in the Syria conflict, and the propaganda on Russia’s doorstep”. The propaganda signal machine was busy in all information areas at was sent that the pro-Russia forces, who are that time (see Chart 1 and Chart 2). perceived unfavourably by the West and the The main aim of the signalling activities Ukrainian government, are complying with has been the promotion of Russia as a the agreement, while the Western forces are superior state provoked by Western efforts still building their military operations against to escalate friction. In order to narrate these Russia on different fronts. (See Picture 1.) storylines and fulfil the interim goals of In this way, the idea of the hypocrisy of the showing the pro-Russian forces as superior, West was imparted. along with the ideas of a failed Ukrainian

12 C. Paul, Strategic Communication. Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues, (Praeger, 2011), p. 46. 8

Chart 1. Level of Russia’s propaganda against Ukraine. Media in Russian language. 15th February 2015 – 15th March 2016 *

Chart 2. Level of Russia’s propaganda against Ukraine. Media in English. 15th February 2015 – 15th March 2016 *

* The chart shows aggregated data of the levels of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the news during every month within the selected time period.

On the 30th of September 2015, Russia began The war ought to be fought to save business, air strikes in Syria, and this event reached the family and church, and to add to prosperity, highest level of engagement activity in both security and faith. Each interest should be audiences. RT propaganda portrayed Russia encouraged to formulate war aims which point as a concerned nation that is thinking about the to the enemy of all who is, in fact, quite as security of its citizens, who are being exposed much the enemy of each.” 13 Therefore, Russia to all the returning Russian and ex-Soviet pictures the engagement “against terrorism” terrorists. The smaller news headline read: in Syria as one where Russian people also “Decision aims to protect Russia’s national have a stake. Bearing in mind that Russian interests as home-born militants would return propaganda portrays anti-Russian forces in to Russia”, thereby indicating that the main Ukraine as terrorist, this message also alludes interest is not the change of the political to the Russian people’s stake in Ukraine. landscape in Syria but is rather an outcry It must be emphasised that the narrative against potential security threats inside Russia. of protecting Russia’s interests in Syria was This propaganda line is neither coincidental, used only by RT; Pervy Kanal promoted nor innovative. Rather, it comes from the old Russia as a strong world player without propaganda arsenal, which can be traced back which terrorism cannot be defeated and to the First World War. Lasswell wrote that “the peace cannot be achieved. This proves nation as a whole, is divisible into an almost that the idea of protecting Russia’s citizens infinite number of constituent groups, which against terrorists was aimed exclusively are in possession of special aspirations of at the Western audience, thus finding their own. The war ought to be interpreted to them as something in which they have a stake, 13 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World not only as members of the general group. War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 70. 9

Picture 1. Ukraine begins withdrawal of heavy weaponry Source: RT, 26th February 2015.

Picture 2. Ukraine announces not to repay 3 billion dollars of debt to Russia Source: RT, 18th December 2015. 10

a pseudo-argument for military involvement there are noticeable differences of total in Syria and demonstrating Russia’s high- propaganda activities in the two main level moral and physical care about its audiences. The most disturbing trend is the nation. decrease in propaganda activities, sticking to rather neutral and formal news broadcasting Another event - Ukraine’s announcement for the regional audience (Russian-language not to repay 3 billion dollars of debt to audio‑visual platforms). It clearly shows that Russia on the 18th of December 2015 - Russia regards this audience as already won was strongly used to send clear signals over, and that the highest level propaganda about Ukraine as a bankrupt and failed activities are no longer necessary for this state and Russia’s readiness to prolong the region. repayment term of the debt (but only if international players provide guarantees), thus promoting the image of Russia as a trustable and internationally stable partner. These signals are a part of a larger objective – to prevent Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the EU and to picture it as an overall unreliable partner that has a poor economic situation and is unable to fulfil international commitments. For the Western audience, the propaganda signalling was even stronger in this case. RT portrayed the IMF as a mysterious organisation with plans to take over the world and make small, struggling countries like Greece their puppets - indicating that Ukraine is one of these puppets. (See Picture 2. on page 10) Instead of making Ukraine out to be the villain that isn’t repaying its debts, the image was portrayed of a useless state in the face of a grave tragedy - economic collapse and being controlled by the Western powers who only care about money. The other alternative is Russia, who “understands” and asks for their position to be understood, thereby gaining support and eventually having sanctions lifted. The most important conclusion about the levels of the dynamics of Russia’s propaganda against Ukraine is the observation that 11 THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC NARRATIVES

Although propaganda goals usually are non- by Ellul16, Lazitski lists the following media conflicting and consistent for those who endarkenment techniques17: carry out the propaganda, these narratives 1) fake news; sometimes do not aim to make a rational point. In Russia’s case, it is important to 2) misinformation; emphasize, that “the power of strategic 3) censorship; narratives is (..) to appeal to emotions and 4) omission; to ‘blur’ the border between what is real 5) spinning and twisting; and what is not: in other words, to form 6) construction of a false reality; a context in which other messages can 7) intimidation; be communicated with greater ease.”14 Therefore, it is important to distinguish 8) entertainment; analytical categories – discursive strategies 9) simplification; – that serve the main goal and reveal 10) lowering/marginalizing of themselves in the interim goals. content’s quality. In regard to this study, it’s possible to talk All of the above mentioned media about two main propaganda discursive endarkenment techniques were detected in strategies: endarkenment of the audience Russia’s propaganda in this study. and goals-oriented propaganda strategies. In the construing, justifying, shifting A strategy of endarkenment of the audience and destructive strategies18, apparently serves as a destructive strategy. “Media unrelated strategies could take place. endarkenment is a process of media However, they serve as interim goals for influence (intended or unintended) by which the main goal of propaganda, as listed both the intellectual level of the viewers and below. Besides, popularity ratings are the number of informed citizens decrease.”15 of paramount importance for Putin, and Drawing on the concept of propaganda

16 J. Ellul, Propaganda: The formation of men’s attitudes. 14 I. Khaldarova, M. Pantti, ‘Fake News: The narrative (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). battle over the Ukrainian conflict’, Journalism Practice, 17 O. Lazitski, O. ‘Media Endarkenment’, American (2016), pp. 1-11. Behavioral Scientist, 58(7) (2014), pp. 898-927. 15 O. Lazitski, O. ‘Media Endarkenment’, American 18 R. Wodak et al, The discursive construction of national Behavioral Scientist, 58(7) (2014), pp. 898-927. identity, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 12 diverse strategies and genres serve the Five assumptions that underpin the goal of approaching diverse audiences who strategic goals of the Russian government’s appropriate media messages.19 Apparently propaganda were tested, and the frequency conflicting discussions, propaganda contra- of their appearance in news coverage was propaganda, the carrousel of interpretations monitored in this research: and factions of facts and falsifications add 1) to regain Russia’s status as one heat and work for geostrategic interests. of the main players in the world These strategies are characterised by: peace process (no one can afford 1) discourses and images of to manage global processes strength, victory and wisdom; without Russia, Russia is the 2) moral justification of superiority; ­­ only country that can ensure the progress of the peace process in 3) naming the enemy; Ukraine and Syria); 4) naming who is weak and 2) to claim Russia’s superiority who is strong in the given (moral, military, rule of law, circumstances; organisation, control over 5) naming who is a “moral evil”, processes, etc.) over the US; “deconstructing” the “hypocrisy” 3) to prevent Ukraine’s of the West, e.g. by launching transformation into being a part war in Syria, and in relation to the of the external border of NATO refugee crisis; and the EU (promoting the 6) naming the “sacred values”. narrative of Ukraine as a failed Russia is involved at a high military and state and an unreliable partner); informational level in the conflicts in Ukraine 4) to promote Ukraine as a bargaining and Syria. Therefore, it’s worthwhile to object and within Russia’s sphere assess propaganda activities by looking of influence at the expense of at both conflicts simultaneously. Analysis eventual peace in Syria; proves that Russia develops parallel strategic 5) to soften and, in the nearest narratives that nurture Russia’s common future, achieve the lifting of propaganda in different situations. In this the sanctions regime imposed way, Russia masters its international image, against Russia. which is later useful for achieving its foreign policy and geopolitical goals.

19 O. Matthews, ‘'s Secret Weapon’, Newsweek (15 June 2016), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ search?q=cache:yfjPXwqC7NgJ:www.newsweek. com/2016/06/24/why-russians-love-vladimir- putin-470432.html+&cd=9&hl=lv&ct=clnk&gl=fi&client= firefox-b-ab; I. Reifová, T. Pavlíčková, ‘Invisible audiences: structure and agency in post-socialist media studies’, Mediální Studia 7(2), (2013), p. 130. 13

dependent state. Moreover, the idea of RUSSIA’S PROPAGANDA ON Russia as a global superpower is also being UKRAINE developed, although at a lower level. (See Chart 3 and Chart 4.)

In general, the analysis of Russia’s This leads to the conclusion that the image of propaganda against Ukraine shows Ukraine as a failed state and as an unreliable significantly higher dynamics of strategic partner is already considered to be well narratives towards the Western audience rooted in the Russian-speaking population of (English-speaking media analysed) than the region and that the active phase of anti- towards the regional audience (Russian- Ukraine propaganda has ended there. On speaking audience analysed). the contrary, English-speaking audio-visual platforms continue to actively promote the In the Russian-speaking media, news ideas of the disastrous state of Ukraine, the programmes have become relatively formal hypocrisy of the West and moral superiority and informative. High-level propaganda of Russia, thus continuing to mobilise cases are rarely detected there. In regard to Western societies towards an anti-Western Ukraine, only one main strategic narrative political attitude and splitting the unity of dominates the Russian-speaking media: the West. (See Chart 5 and Chart 6.) Ukraine is a weak, unsuccessful and

Chart 3. Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Regional audience. Frequency of propaganda narratives.* * Russian-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in news during each month in the selected time period.

“Russia as one of the main players globally”

“Russia’s superiority over the US”

“Prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the EU”

“Ukraine as a bargaining object at the expense of eventual peace in Syria” “Necessity to soften and abolish the sanction regime” 14

Chart 4. Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Regional audience Frequency of Russia’s strategic narratives (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)* * Russian-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period.

Russia’s aim to use propaganda to gain right movements in France, Hungary, etc. control over the conflict in Ukraine and the These also suit Russian politics very well. mind-set of Western societies must be taken Russia spends much of its propaganda force very seriously. Lasswell wrote: “Another to aggravate societies’ frustrations about sustaining force against which sapping the political courses of actions of Western operations must be directed is the confidence governments and leaders. of the people in their government’s honesty. For example, on the 7th of June 2015, when If a suspicion can be engendered against the reporting on the G7 summit, RT portrayed propaganda of the government and the war the G7 summit members, especially the party, a potent weapon of disintegration is created.”20 In other words, dissatisfaction US and Germany, as being hated locally. with the ruling elite leads to political Germany was presented as hypocritical: behavioural changes in society. “Divide and deploying military and armed police to rule” is an old principle of Russian (Soviet) control peaceful protesters while being geopolitical strategy, and there is no need against Russia’s standing up for “their” to search far for examples nowadays: Brexit, people in eastern Ukraine. The G7 summit the Polish Constitutional Court crisis, far- members were shown as hated figures who 20 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World “soak away their worries” at an expensive War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in resort while hundreds of peaceful protesters New York, 1938), p. 164. 15

Chart 5. Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Western audience. Frequency of propaganda narratives.* * English-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period.

“Russia as one of the main players globally”

“Russia’s superiority over the US”

“Prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the EU”

“Ukraine as a bargaining object at the expense of eventual peace in Syria”

“Necessity to soften and abolish the sanction regime” are being targeted by 200 million euros’ continue the sanctions against Russia, RT worth of security forces. RT portrayed directed attention to the intensified fighting the G7 summit members as useless and in eastern Ukraine and criticized Obama incapable of making important decisions. for not mentioning this fact during his They perpetrated this by focussing on a clip speech. After the vox populi interviews with from Obama’s speech where he jokes about protesters who were there to protest the wishing it was October and the Octoberfest summit, RT showed images of state leaders (famous for drinking) was going on, reporting drinking beer and laughing. (See picture 3.) on the number of restaurants, SPA facilities The mobilisation of hatred against Western and other amenities at the $3000+ resort, leaders is not being done without reason: and quoting the resort’s motto of “Doing “If the ruling person, clique or class can be nothing while dwelling on possibility”. made sufficiently obnoxious, Revolution At the same time, Ukraine was portrayed comes, and in Revolution there is little as a failed and manipulative state that is remaining capacity for active hatred of the capable of killing innocent civilians in the external enemy.”21 east for their own political advancement.

Moreover, directly following the reporting 21 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World of Obama’s speech that urges the need to War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 169. 16

Chart 6. Russia’s propaganda on Ukraine. Western audience. Frequency of Russia’s strategic narratives (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)* * English-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period.

In regard to the Western audience, the anti- Another good example of anti-Ukrainian Ukrainian narrative dominates with the aim propaganda is the RT news video of the to prevent Ukraine’s transformation into 31st of August 2015, about the Rada’s vote being part of the external border of NATO on Poroshenko’s decentralisation proposal, and the EU (see Chart 4). For example, which wasn’t passed. The image of Ukraine on the 16th of August 2015, RT reported as an unimportant and unreliable partner in that, following weeks of intense fighting, the ceasefire commitments was nurtured shelling was moving closer to Mariupol and in order to prevent the strengthening of again portrayed Ukraine as a failed state Ukraine’s external border. Meanwhile, the that is incapable of adhering to the Minsk propaganda signal that Russia is the main II agreement and does not care about player, even in the Ukrainian decentralisation civilian suffering. The situation in Donetsk vote, was transmitted. RT focussed on a was portrayed as hopeless by presenting particular member of the Rada - Oleg Lyansko, distressed, crying civilians talking about a far-right opponent to the decentralisation their lost homes and injured families while attempts who is facing criminal charges of standing in front of rubble and destruction, kidnapping and embezzlement. Thereby, and Ukrainian civilians were shown as it was indicated that Ukraine is dangerous angry for being reportedly attacked by the as a partner because decentralisation was government forces (see picture 4). mainly opposed by criminals. 17

Picture 3. At the G7 Summit, President Obama says that it is in the interests of the US and the EU to address Russian aggression Source: RT, 7TH June 2015

Picture 4. Shelling moves closer to Mariupol Source: RT, 16TH August 2015 18

Picture 5. Shelling moves closer to Mariupol Source: Pervy Kanal, 16TH August 2015

Russia uses anti-war propaganda as a war the Ukrainian army was destroying civilian propaganda tool, and this method is nothing infrastructure (homes, hospitals, schools) new. During the first half of the 20th century, and that there were civilian casualties Lasswell wrote: “For the preponderating (including elderly people) (see Picture 5). majority in any community the business of Although this story was very rich in visual beating the enemy in the name of security propaganda tools, the videos and images and peace suffices. This is the great war were possibly from other events as there aim, and in single-hearted devotion to its were no dates or other information achievement they find that ‘peacefulness of indicating which event they were associated being at war’ […].”22 with. “Independent witnesses” (the so- For example, the when covering the shelling called “second screen”), who were actually moving closer to the city of Mariupol on the some YouTube channel users, were also 16th of August 2015, Pervy Kanal intended referenced. They showed ruined houses to mobilise hatred against Ukraine while and debris that were supposedly connected showing that the Ukrainian army must be to what was called “the massive attack by stopped in order to save innocent civilian Ukraine’s army”. A violation of “sacred lives and that it is the main enemy in the fight values” during war – attacks on the elderly to regain peace. The news story suggested and children – was indirectly presented by that Ukraine had broken the fragile truce and showing destroyed homes attributed to continued to shell the Donbass region, that elderly people and debris in which children’s 22 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World items (dolls, books) could be identified. War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 57. 19

This representation of Ukraine corresponds in Russia, which could spread fear and with the classic methods of propaganda: hatred in society. Nevertheless, the lifting of “To mobilize the hatred of the people economic sanctions can still be considered against the enemy, represent the opposing as a strategic goal of Russia’s propaganda, nation as a menacing, murderous aggressor. because all other strategic narratives Represent the enemy as an obstacle to are directed towards upgrading Russia’s the realization of the cherished ideals and international image and involving Russia as dreams of the nation as a whole, and of each an equal ally in Western alliances against constituent unit. […] Represent opposing terrorism. nation as satanic; it violates all the moral standards (mores) of the group, and insults its self-esteem.”23 In this case, Ukraine was RUSSIA’S PROPAGANDA ON portrayed as a cruel enemy without any SYRIA morals, while Russia was allocated the role of the fighter for peace with high moral In turn, looking at Russian propaganda standards. from the perspective of Ukraine’s and Syria’s conflicts, the leading motif is Russia’s Although the sanction regime imposed on superiority, which manifests in the name of Russia by the US and the EU hits the Russian peace (see Charts 7-10). economy hard, it is important to mention that a massive spreading of the narrative of The strategic narrative of Russia’s moral lifting the sanction regime was not observed superiority and its role as a global super during the analysis of strategic narratives power was massively promoted in the news (see Charts 3-6). This can be explained by on the 14th of March 2016, when Russia the discursive tool of silence. Namely, the announced its withdrawal from Syria. It is stories that lie outside propaganda strategy important to pay close attention to this case, are strategically omitted. In these cases, since gaining influence in Syria is closely the distinction should be made between linked to Russia’s aim of increasing control “being silenced” and “being silent”. “When over the situation in Ukraine. being silenced is contrasted with having For the regional audience, the strategic a voice, it is conceptualised as imposed, messages encoded in this story were and it signifies a loss of power and self. But related to Russia as the leading military and silence can also be conceptualised as being political power and the most effective global silent, a shared understanding that need peacemaker (as testified by the Syria conflict) not be voiced.”24 This study shows that the and to Russia’s superiority (military, political) direct narrative on economic sanctions is over the great Western powers, especially avoided in Russia’s propaganda as not to the United States. Russia’s increased and distribute further propaganda messages central role in the global peace process regarding the disastrous economic situation was displayed by naming achievements in 23 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World Syria – stopping the expansion of terrorists, War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 195. destroying their bases and infrastructure, 24 R. Fivush, ‘Speaking silence: The social construction being the top negotiator and organiser in of silence in autobiographical and cultural narratives’, Memory, 18 (2), (2010), pp. 88-98. the peace process in Syria and bringing back 20

political stability there. This was described indicating that Russia had achieved success as something that other parties involved in where the US led coalition had failed in the Syria conflict were not able to achieve all the years prior. It showed that Russia in years. Russia’s military and political is able to bring “peace and prosperity” to superiority over the US was explained by the a completely failed state like Syria, and, fact that, over a longer period of time, the therefore, the failed state of Ukraine could US had not been able to achieve the same also succeed under their guidance. Various results as Russia. The narrative lines were propaganda tools were used in order to distorted by the message that Russia had push forward the interim goals of showing demonstrated unprecedented military skills the Western policy in Syria not only as a and the withdrawal of troops was empirical failure but also its indifference towards evidence of a successfully completed reaching real, lasting peace that values the mission. sovereignty of Syria as a country. Russian success on the ground was reported to be For the Western audience, the Russian so great that they have been able to liberate propaganda was even slightly more dynamic. more than “200 localities” upon withdrawal. It showed Russia as a saint without whom It was underlined that Russia has been so the current peace process would not have successful in Syria that various previously been possible, and further portrayed the anti-Assad groups and personalities have image of the West’s failed policy in Syria by effectively changed their minds about Chart 7. Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Western audience. Frequency of propaganda narratives.* * English-speaking audio-visual platforms were monitored. The chart shows the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in news during each month in the selected time period.

“Russia as one of the main players globally”

“Russia’s superiority over the US”

“Prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the EU”

“Ukraine as a bargaining object at the expense of eventual peace in Syria”

“Necessity to soften and abolish the sanction regime” 21

Chart 8. Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Western audience Frequency of Russia’s strategic narratives (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)* * English-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period.

the Syrian regime. This reporting thereby presence in Ukraine. Therefore, especially pushes the belief that Russia has done the for the Western audience, Russia masters its unimaginable - bringing together those who image as a peace-loving and highly effective were previously deeply divided. military country with high moral standards. It is in line with propaganda basics: “So great The fact that Russian troops did not in fact are the psychological resistances to war in leave Syria was also explained in the name modern nations that every war must appear of peace: despite Putin’s proposed peace to be a war of defence against a menacing, process that has begun in Syria, Russia wants murderous aggressor.”25 to administer the on-going process. Despite the positive messages of groups joining Therefore, especially for the Western Assad and peace being only a step away, audience, Russia masters its image as a the background images showed complete peace-loving and highly effective military destruction that was mostly attributed to country with high moral standards. It is the US led coalition, indicating that Russia in line with propaganda basics: “So great and the Syrian president could deal with the are the psychological resistances to war in situation without Western interference (see modern nations that every war must appear Picture 6). These interim goals work towards 25 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World legitimising Russian efforts in Syria and War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in subsequently legitimising their unofficial New York, 1938), p. 47. 22

Chart 9. Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Regional audience. Frequency of propaganda narratives.* * Russian-speaking audio-visual platforms were monitored. The chart shows the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in news during each month in the selected time period.

“Russia as one of the main players globally”

“Russia’s superiority over the US”

“Prevent Ukraine’s transformation into being part of the external border of NATO and the EU”

“Ukraine as a bargaining object at the expense of eventual peace in Syria”

“Necessity to soften and abolish the sanction regime”

Picture 6. Russia announces withdrawal from Syria. Source: RT, 14TH March 2016 23

Chart 10. Russia’s propaganda on Syria. Regional audience. Frequency of Russia’s strategic narratives (Feb 2015 - Mar 2016)* * Russian-speaking media was monitored. The chart shows aggregated data of the frequency of the five strategic narratives of Russia’s propaganda appearing in the selected time period.

to be a war of defence against a menacing, classes, but to the rapacity of the enemy. murderous aggressor.”26 The aggressors in Guilt and guilelessness must be assessed Syria’s case are various: all kinds of anti-Assad geographically, and all the guilt must be on forces, as well as the US and EU countries, the other side of the frontier.”27 which have aggravated the Syrian conflict to violent and uncontrollable levels due to their military clumsiness, incapability to play the role of conflict mediator and strategic failures. Using different propaganda tools, Russia justifies both its involvement in the conflict and its “partial” withdrawal from Syria and claims that it acts in the name of lasting peace. As Lasswell clearly put it, “The war must not be due to a world system of conducting international affairs, nor to the stupidity or malevolence of all governing

26 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 47. 27 Ibid. 24 COALITION DELIRIUM: TEARING DOWN CLEAR LINES BETWEEN ALLIES, ENEMIES AND NEUTRALS

In conventional crises and wars, there are splits the West by allocating different roles clear lines between allies, enemies and to countries depending on their behaviour neutrals. Nevertheless, and not without and contextual situation, thus creating reason, we assess the current conflicts in enormous uncertainty and deadlocks. The Ukraine and Syria as “hybrid”; this is also Western countries are susceptible to these reflected in the classic understanding of propaganda manoeuvres and hybrid warfare coalitions. Speaking about hostile situations, because of the deeply ingrained culture of propaganda has “four major objectives: peace and a desperate wish to solve conflicts fast and by peaceful means. 1. To mobilize hatred against the enemy; In order to achieve the objective of the mobilisation of hatred against the enemy, 2. To preserve the friendship of allies; Russian propaganda has developed the 3. To preserve the friendship and, following types of messages: if possible, to procure the co- • enemy - those who impose operation of neutrals; economic sanctions against Russia; 4. To demoralize the enemy.”28 • enemy - those who make Russia a This is the classic yet out-dated victim of the aggressive West; understanding of war coalitions. However, • defeating the enemy is necessary in under the conditions of “hybrid” threats, the name of security and peace; the West still seems to stick to it. In turn, the enemy is an obstacle to the Russia plays with the West by dividing it into realisation of the cherished ideals “good boys” and “bad boys”, and the “good and dreams of the nation as a whole boys” are those who are “peace loving”, as and of each constituent unit; the Charter of the United Nations defines it. In other words, with the help of its political • the struggle is between a good and and psychological propaganda, Russia tears a bad collective person; down the classic understanding of blocks • the enemy imposes military and alliances in international relations and pressure (the coercive power of the 28 H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World land, sea and air forces); War, (Martino Publishing, 2013; originally published in New York, 1938), p. 195. 25

• the enemy imposes economic • confidence in the honesty pressure (interference with access of Western governments is to sources of material, markets, diminishing; capital and labour power); • bad news and unwanted criticism • the enemy uses hostile propaganda; may be nullified by distracting the public’s attention away from it. • the power of the enemy must A distraction can be created by be diminished to save business, springing a sensation. family and church, and to add to prosperity, security and faith; To achieve the strategic objective of preserving the friendship of allies and, if • individuals on whom to pin the hate. possible, to procure the co-operation of In order to achieve the objective of the neutrals, Russian propaganda developed demoralisation of the enemy, Russian the following types of strategic messages: propaganda has developed the following • negotiation is a method of types of messages: influencing foreign states with which • the opposing nation is satanic; it one is not in active conflict with; violates all moral standards. The • divide and rule – unsteady Western satanic one is the guilty one. The countries must be engaged as neutral opposing nation is nearly always supporters of Russia, i.e. bilaterally; demonstrably overbearing and • Russia as the most effective and contemptuous; decisive player to settle the conflict • the enemy’s cause is hopeless. in Syria; The enemy’s blood is spilt in vain; • unlike the US, NATO or the EU, • the impossibility of victory on the Russia has direct access to the enemy’s side; Assad regime and is respected by the Assad regime; • public anxiety, nervousness, irritability, unrest, discontent or • granting Russia the status of the most efficient player will be a ‘win-win’ strain triggers were addressed; situation for all, as long as others play • the enemy uses lying propaganda; according to Russia’s rules; • any nation who began the conflict • transmission of suggestions to the and blocks peace is incorrigible, enemy; wicked and perverse; • the allies agree with Russia that, for • the potency of Russian leaders example, they are failing in Syria, versus caricatures of the Russia has the right to control its “weakness” of Western leaders; neighbourhood, or its neighbouring country is unreliable and a mess • Russia’s moral superiority; (Ukraine); “sacred” Russian values versus • the importance of official visits. “hypocritical” Western values; 26

Chart 11. What is your overall attitude towards the US? Russia. Source: Levada Center, July 2016

There are significant differences between of threat coming from the US. In Russia, the image of the US that Russia’s propaganda the majority of Russians (72%) believe spreads to the Western audience and the that the US is Russia’s greatest enemy in one it spreads to the Russian-speaking the world right now. The US is followed population in Russia and in the region. by Ukraine (48% think Ukraine is hostile Namely, Russian propaganda predominantly towards Russia) and Turkey (29% regard this portrays the US to the Western audience country as Russia’s enemy).29 In Russia, the as an enemy. This image is being spread overall attitude towards the US, the EU and extensively, and, taking into account the Ukraine drastically changed in 2014 after dominant role of the US in NATO and in Russia annexed Crimea (see Charts 11-13). military matters of the EU, Russia is trying The peak was reached at the end of 2015, to weaken the Western countries and to but a pronounced negative attitude still disconnect the US from Europe. remains in 2016. In turn, for the Russian-speaking audience, The same mind-set prevails in the Russian- the US is broadcast as a neutral country that speaking audience in Latvia. After 2014, potentially can become an ally to resolve when Russia annexed Crimea and the new global issues - the conflicts in Ukraine negative propaganda regarding Ukraine and Syria. This unusual situation can be and the US referred to them as an “enemy”, explained by the fact that the propaganda no longer needs to nourish the perception 29 Yearly public opinion survey, 2015, (Levada Centre, 2016). 27

Chart 12. What is your overall attitude towards the EU? Russia. Source: Levada Center, July 2016

Chart 13. What is your overall attitude towards Ukraine? Russia. Source: Levada Center, July 2016 28

the negative attitude towards the US in In the same manner, a signal of possible the Russian-speaking audience in Latvia cooperation with the US and portrayal of skyrocketed and reached 64 percent in the US in a neutral light was broadcast on 2015.30 the 11th of May 2015 in RT, when US State Secretary John Kerry met with the Russian This data proves that the image of the US Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov and as Russia’s enemy in both Russia and the President Putin to discuss the Syrian crisis. Russian-speaking audience in the region is Emphasis was put on the warm welcome entrenched. Now, portraying the US as a from the Russian side, “despite tense potential ally in Russia’s attempts to resolve relations” between both countries. Both the violent crises in Syria and Ukraine, Russia meetings were covered as “important works on its image as a peaceful superpower meetings” and as a possibility to “sit down that is superior to the US. for high stakes talks”, while also indicating Nevertheless, the US’s roles as an ally for that much hope is put on Kerry “to suggest the Western audience and as a neutral a new view on the Ukrainian conflict.” This for the regional audience are not stable. example clearly shows the close relationship Especially in the English-speaking media, between the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts a pattern of strategic signalling can in Russian propaganda. be spotted in regard to the US, which Even more complex blurring of the generally appears as an enemy in Russia’s boundaries between allies, neutrals and propaganda. Under certain circumstances, enemies is to be observed in regard to Russia sends signals about possibilities European countries. So, for example, France and conditions under which the US could was pictured as a neutral country, leaning hope for closer cooperation with Russia towards the role of Russia’s ally, when France by being allocated with a better, more launched air strikes in Syria on the16th of peaceful role and thus receiving a better November 2015. We must be reminded that image in the eyes of Russian propaganda. these came after the deadly terrorist attack So, for example, on the 23rd of October on Paris, which Daesh claimed responsibility 2015, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs for. Thus, Russia signalled that it appreciated Sergey Lavrov announced Russia’s France’s course of action in Syria, whilst readiness to help the US and the Free accusing the US of being responsible for the Syrian Army, and RT pictured the US as a Paris terrorist attacks because they “might neutral country in this case. Thus, Russia never have happened if the US had ‘listened’ portrayed itself as a leading peacemaker to officials who opposed the 2003 invasion and sent a signal that those who consider of Iraq”.31 The same country – France – was Assad’s government as an ally worthy of addressed as an enemy a few months before cooperation are more likely to hope for this event, when Russia began its air strikes an improvement in relations with Russia in Syria against opponents of the Syrian and to facilitate a resolution of the crisis,

which the US wishes so desperately. 31 P. Engel, ‘Paris might never have happened if the US had "listened" to officials who opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq’, Business Insider, (11.01.2016), http://www. 30 SKDS public opinion survey, (SKDS, 07.2008-08.2015). businessinsider.com/putin-us-paris-attacks-2016-1. 29 regime in order to hit rebel controlled areas an aggressive, immoral and demoralised in the Homs and Hama provinces on the 30th force. The news reported several serious of September 2015. incidents involving drunken Ukrainian soldiers and showed shots of soldiers In the Russian propaganda aimed towards behaving inappropriately (see Picture 7). At the Western audience, Belgium and the the same time, the violation of the Minsk Netherlands are traditionally pictured agreement was reported, showing soldiers as neutral countries. When the EU in action (see Picture 8). It was claimed that governments agreed to extend sanctions this action was taking place in Mariupol against Russia on the 17th of June 2015, and that the soldiers are proud of their France, Italy, Spain and Greece were behaviour since they had posted this video reported as neutral countries or even on YouTube. allies in light of their negative position on the sanctions. Although Germany is In addition, for the regional audience, the generally portrayed as an enemy in Russian Ukrainian government is portrayed by the propaganda, even this country received a Russian propaganda in a neutral light, while signal on “good boy behaviour”. Namely, separatists are mistakenly accused, victims when Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France and often – Russian allies. agreed that a ceasefire would go into effect Such signalling creates enormous ambiguity on the 15th of February 2016 in Ukraine, in international relations because it has Prime Minister Merkel and President “multiple, often competing, meanings, or Hollande were pictured as neutral partners, […] can have multiple possible outcomes.”32 thus signalling that cooperation with Russia In turn, ambiguity drastically increases the tears down hostilities. amount of information and the complexity It must also be emphasised that Russian of analysis and decision making required. propaganda allocates the role of enemy A classical cognitive strategy for how to differently in regard to Ukraine in English- deal with ambiguity is to find so-called speaking and Russian-speaking audiences. “shortcuts” in order to simplify the decision For the English-speaking audience, the making process and minimise the amount enemy is the Ukrainian government and of information to be analysed. Under such pro-governmental forces. For the Russian- conditions, “tunnel vision” switches on, speaking audience, the situation is which is characterised by considering only different. In Russian-speaking audio-visual a part of a situation and holding a single platforms, the Ukrainian government is opinion rather than having a more general portrayed as a neutral party. The enemy understanding.33 and aggressor is the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian nationalists (“banderovcy”). For example, when the U.S. training mission of Ukrainian soldiers “Operation Fearless 32 A. Mintz, K. Jr. DeReouen, Understanding Foreign Guardian” was launched, involving the Policy Decision Making, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.27. US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade and 33 For more about the meaning of the idiom “tunnel 900 Ukrainian soldiers on the 20th of April vision” in thinking, see Cambridge Dictionary. http:// dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tunnel- 2016, the Ukrainian army was pictured as vision 30

Picture 7. US troops start training Ukrainian infantry. Source: Pervy Kanal, 20TH April 2015

Picture 8. US troops start training Ukrainian infantry. Source: Pervy Kanal, 20TH April 2015

This leads to the conclusion that the ability to put heavy pressure on Assad, the temptation to be “a good boy” or a peaceful West’s desire to achieve the resolution of ally is a powerful tool in international conflicts fast and peacefully is so strong that relations and that flattery (or the good they follow Russia’s rules of bargaining in old “carrots and sticks” strategy) works. this coalition game. Although there are signs that Putin has neither the intention and willingness nor 31 CONCLUSION

The dynamics of Russia’s information language); Pervy Kanal promoted Russia as a activities against Ukraine during the Syria strong world player without which terrorism campaign reveal that propaganda activities couldn’t be defeated and peace achieved. In in relation to both conflicts share mutually addition, the research traced remarkable coordinated strategic narratives promoted differences in total propaganda activities by Russia. The conclusions are based on an for Russian and English speaking audiences. analysis of media news during the pre-Syria The finding that propaganda activities have campaign period (partial ceasefire [26th decreased for the users of Russian-language February 2015] - military engagement of audio‑visual platforms is significant. It Russia in Syria [30th September 2015]) and the indicates that Russia regards this audience Syria campaign period (military engagement as already won over, and that the highest of Russia in Syria [30th September 2015] - level propaganda activities are no longer announcement about the withdrawal of necessary for this region. Russian forces; [15th March 2016]) With regard to the dynamics of strategic Two main information channels have narratives, two main discursive strategies separate target audiences: Russian and were traced: endarkenment of the audience English speaking audiences. In this research, and goal-oriented propaganda strategies. RT (previously known as Russia Today), These strategies reveal a conflation of Pervij kanal, Sputniknews and information apparently conflicting facts, falsifications provided by EEAS Disinformation Review and repeated statements on geostrategic was analysed. interests. The analysis reveals increased dynamics of strategic narratives towards The analysis reveals intensive propaganda the English-speaking audience. In regard signalling activity in English-speaking audio- to Ukraine, the main strategic narrative is visual platforms and a much lower level of related to the image of Ukraine as a weak, propaganda in Russian-speaking media. unsuccessful and dependent state. Furthermore, the research found that the news about the EU extending its sanctions The propaganda strategies reveal the classic against Russia (17th June 2015) was not understanding of blocks and alliances being covered in the Russian-speaking audio-visual deconstructed by Russia in international platforms at all, while English-speaking media relations. It splits the West by allocating reached the highest level of signalling. different roles to countries depending on The narrative of protecting Russia’s interests their behaviour and contextual situation, in Syria was used only by RT (English thus creating enormous uncertainty. Russian 32 propaganda predominantly portrays the and Berg remind us that the policy dilemma US to the Western audience as an enemy. for the US is very serious: “The imperative However, for the Russian-speaking audience, to degrade terrorist capacities tempts policy the US is portrayed as a neutral country that makers to put aside democratic scruples and potentially can become an ally to resolve seek closer ties with autocracies willing to new global issues – the conflicts in Ukraine join the war on terrorism.”36 This is precisely and Syria. An even more complex blurring why the Kremlin’s propaganda sets parallel of the boundaries between allies, neutrals agendas on Ukraine and Syria. If the Russian and enemies was observed with regard to government succeeds in its propaganda European countries, e.g., France. on Syria, its strategy in marginalisation and threatening neighbouring regions To place the findings of this research in a would continue with less barriers. And broader context, the Russian government Russia invests such enormous efforts in the has consistently emphasised that Ukraine propaganda that it is already reminiscent and other neighbouring countries belong “of the period preceding a new war”.37 to the “national interests” of Russia, while NATO and the US government reject This study about concurrent Russian this menacing strategy of threatening propaganda campaigns also shed light on independent countries. However, there further research avenues: is also a long-held and different view in Since the level of Russian propaganda the West. According to this view, which is activities is much lower for the Russian- promoted by some politicians and analysts, speaking audience than for the English- Russia is portrayed as a benign power. speaking audience, an inattentive Bugajski has explained it in this way: “In observer could conclude that Russia had the benign interpretation, Russia is a semi- failed to achieve its goals in Ukraine, democratic large power (..) living on past that the stalemate in the separatist glories, (..) but cooperative and helpful to territories would no longer make the US and the EU, especially in the anti- headlines, and that the resilience of the terrorist campaign, and ultimately benign Ukrainian establishment and society had for American and European interests.”34 proved to be too difficult to overcome. This view is highly beneficial to the Kremlin’s Notwithstanding, it would be a great current geo-strategic interests, and a mistake to look upon Ukraine as if it were large part of the propaganda is devoted no longer the prime target of Russia’s to construing this view. If Putin’s regime information activities in the framework “helps” to fight terrorism in the world, the of its global foreign policy strategy. West should not object to Putin’s regime’s 36 J. Stern, J. M. Berg, ISIS. The state of terror, (New York, efforts to “stabilize the regions bordering HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), p. 155. Russia”.35 Referring to Carothers (a 37 C. Neef, Russian Foreign Policy, 'We Are Smarter, distinguished expert on democracy), Stern Stronger and More Determined', an interview with Kremlin foreign policy advisor Sergey 34 J. Bugajski, ‘Isolation and Marginalization: Russia’s Karaganov, Spiegel online, International, (13 July Offensive in the Baltic Region’, Lithuanian Foreign Policy 2016), Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/ Review, 19 (2007), pp. 162-166. international/world/interview-with-putin-foreign- 35 J. Bugajski, ‘Isolation and Marginalization: Russia’s policy-advisor-sergey-karaganov-a-1102629. Offensive in the Baltic Region’, Lithuanian Foreign Policy html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrrer=http://m. Review, 19 (2007), pp. 162-166. facebook.com 33

The decreasing activity of strategic Russia’s information campaign has created narratives spread by Russia to the direct and immediate consequences for Russian-speaking population in the region Ukraine. rather proves that it considers this part Ukraine finds itself in a very difficult of society as won, and the propaganda and complex situation both politically struggle of the highest level continues for and economically. To help itself and the Western audience. its Western partners, Ukraine must For the regional Russian-speaking implement reforms in the governance audience, the image of the US, the EU sector and the judicial system and and Ukraine as an enemy is already undertake serious anti-corruption and entrenched, and it ideologically splits the anti-oligarch measures. EU and non-EU societies.These processes The real situation in Ukraine needs a are nurtured by the desperate wish of the much stronger narrative in order to resist West to quickly and peacefully solve the the consolidation of Ukraine’s image as a conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, because failed state. Russia uses this wish as a tool in its propaganda and global foreign strategy. The lessons that the Western political powers can draw in regard to Ukraine’s In regard to the Western strategy, it is of future are basically of a geopolitical nature. the highest importance to have a political movement in Crimea and Donbass, The West must understand that the because the greatest mistake would be to struggle will be long and painful in Ukraine leave these territories in a state of a frozen because of both internal and external conflict. It is in the interests of the West factors. Ukraine must fulfil obligations, to have Ukraine whole, free and on the but the West should not turn away. side of the West. Moreover, if Crimea and Despite the temptation to gain control Donbass are left in the hands of Russia over the conflict in Syria with the help of (even in the form of specific autonomy), Russia, collusion with a non-democratic, then the West loses its buffer zone at aggressive and totalitarian power is the borders of the EU and NATO, and dangerous. It’s not about the calculation creates a precedent that can have further of pros and cons or advantages and implications, for example, in regard to the disadvantages; it’s about global eastern borders of the Baltic countries. geopolitics. In the conflicts in Ukraine and Moreover, Crimea is the most crucial Syria, democracy and the basic principles geopolitical test for the whole of Western values and societies are at region, calling into question further stake. democratisation in Belarus as well as how Finally, in regard to the Western course freedom and peace can be guaranteed in of action, it must be emphasised that the Baltics and other central and eastern coordination and united efforts in the European countries. information war are crucial. This is the reason why unity becomes one of the main targets of the hostile propaganda.