DOCSLIB.ORG

ESCUELA SUPERIOR POLITÉCNICA DEL LITORAL Facultad De

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
ESCUELA SUPERIOR POLITÉCNICA DEL LITORAL Facultad De ESCUELA SUPERIOR POLITÉCNICA DEL LITORAL Facultad de Ingeniería en Electricidad y Computación Maestría en Seguridad Informática Aplicada “DISEÑO E IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE UN SISTEMA DE DEFENSA CONTRA ATAQUES DE DENEGACIÓN DE SERVICIO DISTRIBUIDO EN LA RED PARA UNA EMPRESA DE SERVICIOS.” TESIS DE GRADO PREVIA A LA OBTENCIÓN DEL TÍTULO DE: MAGISTER EN SEGURIDAD INFORMÁTICA APLICADA KAROL PAMELA BRIONES FUENTES OMAR ANTONIO CÓRDOVA BALÓN GUAYAQUIL – ECUADOR 2015 ii AGRADECIMIENTO A Dios, A nuestras familias. iii DEDICATORIA A nuestras familias. iv TRIBUNAL DE SUSTENTACIÓN MSIG. LENIN FREIRE COBO DIRECTOR DEL MSIA MSIG. ROKY BARBOSA DIRECTOR DE TESIS MSIG. ALBERT ESPINAL SANTANA MIEMBRO PRINCIPAL v DECLARACIÓN EXPRESA “La responsabilidad del contenido de esta Tesis de Grado, me corresponde exclusivamente; y, el patrimonio intelectual de la misma, a la ESCUELA SUPERIOR POLITÉCNICA DEL LITORAL” ING. KAROL BRIONES FUENTES CI 0921279162 vi DECLARACIÓN EXPRESA “La responsabilidad del contenido de esta Tesis de Grado, me corresponde exclusivamente; y, el patrimonio intelectual de la misma, a la ESCUELA SUPERIOR POLITÉCNICA DEL LITORAL” ING. OMAR CORDOVA CI 0922892161 vii RESUMEN Internet ha revolucionado la forma en que operan los negocios en la actualidad. Gran cantidad de datos son transmitidos a nivel mundial en tiempo real, como es el caso de las compañías en línea, las cuales dependen de la disponibilidad de sus servicios las veinticuatro horas del día, los trescientos sesenta y cinco días del año para que sus clientes se mantengan conectados de diversas maneras y sin interrupciones. Pero, este nuevo mundo de mayores velocidades, grandes volúmenes de datos y alta disponibilidad de los servicios, trae consigo oportunidades para los criminales cibernéticos, cuyo objetivo es aprovechar el mínimo fallo en los sistemas que operan dentro de la gran red mundial. Estos competidores maliciosos, crean dependencias entre la velocidad y disponibilidad de los servicios en internet en contra de sus propietarios, en otras palabras, crean mecanismos de ataque que impiden el acceso normal a los servicios de la empresa, a este tipo de mecanismos se les denomina Ataques de Denegación de Servicios. viii La Denegación de Servicios (o DoS por sus siglas en inglés Denial of Services), es un ataque que pone en riesgo la disponibilidad de los servicios en la red y que ha existido por más de veinte años, modificando su forma de actuar de manera constante pero siempre cumpliendo su objetivo original. En la actualidad, los ataques de Denegación de Servicios han evolucionado notablemente, agregando nuevos mecanismos de evasión que les permite atacar dispositivos de protección de red tanto perimetrales como locales de manera eficaz. Debido a esto, los fabricantes de los dispositivos de protección (Cortafuegos, Detectores de Intrusos, entre otros), incluyen en los equipos un cierto nivel de inteligencia que les permite detectar comportamientos que no se consideran normales dentro de la organización, obligando de esta manera a los criminales cibernéticos a necesitar diversos vectores de ataques simultáneos para llevar a cabo su fin. A esta modalidad de ataques se les denomina Ataques de Denegación de Servicio Distribuido (o DDoS por sus siglas en inglés Distributed Denial of Services). Este tipo de ataques es relativamente nuevo, tiene sus orígenes ix entre finales de junio e inicios de julio de 1999. Un Ataque de Denegación de Servicios Distribuidos es un ataque coordinado y a gran escala, que actúa sobre la disponibilidad de los servicios en un sistema o recursos de red de una organización considerada como víctima, enviados remota e indirectamente a través de muchos ordenadores comprometidos conectados a Internet. La inundación de mensajes entrantes al sistema comprometido afecta su disponibilidad causando una caída forzada, de esta manera deniega el servicio a los usuarios legítimos que realmente requieren hacer uso del sistema. Por lo antes expuesto, las empresas se ven obligadas a reforzar las seguridades en su red, estableciendo mecanismos de defensa que ayuden a minimizar los riesgos de seguridad de información y garantizar la disponibilidad de los servicios publicados. Es por este motivo que la implementación de un sistema de defensa contra ataques de Denegación de Servicio Distribuido debe ser la prioridad en toda empresa de misión crítica, siempre acompañado de un conjunto de Políticas de Seguridad claras y prácticas, que permitan la correcta interpretación y x utilización de los recursos de la empresa, para que, de esta forma, sean de ayuda y permitan mantener la disponibilidad de los servicios de manera efectiva. xi ÍNDICE GENERAL RESUMEN ..................................................................................................... vii ÍNDICE GENERAL ......................................................................................... xi ÍNDICE DE FIGURAS .................................................................................... xx ÍNDICE DE TABLAS ................................................................................... xxv INTRODUCCIÓN ....................................................................................... xxvii CAPÍTULO 1................................................................................................... 1 GENERALIDADES ......................................................................................... 1 1.1 Antecedentes ......................................................................................... 1 1.2 Descripción del Problema ...................................................................... 3 1.3 Solución Propuesta ................................................................................ 6 1.4 Objetivo General .................................................................................. 10 1.5 Objetivos Específicos .......................................................................... 10 1.6 Metodología ......................................................................................... 11 CAPÍTULO 2................................................................................................. 13 MARCO TEÓRICO ....................................................................................... 13 2.1 Ataques Informáticos ........................................................................... 13 2.2 Ataques de Denegación de Servicios .................................................. 15 2.3 Ataques de Denegación de Servicios Distribuidos .............................. 19 xii 2.4 Origen del ataque de Denegación de Servicio Distribuidos ................. 26 2.5 Objetivos de los atacantes ................................................................... 30 2.5.1 Ganancias Financieras ..................................................................... 30 2.5.2 Motivación Política ............................................................................ 32 2.5.3 Amenazas Persistentes Avanzadas (APT) y Ciberguerra ................ 32 2.6 Tipos de Ataques ................................................................................. 34 2.6.1 Por Consumo de Recursos ............................................................... 35 2.6.1.1 Conectividad en la Red .................................................................. 36 2.6.1.2 Uso de sus propios recursos en contra de usted ........................... 37 2.6.1.3 Consumo de Ancho de Banda ....................................................... 38 2.6.1.4 Consumo de otros recursos ........................................................... 38 2.6.2 Por Destrucción o alteración de configuración de información ......... 40 2.6.3 Por Destrucción física o alteraciones de componentes de la red ..... 41 2.6.4 Por Interrupción de las comunicaciones ........................................... 42 2.6.5 Ataques más comunes identificados ................................................ 42 2.6.5.1 Destructive Devices ....................................................................... 42 2.6.5.2 Email y Email Subscription Bombing ............................................. 43 2.6.5.3 Buffer Overflow .............................................................................. 46 2.6.5.4 Bandwidth Consumption o ataques de Amplificación .................... 49 2.6.5.5 Ataques de Enrutamiento y del Sistema de Nombres de Dominio 52 2.6.5.6 SYN Flooding................................................................................. 54 2.6.5.7 Inanición de recursos ..................................................................... 57 xiii 2.6.5.8 Ataques de Router ......................................................................... 58 2.6.6 Herramientas de ataques más comunes .......................................... 59 2.6.6.1 Trinoo (Trin00) ............................................................................... 59 2.6.6.2 Tribe Flood Network (TFN) ............................................................ 61 2.6.6.3 Stacheldraht (German for barbed wire) ......................................... 62 2.6.6.4 TFN2 K (Tribe Flood Network 2 K) ................................................ 64 2.6.6.5 LOIC, HOIC y HULK ...................................................................... 65 2.6.6.6 Software Explotable ....................................................................... 66 CAPÍTULO 3................................................................................................. 68 SITUACIÓN ACTUAL ..................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Asia-Europe Meeting
    Asia-Europe Meeting Topic A: Identifying, Sharing and Remediating Faults in Cybersecurity Topic B: Tackling Local, Regional and Global Hunger MUNUC 32 TABLE OF CONTENTS ______________________________________________________ Letter from the Chair………………………………………………………….. 3 Topic A ………………………………………………………………………..… 4 Statement of the Problem…………………………………………….. 4 History of the Problem……………………………………….…..…….. 9 Past Actions…………………………………………………………….. 14 Possible Solutions………………………………………………………. 18 Bloc Positions…………………………………………………………… 20 Glossary…………………………………………………………………. 22 Topic B ………………………………………………………………...………. 23 Statement of the Problem…………………………………………….23 History of the Problem………………………………………………… 28 Past Actions…………………………………………………………….. 31 Possible Solutions………………………………………………………. 33 Bloc Positions…………………………………………………………… 35 Glossary…………………………………………………………………. 37 Bibliography……………………………………….…………………………. 38 2 Asia-Europe Meeting | MUNUC 32 LETTER FROM THE CHAIR ______________________________________________________ Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Asia-Europe Meeting Forum, or ASEM, at MUNUC 32! My name is Randolph Ramirez, and I usually go by Randy. I am a third year here at The University of Chicago studying Statistics and Political Science. I was born and raised in Wilton, Connecticut, and coming out to attend UChicago was my first trip out to Illinois! All throughout high school I was heavily involved in Model Congress, and partaking in MUNUC my first year here helped transition me into the world of Model UN! I am certain that this conference and committee will be a success, and I cannot wait to experience it with you all! The Asia-Europe Meeting Forum will offer a multitude of experiences, problems, solutions, and overall will hopefully give a descriptive look into the affairs of the two regions. Throughout this experience, I hope delegates learn the various factors that make solving the issues of cybersecurity and huger instability a difficult endeavor, and how best to go about solving them.
    [Show full text]
  • Web Warriors – CBC Documentary
    Cyber Crime Unit The federal government has suffered a nearly 680 percent increase in cyber security breaches in the past six years. 1 Computer Security Risks • A computer security risk is any event or action that could cause a loss of or damage to computer hardware, software, data, information, or processing capability • A cybercrime is an online or Internet-based illegal act Hackers Crackers Script Kiddies Corporate Spies Unethical Cyberextortionists Cyberterrorists Employees Pages 556 - 557 Discovering Computers 2011: Living in a Digital World 2 Chapter 11 3 HACKER Someone who gets into another persons computer or network ILLEGALLY. Say their intent is to improve SECURITY. Have advanced COMPUTER and NETWORK skills. CRACKER 4 Someone who gets into another persons computer or network ILLEGALLY. Their intent is to: 1. GET RID OF data 2. STEAL information 3.Other SPITEFUL acts. Have advanced COMPUTER and NETWORK skills. 5 SCRIPT KIDDIE Not as knowledgeable as a cracker but has the SAME intent. Often use PREWRITTEN hacking and cracking software packages to crack into computers. 6 CYBEREXTORTIONIST Uses EMAIL as a channel for BLACKMAIL. If they are not paid a sum of money, they threaten to: 1. REVEAL confidential material 2. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF a safety flaw 3. BEGIN an attack that will compromise a organization’s network 7 CYBERTERRORIST They use the INTERNET or NETWORK to destroy or damage computers for GOVERNMENTAL motives. Targets may be: 1. Nation’s AIR TRAFFIC system 2. ELECTRICITY-generating companies 3. TELECOMMUNICATION infrastructure 8 CORPORATE SPYS Have OUTSTANDING computer and networking skills and are hired to break into a specific computer and ROB its exclusive FILES and information or to help identify SAFETY risks in their own ORGANIZATION.
    [Show full text]
  • Analisis Y Diagnostico De La Seguridad Informatica De Indeportes Boyaca
    ANALISIS Y DIAGNOSTICO DE LA SEGURIDAD INFORMATICA DE INDEPORTES BOYACA ANA MARIA RODRIGUEZ CARRILLO 53070244 UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL ABIERTA Y A DISTANCIA “UNAD” ESPECIALIZACION EN SEGURIDAD INFORMATICA TUNJA 2014 ANALISIS Y DIAGNOSTICO DE LA SEGURIDAD INFORMATICA DE INDEPORTES BOYACA ANA MARIA RODRIGUEZ CARRILLO 53070244 Trabajo de grado como requisito para optar el título de Especialista En Seguridad informática Ingeniero SERGIO CONTRERAS Director de Proyecto UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL ABIERTA Y A DISTANCIA UNAD ESPECIALIZACION EN SEGURIDAD INFORMATICA TUNJA 2014 _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ _____________________________________ Firma del presidente del jurado _____________________________________ Firma del jurado _____________________________________ Firma del jurado Tunja, 06 de Octubre de 2014. DEDICATORIA El presente trabajo es dedicado en primera instancia a Dios quien día a día bendice mi profesión y me ayuda con cada uno de los retos que se me presentan a lo largo del camino de mi vida. A mi fiel compañero, amigo, cómplice y esposo, quien es la ayuda idónea diaria y mi fortaleza constante para seguir en el camino del conocimiento, quien no deja que me rinda y me apoya incondicionalmente para que día a día logre ser mejor persona. A mis familiares y compañeros de trabajo, por todo su amor, confianza y apoyo incondicional, a nuestros compañeros y profesores gracias por la amistad, la comprensión, los conocimientos y dedicación a lo largo de todo este camino recorrido que empieza a dar indudablemente los primeros frutos que celebramos. AGRADECIMIENTOS La vida está llena de metas y retos, que por lo general van de la mano con grandes sacrificios, por eso hoy podemos decir que gracias a Dios y nuestras familias esta meta se ha cumplido y seguramente vendrá muchas metas que harán parte de nuestro gran triunfo personal como familiar.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering the Proliferation of Offensive Cyber Capabilities
    COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION OF OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES Mr. Robert Morgus, Cybersecurity Initiative & International Security Program, New America Mr. Max Smeets, Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University Mr. Trey Herr, Harvard Kennedy School MEMO №2 GCSC ISSUE BRIEF 161 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 163 SECTION 2: SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 165 SECTION 3: THE PILLARS AND OBJECTIVES OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION 167 SECTION 4: THE TRACE FRAMEWORK 169 SECTION 5: MAKING PROGRESS ON PROLIFERATION: APPLYING THE TRACE MODEL 177 Potential International Agreements 177 Arms Control Agreement 178 Export Control Arrangement 180 Tools for States or Like-minded Actors 181 Enhance Offensive and Defensive Capability 182 Diplomatic Toolbox 183 SECTION 6: RECOMMENDATIONS 184 1. Patience. 184 2. Increase the cost of developing offensive cyber capabilities 185 3. Further explore ways to increase barriers to spreading offensive cyber capability 186 CONCLUSIONS 187 GCSC ISSUE BRIEF 162 SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION The tenor of the cyber stability debate, often moribund and moving more sideways than forward, changed with the 2010 United Nations Governmental Group of Experts (UN GGE) Consensus Report that international law applied to cyberspace.164 It followed a position paper by the Obama administration published in January of that year to bring the various sides closer together. Though it wasn’t a steep trend line which followed, the slow process towards cyber norms was considered to be meaningful and positive.165 Despite this and subsequent progress, however, the events of 2017 have shed doubt on this progressive dynamic. The collapse of the UN GGE process in June sent an alarming message that we are moving away from establishing a meaningful cyber stability regime, rather than towards it.
    [Show full text]
  • A History of Cyber Security Attacks 1980 to Present a History of Cyber Security Attacks 1980 to Present
    A History of Cyber Security Attacks 1980 to Present http://taylorandfrancis.com A History of Cyber Security Attacks 1980 to Present Bruce Middleton CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2017 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed on acid-free paper International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4987-8586-0 (Hardback) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint. Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, trans- mitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright .com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • Teens and Computer Crime
    Teens and Computer Crime Many teens are smart with computers. Sometimes they like to show off just how smart they can be. One way is to hack into a big computer system. For the hacker, this can be a kind of challenge. For the big computer systems, it’s bad news. And it’s also illegal. Fifteen year-old Jonathan James was the first juvenile convicted and jailed in the United States for hacking. He caused a 21-day shutdown of the NASA computers that run the international space station. Michael Calce, known as “Mafiaboy” on the internet, was arrested in Montreal for attacks against major sites like eBay, Amazon, and CNN. Perhaps the most famous teen hacker, James Kosta, broke into several big business and military computers, including major banks. He was sentenced to 45 years in prison. According to the National Crime Agency in England, most teenage hackers aren’t in it for the money. Some see it as a game. Others do it to impress their friends. According to the NCA report, “Conquering the challenge, proving oneself to the group and intellectual satisfaction are more important motivations than financial gain.” Adam Mudd is an exception. When he was 16, he created malware that was used to carry out 1.7 million cyber attacks. He made over $500,000 selling his program to other cyber criminals. Some people believe that the best way to prevent cyber crime is to teach teenagers how to hack. After all, cyber crime and cyber security are two sides of the same coin.
    [Show full text]
  • Ddos.Synflood 216.209.82.62
    CS 361S Malware: Worms and Botnets Vitaly Shmatikov slide 1 Viruses vs. Worms VIRUS WORM Propagates by infecting Propagates automatically other programs by copying itself to target systems Usually inserted into host A standalone program code (not a standalone program) slide 2 1988 Morris Worm (Redux) No malicious payload, but bogged down infected machines by uncontrolled spawning • Infected 10% of all Internet hosts at the time Dictionary Multiple propagation vectors attack • Remote execution using rsh and cracked passwords – Tried to crack passwords using a small dictionary and publicly readable password file; targeted hosts from /etc/hosts.equiv • Buffer overflow in fingerd on VAX – Standard stack smashing exploit Memory corruption attack • DEBUG command in Sendmail – In early Sendmail, can execute a command on a remote machine by sending an SMTP (mail transfer) message slide 3 Summer of 2001 [“How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time”] Three major worm outbreaks slide 4 Code Red I July 13, 2001: First worm of the modern era Exploited buffer overflow in Microsoft’s Internet Information Server (IIS) 1st through 20th of each month: spread • Finds new targets by random scan of IP address space – Spawns 99 threads to generate addresses and look for IIS • Creator forgot to seed the random number generator, and every copy scanned the same set of addresses 21st through the end of each month: attack • Defaces websites with “HELLO! Welcome to http://www.worm.com! Hacked by Chinese!” slide 5 Usurped Exception Handling In IIS [Chien and
    [Show full text]
  • (Ddos) Attacks
    Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Against Independent Media and Human Rights Sites Ethan Zuckerman, Hal Roberts, Ryan McGrady, Jillian York, John Palfrey† The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University December 2010 † Ethan Zuckerman is a senior researcher at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. Hal Roberts is a fellow at the Berkman Center. Ryan McGrady is a PhD student at North Carolina State University. Jillian York is a staff member at the Berkman Center. John Palfrey is a faculty co-director of the Berkman Center. 1 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 3 2. Introduction 6 3. Background 8 3.1. Core vs. Edge 9 3.2. A Brief History of DDoS 11 3.3. Current State of the Art 13 3.4. How DDoS Works 15 3.5. Mitigating DDoS 21 3.6. Additional Attacks 23 4. Research 25 4.1. Media Review 25 4.2. Survey 33 4.3. Interviews 38 4.4. Working Meeting 42 5. Recommendations 48 6. Glossary 58 2 1. Executive Summary Our research begins with the idea that Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is an increasingly common Internet phenomenon and is capable of silencing Internet speech, usually for a brief interval but occasionally for longer. We explore the specific phenomenon of DDoS attacks on independent media and human rights organizations, seeking to understand the nature and frequency of these attacks, their efficacy, and the responses available to sites under attack. Our report offers advice to independent media and human rights sites likely to be targeted by DDoS but comes to the uncomfortable conclusion that there is no easy solution to these attacks for many of these sites, particularly for attacks that exhaust network bandwidth.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybercrime, Cyber-Espionage, Information Warfare and “Cyber War”: the Fil-Rouge Which Connects the Dots
    Cybercrime, Cyber-Espionage, Information Warfare and “Cyber War”: the fil-rouge which connects the dots Raoul “Nobody” Chiesa Expert Disclaimer ● The information contained within this presentation do not infringe on any intellectual property nor does it contain tools or recipe that could be in breach with known laws. ● The statistical data presented belongs to the Hackers Profiling Project by UNICRI and ISECOM. ● Quoted trademarks belongs to registered owners. ● The views expressed are those of the author(s) and speaker(s) and do not necessary reflect the views of UNICRI or others United Nations agencies and institutes, nor the view of ENISA and its PSG (Permanent Stakeholders Group), neither Security Brokers. ● Contents of this presentation may be quoted or reproduced, provided that the source of information is acknowledged. October 26-27, Istanbul, Turkey Istanbul 2015 FIRST Technical Colloquium & TRANSITS Training 2 AgendaAgenda . Introductions . The scenarios and the Actors . Profiling «Hackers» . Information Warfare . Cyber Espionage case study . Conclusions . References, Q&A October 26-27, Istanbul, Turkey Istanbul 2015 FIRST Technical Colloquium & TRANSITS Training 3 Introductions The Speaker . President, Founder, Security Brokers . Principal, CyberDefcon Ltd. Independent Senior Advisor on Cybercrime @ UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute) . Former PSG Member (2010-2012 / 2013.2015) @ ENISA (Permanent Stakeholders Group @ European Union Network & Information Security Agency) . Founder, Board of Directors and Technical Commitee Member @ CLUSIT (Italian Information Security Association) . Steering Committee, AIP/OPSI, Privacy & Security Observatory . Former Member, Co-coordinator of the WG «Cyber World» @ Italian MoD . Cultural Attachè, APWG European Chapter (APWG.EU) . Board of Directors, ISECOM . Board of Directors, OWASP Italian Chapter .
    [Show full text]
  • Ciber-Terrorismo Definición De Políticas De Seguridad Para Proteger Infraestructuras Críticas Frente a Ciber-Ataques Terroristas
    UNIVERSIDAD EUROPEA DE MADRID ESCUELA POLITÉCNICA MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN SEGURIDAD DE LAS TECNOLOGÍAS DE LA INFORMACIÓN Y LAS COMUNICACIONES TRABAJO FIN DE MÁSTER Ciber-terrorismo Definición de políticas de seguridad para proteger infraestructuras críticas frente a ciber-ataques terroristas Carlos Díez Molina Javier Perojo Gascón Juan José Penide Blanco Mikel Arias R.Antigüedad CURSO 2010-2011 TÍTULO: Ciber-terrorismo. Definición de políticas de seguridad para proteger infraestructuras críticas frente a ciber-ataques terroristas AUTOR: Carlos Díez Molina Javier Perojo Gascón Juan José Penide Blanco Mikel Arias R. Antigüedad DIRECTOR: Pilar Santamaría MIEMBROS DEL TRIBUNAL CALIFICADOR: PRESIDENTE: VOCAL: SECRETARIO: FECHA DE LECTURA: 19 de mayo de 2011 CALIFICACIÓN: Resumen en español Los ataques digitales son a día de hoy una realidad de la cual nadie está a salvo. Las infraestructuras que albergan servicios básicos para la sociedad actual (energía, agua, comunicaciones…) no son una excepción, siendo elementos críticos a proteger. El presente documento trata de analizar la situación en la que se encuentran a día de hoy dichas infraestructuras, explicando la legalidad vigente y futuros proyectos de ley y normativas. Se describe la evolución de los ataques digitales y se destacan dos de ellos. Por un lado Stuxnet, virus informático realizado supuestamente para atacar centrales nucleares iranís. Por otro se encuentra Wikileaks, fenómeno nacido en la red que intenta filtrar información secreta de los gobiernos. Según un estudio de Tecnocom el 96% de los ataques existentes se podrían haber evitado con la aplicación de políticas de seguridad básicas. Por ello, se propondrán políticas de seguridad aplicables contra las amenazas digitales, siendo su aplicación una manera preventiva de luchar contra los ataques.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber-Enabled Financial Abuse of Older Americans: A
    Cyber-Enabled Financial Abuse of Older Americans: A Public Policy Problem An interpretative framework investigating the social, economic, and policy characteristics of cyber-enabled older American financial abuse Christine Lyons A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Public Administration College of Public Affairs University of Baltimore Baltimore, Maryland December, 2019 This dissertation is dedicated to those who bravely shared their story with me in confidence. I am truly honored to be entrusted by you with the details of your financial and emotional trauma stemming from a time in your life so vividly painful. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS No one writes a dissertation without significant help from others and this is so very true with this endeavor. I would like to give a special thanks to three strong, admiralty intelligent, and hard-working women, my committee: Dr. Heather Wyatt- Nichol (chair), Dr. Lorenda Naylor, and Dr. Shelly Bumphus. Thank you for not giving up on me and encouraging me to continue to research a much under-studied public administration topic. Without your support, this dissertation would not be finished. I wish to express my thanks to Ms. Nina Helwig; the Adult Protective Services of Montgomery County, MD; and the Fraud Department of the Montgomery County, MD Police. I am also thankful for the time and assistance from Dr. Richard Mestas, as well as two of the best research librarians – Ms. Elizabeth Ventura and Mr. Andrew Wheeler, I am unable to adequately express my gratitude for the unwavering and unconditional support from my life partner of almost forty years, Clint Lyons; our son Clinton, his wife Annie, and our grandchildren CJ, Gabby, Natalie, and Alex; and our daughter Mary-Michael.
    [Show full text]
  • Examples of Computer Crime Cases
    Examples Of Computer Crime Cases Jacob bum his vee defoliate sacredly or thereof after Hari cleat and reinsured impressionistically, endorsable and triangulate. How blackened is Prescott when unaching and supercritical Spiro isomerize some Gurkhas? Sometimes divalent Orson ramifying her eric illegally, but antonymous Rollins buttress polemically or rollick illicitly. Computer Crime Statutes. Swartz did marriage seem or think will he took his significant life before the case gonna go by trial. Cybercrime Litigation Penn Law center Scholarship Repository. Your browser is it happened right approach for example, was also examples such as sexual activity that investigate, although sometimes cybercriminals attack that. Hidta task forces, many computers will give us department. Eurojust and that man sentenced can more. Outlook email accounts there is. What you might violate copyright major forms of a platform for their attorneys as a requirement for example, distributed networks that. Computer Crime and Computer Fraud Montgomery County. Consideration should be used in conclusion, you need for example, completed at detecting malware signaturessoftware also examples would need. Malaysian Law and Computer Crime SANS Institute. We began monitoring security of crime attorney general population that they activated, regardless of a tool. Here be some standout examples of cybercrime to watch store for. We learn more cases have individuals as stalking. Darknet markets therefore vendors and, identity is important that some tips for example, using computers at m for perpetrators could be reconvened meeting of. Defined broadly the term 'computer crime' could reasonably include world wide variety. Who work in combating this archive was max butler? In multiple forms, but it is generally distinguish between personnel must be illegal articles with isil members in building new means a different.
    [Show full text]