V111.1, Winter 1986 Informal Logic

Is Critical Thinking a Technique, Or a Means of Enlightenment?

LENORE LANGSDORF University of Texas at Arlington

Introduction veloped by the Frankfurt School.[2] The inadequacies of "instrumental This paper proposes a theoretical reason" and the prospects of "judg­ basis for practicing and teaching cri­ ment" seem to me illustrated in tical thinking as both "technique" and Richard Paul's critique of any teaching "means for enlightenment." Since the of critical thinking that would be the current state of the art (as reflected in mere application of techniques, rather journal articles as well as textbooks) than the cultivation of a "dialectical seems to me more advanced in devel­ mode of analysis." oping techniques, the stress here is What I'm doing in Part One, then, on "enlightenment." Thus, the ideas is associating Angus's "instrumental I explore are offered as a contribution reason" with Paul's "critical thinking on the "basic theoretical underpin­ in the 'weak' sense," and Angus's nings" which Richard Paul recognizes "judgment" with Paul's "critical think­ are needed for "critical thinking in ing in the 'strong' sense." I hope that the 'strong' sense."[1] This is to say relating Paul's proposals to the pheno­ that I will be proposing a theoretical menological and Frankfurt School basis for understanding that conception traditions in this way provides us with of critical thinking as a means for en­ the beginnings of a theoretical basis lightenment. In order to do so, I will for "strong sense" critical thinking. offer some thoughts on what enlighten­ In Part Two, I consider a question ment might be, why certain features that seems to me comparatively ne­ in our cultural history have resulted in glected in Paul's work: why is it so its atrophy, and how we might make a difficult to reach the non-egocentric start toward changing that situation. standpoint that is the starting point for The paper has three parts. Part the "dialectical mode of analysis" ~ One presents the notion of "instru­ he advocates? Here and in Part Three, mental reason" as a mode of reasoning I rely on Paul Ricoeur's conception of quite different from "judgment." The "ego" as contrasted with "self" in former is concerned with developing proposing that we might be more suc­ techniques for achieving already­ cessful in cultivating a non-egocentric stipulated ends by utilizing already­ standpoint if we have some under­ given means. The latter is concerned standing of egocentricity as an inevit­ with an extended sense of reasoning able, but transcendable, starting which examines those means and ends point.[3] In Part Two, then, I suggest in the light of human needs and goals. that an insistently pervasive techno­ In presenting this concept, I'll be re­ logy-television -suppresses a capa­ lying on the work of Ian Angus, which city-imagination-that is crucial to is situated at the juncture of pheno­ any attempt to move beyond "ego" to menology (as developed by Edmund "self." A form-and-content distinction Husserl) and the Critical Theory de- is crucial to this suggestion: if the 2 Lenore Langsdorf

portrayal given here is accurate, sup­ which is limited to determining appro­ pression of imagination occurs by virtue priate means for achieving a particu­ 1 of television's very form, not only or lar end. What it does not do is consider even primarily because of its program­ the appropriateness of either means ming content. or ends to larger contexts, such as an In Part Three, I propose that another individual's or society's everyday or technology-the printed word, which major life-decisions.[6] His term for does not share television's form­ the type of reasoning that would take stimulates rather than suppresses up that larger-indeed, "global"­ imagination. Ricoeur,s thesis that task is "judgment." In exploring both "ego" becomes "self" through in­ these conceptions of reasoning, Angus volvement with "text," I suggest, pro­ is expanding upon work on the nature vides "theoretical underpinnings" for of reason done from the perspective a critical thinking that responds to of the Critical Theory developed by the Paul's critique, as well as to Angus's Frankfurt School, in that he adds the call for an undoing of the "reversal of "self-reflective and critical character enlightenment" brought about by uni­ of phenomenology," and in particular, versal ized instrumental reason. Husserl's emphasis upon the "consti­ tution of theoretical objectivities" (such as the elements of a logical sys­ Part One: tem), in order to develop a theoretical Instrumental Reason and Judgment basis that would enable us to "renew The expansion of techniques which is the promise of enlightenment."[7] legitimized by instrumental reason This renewal is needed, according turns the objects of the life-world into to Angus's account, because of an his­ mere residues ... while it reduces the torical paradox: the science and techno­ subject to an untheorized plurality of logy which earlier philosophers and ends-instrumental reason results in scientists expected would liberate world alienation and self-alienation. humanity from the arbitrariness and This systematic crisis involves a new harshness of nature, now appear to situation for philosophy.[4) many as replacements for the domina­ I take it to be self-evident that virtually tion practiced prior to the rise of science all teachers of critical thinking want in the Enlightenment by the "mythico­ their teaching to have a global 'Socratic' religious tradition."[8] This has oc­ effect, making some significant inroads curred, he argues, as the science de­ into the everyday reasoning of the stu­ ve loped by Bacon, Descartes, and dent, enhancing to some degree that Galileo required a "transformation healthy, practical, and skilled skepti­ from the Classical question 'why' cism one naturally and rightly asso­ things are to the modern 'how'."[9] ciates with the rational person.[5) Angus retains both questions within In this section, I propose that the pre­ his own analysis, although my focus valence of "instrumental reason," as here is on just one: how does this identified in Ian Angus's critique, is "reversal of enlightenment" oc­ one of the powerfui factors in our cul­ cur?[10] For considering Angus's ture which work against our efforts at analysis together with Paul's suggests having, in our teaching of critical think­ that the critical thinking courses which ing, the "global 'Socratic' effect" on many philosophy departments now find our students that Richard Paul identi­ are their most popular offerings are fies. This is to say that our students training students in instrumental rea­ come equipped with instrumental son (at most), rather than cultivating reason, since it is endemic to our cul­ that "Socratic" and "global" form of ture, and that this form of reason is reasoning which Angus calls judgment. inimical to critical thinking. We are teaching instrumental rea­ Angus's critique identifies instru­ son rather than judgment, I suggest, mental reason as the type of reasoning insofar as we use what Paul calls the Critical Thinking 3

"standard modes of teaching critical from (in his words, are "founded in") rthinking," based on II a fundamental material conditions (in his words, and questionable assumption": that it again, the "lifeworld").[14] can be taught as a "battery of technical This phenomenological description skills" to be "mastered" and applied of the relation between intellectual and (as means to an end) without asking everyday life (e.g., logic and the life­ any "why" questions concerning the world) is incorporated into Angus's context in which the student (subject) theory of "judgment" when he argues or issue (object) is embedded.[11] On that using logical structures in a norma­ this model, Paul goes on to say, argu­ tive manner within the whole of our ments are encountered "atomically," experience does not depend upon any rather than as "networks" delineating "cosmological intuition," or transcen­ "world views." In effect, what we are dent "organizing principle," or "tra­ doing in this mode of teaching critical ditional authority" of the sort asso­ thinking is taking the student, who ciated with "mythico-religious world­ comes to us more-or-Iess well equipped views" which have been rather dis­ by our culture with instrumental rea­ credited, since the onset of the Age of son, and working to instill techniques Science, as sources of epistemological which exercise that equipment. justification or ontological valida­ Paul calls this "critical thinking in tion.[1S] Rather, the justification for the 'weak' sense," and gives us a using logic normatively has its source succinct summary of its usual results. in evidence that results from a pheno­ One likelihood is " 'sophistry' ": the menological analysis of the lifeworld: student "learns to use technical con­ cepts and techniques to maintain his Husserl's transcendental logic sets it­ most deep-seated prejudices and irra­ self the task of delineating the range tional habits of thought." The alterna­ and legitimate objects of traditional logic through a regressive analysis into tive is II 'dismissal' "-outright the 'sense' of the formalizing abstrac­ rejection of rational modes of thought tion that is at its [logic's) root, and "in favor of some suggested alterna­ teleological inquiry into the 'truth' with tive-'feeling,' 'intuition,' 'faith,' or which formalizing abstractions can 'higher consciousness.' "[12] Both of judge about individuals.(16) these are a long way from the goals of teaching critical thinking that are For Angus as well as Husserl, the cited at the start of this section, and " 'sense' " found in this regressive there are a variety of responses we can analysis is that the formal is manifest, give to this disjuncture between goals as inherent modes of structure and and results. I will sketch Angus's order, in the material. In other words: response, and then Paul's, and then Husserl's work on logic and the life­ suggest two inadequacies in the latter world shows that the latter displays which may be remedied by incorpora­ the former; that the form of our rea­ ting elements of the former. soning is implicit in that content. Thus, Angus finds that instrumental rea­ his "redirection of philosophy [which] son's restriction to the application of takers] the whole of the experienced given means-such as logical sys­ lifeworld into thought" is a redescrip­ tems-to given ends is a contribution tion of practice as always already in­ to what Husserl called "the crisis of formed by theory. [17] Western humanity [which] rests on If we accept Husserl's demonstra­ a conception of reason in which formali­ tion that "formalism is not self-en­ zation held sway such that the genuine closed, but rests on presuppositions advances by special sciences and of sense and teleology of truth in the formal logic are severed from philo­ lifeworld," we need not accept the "re­ sophical enlightenment."[13] Hus­ duction of human action to tech­ serl's own response to that situation nique."[18] Angus takes Husserl's was to show that formalizations derive demonstration of logic as embedded .....

4 Lenore Langsdorf within experience as the basis for his and presentational. ... The tradition of claim that insofar as logic is justifiably thought cannot be taken to be exhaust­ (rather than arbitrarily or dogmatically) ive; we must return to the generating applicable to theorizing in general, experiences from which thought we are justified in extending our rea­ emerges. Judgment is an inter-relation­ ship of immediacy and critique .... soning beyond the limitations of instru­ [20] mental reason; he calls this expanded conception "judgment." He goes on The contrast between instrumental to develop this broader notion of rea­ reason and judgment deepens when we soning as including rational considera­ notice that judgment is intrinsically tion of the contexts from which issues bound to a judging process, carried and arguments arise, and to which out by a judging self who is capable techniques apply. of actualizing a spectrum of possible Identifying contextualized objects perspectives on judged subject matter, as the recipients of technical action and is also capable of reflecting upon implies two further differences between that process. Cultivating or developing instrumental reason and judgment. these capacities is then a force for un­ First, ends can now be thematized as doing the "reversal of enlightenment" distinct from, and perhaps problema­ brought about by instrumental reason's tically related to, objects. Also: judg­ limitation to formalizations, uncon­ ment, in reflecting upon objects within nected to the lifeworld, and technique, their contexts, discovers that "it is the connected only to means-end delibera­ context from which technical ends tions. stand out that establishes the possi­ A last, rather lengthy, quotation from bility of a plurality of ends" which are Angus stresses the integration of self, "formulated from" their contexts and process, object, and reflection in his "cannot be conceived as existing prior notion of judgment, in a way that to the formation process ."[19] enables us to see the explicit connec­ Reasoning, understood as judgment, tion between his proposal and Paul's: is thus revealed as an activity with two Judgment makes the absent present .... instrinsic and usually unnoticed di­ The compatibility or contradictoriness mensions. It thematizes objects in the of representations which are gathered lifeworld as presentations of a parti­ from varying perspectives must be con­ cular individual's "immediate expe­ sidered; what is at issue is not the accu­ rience," and it thematizes them also racy of each one in isolation but the de­ as representations, informed by theory. gree to which they can be combined into In other words, this conception of rea­ a comprehensive judgment. This in­ soning understands our reasoning as volves a dual reflection: on the object intrinsically incorporating both pre­ as it emerges and ... on the subject which supposed logical systems (formal iza­ must harmonize, or comprehend the dissonance of, representations .... These tion) and means-ends correlations considerations culminate in an indivi­ which are supplied by cultural and dual judgment, a universalizing claim individual goals, needs and values­ embedded in a singular statement about which is to say that they are inevitably the public object. This claim can be egocentric and sociocentric. In contrast contested-its journey around the ob­ to instrumental reason, judgment ject is not the only possible one .... thematizes those unnoticed presuppo­ Similarly ... the entirety of the self. .. sitions within its own activity, as well is open to constitution in judgment.. .. as reasoning about the objects which The constitution of self and world by judgments is never exhausted by ex­ are instrumental reason's sole interest. isting judgments. It remains a particu­ In Angus's words, larization of an unlimited possibility Both sides of this theory I life-world rela­ of constituting judgments .... Judgment tionship are involved in judgment. In is critrical thinking; it proceeds as cri­ order to overcome the crisis of reason tique ... both inside and outside received judgment must be both representative representations. Actual judgments Critical Thinking 5

hand down the public realm, yet criti­ do provide a demonstration of Paul's cal thought measures its limitations by recognition that "the media" typically incorporating new elements derived present "a profoundly nationalistic from the present and forming a new bias," and that any" 'ego' is identified individual judgment.. .. There is no in part with the national 'ego."'[24] method for critique .... [it) does not pro­ ceed arbitrarily, but it cannot be fixed Exploration of that situation can be the into a method.[21] first step toward recognizing that our usual means of reasoning-i.e., instru­ This reconception of our reasoning mental reason-do not go beyond the ability offers a theoretical basis for "given interest" represented in any Richard Pau I' s "alternative view" of "given argument." We can then go on critical thinking. to make that interest itself explicit, The '" strong' sense" of critical to "imaginatively construct" others, thinking that Paul has been developing and to develop our considerations of abandons atomic skills, arguments these alternatives in a dialectical and issues in favor of comprehending manner. any technique as only one among "a There are two aspects of the notion more complex set of actual or possible of judgment that are not paralleled moves" which enable us to "organize in Paul's proposal, however. My sug­ or conceptualize the world, and our gestion that they be added is offered place in it, in somewhat different terms on the basis of agreeing with the prob­ than others do."[22] Rather than lems and dangers (e.g. "sophistry" remaining within the limitation of any and "dismissal") he identifies, and so actual argument or issue, then, Paul proposing additional "theoretical would relocate the reasoning process underpinning" for effective teaching of to a realm of possible personal and so­ "critical thinking in the 'strong' cial world-views, actions, and judg­ sense." ments. He stresses that it is only when The first aspect of judgment that I we (both students and teachers) come would add to Paul's procedure is sug­ to recognize that any gested by the following remark, which given argument reflects, or if justified occurs when he gives us "some basic would serve, a given interest that we theoretical underpinnings for a 'strong can, by imaginatively entertaining a sense' approach": competing interest, construct an oppo­ sing pOint of view and so an opposing Reasoning is an essential and defining argument or set of arguments. It is by operation presupposed by all human developing both arguments dialectically acts. To reason is to make use of ele­ that we come to recognize their ments in a logical system to generate strengths and weaknesses.(23) conclusions.(25) "Arguments," as he goes on to say, But if we do not inquire into what "are not things-in-themselves"; ra­ appears here to be the merely "given" ther, they are actual or possible pre­ character of "a log ical system," we sentations of factual or imagined con­ limit ourselves to the question of texts, from actual or imagined perspec­ "how" (do I apply these "elements") tives (world-views). and exclude the question of "why" The example Paul provides of how to (they should be applied). This allows teach "critical thinking in the 'strong' a powerful feature of instrumental sense" seems to me to respond, in reason to remain within our reasoning. some ways, to the need to move from We need, therefore, to do some the actual to the possible; from a phenomenological analysis in order to "given" situation or argument to "ima­ discover just what logical elements gined" alternatives. Two films which are implicit in our reasoning. Although present radically different sets of Husserl's analysis of formal systems "facts" in portraying one situation­ can serve as a model for this activity, U.S. involvement in Central America- I suggest that actually carrying out this 6 Lenore Langsdorf

analysis in classroom practice is pre­ ception of judgment which would be ferable for theoretical and pedagogical, helpful here in two ways. First, it pro­ as well as ethical, reasons. The theore­ vides us with a theoretical (i.e. ideal) tical and pedagogical advantages de­ point from which to recognize that the rive from our ability to justify the "use "constitution of self and world by judg­ of elements of a logical system" on ment is never exhausted by existing the basis of identifying them as intrin­ judgments."[27] Exploring the evid­ sic structures of actual arguments­ ence for this feature of judgment rather than as independent, abstract (as provided by our own biographies rules which the critical thinking teacher and in fiction) allows us to recognize prescribes in much the same way that that any world view is intrinsically­ the medical doctor prescribe drugs for by virtue of the very nature of human an illness. The ethical aspect involves reasoning-a "particularization [an our ability to show why "elements in actual instance] of an unlimited pos­ a logical system" should apply to our sibilityof constituting judgments."[28] arguments and actions. For neglecting We can thereby avoid getting side­ to justify our prescriptions places us tracked into any implication that our in the rather paradoxical position of own reasoning is being singled out as saying to our students: "If you want to particularly or especially deficient; be a critical th i n ker, do exactly as I e.g., that the media in our society is say." especially biased, or that a particular The second aspect of judgment which individual has a psychological defi­ I would add to Paul's proposal is sug­ ciency or social disadvantage which gested by this mention of his own con­ interferes with reasoning. text: The second way in which the shift I teach in the United States .... [T]he from a focus on individual cases to a media here as everywhere reflects, and concern with general structures is the students have typically internalized, helpful involves understanding how it is a profoundly 'nationalistic' bias .... that we can "internalize" bias without [T]heir 'ego' is identified in part with becoming "incapable of the process the national 'ego,' nevertheless they of systematically question i ng. " The are not. .. incapable of beginning the feature of human being which allows process of systematically questioning this to occur, I suggest, is the theore­ it.[26] tical reciprocity of perspectives which Despite the phrase "as everywhere" phenomenological analysis of the life in this remark, Paul's proposal is often world confirms. In practice, this is often read as critical of our media in particu­ limited; one way to understand what lar; and even, as claiming that Ameri­ critical thinking teaching is about, I can students and American culture in suggest, is as the cultivation of that general are more national istic than capacity for reciprocity. Paul refers to others. This seems to me a misreading this as the necessity of moving from of his proposal which may be en­ an egocentric and sociocentric world couraged by a lack of explicit attention view to a dialectical one, and notes that to the question of whether he is talking he is "beginning" on the "develop­ about reasoning in general, or as it is ment of 'strong sense' approaches" present in his particular situation. The to teaching critical thinking on the principle of charity seems appropriate dialectical model. [29] here, for the overall context of his work One of the "theoretical underpin­ suggests that he is talking about the nings" for those approaches (which nature of reasoning itself, and how to also need development, I suggest) is cultivate improvements to it, rather the effect of the media on our capacity than about any particular manifesta­ to move from the egocentric stand­ tion. points from which human beings in­ Presentation (as contrasted to repre­ evitably begin. In the following two sec­ sentation) is the aspect of Angus's con- tions, then, I will consider the ways Critical Thinking 7 in which two of the media-television tion, discernment, [and] analysis" and the printed word-may influence that are basic to thinking critically. our capacity for moving from egocen­ The "four arguments for the elimina­ tricity toward a more public-dialogical tion of television" developed (albeit in or dialectical-position in which we are a speculative and "nonscholarly" more capable of "systematic ques­ fashion) by Mander focus primarily tioning." on the "technology being used upon viewers" so that they-which is to say, we-can separate technique from con­ Part Two: tent" and examine the Television and Imagination erroneous assumption that technologies are 'neutral.' We have not learned to Critical thinking is possible only where think of technology as having ideology the standpoints of all others are open to built into its very form.[32] inspection. Hence, critical thinking while still a solitary business has not By virtue of its form, Mander argues, cut itself off from 'all others.' ... [By] television is force of imagination, it makes the others less a communications or educational present and thus moves potentially medium, as we wished to think of it, into a space which is public, open to all than an instrument that plants im­ sides ... To think with the enlarged ages-and does so in a way that allows mentality-that means you train for no cognition, no discernment, no your imagination to go visiting ... [30] notations upon the experience one is If you decide to watch television, then having.[33] there's no choice but to accept the Before going on to consider Mander's stream of electronic images as it comes. claims, I want to discuss the role that The first effect of this is to create a imagination plays in Angus's and passive mental attitude .... Thinking only gets in the way. There is a second dif­ Paul's critiques. We can then consider ficulty. Television information seems to Mander's claim that the form of tele­ be received more in the unconscious vision-television by virtue of its very than the conscious regions of the technology-suppresses the develop­ mind .... The image doesn't exist in the ment of imagination, and thus, sup­ world, and so cannot be observed as you presses our capacity to "go visiting" would another person .... Perhaps th is beyond egocentricity; i.e., exercise quality of nonexistence, at least in judgment in that "public space" where concrete worldly form, disqualifies this dialogical thinking occurs.[34] image information from being subject In the course of discussing Hannah to conscious processes: thinking, dis­ Arendt's remarks on imagination cernment, analysis.[31] (quoted at the start of this section), My theme in this section can perhaps Ian Angus indicates how imagination be best stated in hypothetical form: expands judgment beyond the limits of if, as Hannah Arendt claims, the "force instrumental reason: of imagination" is crucial to moving us from egocentricity; and if, as Jerry The operation of representation is a Mander asserts, television as a techno­ function of the imagination in which the logy-i.e. in its very form, rather than 'free play' of the mind is not limited by by virtue of its contents (the program­ a definite concept. Kant describes the imagination as 'gathering together ming)-suppresses our "power of the manifold of intuition': it is not forming a mental image of something limited to actual presentations but con­ not present to the senses or never be­ sists in the combination and re-arrange­ fore wholly perceived in reality" (which ment of previous, present, and anti­ is a dictionary definition of "imagina­ cipated presentations. This imaginative tion"), then we have a situation in reconstruction does not take place with which the most pervasive technology reference to a pre-defined purpose but in most of our lives, television, works rather involves a relationship to an anti­ against the capacities for "imagina- cipated singular judgment of a parti- , 8 Lenore Langsdorf

cular which itself implies a universaliza­ "construct a dialogue between two of tion .[35] the most intelligent defenders of each of the points of view."[38] Rather There are three ways that imagination than apply a technique to an actual functions, then, which makes it essen­ argument, the student must generate tial to judgment: it "gathers" the and reflect upon possible arguments contributions of our different senses· it in a dialogical manner, and so trans­ gives us access to presentations that cend the egocentric world view from are actually absent, but potentially­ which we all begin to reason. as "anticipated" -present; and it However, the technology of tele­ enables us to transcend "reference" vision, as Mander portrays it, is one (delimited, "pre-defined" ends) by wh.ich encourages the ego to develop anticipating alternative possibilities. If qUite an opposite set of reactions. we consider how the mind would func­ "Instead of training active attention" tion without these abilities, we have a one of the researchers he cites sa;s, close approxi mation to Angus's charac­ "television seems to suppress it."[39] terization of instrumental reason that Instead of requiring the ego to use its limits us to actual techniques for experience and imagination to trans­ means-end deliberation. cend egocentricity, this technology re­ Richard Paul's discussion of the dif­ ~uires the ego to stay put-quite ferences between critical thinking in literally, as well as figuratively. the" strong" and "weak" senses sug­ In contrast to imagination's func­ gests that these same three functions tion in "gathering" the contributions ?f imagination are necessary if the ego of all five senses, television engages IS to move beyond "atomic arguments" only two, and even these are often sun­ that are presented without any concern dered in a way quite alien to the pre­ for context-i .e. either the individual sentations of pre-technological life. subjects or the specific situations which For example: the visual and aural give rise to those arguments. "Strong stimuli are often non-synchronized, sense critical thinking" recognizes that as when we see people walking on a dis­ these arguments "are in fact a limited tant hillside but hear their conversa­ set of moves within a more complex set tion as though they were next to us. of ac~ual or possible moves reflecting a variety of logically significant engage­ The natural informational balance ments in the world."[36] Since we can between aural and visual has been only evaluate the "strengths and weak­ shattered. Now, information that you nesses of the [particular case of] rea­ take in with visual sense cannot be used to modify or help process the informa­ soning in relation to alternate pos­ tion from the aural sense because they sibilities, "critical thinking in the have been isolated from each other and 'strong' sense" simply cannot be prac­ reconstructed.[ 40] ticed within the limits of actual egocen­ This "isolation" and "reconstruction" tric and sociocentric positions: moreover, are not a product of our o~n It is only when we recognize ... that a imagination, and so the process which given argument reflects ... a given accomplished them is not available interest that we can, by imaginatively to ?ur reflection. If it were, we might entertaining a competing interest, train our imagination to thematize construct an opposing point of view other ways in which it might have been .... [37] done; other products which might have Paul's "sample assignment" certainly resulted. Instead, we have a hidden uses the imagination in this way. For process, instigated by an unknown it is designed to go beyond the ego's author, and resulting in a product all-too-comfortable starting point and quite isolated from our own actual resting place, by requiring the student lived experience. The "two semi­ to "view and analyze critically ... two operative senses cannot benefit from incompatible world views" and then the usual mix of information that Critical Thinking 9 human beings employ to deduce mean­ and mix of its perspectives, no con­ ing from their surroundings."[41] tribution to the internal temporal struc­ The ego is instead reinforced in its iso­ ture of the finished product, and no lation, supplied with "implanted ability to supplement it with alternative images," all of which "arrive in se­ images of the same kind. quence with equal val idity. "[ 42] It My consideration of television as a has passively received the product of form has focused on its technology as a "process of ... dissociation and re­ one which intrinsically suppresses the structuring ... which automatically con­ conditions needed for an ego to develop fines real ity to itself." [43] the "imaginative force" needed to re­ What this isolated ego has not done locate from egocentricity to that is interact, both actually and imagina­ dialogical "space" identified by tively, with pretechnologically-pro­ Hannah Arendt as "public, open to all cessed lived experience-which is the sides."[46] This should not be cons­ real context of both logic and logic­ trued as any sort of general ized re­ users. In that interaction (and in situa­ jection of technology, or even as agree­ tions such as Paul's sample assign­ ment with Mander's assertion that tele­ ment) the ego has opportunities to vision should be "eliminated." Rather, choose and develop alternative pos­ my interest in the effects of cultural sibilities, and then, to discover and de­ factors on reasoning capacity is insti­ velop logical practices in order to judge gated by the conviction that our at­ competing claims to validity. "Knowl­ tempts to teach "strong sense" criti­ edge is gained," as Mander points out, cal thinking stand a better chance of "by discerning change, by noting the surviving those "moments of frustra­ event that is different from all others, tion and cynicism" that Paul mentions by making distinctions and establishing if we are aware of factors in the culture patterns. "[44] Our everyday lived which operate at cross purposes to experience provides opportunities ours. [47] Correlatively, I bel ieve for these activities, but they are absent that we are more apt to teach "strong in the processed experience (so to sense" critical thinking effectively if speak) provided by television. we make use of factors in our culture Although I have limited this con­ wh ich support the development of sideration of television to the effect imagination, and thus, aid in cultiva­ of its form upon the development of ting our capacity to be critical thinkers. imagination, and thus on the cultiva­ If Paul Ricoeur's thesis is correct, tion of our capacity to become critical another technology-the printed thinkers, one remark by Mander about word-provides such aid. We can now content is so directly relevant to critical consider his proposal: the ego becomes thinking as to demand inclusion. In a the self-i.e., transcends its egocen­ study reporting on what sorts of knowl­ tricity-through encounter with text. edge viewers believe they gain from television programs, "practical knowl­ edge and methods of problem-solving Part Three: lead the list of knowledge reported Ego, Text, and Self acquired through these program."[4S] fiction is not an instance of reproductive Regardless of programming content, imag ination, but of productive imagina­ however, the very form of television tion .... all symbolic systems have a cog­ deprives the ego of the conditions for nitive value: they make reality appear attaining knowledge which are offered in such and such a way ... they generate by actual and imagined experience. new grids for reading experience or Nor will additional technology-e.g. for producing it.[48] recorders which allow us to replay appropriation is the process by which fleeting images, or pause when we the revelat ion of new modes of bei ng ... wish to reflect on them-repair this gives the subject new capacities for lack. For we have no part in the supply knowing himself.. .. Thus appropriation 10 Lenore Langsdorf

ceases to appear as a new kind of One reason for discounting Man­ possession .... lt implies instead a mo­ der's portrayal, I suspect, is our recog­ ment of dispossession of the narcissistic nition that all of our experience is "arti­ ego .... 1 should like to contrast the self ficially reconstructed" by technology. which emerges from the understanding Mander holds that our only choice is of the text to the ego which claims to between "accepting this interpreta­ precede this understanding. It is the tion of reality as our own" and rejecting text, with its universal power of un­ it in favor of "trying to understand the veiling, which gives a self to the ego.[49] world solely through [our] own isolated mental processes." [51] A th i rd alter­ My theme in this concluding section native, however, would be to seek, is that at this point in human history, within our technologically formed en­ the ability to think critically, as non­ vironment, means that provide some egocentric selves, is dependent upon assistance in transcending our socio­ the encounter with texts that portray centric and egocentric context. Mander an imagined world-i.e., with literary does note that the printed word, by texts. virtue of its form, offers that possibil­ A crucial distinction must be stressed ity: at the outset. Just as the previous sec­ print can express much greater depth, tion proposed that the form of tele­ complexity, change of mood, subtlety, vision suppresses imagination, and detail .... Books ... can be written in much thus opposes the very possibility of slower rhythms,_ encouraging a percep­ critical thinking, my argument here tion that builds, state by stage, over the is that the form of literary texts sup­ length of a long reading process .... [52] ports, and perhaps even fosters, the As one of Mander's sources noted: development of imagination and (there­ "The response to print may be fair­ fore) critical thinking. Since this claim ly described as active ... while the res­ is directly dependent upon Paul Ri­ ponse to television may be fairly des­ coeur's theory of text, I offer a sum­ cribed as passive."[53] mary of that theory, and concl ude with Ricoeur's analysis of "response" as a brief mention of one endeavor to the "appropriation" moment of our teach critical thinking from the theore­ interaction with printed discourse­ tical basis I propose here, and which text-identifies it as a culminating mo­ derives from his work. Before consider­ ment that displaces "narcissistic ego" ing Ricoeur's work, however, I begin in favor of an emerging "self." Both with Mander's remarks on the techno­ the author's and the reader's egos are logy of text, in contrast to television. transcended in this moment: The persistent theme in Mander's critique of television as a technology is The relation to the world of the text takes the place of the relation to the that its very form "implants images" subjectivity of the author, and at the that rule out depth, subtlety, and com­ same time the problem of the subjecti­ pari son with actual experience, and it vity of the reader is displaced. To does this all in a manner that "dis­ understand is not to project oneself sociates" and "restructures" those onto the text but to expose oneself to images. Thus, he argues, "discerning" it; it is to receive a self enlarged by the their variation from sequences in the appropriation of proposed worlds which lifeworld, "making distinctions" interpretation unfolds .... fiction is ... among them, or "establishing pat­ a fundamental dimension of the subject­ terns" that transfer rei iably to the I ife­ ivity of the reader: in reading, I 'un­ world which they purport to represent realize myself.' Reading introduces me to imaginative variations of the ego.[54] -in short all of the acitivies which critical thi~king seeks to develop-are In the public space of the proposed discouraged. Instead, "passive" re­ (i .e., possible or potential) world "in ception of these technologically pro­ front of the text," then, we have "a duced images is encouraged.[50] recourse against any given reality

-.~-..----~------Critical Thinking 11

and thereby the possibility of a critique that appropriation of the text's world of the real."[55] To interact with the appears to be impossible. Students possible world of the text is to enlarge insist that requiring them to defend "reality" by including "ideality"­ their interpretations amounts to de­ i.e., possibilities that transcend time, nying those "feelings," "intuitions," or are omni-temporally available. When and "higher consciousness" mentioned the ego encounters text, then, there by Paul as common alternatives to is a displacement from a given, actually critical thinking. Or, they refuse to existing egocentric situation, to a do­ encounter the texts on any level past main of meaning which is always po­ that of plot synopsis, and that only for tentially available to anyone who takes purposes of passing an examination. up the text, reads, and may thereby Accepting either result, if we continue become enlightened.[56] to use Paul's terms, would be teaching Appropriation of the text's meanings literature in a "weak sense"; i.e. as is a process that contrasts quite drama­ an aid to "sophistry" or incentive for tically to reception of television's "dismissal" -despite the teacher's images (as in Mander's account), or hope that a "global 'Socratic' effect" projection of the ego's world view (as (even, enlightenment) would occur. in Paul's portrayal), or assimilation Ricoeur proposes that distanciation, of the culture's values (as in Angus's as a moment (essential feature) of the critique). In Ricoeur's analysis of the form of text, determines that distance nature of our interaction with text, of content evidenced by this classroom "appropriation is the dialectical experience. Both types of distancing counterpart of distanciation," which is, can now be understood positively, as in turn, "the condition of possibility part of the "condition of possibility of understanding oneself in front of of understanding" both self and the text."[57] This latter feature of world.[59] We have already looked at the form of text is unique in our present the nature of appropriation in that way; historical situation: neither television's a correlative look at the nature of dis­ images nor our culture's values are tanciation will enable us to focus on distanciated; i.e. they do not appear to a common feature in both moments us as objects that are alien to us as sub­ and-by means of that feature-on the jects. In the case of television, they value of literary texts for teaching cri­ quite literally come to be within our tical thinking. perceptual processes: "the image Distanciation is Ricoeur's term for doesn't exist in the world."[58] In the the text's presence as a perennially case of cultural values, they are incor­ distant and autonomous force-an porated into ends that are assumed (by "atemporal object" that solicits tempo­ instrumental reason) to lie outside of ral responses.[60] This is not the sort reason's proper sphere. of object that can be possessed; Ri­ The evidence for Ricoeur's dialectic coeur specifically warns us that "appro­ of appropriation and distanciation is priation" is not "a new kind of posses­ phenomenological: i.e., it is derived sion."[61] The atemporality of the from his observations of lived expe­ text-also called omni-temporality and rience. Distanciation as an essential ideal ity - rei nforces its ch aracter as feature (moment) of the reader's en­ alien to us. It has an essentially distant counter with text is documented quite nature which vividly in reports by poetry and litera­ ture teachers. They despair, at least is the ruin of the ego's pretension to constitute itself as ultimate origin. at times, of making the of the content The ego must assume for itself the "great books" accessible to their stu­ 'imaginative variations' by which it dents. In terms of Ricoeur's analysis: could respond to the 'imaginative the spatiotemporal distance between variations' on reality that literature and the world of those texts and the situa­ poetry, more than any other form of tions of contemporary students is such discourse, engender.[62] 12 Lenore Langsdorf

In other words: faced with an object Richard Paul argues, if "critical that presents alternatives to the "false thinking in the 'strong' sense" is to evidences of everyday reality" -es­ occur. pecially its implicit claim to be the only Not coincidentally, the college within possible reality-the reader is pushed which I teach is developing a concep­ to respond to the force of the text from tion of teaching literature, critical a standpoi nt other than that reader's thinking, and writing in an integrated everyday reality; i.e. from a standpoint manner, so that our students (and we that remains centered upon, but is no ourselves) can reflect upon our ego­ longer limited to, the actual ego.[63] centric situations from within the public Given the mode of inquiry inculcated space-the world-constituted by the by our "scientific age" (operating with text.[68] We would like to reverse instrumental reason), the inevitable the culturally-implanted presupposi­ question that greets this analysis tion that books, logic, and composi­ is: "how"? Ricoeur's response is to tion are things that have a quasi­ direct us towards a capacity, rather existence in the classroom, at best. than to impose a method (technique): Our hypothesis is that the way to accomplish that reversal is to thematize Are we not ready to recognize in the the origins of these "things" in, and power of imagination, no longer the their applicability to, the lifeworld of faculty for deriving 'images' from our readers, writers, and thinkers. The aim sensory experience, but the capacity is to integrate philosophy, literature for letting new worlds shape our un­ and composition within the context derstanding of ourselves? This power would not be conveyed by images, but of the students' lives, rather than pre­ by the emergent meanings in our lan­ sent them as abstract entities to be guage.[64] applied as techniques or seen as con­ ducive to some form of "higher con­ The less-asked question, and the one sciousness"-and thus limited to an which moves us beyond instrumental inner, ego logical situation. The multi­ reason, is: "why"? Paul's and Angus's plicity of interpretations arising from critiques suggest the teleological res­ reading texts can be used, in that inte­ ponse to that question: the goal of en­ grated context, to thematize the appro­ countering text is that "global 'Socra­ priateness of a "logic of probability" tic' effect" called "enlightenment." for validation (in contrast to verifica­ The power of the text resides, then, tion) of conflicting claims as to the na­ in ideal (omni-temporal) meanings ture of reality in the imaginatively­ which originate beyond the real (tempo­ constituted world of the self and the rally restricted) situation of the reader. text.[69] Actualizing or realizing those meanings When students enter the writing requires exercise of the "power of process, then, we expect them to do so imagination," if they are to have sig­ as selves, rather than as egos (using nificance within the reader's particu­ both of these terms in Ricoeur's sense). lar situation.[65] Correlatively, read­ The enlightened position we hope to ers "unreal ize" (so to speak) those encourage is described by Ricoeur particular meanings in their encounter as one in which, when "arguing about with the text's meanings. Through this the meaning of an action [or a text,] process, the egocentricity of both I put my wants and beliefs at a distance reader and author are transcended.[66] and submit then to a concrete dialectic The "ego divests itself of itself," of confrontation with opposite points of freeing the reader for relocation view."[70] That dialogue of selves "beyond the limited horizon of his own within the public sphere established by existential situation ."[67] And this text is critical thinking as a force for is precisely where he needs to be, enlightenment. [71] Critical Thinking 13

Notes p. 12), "while it is legitimate to r attribute the term 'instrumental [1] Richard Paul, "Teaching Critical reason' to Horkheimer, it is by no Thinking in the 'Strong' Sense: means his favored one." The term A Focus on Self-Deception, World is used quite generally in the Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Frankfurt School tradition; Analysis," Informal Logic News­ Angus's correlative term, "judg­ letter 4: 2-7 (May 1982). Hereafter, ment," is equally common in the cited as "Paul." Kantian and Husserlian tradi­ tions. [2] The most relevant texts would be: for Angus, Technique and Enlight­ [7] Angus, 17. enment: Limits of Instrumental Reason (Washington D.C.: Center [8] Angus, 56, 67, 121, 135-137, for Advanced Research in Pheno­ 140-141. Although Angus's analy­ menology and University Press of sis denies the possibility of any America, 1984). Hereafter, cited such grounding, Husserl's places as "Angus." For Husserl, The any such claim "under the epo­ Crisis of European Sciences and che." That is, the possibility is not Transcendental Phenomenology, denied, but it is rigorously re­ trans. D. Carr (Evanston: North­ moved from consideration. western University Press, 1970) [9] Angus, 4; d. 12,48,51,85. and Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns (The [10] This phrase is used throughout Hague: Nijhoff, 1969). For Critical Angus's book to refer to the his­ Theory, Max Horkheimer and torical effect of "universalized Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of instrumental reason." Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming [11] Paul, 3. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) and Max Horkheimer, [12] Paul,2. "Traditional and Critical Theory," [13] Angus, 19. in Critical Theory, trans. M. O'Connell et. al. (New York: [14] These "translations" between Herder and Herder, 1972). Marxian and Husserlian vocabu­ [3] The most relevant text would be: laries are accurate, I would argue; but that argument cannot be given Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and here. I use them as if they were the Human Sciences: Essays on unproblematic, for heuristic pur­ Language, Action, and Interpreta­ poses: i.e., to stress the conver­ tion, trans. J .B. Thompson (Cam­ gence between some strands of bridge: Cambridge University neomarxist analysis (such as Press, 1981). Hereafter, cited as "Ricoeur." For a discussion of Critical Theory) and Husserlian egocentricity as inevitable but phenomenological analysis. Also, transcendable, see my "Egocentri­ I use them to reinforce the recipro­ city: What it is and Why it mat­ city of evidence Angus finds ters ," presented at the Fourth in Husserl's analysis of lived ex­ I nternational Conference on Cri­ perience as the origin and telos tical Thinking and Educational of ideal structures (theoretical Reform, Sonoma State University, entities), and neomarxian (even, August 1986. perhaps, Marx's) analysis of eco­ nomic base and ideological super­ [4] Angus, 94 (my emphasis). structure. [5] Paul, 3. [15] Angus, 56; d. footnote 8. [6] As he notes (in his footnote 24, [16] Angus, 33. 14 Lenore Langsdorf

[17] Angus, 20. [29] Paul, 7. l [18] Angus, 93. [30] Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2 (New York: Harcourt, [19] Angus, 126-127 (my emphasis). 1978), 257 (my emphasis). Quoted [20] Angus, 125. This accessibility of by Angus (page 107). objects as both presented in indivi­ [31] Jerry Mander, Four Argum.e~ts dual, immediate experience and For The Elimination of TeleVISion represented in systems is a major (New York: Quill, 1978, 200-201 difference between Husserl's (my emphasis). Hereafter cited as analysis and those semiotic Mander. and hermeneutic traditions which hold that we have access only [32] Mander, 310, 350. to objects as constituted by sys­ [33] Mander, 204 (my emphasis). tem. For these latter trad itions, our reflection can only capture ex­ [34] Arendt, 257; quoted in context perience as already limited by sys­ at the start of Part Two. tems (and so, informed by theory and history); it cannot also en­ [35] Angus, 105; see footnote 20 and counter immediately present accompanying text for "repre­ facets of a pre-theoretical life­ sentation ." The enclosed quota­ world. tion is from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J .H. [21] Angus, 142-143 (my emphasis). Barnard (New York: Collier Mac­ millian, 1974), 15. The suggestion [22] Paul, 3-4 (my emphasis). arising even from this very brief [23] Paul, 5 (my emphasis). treatment of the connection between the subject's use of [24] Paul, 5. In keeping with the per­ imagination to transcend "ego" sistently self-critical character in a movement toward "self"­ stressed in the notion of judgment; as prerequisite for the practice of I would note that the instructions critical thinking/judgment- is that (given to the students who are to "pure reason" may be dependent analyze the "incompatible world upon "judgment." (That is: the views" represented in these films) First Critique may be grounded are heavy with cultural assump­ in the Third.) Obviously, this is a tions. Paul characterizes the two proposition requiring considera­ positions as "a right-wing think­ tion in a very different essay, tank film alleging ... " and a which must also consider the con­ "World Council of Church's [sic] nections and discrepancies bet­ film in defense ... " (Angus, 6). ween Kant's use of "imagination" [25] Paul, 4. and the term as used by Angus, Arendt, Mander, Paul, and Ri- [26] Paul, 5. coeur. [27] Angus, 143 (quoted in context [36] Paul, 3. in the quotation identified in foot­ note 21). In Husserlian terms, this [37] Paul, 4-5 (my emphasis). step would be the "transcendental [38] Paul, 6. Although the two films reduction"; i.e., the focus on "any are the primary sources of informa­ subjectivity whatever" or on the' tion for these imaginative con­ very possibility of reasoning­ structions, Paul notes that they are rather than on any particular, indi­ supplemented by a variety of sen­ vidual reasoning process. sory stimulation and include the [28] Angus, 143. reading of texts. Furthermore, Critical Thinking 15

Mander argues that film techno­ [55] Ricoeur, 93 (my emphasis); d., logy, although it makes use of 142-143. some of the same surface tech­ niques as television (e.g., high­ [56] Ricoeur, 192. My allusion is to St. contrast scenes and a predomi­ Augustine's account of his conver­ nance of close-ups) is not as sion (Confessions, Books Eight restricted to them; nor does the and Nine). Translated into the film rely on the same neurophysio­ vocabulary of this paper: after logical techniques (e.g., projec­ years of wandering in civilization tion of "non-existent" images). as an ego, he encounters a text which instigates the replacement [39] Mander, 209. of ego with self and retires to the [40] Mander, 276 (my emphasis). countryside to integrate this trans­ formation. The publ ic man ifesta­ [41] Mander, 168 (my emphasis). tion of this private enlightenment is a change of occupation: he re­ [42] Mander, 291. signs his rhetoric professorship [43] Mander, 198. and takes Holy Orders. [44] Mander, 300. [57] Ricoeur, 92. [45] Mander, 254. He identifies the re­ [58] Mander, 201; quoted in context at port as Television and Social Be­ the start of Part Two. havior, Vol. 4, "prepared by the [59] Ricoeur, 94. National Institute of Mental Health for the Department of [60] Ricoeur, 185. Health, Education, and Wel­ fare." [61] Ricoeur, 192; quoted in context at the start of Part Three. [46] These phrases from Arendt are quoted in context at the start of [62] Ricoeur, 113-114 (author's empha- this section. sis). [47] Paul, 3. [63] Ricoeur, 113. [64] Ricoeur, 181. [48] Ricoeur, 292-293 (my emphasis). Ricoeur notes that he is using [65] I follow E.D. Hirsch, Jr. in using Nelson Goodman's term, "sym­ "meaning" and "significance" bolic systems," interchangeably in this way, to differentiate the with" fiction." world-of-the-text from the en­ [49] Ricoeur, 192-193 (author's empha­ larged world-of-the-subject who sis). appropriates that text. See, e.g., Validity in Interpretation (New [50] The terms in quotation marks are Haven: Yale University Press, from Mander, 132-133, 197-198, 1967), and The Aims of Interpreta­ 200-201, 300; all are quoted in tion (Chicago: The University of context elsewhere in the text. Chicago Press, 1976), 1-6. [51] Mander, 87. [66] Ricoeur, 94. The dialectical nature of this process must be stressed. [52] Mander, 336; d. 202-203. In Hegelian terms: the ego extern­ [53] Mander, 208; quoting Herbert alizes itself in an objective moment Krugman. (the text) that originates beyond ego and resists ego's attempt to [54] Ricoeur, 94 (my emphasis); d., reduce the text to its own projec­ 188 and footnote 35. tion. Yet in being understood, 16 Lenore Langsdorf

sublation (die Aufhebung) occurs: to technique (the deconstructive self, as the unification of subject process) and the reversal of en­ (reader) and object (text) comes lightenment (by eliminating the into being. conditions for the possibility of This essential persistence of the constituting self and world). text as a perennially available mo­ There is another way to look at ment of objectivity is crucial to the deconstructing process which Ricoeur's text theory, and thus, also results in the frustration of to the conception of enlighten­ Ricoeur's dialectic. This occurs ment I propose with that theory if the process is understood as as basis. As a structural feature originating in the ego, rather than that insists upon the availability in the encounter with the text. of objective meaning, it provides Ricoeur's critique of the subject­ a sharp contrast to that variant ivizing tendency which he finds of the "power of imagination" beginning in Descartes and con­ which I would call the "power of tinuing into Cadamer then be­ deconstruction," as originated comes relevant. (See Ricoeur, by Jacques Derrida. 190-192, 66-68.) The process be­ By discouraging passivity gins and ends with ego; deprived toward the text, deconstruction of object (text) as the external mo­ provides a force against the inges­ ment to be encountered, self can­ tion of any system that would not emerge: there is no opportu­ limit an ego to instrumental rea­ nity to "exchange the me, master son, i.e., render it incapable of of itself, for the self, disciple of judging beyond established, the text." (Ricoeur, 113; d. "given," means-ends complexes. C.W.F. Hegel. The Phenomeno­ Thus, deconstruction seems to use logy of Spirit, Section B.4.A.) the distanciation moment (or [67] Ricoeur, 191. move) in Ricoeur's dialectic, perhaps even to the point of the [68] The project, entitled "CACTIP: disappearance of the subject(s) Composition, Analysis of Text, (the author and/or reader) as well Critical Thinking Integrated Pro­ as the object (the text) into an gram," has been funded by the all-encompassing process: the Division of Educational Programs, technique called deconstruction. National Endowment for the However, insofar as deconstruc­ Humanities, for implementation tion as a technique does reach that June 1985 - May 1987. point, it is incapable of practicing the appropriation moment in Ri­ [69] Ricoeur, 211-213; d., 175. Ricoeur coeur's dialectic. For it has mentions his reliance upon brought about the destruction of Hirsch's theory of text here; see the text as an objective resource, footnote 65. i.e., as an omni-temporal meaning, [70] Ricoeur, 214. potentially available for an infi­ nitude of actualizations by subjects [71] This paper was presented at the who read it. I n other words, the Th i rd I nternational Conference on ego, in explaining the text as a Critical Thinking and Educational humanly-created process, had Reform, Sonoma State University, explained away the text as object­ July 1985. An earlier version was ive ideality. As a result, there is read at the APA Pacific Division no non-egocentric world to appro­ meeting in San Francisco, March priate in understanding as the 1985. I would like to thank Harold new, imaginatively constructed Alderman for his thoughtful and locus for constituting a self. The detailed comments on that paper. ultimate result is then limitation Briefer versions of this paper

~ .• --.---___';;"';;';;O"O~ ...... iooiiiiioi ...... ______..... Critical Thinking 17 r (which present Section Two in a several versions: Ian Angus, Ron self-contained form) were read at Bloomquist, Dennis Danvers, the AILACT session, APA Eastern Jacques Derrida, Ralph Johnson, Division meeting in Washington, Robert E. Longacre, Tom Mc­ D.C., December 1985; Christopher Cormick, Nancy McKenzie, Newport College Conference on Richard Paul, Susan Lynn Peter­ Critical Thinking, April 1986; son, Kenneth L. Pike, Thomas E. and the I nternational Conference Porter, Harry Reeder, and Paul on Argumentation in Amsterdam, Ricoeur. June 1986. I would like to acknowledge an especially extensive debt to Dr. Lenore Langsdorf, Department of these colleagues, students, and Philosophy, The University of Texas teachers with whom I've discussed at Arlington, P.O. Box 19527, Arling­ various parts of the paper in its ton, Texas 76019. D