Wilfrid Laurier University Scholars Commons @ Laurier Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 2017 Cold War by “Other Means”: Canada’s Foreign Relations with Communist Eastern Europe, 1957-1963 Cory Scurr [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd Part of the Canadian History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Scurr, Cory, "Cold War by “Other Means”: Canada’s Foreign Relations with Communist Eastern Europe, 1957-1963" (2017). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1989. https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1989 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Cold War by “Other Means”: Canada’s Foreign Relations with Communist Eastern Europe, 1957-1963 by D. Cory Scurr DISSERTATION Submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, Ontario, Canada © D. Cory Scurr 2017 1 Table of Contents Abstract: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 Acknowledgements: …………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 Introduction: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4 Chapter 1: Changes Behind the Curtain: the Soviet Economic Offensive & Canadian-Soviet Diplomatic Relations ……………………………………… 35 Chapter 2: Foundations of International Friendship: Commercial Relations & Cultural EXchanges between Canada and the USSR ………………….... 83 Chapter 3: Politics in the Shadows of Superpowers: Canadian-Yugoslav Diplomatic Relations …………………………………… 139 Chapter 4: Peering Out from the Shadows: Canadian-Yugoslav Cultural Diplomacy & Canada’s Economic Statecraft …………………... 184 Chapter 5: Mending the Past & Pushing Forward: Canadian-Polish Diplomatic Relations ………………………………………………………………… 222 Chapter 6: The NeXus of Middlepowerism: Canadian-Polish Economic & Cultural Diplomacy………………………………………..……………………….. 252 Conclusion: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 298 Bibliography: …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 310 2 Abstract Following Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became leader of the Soviet Union and ushered in a liberalization campaign that reverberated outward to certain Eastern European nations. Canadian officials recognized that limited freedom of maneuver was conceded to certain Eastern European nations, in addition to Yugoslavia’s eXisting independent position. This proved important, as Communist Eastern Europe became a deliberate and considered factor in Canada’s foreign policy. Canadian Soviet policy thus evolved into a Canadian policy towards Communist Eastern Europe, equipped with various nuances. Specifically, this project eXamines Canadian policy with Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. By the mid 1950s, a general strategic stasis eXisted in the Cold War, which led to something of a political balance; as a result, discovering strategies to engage in the Cold War by “other means” became necessary. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative government was committed to preventing the spread of communism, and this was an integral component of its foreign policy with Communist Eastern Europe. This dissertation argues Canadian policy towards Communist Eastern Europe during the Diefenbaker-Khrushchev period was not solely driven by traditional geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, but was also concerned with non-military Communist tactics. As a result, Canadian officials pursued closer political, economic, and socio-cultural bilateral relations with select Communist Eastern European countries in order to challenge Soviet hegemony in that region and to combat Eastern European communism generally. Despite the differences among Poland, Yugoslavia, and the USSR, Canada’s broad policy objective was consistent: promote positive relations to expose Communist nations to Western modalities in hopes of lessening communist influence globally. The Canadian government during this period did not have a “grand strategy” that governed its policy with the region. Instead, pragmatism prevailed as a number of ad hoc developments in the fields of economic and cultural foreign relations contributed to the growing sense that Canada was engaged in Cold War diplomacy by “other means.” 3 AcKnowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous support of Wilfrid Laurier University Graduate Studies, who, through their scholarships, bursaries, and travel awards, assisted me with my various archival research trips and other eXpenses. As this dissertation is based on primary archival material, I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of staff and archivists. At Laurier, Helene LeBlanc has been most helpful, particularly during the initial phases of this project. The staff and archivists at Library and Archives Canada have been both patient and valuable. From the University of Saskatchewan, Tim Hutchison’s expertise was most useful in helping me navigate the Diefenbaker Canada Centre’s rich archival collection. From Trinity College Archives, Sylvia Lassam’s assistance was warm and informative. My dissertation committee has played a foundational role in this project. Dr. AleX Statiev’s keen eye is always ready to reduce western bias, and his expertise on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has proved invaluable throughout this project. Dr. Ryan Touhey’s remarkable understanding of Canada’s civil service is second to none. Additionally, his encouragement throughout this project has kept me afloat on a number of occasions. A special thanks is also eXtended to Dr. Leigh Sarty, who graciously accepted to be my eXternal eXaminer. His role as Director General for Global Affairs Canada, in addition to his eXpertise on Canadian-Soviet relations, is most welcome. A very special and warm thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Kevin Spooner, who has gone above and beyond the call of duty. Proving not only to be an expert in his field, Dr. Spooner is always ready to provide advice and guidance on a number of issues both related, and unrelated, to academia; he is a true mentor, friend, and inspiration. Finally, I could not have finished this project, or the degree for that matter, if it was not for the unwavering help of my family. My sister, Tammy and her partner, Vi supported me in a number of ways, too long to list. My Dad and his wife, Abbie, have not only provided substantial financial support, but their unbridled encouragement and belief in my goals have given me strength. Finally, to my wife, Holly, I am most grateful. Your strength as a partner and mother motivates me. I am happily forever in your debt for your reassurance and encouragement to finish this project, even during moments of weakness. 4 Introduction CANADA’S COLD WAR BY “OTHER MEANS” By the mid-1950s, Cold War tensions hardened and nuclear stalemate ensued. As historian Larry Collins writes, “victory would no longer be measured in terms of conventional warfare; winning would become too concrete a concept, so the contest would devolve into a constant striving for ‘success’ and the struggle would, in [Prime Minister] Louis St. Laurent’s phrase, become essentially a contest for the ‘minds of men.’”1 Indeed, as historian Odd Arne Westad argues, the Cold War was an ideological struggle for competing visions of modernity.2 Canadian officials believed Canada represented the quintessential good nation: politically able, economically sound, and socially and culturally promising. It is true that John Diefenbaker was a Cold War warrior, and that Canada under his leadership remained a Cold War nation committed to what contemporaries perceived as the struggle against communism. Likewise, many of the Department of EXternal Affairs mandarins, old and new, were Cold War warriors. In fact, the struggle between democracy and communism, even if oversimplified, was entrenched in the very core of Canada’s Communist Eastern Europe policy. In a speech to the International Junior Red Cross Study Centre, Diefenbaker outlined how advances in sciences contributed to a population boom that would constitute added challenges to mankind. He argued, 1 Larry Collins, “Canadian-Soviet Relations During the Cold War,” in Aloysius Balawyder, ed., Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1939-1980 (Oakville, ON.: Mosaic Press, 1981), 47 2 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 5 men everywhere are demanding new living standards, greater equality of opportunity and the hope of better things, rather than despair which has been the lot of so many through the ages. The greater the population, the greater the need of raising economic standards so that there will be sufficient [resources to meet] the needs of the additional multitudes of mankind. It is under these circumstances that the battle for the minds of men is taking place between those who believe in freedom under law, and those who contend that communism is the hope of mankind.3 Imbedded in this statement are two important elements: Diefenbaker’s strident anti-communism and fear of communisms potential global spread, and his awareness of the importance of economics to the future of nations. These factors, among others, contributed to Canada’s policy toward Communist Eastern Europe during