Western Australian Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATING PROCEDURES

2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

This publication is a joint initiative between Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) and Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions (DBCA), Parks and Wildlife Service. DFES Emergency Services Complex, 20 Stockton Bend Cockburn Central, WA 6164 Tel: (08) 9323 9300 Fax: (08) 9323 9470

DBCA 17 Dick Perry Avenue, Kensington Locked Bag 104, Bentley Delivery Centre, WA 6983 Tel: (08) 9219 9000 Fax: (08) 9334 0498

October 2017 All rights reserved. This work is copyright, no part of this publication may be reproduced, transmitted, or stored in a retrieval system, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of the copyright holders. While every care has been taken to ensure that the information contained within this document is the best available, the Department of Fire and Emergency Services and the DBCA, Parks and Wildlife Service do not give warranty nor accept any liability in relation to the content of this work. References to SOPs and protocols must be verified against current Operations Doctrine.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

CONTENTS ACRONYMS ...... 1 1 - INTRODUCTION ...... 3 2 - AUTHORITY ...... 4 2.1 Protocols and Procedures ...... 4 2.2 Heads of Agreement ...... 4 2.3 Supporting Documentation ...... 4 3 – PRIMARY RESPONSE AREAS AND ALLOCATED AERIAL RESOURCES ...... 5 3.1 Metro Primary Response Area ...... 5 3.2 Bunbury Primary Response Area ...... 5 3.2.1 Busselton Regional Airport ...... 5 3.3 Manjimup Primary Response Area ...... 5 3.4 Albany Primary Response Area ...... 6 4 – REQUEST FOR AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION AIRCRAFT ...... 7 4.1 Metro Primary Response Area ...... 7 4.1.1 DBCA Request ...... 7 4.1.2 DFES Request ...... 7 4.1.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area ...... 7 4.1.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 7 4.2 Bunbury Primary Response Area ...... 8 4.2.1 DBCA Request ...... 8 4.2.2 DFES Request ...... 8 4.2.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area ...... 8 4.2.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 8 4.3 Manjimup Primary Response Area ...... 9 4.3.1 DBCA Request ...... 9 4.3.2 DFES Request ...... 9 4.3.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area ...... 9 4.3.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 9 4.4 Albany Primary Response Area ...... 10 4.4.1 DBCA Request ...... 10 4.4.2 DFES Request ...... 10 4.4.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area ...... 10 4.4.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 10

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

4.5 Midwest Response Area ...... 11 4.5.1 DBCA Request ...... 11 4.5.2 DFES Request ...... 11 4.5.3 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 11 4.6 Automatic & Enhanced Response Zone ...... 11 4.6.1 Zone 2 and 2A, including Kings Park & Bold Park ...... 11 4.6.2 I & O Zones (Capes & Albany) and South West North & South ERZ’s ...... 12 4.6.3 Metro Enhanced Response areas, including Rottnest Island & Garden Island...... 12 4.6.4 Air Intelligence ...... 12 4.7 DFES Aerial Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance ...... 13 4.7.1 DFES Request ...... 13 4.7.2 DBCA request...... 13 4.8. Air Base Management ...... 14 4.8. 1 Air Base Management SEAT Operations ...... 14 4.8.2 Air Base Management Rotary Operations ...... 14 5 - AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATING STRUCTURE ...... 15 5.1 Aerial Fire Suppression Operations Guidelines ...... 15 5.2 Vertical Separation for Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 16 6 - OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT ...... 17 6.1 Operational Risk Management - NAFC ...... 17 6.2 Operational Risk Management System ...... 17 7 – AIR ATTACK, AERIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION PILOT PROCEDURES ...... 18 7.1 Aerial Fire Suppression Procedure ...... 18 7.1.1 Notification/Briefing ...... 18 7.1.2 Departure ...... 18 7.1.3 Transit ...... 19 7.1.4 Five Minute Inbound Call ...... 19 7.1.5 Arrival (AFS Operation) ...... 19 7.1.6 Unexploded Ordnance ...... 21 7.1.7 Departure ...... 21 8 - AIR ATTACK SUPERVISOR PROCEDURES ...... 22 8.1 Notification ...... 22 8.2 Planning ...... 22 8.3 Briefing ...... 22

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

8.4 Departure ...... 23 8.5 En-route ...... 23 8.6 Five Minute Inbound Call ...... 23 8.7 Arrival at the Fire Ground ...... 23 8.8 Risk Assessment ...... 24 8.9 Conduct Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 25 8.10 Tactical Decision Making - “SOAR” ...... 26 8.11 Departing the Fire Ground ...... 27 8.12 Arrival back at NOB ...... 27 9 – AIR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PROCEDURES ...... 29 9.1 Mission Planning ...... 29 9.2 Mission Brief ...... 30 9.3 En-route ...... 30 9.4 Fire Ground ...... 31 9.5 Unsecure HLS Procedures ...... 34 9.6 Low Level Flying Procedures ...... 34 9.7 Departure ...... 35 10 AIRCRAFT FLIGHT FOLLOWING AND SAR PROCEDURES (SOP 004) ...... 36 11 COMMUNICATION FAILURE AND AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN ...... 44 12 – FIRE SUPPRESSANTS ...... 47 12.1 Foam ...... 47 12.2 Retardant ...... 47 12.3 Use of Foams, Retardant and Salt Water ...... 48 12.4 Loading of Retardant and Foams ...... 48 12.5 Foam and Retardant Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) ...... 48 12.6 Retardant Request Procedure ...... 48 13 – COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS ...... 49 13.1 Aim ...... 49 13.2 Principle ...... 49 13.3 F-CTAF (Fire - Common Traffic Area Frequency) ...... 49 13.4 Procedure ...... 50 13.5 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan ...... 50 13.6 Tactical Communications Plan (AFS) ...... 51 13.7 Air Intelligence Communications ...... 51

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

13.8 Itinerant/Media Aircraft ...... 52 13.9 Communications Plan for Aerial Fire Suppression Operations ...... 52 13.10 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan with No AAS ...... 53 13.11 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communication Plan ...... 54 13.12 Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan ...... 55 13.13 Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan – Sectorised Operation ...... 56 14 - TRANSPORT OPERATIONS ...... 57 14.1 Carriage of Passengers ...... 57 14.2 Manifest ...... 57 14.3 Safety and Emergency Briefings ...... 57 14.4 On/Off Load of Passenger (pax) and Equipment ...... 57 14.4.1 Aircraft Lands on Site ...... 57 14.4.2 Off Loading Pax and Equipment ...... 58 15 – FUEL MANAGEMENT ...... 59 15.1 Contracted Aircraft Fuel Management Arrangement ...... 59 15.2 DBCA Owned Bulk Fuel Supply Locations ...... 59 15.3 Bulk Fuel Supply at Western Australian Airfields ...... 59 16 – CONTACTS AND ROSTERS ...... 60 16.1 Air Attack Supervisors ...... 60 16.2 Operational Telephone and Fax Numbers ...... 61 17 – AIRSTRIPS ...... 63 17.1 ALBANY REGIONAL AIRPORT (Nominated Operational Base) ...... 64 17.2 AUGUSTA ...... 65 17.3 BEVERLEY ...... 66 17.4 BOYUP BROOK ...... 67 17.5 BREMER BAY ...... 68 17.6 BUNBURY ...... 69 17.7 BUSSELTON AIRPORT...... 70 17.8 COLLIE ...... 71 17.9 COOLUP (WHEELER FIELD) ...... 72 17.10 CUNDERDIN ...... 73 17.11 DARKAN (HILLMAN FARM) ...... 74 17.12 DENMARK ...... 75 17.13 DONGARA ...... 76

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

17.14 DWELLINGUP ...... 77 17.15 ESPERANCE REGIONAL AIRPORT ...... 78 17.16 FRANKLAND VALLEY ...... 79 17.17 GERALDTON ...... 80 17.18 GINGIN AIRBASE (RAAF). Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU...... 81 17.19 GNOWANGERUP...... 82 17.20 JANDAKOT AIRPORT (Nominated Operational Base) ...... 83 17.21 JERRAMUNGUP ...... 84 17.22 JURIEN ...... 85 17.23 KALBARRI ...... 86 17.24 KATANNING ...... 87 17.25 KOJONUP ...... 88 17.26 MANJIMUP ...... 89 17.27 MARGARET RIVER ...... 90 17.28 MOORA ...... 91 17.29 NANNUP ...... 92 17.30 NARROGIN ...... 93 17.31 NORTHAM ...... 94 17.32 PEARCE AIRBASE (RAAF). Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU...... 95 17.33 QUAIRADING AIRPORT ...... 96 17.34 RAVENSTHORPE AIRPORT (Shire of Ravensthorpe) ...... 97 17.35 RAVENSTHORPE (Mount Short) ...... 98 17.36 STIRLING RANGE RETREAT ...... 99 17.37 TAGON (Orleans Farm) ...... 100 17.38 WALPOLE ...... 101 APPENDIX I – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION REQUEST FORM ...... 102 APPENDIX II - INITIAL ACTIVATION PLANS ...... 103 IAP – METRO ...... 103 IAP – BUNBURY ...... 106 IAP – MANJIMUP ...... 108 IAP – ALBANY ...... 110 APPENDIX III – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION RESPONSE AREAS ...... 112 APPENDIX IV – ZONE 2 AND 2A ...... 113 APPENDIX V – LOWER SOUTH WEST (BUSSELTON/AUGUSTA/MARGARET RIVER) ...... 114

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

APPENDIX VI(A) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, NORTH A ...... 115 APPENDIX VI(B) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, NORTH B ...... 116 APPENDIX VI(C) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, SOUTH ...... 117 APPENDIX VII – GREATER ALBANY ZONE ...... 118 APPENDIX VIII – KINGS PARK AND BOLD PARK ...... 125 APPENDIX IX – MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS FOR CLASS ‘A’ FOAMS ...... 126 APPENDIX X – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL ...... 136 APPENDIX XI – USDA FOREST SERVICES APPROVED APPLICATION LIST ...... 137

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018

WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

ACRONYMS AAS Air Attack Supervisor ABM Air Base Manager ADO Air Desk Officer AFS Aerial Fire Suppression AGL Above Ground Level AI Aerial Intelligence AIIMS Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System AIO Air Intelligence Officer AMSL Above Mean Sea Level ASA Air Services Australia CAO Civil Aviation Order CAR Civil Aviation Regulation CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation CRM Crew Resource Management CWN Call When Needed DAC Duty Assistant Commissioner DAO Duty Aviation Officer DBCA Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions DFES Department of Fire & Emergency Services F-CTAF Fire – Common Traffic Advisory Frequency FOB Forward Operational Base FOR Flight Operations Return HLS Helicopter Landing Site HUET Helicopter Underwater Escape Training IAP Initial Action Plan IMT Incident Management Team IR Infrared NAFC National Aerial Firefighting Centre NOB Nominated Operational Base PIC Pilot In Command POB Persons on Board PPE Personal Protective Equipment PRA Primary Response Area

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 1 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

RDC Regional District Coordinator SAOO State Aviation Operations Officer SAR Search and Rescue SEAT Single Engine Air Tanker SOAD State Operational Air Desk SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRA Secondary Response Area VHF Very High Frequency

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 2 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

1 - INTRODUCTION Aerial fire suppression aircraft were introduced on a trial basis in the summer of 1996-97 for fire suppression in the Perth rural/urban interface and surrounding forest areas. This operation was termed 'Operation Firebird' and involved using two fixed-wing Dromader agricultural aircraft primarily to apply an aggressive initial attack on reported fires. Objectively a combination of early detection and rapid aircraft response restricts early fire development. The time 'bought' by the aircraft operation provides ground crews additional opportunity for effective suppression on high hazard days. This trial provided the economic, social and environmental basis for a continued aircraft suppression capacity in the southwest. Subsequently, an additional operation termed 'Operation Southern Skies' was established at Bunbury and Manjimup for fire suppression in the Bunbury, Manjimup and broader South West Land Division. In 2002/03 helicopter aerial fire suppression aircraft were introduced with two rotary wing aircraft based in Perth for the urban-rural interface especially the Perth Hills area. The 2004/05 season saw a new fixed wing base established in Albany and an additional two rotary wing aircraft in Perth.

The Fixed Wing Operation is a joint initiative of the Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions (DBCA), Parks and Wildlife Service and the Department Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) and is managed by DBCA on behalf of the both fire agencies and the Government of Western Australia. Funding for the operations has been apportioned between the two combat agencies with remaining operational costs being met on a 'user pays' system. In addition, the Albany based aircraft standing charges are 50% funded by the National Aerial Fire Fighting Centre (NAFC).

The fixed wing aerial fire suppression contracts, which are managed by DBCA supply eight Air Tractor 802’s with 3150 litre capacity for the Perth, Bunbury Manjimup and Albany response areas. The contract also provides for a ninth aircraft for ad hoc use. The operation is likely to commence mid December and finish in early April dependant on weather conditions. Two of the eight SEATs are secured through a NAFC contract managed by DBCA.

The rotary aerial fire suppression operation is a joint initiative managed by DFES. Funding for this operation has been apportioned between DFES and NAFC with operational costs being met on a 'user pays' system between DBCA and DFES. In 2013 these contracts were awarded for a 3 year period with 2 options of one year. The contracts provide six Bell 214B Helitaks with capacity of 2650lt as well as the capability of transport for both personnel and logistical support. An additional Erickson S64E Aircrane with capacity of 7000lts is also provided. Four of the 214B Helitaks will be based at Jandakot with the remaining two 214B positioned at Busselton. The Aircrane will be based at Serpentine airfield.

Aerial observation and fire detection is carried out by both agencies, DBCA utilise their Scout fleet to service the SW/LSW with regular daily prescribed flights. DFES, during the contract period will have a dedicated Aerial Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AISR) platform that services the metro area out to 120km from Perth airport.

The State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) provides a coordinated, efficient and effective process in dispatching a rapid aggressive attack on fire incidents by aerial fire suppression aircraft.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 3 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

2 - AUTHORITY

2.1 Protocols and Procedures The protocols and procedures contained within this document derive their legislative framework from existing State Acts, these include:

• Emergency Management Act 2005 • Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 • Bush Fires Act 1954 • WA Fire Brigade’s Act 1942 Further guidelines have been taken from the Keelty Report – “A Shared Responsibility 2011”

Recommendation 1 (TOR 5)

The Department of Fire and Emergency Services and the Department of Parks and Wildlife develops and finalise their Memorandum of Understanding and commit to working in partnership.

2.2 Heads of Agreement As a result of the above recommendation a Heads of Agreement document has been published and is the source of reference for the Western Australian Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures. These protocols and procedures have been developed using the Statement of Intent and Principles outlined in the Heads of Agreement.

In particular

DBCA and DFES will implement joint coordination and management of aviation resources and activities in accordance with management guidelines and business rules agreed between agencies

2.3 Supporting Documentation The development of the guidelines for the Operational plans and procedures contained within this document have been referenced from the following sources:

• State Emergency Management Plan for Fire August 2013 - WESTPLAN FIRE • NAFC Australian Aerial Firefighting Operator’s Manual – draft 11 June 2011 • CASR, CAO & CAR • CAO • CAR • DBCA Polices & procedures • DFES Policies & Procedures

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 4 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

3 – PRIMARY RESPONSE AREAS AND ALLOCATED AERIAL RESOURCES Primary Response Areas (PRA) are identified as the initial area of response for the allocated aerial fire suppression aircraft. The PRA is nominated as 120 km from a Nominated Operational Base (NOB) or in the case of the Metro PRA from Perth control tower. Requests for aerial fire suppression aircraft outside their assigned PRA or into the Secondary Response Area (SRA) will be authorised by the State Duty Director/Officer from both fire agencies. Refer Appendices III – Aerial fire suppression response areas

3.1 Metro Primary Response Area AFS Metro Primary Response Area 120km from Perth Control Tower Perth Airport

AI Metro Primary Response Area 120km from Perth Control Tower Perth Airport

Allocated Aerial Fire Suppression aircraft - Jandakot

• 4 x 214B Helitaks (2650lts capacity per aircraft + transport capability 9pax for crew and logistical support 2276kg payload) • 1 x 64E Aircrane (7000lts) • 2 x 802 AT(3150lts per aircraft) SEAT • 2 x AAS rotary platforms • 1 x AAS fixed wing platform • 2 x 802AT (3150lt) SEAT call when needed (CWN) • 1 x BO 105 rotary aerial Intelligence platform 3.2 Bunbury Primary Response Area Bunbury Primary Response Area 120km from the Bunbury Regional Airport

Allocated Aerial Fire Suppression aircraft at Bunbury NOB

• 2 x 802AT(3150lts per aircraft) SEAT • 1 x AAS fixed wing platform

3.2.1 Busselton Regional Airport • 2 x 214B Helitaks (2650lts capacity per aircraft + transport capability for crew and logistical support 9pax/2276kg internal payload) • Outside the Bunbury and Manjimup PRA DAC/SDO approval is required. NB: These resources will be deployed and will operate under the control of an assigned AAS

3.3 Manjimup Primary Response Area Manjimup Primary Response Area – 120km from Manjimup Regional Airstrip

Allocated Aerial Fire Suppression aircraft at Manjimup NOB

• 2 x 802AT (3150lts per aircraft) SEAT • 1 x AAS fixed wing platform

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 5 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

3.4 Albany Primary Response Area Albany Primary Response Area – 120km from Albany Regional Airport

Allocated Aerial Fire Suppression aircraft at Albany NOB

• 2 x 802AT (3150lts per aircraft) SEAT • 1 x AAS fixed wing platform

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 6 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4 – REQUEST FOR AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION AIRCRAFT

4.1 Metro Primary Response Area

4.1.1 DBCA Request DBCA Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

DBCA District Duty Officer will:

i. Complete Aerial Fire Suppression Request Form (ADF 01) - Appendix I. ii. Contact State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) by phone to advise of imminent request- (08) 9414 7970. iii. Fax or email the aerial fire suppression Form ADF 01 form to SOAD (08) 9414 7859. iv. Establish Flight Following arrangements

4.1.2 DFES Request DFES Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

COMCEN will:

SOAD will:

i. SOAD will radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of fire bombers to the incident. ii. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.1.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft for areas outside the Primary Response Area, are to be placed through the SOAD.

i. The SOAD will determine priorities for dispatch and make recommendations to DAO/SAOO who will gain approval from DBCA State Duty Officer (SDO) & DFES Duty Assistant Commissioner (DAC). ii. Requesting District Duty Officer and COMCEN to be notified of outcomes. iii. COMCEN notifies IC of ETA of the aircraft for DFES managed fires

4.1.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations If the aerial fire suppression aircraft are required for a Sustained Attack - More than 3 Drops per SEAT or 1 hour Helitak operation.

i. The Air Attack Supervisor will recommend to the Incident Controller (IC) that a sustained attack will be necessary to meet the IMT strategies for the incident. ii. The IC will endorse the sustained attack and notify the SOAD of this endorsement. iii. The SOAD will notify the SAOO and DAO. iv. The DAO/SAOO will advise DAC/SDO.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 7 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.2 Bunbury Primary Response Area

4.2.1 DBCA Request DBCA Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

DBCA District Duty Officer will:

i. Complete aerial fire suppression Request Form (ADF 01) - Appendix I. ii. Contact State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) by phone to advise of imminent request- (08) 9414 7970. iii. Fax or email the aerial fire suppression Request Form ADF 01 to SOAD (08) 9414 7859. iv. Establish flight following arrangements

4.2.2 DFES Request DFES Brigade Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

Local Government/Bush Fire Brigades will contact the nearest DBCA District Office and request aerial fire suppression aircraft through the District Duty Officer (as per 5.2.1).

Fire and Rescue Brigades will contact COMCEN (6AR/6IP) and request aerial fire suppression aircraft through the COMCEN operator.

COMCEN will:

SOAD will:

I. Contact DBCA District Officer and establish SAR keeper details II. Radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of water/fire bombers to the incident. iii. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.2.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft for areas outside the PRA, are to be placed through the SOAD

i. Determine priorities for dispatch and gain approval of SAOO and DAO. ii. Requesting District Duty Officer and COMCEN to be notified of outcomes. iii. COMCEN notifies IC of ETA of the aircraft for DFES managed fires.

4.2.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations If the aerial fire suppression aircraft are required for a Sustained Attack - More than 3 Drops per SEAT or 1 hour Helitak operation.

i. The Air Attack Supervisor will recommend to the Incident Controller (IC) that a sustained attack will be necessary for the combat of the incident.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 8 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

ii. The IC will endorse the sustained attack and notify the AAS of this endorsement who will notify the SOAD. iii. The SOAD will notify the SAOO and DAO. iv. The SAOO and DAO will advise DBCA SDO and DFES DAC. 4.3 Manjimup Primary Response Area

4.3.1 DBCA Request DBCA Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

DBCA District Duty Officer will:

4.3.2 DFES Request DFES Brigade Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

• DFES and bushfire Brigades will contact the nearest DBCA District Office and request aerial fire suppression aircraft through the District Duty Officer (as per 5.3.1). SOAD will:

i. Radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of aerial fire suppression aircraft to the incident. ii. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.3.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft for areas outside the PRA, are to be placed through the SOAD

i. The SOAD will determine priorities for dispatch and gain approval of SAOO and DAO. ii. Requesting District Duty Officer and COMCEN to be notified of outcomes. iii. COMCEN notifies IC of ETA of the aircraft for DFES managed fires.

4.3.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations If the aerial fire suppression aircraft are required for a Sustained Attack - More than 3 Drops per SEAT or 1 hour Helitak operation.

i. The Air Attack Supervisor will recommend to the Incident Controller (IC) that a sustained attack will be necessary for the combat of the incident. ii. The IC will endorse the sustained attack and notify the AAS who will notify the SOAD. iii. The SOAD will notify the SAOO and DAO. iv. The SAOO and DAO will advise DBCA SDO and DFES DAC.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 9 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.4 Albany Primary Response Area

4.4.1 DBCA Request DBCA Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

DBCA Regional Duty Officer will:

4.4.2 DFES Request DFES Brigade Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

I. Bush Fire Brigades will contact the nearest DBCA Regional Office and request aerial fire suppression aircraft through the Regional Duty Officer (as per 5.4.1). II. Fire and Rescue Brigade will contact the Regional District Coordinator and request aerial fire suppression. III. RDC will contact DBCA RDO who will activate as per 5.4.1

SOAD will:

i. Radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of aerial fire suppression to the incident. ii. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.4.3 Request for Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft – Secondary Response Area Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft for areas outside the PRA, are to be placed through the SOAD

4.4.4 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations If the aerial fire suppression aircraft are required for a Sustained Attack - More than 3 Drops per SEAT or 1 hour Helitak operation:

i. The Air Attack Supervisor will recommend to the Incident Controller (IC) that a sustained attack will be necessary for the combat of the incident. ii. The IC will endorse the sustained attack and notify the AAS who will notify the SOAD. iii. The SOAD will notify the SAOO and DAO. The SAOO and DAO will advise DBCA SDO and DFES DAC.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 10 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.5 Midwest Response Area

4.5.1 DBCA Request DBCA Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

DBCA District Duty Officer will:

4.5.2 DFES Request DFES Brigades Request for aerial fire suppression aircraft – Primary Response Area

i. Fire & Rescue/Local Government/Bush Fire Brigade will contact the DFES RDC and provide information for the request of aerial fire suppression aircraft. ii. DFES RDC will provide information to DBCA Duty Officer to request aircraft (as per 5.5.1) SOAD will:

i. Radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of aerial fire suppression to the incident. ii. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.5.3 Sustain Aerial Fire Suppression Operations If the aerial fire suppression aircraft are required for a Sustained Attack - More than 3 Drops per SEAT or 1 hour Helitak operation.

4.6 Automatic & Enhanced Response Zone

4.6.1 Zone 2 and 2A, including Kings Park & Bold Park SOAD will

i. Dispatch a minimum of 2 aerial fire suppression aircraft ii. This is the only true automatic dispatch of AFS aircraft iii. No request from the fire ground required iv. The SOAD has full autonomy to dispatch a minimum of 2 AFS aircraft to fires within these zones

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 11 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.6.2 I & O Zones (Capes & Albany) and South West North & South ERZ’s ComCen upon identifying that there is a fire within a response zone will notify the relevant DBCA RDO.

DBCA RDO will

4.6.3 Metro Enhanced Response areas, including Rottnest Island & Garden Island. Note: Metro Enhanced response zones only apply to all fires within gazetted fire districts (GFD) and only DFES and LGA fires outside GFD. Fires within DBCA lands outside of GFD do not apply. ComCen upon identifying that there is a fire in an enhanced response area will i. Complete aerial fire suppression Request Form (ADF 01) - Appendix I. ii. Contact State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) by phone to advise of imminent request- (08) 9414 7970. iii. Fax or email the aerial fire suppression Request Form ADF 01 to SOAD (08) 9414 7859.

SOAD will

i. Dispatch a minimum of 2 aerial fire suppression aircraft.

4.6.4 Air Intelligence In an effort to provide timely, accurate and trusted incident intelligence, automatic dispatch protocols have been implemented for all DFES and LGA Grass, Scrub & Bush fires within a 60 km radius of Perth CBD, they are;

i. Any fires in the Zone 2/2A response area including Kings Park and Bold Park ii. Any fires in the metropolitan enhanced response area including Rottnest and Garden Islands iii. Any 3rd Alarm and above GSB fires

SOAD will

i. Dispatch the Air intelligence platform ii. Advise ComCen of the dispatch

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 12 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.7 DFES Aerial Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance

4.7.1 DFES Request

Metro: DFES brigades request Aerial Intelligence through ComCen.

COMCEN will: i. Complete aerial fire suppression Request Form (ADF 01) - Appendix I. ii. Contact State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) by phone to advise of imminent request- (08) 9414 7970. iii. Fax or email the aerial fire suppression Request Form ADF 01 to SOAD (08) 9414 7859. SOAD will: iv. Dispatch aircraft and radio COMCEN of time the resources were deployed and ETA of Aerial Intelligence aircraft to the incident. v. COMCEN will notify the IC of ETA of the aerial fire suppression aircraft.

Regional: DFES brigades request Aerial Intelligence through the RDC. DFES Brigade Request for aerial Intelligence aircraft

i. Fire and Rescue, Bush fire and LGA Brigades will contact the Regional District Coordinator and request Aerial Intelligence aircraft. ii. RDC will contact DBCA RDO who will provide details to activate as per 5.7.1

SOAD will: i. Determine priorities for dispatch and advise DAO. ii. The DAO will seek approval from DFES DAC. iii. Requesting RDC and COMCEN to be notified of outcomes.

4.7.2 DBCA request DBCA Incident Controllers can request DFES Aerial Intelligence platform through the regional/District DO.

RDO/DO will:

i. Seek SAOO approval ii. Complete aerial fire suppression Request Form (ADF 01) - Appendix I. iii. Contact State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) by phone to advise of imminent request- (08) 9414 7970. iv. Fax or email the aerial fire suppression Request Form ADF 01 to SOAD (08) 9414 7859. SOAD will:

v. Determine priorities for dispatch and advise SAOO and DAO. vi. The SAOO and DAO will seek approval from DBCA SDO and DFES DAC. vii. Requesting RDO and COMCEN to be notified of outcomes.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 13 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

4.8. Air Base Management

4.8. 1 Air Base Management SEAT Operations If operations are going to be of a sustained nature and the airstrip is holding movements of 4 or more aircraft, an air base Manager will be mobilised as required. The SOAD will advise the SAOO and DAO who will in turn make the decision on which agency will provide Air Base Management.

4.8.2 Air Base Management Rotary Operations Whenever the Helitaks are dispatched to an incident and the incident dictates that the use of a remote HLS is required the SOAD will advise the SAOO and DAO who will in turn make the decision on which agency will provide Air Base Management.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 14 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

5 - AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATING STRUCTURE

5.1 Aerial Fire Suppression Operations Guidelines Aerial fire suppression operations will be coordinated and managed as a single operation on behalf of DBCA and DFES. This provides efficiency and effectiveness in the suppression operation and will be conducted using the following guidelines.

i. All Aerial Fire Suppression Operations are conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) ii. Air Operations will operate and develop its structures under the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System AIIMS 4 with the principles of: o Unity of Command o Span of Control o Functional Management o Management by Objectives o Flexibility iii. The AAS will ensure appropriate span of control principles are in place and will sectorise the aerial fire suppression operations to meet the objective. The decision to sectorise resides with the AAS and will be based on complexity and/or 1:7. iv. An AAS will be deployed in support of all aerial fire suppression operations. v. The Ground Controller (GC) may call in aerial fire suppressant drops in the absence of the AAS. vi. A GC will be nominated as the link between the IMT and the aerial fire suppression operations. Aerial fire suppression strategies will be approved by the IC in consultation with the AAS. vii. The GC must ensure safety standards are maintained and identify ground risks to air operations at all times. viii. The GC is responsible for safety of ground crews in the proximity of the drop zone. ix. AAS are to liaise through the GC to ensure “Drop Zone Clear”. x. Aerial fire suppression aircraft will NOT drop until it is confirmed “Drop Zone Clear” – if there are no crews on the ground ie lightning strike incident, in this situation the pilots can, once completed a visual risk assessment of the drop zone, conduct aerial fire suppression operations without confirmation of “Drop Zone Clear”. xi. Aircraft are assigned to the Incident Controller and require approval from the Incident Controller for the release of the aircraft from the incident. Liaison between IC and the SDO/DAC may take place for the redirecting of aircraft during an Emergency Situation where resources are allocated on the risk to life. xii. All aerial fire suppression aircraft revert back to the SOAD at the completion of that days operation and requires reactivation for the next day if required at the same incident. xiii. Aircraft Officers will be deployed for complex Level 2 and 3 incidents or through IMT request as part of the Aircraft Unit and will prepare the Air Operations Plan for inclusion in the IAP. xiv. Trained and equipped ground crews will be provided to reload fixed wing aerial fire suppression aircraft. These crews will be available at any designated Nominated/Forward Operational Base. xv. Air Base Managers may be deployed when the air base is operating more than 4 aircraft and where HLS have been established.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 15 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

5.2 Vertical Separation for Aerial Fire Suppression Operations

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 16 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

6 - OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

6.1 Operational Risk Management - NAFC Firefighting operations take place in a relatively volatile, hazard-rich environment. In order to assess and mitigate the risks associated with this environment, some form of risk management procedure is required.

The aim of the operational risk management system is to provide a process that documents that which a very experienced and competent Pilot does intuitively using knowledge and experience gained over many years of operating in the environment.

The Company Safety Management System can be used for operational risk management where it is adequate for that purpose; otherwise the following operational risk management system should be used.

6.2 Operational Risk Management System i. The overriding concept is that the Pilot’s authority to modify, decline, cancel, divert, or terminate a task overrides any decision of other parties to accept or continue a flight. ii. The Pilot’s decision to accept a task may be overridden by Agency or Company personnel using their operational control procedures including the use of risk assessment. iii. Before the first flight of the day, Pilots should complete a Daily Risk Assessment by assessing each relevant line in the table. The Pilot should assess the likely risk caused by hazards in that topic and score the risk if above ‘low’ by placing a ‘1’ in either the ‘Medium’ or ‘High’ column as appropriate. iv. Once a task has been allocated, Pilots should complete a Task Risk Assessment by amending the Daily Risk Assessment table as required. v. When on site, Pilots should complete an On-site Risk Assessment at a safe height by mentally amending the Task Risk Assessment table as required. vi. The resulting totalled scores are only a guide and do not indicate the total risk, or the nature of the risk. The Pilot should make a judgement on how the combination of risks will affect the safety of likely tasks. As a guide, if all the risks total more than half of the total of 31 possible risk areas, then the Pilot should consult with Agency or Company supervisors and consider declining or modifying a task. vii. Particular consideration should be taken of high risk scores and declining or modifying a task should be considered at a lower total score level if high risk scores are present. Pilots should decline or modify a task if they are concerned by one or more high risk scores.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 17 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

7 – AIR ATTACK, AERIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION PILOT PROCEDURES During operations the contracted aerial fire suppression aircraft will comply with their company’s Operations Manual for the mandated daily and pre-flight checks to ensure the aircraft is ready for operations. The pilot will receive a mission brief from either the SOAD or the AAS/AIO and will assess the requested tasking against the risk to determine if the flight can be safely undertaken to meet its objectives. The final decision rests with the pilot and he/she should not accept the mission if safety will be compromised. NB: The pilot should not accept the mission to meet contractual obligations if safety is compromised. The following fire agency procedure is to be carried out in conjunction with required aviation regulations and the company’s procedures. NB: Aerial fire suppression operations to be conducted VFR.

7.1 Aerial Fire Suppression Procedure

7.1.1 Notification/Briefing Air Attack pilot – will be notified and briefed by the AAS of the deployment

Air Intelligence pilot – will be notified and briefed by the AIO of the deployment

Bomber pilot – will be notified by the State Operations Air Desk and be provided with:

i. Mission objective ii. Track/distance to the fire ground iii. Lat/Long to the location of the fire ground iv. Communications Plan o Air to ground channel o F-CTAF o Potential Tactical aerial fire suppression channel (AAS will indicate if Tactical comms are to be implemented) v. Flight following arrangements - nominated SAR keeper and contact arrangements vi. Any known hazards vii. Aircraft deployed to the fire ground

7.1.2 Departure The pilot/AAS/AIO will establish communications with nominated SAR Keeper with Flight following details including: i. Call sign ii. Aircraft registration iii. Pilot and POB iv. Departing from v. Tracking to vi. Endurance vii. Designate SAR TIME – this time will be given in WST (24hr)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 18 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

7.1.3 Transit During transit to the fire ground the pilot is to comply with all ATC/VFR requirements.

Whilst considering aerial fire suppression operations, the pilot is to implement the “Fly Neighbourly Policy” by ensuring:

i. Avoid where possible flight paths over domestic housing estates. ii. Avoid where possible flight paths over areas where livestock are penned. iii. Avoid where possible flight paths over waterways when conducting retardant/foam aerial fire suppression operations. iv. Avoid where possible flight paths over UXO areas.

7.1.4 Five Minute Inbound Call At five minutes from the fire ground the pilot is to make 2 in bound calls:

All aircraft are to make a mandatory call on the F-CTAF frequency when positioned 5 minutes from the fire ground. This will be the initial procedure until aerial fire suppression communications have been established.

7.1.4.1 First Radio Message on the F-CTAF Channel (Aviation) Pilot-to-Pilot The pilot to make “all traffic” broadcast to inform all other pilots in the vicinity of:

i. Aircraft identification and number in company ii. Altitude iii. Bearing (direction of entry) iv. Intent v. If the AAS platform is in position the bomber pilot will then request from the AA pilot o Confirmation of QNH o Aircraft separation protocols o Any identified flight hazards

7.1.4.2 Second Radio Message on Air to Ground Channel (Fire Operation) The bomber pilot will make contact with the AAS or the Ground Controller in the AAS absence and request

i. Fire ground strategies – (i.e., direct attack on the head fire) ii. Flight hazards – (i.e., power lines to the north of the fire and itinerant aircraft in the area) iii. Use of foam – (if yes at this point inject the foam concentrate)

7.1.4.3 Second Radio Message on Air to Ground Channel (AISR Operations) The AIO will make contact with the fire ground and request

1 Fire ground strategies 2 Flight hazards 3 tasking

7.1.5 Arrival (AFS Operation) On arrival at the fire ground the bomber pilot to make contact with the AAS for tasking for the operation ensuring:

i. Anchor point ii. Type of drop

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 19 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

iii. Type of load iv. Drop zone is clear- drop only to be carried out once it’s confirmed “Drop Zone Clear” Once tasking has been given the pilot will conduct a recce of the fire ground to assess the conditions to enhance his situational awareness. The pilot on arrival will undertake their own hazard assessment of the area and the prevailing conditions to ensure a safe aerial fire suppression operation, including • Aerial fire suppression requirements • Target area • Details of local terrain • General weather and fire conditions • Wires (especially those strung across valleys or over ridge lines • Fire line elevation • Fire crews on the fire line • Location of water ways if using retardants or foams SAFETY NOTE: if on approach fire-fighters are sighted in the drop zone even though the drop zone has been cleared DO NOT drop. Inform AAS to ensure that all personnel are clear of the drop zone. Ensure aircraft separation protocols are maintained at all times.

7.1.5.1 Hazards to Low Flying Aerial Fire Suppression Operations Hazards to Low Flying SEAT and Helitak Operations include:

i. Air traffic hazards such as other itinerate aircraft ii. Flight hazards in the target area or at the refilling site such as: o Buoy lines submerged below water line at water points o Fences around water sources o Floating pumps in water dams o Power feeder line to pump station at dam o Public positioned in entry and exit pathways to water points o Property owners do not want the water point to be used iii. Low visibility due to smoke or atmospheric conditions iv. Power lines both high voltage and feeder lines v. Radio/TV/mobile phone masts vi. Aerials/antennae’s and supporting wires vii. Rising ground viii. Stags ix. Turbulent winds and up draughts generated by fire behaviour x. Wires or wire indicators xi. Airspace restrictions either operating in controlled air space or congested airspace (number of aircraft) xii. Air traffic hazards, eg; RPAS xiii. Extreme fire behaviour xiv. Large birds eg; Eagles While conducting aerial fire suppression operations both the AAS and the aerial fire suppression pilots will monitor the safety of the fire fighters on the ground by identifying and informing the fire fighters involved and the AAS of the following hazardous situations that may compromise their safety: i. Erratic weather behaviour

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 20 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

ii. Change of wind directions especially if the change in direction has not been forecasted iii. Spot fires iv. Hop overs v. Blow ups vi. Potential Dead Man Zones vii. Crew burn over situations

7.1.6 Unexploded Ordnance Aerial suppression forms an important part of bushfire suppression strategies in UXO areas. If tasked to an incident in UXO area, the AAS/AIO during the briefing will identify the area and establish operating protocols whilst over the fire ground.

These protocols in any of the identified UXO area include:

i. For Helitak operations NO hover drops to be conducted for bushfire fighting suppression. ii. No landing in the identified UXO area. iii. Refuel sites to be at least 800m from the boundary of any UXO area

7.1.7 Departure Once the AAS/AIO has gained approval from the IC to release the bombing aircraft from the fire ground the aircraft is to return to their NOB where possible and cease flight following procedures with the SAR keeper.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 21 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

8 - AIR ATTACK SUPERVISOR PROCEDURES

8.1 Notification The Air Attack Supervisor will receive details from the State Operations Air Desk (SOAD) of deployment. These details to include:

i. Location of fire. ii. Track and distance to the fire. iii. Communications plan. a. Ground controller call sign. b. Air to Ground channel. c. F-CTAF d. Potential tactical channel –(AAS to nominate if tactical comms are to be implemented) iv. Aerial resources deployed to the fire. v. SAR Keeper details.

8.2 Planning From this information given the AAS will develop a plan using the appropriate map identifying:

i. Communications plan. ii. Any known flight hazards. (HV power lines, towers) iii. Elevation of the fire ground. iv. ETA. v. Confirming track and distance. vi. Enter details on flight log. vii. Suitable water pick up locations for RW Helitaks if known.

8.3 Briefing 9.3.1 The AAS will provide the Air Attack pilot with a Mission brief detailing: i. Location of fire. ii. Track and distance to the fire. iii. Communications plan. a. Ground controller call sign b. Air to Ground channel c. F-CTAF d. Tactical channel iv. Aerial resources deployed to the fire. v. Type of response. a. Automatic or managed responses b. Combined operation, FW / RW vi. Any known flight hazards. vii. Potential tasking’s, operational priorities. viii. Predicted fire ground conditions. ix. Consideration of any airspace restrictions.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 22 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

8.4 Departure 9.4.1 Prior to departure the AAS platform contacts the SAR keeper and provides SAR details: i. Aircraft registration ii. Aircraft callsign iii. Departure location and destination iv. Track and distance v. Pilot vi. Persons on Board (POB) vii. Endurance viii. SARTIME

8.5 En-route During transit flight the AAS will: 9.5.1 Navigate to the incident ensuring the exact location of the aircraft is known throughout the flight in the event that the location is required for emergency procedures. 9.5.2 During transit to the incident consider monitoring radio ATC/CTAF and fire agency radios to assist with CRM in situational awareness for other aircraft location. 9.5.3 As a general rule aerial fire suppression aircraft will transit to the fire ground at 1500ft AGL or as directed by ATC. However, once over the fire ground Helitaks will operate within the “water/fire Bombing Zone” and not above 500ft AGL, with SEATs operating not above 1000ft AGL.

8.6 Five Minute Inbound Call At 5 minutes from the fire ground the AAS will make contact with the Ground Controller on the assigned air to ground frequency and request the following. i. Fire ground strategies ii. Any known hazards ( Itinerate aircraft, towers ) iii. Use of foam Note: At the discretion of the AAS and dependant on the volume of radio traffic on all frequencies, the AAS may deselect CTAF and F-CTAF and maintain communications with the ground controller on the air to ground frequency. The AA pilot will monitor the CTAF and F-CTAF and advise the AAS of inbound aircraft at all times.

8.7 Arrival at the Fire Ground Once arrived at the fire ground the AAS will: i. Conduct an incident appreciation ii. Maintain communications with the ground controller iii. In consultation with the AAP develop an agreed aircraft separation protocol iv. Identify any flight hazards v. Develop aerial fire suppression plan to achieve the objective of the IMT

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 23 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

8.8 Risk Assessment Prior to commencing any aerial fire suppression operation, a risk assessment of the mission will be conducted by the AAS and AAP. The AAP will establish the aircraft at the designated altitude and circuit direction, from there,

i. The AAS will conduct an incident appreciation of the fire ground and, ii. The AAP will conduct a visual risk assessment of the fire ground air space identifying flight hazards and limitations that could affect aerial fire suppression operation. Good CRM is essential for safe aerial firefighting operations. Both the AAP and the AAS must maintain a heightened situational awareness at all times ensuring flight critical information is communicated. Flight hazards both in the air and on the ground to be identified and acknowledged.

Common flight hazards i. Air traffic hazards such as other itinerate aircraft. ii. Low visibility due to smoke or atmospheric conditions. iii. Power lines both high voltage and feeder lines. iv. Radio/TV/mobile phone masts. v. Aerials/antennae’s and supporting wires. vi. Rising ground. vii. Stags. viii. Turbulent winds and up draughts generated by fire behaviour. ix. Wires or wire indicators. x. Airspace restrictions either operating in controlled air space or congested airspace. (number of aircraft) xi. Extreme fire behaviour.

Hazards to low level aerial fire suppression operations May include

i. Flight hazards in the target area or at the refilling site such as: ii. Buoy lines submerged below water line at water points. iii. Fences around water sources. iv. Floating pumps in water dams. v. Power feeder line to pump station at dam. vi. Public positioned in entry and exit pathways to water points. vii. Irate property owners not wanting the water point to be used. viii. RPAS While conducting aerial fire suppression operations the AAS will monitor the safety of the fire fighters on the ground by identifying and informing them of the following hazardous situations that may compromise their safety

i. Erratic weather behaviour ii. Change of wind directions especially if the change in direction has not been forecasted iii. Spot fires iv. Hop overs v. Blow ups vi. Potential Dead Man Zones

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 24 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

vii. Crew burn over situations From this assessment the AAS will evaluate the options and develop a tactical aerial fire suppression plan. A low level recce maybe required to confirm circuits and identify flight hazards. Scout air attack platforms are not to undertake low level recces. The aerial fire suppression pilot will consult with the AAS on the circuit pattern preferred for the operation with consideration for a safe and efficient circuit from the water point to the target area to achieve the aerial fire suppression strategies, as indicated by the IC/IMT.

The final decision on separation protocols, circuit pattern, direction and height is made by consultation between the pilot and Air Attack Supervisor. Final decision by pilots

NOTE: SAFETY WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED FOR OPERATIONAL EXPEDIENCY.

8.9 Conduct Aerial Fire Suppression Operations The AAS will ensure a safe, efficient and effective aerial fire suppression operations at all times. If the potential for safety is compromised the AAS will suspend the aerial fire suppression operation immediately and will only reinstate the operation if the risk has been mitigated and safety re- established.

AAS to detail to the water/fire bombers at 5 minute inbound:

i. Separation protocols ii. Firefighting strategies iii. Flight hazards iv. Use of foam Once the initial circuit pattern has been broadcasted by the AAS and acknowledged by all the aerial fire suppression pilots involved, the AAS will commence the supervision of the aerial fire suppression operation by providing tactical instructions to all aerial fire suppression pilots. The AAS will establish and provide the link between the Operation and the IC/IMT at the fire ground. The AAS will assume overall supervisory coordination of all aerial fire suppression aircraft involved over the fire ground.

Once aerial fire suppression aircraft are in circuit:

i. Identify anchor point ii. Provide tasking iii. Confirm Drop Zone is Clear iv. Provide assessment of drops a. Accuracy of drops b. Drop pattern c. Break up of drop d. Canopy penetration e. Coverage levels f. Quality of foam production v. Task the aerial fire suppression aircraft once drop is complete. vi. Maintain log of events. During larger and more complex incidents involving multiple aerial fire suppression aircraft the AAS may sectorise the operation and assign water/fire bombers and a second AAS to a sector. The second

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 25 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

AAS will provide the supervisory role for the aerial fire suppression aircraft allocated to that sector. Separation protocols will be established and agreed to by all the AAS prior to separation of the aerial fire suppression aircraft. Horizontal separation require a clearly defined no fly area to be established and agreed to, clearly indicating the operating areas of the sectors e.g. roads, rivers, waterways. The second AAS will provide regular situation reports back to the lead AAS.

8.10 Tactical Decision Making - “SOAR” Detailed below is a guideline for Tactical Decision Making during aerial fire suppression operations. Each operation will have its own challenges and the AAS will implement systems and procedures to ensure a safe, effective and efficient operation. Continual consultation between the water/fire bomber pilot and the AAS is critical to the success of this process:

Size Up

i. Arrival sitrep – information obtained from the Ground Controller or IC on strategies, flight hazards and use of foam. ii. Dynamic Risk Assessment – develop a dynamic risk assessment identifying hazards for aircraft such as wires, towers and masks, careful examination of the terrain, aircraft circuits, suitable water source to ensure a safe operating environment prior to commencing aerial fire suppression operations. iii. Primary Objective –Protection of Life and Property. Restrict fire from moving into heavier fuels, keep the fire as small as possible, and make sure all suppression actions contribute to delivering successful outcomes for achieving the strategies as developed by the IMT. Options i. Determine options – explore all options, water points static v collar tank, aircraft separation, turnaround times, continuity of delivery - split fuel refill cycles , analysis each option. ii. Plan- develop a Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Action Plan incorporating: i. Separation protocols ii. Communication plan iii. Water point to target area circuits iv. Match aircraft type to capability to meet fire ground strategy v. Refuelling plan – staggered to maintain aircraft operation over the fire iii. Nominate a Trigger Point - Ensure that a trigger point is identified to maintain a realistic analysis of the progress of the effectiveness of the operation, once that trigger point is reached then modify or change the plan as required. iv. Alternate Plan - Ensure that there is an alternative plan in the original objective if the first option is not effective (a plan B).

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 26 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Action i. Task the pilots - Identifying any flight hazards, instruct the pilots of the water/firebombing tactics, assess the water drops and provide critical assessment of the water drops, provide feedback to the pilots on the accuracy of the drops made and implement corrective action if required. ii. Sitreps - maintain regular sitreps to the Ground Controller on the progress of the operation and the effectiveness of the strategies. Recommend alternate tactics if the current situation is not effective. Notify if fire-fighter safety is at risk. Review i. Monitor – constantly monitor the Safety, Effectiveness and Efficiency (SEE) of the aerial fire suppression operation including, fire ground safety, water point security, refuelling sites and landing sites. ii. Modify – implement alternate strategies if original is not effective. If water point security is compromised either the AAS or the HP is to change the water point used. Suspend aerial fire suppression operation if either aircraft or fire fighter safety is compromised. iii. Review – constantly review the operation and ensure that you are managing the operation and the operation is not managing you. If the operation is managing you change it to regain control.

8.11 Departing the Fire Ground On completion of the aerial fire suppression operation the AAS will:

i. Provide final sit rep to the ground controller. a. Fire line control status. b. Fire ground resourcing.

ii. Notify SAR Keeper that AAS and aerial fire suppression aircraft are departing the fire ground iii. Navigate to NOB ensuring the exact location of the aircraft is known throughout the flight in the event that the location is required for emergency procedures. During transit monitor ATC/CTAF to assist with situation awareness - eyes out for aircraft identification and terrain hazards. Ensuring good CRM at all times.

iv. Scan horizon for any other indicators of fire activity and report to SAR Keeper. Plan for potential redeployment to the identified fire. 8.12 Arrival back at NOB On arrival back at NOB the AAS will:

i. Cease flight following arrangements ii. Notify SOAD of arrival back at NOB and request incident number of the controlling agency. iii. The AAS will confer with the AAP to ensure that the Flight Operations Returns (FOR) flight time details are correct and correspond with the AAS records. The AAS to verify correct and then sign the FOR.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 27 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

iv. Conduct debriefs with AAP and water/fire bomber pilots covering any Safety issues during the operation. Topics to be covered include. a. Supervision and aircraft separation protocols. b. Effectiveness of the strategies and tactics of the aerial fire suppression operation. c. Any fire ground outcomes/feedback from the IMT to convey to the team. d. Equipment issues. e. Communication plan – effectiveness and any limitations identified to be registered for future operations i.e. comms black-spots / comms plans used as work around solutions. f. Water point suitability/security – any action required. g. Refuelling site – suitability and any issues. h. On completion of the debrief, the AAS is to contact the SAOO or DAO and report on any issues arising from the debrief.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 28 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

9 – AIR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PROCEDURES

9.1 Mission Planning 10.1.1: Prior to conducting an AI mission the AIO is to conduct a thorough mission plan. The information that is required for mission planning is:

• Incident name & number. • Incident location & map reference. • Ground contact. • Radio channels. • Other F-CTAF aircraft. • Tasking. 10.1.2 The scope of tasking for an AI operation is detailed in the Air Intelligence Tasking Guide. 10.1.3 The AIO will record all relevant mission information for an incident on the Air Intelligence Flight Log. Multiple incidents during a mission are to be recorded on separate flight logs. 10.1.4 The AIO will complete all relevant incident information and record this information on the DFES Aviation Briefing Board including incident details with tasking and communications plan. 10.1.5 When AI has been ordered to mobilise, the AIO will notify the AIP immediately and provide an incident location including track &distance from Perth Airport in order for the AIP to submit a flight plan. The AIO will inform the AIP of the time and location of the Mission Briefing. 10.1.6 The ISO is responsible for ensuring that the mission equipment is ready for operational deployment. 10.1.7 The AIO will determine the fuel support arrangements required to achieve the mission and implement procedures to ensure the support required. Refer to Section 5 – Aircraft Refuelling. Prior to departure on a mission the AIO will contact the GIS Duty Mapping Officer (DMO) when AI has been tasked with mapping at an incident. The ISO is to inform the DMO of incident details and an estimated time for receipt of the first perimeter. Estimated time is arrival time plus 10 minutes. 10.1.8 Prior to departure on a mission the AIO will attempt to contact the IC/DM attached to the incident to confirm tasking and nominate a radio channel for communications. They are to be informed that AI will be monitoring CH 369.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 29 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

9.2 Mission Brief 10.2.1 Prior to conducting an AI mission the AIO is to brief the AIP and ISO on the mission plan. The mission brief will include: 1) Location of incident: • Map reference • Bearing & distance from Perth Airport • CP/IMT location 2) Incident situation overview: • Fire ground conditions • Operational priorities • Tasking 3) Timings 4) Communications plan • F-CTAF • Incident Command • Air to ground – Air Intelligence • Ground control – Aerial Suppression 5) F-CTAF procedures • Fire ground elevation • AI operating altitude • Other F-CTAF aircraft 6) Airspace considerations 7) Fuel management plan 8) Known flight/terrain hazards

9.3 En-route 10.3.1 The ISO will complete all equipment checks as per the equipment contractor’s checklists. Refer to the Air Intelligence Flight Manual. 10.3.2 The AIO will record the engine start time and the aircraft departure time on the AirIntelligence Flight Log. 10.3.3 Communication procedure for AI operations En-route are: 1. The AIO will make taxiing (turnout), airborne call and establish flight following procedure with the SOAD.

2. The AIO will then establish contact with ComCen on DFES command network 6AR and advise of turnout and ETA over the incident.

3. The AIO will continuously monitor and communicate on DFES command network 6AR (ch 371) as the primary means of communication to ComCen and the fire ground.

4. When the incident can provide a nominate ground contact to monitor the dedicated Air Intelligence ch 369, the AIO will switch from communicating on 6AR to Ch 369 after the 5 minute inbound call.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 30 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

5. The AIO will continuously monitor the AI Operations Ch 369 as the secondary means of communication from the ground to AI. 6. The AIO will monitor air traffic control frequency where possible during departure and arrival into Jandakot Airport, and other controlled airspace, in order to maintain situational awareness.

7. The AIO will monitor the F-CTAF frequency en-route and entering F-CTAF where possible in order to gain situational awareness of operations within the F-CTAF.

8. At 5 minutes from overhead the incident the AIO will make an arrival call into ComCen on DFES command network (6AR) at the same time simultaneously broadcasting to the fire ground the arrival of Air Intelligence.

9. If a nominated ground contact has been established, at 5 minutes from overhead the incident the AIO will broadcast an inbound call to the nominated contact person on AI Operations Ch 369. If contact with the nominated person is not established on AI Operations Ch the Incident Command Channel may be used to make initial contact. 10.3.4 All radio communications during the AI mission are to be recorded on the Air Intelligence Flight Log. 10.3.5 During transit the AIO will actively navigate to the incident. The AIO must continuously know the location of the AI aircraft En-route in order to enable:

• Reporting on the location of observed incidents • Navigation if redirected • Revision of ETA • Verification of incident location 10.3.6 Transit to the incident is generally at 1500ft AGL or as directed by ATC. This altitude is effective for AIO navigation and ISO equipment setup. 10.3.7 It is the AIP’s responsibility to organise separation with other aircraft. In accordance with DFES Air Operations Protocols, the AI aircraft is to be established at the nominated operating altitude prior to entry to the F-CTAF when aerial suppression operations are being conducted. The standard operating altitude for AI operations is 2,500ft AGL. Refer to Appendix 1 – Separation Diagram.

9.4 Fire Ground 9.4.1 The AIO will record the incident arrival time on the Air Intelligence Flight Log. 9.4.2 F-CTAF Separation Protocols Separation protocols for AI operations in the F-CTAF are: 1) Separation with other aircraft in the F-CTAF is the responsibility of the AIP; 2) On arrival at the incident the AIO will brief the AIP on the flight pattern required to complete the allocated tasking. The standard circuit for AI operations at a bushfire incident is: • 2500ft AGL • Left-hand circuits

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 31 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

• Box circuit on cardinal headings or parallel to fire perimeter as required • Generally 300m spacing from fire perimeter, or as required • Generally 60kts IAS, or as required 3) There are circumstances during AI operations where a standard circuit is not feasible. The common circumstances that limit the use of a standard circuit include the proximity to CTA, weather conditions, and visibility due to smoke. During these circumstances the AIO will ask the AIP to request a clearance from ATC to operate in CTA in order to maintain standard circuit procedures in the F-CTAF; 4) It is standard protocol that at least 500ft vertical separation is maintained between other aircraft in the F-CTAF during AI operations unless the AIP has established clear horizontal separation; 5) The AIP is to inform the AIO of any known itinerant aircraft in the F-CTAF; and 6) If the AIO has any safety concerns with aircraft separation then this is to be bought to the AIP’s attention for resolution. AI operations are to cease if the safety concern cannot be resolved. 7) The AIO will conduct a size up of the incident that includes: 1) Dynamic Risk Assessment – assessment of aviation risks will be in consultation with the AIP; 2) Fire appreciation; and 3) Determine Tasking/information requirements. 9.4.3 Any critical information that relates to life or property under threat must be reported immediately to the IC or the nominated contact person. Critical information relating to life or property under threat has priority over standard tasking. 9.4.4 The AIO will provide incident information to ComCen and the IC via DFES command network 6AR until the incident can provide a nominate ground contact to monitor the dedicated Air Intelligence ch 369, as soon as practical after the completion of the incident size up. 9.4.5 At bushfire incidents the ISO will complete a perimeter as soon as practical after the completion of the incident size up. This Initial Location Plot will lack the details of subsequent fire shapes/lines and is intended to convey the location and approximate size of the fire to IMT and operations centres as soon as possible. This plot is to be identified as an Initial Location Plot when sent. The AIO will log the time of plot completion and then the time of successful sending.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 32 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

9.4.6 A standard naming convention is to be used for data files: Type of shape file Shape file name

Perimeter (polygon) ____AREA

Fireline (polyline) ____LINE

EO Contacts & RefMarks ____POINT

Example: “25763_Forrestdale_140117_1528_AREA” 9.4.7 The AIO will develop an AI Action Plan in order to conduct safe AI operations at the incident and achieve the mission objectives. Considerations for developing an AI Action Plan are: Incident phase Reporting lines Incident information requirements Information delivery options Communications Refuelling Last light Crew welfare Safety A standard AI Action Plan has been developed for bushfire incidents. Refer to the Air Intelligence Action Plan (Bushfire). 9.4.8 The AIO is to brief the AIP and ISO on the AI Action Plan. 9.4.9 AI is to conduct safe AI operations as per the AI Action Plan developed by the AIO. 9.4.10 When an IMT is fully formed at an incident it becomes beneficial to the AI operation to have a Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) at the CP. Generally, the most efficient method to establish ground liaison is to land and drop off the AIO at the CP to assume the duties of a GLO. The duties of a GLO are: 1) Establish and maintain radio communications with AI 2) Establish contact with the IMT 3) Provide the PO with a situations brief 4) Establish video access for the IMT 5) Act as liaison for Intelligence from AI (Maps/Video/Sitreps) 6) Provide AI with tasking from IMT 9.4.11 The Air Intelligence Situations Report form is to be used by the GLO to provide situation reports to the IMT. 9.4.12 During an AI mission the AIO is to review safe AI operations by monitoring: • Effectiveness and efficiency of the operation.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 33 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

• The aircraft endurance in order to manage fuel. • The crew welfare in order to manage fatigue. • Last light in order to plan a departure time. • Safety. 9.4.13 Safety is to take precedence over any other activity while conducting AI operations. If the AIO or ISO have any safety concerns then they are to be immediately bought to the attention of the AIP for resolution. If the issue cannot be resolved safely then AI operations are to cease.

9.5 Unsecure HLS Procedures During AI operations the AI aircraft may be required to land at an unsecured HLS. The most common reasons for landing at an unsecured HLS during AI operations is to drop off the AIO at the CP and to refuel the aircraft. The AIO will ensure all procedures for landing or take off from an unsecured HLS are completed prior to the AI aircraft landing or taking off. Unsecured HLS Procedures are:

1) A recce of the HLS is to be conducted to identify aviation hazards; 2) Pre-Landing checks are to be completed prior to final approach – refer to the Air Intelligence Flight Manual; 3) The AIO and ISO are to provide lookout on the final approach and help the AIP to clear the tail rotor; 4) The AI aircraft is to land clear of the public or a ground marshall is to be requested; 5) The AI aircraft is not to land within 100m of the CP; 6) The AIO is to attempt to contact the CP prior to all landings and start-ups in the vicinity of the CP. 7) After landing and prior to start the AIO is to locate at the 2 o’clock position clear of the disk to watch the tail rotor; 8) Personnel not trained in aircraft operations are to be accompanied during hot entry and exit from the disc. 9) Personnel flying on the AI aircraft are to receive a passenger brief.

9.6 Low Level Flying Procedures During AI operations the AI aircraft may be required to conduct low level flying in order to complete the tasking allocated. The most common tasking that requires low level flying is at a bushfire incident to complete a final accurate perimeter. The AIO will ensure that all procedures for low level operations are completed prior to low level flying commencing. Low Level Flying Procedures are:

1) AIO must be in the front seat of the AI aircraft during low level operations to provide additional lookout. 2) Air recce is to be conducted to identify aviation hazards in the low flying area, in particular, all wires and mast/towers in the low flying area are to be identified; 3) AIP requested to broadcast intentions on the F-CTAF frequency. 4) If predicted to be at low level during a scheduled SAR call and potentially out of radio contact with SAR keeper, notify of circumstances. 5) AIO must provide continuous lookout below 200ft AGL; 6) Standard flight parameters for low level mapping are 50ft AGL & 50kts IAS;

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 34 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

7) Brief AIP to ensure rotor downwash does not present risk of blowing embers or affecting ground crews; 8) The AI aircraft is to remain clear of smoke to maintain visibility; and, 9) Livestock are not to be over flown at low level.

9.7 Departure 9.7.1 AI will not depart from an incident until released by the IC, unless the AI aircraft must depart from the fire ground due to fuel requirements, last light or safety concerns. When the AI aircraft must depart the fire ground without being released from the incident, the AIO will inform the IC as soon as possible. 9.7.2 When released from the incident, or if no further fuel is required prior to last light, the AIO may stand down the refuelling support. The AIO will record the aircraft departure time from the incident on the Air Intelligence Flight Log. 9.7.3 The AIO will make a departure call as soon as practical after departure as per Departure Call in Section 7.5.2 – Air Intelligence Communications Plan. 9.7.4 During transit the AIO will actively navigate to base. 9.7.5 The AIO will make circuit area and landed/cancel SAR calls as per Section 7.5.2 – Air Intelligence Communications Plan. 9.7.6 The AIO will record the aircraft arrival time at base and the engines off time on the Air Intelligence Flight Log. The AIO will reconcile flight times with the AIP.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 35 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

10 AIRCRAFT FLIGHT FOLLOWING AND SAR PROCEDURES (SOP 004) PURPOSE

To outline the actions required by the Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions’ Parks and Wildlife Service staff to monitor and record aircraft movements and the steps to be followed in an aircraft emergency.

SCOPE

Search and Rescue (SAR) procedures are mandatory for all aircraft operations undertaken by or on behalf of the Parks and Wildlife Service. All personnel involved in air operations as well as Duty Officers (DOs) and others responsible for receiving and recording SAR calls must have a sound understanding of the procedures and must act promptly when required. Aircraft ferry flights for maintenance or positioning are advised but not required to use SAR procedures outlined in this document, provided a responsible person is holding a flight note.

BACKGROUND

Use of aircraft by the Parks and Wildlife Service occurs on a regular basis. Aircraft are used for numerous tasks such as, but not limited to:

• fire detection • bushfire monitoring and suppression • prescribed burning • pest animal baiting • aerial photography/remote sensing • transport of crews and materials.

Procedures need to be in place so that aircraft and the persons on board are recorded and tracked from departure to landing, and that contact is maintained at frequent intervals and available at all times throughout the flight. SAR detail and times must be recorded – a template of an AIRCRAFT SARWATCH LOG is attached (Appendix 1). SAR is critical in ensuring that if an incident occurs, emergency procedures are activated quickly and efficiently to ensure rapid location of the aircraft and the dispatch of help.

TRAINING

All personnel involved in SAR Keeping must be over the age of 18 years old and undergo required SAR training at intervals not exceeding 2 years. Aircraft Communication Systems Parks and Wildlife Service and its contract aircraft are equipped with several two- way radio communication systems. They will have as a minimum one Parks and Wildlife Service VHF high-band radio and one aviation band VHF radio.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 36 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

SAR Options FULLSAR A continuous listening watch is maintained between the aircraft and a ground-based SAR Keeper. Standard radio calls are made and recorded at prescribed times. If communication is lost, follow the procedures outlined below. SARTIME A continuous listening watch must be available and is established by the entry or taxi call in which a SARTIME will be nominated. The SAR Keeper must monitor the notified SARTIME and expect cancellation advice prior to the expiry. Should the SARTIME expire and no communication from the aircraft be received, follow the ‘No Contact for 10 Minutes’ procedure outlined below. SARTIME flights can only be initiated when 2 or more aircraft are working in company. However, when aircraft are undertaking ferry flights, SARTIME may be held by CENSAR, or alternatively, a flight note is organised with a responsible person. SPIDER TRACKS If Spider Tracks (or similar program) is in use, FULLSAR and SARTIME procedures will not apply. Monitoring of the aircraft on the tracking program must be maintained by the nominated personnel (not necessarily Parks and Wildlife Service staff). Contracted aircraft using Spider Tracks for SAR will provide a link to the tracking program to local Parks and Wildlife Service staff. Contracted aircraft are required to contact the local office by radio on taxi or entry to the relevant area to advise of operations. SAR Keepers will then pass traffic information to other aircraft as usual. If an incident or accident occurs, follow the ‘Spider Tracks Emergency Call Received’ procedure outlined below.

Procedure FULLSAR The following radio communications must be recorded: • Taxi Call • Airborne Call (5 minutes after Taxi Call) • ½ hourly Operations Normal Call (within 2 minutes of the hour and ½ hour) • Circuit Area Call • Landed Call – CANCEL SAR (5 minutes after Circuit Area Call)

SARTIME

• Water Bomber and Air Attack Aircraft operating in company may use SARTIME procedures. • In the initial Taxi Call, a SARTIME will be given. No other scheduled calls may be made, until the Landed Call - CANCEL SAR.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 37 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

• If the aircraft are diverted to another fire/task, the pilots will advise the SAR Keeper giving the new location/destination and CHANGE TO SARTIME, if applicable. • A Landed Call -CANCEL SAR will be made on completion of the sortie. If the SARTIME elapses without contact, follow the procedures for ‘No Contact for 10 Minutes’ outlined below.

Procedure Pilots Communication Procedure Action By Failure • Return to parking area and shut down. Contact the office holding SAR by phone and advise Duty Officer (DO)/District Taxiing Manager (DM) of: Pilot • malfunction • cause (if known) • proposed action No after take-off • Return to airstrip and land without delay Pilot "Airborne" call and then proceed as above • Try to establish contact with another aircraft on the Air Services Australia (ASA) area frequency with a request to advise the In task area SAR Keeper of the communications failure Pilot and intentions • If no contact with another aircraft, return to base without delay Circuit area call • As above Pilot Landed, unable to • As above Pilot cancel SAR watch

Procedure SAR Keeper/DO/DM/State Duty Officer (SDO) Issue Procedure Action By • Call aircraft on all radios No Response or • Call other aircraft on frequency and request Missed Radio Call them to contact aircraft SAR Keeper • Try calling pilot mobile phone – if No reply, advise (DO/DM)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 38 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

• SAR Keeper to continue calling aircraft on all available channels, and • ask other aircraft to call missing aircraft No Contact for • Track aircraft on Spatial Support System 10 minutes or • If missed call was Airborne call or Landed DO/DM Expired SARTIME CANCEL SAR call, contact airport or dispatch an officer to the airstrip to check if the aircraft is on the ground • Aircraft not on ground - proceed as below • SAR Keeper to continue calling aircraft on all available channels DO/DM • Notify SDO

No Contact for 15 • Notify Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) SDO minutes on 1800 815 257

• Contact local residents and Parks and Wildlife Service crews in vicinity of missing aircraft's DO/DM flight path for any information of any aircraft sightings (give description of aircraft) • SAR Keeper to continue calling aircraft on all SAR Keeper available channels

No Contact for 30 • Advise relevant Chief Pilot/Aviation Technical minutes Adviser and State Aviation Operations Officer (SAOO) SDO • Commence an air and ground search as advised by JRCC

Accident • Advise Ambulance and Fire Service SDO Confirmed • See ‘Accident Notification’, below

Procedure Mayday Call Received Issue Procedure Action By • Write down callsign, location and other details as given SAR Keeper • Notify DO/DM • Track aircraft on Spatial Support Mayday Call Received • Advise JRCC on 1800 815 217 • Advise relevant Chief Pilot/Aviation Technical DO/DM Adviser and SAOO • Advise State Duty Officer

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 39 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Safe Landing • Organise crew pick up DO/DM Confirmed

Accident • Advise Ambulance and Fire Service SDO Confirmed • Accident Notification as below

SPIDER TRACKS Emergency Call Received Issue Procedure Action By • SAR • Write down details as received Keeper

• Track location on Spider Tracks •

Notification of • program Emergency • Follow instructions as provided by contracted Received company • Make recovery resources available as • DO necessary in liaison with the contracted company • Advise Aviation Technical Adviser • Advise SDO

Procedure SDO Issue Procedure Action By Accident • Advise the aircraft owner or company Notification concerned if not a Parks and Wildlife Service- owned aircraft. • Advise Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on 1800 011 034. ATSB will require the following information: ▪ aircraft make, model and registration ▪ name of owner and operator SDO ▪ full name of pilot in command ▪ date and time of accident ▪ last known point of departure, point of intended landing and nature of flight (e.g. type of aerial work) ▪ location of accident (Lat. & Long, or a known identifiable point)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 40 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Procedure SDO Issue Procedure Action By ▪ number of persons on board and number and names of persons killed or injured ▪ description of the terrain at the accident site in terms of its accessibility • Confirm WA Police have been notified that the aircraft has been located - ring local station, otherwise 000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 41 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN Missed Radio Call CONTACT ESTABLISHED ▪ Call aircraft on all radios ▪ Ask other aircraft in area to call missing aircraft OPS NORMAL ▪ Call pilot mobile phone RESUME TASK

No Contact for 10 Minutes or Expired SARTIME CONTACT ESTABLISHED ▪ Advise DO ▪ Continue to call on all radios OPS NORMAL ▪ Check last position report and Spatial Support System ▪ Missed airborne or landed call – call or dispatch officer to airport RESUME TASK

No Contact for 15 Minutes CONTACT ESTABLISHED ▪ Notify SDO ▪ Notify JRCC 1800 815 257 OPS NORMAL ▪ Continue to call on all radios ▪ Contact P&W crew in area and ask for sightings of the aircraft RESUME TASK

ADVISE JRCC

No Contact for 30 Minutes CONTACT ESTABLISHED ▪ Commence air and ground search as advised by JRCC ▪ Continue to call on all radios OPS NORMAL ▪ Advise relevant Chief Pilot/Aviation Technical Adviser RESUME TASK NOTIFY: JRCC and CP

Aircraft located MAYDAY CALL RECEIVED ACCIDENT CONFIRMED

▪ Record details of radio call ▪ Advise Ambulance and Fire Service ▪ Notify DO ▪ Advise ATSB 1800 011 034 ▪ Track aircraft on Spatial Support ▪ Confirm WA Police notified (Call 000) ▪ Notify JRCC 1800 815 257

SAFE LANDING CONFIRMED ▪ Organise crew pickup

▪ Advise ATSB 1800 011 034 ▪ Advise WA Police (local station, otherwise 000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 42 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

REFERENCES

• Policy No. 60: Occupational Safety and Health • Policy No. 66: Aviation in the Department of Parks and Wildlife • AS/NZS 31000 (2009): Risk Management • Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984

APPROVED BY:

______31/08/2017

Paul Brennan Date

Branch Manager

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 43 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

11 COMMUNICATION FAILURE AND AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

UNCERTAINTY PHASE

• COMMUNICATION FAILURE FROM 5 TO LESS THAN 30 MINUTES • FAILURE TO CANCEL SAR • NO KNOWN ACCIDENT

1. Advise Duty Officer/Manager 2. Check last known position of aircraft, or last position report 3. Advise other aircraft in area to call missing aircraft 4. Call airport phone, pilot mobile phone 5. Continue to call aircraft on all radios 6. Call DPaW crews in field near area and instruct them to watch or investigate anything abnormal. Give aircraft description clearly. 7. Advise State Duty Officer and State Aviation Operations Officer who will advise agency/contractor if not a DPaW aircraft 8. Call Flight Information Region Manager – Melbourne Centre on (03) 9235 7420 and request aircraft in the area to call the missing aircraft on area frequency. They will require the area of operation to be nominated.

COMMUNICATION WITH AIRCRAFT RESTORED YES RESUME NORMAL OPERATIONS

DISTRESS PHASE NO

• COMMUNICATION FAILURE IN EXCESS 30 MINUTES • MAYDAY CALL RECEIVED • POSSIBLE OR KNOWN ACCIDENT

PROCEED WITH STEPS 1-8 ABOVE AND THEN AS FOLLOWS:

9. Advise RCC on 1800 815 257 10. State Duty Office, Principal Fire Operations Officer or State Aviation Operations Officer to advise ATSB on 1800 621 372 and the company/agency concerned if not a DPaW aircraft IF ACCIDENT CONFIRMED PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

11. Advise if required AMBULANCE FIRE & RESCUE SERVICE 12. State Duty Officer decide on police notification 13. Notify WAPOL subject to 12.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 44 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

AIRCRAFT SARWATCH LOG FULL SAR Today’s Schedule: Page: of

Date: Recorder:

Aircraft Operation:

Time: Location:

Callsign Aircraft Reg Pilot Passenger Endurance Flight Details Time Position Time Position Time Position Time Position Time Position

Taxi

Airborne

Ops Normal

Ops Normal Landed Cancel SAR

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 45 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

AIRCRAFT SARWATCH LOG SAR TIME Today’s Schedule: Page: of

Date: Recorder: Aircraft Operation: Time: Location:

Callsign Aircraft Reg Pilot Passenger Endurance SARTIME Flight details Time Position Time Position Time Position Time Position Time Position Taxi Detail change If required Detail change If required Landed CANCEL SAR Taxi Detail change If required Detail change If required Landed CANCEL SAR

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 46 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

12 – FIRE SUPPRESSANTS Suppressants and retardants are liquid agents applied to burning and adjacent fuels and can be delivered tactically by aerial fire suppression aircraft either direct or indirect to the fire to cool, reduce the rate of spread or to establish a line from which other firefighting tactics can be employed. Both products are used for Aerial Fire Suppression in Western Australia.

All aerial fire suppression aircraft are fitted with a foam concentrate reservoir and an injection system that can vary the percentage of foam concentrate injected into the water during flight. The percentage can be varied to meet the desired objective of the foam drops. It is important when the foam is being assessed to ensure that the correct foam coverage is being achieved.

All aerial fire suppression aircraft will initially be dispatched with just water as the payload and will only inject foam concentrate into the payload once approval has been given by the Incident Controller at the 5 minute inbound call.

12.1 Foam The foam products used during aerial fire suppression vary between agency and aircraft type. Foam stocks for the SEAT operation are stored on location at FOB and for the Helitak operation a foam trailer is towed to the helicopter refuelling site.

All aerial fire suppression aircraft use WD881 Class “A” foam concentrate at .2% to .4% vol.

12.2 Retardant MVP-F is the retardant used and delivered by SEATs. Retardant is primarily used for lightning strikes, line building, asset protection and Unexploded Ordnance areas.

Retardant stocks are located at the following:

i. Jandakot Airport • Tanker trailer with 30,000lt pre-mixed retardant capacity (10 loads using aAT 802) – option to be repositioned • . ii. Goad Transport Site • 1 x truck incorporating a mixing unit and storage tanker 21,000lt capacity (approx. 7 loads using AT802) • Would need additional logistical support to transport retardant concentrate to set up and provide continuous supply of mixed retardant If there is a requirement for retardant operations to be conducted at bases other than from the Jandakot base, the GOAD Transport truck and mixing unit will be mobilised to site and set up to deliver the retardant.

As an example for a retardant operation to be established and operational at Albany, it would take approximately 8 hours to deliver the equipment and logistical support to establish the mixing process to ensure continuous supply once the approval has been given.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 47 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

12.3 Use of Foams, Retardant and Salt Water Foams, retardants and salt water are not to be applied within riparian zones associated with water bodies, wetlands or drainage lines. Foams and retardants are not to be applied within 100m of any standing water body or wetland. Foams and retardants are not to be mixed within 200m of any water body or wetland. NOTE: The Incident Controller can override these recommendations for the protection of life and property.

12.4 Loading of Retardant and Foams Foams will be loaded into the aircraft by reloaders and helitak engineers. Retardant mixing is completed by DBCA staff and the contractor supplying the retardant product. All appropriate PPE is to be worn during any mixing and loading operation.

12.5 Foam and Retardant Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) Refer Appendix IX

12.6 Retardant Request Procedure The request for retardant to be used as a strategy for fire control at an incident requires the Incident Controller/IMT to develop a plan identifying the operational benefits of the strategy including any environmental considerations that may occur as a consequence of the use of retardant.

The other consideration is the net benefit based on other suppressant options and the financial impost that a retardant operation incurs.

DBCA requests for retardant can initially be acted upon by the SOAD for the first drops from the Jandakot SEATS, with all other requests requiring State approval.

DFES or LGA request for retardant require DAC approval prior to use.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 48 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13 – COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS

13.1 Aim To establish and maintain an effective communication plan to ensure a safe and efficient aerial fire suppression operation. The communication plan will ensure effective communications between aircraft improving coordination and a heightened situational awareness over the fire ground.

13.2 Principle The pilot of the aircraft has priority on the communications system within the aircraft. The pilot is by law, in command of the aircraft and the use of communications equipment within the aircraft shall be with the approval of the pilot at all times. During an emergency the pilot may instruct for all fire ground communication to cease allowing less congestion on the radio to deal with the emergency. During the daily checks on the aircraft the pilot will provide details to the AAS/AIO on the procedure to follow in the scenario that would necessitate the need to close down fire ground communications.

For the communication plan to work effectively, good radio discipline is required by supervisors, pilots and ground controllers. Communications are to be kept brief and to essential information relevant to the assigned task. If at any time the AAS/AIO deems the safety of the operation to be compromised due to failed communication they will stand down the aircraft and either rectify the equipment issue or modify the communication plan.

During aerial fire suppression operations the environment may involve aircraft of varying types and capabilities conducting a range of roles from aerial fire suppression coordination and fire ground intelligence gathering. With these varying roles of the operation, a well-structured and disciplined communication plan to assist in ensuring a safe and effective aerial fire suppression operation whilst achieving the required strategies set by the IMT for the aircraft involved.

This communication plan has been developed to ensure that a key principle of AIIMS (Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System) “span of control” is maintained throughout the Aerial Suppression Operation and the decision to sectorise the operation will be determined by the AAS.

13.3 F-CTAF (Fire - Common Traffic Area Frequency) F-CTAF is the aviation frequency allocated for PILOT-to-PILOT communication over the fire ground. The use of this frequency is for pilots involved in the aerial fire suppression operation, pilots of itinerant or non-operational aircraft such as the police and media aircraft. These communication frequencies are licensed to the fire agencies and are not for general pilot to pilot chat. The F-CTAF is for pilot information to be broadcast to provide situational awareness of aircraft movements and positional information over the fire ground at all times.

All aircraft pilots involved in the aerial fire suppression operation must have a listening watch on the designated F-CTAF which provides a direct link to all pilots for critical aviation information at any time during the operation.

Fires within 10nm of each other will operate under the one F-CTAF. If there is the need for separate management of the fires than the air space will be sectorised and an additional AAS will be dispatched operating under the one F-CTAF.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 49 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13.4 Procedure To achieve this aim, established predetermined communication plans are to be implemented during aerial fire suppression operations. The appropriate communication plan can be implemented whether the operation involves various aircraft with mixed roles on the same fire line or aircraft operating on different sectors of the fire ground.

The communication plans (see following pages) are a diagrammatical representation of the communication panel systems including the number of radios allocated within the contracted aircraft. It indicates the recommended switching positions with the pilot having the ultimate decision on the set up of the audio panel system within the aircraft.

All fire agency tasking will be conducted on one designated radio channel.

13.5 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan The initial communication plan is established on the first deployment of aerial resources to the fire ground. This plan is established to ensure that all sections of the fire ground operation have the ability to communicate with the deployed aerial resources.

Importantly this includes the Ground Controller who may be required to coordinate the initial aerial fire suppression operation until the arrival of the assigned AAS.

Aerial fire suppression Pilot is required to make two “5 Minute In bound” radio calls

First call on the assigned F-CTAF detailing:

• Aircraft identification and number in company • Altitude • Bearing (direction of entry) • Intent of the mission • If the AAS platform is in position the bomber pilot will then request from the AA pilot o QNH o Aircraft separation protocols o Any identified flight hazards If in position, the Pilot in Charge of the Air Attack platform will respond and communicate to aircraft operating over the fire ground on the F-CTAF channel detailing information and compliance requirements. This will establish heightened situational awareness for all aircraft.

Note; Once AFS operations are established, if communication cannot be raised with the Lead AAS pilot on the F-CTAF then approaching aircraft are to remain outside of the 5 minute radius until communication and confirmation to enter is instated.

Second Call on the assigned Air to Ground (Fire agency) Channel requesting (Fire Operation):

• Strategies for the aerial fire suppression operation • Any identified hazards to aircraft • Use of foam NB: In the first instance this call may be to the Ground Controller until the arrival of the assigned AAS. This structure may also be implemented during refuel cycles of the AAS aircraft.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 50 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

All aerial fire suppression strategies from the Incident Management Team/Incident Controller will be transmitted through the Ground Controller to the Air Attack Supervisor/aerial fire suppression pilot on the Air to Ground channel.

The AAS will determine, based on the complexity of the aerial fire suppression operation, if the initial communications plan will continue for the duration of the operation.

13.6 Tactical Communications Plan (AFS) The AAS will establish a tactical aerial fire suppression communications plan to reduce the radio workload of the aerial fire suppression pilots and provide a dedicated tasking channel for aerial fire suppression operations. This removes the need for the pilot to listen to the air to ground channel.

In the first instance on all initial aircraft deployments the initial communications plan will be utilised. The tactical communications plan will be implemented by the controlling AAS and will be based on the following criteria

• Complexity of the operation • Number of aircraft • Increased air to ground radio chat Once the tactical communications plan has be implemented by the AAS the structure will involve:

• On direction from the AAS, the pilots to change the air to ground channel to the nominated tactical channel and will then receive tasking from the AAS on this channel. • If the aerial fire suppression aircraft is required to transit outside the 10 nm radius of the fire ground (5min in bound call) then the aerial fire suppression pilot will be required to only make one 5 min in bound call on the F-CTAF. • AAS on receiving the 5 min in bound call on F-CTAF will respond to the pilot on the tactical aerial fire suppression channel for tasking • The AAS will be required to manage the communication panel by switching the transmit toggle to the required channel either air to ground channel or the tactical channel The tactical communications plan provides the scope for the AAS to sectorise this plan and assign a sector to another AAS operating under the one communications plan

The Air Attack Supervisor is to maintain separation between the mixed types of aerial fire suppression aircraft. Wherever possible the Air Attack Supervisor is to allocate clearly defined sectors, which by road, landmarks or landforms clearly demarcate the different sectors of the aerial fire suppression operation. This is to ensure that pilots of all aircraft operating over the fire ground have good situational awareness as to the location of all aircraft at the incident.

13.7 Air Intelligence Communications The initial communication plan is developed on the first deployment of air intelligence platform to the fire ground.

To enable seamless operations and no interference to water bombing AFS operations Air Intelligence has a dedicated channel allocation, channel 369.

Air Intelligence will be dispatched on the DFES command network until the incident can provide a dedicated person to communicate and monitor ch 369.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 51 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Air Intelligence operational communications are detailed in section 10.

13.8 Itinerant/Media Aircraft Media aircraft will broadcast their location and intent on the F-CTAF at the 5 minutes in-bound to the incident as detailed during the pre-season brief.

If in position the Pilot in Charge of the AA platform will respond and communicate to all aircraft operating over the fire ground on the F-CTAF channel of this information or any compliance requirements establishing situational awareness for all aircraft.

13.9 Communications Plan for Aerial Fire Suppression Operations On establishing SAR, nominate the radio channel you are transmitting on.

NOTE: Communications Plan to be discussed with AAS by the Incident Controller.

location F-CTAF Air to Ground Aircraft Tactical Plan #

1 Metro North 132.55 621 368

2 Metro 131.20 644 367

3 Metro South 130.95 646 366

4 SW North 129.95 640 368

5 SW Capes 126.35 638 367

6 Manjimup 132.55 545/622 366

7 Albany 119.10 525 368

8 Esperance 131.20 530 367

9 Jurien 119.10 537 366

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 52 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13.10 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan with No AAS An example of an Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan with no AAS at the incident at the time of the aerial fire suppression aircrafts arrival. On the mission briefing the pilot will be given: • F-CTAF Channel • Ground Controller Channel • Tactical Channel

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 53 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13.11 Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communication Plan An example of an Initial Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan. This would be used for an aerial fire suppression operation involving a couple of aerial fire suppression aircraft. On the mission briefing the pilot will be given: • F-CTAF Channel • Ground Controller Channel • Tactical Channel

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 54 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13.12 Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan An example of a Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan to be initiated by the AAS. On the mission briefing the pilot will be given: • F-CTAF Channel • Ground Controller Channel • Tactical Channel

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 55 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

13.13 Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan – Sectorised Operation An example of a Tactical Aerial Fire Suppression Communications Plan to be initiated by the AAS. On the mission briefing the pilot will be given: • F-CTAF Channel • Ground Controller Channel • Tactical Channel

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 56 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

14 - TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

14.1 Carriage of Passengers Only authorised passengers are permitted on board the Fire agency contracted aircraft. The carriage of passengers must be detailed in the IAP and approved by the IC or as tasked by the SAOO / DAO.

14.2 Manifest All passengers are to be listed on a manifest. The aircrew to complete the aviation manifest with:

• Names of passengers. • Weights of passengers. • Description of equipment and weight.

A copy is to be left with a responsible person on the ground. Where this cannot be achieved, the manifest is to be transmitted to the SAR keeper for the operations or a responsible person.

The PIC is ultimately responsible for maintaining a manifest of Persons On board (POB).

The PIC shall calculate the weight and balance of the aircraft including POB and equipment before each mission. The final decision on the numbers to be taken on board rests with the pilot.

14.3 Safety and Emergency Briefings All passengers will receive a safety brief on the aircraft prior to departure. Briefings will include clear instruction on:

• How to operate exits. • How to operate seat belts. • Location and operation of fire extinguisher and Emergency Locating Beacon (ELB). • Location of First aid and survival equipment. In the event of an emergency the PIC will give instruction on how to prepare for and emergency. All passengers are to comply with the PIC instructions.

14.4 On/Off Load of Passenger (pax) and Equipment Following are details to provide the aircrew with recommendation to “on and off” load of passenger (pax) and equipment:

• On Loading Pax and Equipment operations. • Aircraft on site. • Aircrew to complete manifest detailing names and weights. Person in charge of pax needs to make up a manifest and supply to aircrew. • Have passengers muster in a safe location from the aircraft landing area, and put their kit bags in one location.

14.4.1 Aircraft Lands on Site • Aircraft lands. • Aircrew will get out of the aircraft and receive a manifest if available, ensure a copy left at the pickup area, and give a copy to the pilots. (If at this point there is not a completed manifest the aircrew will assist in filling out the manifest).

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 57 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

• Aircrew will prepare the aircraft to receive the baggage and pax. • Aircrew will manage pax loading baggage into the aircraft baggage compartment ensuring baggage is loaded securely. Aircrew will brief the pax. • After the baggage is loaded and secured then the aircrew will start loading the pax, with the aircrew outside the aircraft supervising the pax and keeping them in single file and away from the tail of the aircraft. • Aircrew will get on-board and take their seat. When cabin is secured the aircrew will let the pilot know they are ready for departure.

14.4.2 Off Loading Pax and Equipment • After landing, the pilot will give the aircrew permission to start off loading the pax. • The aircrew will open the cabin door and will exit the aircraft and supervise the off-loading of the pax. Making sure the pax get safely away from the aircraft. • The last two pax will help the aircrew off load the baggage. • The aircrew will then reboard the aircraft and secure the cabin again and let the pilot know when the cabin is ready for departure.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 58 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

15 – FUEL MANAGEMENT

15.1 Contracted Aircraft Fuel Management Arrangement There are two arrangements for the fuel management of aerial fire suppression aircraft. Both arrangements involve mobile transport solutions either bulk fuel tankers or trucks transporting 200lt drum fuel.

McDermott (214B and AA5) Helitak and Kestrel (Aircrane S64E) Helitak contracts operate under a Wet Hire arrangement which requires the contractor to supply fuel for at least a 10 hour operation for the duration of the contracted period.

Dunns Aviation contract operates as a Dry Hire. DBCA provides the fuel management for all the SEAT operations.

DBCA also provides fuel management for all other air attack platforms other than Air Attack 5.

An agreement between contractors is in place to allow for the provision of fuel from one contractors supply to the others as long as it is not to the detriment of their service delivery.

15.2 DBCA Owned Bulk Fuel Supply Locations Bunbury – Jet A1 – 11,000lt capacity Manjimup – Jet A1 – 5,600lt capacity Jurien – Jet A1 – 5,000lt capacity NOTE: 214B and S64E Aircrane are unable to use the DBCA Bunbury facility due to insufficient clearance around the fuel dispensing area to conduct safe refuelling operations.

15.3 Bulk Fuel Supply at Western Australian Airfields The following airfields have Avgas and or JetA1 for sale to General Aviation:

Geraldton – Avgas and Jet A1 Jandakot – Avgas and Jet A1 Albany – Avgas and Jet A1 Esperance - Avgas and Jet A1 Bunbury – Avgas only Busselton – Avgas only (Jet A1 McDermott’s 30,000lt container)) Manjimup – Avgas only

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 59 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

16 – CONTACTS AND ROSTERS

16.1 Air Attack Supervisors

Name Agency Work No. Mobile No.

DFES Air Attack DFES PERTH 0427 004 419

BENSON, Alison DBCA 9842 4500 0409 131 597 BOURKE, Brad 9725 5938 0429 104 270 CANTELO, Jordan 9405 0700 0419 126 936 COOPER, Matthew 0438 502 184 DONOVAN, Evan 0447 722 380 DONOVAN, Owen 9182 2000 0429 100 533 DUNSTAN, Paul 0427 190 121 EIKELBOOM, Grant 9725 4300 0428 525 060 GARDINER, Beverly 9731 6232 0427 977 788 GIBLETT, Mark 9735 1988 0488 915 005 GIBSON, Peter 9725 4300 0419 905 513 HOLZHEUER, Helen 9752 5555 0428 169 861 HULLS, Kyle 9735 1988 0447 985 304 JOHNSON, Brad 9168 4200 0459 819 860 MADGWICK, Allan 9538 1016 0429 278 435 MARISSEN, Lincoln 9776 1207 0467 780 244 MEAD, Ross 9219 9236 0417 920 848 MUSARRA, Paul 9290 6100 0427 477 150 NEWMAN, Jessica 9735 1988 0417 962 642 OKE, Natasha 9735 1988 0427 080 715 PASOTTI, Michael 9290 6100 0427 386 598 PRESTON, Jeremy 9405 0700 0407 101 255 ROBERTS, Michael 9405 0700 0429 109 085 SAGE, Leigh 9405 0700 0400 070 230 TAYLOR, Malcolm 0459 843 889 TOM, Chris 0412 081 583 WELLSTEAD, Tim 9842 4500 0427 998 971

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 60 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

16.2 Operational Telephone and Fax Numbers Authority/Agency Office Phone Office Fax Name Mobile STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK (P) 9414 7970 9414 7859 Rostered (S) 9395 9651 (M) 0400 207 400 DBCA SDO 9219 9000 9367 9913 Rostered DBCA Swan Region DO 9423 2900 9423 2901 Rostered DBCA SW Region DO 9725 4300 9725 4351 Rostered DBCA Warren Region DO 9771 7988 9777 1363 Rostered DBCA Wheatbelt Region DO 9881 9200 9881 3297 Rostered DBCA Midwest Region DO 9964 0901 9921 5713 Rostered DBCA State Aviation Operations 9725 5938 9725 4900 Rostered Officer DBCA South Coast RDO 9842 4500 9842 4551 Rostered DBCA Media 9219 9999 Police 9222 1111 Rostered DFES State Duty Director (COM- 9395 9202 9395 9299 Rostered CEN) 9395 9841

DFES State Duty Aircraft 9395 9202 9395 9544 Rostered Coordinator (DAO)

DFES Duty Aircraft Operations 9395 9202 9479 9344 Rostered Officer (DAOO) DFES Duty Coordinator ‘Lower 9771 6820 ROC 9772 4754 South West’ Office – 9771 Manjimup 6868 DFES Duty Coordinator ‘Great 9845 5000 ROC 9842 1476 Southern’ Office 9841 6719 Albany DFES Duty Coordinator Mid West 9956 6000 ROC 9964 4617 Gascoyne Office 9921 8577 Geraldton DFES Duty Coordinator South West 9725 4318 ROC 9725 4255 Bunbury Office 9725 4230

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 61 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Authority/Agency Office Phone Office Fax Name Mobile Bomber -immediate Dispatch 9417 4000 9417 4011 Rostered 0437 737 111 Jandakot Bomber -immediate Dispatch Graham Lowe 0437 286 111 BUNBURY - Chief Pilot Bomber -immediate Dispatch Ramon Mugica 0437 626 111 MANJIMUP – Base Leader Bomber -immediate Dispatch Gary Lanigan 0437 252 111 ALBANY – Base Leader Perth Airport Approach 9476 8620 9476 8614 Flow Controller 9476 8620 Jandakot Airport Approach 9476 8831 Flow Controller 9476 8833

Helicopter Logistics Matt Corbett 0427 083 819

Kestrel Aviation (03) 5796 2373 (03) 5796 2449 Ray Cronin McDermott Aviation (07) 5447 6600 (07) 5447 6336 John McDermott 0409 177 770 Dunn Aviation Director Contracts/ 9417 4000 9417 1266 Neville Dunn 0427 802 000 Operations Manager Administration Management 9417 4000 9417 4011 Nathan Dunn 0408 938 975 Jandakot Senior Base Pilot Phillip Dunn 0427 602 000 Jandakot Line Pilot Nick Long 0408 387 684 Relief Pilot Jandakot Denver Craig 0474 181 580 Perth Ground Support Robert Dunn 0427 402 000 Relief Pilot All Bases Neil West 0418 664 060 Relief Pilot Relief Ground Support William Philbey 0467 910 310 Relief Ground Support Bunbury Chief Pilot 9728 1038 9728 0081 Graham Lowe 0427 713 401 Bunbury Line Pilot Terry Freeman 0428 340 314 Bunbury Ground Support 9725 4034 Ian Newman 0407 980 334 Manjimup Senior Base Pilot David Jack 0418 159 905 Manjimup Line Pilot Ramon Mugica 0427 765 035 Manjimup Ground Support Jim Moore 0437 230 156 Albany Senior Base Pilot 9844 1596 9844 1596 Gary Lanigan 0429 623 469 Albany Line Pilot

Albany Ground Support Wayne Black 0428 219 178

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 62 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17 – AIRSTRIPS 17.1 ALBANY REGIONAL AIRPORT (NOB) 64 17.2 AUGUSTA 65 17.3 BEVERLEY 66 17.4 BOYUP BROOK 67 17.5 BREMER BAY 68 17.6 BUNBURY (NOB) 69 17.7 BUSSELTON 70 17.8 COLLIE 71 17.9 COOLUP (WHEELER FIELD) 72 17.10 CUNDERDIN 73 17.11 DARKAN (HILLMAN FARM) 74 17.12 DENMARK 75 17.13 DONGARA 76 17.14 DWELLINGUP 77 17.15 ESPERANCE REGIONAL AIRPORT 78 17.16 FRANKLAND VALLEY 79 17.17 GERADLTON 80 17.18 GINGIN AIRBASE (RAAF) - Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU 81 17.19 GNOWANGERUP 82 17.20 JANDAKOT AIRPORT (NOB) 83 17.21 JERRAMUNGUP 84 17.22 JURIEN BAY 85 17.23 KALBARRI 86 17.24 KATANNING 87 17.25 KOJONUP 88 17.26 MANJIMUP (NOB) 89 17.27 MARGARET RIVER 90 17.28 MOORA 91 17.29 NANNUP 92 17.30 NARROGIN 93 17.31 NORTHAM 94 17.32 PEARCE AIRBASE (RAAF) Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU 95 17.33 QUAIRADING 96 17.34 RAVENSTHORPE AIRPORT (Shire of Ravensthorpe) 97 17.35 RAVENSTHORPE (Mt Short) 98 17.36 STIRLING RANGE RETREAT 99 17.37 TAGON (Orleans Farm) 100 17.38 WALPOLE 101

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 63 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.1 ALBANY REGIONAL AIRPORT (Nominated Operational Base)

Contact Reporting Officer, Anna Page - 9841 7372 / 0439 694 666 (duty phone)/ 0457 782 536

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 56 117o 48 223 14 / 32 1800 Bitumen Fully Domestic Air 05 / 23 1100 Gravel Terminal

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Hydrant mains pressure Fuel Supply Bulk Avgas and Jet A1 Communications VHF 523 DBCA, DFES, City of Albany Dedicated air Brigades operations channel, all agencies Foam DBCA Albany Stored in shed at airport Stocks held at P&W with pump Albany Operational Map Base DBCA & DFES Albany DBCA COG DBCA Albany District atlas held by DBCA, DFES and ALL Albany Brigades

Ground Crew: 1st Call DBCA South Coast RDO - 9842 4500 2nd Call DFES - 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 64 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.2 AUGUSTA

Contact Augusta-Margaret River Shire - 9780 5255 or (fax) 9757 2512 Chris Lloyd, CESM – 0419 905 285

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 19 115o 09 125 17-35 1000m Sealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Blackwood D/O – Static tank – 20,000 lt Steve Ryan (keys) 9731 6232 0400 005 294 Fuel Supply DBCA Bunbury NIL Kirup helitorch truck as backup Communications DFES 638 VHF radio Foam P&W Blackwood D/O – 6 x 20lt drums on site 9731 6232 Operational Map Base N/A COG

Ground Crew: 1st Call DBCA Blackwood DDO – 9731 6232 2nd Call DFES Duty Coordinator - 9771 6820

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 65 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.3 BEVERLEY

Contact Beverley Shire – Ph: (08) 9646 1200 - Fax: (08) 9646 1409 Shire - CEO Steve Gollan (a/h) – 0429 461 200 DFES - Neal - [email protected]

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o 08 116o 57 750 ft 08/26 1250m Gravel 16/34 1460m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Steve Gollan 0429 461 200 Tankers Fuel Supply DBCA Rostered State Aviation Ops Officer Communications CH TBA Foam Wheatbelt RDO Operational Map Base DBCA & Fire Service Duty DBCA COG Officers

Ground Crew: 1st Call DBCA Narrogin Regional Duty Officer 9881 9200 2nd Call DFES Duty Coordinator - 9690 2300 3rd Call Shire CESM Justin Corrigan /Troy Granville - 0427 057 719 4th Call Darren Boyle - 9646 1240 or 0428 932 711

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 66 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.4 BOYUP BROOK

Contact Boyup Brook Shire - 9765 1200 or BBS Depot Daly Winter 9765 1200 or 0458 699 923 David Inglis – 0418 651 088

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 54 116o 27 825 Ft 18-36 1000m Gravel Unsealed AMSL

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Boyup Brook Shire – Water pumped from a Daly Winter 9765 1200 or 9765 1200 local dam & 20,000lt 0458 699 923 tank Fuel Supply DBCA Blackwood DO 9731 6232 Communications DFES 638 Foam Daly Winter 9765 1200 10 x 20lt drums at Restock from DBCA Kirup or 0458 699 923 Shire Depot Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Blackwood Duty Officer – 9731 6232 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9771 6820 3rd Call Shire – 9765 1200; Daly Winter 9765 1200 or 0458 699 923

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 67 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.5 BREMER BAY

Contact Jerramungup Shire CEO – Brent Bailey – 9835 1022 (a/h) / 0429 204 538 ([email protected]) Works Manager- Murray Flett– 0400 219 073 ([email protected])

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 22 119o 20 100 06 / 24 1200m Gravel 12 / 30 600m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Shire water tanker 1 x 20,000lt Brigade appliances can CBFCO Dave Edwards: supply – contact through 0429 100 007 CBFCO CEO – 0429 208 427 Fuel Supply 4 x 200lt drums Jet A1 Additional fuel delivered by 2 x 200lt drums Avgas JRS Holdings Communications VHF 517 DBCA, DFES and Fire ground communications Brigades command channel to Albany DBCA is VHF 517 Foam DBCA Albany 4 x 20lt drums on site Operational Base Map DBCA and DFES Duty DBCA COG District COG atlas available Officer

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA South Coast Regional Duty Officer – 9842 4500 2nd call DFES - 9845 5000 3rd call Shire CESO- Ashley Peczka 0438 498 221

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 68 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.6 BUNBURY

Contact City of Bunbury (office hrs only) – 9792 7000

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 22 115o 40 50 07 / 25 1220m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Static tank 150,000lt Replenished from mains Fuel Supply DBCA – Jet A1 11,000lt DBCA Jet A1 Avgas – Bunbury Aero tank Club 9725 4377 Bowser fuel (Avgas) Communications DBCA 640 Foam DBCA Bunbury RDO 20 x 20lt drums Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call Dunn Aviation Refiller – Ian Newman – 0407 980 334 2nd call DBCA Wellington DDO – 9735 1988 3rd call DFES Duty Coordinator 9780 1900 / 9725 4318 (a/h)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 69 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.7 BUSSELTON AIRPORT

Contact Busselton Shire – 9781 0444

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 41’ 30” 115o 30 20 03 / 21 1800m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Busselton Shire Static tank 90,000lt Replenished from mains 9781 0444 Fuel Supply Bsn Aero Club – 9751 Bowser fuel – Avgas 1400 only Bsn Air Service – 0417 Avgas Min 4000lt tank 928 916 capacity 13500lt Ian Stephenson – 0407 442 846 (Avgas) Communications DFES 638 VHF Radio Foam Situated in shed near Refillers have key tank Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Blackwood District Duty Officer – 9731 6232 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9771 6823 DFES RDC Phone- 9771 6820

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 70 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.8 COLLIE

Contact Shire – 9734 1000

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 22 116o 13 800 10 / 28 1150m Sealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Wellington DDO Static tank - 9735 1988 Fuel Supply DBCA Wellington DDO Jet A1 and Avgas 200lt For restocks, contact FMS - 9735 1988 drums @ P&W District Bunbury 9725 5938 yard Communications DBCA 640 VHF Radio Foam DBCA Wellington DDO 20lt containers at - 9735 1988 District yard Operational Base Map DBCA COGS

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wellington District Duty Officer – 9735 1988 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9780 1900 / 9725 4318 (a/h)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 71 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.9 COOLUP (WHEELER FIELD)

Contact Ra Wheeler – 9530 3095 / 0417 776 657 Brenda Boaden – 0419 953 371

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o 47 115o 47 30ft 06 / 24 1300m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Swan Coastal Dam and pump DDO 9405 0700 Fuel Supply DBCA Swan Coastal DDO 9405 0700 Communications DFES 276/640 Foam On site 4 x 20lt drums at hangar Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Swan Coastal DDO – 9303 0700 2nd call Ra Wheeler- 0417 776 657 / 9530 3095 3rd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9780 1900 / 9725 4318 (a/h)

Note: Pilots – Departure restriction at 09: right turn immediately after take-off and head due east.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 72 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.10 CUNDERDIN

Contact Cunderdin Shire – 9635 2700

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 31o 37.38 117o 12.99 700ft 05 / 23 1850m Bitumen 14 / 32 1520m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Cunderdin Shire Hydrant Fuel Supply DBCA Rostered State Aviation Ops Officer Communications Foam Wheatbelt RDO 6 x 20lt drums on site 9881 9200 Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer – 9881 9200 2nd call DFES Northam – 9690 2300 3rd call CESM – Daniel Birleson –0448 008 653 4th call Works Manager - Ian Bartlett - 0409 686 938 (until end January 2018) Greg Stephens – 0409 686 938 (post end January 2018)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 73 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.11 DARKAN (HILLMAN FARM)

Contact West Arthur Shire – 9736 2222 Bill Owen – 0427 362 214 Nicole Wasmann (CEO) – 0427 900 563

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 16 116o 49 850 ft 03 / 21 1200m Unsealed Skydivers operate from AMSL Gravel the airfield

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply West Arthur Shire Static tank 10,000lt Brett Edwards Shire water tanker Nicole Wasmann 2 x 10,000lt tankers Fuel Supply DBCA Wellington DDO – 9735 1988 Communications DBCA 640 Foam DBCA Wellington DDO 4 x 20lt drums on site Restock from DBCA Bunbury – 9735 1988 Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wellington District Duty Officer – 9735 1988 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator Albany – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 74 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.12 DENMARK

Contact Denmark Shire – 9848 0300 Marcus Owen – 0428 913 937 Charmain Shelley – 0488 909 650 – Senior Ranger David Lonie – 0429 482 244

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 56 117o 24 200 10 / 28 1030m Gravel Pilot activated lighting 120.6 3 x depressions of PTT for 5 secs within 25 secs

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Shire water tankers: 2 x Static tanks Refill from contractor tanker D Lonie 0429 482 244 1 x 10000lt tanker AD Contractors – 9841 1 x 6,500lt tanker 2399 Private Contractor: Ian Atwell - 0408 412 2 x 11,000lt tankers 399 1 x 17,000lt tanker Peter – 0429 417 994 Private Contractor: 1 x 10,000lt tanker 1 x 5,000lt tanker Fuel Supply DBCA Frankland DDO DBCA Frankland Communications DBCA VHF 545 Shire, P&W, Fire Contact DBCA Frankland Services DDO Foam DBCA Albany DDO 4 x 20lt drums on site Stocks held at DBCA Albany and Walpole Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Services P&W COG Duty Officers

Ground Crew 1st call Shire Ranger – 0429 482 244 / 9848 0300 2nd call DBCA Frankland District Duty Officer – 9840 0400 3rd call DFES Albany Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 75 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.13 DONGARA

Contact DBCA Geraldton : (08) 9964 0901

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 29o 17.899 114o 55.631 20 ft 18-36 1300m Sealed - bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Midwest Geraldton Static tank 9964 0901 9964 0977 (fax) Fuel Supply Midwest Geraldton 9964 0901 9964 0977 (fax) Communications TBA Foam Midwest Geraldton 9964 0901 9964 0977 (fax) Operational Base Map

Ground Crew 1st call Midwest Geraldton Regional Duty Officer - 9964 0901 / Fax 9964 0977 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9956 6000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 76 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.14 DWELLINGUP

Contact DBCA Perth Hills Duty Officer – 9290 6100

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o 42 116o 04 850 06 / 24 865m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Perth Hill DDO Static tank 90,000 lt 9290 6100 Static tank 111,500 lt Fuel Supply DBCA Perth Hill DDO 2 x 200lt drums Avgas Extra Jet A1 can be ordered 9290 6100 4 x 200lt drums Jet A1 through FMS Bunbury Communications Ch 646 Foam DBCA Perth Hill DDO 4 x 20lt containers on 9290 6100 site Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Perth Hill Duty Officer - 9290 6100 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9780 1900 (office) / 9725 4318 (a/h)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 77 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.15 ESPERANCE REGIONAL AIRPORT

Contact DBCA Albany District Duty Officer – 9842 4500

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 41 121o 49 470ft 11 / 29 1800m Bitumen 03 / 21 1178m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Esperance airport 1 x 30,000lt Water pumped from farmers 9075 4145 paddock for initial use only – not to be used in sustained attack Ballantyne 27,000lt water tanker As bombers are deployed Earthmoving (Troy) 12,000lt water tanker 0427 717 992 Shane - 0427 100 287 Esperance Shire 25,000lt water tanker Contractors need to be 9071 0666 notified as soon as possible Mel Ammon 0418 954 051 Fuel Supply BP Esperance: Bulk Avgas and Jet A1 Contact 24 hrs Airport Officer 0428 935 618 Communications VHF 530 DBCA, DFES Foam DBCA Esperance Stored in shed at Stocks held at DBCA airport with pump Esperance depot Operational Base Map DBCA and DFES P&W COG DBCA Esperance District Esperance atlas, DFES and all Esperance Brigades

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Esperance – 9083 2100 2nd call DFES – Derek Change (08) 9071 3393

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 78 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.16 FRANKLAND VALLEY

Contact Rod Hallet, Alkoomi Wines – 0427 552 303 / (08) 9855 2229 Sandy Hallet – 0428 134 203 / (08)

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 20 116o 57 825 09 / 27 1000m Unsealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Warren RDO – 2 x Static tank 20,000lt 1 tank on it’s last legs, can 9771 7988 only hold approx. 10,000lt Reticulated water available Fuel Supply DBCA Warren RDO – 9771 7988 Communications DBCA 545 Foam DBCA Warren RDO – 9771 7988 Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Warren Regional Duty Officer – 0409 298 845 Backup 9771 7988 / 9776 1207 2nd call Tom Edridge – 0427 566 232 Peter Edridge …………………….

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 79 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.17 GERALDTON

Contact City of Geraldton- 9956 6600 – Bob Urquhart – 9956 6987

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 28o 47.8 114o 42.5 121ft 03 / 21 1981m Bitumen 08 / 26 900m 14 / 32 844m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Hydrant Mains supply Fuel Supply Mobil – 9923 3624 On site bulk (Mobil) 0467 086 652 Air Desk to set up fuel account with Mobil Communications DFES Channel TBA Foam Midwest Duty Officer To be stored at 0429 640 916 Moonyanooka BFB shed (at the airfield) Operational Base Map Midwest COG map AUSLINK: atlas 1:250,000 1:100,000

Ground Crew 1st call Midwest Duty Officer – 0429 640 916 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9956 6000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 80 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.18 GINGIN AIRBASE (RAAF). Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU.

Contact Base Command Post – 9571 7888 / 0408 900 142 Operations Coordinator 1 – 9571 7004 / 0417 181 456 (Dave Dunham) Operations Coordinator 2 - 9571 7120 / 0408 427 195 ATC Approach Supervisor Pearce – 9476 8622

When reloading from Gingin RAAF airbase please ensure ASAP: • Notify Pearce Security Access Office 9571 7603 and advise that Bullsbrook Water Carriers (BWC) will be required to refill the Gingin airbase water bomber tank. • Once approval for access is received, contact Kevin (BWC) on 9571 2726 & request their services to refill water bomber tank. • Any problems call Mark Giblett 0488 915 005.

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 31o 27.9 115o 51.8 247 08 / 26 1000+ Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Trevor Prentis 0409 250,000 lt tank Require access through 132 468 or (pumper motor) Pearce Airbase (See dot 9571 7116 for initial points above) filling. Duty Room a/h 9571 7666 Dunn Aviation For additional requirements 9417 4000 Fuel Supply DBCA Swan Coastal Jet fuel at Pearce, No Avgas available. DDO 9405 0700 contact tankers on 9571 7002 JRS Logistics & DBCA store at a/h 0403 341 245 or Yanchep tower direct 9571 7442 If base not active, min 2 hr wait. Pay min 4 hrs callout JRS Logistics drum stock Communications VHF Ch 638 (or nominated) Foam DBCA Swan Coastal Stocks ex Swan Coastal DDO 9405 0700 District yard Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Service WAC 3351, VTC Perth, Duty Officer COG, ESD

Ground Crew 1st call Transfield Fire Services (manned Mon-Thurs 0800-1700; Fri 0800-1500) Duty Room a/h 9571 7666 2nd call

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 81 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.19 GNOWANGERUP

Contact Gnowangerup Shire – 9827 1007

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 58.70 118o 00.77 885 AMSL 12 / 30 1500m Sealed - Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Gnowangerup Shire – Static tank 110,000lt 9827 1007 Fuel Supply DBCA Bunbury Nil 9725 5938 Communications TBA Foam Wheatbelt RDO 3 x 20lt drums on site 9881 9200 Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer – 9881 9200 2nd call DFES Great Southern - 9845 5000 4th call SES – Les Mayda – 0447 271 753

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 82 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.20 JANDAKOT AIRPORT (Nominated Operational Base)

Contact Jandakot Airport Holdings – 9417 0900

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o 05.8 115o 52.9 99 24 / 06 990m Bitumen 30 / 12

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Dunn Aviation Hydrant 9417 4000 Robert Dunn 0427 402 000 Fuel Supply Air BP Jandakot by VHF Avgas and Jet A1 Fuel to be arranged by the 9414 1515 contractor as required Communications VHF Ch 644/621 Foam Dunn Aviation 9417 4000 Operational Base Map DBCA and Fire Services VTC, Street Smart, COG Duty Officer

Ground Crew 1st call Dunn Aviation – 9417 4000 2nd call Robert Dunn – 0427 402 000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 83 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.21 JERRAMUNGUP

Contact Jerramungup Shire Brent Bailey CEO – 9835 1022 - (a/h) 0429 24 538 Murray Flett – 0400 219 073

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 55 118o 54 1024 14 / 32 1600m Gravel Pilot activated lighting 120.6

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Shire water tanker Static tank 20,000lt Brigades can supply – M Flett: contact through CBFCO 0400 219 073 David Edwards CEO: 0429 204 538 0427 374 065 Fuel Supply DBCA Albany RDO Drum fuel on-site Additional fuel delivered by (none on site) Sea container, aviation JRS Holdings lock 4 x 200lt drums Jet A1 2 x 200lt drums Avgas Communications VHF 517 P&W, DFES and Fire ground communications Brigades command channel to Albany DBCA is VHF 19 Foam DBCA Albany RDO On-site sea container, 8 x 20lt pails aviation lock Operational Base Map DBCA and DFES DO P&W COG District COG atlas available

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA South Coast Regional Duty Officer – 9842 4500 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000 3rd call Shire CESM- Ashley Peczka- 0438 498 221

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 84 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.22 JURIEN

Contact Dandaragan Shire- 9652 0800, CESM- Matt Dadd –9650 0806 / 0428 114 221 (a/h)

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 30o 18 115o 02 50

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Jurien DDO 25,000lt on-site tank Refill with tanker 0417 182 618 connected to bore Midwest RDO 0429 640 916 Dandaragan Shire 9652 0800 Fuel Supply DBCA Jurien 8 x 200lt drums Jet A1 Located in Jurien District 9688 6000 3x 200lt drums Avgas shed 3300L bulk of Jet A1 Communications DBCA Ch 537 Foam DBCA Jurien 40 x 20lt containers on location in Jurien District shed Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Service DBCA COG Duty Officers

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Midwest Regional Duty Officer – 0429 640 916 2nd call DBCA Jurien District Duty Officer – 0417 182 618

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 85 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.23 KALBARRI

Contact Northampton Shire – 9934 1202, Shire Ranger, Rick Davy - 0429 341 203

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 27o 41 114o 15 515 16 / 36 1600m Sealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Midwest Geraldton Static tank 34,000 lt RDO - 0429 640 916 Fuel Supply Midwest Geraldton 6x 200 Jet RDO - 0429 640 916 2x 200 Avgas Communications TBA Foam Midwest Geraldton RDO - 0429 640 916 Operational Base Map

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Midwest Geraldton Regional Duty Officer - 0429 640 916 2nd call

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 86 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.24 KATANNING

Contact Katanning Shire – 9821 9999

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 41.97 117o 39.40 935 06 / 24 1500m Unsealed 13 / 31 1000m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Katanning Static tank 160,000lt 9821 1296 Fuel Supply DBCA Rostered State Nil Aviation Ops Officer Communications VHF High 628 Foam Wheatbelt RDO 6 x 20lt drums on site 9881 9200 Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer - 9881 9200 2nd call DFES Great Southern – 9845 5000 3rd call Cindy Pearce – 0417 071 567

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 87 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.25 KOJONUP

Contact Kojonup Shire – 9831 2400 / 0427 989 187 (a/h)

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 45.72 117o 08.20 910 17 / 35 1420m Unsealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Rick Mitchell-Collins Static tank 22,000lt 30,000lt tanker (CEO) 0419 903 363 10,000lt tanker Fuel Supply DBCA Rostered State Aviation Ops Officer Communications TBA Foam DBCA Wheatbelt RDO 6 x 20lt drums on site 9881 9200 Operational Base Map DBCA COGS

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer 9881 9200 2nd call Kojonup Shire – 9831 2400 3rd call Kojonup Shire (a/h) 0427 989 187 4th Call DFES Regional Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 88 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.26 MANJIMUP

Contact Manjimup Shire – 9771 7777

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 16 116o 08 940 12 / 30 1225m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Donnelly DDO 2 x 226,000lt tank @ 0409 298 845 Mjp airfield Fuel Supply Manjimup Shire Avgas bowser DBCA Pilot or DDO Jet A1 x 5,000lt tank Communications DBCA 545 Foam DBCA Manjimup 10 x 20lt containers at 9771 7988 airfield Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Donnelly District Duty Officer - 0409 298 845 Backup – 9776 1207 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9771 6820

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 89 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.27 MARGARET RIVER

Contact Augusta/Margaret River Shire – 9780 5255 Chris Lloyd, CESM – 0419 905 285

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 55 115o 06 374 02 / 20 1110m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Blackwood DDO Static tank 150,000lt Steve Ryan (keys) 9731 6232 0400 005 294 Fuel Supply P&W Bunbury Kirup helitorch truck as backup Communications DFES 638 VHF Radio Foam DBCA Blackwood DDO 4 x 20lt containers at 9731 6232 Margaret River yard Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Blackwood District Duty Officer - 9731 6232 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9771 6820

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 90 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.28 MOORA

Contact Moora Shire – 9651 0000

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 30o 41 115o 59 190m 13 / 31 900m Gravel Length – can extend to 1800m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Moora Shire: 3 x water tankers: Need prior planning through John Greay - 27,000lt DBCA Jurien before initiating 9651 0000 10,000lt forward base. 0428 511 288 9,000lt Trevor Longman- 0427 511 405 Dandaragan Shire 9652 0800 Fuel Supply DBCA Jurien As per Jurien airfield 9652 1911 Communications Ground channels: DBCA 520 Foam DBCA Jurien Containers No foam pump use Jurien 9651 1911 Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Service DBCA COG Officers

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Jurien 1st FEA – 0417 182 618 DBCA Midwest Geraldton Regional Duty Officer – 0429 640 916 2nd call Moora Shire, CESM, Vicki Booth – 9651 0060 / 0409 137 645 3rd call SES Moora, Hugh Bryan – 9654 2007 / 0427 542 007

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 91 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.29 NANNUP

Contact DBCA Blackwood District Duty Officer – 9731 6232

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 01 115o 44 500 10 / 36 1230m gravel 10 / 28 500m

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Blackwood DDO Static tank 150,000lt Key for airfield at Nannup 9731 6232 office & Nannup Shire Fuel Supply DBCA Blackwood DDO Nil 9731 6232 Communications DFES 638 VHF Radio Foam DBCA Nannup yard 4 x 20lt containers at airfield Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Blackwood District Duty Officer - 9731 6232 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9771 6820

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 92 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.30 NARROGIN

Contact Narrogin Shire - 9890 0900 Narrogin Shire CEO, Aaron Cook – 0407 552 279 Narrogin Shire, John Warburton - 0408 913 694

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o 55.8 117o 04.8 1080ft 10 / 28 1028m Gravel 18 / 36 1450m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Narrogin Shire - (a/h) Static tank 20,000lt Reticulated water coming 9890 0900 on-line in near future John Warburton 0408 913 694 Fuel Supply Narrogin Aero Club Avgas only If urgent call Police Station (message service only) 9881 1911 9881 1761 Additional fuel through FMS Bunbury Alternative fuel arranged through DBCA Rostered State Aviation Ops Officer Communications VHF 623 DBCA and Fire Service Foam DBCA Wheatbelt RDO 2 x 20lt containers on Contact Agency Duty Officer 9881 9200 site Operational Base Map DBCA and Fire Service DBCA COG Duty Officers

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer - 9881 9200 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator Narrogin – 9881 3892 / 9881 3893

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 93 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.31 NORTHAM

Contact Northam Aero Club President – 9622 3248 / Errol Croft- 0428 880 149 Northam Shire – 9622 6100 / Shane Morehead- 0409 851 626 / Cheryl Greenough – 0401 049 040

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 31o 37.8 116o 41 500 14 / 32 1370m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DFES Duty Coordinator Static tank Refill from mains outlet Northam - 9690 2300 Fuel Supply Northam Air Services Additional fuel through 9622 1550 DBCA Rostered State Avgas only Aviation Ops Officer Communications DBCA Ch 644/621 Must use simplex on ground Foam DFES Northam office 2 x 20lt containers 9690 2300 Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Service DBCA COG Duty Officers

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Wheatbelt Regional Duty Officer - 9881 9200 2nd call DFES Northam Duty Coordinator– 9690 2300 3rd call SES Sarge- 0407 112 436

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 94 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.32 PEARCE AIRBASE (RAAF). Activate using Pearce RAAF MOU.

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 31o 40.1 116o 00.9 149 36R 2539m Bitumen

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Trevor Prentis 0409 Hydrant Require access through 132 468 or Pearce Airbase 9571 7116 for initial filling. Duty Room a/h 9571 7666 Dunn Aviation For additional requirements 9417 4000 Fuel Supply State Operations Air Jet fuel at Pearce, No Avgas available. Desk (SOAD) contact tankers on Primary – 9414 7970 9571 7002 JRS Logistics 2nd – 9395 9651 a/h 0403 341 245 or 3rd – 0400 207 400 tower direct 9571 7442 If base not active, min 2 hr wait. Pay min 4 hrs callout JRS Logistics drum stock Communications VHF Ch 638 (or nominated) Foam DBCA Swan Coastal Stocks ex Swan Coastal DDO 9405 0700 District yard Operational Base Map DBCA & Fire Service WAC 3351, VTC Perth, Duty Officer COG, ESD

Ground Crew 1st call Transfield Fire Services (manned Mon-Thurs 0800-1700; Fri 0800-1500) Duty Room a/h 9571 7666 2nd call

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 95 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.33 QUAIRADING AIRPORT

Contact Quairading Shire (08) 9645 1001

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 32o00.350 117o25.004 805 ft 05/23 1360 Unsealed

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Quairading Shire 23,000 lt (08) 9645 1001 Filled from bore Fuel Supply Contact State Aviation Operations Officer Communications TBC

Foam DBCA Wheatbelt RDO - 9881 9200 Operational Map Base

Ground Crew: 1st Call DBCA Wheatbelt RDO - 9881 9200 2nd Call DFES Northam – 9690 2300 3rd call Daniel Birleson – 0448 008 653

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 96 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.34 RAVENSTHORPE AIRPORT (Shire of Ravensthorpe)

Contact Airport Manager - Stacey Jaskiewicz T (08) 9839 0000 F (08) 9838 1282 M 0427 977 489 E [email protected]

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33°47’50” 120°12’29” 209ft/64m 06/24 1690m Bitumen Wind sock in place Runway lighting 209ft/64m 14/32 1200m Gravel ICAO: YNRV

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Airport Manager or Static tank –2 x 23,000 Due to location DBCA Regional duty lt request additional officer 98424500 water as soon as planes are activated. Fuel Supply 4 x 205lt JetA1 2 x 205lt AVGAS Stored in P&W sea container at airport with pumps. Communications DBCA 529, DFES 304 Foam DBCA Albany 20 x 20lt drums stored onsite in sea container Operational Map Base N/A

Ground Crew: 1st Call SES Ravensthorpe, Keith Rowe 0428381231 2nd Call Ravensthorpe Airport Manager, Steve McGuire 0427977489

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 97 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.35 RAVENSTHORPE (Mount Short)

Contact Ravensthorpe Shire Ranger – Stacey Jaskiewicz – 0427 977 489

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 32 119o 59 1100 18 / 36 1200m Gravel No night lighting, though SES available for emergency setup of strip side torches

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply Rod Edwards 1 x 38,000lt tanker All fitted with 75mm 0429 381 201 1 x 25,000lt tanker pumping facilities Fuel Supply DBCA Albany NIL Additional fuel delivered by 9842 4500 JRS Logistics 4 x Jet A1 2 x Avgas DBCA Ravensthorpe Airstrip Communications DBCA VHF 529 DBCA, DFES & Shire Fire ground communications Brigade network command channel to Albany DBCA is VHF 16 Foam DBCA Albany DO Stocks to be held in No foam pump DBCA Ravensthorpe depot Operational Base Map DBCA & DFES Albany DBCA COG DBCA Albany atlas held by DBCA and DFES

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA South Coast Regional Duty Officer – 9842 4500 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 98 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.36 STIRLING RANGE RETREAT

Contact Marcus Sounness – 0417 941 914 Stirling Range Retreat 9827 9229 - Darren Fisher 0427 383 345

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 18 118o 11 715 11 / 29 800m Grass Marked by tyres 18 / 36 1200m Grass

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply AD Contractors: Private contractor Water point (dam) available 9841 2399 1 x 10,000lt to pick up water Ian Atwell: 1 x 17,000lt Other contact available 0408 412 399 through RIC Stirling Range Peter: NP 9827 9230 and/or VHF 0429 417 994 546 Gnowangerup Shire: Shire unit 1 x 4,000lt 9827 1007 Works Supervisor Yvette Wheatcroft 0439 791 925 Fuel Supply DBCA South Coast Available to DBCA, Fire ground channel Albany DO DFES & Brigades (Shire) Communications VHF 525 Stock held at RIC SRNP Stocks held at DBCA & DFES Albany and RIC at SRNP Foam DBCA South Coast Albany DO Operational Base Map DBCA & DFES Duty DBCA COG Officer

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA South Coast Regional Duty Officer – 9842 4500 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 99 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.37 TAGON (Orleans Farm)

Contact Simon Fowler – 0428 750 012 (Privately owned – Orleans Farm)

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 33o 47 122o 56 100 ft 14/32 1690 Gravel/Dirt Privately owned. Wind sock in place.

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Esperance Static Tank PPOC – 9083 2100 2 x 23,000lt

Fuel Supply BP Esperance Nil Airport Officer 0428 935 618 or contact DBCA Esperance PPOC – 9083 2100 Communications DBCA 516 VHF radio Foam DBCA Esperance Trailer set up with Additional foam available at PPOC – 9083 2100 hoses/pump x 4 DBCA

Drums of foam Esperance Operational Base Map N/A

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Esperance PPOC – 9083 2100 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 100 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

17.38 WALPOLE

Contact DBCA Frankland District Duty Officer – 9840 0400

Latitude S Longitude E Elevation Runway Length Surface Comment 34o 57 116o 42 100 14 / 32 850m Gravel

Requirement Contact Facilities Available Comments Water Supply DBCA Frankland DDO – 2 x 113,000 lt tanks 9840 0400 Fuel Supply DBCA Frankland DDO – 5 x 200lt drums Avgas Additional fuel through 9840 0400 6 x 200lt drums Jet A1 DBCA FMS Bunbury @ airfield Communications DBCA Ch 545 Foam DBCA Frankland DDO – 4 x 20lt containers at 9840 0400 Walpole Operational Base Map COG

Ground Crew 1st call DBCA Frankland District Duty Officer – 9840 0400 2nd call DFES Duty Coordinator – 9845 5000

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 101 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX I – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION REQUEST FORM

STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK A D F 0 1

AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION REQUEST FORM

1. PHONE: State Operations Air Desk of Request - Primary contact (08) 9414 7970 Secondary contact (08) 9395 9651 Tertiary contact 0400 207 400 2. FAX: Request Form ADF01 to either (08) 9414 7859 Or EMAIL Request Form ADF01 to either [email protected] [email protected]

DATE TIME

REQUESTING OFFICER / AGENCY □DFES □DBCA

CONTROLLING AGENCY □LGA □DFES □DBCA FIRE NAME/INCIDENT NUMBER

AUTOMATIC/MANAGED RESPOND □Zone 2/2A □I/O Zone □SWZR (Perth Hills Response) (Capes Response) (Bunbury Response)

GROUND CONTROLLER /CALL SIGN FIRE BOMBING RADIO CHANNEL LOCATION OF FIRE –map reference FLIGHT HAZARDS (IF KNOWN) INDICATE REQUESTING □ Public Safety at Risk ACTIVATION CRITERIA □ Fire Crews in Imminent Danger □ Assets at Imminent Risk □ Known high fuel loads and likelihood of excessive ROS and/or extreme fire danger

PREFERRED RESOURCE □ Fixed Wing □ Helitak □ Both SAR ARRANGEMENTS SOAD USE ONLY Air Desk Officer Time Received Action Taken

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 102 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX II - INITIAL ACTIVATION PLANS

IAP – METRO STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK A D F 0 3 Incident / Job No Date Agency Time Initial 1 Notification of the aerial resources request. Determine appropriate aerial resources for deployment • Air Attack: • • 2 • Bomber: • • Helitak: • • Air Intel: • Plan aerial operation by determining and nominating Bearing: ______° Lat: _____ ° _____ m ______s S Distance: ______nM Long: _____ ° _____ m ______s E

Map: COG / UBD / ESD Page: ______Ref:______

Communication Plan Air to Gd Channel: 644 / 621 3 F-CTAF: 135.55 / 123.65 / 119.10 Tactical Channel: 368 / 367 /366

Ground Control: Call sign: ______Name: ______SAR Arrangements: SOAD / Other: ______Full SAR / SARTIME 4 Seek authorisation from DAO/SAOO for non-standard activation.

5 Telephone and brief nominated Lead Pilot of Fire Suppression aircraft refer to relevant: FW______, HLTK______, Aircrane______Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft/Aircrew Dispatch Sheet for contact details. Telephone and brief AAS refer to: 6 Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft/Aircrew Dispatch Sheet for contact details. Telephone and brief Air Intel Officer if/when activated by COMCEN: 7 • AIO – 0427 076 894 or 0429 102 896 8 Ensure SAR arrangements are in place. FAX Air Traffic Control of approx location of AFS operation on VTC: 9 • Perth Approach 9476 8614 (fax) • Jandakot Tower 9476 8831 (fax) Notify requesting office of aerial resources dispatched and ETA: 10 DFES radio ComCen / DBCA contact District Duty Officer

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 103 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Activate Forward Operating Base if required refer to SOPs . 11 FOB: ______Monitor & log all aircraft movements on log sheet. 1. PEARCE RAAF Base: (Mon-Thurs 0800-1700, Fri 0800-1430): Call RAAF Pearce for request visitor access passes for support trucks to pick on arrival. Contact either: 1) Base Command Post (24 / 7): 9571 7888 or 0419 273 062 Alternative base command staff should no one answer above 0455 070 454 (Michal Mikeska) or 0408 900 142 (Marianne O’Driscoll) 2) Air Ops Coordinator 1: 9571 7004 or 0417 181 456 3) Base Aviation Safety Officer: 9571 7120 or 0408 427 195 12 • “Immediately dispatch Dunn’s Support Truck to Pearce” • Advise RAAF Pearce when operations are completed & advise the number of loads taken from the base. • Advise Pearce if activation is cancelled prior to aircraft arriving. • RAAF fuel availability requires 2hrs notice. 2. GINGIN RAAF Base: (Mon-Fri 0800 to 1700) outside of these operating hours contact DAO/SAOO • RAAF Fuel availability requires 3hrs notice. 3. PERTH For Emergency use only - Contact DAO & SAOO. Dispatch Fuel Support for Fire Suppression aircraft if required, refer to relevant: 13 Aerial Fire Suppression Aircraft/Aircrew Dispatch Sheet for contact details (Note - Air Intel to dispatch their own fuel support) 14 Text fire location & dispatch details using QSMS. Activate Helitak Air Base Manager if: 15 • Metro Helitak Fuel truck is activated - refer DFES ABM Roster Sustained Attack 1) Contact IC to assess viability 2) Text “Sustained Attack” to: a) All Hours DBCA State Duty Officer 16 b) All Hours DBCA State Aviation Operations Officer c) All Hours DFES State Duty Aircraft Coordinator Contact P&W State Aviation Operations Officer and request Air Base Manager for AFS involving 4 or more SEATs Fax the Fire Bomber Request form to: 17 • Bomber Base (Dunn) Jandakot 9674 1266 18 Notify Air Base Managers that operation is complete. 19 Notify Fuel Support that operation is complete and return to base.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 104 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

20 Confirm aerial resources have landed and SARwatch is terminated. 21 Text incident completion or redirection using QSMS. 23 Notify DFES ComCen of completion of aerial operation.

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 105 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

IAP – BUNBURY STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK A D F 0 4 Incident / Job No Date Agency Time Initial 1 Notification of the aerial resources request. Determine appropriate aerial resources for deployment: • 2 • Air Attack: • • Bomber: • • Helitak: • Plan aerial operation by determining and nominating: Bunbury Busselton (Helitak) Bearing: ______° Bearing: ______° Distance: ______nM Distance: ______nM

Location Lat ______° ______min S Long: ______° ______min E

Map: COG / SS / ESD Page: ______Ref:______3

Communication Plan Air to Gd Channel: 640 F-CTAF: 135.55 / 123.65 / 119.10 Tactical Channel: 368 / 367 /366

Ground Control: Call sign: ______Name: ______SAR Arrangements: SOAD / Other: ______Full SAR / SARTIME Telephone and brief Lead Bomber Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 4 above details Telephone and brief AAS and AA Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 5 above details Ensure SAR arrangements are in place (District DO) and inform AAS. If 6 forward basing is required arrange with the District DO for an appropriate Communication Plan 7 • Telephone DBCA South West RDO 8 Telephone DFES South West RDC 9725 4318 Fax the Fire Bomber Request form to Bunbury group fax: a) Bomber base (Dunn) Jandakot fax 9417 4011 b) DBCA Corporate Relations fax 9334 0498 9 c) DBCA South West RDO fax 9725 4351 d) DFES South West RDC fax 9725 4230

10 Text fire location and dispatch details on QSMS

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 106 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

11 For DFES fires notify COMCEN of ETA of the resources 9395 9202 12 For Helitak operations notify and brief fuel support truck driver 13 Keep regular contact with the respective District Duty Office Keep regular contact with bomber ground support as per dispatch 14 sheet Sustained Attack 3) Contact IC to assess viability 4) Text “Sustained Attack” to: a) All Hours DBCA State Duty Officer 15 b) All Hours DBCA State Aviation Operations Officer c) All Hours DFES State Duty Aircraft Coordinator 5) Contact DBCA State Aviation Operations Officer and request Airbase Manager for AFS involving 4 or more SEATs Once the bomber operation is complete then confirm the bombers are 16 on the ground at Bunbury or FOB and note time 17 Notify DBCA South West RDO and DFES South West RDC 18 Confirm Fire and Job/Incident number

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 107 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

IAP – MANJIMUP STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK A D F 0 5 Incident / Job No Date Agency Time Initial 1 Notification of the aerial resources request. Determine appropriate aerial resources for deployment: 2 Air Attack: Bomber: Helitak: Plan aerial operation by determining and nominating: Manjimup Busselton (Helitak) Bearing: ______° Bearing: ______° Distance: ______nM Distance: ______nM

Location Lat ______° ______min S Long: ______° ______min E

Map: COG / SS / ESD Page: ______Ref:______3

Communication Plan Air to Gd Channel: 640 F-CTAF: 135.55 / 123.65 / 119.10 Tactical Channel: 368 / 367 /366

Ground Control: Call sign: ______Name: ______SAR Arrangements: SOAD / Other: ______Full SAR / SARTIME Telephone and brief Lead Bomber Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 4 above details Telephone and brief AAS and AA Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 5 above details Ensure SAR arrangements are in place (District DO) and inform AAS. If 6 forward basing is required arrange with the District DO for an appropriate Communication Plan 7 Telephone DBCA Warren RDO 8 Telephone DFES Lower South West RDC 9771 6820 Fax the Fire Bomber Request form to Manjimup group fax: a) Bomber base (Dunn) Jandakot fax 9417 4011 9 b) DBCA Corporate Relations fax 9334 0498 c) DBCA Warren RDO fax 9771 8449 d) DFES Lower South West RDC fax 9771 6868

10 Text fire location and dispatch details on QSMS

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 108 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

11 For DFES fires notify COMCEN of ETA of the Fire Bombers 9395 9202 12 For Helitak operations notify and brief fuel support truck driver 13 Keep regular contact with the respective District Duty Office Keep regular contact with bomber ground support as per dispatch 14 sheet Sustained Attack 6) Contact IC to assess viability 7) Text “Sustained Attack” to: a) All Hours DBCA State Duty Officer 15 b) All Hours DBCA State Aviation Operations Officer c) All Hours DFES State Duty Aircraft Coordinator 8) Contact P&W State Aviation Operations Officer and request Airbase Manager for 4 or more SEATs Once the bomber operation is complete then confirm the bombers are 16 on the ground at Bunbury or FOB and note time 17 Notify DBCA Warren RDO and DFES Lower South West RDC 18 Confirm Fire and Job/Incident number

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 109 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

IAP – ALBANY STATE OPERATIONS AIR DESK A D F 0 6 Incident / Job No Date Agency Time Initial 1 Notification of the aerial resources request. Determine appropriate aerial resources for deployment: • 2 • Air Attack: • • Bomber: • • Helitak: • Plan aerial operation by determining and nominating: Albany Busselton (Helitak) Bearing: ______° Bearing: ______° Distance: ______nM Distance: ______nM

Location Lat ______° ______min S Long: ______° ______min E

Map: COG / SS / ESD Page: ______Ref:______3

Communication Plan Air to Gd Channel: F-CTAF: 135.55 / 123.65 / 119.10 Tactical Channel: 368 / 367 /366

Ground Control: Call sign: ______Name: ______SAR Arrangements: SAR keeper: ______Full SAR / SARTIME Telephone and brief Lead Bomber Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 4 above details Telephone and brief AAS and AA Pilot as per Dispatch Sheet with 5 above details Ensure SAR arrangements are in place (District DO) and inform AAS. If 6 forward basing is required arrange with the District DO for an appropriate Communication Plan 7 • Telephone DBCA South Coast RDO 8 Telephone DFES Great Southern RDC 9845 5000 Fax the Fire Bomber Request form to Albany group fax: e) Bomber base (Dunn) Jandakot fax 9417 4011 f) DBCA Corporate Relations fax 9334 0498 9 g) DBCA South Coast RDO fax 9841 7105 h) DFES Great Southern RDC fax 9841 6719

10 Text fire location and dispatch details on QSMS

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 110 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

11 For DFES fires notify COMCEN of ETA of the Fire Bombers 9395 9202 12 For Helitak operations notify and brief fuel support truck driver 13 Keep regular contact with the respective District Duty Office Keep regular contact with bomber ground support as per dispatch 14 sheet Sustained Attack 9) Contact IC to assess viability 10) Text “Sustained Attack” to: a) All Hours DBCA State Duty Officer 15 b) All Hours DBCA State Aviation Operations Officer c) All Hours DFES State Duty Aircraft Coordinator 11) Contact P&W State Aviation Operations Officer and request Airbase Manager for 4 or more SEATs Once the bomber operation is complete then confirm the bombers are 16 on the ground at Albany or FOB and note time 17 Notify DBCA South Coast RDO and DFES Great Southern RDC 18 Confirm Fire and Job/Incident number

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 111 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX III – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION RESPONSE AREAS

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 112 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX IV – ZONE 2 AND 2A

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 113 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX V – LOWER SOUTH WEST (BUSSELTON/AUGUSTA/MARGARET RIVER)

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 114 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX VI(A) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, NORTH A

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 115 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX VI(B) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, NORTH B

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 116 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX VI(C) – SW ALPHA BRAVO ZONES, SOUTH

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 117 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX VII – GREATER ALBANY ZONE

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 118 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 119 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 120 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 121 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 122 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 123 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 124 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX VIII – KINGS PARK AND BOLD PARK

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 125 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX IX – MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS FOR CLASS ‘A’ FOAMS

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 126 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 127 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 128 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 129 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 130 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 131 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 132 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 133 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 134 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 135 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX X – AERIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL RISK LEVEL Low Medium High Notes Environment Weather Cloud Visibility Wind Temperature

Operating Area Smoke Turbulence Terrain Altitude Density Obstructions Ground environment Emergency landing Familiarity

Aircraft Serviceability Weight CG Performance Fuel

Operation Task Other aircraft

Crew Members Experience Recency Fatigue Stress Crew cooperation Workload Flight & duty time

Equipment Navigation Sling load Long line

Overall Total Date: ______Pilot: ______

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 136 WA Aerial Fire Suppression Operating Procedures 2017-18

APPENDIX XI – USDA FOREST SERVICES APPROVED APPLICATION LIST

Reviewed June 2017 `Uncontrolled When Printed’ Next Review: June 2018 P a g e | 137

Air Attack Supervisor Flight Log / Incident Report

Inc/Job Number Time Date Location Bearing Dist Flight Following Details Map Reference A/C callsign Land Tenure Control Agency DBCA LGA DFES A/C rego Ground Controller Name Callsign Pilot FCTAF Ground control Tactical AAS Comms Plan Trainee

Departure From Total flight time Endurance No drops SEAT SARTIME No drops HLTK Start Engine Stop Engine Last Light Flight Time Depart Base Arrival At Arrive Fire Depart Fire Bomber ID: Helitak ID: Arrive Base

Wind Flame Report Time Values at Risk HFROS Fire Behaviour Dir/Strength Ht 1. 2. 3.

F/ground Time From To Notes Elevation 5 Minute in Bound Call Separation Plan

Strategies: Air Intel

Hazards: AAS

Use of Foam: SEAT

Helitak

Signature Air Attack Supervisor: Fax by 0800 on day following operations to: Administrative Officer FMS Bunbury (08) 97254900

FIRE 88a (01/18)

Bomber ID: Helitak iD:

Fire Diary Time From To Notes

Custodian: Manager Regional Fire Services Page 2 of 5

FIRE 88a (01/18)

Allocated Aerial Resources Summary

Call Sign Drop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Time Head Flank H-Over Full Split Restricted Type of Suppressant Assessment Drop Objectives

Custodian: Manager Regional Fire Services Page 3 of 5

FIRE 88a (01/18)

Call Sign Drop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Time Head Flank H-Over Full Split Restricted Type of Suppressant Assessment Drop Objectives

Custodian: Manager Regional Fire Services Page 4 of 5

FIRE 88a (01/18)

Operational Tasking in Percentage Terms

Reduce Assets Crew Line building Spot Fire forward rate of Other Protection Protection spread

After Action Review Summary

Communications Air to Air 1 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Communication Air to Ground 2 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Tasking and ground controller function 3 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Appropriate tasking to match aircraft type 4 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Accuracy of fire bombing drops 5 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Fire fighters in attendance and consolidating drops 6 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Overall aerial suppression effectiveness 7 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective Safety of Aerial Suppression Operation 8 Limited 1 2 3 4 5 Effective

Provide information on any of the operational functions that rate a 1 or 2 and any other additional comments.

Custodian: Manager Regional Fire Services Page 5 of 5 CSIRO PUBLISHING

International Journal of Wildland Fire http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF11063

The effect of aerial suppression on the containment time of Australian wildfires estimated by fire management personnel

M. P. PlucinskiA,B,G, G. J. McCarthyC,B,D, J. J. HollisE,A,B,F and J. S. Gould A,B

ACSIRO Ecosystem Sciences and CSIRO Climate Adaption Flagship, GPO Box 1700, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia. BBushfire Cooperative Research Centre, Level 5, 340 Albert Street, East Melbourne, VIC 3002, Australia. CSchool of Forest and Ecosystems Science, University of Melbourne, PO Box 260, Orbost, VIC 3888, Australia. DPresent address: Department of Sustainability and Environment, PO Box 260, Orbost, VIC 3888, Australia. EDepartment of Environment and Conservation, Manjimup, WA 6258, Australia. FPresent address: School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, University of New South Wales@ADFA, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia. GCorresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Abstract. The addition of aerial firefighting resources to wildfire suppression operations does not always result in faster fire containment. In this paper, containment times of fires with aerial suppression are compared with estimated containment times for the same fires without aerial suppression. Senior firefighting personnel who had worked on each fire estimated whether fires could have been contained within a time class if aircraft were not available. Data from 251 wildfires were analysed based on four fire-containment time classes: #2, 2–4, 4–8 and 8–24 h from the start of initial attack. Aircraft were perceived to reduce time to containment when firefighting conditions were more challenging owing to fuel hazard rating, weather conditions, slope, resource response times and area burning at initial attack. Comparisons of containment time with and without aircraft can be used to develop operational tools to help dispatchers decide when aircraft should be deployed to newly detected fires.

Additional keywords: fire management, initial attack, operational data, suppression resourcing.

Received 6 May 2011, accepted 13 July 2011, published online 14 December 2011

Introduction firefighting operations in a range of attack and intelligence- The use of firefighting aircraft in Australia has increased sub- gathering roles. Although aircraft are not deployed to all fires, stantially over the last decade, with increasing fire load and the use of aerial suppression during initial attack has become government funding to support aerial firefighting. The appli- common in Australia, particularly in situations where fires may cation of aircraft in Australian wildfire operations has been affect people or property, or when they have greater potential to discussed in many government and parliamentary inquiries grow and become difficult and costly to control. Aircraft are able (Esplin et al. 2003; House of Representatives Select Committee to access fires with greater ease than conventional ground 2003; McLeod 2003; Ellis et al. 2004; Kanowski et al. 2005; resources owing to the route taken and because they are less Select Committee on Agricultural and Related Industries 2010; restricted by terrain and vegetation around the fire. Firefighting Teague et al. 2010), with recommendations made for their aircraft cannot perform many of the tasks that ground suppres- continued use. Questions of how appropriate, useful and cost- sion resources undertake, such as mop-up operations, which efficient they are for fighting wildfires are difficult to address. require detailed and localised attention. Helicopters and single-engine fixed-wing aircraft are often Firefighting aircraft can enhance the effectiveness and effi- deployed to Australian wildfires during initial attack to halt or ciency of ground suppression forces. Aerial drops are often used minimise the fire perimeter growth and to support ground to suppress flames and slow fire progression ahead of ground suppression resources. They are also used to support ongoing resources, thereby making the tasks of flame extinguishment

Journal compilation Ó IAWF 2011 www.publish.csiro.au/journals/ijwf B Int. J. Wildland Fire M. P. Plucinski et al.

and mineral-earth line construction safer and easier. Such a Table 1. Variables used in the analysis tactic can enable faster rates of line construction than either resource type working alone and may allow ground resources to Variable Description work on sections of fire edge that may otherwise have been too intense for them to safely suppress. In most cases, suppressant ta Time delay between detection and first air suppression work (h) tg Time delay between detection and first ground suppression drops are of limited value without timely follow-up from the work (h) ground, as drop zones can burn through over time, allowing fire tca Time period (h) between first suppression work and containment spread to continue. with ground and aerial resources (actual)

There have been little quantitative data collected on the tcg Estimated time period (h) between first suppression work and specific contribution of aerial suppression to fire containment. containment with ground resources only Previous studies containing analyses of initial attack fire- FFDI Forest fire danger index (McArthur 1967) containment data (e.g. McCarthy and Tolhurst 1998; McCarthy T Maximum air temperature (8C) H Minimum relative humidity (%) 2003; Cumming 2005; Arienti et al. 2006; Plucinski et al. 2007) 1 have considered a range of resource types, but have been unable U Maximum wind speed at 10 m in the open (km h ) to make comparisons between them. Many fire containment SFHS Surface fuel hazard score NSFHS Near-surface fuel hazard score studies have developed models that simulate fire containment EFHS Elevated fuel hazard score based on rates of fire perimeter growth and line production BFHS Bark fuel hazard score (e.g. Anderson 1989; Fried and Fried 1996; Podur and Martell OFHS Overall fuel hazard score 2007). Although these studies have considered a range of shrub Presence of a shrub layer in the vegetation (1 ¼ present, suppression resourcing scenarios, they have not been used to 0 ¼ absent) model the specific contribution of aerial firefighting. S Slope class: 0 (flat, 08); 1 (low slope, ,58); 2 (moderate slope, The aim of this study was to determine when aerial suppres- 5–158); 3 (steep slope, .158) sion is perceived to provide a reduction in the time taken to Ai Fire area at initial attack (ha) contain wildfires by fire management personnel. Here, the containment times of wildfires that have had both aerial and ground-based suppression resources operating on them are officer, divisional commander or air attack supervisor. Contact compared with expert estimations of containment time of the officers were not purposely selected because of their role, but for same fires had only ground resources been available. their involvement in and knowledge of each fire operation, localised experience in fire management operations and likelihood that they could provide the requested data and expert Methods judgement on fire containment. Each of these contact officers Data collection was experienced in performing several other operational roles Data were sourced from operational personnel who were heavily (including fire ground command and suppression roles) and was involved in suppression operations of Australian wildfires that required to obtain information from others involved in the were contained within 24 h of initial attack. The dataset included fire, including the first-arriving crews at the fire and field- fires that occurred between the 2004–05 and 2007–08 fire sea- based commanders. Each contact officer worked within the sons in a range of locations across populated regions of southern fire district that they provided data for and was familiar with Australia. All fires analysed in this study used aircraft to drop the local fire environment, including fuels, fire behaviour, suppressants, retardants or both to assist with containment and resource availability and response protocols. also involved ground tanker-based suppression. The fires used For each fire, the contact officers estimated if containment in this study burned in predominately forest and shrub vegeta- could have been achieved within given time periods without the tion. Grassland fires were excluded from this study owing to support of aerial suppression. Fire containment time was defined differences in fire behaviour and suppression tactics (Luke and as the time when the fire reached its final size. This may McArthur 1978; Cheney and Sullivan 2008). have preceded the completion of a control line around the The fire incident data were collected using detailed survey full perimeter. This definition provided consistency for data forms that were given to fire management personnel. Informa- from different agencies and states. Containment time estimates tion requested on the data collection forms covered a range of involved spatial fire spread predictions based on weather, terrain fire-related statistics, but was limited to those that could be and landscape conditions and available ground resources at each readily obtained. These included timing, weather, fuel, terrain fire. The suppression tactics used for making these predictions and fire variables, as described below. A list of the variables that were often different to those used when aircraft were present. were used in the analysis is given in Table 1. Indirect attack using backing-fire was assumed for some fires Briefings on the aims of the study and data collection process that were directly attacked when supported by aerial suppression were given before the distribution of data collection forms because they had sections with flames that were too intense for through workshops and meetings. Forms were also sent to fire direct attack by ground resources alone. Follow-up interviews management officers after incidents to remind them of the data were conducted to discuss the method used for estimating request. This prompting did not always result in a response. containment time and to check other data provided for each Information for each fire was collated by an agency-based fire. Estimates of containment time were given in four exclusive officer who had been involved in the incident management team time-period categories because containment time could only for that fire in a role such as incident controller, operations be estimated as a range of times for many of the fires. These were The effect of aerial suppression on containment time Int. J. Wildland Fire C

containment within: 2, 2–4, 4–8 and 8–24 h from the start of officially reported figures of final fire area as well as the burning initial attack. conditions and likely ignition time. The role of contact officers during each fire was categorised into three groups to allow testing of source-based bias. These Data analysis were office-based, ground-based or air-based, depending on their location during each fire. Office-based roles included those Data for each time category were divided into two groups based that were based in incident control centres, for example incident on estimations of their containment status within the time controller and operations officer. Ground-based roles included category if aerial suppression was not available. Variables ground controllers, divisional commanders and crew leaders within these groups were compared using the Wilcoxon rank who were present on the fire-ground, whereas those in air-based sum test (Hollander and Wolfe 1973), as the data had a range roles performed as either air-attack supervisors or air observers. of distributions that did not suit parametric tests. All statistical tests and modelling were performed using the statistics program Data fields R(ver. 2.11.1, R Development Core Team 2010). Quantitative timing data provided for each fire included the Logistic regression and classification tree analyses were used times of detection and fire containment. Time periods between to identify significant variables for determining the estimated fire containment status without aerial suppression. Logistic detection and first aircraft suppression work (ta) and first ground regression models were of the form: suppression work (tg) were used as predictor variables in the analysis. The categorised time periods between the first sup- ln½¼P=ðÞ1 P b0 þ b1 f1 þ ::: þ bn fn ð1Þ pression work and fire containment (tca) from the data (with aircraft present) were compared with the binary estimates of . containment if only ground suppression resources were avail- where P is the probability that tcg 2, 4, 8 or 24 h in respective # , # , # able (t ) for the main analyses of this study. datasets containing fires where tca 2, 2 tca 4, 4 tca 8, cg , # Weather data collected for each fire included maximum or 8 tca 24 h, b0, b1 and bn are regression coefficients, and f1 Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) (McArthur 1967), maximum and fn are predictor variables. Logistic models for each dataset air temperature (T), maximum hourly mean wind speed at 10 m were formulated using a forward stepwise method based on in an open area (U) and minimum relative humidity (H) for the likelihood ratio tests (Lehmann 1986) with testing for interac- period from detection to containment. These data were either tions between all variables selected in the model. The cut-off for obtained from the most representative Bureau of Meteorology significant variables included in the models was decided using automatic weather station, agency weather stations or field the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Sakamoto et al. 1986). measurements. This process was used to identify influential factors in each of Visual fuel hazard ratings (McCarthy et al. 1999; Gould et al. the datasets. The best-fitting logistic regression model for all 2007a) were used to describe fuel characteristics. Fuel hazard datasets was identified by comparing models with all possible guides are used operationally to describe fuels in many parts of combinations of variables across the four datasets and selecting Australia. The fuel hazard rating method allows quick assess- the one with the lowest AICs. ment of fuel layers based on the continuity, depth, height and Classification tree modelling was used as an alternative portion of dead fuel. Fuel hazard ratings were recorded for the method for identifying the main variables for predicting the four fuel layers: surface (litter), near-surface fuel (suspended estimated fire containment status without aerial suppression. low fuel), elevated fuel (shrubs) and bark fuels. Overall fuel Classification tree modelling involves the testing of independent hazard rating was determined using the method of McCarthy variables on subsets of the data. Classification trees were et al. (1999). Fuel hazard ratings were an estimated average formulated using the methods described by Breiman et al. for the area burned before containment based on assessments of (1984) and De’ath and Fabricius (2000), with the number pre-burned fuels or from nearby unburned areas. Ordinal values of partitions in each tree determined using the v-fold cross- (1–5) were assigned for the five rating classes (low, moderate, validation technique. high, very high and extreme) for analysis. The goodness-of-fit of the logistic models and classification The presence of a shrub layer was used to categorise trees were compared using the fraction of correctly classified structural vegetation type within the dataset using a binary predictions (prediction accuracy) and Matthew’s correlation categorical variable shrub. Fires that burned in vegetation coefficient (MCC) (Baldi et al. 2000). For both these measures, characterised by a prominent shrub layer were given a value the predicted probability of success of 0.5 was used as a cut-off. of 1 for this variable, whereas those that did not have a shrub The MCC was used because it gives a more balanced measure of layer were given a value of 0. Fires with a shrub value of 1 goodness-of-fit than prediction accuracy when models have low burned in vegetation types such as shrubland, heathland, scrub sensitivity (fraction true positive prediction) or specificity (frac- and woodland with a shrubby understorey, whereas those that tion true negative prediction) or when the class groups are of had a shrub value of 0 tended to occur in areas composed of uneven size. An MCC of 1 indicates perfect prediction, whereas forest and woodland with substantial litter fuels on the ground. MCCs of 0 and 1 indicate random and inverse prediction. The average slope (S) for the fire area at initial attack was placed into one of four slope classes: 0 ¼ level ground (08), Testing for source bias 1 ¼ low slope (,58), 2 ¼ moderate slope (5–158), or 3 ¼ steep In order to determine the range of estimations from the data slope (.158). Estimates of initial fire area (Ai) were obtained providers, a subsample (35) of contact officers were asked to from the first-arriving personnel. These were checked against estimate containment times without aerial suppression for four D Int. J. Wildland Fire M. P. Plucinski et al.

hypothetical scenarios representing a range of situations from Table 4. The means of variables (other than relative humidity H) the dataset. The first scenario was based on median values for were mostly greater for fires that were estimated to have key parameters, whereas others varied fuel hazard, weather required aerial suppression for containment within each time conditions and response times. A summary of the conditions period than those that were not. However, there were only a few used in comparative scenarios is presented in Table 2. For each cases where there were significant differences (Wilcoxon rank scenario, the contact officers were asked to estimate the most sum test). No individual variable was found to have significant likely time required for containment without aircraft. They were differences in more than one time category. Fires that were also asked to provide information on primary and occasional contained within 2 h of initial attack were more likely to have a roles that they undertake during fire operations and to rate the faster ground suppression response, higher relative humidity similarity of each scenario to fires that they had operational and gentler slope when containment without aerial suppression experience with. This information allowed comparisons to be within 2 h was estimated to have been possible. Fires that were made between role types and only the scenarios that respondents contained within 4 h and estimated to have not required aerial had experience with to be compared. These comparisons were suppression had lower surface, bark and overall fuel hazard made using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. scores. Fires that were contained within 8 h and estimated to have not required aerial suppression to improve containment Results time had slower aerial suppression responses and occurred Data were obtained from 251 wildfires. The number of fires that at lower FFDIs. No variables were found to be significantly were contained and the number of fires where containment different when the containment time with aircraft was between without aerial suppression was estimated in each of the tested 8 and 24 h. time period categories are listed in Table 3. A total of 67% of the fires burned in forest-dominated vegetation (i.e. shrub ¼ 0). Modelling analysis The data were obtained from 141 different primary contact Table 5 shows the variables that were found to have the highest officers, with 69% of these officers providing data from one fire, significance within each dataset using stepwise logistic regres- whereas others provided data on up to 11 fires. All but two of the sion. No interactions between variables were found to be sig- primary contacts who provided data on multiple fires performed nificant in these models. Table 6 shows the variables selected for the same role during each fire. A small percentage (22%) of the the best single model across the four datasets. There were neg- data came from contact officers who had performed in air-based ative (although small) coefficients for initial attack area in the roles, whereas 41 and 36% of the data came from contact 4 , tca # 8-h dataset and FFDI in the 8 , tca # 24-h dataset as a officers who had been in office-based and ground-based roles. result of the model form being forced onto datasets where these variables were not significant. Predicted containment status comparison The results of the classification tree analysis are shown in The range of the variables used to compare containment within Fig. 1. The classification trees generated here were very simple, time periods with and without aerial suppression is given in with two featuring only a single split. The classification trees selected different variables to those in the stepwise logistic models. This is a result of the different processes used by these Table 2. Summary of main variables used in the comparative scenarios modelling procedures. See Table 1 for definition of variables Some variables selected in the logistic regression and classification tree analyses were also found to be significant in the Variable Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Wilcoxon rank sum tests (Table 4). Fuel variables featured in all (median (extreme fuel (extreme (slow tg logistic models and two of the classification trees. Weather values) hazard) weather) and tca) variables only featured in one stepwise logistic model and two of OFHS 3 (High) 5 (Extreme) 2 (Moderate) 3 (High) the classification trees. FFDI 20 (High) 6 (Moderate) 55 (Extreme) 14 (High) 8 8 8 8 Slope 5 5 0 10 Testing for source bias in the dataset t 1 h 1.5 h 0.66 h 0.66 h a Comparisons between the mean estimated probabilities of tg 0.5 h 0.66 h 0.33 h 1.5 h tca 3 h 5 h 1.5 h 22 h containment for the three role types within the four time cate- Ai 2 ha 1 ha 0.5 ha 2.5 ha gories are given in Fig. 2. These comparisons show the estimated probability of containment varied widely for the fires sourced from contact officers in office-based roles, whereas the mean Table 3. Summary of number of fires contained within each time estimated probability of containment without aircraft from those period with aircraft (tca) and number (and percentage) of fires where in ground-based roles was higher than that those in air-based containment without aircaft (tcg) was estimated to have been possible roles in all time categories. This suggests that air-based per- within the time period sonnel are more likely to think that aircraft are required for timely containment of fires than those in ground-based roles.

tca # 2h 2, tca # 4h 4, tca # 8h 8, tca # 24 h Fires where data were provided by contact officers in air-based roles tended to occur in more severe conditions than the ones t 89 57 69 36 ca provided by contact officers in ground-based roles, with higher t 31 (34.8%) 9 (15.8%) 25 (36.2%) 16 (44.4%) cg fire danger index values and fuel hazard scores. In order to h feto eilsprsino otimn time containment on suppression aerial of effect The

Table 4. The range of variables in each time category dataset sorted by tcg (estimated time between first suppression work and containment with ground resources only) See Table 1 for definition of variables, bold * and ** signify groups are significantly different using the Wilcoxon rank sum test at the P ¼ 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively

tca # 2h 2, tca # 4h 4, tca # 8h 8, tca # 24 h

tcg # 2h tcg . 2h tcg # 4h tcg . 4h tcg # 8h tcg . 8h tcg # 24 h tcg . 24 h (n ¼ 31) (n ¼ 58) (n ¼ 9) (n ¼ 48) (n ¼ 25) (n ¼ 44) (n ¼ 16) (n ¼ 20) ta mean (s.d.) 0.74 (0.56) 0.86 (0.74) 1.29 (0.42) 1.1 (0.75) 1.97 (1.66) 1.2 (1.12)* 3.11 (2.99) 2.4 (2.4) range 0.02–2.83 0.02–4 0.83–1.88 0–3 0.38]7.4 0]4.73 0.6–12 0.05–8 tg mean (s.d.) 0.56 (0.54) 0.88 (0.88)* 0.99 (0.97) 0.76 (0.77) 0.9 (0.92) 1.03 (1.06) 1.44 (1.32) 1.82 (3.28) range 0.08]2.5 0.15]5 0.07–2.6 0.05–3.75 0.08–4 0.05–5 0.1–5 0.15–14.52 FFDI mean (s.d.) 21.95 (17.29) 24.96 (15.58) 19.58 (14.7) 23.09 (15.02) 17.02 (11.7) 25.22 (15.62)* 32.52 (21.67) 26.31 (16.21) range 1.53–76.55 1.34–70.18 1.53–50.39 4.97–72.6 4.88]48.99 3.38]79.7 6.99–90 5.25–62.5 T mean (s.d.) 27.45 (5.02) 29.17 (6.1) 28.57 (5.22) 28.67 (5.83) 27.6 (5.03) 30.01 (5.48) 28.46 (6.05) 28.94 (5.89) range 17.7–35.3 14.6–40 17.7–34.2 13–40 19.1–40.2 19.2–40 18.7–39.5 16–37.4 H mean (s.d.) 39.58 (19.71) 32.53 (19.32)* 32.11 (21.39) 33.21 (18.47) 37.56 (18.63) 31.23 (15.69) 23.06 (13.85) 27.9 (13.76) range 5]90 9]94 14–80 7–74 18–90 7–63 5–57 10–54 U mean (s.d.) 20.13 (18.07) 18.39 (15.78) 11.51 (10.94) 18.4 (14.61) 14.52 (15.11) 16.29 (14.14) 24.58 (16.1) 21.5 (13.42) range 0.5–67 0–60 3.1–28 2.5–52 2.6–60 1.9–48 4.6–57 5.1–40 SFHS mean (s.d.) 2.22 (0.76) 2.48 (0.96) 1.67 (0.71) 2.66 (0.91)** 2.53 (0.9) 2.88 (0.69) 2.73 (1.04) 2.72 (1.09) range 1–3 1–5 1–31–5 1–4 2–5 1–5 1–5 NSFHS mean (s.d.) 1.97 (0.79) 2.41 (0.8) 2.33 (1.32) 2.4 (1.04) 2.31 (0.99) 2.52 (0.89) 2.39 (0.9) 2.94 (0.69) range 1–3 1–4 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–4 2–4 EFHS mean (s.d.) 2.36 (0.75) 2.6 (0.87) 2.78 (1.3) 2.75 (0.97) 2.78 (1.06) 2.76 (0.95) 2.91 (0.89) 3.16 (0.92) range 1–4 1–4 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–5 1–4 1–5 BFHS mean (s.d.) 1.9 (0.99) 2.12 (1.09) 1.33 (0.5) 2.35 (0.96)** 2.53 (1.13) 2.68 (1.03) 2.58 (1.02) 2.54 (1.05) range 1–4 0–5 1–21–4 1–5 1–5 1–4 1–4 OFHS mean (s.d.) 2.5 (0.71) 2.74 (0.77) 2.11 (1.36) 2.89 (0.87)* 2.97 (0.93) 3.03 (0.74) 2.99 (0.97) 3.23 (0.82) range 1–4 1–5 1–51–5 1–5 2–5 1–5 1–4 S mean (s.d.) 1 (0.86) 1.47 (0.82)* 1 (1.22) 1.39 (1.02) 1.36 (1.12) 1.53 (0.89) 1.59 (0.99) 2.03 (0.91) range 0–30–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 0–3 Ai mean (s.d.) 0.72 (0.83) 2.32 (4.93) 2.79 (2.97) 5.04 (6.41) 7.25 (8.55) 5.78 (12.68) 7.57 (12.06) 8.16 (11.37) range 0–3 0.01–30 0.1–9 0.04–25 0.1–35 0.01–80 0.2–50 0.2–50 n.J idadFire Wildland J. Int. E F Int. J. Wildland Fire M. P. Plucinski et al.

Table 5. Stepwise logistic regression models predicting the probability that the estimated containment

time without aerial suppression was more than 2, 4, 8 or 24 h for the respective tca # 2, 2 , tca # 4, 4 , tca # 8 and 8 , tca # 24 h datasets, and their fits Where b0, b1, b2 and b3 are regression coefficients; f1, f2 and f3 are predictor variables and MCC is Matthew’s correlation coefficient. See Table 1 for definition of variables

tca # 2h 2, tca # 4h 4, tca # 8h 8, tca # 24 h

b0 1.930 6.090 2.369 1.626 b1 (f1) 0.747 (S) 1.731 (SFHS) 0.055 (FFDI) 0.994 (NSFHS) b2 (f2) 0.747 (NSFHS) 1.946 (BFHS) 0.936 (SFHS) 1.547 (shrub) b3 (f3) 0.241 (Ai) 0.480 (ta) Model accuracy 0.711 0.687 0.763 0.719 MCC 0.336 0.278 0.480 0.438

Table 6. Coefficients and fits for a single logistic regression model considered (Fig. 4a). However, when only primary role types # , # , # form fitted to the four datasets (tca 2, 2 tca 4, 4 tca 8 and were considered (Fig. 4b), significant differences were found for , # 8 tca 24 h) Scenarios 1 and 3. Ground-based respondents predicted signif- Where b0, b1 and b3 are regression coefficients; * indicates coefficients were icantly higher containment times than office-based respondents ¼ significant at the P 0.05 level; MCC is Matthew’s correlation coefficient. in Scenario 1 (P , 0.05). Respondents from all role types gave See Table 1 for definition of variables significantly different predictions for Scenario 3 (P , 0.05), with ground-based role types again predicting the highest con- # , # , # , # tca 2h 2 tca 4h 4 tca 8h 8 tca 24 h tainment times. Although not significantly different, estimations b0 1.475 1.873 0.872 0.414 from respondents in ground-based role types were lower than the b1 (Ai) 0.393 0.108 0.019 0.011 other groups in Scenarios 2 and 4. These results suggest that b2 (FFDI) 0.026 0.027 0.053* 0.015 prediction variation between role types is small and probably b3 (OFHS) 0.560 1.139* 0.226 0.302 scenario-dependent. b4 (shrub) 1.395* 0.648 0.746 1.493* Model accuracy 0.719 0.860 0.710 0.667 Discussion MCC 0.333 0.309 0.331 0.325 The results of this study show that Australian fire managers believe that aerial suppression can reduce fire containment time in many situations, particularly when conditions such as fuel, minimise the influence of environmental conditions, the prob- weather and topography make wildfire suppression difficult. ability of containment without aircraft within the same time Fire managers estimated that aircraft were essential for timely class was compared within Forest Fire Danger Rating and containment for more than half of the fires within each time Overall Fuel Hazard Score (OFHS) classes. These were only category investigated in this study (Table 3). Just under a third of done for moderate, high and very high classifications in each, as the fires in this dataset were estimated to have been able to be there were few data points within the low and extreme classi- contained within the same time period without aircraft. Fuel fications. There were no apparent trends in the mean probability hazard ratings were identified as the most important variables by of containment without aircraft within the same time class all logistic models, and were found to have significant differ- between the predictions made by the different role types with the ences with Wilcoxon rank sum test in two time categories (t # data organised in this way (Fig. 3). ca 2h, 2, tca # 4 h). Surface and near-surface fuels were the most frequently selected fuel hazard ratings. Vegetation type, as Testing for source bias using comparative scenarios indicated by the variable shrub, was only included in one step- Containment time estimates for the four comparative hypo- wise logistic model but also featured in the logistic model form thetical scenarios were obtained from 23 primary contact offi- fitted to all datasets. Fuel hazard rating has been shown to in- cers (65% response). There was considerable variability in the fluence fire behaviour (e.g. Gould et al. 2007b) and would affect estimated containment times for some of the scenarios (Fig. 4), suppression ease through indirect effects on flame dimensions, possibly reflecting the lack of detail presented in scenarios, spread rates, spot-fire generation and accessibility (McCarthy which may have contributed to varied interpretation. Most of the and Tolhurst 1998). respondents (19) operate in multiple role types within their Fire weather variables (FFDI, relative humidity H and tem- regions with 18 working occasionally in ground-based roles, 16 perature T) were found to be important in two time categories in office-based roles and 14 in air-based roles. Twelve of the with the Wilcoxon rank sum test and classification tree analysis respondents’ primary roles were office-based, five were air- and were included in the logistic model form fitted to all datasets. based and the remaining six were ground-based. Comparisons Slope was found to be significant in the dataset composed of fires between role types were made for each fire for the scenarios that that were contained with aircraft within 2 h. Here, fires on steeper were representative of the respondent contact officers’ experi- slopes were estimated to have a higher probability of requiring ence. No significant differences were found between any of the aircraft for timely containment. As the majority of the fires (55%) role type groups when all (primary and occasional) roles were in the dataset occurred in low-slope (,58) conditions, the The effect of aerial suppression on containment time Int. J. Wildland Fire G

(a)(b) 25.5 H 25.5 1.75 SFHS 1.75

0.73 tg 0.73 P 0.85 A 0.55 i 0.55 n 34 P 0.74 n 19

P 0.17 P 0.67 P 0.43 P 0.90 n 18 n 18 n 7 n 50 Accuracy: 0.740 MCC: 0.513 Accuracy: 0.698 MCC: 0.424

(c)(d) 18.14 FFDI 18.14 2.61 NSFHS 2.61

29.05 T 29.05 P 0.47 n 36

P 0.43 P 0.92 P 0.33 P 0.71 n 7 n 26 n 15 n 21 Accuracy: 0.478 MCC: 0.462 Accuracy: 0.723 MCC: 0.378

Fig. 1. Classification trees for determining the probability that (a) tcg . 2 h where tca # 2h;(b) tcg . 4 h where 2 , tca # 4h;(c) tcg . 8h where 4 , tca # 8 h; and (d) tcg . 24 h where 8 , tca # 24 h and their fits, where tcg is the predicted containment time without aerial suppression and tca is the containment time with aerial suppression. The numbers and symbols on the horizontal lines indicate cut-off points for each split. Branch length is scaled to the variation explained at each split with the probability (P) and number of data observations (n) given below each terminal branch. See Table 1 for definition of variables; MCC is Matthew’s correlation coefficient.

0.70 Air-based 0.60 Ground-based Office-based 0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

Mean probability of containment without aircraft 0.00 17 37 35 16 17 24 16 27 26 7 10 19 tca 2 h 2 tca 4 h 4 tca 8 h 8 tca 24 h

Fig. 2. Probability of containment for each time period without aircraft by different role types (air-based, ground-

based and office-based) sorted by fire containment time (actual) with ground and aerial suppression (tca). Numbers below the bars indicate the number of observations in each grouping. H Int. J. Wildland Fire M. P. Plucinski et al.

(a) (b) 0.50 0.50 Air-based 0.40 0.40 Ground-based Office-based 0.30 0.30

0.20 0.20

0.10 0.10 Mean probability of containment within a time class without aircraft 0.00 0.00 12 26 17 12 28 33 26 29 39 13 25 30 31 37 44 11 16 22 Moderate High Very high Moderate High Very high (5 FFDI 12) (12 FFDI 24) (24 FFDI 50) (OFHS 2) (OFHS 3) (OFHS 4) Forest fire danger rating Overall fuel hazard score

Fig. 3. Probability of containment for each time period without aircraft depending on role type (air-based, ground-based and office-based) by (a) Forest Fire Danger Rating and (b) Overall Fuel Hazard Score Rating. Numbers below the bars indicate the number of observations for each grouping. FFDI, forest fire danger index. influence of this variable may not be fully realised. Initial attack perform multiple roles over a season and comparative predic- area featured in the logistic model fit to all datasets, one stepwise tions made for the same scenarios showed minimal differences. logistic regression model and one classification tree. In all cases, The findings from this study are limited by the reliance on it had a positive effect on perceived need for aerial suppression. expert estimates of containment outcome scenarios. The para- This variable has been found to have a strong negative effect on meters that influence when aerial suppression reduces contain- initial attack success (e.g. Hirsch et al. 1998; Arienti et al. 2006; ment time that were identified here may not necessarily be the Plucinski et al. 2007). Although aircraft are perceived to make a same as those that might influence it in reality. Comparative difference to timely fire containment when initial attack area is modelling of containment success using data from fires that used large, if it is too large, fire containment within an acceptable aerial suppression and data from fires that did not use aerial period will be unlikely regardless of the resources deployed. suppression would provide a more realistic estimate of the Aerial and ground response times displayed contrasting effects contribution of aerial suppression to wildfire containment. on the perceived benefit of aerial suppression. Fires with slower Undertaking such a study within Australia would require a aircraft response times were generally estimated to have not substantial data collection effort because relevant variables benefited from aerial suppression, whereas those that had slower quantifying response timing, fuel hazard, weather and terrain ground response times were. Fires with slower aircraft response are not currently routinely collected by fire agencies. It would times were found to be significant in the 4 , tca # 8-h time class also be difficult to obtain comparative datasets that span the and the fires with slower ground response times were found to be same range of weather conditions, as aircraft are deployed to significant in the tca # 2-h time class. most fires that occur during extreme fire danger periods. The method for comparing fire containment times with and The four containment time categories used in this study without aircraft relied on estimates from experienced fire represent a range that could be considered acceptable in differ- operations personnel. Wildfire operations research has often ent situations. In high-risk locations, such as urban interface been based on data sourced from surveys and interviews (e.g. areas, it is highly undesirable to have fires burning at all, so Hodgson and Little 1970; Hirsch and Martell 1996; Hirsch et al. quick containment within 2 h is preferable. In contrast to this, it 1998, 2004; McCarthy and Tolhurst 1998; McCarthy 2003; may be more realistic for fires burning in low-priority areas Canton-Thompson et al. 2008). These authors also accepted where the potential for damage is low to be contained within potential subjectivity in their data in order to obtain a sufficient 24 h. Obtaining uncategorised containment time estimates quantity for analysis. The use of expert judgements in wildfire would have been more useful for this kind of comparison as it operational studies can be subject to bias affecting data accuracy would have allowed estimates to be treated as a continuous and reliability (e.g. Simard et al. 1973; Hirsch and Martell variable. Requesting data providers to estimate the lowest, most 1996). The quality of estimates of containment time without likely and highest time required for containment without aircraft aircraft could be biased according to the experiences, training would have provided a more useable dataset that the categorised and cognitive ability of each respondent. Estimates used in the one used for this analysis. present study were obtained from senior fire managers and can be considered expert opinion because of the experience and Management implications local knowledge of each contact officer. Bias associated with the The decision to deploy aircraft should be an informed one role types of the data providers is likely to be minimal as most because aerial suppression can be a costly and ineffective use of The effect of aerial suppression on containment time Int. J. Wildland Fire I

(a) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 10 25

8 20

6 15 cg cg t t 4 10

2 5

0 0 Office (14) Air (13) Ground (16) Office (13) Air (13) Ground (16)

Scenario 3 Scenario 4 40 80 35 70 30 60 25 50

cg 20 cg t t 40 15 10 30 5 20 0 10 Office (16) Air (14) Ground (18) Office (16) Air (14) Ground (18)

(b) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 10 25

8 20

6 15 cg cg t t 4 10

2 5

0 0 Office (10) Air (5) Ground (6) Office (9) Air (4) Ground (6)

Scenario 3 Scenario 4 40 80 35 70 30 60 25 50

cg 20 cg t t 40 15 10 30 5 20 0 10 Office (12) Air (5) Ground (6) Office (10) Air (5) Ground (6)

Fig. 4. Boxplots showing estimated containment time without aircraft (tcg) for the four comparative scenarios (Table 2) by role type: (a) considering all role types performed by respondents; and (b) considering only the primary roles. Boxes represent the upper and lower quartile around the median (bar), the vertical lines (whiskers) indicate the ranges of values that fall within 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the box. Points indicate outliers. Numbers with role location labels indicate how many respondents were categorised in each group. The number of responses varies between scenarios because estimates were only considered for scenarios that reflect the respondents’ experience. J Int. J. Wildland Fire M. P. Plucinski et al.

resources. The deployment decision needs to be made quickly Breiman L, Friedman JH, Olshen RA, Stone CJ (1984) ‘Classification and because delays in deployment reduce the probability of initial Regression Trees.’ (Wadsworth: Belmont, CA) attack success (e.g. Plucinski et al. 2007). The results of the Canton-Thompson J, Gebert KM, Thompson B, Jones G, Calkin D, Donovan G present study provide insight into the mental heuristics applied (2008) External human factors in incident management team decision by experienced fire operations personnel when considering making and their effect on large fire suppression expenditures. Journal aircraft deployments. Aircraft are becoming more available for of Forestry 106, 416–424. Cheney NP, Sullivan AL (2008) ‘Grassfires, Fuel, Weather and Fire wildfire suppression in Australia and fire managers that have Behaviour.’ 2nd edn (CSIRO Publishing: Melbourne) little experience with them are now able to request them. This Cumming SG (2005) Effective fire suppression in boreal forests. Canadian study will help Australian fire agencies develop guidelines that Journal of Forest Research 35, 772–786. doi:10.1139/X04-174 identify when aerial suppression will be the most beneficial for De’ath G, Fabricius KE (2000) Classification and regression trees: a powerful timely fire containment. yet simpletechnique for ecologicaldataanalysis.Ecology81, 3178–3192. doi:10.1890/0012-9658(2000)081[3178:CARTAP]2.0.CO;2 Future research Ellis S, Kanowski P, Whelan R (2004) ‘National Inquiry on Bushfire Given the limitations of the methodology used here, future Mitigation and Management.’ (Council of Australian Governments: research efforts should be based on operational wildfire con- Canberra, ACT) Available at http://www.coagbushfireenquiry.gov.au/ [Verified 6 May 2011] tainment data that include fires with and without aerial Esplin B, Gill M, Enright N (2003) ‘Report of the Inquiry into the 2002– suppression. This research could lead to the development of 2003. Victorian Bushfires.’ (State Government of Victoria: Melbourne) decision support tools and procedures to aid dispatch decisions Fried JS, Fried JK (1996) Simulating wildfire containment with realistic on when to deploy aircraft to new fires and how to prioritise tactics. Forest Science 42, 267–281. deployments when there are multiple fires. Future research Gould JS, McCaw WL, Cheney NP, Ellis PF, Matthews S (2007a) ‘Field should include the investigation of aerial suppression effec- Guide – Fuel Assessment and Fire Behaviour Prediction in Dry Eucalypt tiveness on property protection. Forest.’ (Ensis–CSIRO: Canberra, ACT, and Department of Environ- ment and Conservation: Perth, WA) Conclusion Gould JS, McCaw WL, Cheney NP, Ellis PF, Knight IK, Sullivan AL (2007b) ‘Project Vesta: Fire in Dry Eucalypt Forest: Fuel Structure, Fuel The results from this study identified factors that are perceived Dynamics and Fire Behaviour.’ (Ensis–CSIRO: Canberra, ACT, and by experienced fire managers to have an important effect on Department of Environment and Conservation: Perth, WA) aerial suppression reducing wildfire containment time. Aerial Hirsch KG, Martell DL (1996) A review of initial attack fire crew suppression was estimated to be most effective in reducing fire productivity and effectiveness. International Journal of Wildland Fire containment time when wildfire suppression conditions are 6, 199–215. doi:10.1071/WF9960199 difficult because of fuel hazard rating, weather conditions, Hirsch KG, Corey PN, Martell DL (1998) Using expert judgement to model slope, resource response times and area burning at initial attack. initial attack fire crew effectiveness. Forest Science 44, 539–549. Hirsch KG, Podur JJ, Janser RF, McAlpine RS, Martell DL (2004) Acknowledgements Productivity of Ontario initial-attack fire crews: results of an expert- judgement elicitation study. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 34, We thank all the operations personnel who generously shared their expertise 705–715. doi:10.1139/X03-237 and provided us with data to make this work possible. These personnel Hodgson BS, Little EC (1970) Airtanker evaluation in three Canadian came from fire and land management agencies across southern Australia, Provinces 1965–1967. Canadian Department of Forestry and Rural including the Western Australian Department of Environment and Conser- Development, Forest Fire Research Institute, Information Report vation, Fire and Emergency Services Authority of Western Australia, FF-X-26. (Ottawa, ON) Country Fire Service of South Australia, South Australian Department of Hollander M, Wolfe DA (1973) ‘Non-parametric Statistical Methods’ Environment and Heritage, Victorian Department of Environment and (Wiley: New York) Sustainability, Victorian Country Fire Authority, Tasmanian Fire Service, House of Representatives Select Committee (2003) ‘A Nation Charred: Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service, New South Wales Rural Fire Ser- Inquiry into the Recent Australian Bushfires.’ (Parliament of the vice, New South Wales Department of Environment, Climate Change and Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, ACT) Water, Forests New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory Rural Fire Kanowski PJ, Whelan RJ, Ellis S (2005) Inquiries following the 2002–2003. Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. Andrew Sullivan and Australian bushfires: common themes and future directions for Kelvin Hirsch provided helpful comments on early versions of the manu- Australian bushfire mitigation and management. Australian Forestry script. The authors also thank the associate editor and anonymous reviewers 68, 76–86. whose comments helped to improve the manuscript. Lehmann EL (1986) ‘Testing Statistical Hypotheses.’ 2nd edn (Wiley: New York) References Luke RH, McArthur AG (1978) ‘Bushfires in Australia.’ (Australian Anderson DH (1989) A mathematical model for fire containment. Canadian Government Publishing Service: Canberra, ACT) Journal of Forest Research 19, 997–1003. doi:10.1139/X89-153 McArthur AG (1967) Fire behaviour in Eucalypt forests. Department Arienti MC, Cumming SG, Boutin S (2006) Empirical models of forest fire of National Development, Forestry and Timber Bureau Leaflet 107. initial attack success probabilities: the effects of fuels, anthropogenic (Canberra, ACT) linear features, fire weather, and management. Canadian Journal of McCarthy GJ (2003) Effectiveness of aircraft operations by the Department Forest Research 36, 3155–3166. of Natural Resources and Environment and the Country Fire Authority Baldi P, Brunak S, Chauvin Y, Andersen CAF, Nielsen H (2000) 1997–1998. Department of Sustainability and Environment, Victoria, Assessing the accuracy of prediction algorithms for classification: an Research Report Number 52. (Melbourne) overview. Bioinformatics 16, 412–424. doi:10.1093/BIOINFORMATICS/ McCarthy GJ, Tolhurst KG (1998) Effectiveness of firefighting first attack 16.5.412 operations by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment The effect of aerial suppression on containment time Int. J. Wildland Fire K

from 1991/92–1994/95. Department of Sustainability and Environment, Computing: Vienna, Austria) Available at www.r-project.org/ [Veri- Victoria, Research Report Number 45. (Melbourne) fied 6 May 2011] McCarthy GJ, Tolhurst KG, Chatto K (1999) Overall fuel hazard guide, 3rd Sakamoto Y, Ishiguro M, Kitagawa G (1986) ‘Akaike Information Criterion edn. Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Statistics.’ (Reidel: Dordrecht, Holland) Research Report Number 47. (Melbourne) Select Committee on Agricultural and Related Industries (2010) ‘The McLeod R (2003) Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January Incidence and Severity of Bushfires across Australia.’ (Senate of 2003 Bushfires in the ACT. ACT Government Publication 03/0537. the Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, ACT) Available at (Canberra, ACT) http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/agric_ctte/bushfires/report/ Plucinski M, Gould J, McCarthy G, Hollis J (2007) The effectiveness and index.htm [Verified 6 May 2011] efficiency of aerial firefighting in Australia, Part 1, Bushfire Cooperative Simard AJ, Graham JD, Muir AS (1973) Development of computer proces- Research Centre, Technical Report A0701. (Melbourne) sing techniques for individual forest fire report data. Department of the Podur JJ, Martell DL (2007) A simulation model of the growth and Environment, Canadian Forestry Service, Forest Research Institute, suppression of large forest fires in Ontario. International Journal of Information Report FF-X-40. (Ottawa, ON) Wildland Fire 16, 285–294. doi:10.1071/WF06107 Teague B, McLeod R, Pascoe S (2010) ‘2009 Royal Commission Final R Development Core Team (2010) ‘R: A language and environment Report Summary.’ (Parliament of Victoria: Melbourne) for statistical computing.’ (R Foundation for Statistical