Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency

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Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency Journal ofMoral Education, Vol.31, No. 2, 2002 SelectiveMoral Disengagement in theExercise of MoralAgency ALBERT BANDURA Stanford University, USA ABSTRACT Moralagency hasdual aspects manifested in boththe power to refrain from behavinginhumanely andthe proactive power to behave humanely. Moralagency is embedded in abroadersocio-cognitive self-theory encompassing affective self-regulatory mechanisms rootedin personal standardslinked to self-sanctions. Moralfunctioning is thus governedby self-reactive selfhoodrather than by dispassionateabstract reasoning. Theself-regulatory mechanisms governingmoral conduct donotcome intoplay unless they areactivated and there aremany psychosocial mechanisms by whichmoral self-sanctions areselectively disengagedfrom inhumane conduct. Themoral disengagement may centre onthe cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct intoa benign orworthy one bymoraljusti cation, sanitising languageand exonerativesocial comparison; disavowalof personal agency in theharm one causes bydiffusion ordisplacement of responsibility; disregardingor minimising theinjurious effects ofone’s actions; andattribution of blame to,and dehumanisation of, thosewho are victimised. Socialcognitive theoryadopts an interactionist perspective tomorality in whichmoral actions arethe products of thereciprocal interplay of personal andsocial in uences. Giventhe many mechanisms for disengagingmoral control at both the individual and collective level, civilisedlife requires, in additionto humane personal standards,safeguards built intosocial systems thatuphold compassionate behaviourand renounce cruelty. This article addresses theimportant but neglected issue ofselective moral disengage- mentin theexercise ofmoral agency. In arecentbook entitled, Everybody Does It,Thomas Gabor (1994) documentsthe pervasiveness ofmoral disengagement by peopleof all statusesin all walks oflife. Psychological theoriesof morality have traditionally focusedheavily on theformal character of moral reasoning to theneglect ofmoral conduct. Peoplesuffer from the wrongs done tothem regardless ofhow perpetrators justify theirinhumane actions. The regulation ofhumane conduct involves muchmore than moral reasoning. Acompletetheory of moral agency mustlink moral knowledge and reasoning tomoral conduct. This requires an agentic theoryof morality ratherthan onecon ned mainly tocognitions about morality. In thesocial cognitive theoryof the moral self(Bandura, 1986, This isthe text of the 14th LawrenceKohlberg MemorialLecture, delivered at the 27th annualconference ofthe Associationfor MoralEducation, Vancouver, Canada, 26October2001. ISSN 0305-7240print; ISSN 1465-3877online/ 02/020101-19 Ó 2002Journal of MoralEducation Ltd DOI:10.1080/ 0305724022014322 102 A. Bandura 1991), moral reasoning is linked tomoral action throughaffective self-regulatory mechanisms by whichmoral agency is exercised. The moral selfis thusembedded in abroadersocio-cognitive selftheory encompassing self-organising, proactive, self-reective and self-regulative mechanisms (Bandura, 2001). Theseself-referent processesprovide themotivational as well as thecognitive regulators ofmoral conduct. In thedevelopment ofa moral self, individuals adopt standards ofright and wrong thatserve as guides and deterrentsfor conduct. In thisself-regulatory process, peoplemonitor their conduct and theconditions under whichit occurs, judge it in relation totheir moral standards and perceived circumstances, and regulate their actions bytheconsequences they apply tothemselves. They do things thatgive them satisfaction and asense ofself-worth. They refrain frombehaving in ways that violate theirmoral standards because such conduct will bring self-condemnation. The constraint ofnegative self-sanctions forconduct thatviolates one’s moral standards and thesupport of positive self-sanctions forconduct faithful topersonal moral standards operateanticipatorily. In theface of situational inducements to behave in inhumane ways, peoplecan chooseto behave otherwiseby exerting self-inuence. Self-sanctions keepconduct in line withinternal standards. Itis throughthe ongoing exercise ofevaluative self-inuence thatmoral conduct is motivated and regulated. Morality is thusrooted in aself-reactive selfhood,rather than in dispassionate abstractreasoning. The self-regulation ofmorality is notentirely an intrapsychic matteras rational- ist theoriesmight lead oneto believe. Peopledo notoperate as autonomous moral agents, impervious tothe social realities in whichthey are enmeshed. Social cognitive theoryadopts an interactionsist perspectiveto morality. Moralactions are theproduct of the reciprocal interplay ofcognitive, affectiveand social inuences. Mechanismsof MoralDisengagement Moralstandards do notfunction as xed internal regulators ofconduct. Self-regula- torymechanisms do notoperate unless theyare activated. Thereare many psycho- social manoeuvres by whichmoral self-sanctions can bedisengaged frominhumane conduct. Selective activation and disengagement ofself-sanctions permitsdifferent typesof conduct by peoplewith the same moral standards. Figure 1showsthe points in theprocess of moral controlat whichmoral self-censure can bedisengaged fromreprehensible conduct. The disengagement may centreon redening harmful conduct as honourable by moral justication, exonerating social comparisonand sanitising language. Itmay focuson agency of action sothat perpetrators can minimise theirrole in causing harm by diffusion and displacement ofresponsibility. Itmay involve minimising ordistorting theharm that owsfrom detrimental actions; and thedisengagement may include dehumanising and blaming thevictims ofthe maltreatment. The sectionsthat follow analyse howeach of these types of moral disengage- mentfunction in theperpetration of inhumanities. Selective MoralDisengagement 103 FIG.1.Mechanism through which moralself-sanctions are selectively activated and disengagedfrom detrimentalbehaviour at differentpoints inthe self-regulatoryprocess (Bandura, 1986). MoralJusti cation One setof disengagement practicesoperates on thereconstruction of thebehaviour itself. Peopledo notusually engage in harmful conduct until theyhave justied, to themselves, themorality oftheir actions. In thisprocess of moral justication, pernicious conduct is made personally and socially acceptableby portraying it as serving socially worthyor moral purposes.People then can acton amoral imperative and preservetheir view ofthemselves as moral agents while inicting harm on others. Rapid radical shiftsin destructive behaviour throughmoral justication are moststrikingly revealed in military pursuits. The conversion ofsocialised peopleinto dedicated ghtersis achieved notby altering theirpersonality structures,aggressive drives ormoral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively redening the morality ofkilling sothat it can bedone freefrom self-censure. Through moral justication ofviolent means, peoplesee themselves as ghting ruthlessoppressors, protectingtheir cherished values, preserving worldpeace, saving humanity from subjugation orhonouring theircountry’ s commitments.Moral justi cations sanctify theviolent means. Voltaireput it well whenhe said, “Thosewho can make you believe absurdities, can make you commitatrocities.” Over thecenturies, muchdestructive conduct has beenperpetrated by ordinary, decentpeople in thename ofrighteous ideologies, religious principles and national- istic imperatives (Rapoport& Alexander, 1982; Kramer,1990; Reich, 1990). Adversaries sanctify theirmilitant actions, butcondemn thoseof theirantagonists as barbarity masquerading under amask ofoutrageous moral reasoning. Each side feels morally superiorto the other. The politicisation ofreligion has along-blooded history. In holy terror,perpe- tratorstwist theology sothey see themselves as doing God’s will. PopeUrban launched theCrusades withthe following impassioned moral proclamation: “I address thosepresent, I proclaim it, tothose absent. Christ commands it. Forall 104 A. Bandura thosegoing thither,there will beremission ofsins if theycome to the end ofthis fetteredlife.” He thendehumanises and beastialises theMuslim enemies: “Whata disgrace if arace sodespicable, degenerate, and enslaved by demons, should overcomea peopleendowed withfaith in Almighty God and resplendent in the name ofChrist! Letthose who once fought against brothersand relatives now rightfully ght against thebarbarians under theguidance ofthe Lord.” Islamic extremistsmount their jihad, construed as self-defenceagainst tyranni- cal, decadent indels whodespoil and seekto enslave theMuslim world. Bin Laden enobled his global terrorismas serving aholy imperative. “Wewill continue this coursebecause it is partof our religion and because Allah, praise and glory beto him, orderedus tocarry outjihad sothat the word of Allah may remain exalted to theheights.” Through thejihad theyare carrying outAllah’ s will as a“religious duty”. The primeagency forthe holy terroris displaced toAllah. Bin Laden beastialises theAmerican enemy as “lowly people”perpetrating actsthat “ themost ravenous ofanimals would notdescend to”. Terrorismis sanitised as “The winds of faithhave come”to eradicate the“ debauched”oppressors. His followerssee themselvesas holy warriorswho gain ablessed eternal life throughtheir martyrdom. Rabin’s assassin was similarly acting on adivine mandate using therabbinical pursuer’s decreeas moral justication. Thosewho give overtheir people and land tothe enemy mustbe killed. As heexplained thekilling toprevent transfer of land toPalestinian
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