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Zuverlässigkeit Von Raumflugkörpern

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Zuverlässigkeit Von Raumflugkörpern (c) 2005-2007 Dipl.-Ing. (RWTH) Jan Thimo Grundmann e : janthimogrundmann (at) yahoo.de Betr.: Zuverlaessigkeit v.1.0.0.1 pdf Zuverlässigkeit von Raumflugkörpern vorgelegt von cand.-ing. Jan Thimo Grundmann Betreuer: Dr.-Ing. G. Neuwerth Institut für Luft- und Raumfahrt der RWTH Aachen 30.11.2005 2007 durchgesehene Fassung Aufgabenstellung i für Herrn cand. ing. Jan Thimo Grundmann Matr.-Nr. 192335 Die Planung und Auslegung von Satellitenkonstellationen zur Errichtung von Kommunikations-, Navigations- und Erkundungssystemen im Erdorbit sowie von interplanetaren Sondenflotten zum Zwecke der kontinuierlichen Erforschung von Objekten des Sonnensystems über mehrere Oppositionszyklen hin erfordert die Berücksichtigung der zu erwartenden Ausfallraten in den jeweiligen Missionsphasen hinsichtlich der Erfüllung der Missionsziele und der Kostenoptimierung. Die hierzu verfügbaren Daten sind jedoch aus historischen, politischen und rechtlichen Gründen sehr heterogen und lückenhaft in Detail und Umfang. Dies hat zur Folge, daß der Bedarf an Reserve-Raumflugkörpern und der Erfahrungszuwachs im Serienbau sowie das Missionsrisiko in Gruppen von einzelnen Flugkörpern verschiedenen Aufgabenstellungen nur unzureichend erfaßt werden können. Auch wird die Erkennung von grundlegenden Häufungen bestimmter Probleme durch statistische Methoden mangels einer konsistenten Datenbasis ebenso sehr erschwert wird wie Vorhersagen des zukünftigen Raumfahrtmarktes. Im Rahmen der Studienarbeit soll daher untersucht werden, ob aus den verfügbaren veröffentlichten Dokumentationen ausreichend detaillierte Daten zu extrahieren sind, um eine verbesserte Planungsgrundlage zu erhalten. Hierzu sind u.a. die folgenden Aufgaben zu bearbeiten: - Eine im gegebenen Zeitrahmen möglichste umfassende Literaturrecherche - Auswahl und Klassifizierung der erhaltenen Daten nach Umfang, Detailliertheit, fachlicher Kompetenz und Zuverlässigkeit der Quelle - Ermittlung von statistisch erkennbaren charakteristischen Versagensmodi und ihrer Entwicklung über der Zeit - Vergleich mit technisch ähnlich anspruchsvollen Bereichen der Luftfahrt - Berücksichtigung der Kostenentwicklung von Raumfahrtsystemen - Ausführliche Dokumentation der behandelten Teilaufgaben Inhaltsverzeichnis ii Aufgabenstellung i Inhaltsverzeichnis ii Verzeichnis der Tabellen iv Nomenklatur v 1. Einleitung 1 1.1. Historische Entwicklung zur Raumfahrt 1 1.2. Entwicklung der Datengrundlage 5 2. Definitionen: Raumfahrt, System, Erfolg und Mißerfolg 8 2.1. Raumfahrt und die Abgrenzung des Weltraumes 9 2.1.1. Anerkannte administrative Abgrenzungen des Weltraumes 9 2.1.2. Erflogene Abgrenzungen des Weltraumes 11 2.1.3. Physiologische Abgrenzung des Weltraumes 14 2.1.4. Abgrenzung des Weltraumes durch elektrische Versagenshergänge 15 2.1.5. Weitere mögliche technische Abgrenzungen des Weltraumes 15 2.1.6. Gewählte Definition der Abgrenzungen des Weltraumes 16 2.2. Systembegriff 20 2.2.1. Ein Beispiel für den Umfang eines Systems und die Vielfalt der Einflüsse 20 2.2.2. Gewählte Definition für ein System 26 2.2.3. Veränderung des Systems im Verlauf eines Flugversuches 27 2.3. Erfolg und Mißerfolg 29 3. Auswertungsverfahren 31 3.1. Vorauswahl der Quellen 31 3.1.1. Erste Phase der Auswertung 32 3.1.2. Hauptauswahl der auszuwertenden Literatur 33 3.2. Zweite Phase der Auswertung 35 3.2.1. Eindeutige Identifikation der Versagensfälle 35 3.2.2. Klassifizierung ausgewerteter Versagensfälle 39 3.2.2.1 Versagensfälle unter Beteiligung kerntechnischer Einrichtungen 44 3.3. Einfluß manipulativer Information bei Klassifizierung und Bewertung 45 3.3.1. Das Nedelin-Desaster als Beispiel manipulierter Information 49 3.3.2. Vergleich mit bekannten Informationen zu anderen schweren Unfällen 55 3.3.2.1. Nicht nachvollziehbare Informationen zu anderen schweren Unfällen 56 3.3.3. Weitere charakteristische Formen manipulativer Information 57 3.3.4. Einfluß der Perzeption bei manipulativer Information 60 3.4. Klassifizierung der Verantwortung für Versagensfälle 63 3.5. Hilfseinträge zur Analyse 67 3.6. Abschluß der Auswertungsphase 68 Inhaltsverzeichnis iii 4. Rechnungsverfahren 69 4.1 Rechnungsverfahren für bestimmte Fragestellungen 70 4.1.1. Begrenzungen und Aufwand bei der Erstellung von Ergebnisauszügen 72 4.2. Durchgeführte Rechnungen 73 5. Ausgewählte Flugkörpertypen und -familien 74 6. Schlußfolgerungen 86 6.1. Allgemeine Verteilung von Versagensereignissen 86 6.2. Beispiele für typische Versagenshergänge 92 6.2.1. Versagen durch atmosphärische Einflüsse 92 6.2.2. Versagen durch das Verhalten von Betriebsmitteln im Weltraum 94 6.2.3. Versagen durch Rückwirkung missionsbedingt abzutrennender Bauteile 98 6.2.4. Hohe Systemkomplexität als Beitrag zu Versagensfällen 99 6.2.5. Beabsichtigtes Versagen von Raumflugkörpern 101 6.2.6. Leistungsverbesserung von Raumflugkörpern durch Versagensfälle 104 6.3. Herkunft der Verursacherbeiträge und Behebungsbeiträge 106 6.3.1. Faktor Mensch an Bord und am Boden 107 6.3.2. Faktor Management 118 6.3.3. Kostenfaktor experimentelle Erfahrung 120 6.3.4. Kostenfaktor Mensch an Bord 130 6.3.5. Kostenfaktor Mensch im STS 149 6.3.6. Kostenfaktor Ende und Neubeginn 151 6.3.7. Versagensfaktor Kosten 154 6.3.8. Versagensfaktor Organisationsmethodik 161 6.3.9. Einfluß der Informationsflußbegrenzung 166 6.3.10. Versagen der Vorstellungskraft 172 6.4. Technisches Versagen 174 6.5. Versagen und Fortschritt 175 6.6 Zusammenfassung 177 7. Literatur 182 A. Anhänge 196 A.1. SI-fremde Einheiten 196 A.2. Anmerkungen zur Transkription 196 A.3. Anmerkungen zu Typenbezeichnungen 197 A.4. Hinweise zur eigenen Literaturrecherche 198 A.5. Ausgewählte Quellenzitate im Original 199 A.5.1. Kelly's Rules 200 A.6. Ausgewählte Ergebnisauszüge 201 Verzeichnis der Tabellen iv 2.1 - Nach der geometrischen Höhe definierte und erflogene Weltraumabgrenzungen 10 2.2 - Niedrigste in stabiler Umlaufbahn erflogene Perigäumshöhen 11 2.3 - Einige typische suborbitale Flüge 12 2.4 - Belastungen in der sehr niedrigen Erdumlaufbahn durch den Einfluß der Atmosphäre 13 2.5 - Flugmedizinisch bedingte Höhengrenzen 14 2.6 - Einige Arbeitsumgebungen entfernt vom menschlichen Eingriff arbeitender Geräte 19 2.7 - Verschiedene Zählweisen der Raketenstufung und Lokalisation von Triebwerkversagern 28 3.1 - Einträge im Tabellendokument für die erste Stufe der Auswertung 32 3.2 - Aufteilung der zur Auswertung ausgewählten Werke 34 3.3 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Identifikation eines Versuches über das Datum 37 3.4 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Anzahl der identifizierten Flüge 38 3.5 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung der Art von Versagensereignissen 42 3.6 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung des Versagenshergangs 43 3.7 - Opfer der Nedelin-Katastrophe in Abhängigkeit vom Informationsfluß 51 3.8 - Vergleich der Entwicklung von R-16 und LGM-25C 53 3.9 - Opfer ausgewerteter Versagensfälle 56 3.10 - Flugzahlen der Famile 7K Soyuz 59 3.11 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung des Verursacherbeitrages 64 3.12 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung der Schwere des Versagens 65 3.13 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung des Behebungsbeitrages 65 3.14 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Klassifizierung von Kollateralschäden 66 3.15 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Unterstützung der Auswertung (1/2) 67 3.16 - Einträge im Tabellendokument zur Unterstützung der Auswertung (2/2) 68 3.17 - Zustand des Tabellendokumentes nach Auswertung und Klassifizierung 68 4.1 - Gesamtzahl der aufgenommenen Einträge nach Flugkörperart und Versuchszählung 69 6.1 - Umfassender Ergebnisauszug mit A4 und Fi-103 Einsatzflugkörper 87 6.2 - Umfassender Ergebnisauszug ohne A4 und Fi-103 Einsatzflugkörper 88 6.3 - Umfassender Ergebnisauszug ohne A4 und Fi-103 Einsatzflugkörper, anteilig 89 6.4 - Häufigste Kombinationen System - Fachbereich für Versagensereignisse 90 6.5 - Einträge der Gruppe System nach ihrer Häufigkeit 91 6.6 - Einträge der Gruppe Fachbereich nach ihrer Häufigkeit 91 6.7 - Ergebnisauszug der Behebungsbeiträge ohne A4 und Fi-103, nach Verursacherbeitrag 106 6.8 - Verursacher- und Behebungsbeiträge und unmittelbarste menschliche Beteiligung 107 6.9 - Anteile bemannter Raumflugkörper und des Verantwortungsbereiches Crew 109 6.10 - Relative Effizienz der Behebungsbeiträge leistenden Gruppen 117 6.11 - Kosten des Skylab-Programmes; geplante und hypothetische Nachfolger, und ISS 121 6.12 - Kosten des Apollo-Programmes 122 6.13 - Massen und bewohnbare Volumen von Skylab im Vergleich zu Mir und ISS 124 6.14 - Neu aufzuwendende Mehrkosten für Skylab-Fortsetzung im Vergleich zu Mir u. ISS 125 6.15 - Vergleich mit pauschalen Kostenangaben zu Apollo in der Öffentlichkeit 126 6.16 - Kosten von Apollo, Skylab und ASTP als inkrementelle Entwicklung betrachtet 128 6.17 - Übersicht der Ye-8 Luna Landesonden 130 Verzeichnis der Tabellen v 6.18 - Kostenabschätzung für Ye-8-5, Ye-8-5M Luna Landesonden mit Probenrückführung 131 6.19 - Optimistische Kostenabschätzung für Ye-8-5, Ye-8-5M Probenrückführung 132 6.20 - Verteilung der Außenaktivitäten auf die Apollo Missionstypen 134 6.21 - Kostenabschätzung für Apollo Probenrückholung, Außenaktivität und Experimente 135 6.22 - Vergleich günstigster und ungünstigster Kostenschätzungen für Ye-8-5 und Apollo 136 6.23 - Arbeitszeitaufwendungen für Mondexkursionen 137 6.24 - Bahndynamisch mögliche und erflogene Landekoordinaten von Mondlandern 138 6.25 - Entwicklung der Startkosten des STS und ihre Darstellung 139 6.26 - Bau- und Entwicklungskosten des STS und ihre Darstellung
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