University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1981 The Soviet perception of detente : an analysis of the ideological continuity of the policy of peaceful coexistence from Lenin to Brezhnev. Stephen Robert Willand University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Willand, Stephen Robert, "The Soviet perception of detente : an analysis of the ideological continuity of the policy of peaceful coexistence from Lenin to Brezhnev." (1981). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1897. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1897 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE FROM LENIN TO BREZHNEV A Dissertation Presented By Stephen Robert Willand Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1981 Political Science Stephen Robert Willand All Rights Reserved ii THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE FROM LENIN TO BREZHNEV A Dissertation Presented By Stephen Robert Willand Approved as to style and content by: Professor Karl W/^^Ryavec, Chairperson of Committee Professor Peter J. Fliess, Member Professor Robert H. McNeal , Member Professor Glen Gordon, Department Head Political Science i i i . PREFACE This dissertation vnll focus on the subject of Soviet-American detente. It will be demonstrated that the detente policy has caused a good deal of confusion regarding its true meaning both in theory and in practice. After analyzing the most significant schools of thought and different viewpoints in regard to detente, this disserta- tion will pose three major hypotheses. These hypotheses will address what this writer feels are the most critical aspects of Soviet-American detente and will be assessed throughout the body of this study. This dissertation will place specific emphasis on the Soviet perception of detente and, accordingly, will rely heavily on primary Soviet source documentation The first hypothesis will present the belief that detente was Furthermore, a political strategy that was created solely by the U.S.S.R. the Soviet leadership designed detente on the basis of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology; an ideology that serves as an important factor that detente in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. It will be shown the United States and was not a policy that was developed jointly by and updated the U.S.S.R. Rather, detente was conceived, implemented, ideological objectives by the Soviet Union as a means by which long-term the Soviet view, could best be accomplished. The United States, in detente that were established never willingly agreed to the conditions of that the United States continually by the Soviet Union. The Soviets argue the unfriendly cold war opposed the Soviet policy of detente and chose policy of peace. It was only upon posture as an alternative to the Soviet iv reassessing the objective reality of the realignment of world forces in favor of socialism, the growing might of the Soviet Union, and the inherent weakening of and contradictions in the imperialist system that the United States was forced to accept the Soviet policy of detente. The Soviet Union not only created detente but built the policy on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. That ideology has done much to define the scope and purpose of Soviet foreign policy in general and detente in particular. Detente was not specifically created as a means by which short-term objectives could be realized or the cause of Soviet national interest served. Rather, historical evidence suggests that detente was designed as the catalyst by which long-term goals could be achieved and the cause of communist ideological objectives addressed. Thus, a presentation will be made in regard to the conflicting schools of thought on the subject of ideology. It will be argued that the central core of detente, a commitment to the ideological goal of the worldwide victory of socialism, has remained in existence throughout the long history of Soviet-American detente. The second major hypothesis presents the belief that detente was created by V.I. Lenin in 1918, and has remained a constant factor in Soviet foreign policy to this day. Hence, a detailed study of the history of detente will be presented. It will be shown that Lenin designed detente as a means by which to accomplish eight (8) primary objectives. Detente provided the breathing spell, a respite in war, by which Lenin could con- solidate internal strength. Detente allowed Lenin to survive as an "oasis" gave Lenin the in a sea of capitalist-imperialist adversaries. Detente military means by which he could best prepare for the inevitable East-West confrontation. Detente provided the means by which Lenin could best nations. forestall the inevitable anti-Soviet alliance of imperialist V Detente afforded Lenin the opportunity to secure much needed Western, and specifically American, economic assistance. Detente provided the means by which Lenin could exploit the existing contradictions within the imperialist camp. Most importantly, detente provided the fulcrum by which Lenin would achieve his ultimate goal of transforming the world in the socialist order. It will be shown that Stalin and Khrushchev adhered to and implemented the policy of detente as established by Lenin. While making basic alterations in the policy, both Stalin and Khrushchev maintained the nucleus of detente and formulated Soviet foreign policy on the basis of the detente strategy. It will also be demonstrated that Leonid Brezhnev has maintained both the historical and ideological continuity of detente to this day. Evidence will be presented to support the thesis that the detente of Brezhnev is far more effective than that of any of his predecessors by virtue of the more advantageous and powerful position of the Soviet Union in world affairs. It will be shown that the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviet Union and the augmented ranks of the socialist commonwealth have made detente a very aggressive and highly successful Soviet strategy. It will then be suggested that detente, while maintaining the central objective of a worldwide socialist victory, has been transformed from a defensive ploy to an offensive weapon. The third major hypothesis will posit the belief that the Soviet policy of detente has posed a serious threat to the interests of the United States. It will be shown that the stated objectives of detente are inimical to the United States and were designed to accrue unilateral of advantages to the cause of world socialism. Moreover, the acceptance imposed by detente by the United States, with the inherent limitations American the Soviet Union, has made detente all the more dangerous to vi interests. It will also be demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. has clearly stated that detente will provide the catalyst for the further dissemination of socialist influence and prestige to the direct detriment of the United States. Detente, in this view, has always provided the best conditions for the proliferation of socialism and the construction of communism. It will be argued that the Soviet Union has used detente to achieve the ultimate objective of gaining the worldwide victory of socialism. Within this overall strategy the U.S.S.R. has targetted the specific objectives of further augmenting the ranks of non-capitalist nations and of continuing the process of the realignment of world forces in favor of socialism. In order to accomplish this objective the Soviet Union has employed the strategic goal of realigning the Third World, or developing nations, by way of national liberation movements, from the non- socialist to the socialist camp. Hence, it will be argued that detente imposes unilateral restraints on American action and allows for freedom of action for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, detente does not allow for the preservation of the status quo, the sustainment of the present balance of power, any convergence with the West, the lessening of the inter-camp ideological struggle, or any long-term rapprochement of sorts with the United States. In fact, in the Soviet view, detente guarantees the antithesis of any of these and ensures the shift in the status quo in favor of the "forces of peace," a realignment of the balance of power in favor of world socialism, no convergence with the West, an intensification of the ideological struggle, and an irreversible posture for the policy of capitalist decline and socialist gain. vii ABSTRACT THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE FROM LENIN TO BREZHNEV (May, 1981) Stephen R. Willand, B.A., College of the Holy Cross M.A., Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami (Fla.), Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Professor Karl Ryavec The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Soviet perception of detente with specific reference to the conduct of Soviet- American relations. It is shown that the Soviet understanding of detente differs significantly from that of the United States. Moreover, the Soviet view of detente has been translated from theory to practice and now governs the scope of U.S. -Soviet, and East-West relations. The first thesis presented is that detente was created by the Soviet Union and was built on the foundation of revolutionary Marxist- Leninist ideology. It is demonstrated that detente was never mutually designed by the U.S.S.R.