THE EU-RUSSIA REVIEW
Issue Four
Voices from Russia
June 2007©
Introduction
This fourth EU-Russia Centre Review is devoted to two key questions. First, how do Russians view the European Union (EU) and democracy? Second, how do the Russian media portray Europe and EU-Russia relations?
The first issue on how Russians view the EU and their attitude towards democracy and the rule of law is covered in the analysis by Maria Ordzhonikidze. She examines the results of the EU-Russia Centre’s survey, for which the opinion polling was conducted by the Levada Center, a respected independent Russian sociological agency. At first glance, it is surprising that so many Russians (71%) do not consider themselves to be European and over 50% say they are concerned about the potential negative impact that the EU could have on Russia. But if one then reviews the way in which the Russian media portrays the EU then these figures are less surprising.
This aspect is covered in the article by Elena Prokhorova who reviews how Russian television portrays the EU, and the study by the EU-Russia Centre of the media coverage of recent EU-Russia summits in Russia. Prokhorova’s analysis reveals a largely negative view of the EU with most of the media content to follow the line put out by the Kremlin. As the three main television channels are under state control, directly or indirectly, this is also not surprising. But it means that most Russians only receive a negative image of the EU struggling to deal with an array of institutional, economic, social and religious problems. This output is hardly conducive to promoting the official line of Russia having made its “European choice”.
The media analysis, which covers the two EU-Russia summits (Sochi and Helsinki) and the special meeting of the European Council (Lahti) in 2006, reveals a similar picture. Much of the media paints a suspicious picture of the EU although sometimes there is an appreciation of Europe as a source of new ideas and technologies which could assist the reform of the Russian economy. But by and large the majority of commentators share the suspicions of officials in Moscow that ‘there is a large-scale and coordinated anti-Russian campaign’ in the West.
The impact of the state influenced media is also apparent in how Russians view the present political system. President Putin is given extensive coverage as ‘the strong leader’ who rescued Russia from the ‘chaos’ of the 1990s. The EU-Russia Centre opinion survey reveals a high level of support for ‘a strong figure’ who would combine executive, legislative and judicial functions. This failure to understand the importance of the separation of powers as one of the basic requirements for democracy is worrying.
The lessons for the EU are that it must do a far better job at explaining to Russians its basic principles and policies. There must be a concerted effort by the EU institutions and the member states. At the same time, if the Kremlin is serious about its ‘European choice’ it should ensure that the media offer a more balanced view of current developments in the EU. A new strategic partnership between the EU and Russia requires a solid level of public support. The portrayal of the EU in the Russian media is hardly conducive to building this support.
Fraser Cameron
2 Contents
The Russian Media and Estonia 444
AllAllAll-All ---RussiaRussia Representative Survey: Russian Perception ofof European Values Introduction 6 Methods 7 Chapter 1. Russian Citizens – An Overview 8 Chapter 2. Do Russians believe that democracy is appropriate for their country? 10 Chapter 3. Civil Society in Russia 121212 Chapter 4. State paternalism vs. a liberal economy 14 Chapter 5. Legality, protection of human rights and property in Russia 17 Chapter 6. Role of the executive power 19 Chapter 7. Role of other power branches 21 Chapter 8. Russia and West 23 Conclusion 28
The EU on Russian Television: an overview 292929
Russian Media Ownership 343434
Russian MMediaedia Perceptions of EUEU----RussiaRussia Relations Introduction 36 Summary 36 Methodology 36 Groups of the studied sources 37 Levels of mass media interest in EU-Russian- summits 38 Comments from official representatives of the Russian government 39 Coverage of the Sochi Summit (May 25, 2006) in the media 40 Coverage of the Lahti Summit (October 20, 2006) in the media 40 Coverage of Helsinki Summit in the media 41 Main concepts in highlighting the present situation around Russian-European relations in Russian media 42 Conclusion 45
3 The Russian Media and Estonia
Commentary by Arturas Jonkus, Chairman of the New Europe Initiative, Lithuania
The reaction of the Russian media to the recent events in Estonia provides a good example of how the state uses the media for political purposes. According to Freedom House, Estonia is a country where there is freedom of the press, while the media in Russia is very much under state control. In countries with freedom of press the latter is usually defined as the ‘fourth estate or power’ with its main function as “watchdog” for the remaining three powers. But in countries where the media is under state control, its function is distorted and it becomes more of a propaganda tool, promoting certain attitudes and stereotypes both within the country and with regard to third countries. The political elite are able to shape public opinion since they have all public information instruments in their hands.
This is the case with the Russian media, which experienced a period of freedom after the collapse of the Soviet Union but during the last eight years has reverted to a similar situation to that which existed before Mr. Gorbachev came to power. The fact that the Russian media is a propaganda tool of the Russian authorities was clearly demonstrated by the recent events in Estonia. Among those Russian journalists who covered the events in Estonia, none behaved like those journalists who covered the independence of Lithuania in 1991:despite the risk of losing their jobs at NTV television, they still managed to present objective information from Vilnius about the Soviet army attacks on the Lithuanian television station which resulted in many deaths and injuries.
During the events in Estonia, the Russian media was highly selective in its reporting with little analysis of the background to what was taking place, or the motives and goals of the people who took part in the riots. Pictures of young people looting shops during the riots were published only by Estonian and Western media and on the internet.
The attempt of the Russian media to show the different positions held by the politicians from the Baltic States with respect to the events in Estonia is also worth mentioning. Both the President of Lithuania and the Chairman of the Seimas were forced to explain their positions after rather free-ranging “interpretations” of their speeches by the Russian media. The comparison of the original texts with the press releases of the Russian news agency was reminiscent of the propaganda methods applied by the Soviet Union.
Russia also engaged in a cyber war with Estonia. According to the Estonian Minister of Justice, a number of official Russian institutions made attempts to block Estonia’s entire internet space during the above mentioned events. The intensity and length of the attacks forced Estonian politicians to raise the issue at the international level.
These developments raise a number of problems regarding the means of defence for a small state against attacks from countries where the media is used as a propaganda tool.
Russia is a much more active player in the information and media markets of the Baltic states than the European countries. The largest US and European media concerns, with some exceptions, do not have correspondents in the Baltic States as they are too small. They cover this area from Moscow and the information about the Baltic States used by these journalists is often taken from the press releases of the Russian media. The Russian media, by contrast, have correspondents in each of the Baltic States; and they even specifically adapt TV and radio programmes and daily newspapers for each country in the region. It is quite obvious that this is not done on commercial grounds. This Russian
4 behaviour, controlling the information in its own country and seeking to do the same in neighbouring countries, is raising serious concerns.
The analysis of the Russian media and the research presented in this Review gives a very clear picture of the growing use of the media by the Kremlin for political purposes.
5
The majority of the population has not been able to gain much from this process of change, prevented either by too many years under state paternalism, by the melancholic Russian ‘mysterious soul’, by age, by disability, or by other circumstances. They have not experienced, or perhaps thought about, many of the problems that their wealthier, more educated compatriots face regularly: corruption, unprotected property rights, arbitrary acts by the siloviki (secret services), unfair court decisions, restrictions over information access etc. The concepts of human rights, civil liberties and democracy are still very abstract to this less-privileged part of Russian society. Their demands are more basic, and their values are quite individual, often demonstrating a readiness to give up democratic freedoms and rights for promises of better state support and, ultimately, a better quality of life.
History shows that it is impossible to devise a universal recipe that ensures happiness and prosperity for the whole of Russian society. However, it is possible, and indeed necessary, to create conditions where people have more opportunities to realise their dreams and ambitions, be it in business, in education, in politics or in other fields. While fruitlessly searching for a ‘national idea’, defining allies and foes, and re-distributing property, the Russian ruling elite risks neglecting the interests and desires of most of the rest of the population.
At the same time, those in power elsewhere in Europe continue to communicate with their Russian counterparts, continue to consume information from official Russian sources and media, continue to observe alarming Russia-related events - and continue trying to understand why Russians do not defend their democratic freedoms. Europe assumes that Russian beliefs, ambitions, preferences and values are the same as theirs, and finds it difficult to understand the underlying reasons for such passive political behaviour by a majority of Russians, alongside the unsurpassed popularity of the ruling regime.
Today, with Russia as an immediate neighbour of the EU, it is crucially important for Europeans and Russians to understand each other. Mutual understanding will hopefully bring them closer together, and this research aims to facilitate this process.
Methods The research aimed to capture Russians’ understanding and perceptions of basic democratic values, such as democracy, human rights, the market economy, relations between individual and the state, civil activity of the population and the degree of its protection from the arbitrariness of the state.
In December 2006, the Yuri Levada Analytical Center in Moscow carried out a nationally representative public opinion poll in Russia at the request of EU-Russia Centre. The survey was conducted in 46 regions of Russia in 130 villages, towns, and cities. The results of the research follow.
7 AllAllAll-All ---RussiaRussia Representative Survey: Russian Perception ofof European Values
Maria Ordzhonikidze, Secretary General of the EUEU----RussiaRussia Centre
Maria Ordzhonikidze is a visiting professor at the Friendship University of Russia and one of the founders of the EU-Russia Centre. She is a communications professional with experience in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and the UK.
Introduction Ever since the end of the seventeenth century when Peter the Great first ‘opened a window’ to the West, there have been discussions about whether or not Russia is part of Europe. Even today, Russian and European political scientists continue to try to define Russia’s place in the modern, globalised world.
But have the Russian people ever been asked where they belong or what they want? As Russian history continuously demonstrates, Russian people have never consciously voted for the changes imposed on them by different regimes. As trade and energy bring Europe and Russia closer together, how will Russians feel about the changes that this will inevitably bring?
The study, Voices from Russia carried out at the end of 2006, gave Russians the opportunity to answer these questions among others, including their views on Europe, democracy, civil rights, the market economy and personal freedoms.
This is a crucial time for these questions to be posed. Discussions on the replacement of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russia begin this year. Whatever form the new agreement takes, it will require a reference to the common values that bind the two partners – indeed these values must be cited as the very foundations of the relationship. However, as this study reveals, identifying common values is only half the challenge – finding a common understanding of these values is the other half.
This challenge starts with democracy – is Russia ready for it? This question and the differing answers to it have spawned various rogue descriptions of democracy over the years - ‘managed’, ‘sovereign’ or ‘our own special orthodoxy’. Today, once again, Russians silently watch their lives change as they adapt resignedly to whatever governing model is being introduced by their leaders.
In the meantime, Russians continue to study, marry, bear children, leave the country, die, build businesses, pay taxes and care about the future of their families. However, they are using their civic right to vote less frequently than they did in Soviet times, and have become increasingly indifferent toward politics. In line with many other Western countries, Russians have become more focused in defining their life goals and are far more individualistic in their personal lives. This change has only become possible since Russians have been able to buy their homes, buy shares in Russian enterprises, work and study in diverse places, and earn incomes that are limited only by their own capacities, connections and energy.
For those who manage to use these new opportunities and adapt to the immense changes in the country, Russia is a comfortable, adventurous, risky - but enjoyable - place to live. A lot of Russians have a decent education, own more than one home and car, have a high income, travel abroad and generally share Western values. They recognise the importance of those values through their own experience and enrichment.
6 Chapter 1 ––– Russian Citizens ––– An Overview The sample is representative of the Russian population. Along with standard socio- demographic and consumer criteria, the main sources of information used by Russians were identified, as well as the share of the population that visited non-CIS states.
1.1. Main socio-demographic criteria 142 million people, of whom 45% are male and 55% female.
Age Highest level of Education completed 18% 3% 13% 3% 8%
65 and 18 -24 over 27% 20% 14% 55 -64 13% 9% 16% 25 -34 18%
19% 19% Primary education (compreh ensive /high school not finished) Junior high school (9 years ) Vocational school after 9 years ’ education 45 -54 35 -44 High school (11 gr ades) Vocational school after comprehensive /high school Specialist secondary education (vocational training) Incomplete higher education (not less than 3 years’ study ) Complete higher education
Employment structure Employment structure Housing ownership
5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 16%
17 % 1% 7% 23% 10% 4% 32%
Independent entrepreneur Executive, manager 70% Employee with no Military officer, interior management responsibility department, prosecutor’s office Unskilled employee Student Worker, including agriculture Disabled pension er Pensioner Rent from individuals Municipal apartment Unemployed Homemaker Personal apartment or house
8 1.2. Consumer status (self-esteem)
What group do you identify with most?
We can afford groceries and clothes. But find difficulty in 48% acquiring consumer durables (TV set, refrigerator) We can afford groceries but find difficulty in affording clothes 28% We can easily afford durables but we can hardly afford very 13% expensive things We hardly make ends meet. The money is scarce even for 11% groceries Extremely expensive things – apartment, country house, other Less are quite affordable than 1%
The material conditions of life for Russian families improved in 2006 due to improvements in economic development: real income growth, enhancement of loans programmes and credit to meet consumer demand for goods. Today, an increasing number of Russians can afford groceries and clothes, although many still have difficulties acquiring consumer durables.
1.3. Information sources about the events in Russia and the World
Television is the main information source for the population (86%), led by the news programmes broadcast by two main state-controlled channels (Vremya by ORT and Vesti by RTR).
Up to three quarters of the sample (74%) read Russian newspapers, less than a third (31%) do so on a regular basis. Regular readers can often be found among professionals (Bachelor and Masters degree level educated - 38%) with an average or above average income (37%), executives, managers (50%), specialists with no management responsibility (39%).
The lowest proportion of Russians read news on the Internet (1.5%). Regular internet users are most frequently found among the youngest group aged 18-24 (12%), among people with degree-level education (13%) and a high consumer status (18%), Moscow residents (12%), independent entrepreneurs (13%) and executives (26%).
1.4. Visits to non-CIS states The isolation of the majority of the Russian population from the ‘real experience’ of ‘other life’, opportunities, etc. continues to remain significant. Only 18% of Russians have visited non-CIS states at least once in their lifetime (the share is bigger among youngsters, there is a dramatic drop in the number of older Russians).
9 Chapter 2 ––– Do Russians believe that democracy is appropriate fforor their country?
2.1. What does the word ‘democracy’ mean to Russians? Russian understanding of democracy, liberalism, freedom and human rights is confused and often contradictory, and Russians appear to see little relevance of these values to their own lives. Some 65% of the sample was unable to describe what liberal democracy means to them. However, when asked to choose a definition of democracy from a series of options, 54% of those giving a positive response cite either a ‘fair system of state governance based on the participation of all citizens on equal terms’, or a ‘series of guarantees to observe citizens’ rights and freedoms by the authorities/government’. Only 9% cite such fundamental democratic principles as a ‘free and fair competitive political party system’ and the ‘separation of the powers (the executive, judiciary and legislature) and the accountability of the authorities to Russia’s citizens’.
Of those giving a negative response, most (19%) say democracy is ‘empty talk and demagoguery’, 12% say it is a ‘system of government for normal countries, but not Russia’, and 11% say it means ‘chaos, disorder and anarchy’.
2.2 Who needs democracy in Russia? The younger respondents, better educated and well-to-do groups, entrepreneurs, state officials, officers of power structures, and the prosecutor’s office employees have a positive attitude towards ‘democracy’; linking the notion with the current political regime. The reason for this attitude lies in the fact that the beginning of Putin’s presidency (1999-2000) coincided with recovery from the severe 1998 crisis. Long-expected economic growth arrived; partly due to the reforms of the first half of 1990s, but primarily to favourable market conditions for oil and gas exporters.
On the other hand, residents of more rural villages and towns, the elderly and undereducated groups regard the new order as imposed and unfair.
Only a very small part of the population (as a rule, the most educated and qualified) 12- 15% are able to identify a model of democracy that is close or identical to the European ideal. These are not necessarily the most advanced and informed people – they frequently share other European values and are more oriented towards European culture, history and outlook. It is these people that most frequently identify themselves with ‘Europeans,’ and support the western model of development and government for Russia.
For others, even those who feel generally positive to these ideas, the concept of ‘democracy’ is associated mainly with indirect signs or effects of wider democratic systems (the right to criticise those in power, social justice, guarantees from the authorities not to violate citizens’ rights and freedoms, etc.). However, they do not necessarily perceive the concept as being at the core of a democratic government system and the process of political decision-making.
Of those giving a negative response, saying that democracy is just ‘chaos, empty talk and demagoguery,’ 19% are the poorest and most disadvantaged, while 6 % of wealthy Russian believe this to be the case, 16% of the poorly educated agreed with the statement, as against 4% of students and 9% of university graduates. Most frequently, negative sentiments “democracy is not for us” are given in more rural villages (15%), whereas the figure in Moscow is 4%.
10 Responses were more clearly expressed by those with definite opinions on which political party they supported, (50% of the population); in other words the more politically engaged and aware. It is precisely those potential voters that identify different meanings of the concept of democracy. Supporters of the communists, V. Zhirinovsky and Spravedlivaya Rossiya, feel more negative about democracy, while the political right stresses the institutional criteria of democracy, the protest voters for the Yabloko party favour populist sentiments based on ‘justice’ and criticism of the authorities, etc.
2.3. Which political system do Russians find most appropriate? When asked if Russia has ever been a democratic state, and if so, when; 27% believe that Russia has never been a democracy. A third say Russia is currently a democracy, while 12% felt Russia was a democracy during Brezhnev’s time.
Twelve per cent said that democracy is suitable for other nations, but not for Russia and only 37% of Russians feel it exists in their country at all. However this view appears to be contradictory as nearly half of the sample believes that Russia needs democracy, with 19% saying that it doesn’t.
Russian democracy is seen as paternalistic and this fact fuels the popularity of the Soviet system. When asked for their preference for Russian state governance, 35% prefer the Soviet system, 26% the current system, and 16% a Western-style democracy.
Which political system do you think is the most appropriate for Russia?
1996 1997* 1998* 2000* 2003* 2004* 2005* 2006
% % % % % % % % The Soviet system we had before the 34 38 43 42 48 41 42 35 1990s Current system 18 11 5 11 18 19 23 26 Democracy based on the Western 25 28 32 26 22 24 20 16 model Other 8 8 7 4 6 5 6 7 No opinion 15 15 13 17 6 11 9 16
Russian public opinion does not appear to recognise the concept of the separation of power (checks and balances).
When asked which state system is ideal for Russia, a majority, (61%), cite one where the President co-ordinates work undertaken by the Duma, government, legislature and the judicial system, but has overall control. Only 18% believe a separation of executive powers from the legislature and the judiciary would be better for the country; 20% of the respondents gave no opinion.
11 Chapter 3 –––Civil–Civil Society in Russia
3.1. Influence of citizens on life in the country Russians appear to be overwhelmingly apathetic about the degree of influence they have on the country, their city or region, their district or street. A minimum of three quarters said they had little or no influence over anything other than their family. The largest number (over 94% in each case) feel that they have little or no influence over what happens in Russia as a whole, or in their region or city.
Decisive/Considerable Little/ very little/ No No opinion
% influence % % Your country 2 94 4 Your city, region 3 93 4 Your district, 9 88 4 street Your work 16 74 10 Your family 81 17 2
Asked whether Russians could exert influence on the actions of the authorities, 41% gave a negative response. Those who gave a positive answer were asked how they could influence the authorities:
Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 19% Appeal to television, radio, papers, placing materials on the internet 18% Appeal to a Russian court 17% Organise protests, civil unrest, meetings and demonstrations 14% Write letters and petitions to the administrative powers 13% Appeal to their deputy/party representative 10% Set up a public organisation and actively participate in such organisations 9%
More educated people who occupy superior positions at work are inclined to take action. Undoubtedly this is likely to apply to statements of their ideological views and not necessarily their readiness to take real action. However, socially weak and deprived groups are ready ‘to bear it all’ and passively accept administrative arbitrariness.
3.2. Responsibility of citizens for the events in the country. Because there are such low expectations of Russians’ ability to influence events in the country and such little faith that citizens can effectively influence the behaviour of the authorities, the figures indicating the responsibility people feel they have for events that take place in the country are correspondingly low.
Do you feel responsibility for what occurs in... Some + considerable None + little No opinion % % % Your country 11 82 7 Your city, region 12 82 7 Your work 28 60 12 Your district, street 20 74 6 Your family 88 9 3
12 3.3 The right to vote People’s feeling of a lack of responsibility for events and the feeling of having insignificant influence on political life in Russia results in political apathy and indifference to parliamentary and presidential elections.
17% do not intend to vote at the Duma elections this year. 23% haven’t made their decision. 11% haven’t decided whether they will vote at the parliamentary elections or not.
The response was almost the same with regard to the presidential elections. 18% do not intend to vote and 27.5% found difficulty in saying who they will vote for at the elections if the list doesn’t contain Putin’s name.
13 Chapter 4 ––– State paternalism vs. a liberal economy
4.1. What does ‘liberalism’ mean to Russians? The concept of ‘liberalism’ is viewed by Russians as even less comprehensible and relevant to life in Russia than the word ‘democracy’. The number of the sample who gave no opinion on this question reached a third:
What do you identify the idea of ‘liberalism’ with? (% of the number of the respondents, total of the responses over 100% as respondents could name several alternatives, responses vary)
Positive % Negative % Lack of state control over the economy 15 Demagoguery of people in 24 power Effective market economy 10 Wild capitalism 11 State protection of free trade 9 Demagoguery of disgraced 8 politicians Policy under which the government is 8 represented by hired employees whose salaries are paid from taxes Total 42 Total 43
Only small and insignificant groups (less than 15% of the population) feel positive about the notion of liberalism. On the other hand, negative connotations are much more widespread and characterise the opinions of at least a quarter of the population.
Most frequently it is the young, the educated, students, entrepreneurs, executives and specialists who have a positive attitude. Negative responses are given by pensioners, housewives, executives and specialists (the latter are more polarised) and socially excluded groups.
Less than a fifth of the sample said that Russia needs liberalism.
4.2. Attitude toward a ‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism’. The attitude toward the closely related terms of ‘market economy’ and ‘capitalism’ is wide- ranging. ‘Market economy’ was a subject of a fierce debate in Russian in the 1990s. At that time the majority of the Russian population was largely convinced of the necessity for market reform. Today, capitalism is still regarded as an ideological bogie, a scarecrow and a way to accuse those supporters of reforms who allegedly seed ‘wild capitalism’ in Russia. The share of positive attitudes towards ‘capitalism’ is just 10%, and of negative – three times higher – 40% with a comparable balance of indifferent attitudes.
Positive Indifferent Negative % % % Market economy 29 44 24 Capitalism 10 46 40
4.3. Attitude toward ‘private property’ and privatisation. In the course of the reforms of the 1990s, people rapidly started to identify the notion of ‘private property’ with owned property (apartments, household plots or country houses, vegetable gardens, cars; then shops, workshops, small businesses etc.). The term ‘privatisation’ that describes the process of the transfer of property into private ownership,
14 has negative connotations. This can be largely explained by the way media has covered the questionable deals of “de-nationalisation” of socialist property.
Positive Indifferent Negative % % % Private property 44 38 14 Privatisation 22 38 36
4.4. Should private property be allowed? Over the past 15 years, the legitimacy of the ownership of large properties has been gradually accepted. Private ownership of housing, personal transport, premises and equipment for small workshops, shops, companies, cafes, etc. was approved of by the majority of the population from the very start of the reforms and is now taken for granted. However, objections were raised about the legitimacy and fairness of the ownership of factories, production units, buildings and airports, especially where foreign capital was involved in that ownership.
Residents of villages and cities have widely differing attitudes to property ownership: the majority of city dwellers believe in the right of individuals to own and sell land. As a result, many will attempt to consolidate their ownership of country houses and houses in rural areas and arrange their sale. The legal status of these properties was far from certain in Soviet times. The rural population is fiercely opposed to private land ownership, maintaining that the land should either be possessed collectively or much less often, be the individual property of those working on it. Alternatively, some believed that the inflow of money into villages would destroy the way of life established in Soviet times.
The survey shows that attitudes towards private property, including the means of production, land, etc. have virtually evened out. Property ownership is most frequently regarded as legitimate among young and educated Russians and while the elderly and under-educated do not agree and retain the prejudices of the Soviet era.
What is your attitude toward private property ownership of…
Right of property ownership of… Approve Indifferent Disapprove No opinion % % % % Land for farming 63 10 21 6 Land for commercial 57 12 7 8 construction or industrial production Buildings and facilities for 54 15 23 8 business Factories, industrial units, etc. 40 11 41 8 Transport vehicles (planes, cars) 55 11 26 8 for personal possession Transport vehicles (planes, cars) 57 12 24 7 for business Buildings, facilities for dwelling 70 8 16 6 Buildings, facilities for 52 12 28 8 commercial purposes
15 4.5. Attitude towards wealth At the beginning of 1990s around one quarter of respondents to research undertaken at the time believed it was possible to earn millions in Russia honestly. However in 2006, only 13% gave a positive response to the same question. Russians believe that it is possible to earn honest millions in the following spheres: entrepreneurship; big or medium private business (6-9%); show business (6%) and working as manager.
4.6. Role of the state in the economy Paternalistic expectations of the state still prevail in Russian society. Most Russians (66%) believe that the state should provide its citizens with a decent standard of living.
The State should provide all its citizens with a decent standard of living 66.1% The State should provide help to all its citizens who find themselves in a difficult 15.3% situation, for instance, unemployed The State should provide social protection only to those who are unable to care 12.4% about themselves, for instance, physically challenged people People should care and provide for themselves without any state interference 2.1%
16 Chapter 5. Legality, protection of human rights and property in Russia
5.1. Does the law protect Russians? Only one quarter of the sample feel protected by the law. 68% feel insecure (the remaining 7% gave no opinion). The lower down the social scale respondents were, the less secure they feel. Those who have the highest social status feel the most secure – 33%, 28% of upper middle classes felt secure and 22% of lower middle classes. Those who feel unprotected by law are arranged the following way:
I feel insecure because laws are not made for everyone, some believe they are 45% above the law I feel insecure because everyone is corrupt and I cannot expect an unbiased and 42% honest consideration of my case in court I feel insecure because all laws are easily misinterpreted by those in power 37% I feel insecure because laws constantly change 23% I feel insecure because people do not have the means to influence the authorities 20%
Some differences are aroused by ideological positions. Those who vote for Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia) feel most secure (34% with average 25%), least security is enjoyed by those who vote for Yabloko (9%) and Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Fair Russia) (8%).
5.2. Who is above the law? Only 3% of Russians believe that no-one in Russia is above the law today. 8% have no opinion. A large majority believes that officials and the authorities are way above the law - 59%. More often than not, such responses were given by educated respondents - 64%.
52% said that people who have become rich in recent years are above the law and that these people are also able to buy power and justice. 41% (university graduates – 47%) believe that deputies and leaders of Duma parties also belong in this category. 41% of the sample believes that law enforcement organisations (police, special police units (OMON), tax bodies, political police – Federal Security Service, etc.) and entrepreneurs (34%) are among such people. 7-8% of the sample think that ordinary citizens might bribe officials, when necessary.
Finally, 16% of the sample believes that laws are not observed by either the authorities or citizens in today’s Russia. This opinion is 1.5 times more frequent among educated people with high social status (24% and 21% of the sample of the corresponding categories of the population).
5.3. Human rights The overwhelming majority of the sample (from 40% to three quarters of respondents) see ‘human rights’ as a guarantee over the quality of life of the individual by a paternalistic state; their work and their pay; their education, medical treatment, social welfare, etc. Political rights, freedom of conscience, the right to express personal opinions, legal responsibility and rule of law are held in lower esteem: from 15% to 25% of the sample believe them to be crucial.
17 Which of the following human rights do you believe the most important?
Important rights % The right to life 68 The right to privacy and home 64 The right to choose employment and work 36 The right to own private property (accommodation, land, vehicle, means of production 32 The right to a fair trial 29 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 22 The right to only be punished under the terms of the law 20 Freedom of expression 18 The right to effective means of legal protection 17 The right of access to information 12 The right to move to another country and return 12 Prohibition of discrimination 10 The right to get married 9 Freedom of assembly and association 4
Almost half of Russians feel positively about the term “human rights protection”. A third of those interviewed (32.3%) state that they are worried about serious human rights abuses in Russia. Only 12.3% think that the current human rights situation is satisfactory.
Over half of Russians do not have any concerns about human rights abuses in Russia; they are satisfied with the current situation and ready to sacrifice their freedoms and rights for the common order in the country.
5.4. Protection of the right to private property Over 40% of the sample believes that the right to own private property in modern Russia is not guaranteed or that it is poorly protected. Only 4% believe it to be guaranteed. Entrepreneurs and better educated groups of the population most frequently expressed a belief that the right to own private property is not protected in legal and social terms.
Do you believe that inviolability of private property of …guaranteed in Russia?
Guaranteed Little No No opinion % guarantee guarantee % % % Land for farming 25 17 43 16 Land for commercial construction or 25 17 41 17 industrial production Buildings and facilities for business 23 19 40 18 purposes Factories, industrial companies, etc. 21 18 43 18 Transport vehicles (planes, cars) for 29 17 38 17 personal possession Transport vehicles (planes, cars) for 29 16 37 18 business purposes Buildings, facilities for dwelling 31 17 36 16 Buildings, facilities for commercial 26 18 38 18 purposes
18 Chapter 6. Role of the executive power
6.1. Role of the President The withdrawal of Russian citizens from politics as a decision-making process and as a method of stimulating development, alongside their inability to feel responsible for what happens in Russia is a demonstration of mass distrust of most Russian institutions. There is a shift of the macro control over economic, social and political life to the President alone. This phenomenon is especially marked among socially weak layers of the society – the elderly and less well-off and less well-educated respondents. Russians believe that the President controls the army, foreign policy and observance of the Constitution, (40% of the sample)
Which areas of life should the President of Russia have personal control? What areas does he control in reality?
President should President actually Difference control controls % % Observance of the Constitution 67 42 -25 Army (as Commander-in-Chief) 52 39 -13 Foreign policy 43 41 -2 Activities of law enforcement 40 16 -24 agencies Security of citizens 37 12 -25 Civil rights 36 9 -27 Work of the parliament 35 21 -14 Judicial system 28 10 -18 No opinion 7 24
6.2. Influence of the President and other top officials on the life in the country
How do you assess the influence of such people as…on the life in the country? Positively No influence Negatively No opinion % % % % President Putin 67 13 16 4 Deputy Medvedev 43 24 22 11 Defence Minister S. Ivanov 42 22 26 11 Prime Minister M. Fradkov 32 29 28 10 Prosecutor General Y. Chaika 22 30 31 16 Justice minister V. Ustinov 22 30 31 16 Emergency Situations Minister 50 19 22 10 Shoygu Governor of your region 50 18 27 5 Mayor/ head of the administration of 43 22 30 6 region
19 6.3. Role of the executive in politics and the economy Over the past five years do you believe that there has been a considerable increase in the number of people who would like to see the President and government tightening control over the economic and political life of the country?
President and government should... 2001 2006 % % Tighten control over economic and political life in the country 53 69 Allow people freedom and observe and abide by the laws of the country 33 23 No opinion 14 8
The number of Russians who currently favour the consolidation of power by the state rather than society’s greater control is also growing.
What do you think Russia needs most at present: consolidation of power by the state or greater control from society?
2001 2006 % % Consolidation of the power by the state 37 43 Establishing control of society over power 54 42 No opinion 9 15
20 Chapter 7. Role of other power branches
7.1. Evaluation of the activities of the legislative power Russians’ attitudes to the activities of the legislative power (State Duma, Council of the Federation as well as local legislative bodies) are evenly spread.
How do you assess the influence of the activities of… on the life in the country? Positively No Negatively No opinion % influence % % % Council of the Federation 37 29 24 10 State Duma 38 27 30 6 Regional legislative deputies’ council 28 28 33 11
Local deputies’ council 28 27 35 10
7.2. Independence of the legislative power The following are Russians’ opinions on the level of dependence of the legislative bodies on the executive branch at local levels compared with their perception of the ideal situation.
Do you find the activities of your local legislative council controlled by the executive?
It is corrupt and anyone with money can get a favourable decision in a court 31% It is controlled by local (oblast, city, regional) administrations 21% It is controlled by the Russian government 11% It is entirely independent 5% No opinion 35%
Should the activities of legislative bodies be controlled the executive?
Yes, they should, to a certain extent/ entirely 54% They shouldn't, they must be entirely independent of executive power 22% No opinion 24%
7.3. Independence of judicial power The same questions were posed to Russians with regard to the real and ideal situation of the courts.
Do you find the activities of judicial system in your city, region controlled by the executive?
Russian judiciary is corrupt and anyone with money can get a positive decision in a 36% court It is controlled by local (oblast, city, regional) administrations 17% It is controlled by the Russian government 12% It is entirely independent 8% No opinion 31%
21 Should the activities of judiciary be controlled by the executive?
Yes, it should, to a certain extent/entirely 56% It shouldn't, it must be entirely independent of the executive 27% No opinion 17%
These figures indicate that the both the current situation and that desired by Russians regarding the independence of courts and legislative councils as they relate to executive power still has a long way to go to reach the ideals of democracy.
22 Chapter 8. Russia and West
8.1. Perception of Russia and Europe, Russia and the West Russians believe that Europeans consider Russia primarily as a ‘source of raw materials’ (40%), a ‘source of brains’ for Western companies and scientific institutions’ (25%), and ‘a place for advantageous investment’ (24%). At the same time European countries are viewed mostly positively by Russians.
How is Russia seen by European countries? How are European countries perceived in Russia? (Respondents could select more than one response).
Russia is most likely to be seen by European countries are most likely to %%% %%% European countries as... be seen by RuRussiansssians as... Neighbours and partners with which we A source of raw materials 40 should strengthen and develop 32 relations A source of technical expertise for Western companies and scientific 25 Having a high standard of living 29 institutions A place for profitable investments 24 Main trading partners 24 A country where there is no law for those Attractive countries to work and 20 23 who have money emigrate to An undeveloped, unpredictable and 17 Centres of cultural and historical values 10 aggressive country A neighbour and partner with which we Potential aggressors united by NATO should strengthen and develop relations 15 8 military bloc
The home country of people who ‘throw Implementer of US policy on the 14 7 money about’ Eurasian continent A potential military adversary, nuclear 12 No opinion 16 power A country from which unwanted 9 migrants come to Europe A great power, with a rich cultural 8 heritage A country controlled by the KGB 4 No opinion 12
Russians’ opinions, both of themselves and Westerners, differ considerably. Thus 40% of the sample believes that the majority of Russians treat Western countries ‘with respect’; 34% feel indifferent with regard to the issue. The majority of Russians do not feel any ‘fear’ or ‘contempt’ for the Western world and only 10-11% of the sample feel some ‘wariness’ towards the West.
In contrast, people in the West, according to the same sample, feel far less secure about Russia. Only 17% of the respondents indicated that they had no anxieties. 12% of the sample in Russia believe that Westerners feel ‘alarmed’ by Russia; 14% believe it is ‘treated with contempt’; only 13% of the sample think that people of the West treat Russians with ‘respect’.
23 What is the attitude of the West toward Russia?
2000 – August 2005 – December 2006 – December % % % Respect 8 7 13 Sympathy 24 16 14 Alarm 12 13 12 Contempt 21 16 14 Fear 5 7 6 No sentiments 17 32 28 No opinion 14 9 13
What is the attitude of Russia toward the countries of the West?
2000 - December 2005 - December 2006 - December % % % Respect 34 30 40 Sympathy 3 2 2 Alarm 10 13 11 Contempt 3 5 2 Fear 4 3 2 No sentiments 35 39 34 No opinion 11 7 10
8.2. Why does Russia need the EU? When considering the motivation for the formation of the EU, nearly half the sample (46%) say it was economic, while a quarter (26%) believe it was to ensure long-term development, bringing freedom of movement and other democratic freedoms to its citizens.
Russians see the main benefits of EU membership as being the freedom to work and study in any of the 27 member states (49%); a common currency (38%); the opportunity to travel without visas (38%), and common legislation (25%).
Nearly a third are attracted to the quality of life in EU countries and nearly a quarter view the EU as an attractive place to live and work.
8.3. Do you think Russia is part of Europe? 71% of Russians do not consider themselves to be European; only a fifth see the country as aligned with European culture. More frequently in recent years respondents agree that Russia has ‘its own path of development’. Most often they refer to its geographical position – the country borders both Europe and Asia.
24 Which of the following statements do you most agree with?
2003 % 2006 % Russia is part of the West and it should move closer to Europe and US 12 10 Russia is an Eurasian state that has its own path of development 76 75 Russia is an Eastern country and should aim to cooperate with the counties of Asia 6 6 No opinion 6 9
8.4. Does the European Union constitute a potential threat to Russia? ‘Russia’s special path of development’ is also related to the image of ‘foreign hostility’ that has become entrenched in the mass consciousness during 1990s and the beginning of the 21 st century.
Today, public opinion in Russia sees the countries of former Soviet Union as the country’s main ‘enemies’, determined to integrate with the West and Ukraine. The Baltic countries, Georgia and Ukraine (also the traditional ideological and former ‘military opponent’ the US) rank first. The mass media, controlled by the state, suggests that these states pose the main threat to the country’s security. At the very least, they are viewed as a source of unfriendly actions and negative influence over Russian society. The Russian authorities’ fear of importing ‘coloured revolutions’ and the prospect of further democratisation of the country are behind much of this suspicion, which has lead to the increased isolationism and weakened authoritarianism. In the past two years negative references to Georgia in the Russian mass media have increased by 6%; and those to the Ukraine have doubled from 13% to 27%. The attitude toward US has worsened while the response toward China has grown more positive.
Name five countries which, in your opinion, are close friends and allies of Russia and five countries which, in your opinion, have unfriendly and hostile attitude towards Russia.
Close friends and 2005 - May 2006 – May Unfrie ndly and 2005 - May 2006 - May allies % % hostile % % Belorussia 46 47 Latvia 49 46 Germany 23 22 Lithuania 42 42 Kazakhstan 20 33 Georgia 38 44 Ukraine 17 10 Estonia 32 28 India 16 15 US 23 37 China 12 24 Ukraine 13 27 France 13 8 Afghanistan 12 12 Bulgaria 11 10 Iraq 10 9 US 11 5 Iran 6 7 Armenia 9 14 Japan 6 4 Italy 6 7 Azerbaijan 5 4 Finland 6 6 Armenia 4 3 GB 5 4 Moldavia 6 9 Azerbaijan 5 7 China 4 3 Israel 5 3 Poland 4 7
25 Close friends and 2005 - May 2006 – May Unfriendly and 2005 - May 2006 - May allies % % hostile % % Kirghizia 5 7 GB 3 5 Poland 5 4 Germany 3 2 No opinion 14 15 No opinion 15 19 N=1600; ranked are only those countries that were mentioned by 5% and more of the sample (‘friendly countries’ and by 3% and more (‘hostile’ countries)
Does the European Union constitute a potential threat to Russia?
% Yes 45 No 37 No opinion 17
Of those that see the EU as a threat, 25% cite the possibility of Russia losing its financial and industrial independence; 15% fear the imposition of an alien culture; and 15% are concerned about Russia losing its political independence.
In your opinion, relations between Russia and the West…
2005 - June 2006 - April % % Can be really friendly 44 35 Will always be based on distrust 42 54 No opinion 14 11
The number of Russians convinced of the West’s hostility toward Russia has considerably increased during the recent year.
8.5. Do you find western culture and its political system appropriate for Russia?
It is not surprising that more than 40% of respondents consider Western democracy to be inappropriate and even potentially devastating to Russia. Such attitudes have gained more popularity during the 2000s. Approximately the same proportion of the sample (45%) cautiously say that Russia can learn a lot from the West –this is an area where closer relations can develop.
In your opinion Western democracy and culture...
April 2000 December 2006
% % Are necessary, crucial for Russia 2 3 Can benefit Russia 55 45 Are not appropriate for Russia 25 30 Are destructive to Russia 10 12 No opinion 8 10
26 The attitude of Russians towards Western culture (most stereotypical perceptions are about American culture – primarily due to popular movies and music) is negative. This is especially pronounced among elderly, less well-educated and less well-off groups and it is exactly these people that make up the statistical majority of Russians.
Do you find Western culture has a negative influence on the situation in Russia?
1996 1997 1998 1999 2002 2006 N=1700 N=1700 N=1600 N=1700 N=1600 N=1600 % % % % % % Agree 48 53 61 51 67 63 Disagree 36 35 33 36 28 32 No opinion 16 12 6 13 5 5
27 Conclusion The deterioration of Russians’ attitudes towards the West and its basic values, as seen from these figures, is a disturbing sign of an apparent lack of effort by the Russian elite to integrate Russia into the European system of values.
While Europeans consider human rights, the rule of law and respect for private property to be inextricably linked with a democratic society, democracy for Russians does not have the same positive associations – and many Russians do not understand democracy at all.
Similar concerns and confusions are expressed about the Western market system and in particular, about privatisation, which is closely associated with greed, corruption and dishonesty.
Given this scepticism about two fundamental elements of European society, it is unsurprising that Russians’ overall perception of Europe is negative. Far from being a positive influence and a role model for Russia, Europe is considered, first and foremost, to be responsible for exploitation of Russia’s mineral and intellectual resources. The survey reveals that since 1996, Russian support for the adoption of a democratic political system based on a Western model has been in decline.
Russians’ lack of a sense of responsibility for the events in the country, their readiness to delegate decision-making to those who voice them on television, their suspicious attitude towards the concept of the separation of powers is also evidence of the growing value gap between Russia and Europe.
This drift away from Europe since the end of communism must be of concern for the EU, and helping to reverse this trend should be a priority for the Union.
As trade and energy make Russia and the EU increasingly inter-dependent, there will be an increasing need for constructive dialogue based on recognition of core values. Without this understanding, the relationship will be clouded by distrust and misunderstanding, and opportunities for mutual gain will be missed.
This political passivity on the part of the public provides the ruling elites with significant freedom to carry out a more Westernised policy line than the majority of Russians actually support. At the same time, the public’s strong refusal to accept European values limits the government ability to follow a pro-Western foreign policy line, just as it acts as a brake on the introduction of further reforms to strengthen the market economy and further the democratic process. This dualism that has been one of the main determinants of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy course over the last seven years has to be acknowledged and won through.
28 The EU on Russian Television: an overview
Elena Prokhorova - analyst, regular contributor to bbcrussian.com
Russia’s three national television networks hold a virtually unbeatable monopoly on providing and interpreting information – a drastic change compared with the early nineties, when pluralism and glasnost gave rise to a plethora of independent media outlets. Two main TV channels are directly owned and controlled by the state. These are the “First Channel” and RTR, each covering around 95% of the territory with 20%-25% daily audience share. The third one, NTV ( nezavisimoje – independent TV), covering 85% of the territory with 12% daily audience share, is formally owned by Gazprom’s media holding in which the Kremlin has a controlling share. RTR positions itself as a predominantly news channel and runs hourly news programmes. The other two show a mix of news, films, talk shows, documentaries and entertainment. TVC is owned by the Moscow city administration which is closely controlled by the Kremlin. The only independent (previously privately owned) channel, REN TV, has now been taken over by a Kremlin-friendly oligarch.
Close monitoring of Russian television today gives the impression that editors-in-chief follow versions of official directives or meet expectations on how to cover news and what messages to give to the audience. It is widely rumoured that the editors of the TV channels and several key state-owned newspapers have a weekly briefing at the office of Vladimir Surkov, the Deputy Chief of Staff to President Putin, where they are given directives about what to show and how to interpret events. For the past three years there have been no live TV shows – everything is pre-recorded and therefore subject to control. A few exceptions apply in the case of certain talk shows and discussions, where independent analysts or politicians might express views that contradict “the party line.” Privately, seasoned TV editors and journalists admit to a certain self-imposed censorship, which at times pushes them to go even further than expected by the authorities in their praise of the Kremlin or criticism of its opponents.
Europe, the European Union and EU-Russia relations feature fairly high on the agenda. Overall European stories on Russian TV fall into several major rubrics.
“Russia is the birthplace of elephants…” This old time Soviet anecdote ridicules a propaganda technique, whereby anything “made in USSR”- from tractors to ideology - would be superior in size and quality. By extension, everything that is the best and the biggest is of home origin. This metaphor could well be applied to the coverage of Europe on the Russian TV nowadays. The Russian public is led to believe that its own leadership has chosen an optimal course to ensure stability, prosperity and world wide respect; while the Old World, in particular the EU, is largely portrayed as a failing system, wrestling with institutional, social and religious problems.
An aggressively polemic commentary on the occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome describes the Berlin declaration as a propaganda exercise in the old Soviet style (NTV, “ Realnaja Politika”, 31.03.2007). It goes over the top to belittle EU successes and achievements. “The European Union was created on the bones of millions of WWII victims… It was Europe which invented World wars, as well as Nazi ideology of the worst kind… The unprecedented scope of European atrocities was largely targeted against Eastern Europe and the USSR… European integration was, in a way, necessary surgery – like the castration of a rapist… ”
29 According to this TV commentary, Europe’s ex-empires were forced to set millions of people free under pressure from the Soviet Union. “We squeezed the Europeans out of their colonies, so they had to go back home and get down to their boring economic business.” Current tensions between the EU and Russia are described as “normal frictions between the two youngest mega-states on the planet, which only now are becoming aware of their true interests.”
There are very few attempts to contemplate whether Russia’s national interests coincide or overlap with those of Europe. One such discussion was built around the results of the opinion poll commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre and undertaken by Levada Center in Moscow – “Voices from Russia: society, democracy, Europe” - which revealed disturbing figures: i.e. 71% of the respondents do not regard themselves Europeans.
Participants in the debate (“First Channel”, “Vremena”, 4.3.2007) included MPs, journalists and political scientists. Some portrayed Europe as being in a state of decay; regretted the loss of European spiritual ideals and its “degeneration into consumerism, pop culture and Pepsi civilisation”. Others reproached Europe for playing a role in Russia’s disillusionment with liberal democracy as it was prescribed by the West and incorporated in the 90s, leading to a massive impoverishment of the population. However, some participants argued that Russian people easily bow to manipulation and indoctrination, which accounts for their current anti-western sentiments in general and their misperceptions of Europe in particular.
Repeated references were made to common Christian values and respect by the Russians for such principles as private property and the rule of law. Interestingly, these two notions are often invoked as acceptable and welcome by society as a whole, whereas human rights mainly feature in the context of European criticism and therefore have a negative connotation.
Old Europe anandd New Europe The European Union is very often depicted as a heterogeneous organisation, with deep divisions between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe. As a rule, ‘Old’ EU member states are seen as friendly or neutral towards Russia and the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe are viewed as biased and trying to settle old scores with Moscow. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece normally receive positive coverage. In the early days of the present German government, TV presenters were looking for evidence that Chancellor Merkel had as much charisma and a human touch like that of ex-Chancellor Schroeder, but then had to admit that the new German leader’s approach to Russia is purely pragmatic and devoid of sentiment, so the subject was dropped.
The UK is singled out as a semi-hostile country fostering terrorist organisations with links to Chechen warlords and harbouring Russian dissidents who conspire to overthrow the current Kremlin regime. This negative image was reflected in comments by TV presenters about the saga of the British marines taken captive in Iran. In the Russian view, London has lost ground in the propaganda war with Iran, whereas the Iranian leader has gained serious political dividends. The story itself received unprecedented coverage on Russian TV, with the ramifications of the role of Syria in mediating the release being highlighted and numerous interviews with Iranian officials and people in the street.
Among new member states, Poland and Estonia are top of the blacklist of unfriendly regimes. The Polish “meat affair” – Warsaw vetoing talks on a new EU-Russia treaty in retaliation to Moscow’s ban on its meat products – is now gradually giving way to a new highly politicised story. All national TV channels have focused on a scandal looming around
30 the Auschwitz museum, whose administration closed down the Russian part of the display insisting that certain historical inaccuracies should be corrected, i.e. inmates from the former Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact should be listed as Polish citizens. In Russia’s interpretation, this would essentially amount to acknowledging the Soviet “occupation” of Poland. As a result, Warsaw is now portrayed on Russian TV as seeking to rewrite history, with the EU paying lip service to such attempts.
Estonia today is also increasingly viewed as a revisionist country. A conflict has been simmering for several months between Moscow and Tallin over the destiny of the WWII monument to Russian soldiers in the Estonian capital. The first signs of friction were reported on Russian TV early this year, when several factions in the Estonian parliament voted to transfer the memorial from the centre of Tallin to a military cemetery on the outskirts. This provoked a harsh reaction from the Russian-speaking community. Soon a group of activists emerged to protect the monument, setting up a round-the-clock guard on the site. Clashes with Estonian activists portrayed as “nationalists” or “neo-Nazis” were shown by all Russian TV channels.
Following recent parliamentary elections, the new Estonian Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip, backed the decision to transfer the monument. Works to unearth the remains of the Russian soldiers began some days before the 9 th of May – the official V-Day celebrations in Russia, triggering clashes between ethnic Russians and police in Tallin. These new twists triggered a wave of political fury across the country, with the State Duma leading an anti- Estonian campaign. One of the two principle candidates for the Russian presidency, Sergei Ivanov, was repeatedly shown on TV addressing Russian war veterans with patriotic speeches and urging the population to boycott Estonian dairy products. A TV presenter in a talk show sided with an MP who urged Moscow to impose economic sanctions on Estonia, quoting US sanctions against Iran as a comparable precedent. High-ranking Russian officials warned in televised interviews that the Tallin incident might affect Russia’s relations with the EU, i.e. jeopardise the EU-Russia summit in Samara.
The symbolism of the monument is vital for both sides. For many Estonians, it embodies the occupation by the Soviet Union, to which today’s Russia, with its assertive policy in the near abroad, is seen as a moral successor. From the Russian point of view the memorial symbolises its glorious past, which is at the heart of Russia’s newly restored identity. Russia is now accusing Estonia of attempts to revise the outcome of WWII, and the European Union is seen as submitting to dangerous trends towards the revival of Nazi ideology.
In a talk show dedicated to the Russian-Estonian “monumental crises” a pro-Kremlin journalist insisted that Russia should stop talking to small countries like Estonia, who “have delegated their sovereignty to great powers or international organisations, and sort out differences directly with their bosses instead”. (NTV, “ Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovjev ”, 21.01.2007”)
The Estonian war memorial drama that was played out on Russian TV is often contrasted by stories from “friendly countries”. Thus a series of reports from Slovakia and Latvia revealed that the WWII monuments are treated with due respect. Also, Latvia has received widespread positive coverage on official TV channels after it dropped claims to a part of Russian territory and finally signed a long overdue border treaty. Here the role of the EU was shown as benign. According to some comments, Latvia has “changed the intransigent position it held under the influence of the EU since EU membership is incompatible with unresolved territorial disputes”.
31 For years Latvia mainly featured on the Russian TV as a state violating the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities. This hard line towards its Baltic neighbour is softening now, and more nuances emerge. For example, the Russian TV audience learns that the Latvian business community is lobbying for better relations with Russia. Comments go as far as calling the situation ridiculous when two neighbouring countries have no proper relationship. Mutual interests are being discussed, i.e. Riga seeking participation in the North European gas pipeline and Russia promoting the rights of its fellow nationals in Latvia. President Putin appears on TV expressing hope that Latvia, as a member of the EU, will play a positive role in promoting Russia’s interests in attracting European investments.
US Missile Defence The transatlantic allegiances of new EU member states are normally presented on Russian TV as a source of tension and divisions within the European Union. US plans to deploy a new missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic are widely used to substantiate this thesis. Two conclusions are drawn. First, that the US is capitalising on special relations with the new member states in order to weaken the EU, which it allegedly sees as a rival. Second, that the political elite in both countries are ignoring public opinion, which is overwhelmingly against the project, thus defying the democratic principles that they claim to uphold.
Phantom pains of recent history In discussing this theme, Mikhail Leontjev, a TV presenter close to the Kremlin, has recently asked the rhetorical question: Why is Russia criticised for its expansion in the “near abroad? It is ridiculous to talk about expansion in relation to one’s own leg or liver?” (NTV, “Sunday Night with Vladimir Solovjev ”, 21.01.2007) This metaphor rather accurately describes the Russian official line, as depicted by the main TV channels, towards what the EU calls “the new neighbourhood.” The European Union is a constant point of reference here, as Russia’s successes and failures in the near abroad are generally viewed against the backdrop of the EU’s “expansion into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence”. Europe is seen as seeking regime changes with a view to tearing away Russia’s traditional satellites.
Poor Old Europe Stories from Europe seem to be deliberately selected to corroborate the theory that most of Europe’s social and political problems, including the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or extremism, stem from the weaknesses of unrestrained, all permissive western-style democracy. For example, a more prohibitive French approach to the issue of Islamic symbols, i.e. wearing hidjab in school, is considered as reasonable compared to the more relaxed approach in the UK which leaves matters to legal interpretation and the discretion of school administrators. A court case in Germany was widely discussed, where a judge refused to allow a quick divorce for a Moroccan woman terrorised by her husband, saying that it was a religious matter.
The choice of European themes gives the impression that Europe suffers from the same vices and shortcomings as Russia, i.e. corruption and criminality, hence it cannot claim the high moral ground for its criticisms. Stories would typically feature an account of the latest news of the Italian Mafia, or the UK cash-for-honours scandal.
The logic of escalation The coverage of the Russian-Estonian conflict over the war monument (mentioned above) provides some insight into the logic of escalation. In the early days of the dispute some politicians appeared on TV calling for a civilised dialogue with the EU over what was seen as
32 Tallinn’s deplorable behaviour. Moscow, they argued, should urge Brussels to hold emergency debates and investigate the disproportionate use of force employed by Estonia’s law enforcement agencies.
But as the story was evolving on a daily basis, it acquired a momentum of its own. Angry reactions on TV reflected sentiments prevalent in wider public opinion. It was not so much about the substance – moving the monument was, after all, an internal Estonia affair - but the form. Tallinn chose surgery to do away with the Soviet past. The authorities ordered the removal of the monument in the run up to the WWII Victory day celebrations in Russia, using excavators to exhume the remains of the Soviet soldiers.
Russian viewers felt deeply shocked and offended watching newsreels from the scene. It was as if the Danish cartoons were published on the eve of Ramadan. Furthering this analogy, Russia’s foreign minister appeared on TV time and again calling Tallinn’s actions blasphemous and inhuman – not dissimilar from the Muslims’ reactions to what was perceived as a western assault on their fundamental values.
The coverage of the conflict, which has beaten all records in terms of the amount of airtime devoted to it, has stirred up debate both in parliament and on TV over the future of relations with Europe. Up until now, anti-western attitudes in Putin’s Russia had been either fairly generic or targeted mainly against the US. Europe’s cautious solidarity with Estonia has fuelled anti-European sentiments. The incident with the monument will be exhausted sooner or later, but it might leave some scars, damaging chances for a new strategic partnership treaty.
It is now likely that Tallinn’s stand off with Moscow will embolden Russia’s critics both inside and outside the EU; for example, in other Baltic states, Georgia, possibly Ukraine and Moldova. Already Estonia has hinted that it might join Poland in vetoing the start of the talks with Russia over a new treaty. Reports of such developments on Russian TV, in addition to the repercussions of the forthcoming decision on the status of Kosovo and the affair of the US missile defence in Europe, is likely to shape the perceptions of the world to Russian voters as being essentially hostile. As a result, Russia’s next president might secure a mandate to continue, or even tighten, the present foreign policy course, pushing the country further towards self-isolation. However, and here lies the drama, this is not what the majority of the Russian population is hoping for. There is a vast constituency in favour of the country becoming a modern state, a respected member of the G8 and enjoying good relations with Europe.
Conclusion The Kremlin has succeeded in taking over control of all major media outlets in Russia. The picture that is portrayed of the European Union is thus very much the picture that the authorities wish to paint. This in turn colours the attitudes of ordinary Russians towards Europe. There may be considerable interest in and attraction to Europe in the population but the negative messages projected on Russian TV are hardly conducive to building trust in EU-Russia relations.
33 Russian Property Dmitryi Evrofinance, Gazprom Alisher Usmanov Management Biryukov Mosnarbank Agency MetalloInvest Rossiiskaya Gazeta VGTRK First Channel Voice of Russia
Kommersant 7TV Gazprom-Media Rian.ru Rossiya Radio Rossii Publishing House Rfn.ru Kultura Mayak Strana.ru Sport Yunost RTR-Planeta Orphei Gazeta.ru Izvestia M-Pul+ 7 Dney Publishing Sekret Firmy Vesti-24 Nostalgie NTV Media Open Radio Ekho Moskvy Tribuna Company House Vlast Dengi Kommersant Alexander Avtopilot Alexander and Dmitryi Kaverznev NTV Itogi Ananiev NTV-Mir 7 Dney Radio Popsa City FM NTV Plus Caravan Istoriy Radio Next Relax FM Leonard TNT Shtab-Kvartira PromSvyaz Blavatnik Capital Oleg Deripaska Baring Vostok Alexander Access Alfa Group Extra M Media Argumenty i Fakty Trud Publishing Capital Partners Rodnyansky Industries Group Publishing House (56%) House Russian-Asian Investment Company Extra M Argumenty i Fakty Trud Okruga STS Media
Sanoma OVA-Press Group Vokrug Sveta STS Publishing House Expert Publishing House Domashniy Roman Konstantin Abramovich Remchukov Hello Expert Expert-Online Independent Media Interior+Design Publishing House Vladimir Interros Vokrug Sveta Potanin Millhouse Nezavisimaya Gazeta Polden XXI Vek Capital Vedomosti Irena and Dmitryi OAO RZD The Moscow Times Lesnevsky Courier Publishing Sobesednik Smart Money House Publishing House Russia Profile Prof-Media The New Times Gudok Pod Gradusom Sobesednik Magnum Zheltaya Gazeta (Yellow Press)
Cinema Complex B2B Media Movie Company Central Afisha Industries Veschatelnaya Rambler Media Komsomolskaya Belarusian Gazeta Cinema Park Publishing Publishing Schematic symbols Partnership Korporatsia Pravda Publishing House House House (60%) Grigory Berezkin 2x2 - newspapers - journals TV3 Komsomolskaya Pravda ESN Rambler-TV Finansovyi Director Afisha Avtoradio - radio stations - TV channels Sovetskiy Sport Industriya Reklamy Afisha Mir Avtoradio – St. Petersburg RZD-Partner Express-Gazeta Rambler-TV : under liquidation Bolshoy Gorod Energy Yumor FM RZD-Partner – — — — – : under sale Afisha.ru Russkie Pesni Strela : under purchase BG.ru Sakvoyazh-SV Federal Drugs and Yuri Vladimir Arkady Psychotropic substances Pavel Gusev Kovalchuk Evtushenkov Gaidamak Watchdog Oleg Rudnov
Viktor Moscovskie Novosti United Baltic Media Saint Petersburg Joint Stock Bertelsmann AFK Sistema Moscovsky Cherkesov Media Group Administration Bank Rossiya (Germany) Komsomolets Publishing House
Mass Media Systems Moscovskie Novosti Business FM STO Volna RTL Group (100%) Moscovsky Komsomolets The Moscow News Biznes Abros Investment Company MK Bulvar Rosbalt Radio Baltika Nevskoye Vremya TRK Petersburg Ren TV Rossia Delovye Lyudi Information Smena Literaturnaya Gazeta Atmosfera Agency Vechernee Vremya Surgutneftegaz Severstal-group
Iskander Sergei Alexander Alexander German Dmitryi Belik Makhmudov Rodionov Volin Morgulchik Kaplun Arnold Uvarov Alexander Lebedev Mikhail Gorbachev Rodionov Publishing House RBC Information Systems Arnold Prize Group The National Reserve Corporation Profil Krestianka Point.ru Kompania Publishing House RBC Daily RIA RosBusiness RBC-TV Arnold Magazines Nashe Vremya na Militseyskoy Volne Kariera Consulting Publishing House Radio Jazz She/ Ona Radio Classic Novaya Gazeta Domovoy Krestianka XXL RBC Over 20 Votre Beaute BusinessWeek Rossiya Internet Loaded resources Homes&Gardens Alexander Polesitsky Boris Fedorov Lukoil Igor Krutoy Mezhprombank Collective Moscow Property Moscow European UFG Private Management Government Media Group Equity Fund Aram Department Gabrelyanov 3 channel (Moskovia Russian (management) ARS Television and Radio Europa Plus News Media Media Group Broadcasting Company) Retro FM PromTorgTsentr Radio 7 na Semi Holmah Tvoy Den Zhisn za Vsyu Nedelyu (Life For A Week) Russian Radio Stolitsa channel Russian News Agency Media Hold Russian Dinamit FM Defense Schematic symbols Maximum Ministry Muz-TV Love Radio Monte-Carlo Radio Centre TVC - newspapers - journals M-Radio Hit FM Radio-Dacha Television and Radio Broadcasting - radio stations - TV channels System of the Russian Armed Services Rambler-TV : under liquidation Pingvin Fomenko.ru RUTV Govorit Moskva –———–: under sale Public Russian Radio : influenced : under purchase Sport Zvezda Zvezda FM
Russian Media Perceptions of EUEU----RussiaRussia Relations
Introduction The six-monthly summits between the EU and Russia have become an important new feature of European foreign policy. The summits attract wide media attention both in the EU and Russia. The difference in coverage, however, is very noticeable because increasing state control of the media in Russia means that what is shown on TV or printed in the newspapers reflects the message that the Kremlin wishes to propagate.
This research project by the EU-Russia Centre analysed the entire coverage of the two summits in 2006 (Sochi and Helsinki) plus the extraordinary meeting of the European Council at Lahti to which President Putin was invited for dinner. The results provide a revealing insight into how the Kremlin uses the media, Russian official attitudes to the EU and the influence of the media in shaping ordinary Russians’ views of the EU.
Summary Mass media from all sectors, newspapers, TV and radio - except for the small-circulation edition Novaya Gazeta, express their general support for President Putin’s foreign policy. This policy seeks to review every aspect of Russian-European relations in light of the consolidation of Russia’s economic and military power and the diversification of foreign relationships under the motto ‘Returning to Asia and the East’.
Leading newspapers still find a united Europe appealing but not as a political system to be copied. It is rather viewed as a centre for ideas and technologies which could assist the further transformation of the Russian economy.
A united Europe is seen as possible only through reaching ‘a strategic alliance’ between the EU and Russia.
The apparent new attitude of aggression of the Russian government towards Europe is seen by the media as ‘the natural desire’ of a great country to rapidly restore its position in Europe, which was shaken as a result of the ‘historical catastrophe’ of the 1990s when Russia was in debt and on the brink of collapse.
The majority of commentators share the suspicions of officials in Moscow that ‘there is a large-scale and coordinated anti-Russian campaign’ in the West that has resulted in European media and politicians talking about a crisis in Russian-European relations.
If the EU continues to insist that Russia signs the Energy Charter, then the majority of journalists believe that Russia should return to bilateral dialogue with each EU member state.
Methodology The research was based on an analysis of 22 national newspapers and the coverage of five national TV channels between May and December 2006. At this time there was heightened interest in Russian-European relations because of the number and level of official events. These included the EU-Russia summit in Sochi (May 25), the first period, the unofficial meeting of leaders of EU countries with President Putin in Lahti (October 20) - the second period, and the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki (November 24) - the third period.
36 Opinion and editorial articles published in the week before each event were reviewed in order to gain insight into the expectations of the Russian media and to discover any apparent attempts to influence public opinion. Articles published during the month following each event were subjected to an in-depth analysis looking at all areas of Russian- European relations relating to the outcome of each event.
The research focused on television and national print media to reflect the demographics of the Russian population and the way that they normally would receive information on national and international events. According to a study by the Yuri Levada Sociological Center in January 2007, 85.9% of the population receives information about events in the country and across its borders overwhelmingly from television news broadcasts, though the concentration of state capital in television mass media is the highest. 46.5 % of the sample believes the information broadcast by local and national TV. The number of people who receive information from radio programmes is much lower – 19.4%. According to the survey conducted by ROMIR-monitoring (http://www.rmh.ru) for the fourth quarter of 2006, only 21% of the adult population of Russia uses the internet and only 7% use it on a daily basis, 18% surf the web once a week. Thus the internet has the least influence on the formation of public opinion.
The selection of media sources was conducted to reflect estimates of the National Circulation Service (http://www.pressaudit.ru) which looked at newspaper circulation figures and the data from TNS Gallup Media on the audience share of TV channels as published by the Itogi journal.
Only original publications and programmes were included in the research; repeats and reprints (30% of the total) were not considered in the final estimates.
Groups of the studied sources The analysis of the data allows the division of the Russian media into several groups with regard to their position on the European Union.
Group A – Hostile to the EU: daily newspapers Moskovsky komsomolets (circulation 800,000, readership – 1.7 million); Nezavisimaya gazeta (circulation – 49,000, readership – 64, 000 people); RBC daily (circulation – 68,000 copies); weekly Moskovskie novosti (circulation - 67,200 copies); TV channel TVC (daily audience share in the first period 3.1%, in the second – 2.6%, in the third – 2.9%).
This group is characterised by a more sceptical analysis of Russian-European relations and their future. It is dismissive of most of the initiatives undertaken by the European Commission and Russia’s European orientation. Many articles are emotionally charged. Attitudes voiced by Russian officials are cited along ideological lines and arguments from the opposition are not provided.
Group BBB - Pro-European: daily newspapers Vedomosti (circulation – 69,800, readership - 113,600); Kommersant (circulation – 120,000, readership – 230,000); Gazeta (circulation – 72,000, readership – 55,100); (Novye Izvestia (circulation – 107,000).
Newspapers within this group are convinced of the appropriateness and inevitability of Russia’s ‘European path;’ they believe in a deepening of the Russian-European dialogue, only lightly criticising the authorities for any lack of flexibility in the negotiations. They reflect the arguments of both sides. Articles in these publications are marked by a positive attitude towards democratic and civil subjects.
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Group CCC – Officialdom: daily newspapers Izvestia (circulation– 103,000, readership – 385,000); Komsomolskaya Pravda (circulation 600,000– 900,000, readership – 2.68 million); Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official newspaper of the Russian government of Russia, circulation – 291,000; readership – 390,000); TV channels - First channel (average audience share in the first period – 22.3%, in the second - 21.8%, in the third –20.6%); VGTRK ‘Rossia’ (average audience share in the first period – 17.6%, in the second - 20.4%, in the third – 22%); NTV channel (average audience share in the first period – 11.6%, in the second - 12.7%, in the third – 12.3%).
This group is characterised by widespread quoting of officials without any editorial comment, straightforward coverage and a simplistic approach to evaluation. Often a loose command of the subject is reflected in articles. Opposition to the government is quoted but often its statements are edited and are not reported in context.
Group D --- Articulate; daily newspaper Vremya novostei (circulation – 51,000, readership – 210,000); weekly Itogi (circulation – 85,000 copies, readership - 465,400); TV channel Ren TV (average audience share in the first period – 4.9%, in the second – 4%, in the third – 3.8%)
The group is characterised by a competent, professional approach where attention is given to arguments from both sides. These publications have demonstrated an interest in concrete problems that may be resolved by dialogue between Russia and the EU. Articles do not use emotionally charged language.
Group E – Novaya Gazeta (it was issued twice a week at the time of the research with a circulation of 535,000 copies (readership – 1.6 million)).
Editorial consistently and harshly criticises the EU for its lenient position towards Moscow, openly declaring its focus on European values.
Levels of mass media interest in EUEU----RussianRussianRussian---- summits
EU-Russia summits coverage by mass media
Publications in research period
Number of publications 120 Helsinki 100 Lahti 80 Sochi 60 40 20 0 1
Sochi Lahti Helsinki
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The second and third periods are marked by an increase in the number of publications as compared with the first period on average by 1.5 times. This increase can be interpreted as evidence of the journalist community perceiving that the Russian relationship with Europe as a key priority of the Kremlin as determined by the activity of the President and his close circle. A boost in the number of publications is also explained by intensified PR activity from the government on this issue.
The emotional language of the publications also changes throughout the period studied. It is reserved and shows moderate optimism on the future of Russian-European relations in the first period: this gives way to scepticism in the second period and then shifts to confrontation and emotion in the third period.
Comments from official representatives of the Russian government The character of public speeches made by Russian officials also underwent substantial changes during the studied period. The number of interviews and opinion articles in the third (confrontational) period doubled, as compared with the first period, and grew by 3.5 times compared with the second period. The level of representation of these speakers grew considerably.
In the first period, bilateral relations were largely commented upon by experts, such as the permanent representative of Russia to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov, deputy foreign minister Alexander Grushko, special representative of the President, Sergei Yastrezhembsky and heads of foreign affairs committees of the State Duma and Council of Federation Konstantin Kosachev and Mikhail Margelov. Their overall contributions can be boiled down to comments on a description of the situation. The Assistant to the President, Igor Shuvalov, one of the chief Kremlin ideologists, was a notable exception.
In the second period, prominent figures such as Vice-premier Sergei Ivanov and the President (he gave two extensive interviews entirely dedicated to the EU) took part in the discussion. The debate became gradually more and more politicised. Speakers’ contributions become tougher and more simplistic.
The third period saw the theme of Russian-European relations emerge most prominently¹ due to an article written by the deputy head of the President’s administration, Vladislav Surkov. ‘Nationalisation of the future’ (Expert, #43, 2006) perfectly fitted into the discussion about a national strategy and the new state ideology – ‘sovereign democracy’. Several days before the summit in Helsinki, leading world newspapers (including Russian newspapers Vedomosti and the official publication of the State Duma, Parlamentskaya Gazeta) ran President Vladimir Putin’s article ‘Russia-EU partnership opens the way for the construction of a united Europe, new opportunities for all Europeans’. This summed up Moscow’s official position. The majority of ideas spelt out by the President were adopted by newspapers from groups A and C, heavily influencing the slant taken on the issue in media coverage.
It is worth noting that interviews and articles by Russian officials make up 25% of the total number of publications during the studied period (regardless of the extensive coverage on television), direct comments from EU representatives do not exceed 5% of the entire media content.
39 Coverage of the Sochi Summit (May 25, 2006) in the media
Media attitude to the Sochi Summit
The summit in Sochi saw potentially difficult issues on the table: for instance, the adoption of the new law about non-governmental organisations and the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, these became rather distanced from the event and lost their initial urgency. The only real tension was sparked off by US Vice-president Dick Cheney’s tough speech on May 4 at the meeting of leaders of Baltic and Black Sea countries in Vilnius. This event was used by Russian authorities to demonstrate the gaps in Moscow’s relations with Washington and Brussels.
Media-group C announced that the May summit had been very successful (‘To everyone’s surprise the meeting was successful. A response to sceptics’ – ‘First channel’, ‘The parties manifested their willingness to hear and to listen to each other’, NTV) pointing out that the leaders established very close relations - the journalists of these media saw Putin’s charm as one of his most significant attributes (‘To an outsider it was rather like a meeting of old friends’ – ‘Rossiya’). Signing the agreement on readmission and simplification of the visa regime for certain categories of citizens were depicted as ‘a breakthrough in Russian- European relations’ (‘First channel’) and ‘quite a serious achievement’ (NTV).
The remainder of the media groups gave a more sceptical assessment of events, ‘The negotiations were uneasy. The parties found a real difficulty in making a compromise’ – TVC, ‘We are faced with the dizziness of success and delusions of grandeur. US and Europe perceive Moscow’s current behaviour as a challenge’ – Kommersant, ‘A month ago we spoke as the tentacles of our pipeline were reaching the Europe’s neck. Now we have decided to back down in all the ways’, - Novaya Gazeta, ‘The bottom line of the first decade of cooperation between Russia and EU is drawn, the new decade promises to be much more complicated’, - Vremya novostei.
Coverage of the Lahti Summit (October 20, 2006) in the media
Media views of the Lahti Summit Written Media TVTVTV Positive 2 2 Neutral-positive 4 6 Neutral 16 10 Neutral-negative 17 7 Negative 11 4
The coverage in the second period was totally different. The informal meeting in Lahti was preceded by Putin’s trip to Dresden, during which he stated his readiness to redirect the Stockman deposit towards Europe and invited Germany to become the chief gas distribution centre in the EU. The response to these offers was the creation of the energy alliance between Germany and France - without Russia’s participation. A serious blow to Moscow’s negotiating position was then inflicted by the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. The situation was worsened by the Russian-Georgian conflict, to which the EU Council dedicated a tough resolution several days before the summit. Head of the Written media TVTVTV Positive 5 10 Neutral-Positive 2 7 Neutral 17 11 Neutral-Negative 16 5 Negative 7 2 40 European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, voiced open criticism of the Kremlin’s course during a lecture at the Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House in London.
Newspapers within all of the groups pointed out that the negotiations had been difficult, however, they disagreed that they had been unsuccessful. The moral victory went to Vladimir Putin, ‘Leaders of EU countries left Lahti as outsiders’, ‘European leaders gave in to the psychological attack’ (Kommersant), ‘The invitation to Lahti was very flattering. It demonstrated that Europe may criticise Russian democracy but it cannot do without Moscow in solving international problems’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta), ‘Putin’s stance was as hard as concrete’ (Moskovsky komsomolets). The opinion was shared by Novaya Gazeta which reproached Brussels for betraying democracy in Russia.
Coverage of Helsinki Summit in the media
Media view of the Helsinki Summit Written Media TVTVTV Positive 2 3 Neutral-positive 4 7 Neutral 25 10 Neutral-negative 20 19 Negative 10 10
Finally, the third summit was held against the dramatic background of the murder of Alexander Litvinenko and the Polish veto on the start of negotiations on the new framework agreement between Russia and the EU. These events came as a blow to Moscow. The Kremlin had begun a media campaign that promoted the need to transform the framework agreement into ‘the strategic partnership’ agreement (this idea had been actively promoted by Russia’s representative to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, in interviews and articles since May). Moscow’s frustration at having its hopes dashed of an easy re-signing of the PCA ’was naturally reflected in mass media from Group A, ‘The summit of small affairs’ (Moskovskie novosti), ‘European leaders inappropriately put down Vladimir Putin and received a corresponding tongue-lashing’, ‘The meeting between Russia and the EU was disrupted, officially because of Poland. However, there are two real reasons: the EU’s unreadiness for positive compromises with Russia and a US drive not to allow these compromises’ (RBC- daily).
‘B and D groups’ publications were even tougher in delivering their assessment of the summit’s outcome, characterising it as ‘a total failure’. ‘We haven’t seen such a scandalous EU-Russia summit before’ (Gazeta), ‘Leaders keep silent with journalists around, though without them they also have got nothing to say. The agenda has been disrupted’ (Ren-TV).
Only the state-controlled media tried to inject some optimism (Group C and partially Group A), ‘The summit showed that Russia and EU will always have something to discuss’ (Rossiya).
This interdependence allows Russia much room for manoeuvre. A break in the rapprochement between Russia and EU was proposed by Groups A, C and D’s media to allow a review of Russian interests and the development of appropriate tactics. According to them, Moscow shouldn’t look to reach the new framework agreement in the current circumstances, as the viewpoint of Russia and Brussels differ considerably.
41 Main concepts in highlighting the present situation around RussianRussian----EuropeanEuropean relations in Russian media
Europe and the European Union The European Union is viewed as a political block which may not be aimed directly against Russia, but undoubtedly damages its cultural and geopolitical ‘European nature’ (Groups A, C and D). Its expansion is perceived as an attempt to ‘push Russia into the East’ (Group A) while the new policy of cooperation between neighbours of former CIS countries aims to set up ‘a sanitary cordon’ at the Russian border (Groups A and C). Characterising the competition between Moscow and Brussels in the post- Soviet space as ‘ideological’, Russian mass media simultaneously stresses the commonality of European values with its own ‘different’ interpretation’ (all newspapers, official speakers – Putin, Surkov, Margelov).
United Europe and Russia The prospect of a united Europe is regarded positively by the majority of Russian journalists, but the European Union is viewed as a work-in-progress, a raw and weak conglomerate of states with very different self-interests. They consider that the European Union project is only truly achievable if a 'strategic union' can be agreed based on the consolidation of the EU military power and Russia's extensive natural resources. ’
At the same time as Russia is not viewed as a potential member of the EU and as the object of a cultural and economic takeover – ‘The path that was taken by small peoples of Europe is not appropriate for Russia’ – Moskovskie novosti quotes Putin’s official, Surkov. The outcome of such a move could result in a new stimulus for the EU, the mutual consolidation of the parties and the transformation of Europe as a world power capable of balancing out ‘aggressive US policy’.
The creation of a genuinely united Europe is seen as one of the steps on the way to building a new, ‘fairer’ world system, in which Russia will play a crucial role (all groups, officials – Lavrov). As an initial contribution to the world’s well-being, journalists from Groups A and C believe that Russia could offer its thousand-year-long experience of peaceful co-existence between different religious affinities and nationalities that could help the EU to overcome the crisis related to the dominance of culturally alien migrants (official speaker – Surkov).
The main proponent of the idea of a ‘Great Europe with no demarcation lines’ is the Russian President himself. (In the course of his presidency, Putin has attempted to create a great common Europe and it is not his fault that the project is falling apart’, - Nezavisimaya gazeta’.)
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement The EU’s cautious stance in negotiations with Russia is interpreted by journalists as a manifestation of ‘distrust’ (Groups B, C and D) and even a ‘conscious exclusion of Moscow from the discussion of crucial issues’, an ‘unwillingness to take reciprocal steps’ (Group A).
In this situation, the media is inclined to view the EU’s partial concessions over certain issues as ‘a gambit’ or even ‘a trap’. Thus the signing of the agreement on readmission and the simplification of the visa regime was taken as ‘a convenient excuse’ to delay the final cancellation of mandatory visa permits for Russian visitors to Europe. The decision to create an energy alliance between France and Germany without Russia’s participation came as a blow to any optimism regarding Russia-EU relations as far as the Russian mass media was concerned.
42 Europe’s Attitude towards Russian democracy Views on the fairness of European claims regarding the democratic situation in Russia differ considerably in Russian media. Novaya Gazeta’s approach is most the radical in this sense. It demands that Brussels toughens its rhetoric and considers breaking diplomatic relations and presses for the exclusion of Russia from international organisations. An overwhelming majority of journalists from A and C groups consider Brussels’ criticism ungrounded and too harsh; Group D publications doubt its sincerity.
On the whole, the media demonstrates its readiness to justify any change in the socio- political life of the country to be Russia specific; sovereign democracy’ (introduced by Surkov). Even the most cautious criticism is regarded as ‘interference with domestic affairs’ and the ‘imposition of artificial standards’. The bad feeling caused by the EU’s harshness has prompted a geopolitical shift to Asia that is ‘less demanding of democratic standards’.
Anti-Russian Campaign in Europe There’s a widespread conviction within the Russian media (all groups, except for Group E) that public opinion compels leaders of the EU (who cannot afford to overlook public opinion after the failure of European constitution) to pose unpleasant questions to Putin. Europeans tone down their talks with Moscow in private meetings – discussions become more substantial, articulate and respectful. Russian journalists view Europeans’ ‘Cold war victory syndrome’ (introduced by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov) as a factor that stands in the way of bilateral relations. The media believes that Europe is not willing to understand the psychology of modern Russia and doesn’t make an effort to consider its arguments.
A considerable part of the journalist community (Groups A and C) share Moscow’s suspicions of the ‘existence of a large-scale and coordinated anti-Russian campaign’ being mounted in the West that has resulted in talk about a crisis in Russian-European relations. This version of events has been made public personally by the President’s special representative, Sergei Yastrzhembsky.
The Future of Russian-European Relations Despite the fact that Russian-European relations today are characterised as at ‘a stand off’ and full of ‘mutual suspicion’, the prospect of an improvement in relations is inevitable to all mass media outlets (except for Group E) – because with the existing level of mutual dependence, it is felt that an agreement between the parties will be reached anyway and its achievement is just a matter of time.
Perception of the Russia-EU Energy Dialogue Moscow and Brussels’ fixation on the energy issue is viewed by the media as one of the main obstacles for the development of a constructive dialogue. Many publications believe that relations with the EU are subject to the interests of big state business that dictates the agenda and rarely considers the interests of ordinary people.
Europeans’ demands to liberalise the Russian energy market and to open cross-country pipelines for the transit of raw materials from third-world countries are perceived by Groups A, C and partially D as a threat to Russian sovereignty, ‘EU views our resources as if it owned them’ (Interfax), ‘They attempt to make Russia act against its national interests’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta).
In response to ‘Brussels’ undue pressure’ Group A and C publications call for ‘energy nationalism’ and a more decisive use of energy as a political tool. Groups B and D agree
43 that such energy pressure will enjoy a short-term effect, but point out that ‘similar tools will depreciate while frustrating Russian diplomacy’ – Vedomosti.
Groups A, B and C view recognition of Russia’s leadership in the sphere of energy security as a constructive step towards a more close political union with Europe, a signal of political trust.
Russia doesn’t regard Europe as a reliable consumer capable of paying for supplies in ‘hard currency’ (Barroso), ‘The leadership of our government finally realised that our natural resources in terms of their value, are no match for coloured paper, so-called money, if these coloured papers are directly given to those who printed it’ – Literaturnaya gazeta, A group. Considering the economy’s reliance on ‘raw materials’ as temporary, the media demands that supplies are redirected towards those consumers that can ‘offer cutting-edge scientific- technical development for our economy’ – Moskovskie novosti. This idea is officially promoted by Vladislav Surkov.
Groups A and C view the investment of Russian capital in European companies, primarily in the hi-tech sector, and using western companies as contractors in the development of Russian deposits, as the main way of acquiring new technologies. They also propose seeking funds for investments in the fuel and energy industry which are necessary to maintain the status of a reliable supplier to the end-consumer market in Europe.
All media covers the unwillingness of Brussels to allow Russian business access to its market, not because of any principles but due to a desire to defend its own companies from competition. Russian journalists believe that political setbacks in EU-Russia relations are the result of economic competition that allows the Russian approach to diplomacy of ‘where there’s bargaining there’s a deal’.
Groups A and C take the EU’s statements concerning its intention ‘to include’ the main provisions of Energy Charter into the text of the new framework agreement as an insult that aims to highlight Moscow’s status merely as a source of ‘raw materials’. Representatives of these groups take an uncompromising stance: if Brussels refuses to make concessions, then Russia should return to bilateral dialogue with each individual EU member. The gambit of highlighting the contradictions inside the EU at present may considerably benefit Russia.
Perception of the History of Russian-European Relations The media’s attitude towards the modern European Union is, in many ways, conditioned by a sort of 1990s ‘psychological trauma’. It is at this point, the journalists believe, that relations between Brussels and Moscow were founded on an unequal basis. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that took effect in 1997 ‘When Russia was experiencing a system crisis’ (Itogi) is characterised by the majority of mass media as ‘one- sided agreement’ (TVC channel).
The market reforms that were driven by international experts, including the EU, are frowned upon in the media (especially for A group): ‘The talk about democracy and a free market in Russia clouded a bitter fight for power and money. By the end of the 1990s its results became obvious: millions of people got poor and lost their illusions’ – TVC channel. There is a widespread conviction among a small group of publications about Brussels’ malicious intentions, ‘The project aimed to put the Russian economy into total dependency, caused by its debts. Then it would have had to pay it off by providing oil and gas to Western companies. Thus our natural resources were to steadily pass into foreign ownership’, - Moskovskie novosti. Lack of criticism of a young Russian democracy during the Yeltsin
44 period is perceived as another manifestation of Brussels’ insincerity about this issue, ‘Can you call this a democracy? But they did because they found a weak, dependent, neglected and powerless Russia quite suitable’, - TVC channel.
Russia’s modern ambitions are depicted as part of its drive to get back its legitimate position which it lost in the 1990s. This viewpoint is strongly promoted by official speakers, including the President himself.
The Political Situation Inside the European Union All Russian media appears to be convinced that the EU is experiencing one of the most dramatic periods in its history. A deep cultural and economic crisis provoked by a half- baked decision to extend its borders and uncontrolled migration may lead to the collapse of the idea of a united Europe. The EU is seen divided into two contending camps – old members and so-called new countries – the newcomers. The conflicts between these are not being solved and continue to intensify.
‘The new Europe’ led by Warsaw, is seen by all media groups as a stronghold of Atlantic interests in Europe. It is stated that Washington openly uses EU ‘newcomers’ to restrain its European competitors.
Such an alternative doesn’t facilitate the unification of the European Union. For some countries important decision-making is spurred more and more frequently by national egotism as manifested by Poland’s veto on EU negotiations with Russia on the new framework agreement – the media called the setback ‘an internal problem for the European Union’.
Journalists call for a dialogue with EU countries independently because there’s no shared opinion regarding co-operation with Moscow throughout the EU. Despite a change in the political leadership of Germany and Italy, the Russian mass media (Groups A and C in the first place) continue to consider these countries as chief promoters of Russian interests in Europe. Russia pins much hope on the German chairmanship in this respect. Journalists prefer to overlook the Atlantic slant in Berlin’s policy.
It is assumed that the disagreements inside the EU will inevitably entail a cut in Brussels’ political influence on the international stage, as a result of which the EU will have to seek an influential ally which is open to a dialogue on an equal basis. This ally could be Moscow, which is interested in the stability of its borders to the West.
Conclusion Media coverage of EU-Russia summits, with a few exceptions, is a reflection of the authority’s position on present and future relations between Russia and the EU. It is also a propaganda ‘map’ relayed by the authorities to the people. Analysing the publications dedicated to these issues, it is possible to form an opinion on the position of the authorities, as well as their interpretation of this issue - as they control the media.
The analysis shows that the authorities aim to deepen a pragmatic Russian-European dialogue. However, Brussels is viewed only as one potential partner. Russia mainly relies on specific European capitals, relations with which are promoted to Russian society as tradition-bound, conditioned by a centuries-old history of diplomatic and cultural connections.
45 The commentary of the Russian mass media illustrates that the authorities believe that the European Union is not a single political player on the international stage. They expect that intensification of contact with Brussels will result in political gains leading to the creation of a strategic union (‘The Big Europe’, new world centre of power). The Russian elite’s fixation on energy dialogue to the detriment of other forms of cooperation should be pointed out. At the same time the potential of Russian-European relations goes virtually undisclosed and undiscussed, Russian-European dialogue is presented in a dry and formalised way.
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