OCTOBER 2016

Managing the “Boat People” Crisis: The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees

DESPERATE MIGRATION SERIES NO. 2

ALEXANDER CASELLA Cover Photo: A thirty-five-foot fishing ABOUT THE AUTHOR boat approaches a US navy ship 350 miles northeast of Cam Ranh Bay, ALEXANDER CASELLA is a writer for Asia Times and a Vietnam, after eight days at sea, May consultant on issues related to migration. He worked as an 15, 1984. US Department of the Navy. independent journalist covering the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1975. He worked for the UN Refugee Agency from Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author 1975 to 1996, serving in Hanoi, Geneva, Beirut, and and not necessarily those of the Bangkok. International Peace institute. IPI welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS policies and issues in international affairs. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their generous support. IPI Publications Adam Lupel, Vice President Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor Madeline Brennan, Assistant Production Editor

Suggested Citation: Alexander Casella, “Managing the ‘Boat People’ Crisis: The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2016.

© by International Peace Institute, 2016 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1

Origins of the Crisis ...... 2

International Response to the New Crisis ...... 3

AN INDIVIDUAL-LED, FIELD-DRIVEN INITIATIVE

ADOPTING THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

FOUNDATIONS OF THE CPA

REACTIONS TO THE PLAN

Implementing the Plan ...... 6

PUTTING THE PROCEDURES IN MOTION

THE MASS INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

THE END OF THE EXODUS—AND OF THE COLD WAR

THE PROBLEM OF REPATRIATION

Conclusion ...... 10

1

Executive Summary It was only once Vietnam became involved that a solution to the crisis became possible. Spanning a period of twenty-one years, the 4. UN crisis response can be most effective when a Vietnamese “boat people” exodus was the last single agency is in the lead. The CPA benefited major refugee crisis of the Cold War. It started in from UNHCR being the only agency substan - the spring of 1975 after the fall of Saigon and tively involved in its implementation. resumed in 1978, as tens of thousands of 5. Countries’ involvement in responding to Vietnamese took to sea, headed for Hong Kong or refugee crises does not necessarily translate into the countries of Southeast Asia. The international them adopting refugee law. Most of the response agreed on in Geneva in 1979 was in line countries of Southeast Asia continued to reject with Western Cold War values—all Vietnamese the Refugee Convention. fleeing the communist regime were automatically recognized as refugees and resettled in the West— 6. Refugees and migrants are easy victims of but by 1988 it had begun to unravel. The new rumors and disinformation. One of the reasons international response took the form of the the CPA was successful was that a mass Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese information campaign let Vietnamese people Refugees (CPA), which was in place from 1989 to know it existed. 1996. 7. Durable solutions must address both refugees The CPA was revolutionary in two ways. First, it and migrants. Probably the main achievement was comprehensive, made up of five mutually of the CPA was to bridge the asylum-migration supporting components: (1) screening for refugee conundrum and replace it, in fact if not in status, (2) resettlement of those granted refugee words, with a solution to population movement status, (3) repatriation of those denied refugee in general. status, (4) streamlining of a program allowing Introduction people to apply for refugee status from Vietnam, and (5) a mass campaign to inform Vietnamese of While all asylum and migration crises have their the CPA’s provisions. Second, its individual own specific characteristics, they share one components were predicated on two fundamental common principle: the preferred solution is for rights: the right of Vietnamese boat people to land people to voluntarily return to their home and their right to be processed for refugee status. countries, provided that the conditions leading to As a result, the CPA both saved lives and marked the exodus no longer prevail. In parallel, this the transition from blanket recognition of refugee requires establishing a system of asylum for status to individual status determination—all in a refugees and of mandatory return for those not region whose countries had not ratified the Refugee entitled to refugee status. Establishing such a Convention. system requires the involvement of the country of While all refugee situations are different, the origin, where conditions must emerge to make CPA provides lessons that could extend beyond the such a solution possible. Indochinese refugee crisis: The Comprehensive Plan of Action for 1. Decisive action sometimes depends on initia - Indochinese Refugees (CPA), which was in place tives undertaken by enterprising individuals in from 1989 to 1996, was a practical implementation the field. Plans to address the refugee crisis in of this approach to address Vietnam’s “boat Indochina only progressed due to individual people” crisis. Twenty years after the end of this initiative. agreement, this report considers what lessons could 2. New approaches to refugee crises are bound to be learned from the CPA, some of which could be be controversial. The NGO community was not relevant to today’s migration crises, including the attuned to the CPA’s wholesale rethinking of the movement of people from Africa and the Middle refugee crisis and thus largely opposed it. East to Europe. In Vietnam, conceiving the CPA 3. Comprehensive solutions require the commit - required initiative, imagination, some daring, and, ment and involvement of the country of origin. perhaps most importantly of all, involvement of the 2 Alexander Casella country of origin. It also benefited from the shift in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 2 This, along with the external conditions resulting from the end of the absence of a territorial solution, deprived the Cold War. All of these elements seem lacking from Vietnamese boat people of the right to asylum, responses to today’s migration crises. 1 making resettlement in Western countries the only possible outcome. Origins of the Crisis While the 1951 Refugee Convention provides a clear definition of the term “refugee” and, as such, Spanning a period of twenty-one years, the a legal basis for protection claims, individual Vietnamese “boat people” exodus was the last refugee determination procedures were the major refugee crisis of the Cold War. It started in exception rather than the rule. As most people were the spring of 1975, when some 140,000 Vietnamese fleeing from the East to the West, and with were evacuated from Saigon by the United States in communist countries imposing penalties for illegal the weeks before the city fell to North Vietnam. departure so severe that they amounted to persecu - After a hiatus of about two years, the exodus tion, Western countries considered simply fleeing resumed in 1978, as tens of thousands of from a communist regime as sufficient grounds to Vietnamese took to sea, headed for Hong Kong or warrant refugee status. And so, it was formally the countries of Southeast Asia. agreed that all Vietnamese boat people would be While in theory the international response to this automatically recognized as refugees and resettled exodus could have drawn upon lessons learned in the only countries that would accept them— from previous Cold War refugee crises, the refugee Western countries. crisis in Indochina presented new challenges that This solution was formally adopted at the the international community had never previously International Conference on Indochinese Refugees encountered. in July 1979. At the time, it was the only approach Refugee crises had traditionally been regional that was coherent both with reality and with the phenomena that were addressed through regional values that the West stood for in the Cold War. solutions. By and large, refugees did not overflow Ultimately, however, it proved to be a Western their own geographic areas. African refugees fled to solution in an Asian context; after having initially neighboring African countries, Hungarian and served its purpose, it became part of the problem. Czech refugees were granted asylum by other By 1988, the agreement reached in Geneva had Western countries, and Palestinians were housed begun to unravel. Considering that all of the in camps in the Middle East. In Asia, when the countries of the region (with the exception of Communists came to power in China in 1949, China) were adamant in their refusal to provide many members of the Kuomintang found asylum asylum to any Vietnamese arriving by boat, the in Taiwan. Likewise, when Vietnam was divided in system hinged on resettlement in Western 1954, almost 1 million North Vietnamese sought countries. This was the nonnegotiable precondi - refuge in South Vietnam rather than live under a tion for allowing the Vietnamese boat arrivals to communist regime. land. No such solution proved available to Vietnam’s In parallel to the 1979 conference in Geneva, the boat people. Indeed, with the exception of China, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had signed an which provided asylum to some 260,000 agreement with the Vietnamese authorities setting Vietnamese of Chinese origin, all the countries of up an Orderly Departure Program (ODP). The Southeast Asia adamantly refused to grant ODP was to enable qualifying Vietnamese to leave permanent asylum to any Vietnamese boat person. the country legally. It was expected to provide a Moreover, none of the countries of the Association credible alternative to illegal departure and thus to of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had signed

1 Sources for this report include interviews with two of the four originators of the CPA conducted in June and July 2016, documents shared by these interviewees, and the author’s personal notes. Figures cited are from internal UN documents. 2 Of the destination countries for the Vietnamese boat people, none except China had signed the Refugee Convention in 1979. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have still not ratified the Refugee Convention, while the Philippines ratified it in 1984. While the UK was a signatory to the Refugee Convention, the convention did not apply to the British territory of Hong Kong. MANAGING THE “BOAT PEOPLE” CRISIS 3

help reduce the number of people leaving by boat. on the verge of a new humanitarian catastrophe. The ODP was predicated on the existence of three lists: List A, to be set up by the Vietnamese International Response to authorities, included people with exit permits. List the New Crisis B included Vietnamese for whom foreign countries were willing to provide visas. List C included AN INDIVIDUAL-LED, FIELD-DRIVEN people who figured on both Lists A and B and who INITIATIVE could thus leave legally. As initially conceived, the As the number of pushbacks grew, threatening to ODP never worked. Indeed, Hanoi perceived it as undermine the strategy agreed on in 1979, Western no more than a means of getting rid of Saigon’s diplomats in Bangkok looked on with increasing Chinese community. Of the 10,000 names initially anxiety. In an attempt to address the issue, the Ford submitted on List A, practically all were Chinese, Foundation, in the wake of a series of meetings of and practically none were qualified to figure on List the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 3 B, which excluded them from List C. As a result, by (ASEAN) in the Thai capital, decided to organize a the mid-1980s, with ODP departures few and far seminar in the Thai district of Cha-Am on May 25, between, Vietnamese who felt compelled to leave 1988, on the theme of the Vietnamese boat people. Vietnam had no alternative but to leave by boat. Labeling the meeting as “informal” and claiming At the same time, while the exodus endured, that participation was solely on a personal basis, the resettlement from Southeast Asia and Hong Kong Ford Foundation ensured that the exchange would had begun to erode. Little by little, a residual be frank and to the point. It was. What emerged caseload of “long-stayers” who no Western govern - was a recognition that first asylum for Vietnamese ment was willing to take built up in the camps. was hanging in the balance. Without new solutions, These included North Vietnamese whose such as the restructuring of the international departure had been in no way related to the arrangements for asylum, Southeast Asian situation prevailing in South Vietnam. Western countries were forced to unilaterally take drastic governments also started cutting down on their steps to prevent new boat arrivals. resettlement quotas for Vietnamese boat people, The Cha-Am seminar provided the opportunity arguing that, ten years after the end of the Vietnam for the meeting of minds of four key participants in War, the nature of the caseload had changed and discussions on the Indochinese refugee situation: they had other priorities. Allan Jury, deputy counselor at the US mission in With the residual caseload gradually building Bangkok; Gervais Appave, his Australian counter - and resettlement quotas starting to shrink, part; Pierre Jambor, the UNHCR representative in Southeast Asian countries grew concerned, partic - Bangkok; and Kasit Piromya, director of the ularly as the ratio of arrivals to departures began to Department of International Organizations at the change. Between 1980 and 1986, the yearly number Thai Foreign Ministry. 4 Subsequent to the Cha-Am of resettled boat people exceeded the number of meeting, this quartet met regularly, albeit new arrivals. Then, in 1988, the number of new informally, and soon concluded that the only arrivals almost doubled in comparison to the solution to the coming crisis was to put in place a previous year. Resettlement quotas, however, did comprehensive plan. This plan would include not follow suit. screening refugees, returning to Vietnam those Confronted with the reality of a burgeoning who did not qualify for refugee status, and caseload of non-settled boat people, in order to providing long-term resettlement for those who curb the inflow, countries resorted to the policy did, while also expanding the ODP. They saw such that was easiest to implement: pushbacks. There is a plan as culminating in a new international no estimate of the number who drowned as a result conference on refugees from Indochina, following of these policies. By mid-1988, Southeast Asia was the model of the 1979 conference.

3 Oral source from the UN Refugee Agency. 4 Draft cable report from the US Embassy in Bangkok, May 18, 1988. 4 Alexander Casella

On June 2 nd , Jury sent an official letter to Jambor ADOPTING THE COMPREHENSIVE suggesting that UNHCR take the lead in organizing PLAN OF ACTION a meeting in Bangkok with local representatives of The CPA was revolutionary in two ways. First, it major Western countries to decide on how to was comprehensive, made up of mutually proceed with the proposal. Accompanying Jury’s supporting components that all culminated in a letter was an informal draft agenda containing a solution. Second, its individual components were paragraph proposing “refugee screening”—a bold predicated on two fundamental rights: the right of suggestion coming from a US diplomat. Up until Vietnamese boat people to land and their right to this point, the presumption was that all Vietnamese be processed for refugee status. As a result, the CPA boat people were refugees fleeing persecution. both saved lives and marked the transition from Questioning this presumption could have had blanket recognition of refugee status to individual major political repercussions for Vietnam in the status determination. Moreover, it did this in an way the country was perceived both regionally and environment where refugee law was nonexistent, internationally. given that almost none of the countries of the While the quartet, which had been expanded to region had ratified the Refugee Convention. include representatives of Australia, Canada, In practical terms, this meant that boat people France, and the EU, started to work on a text based who landed after a given cutoff date would no on Jury’s proposals, it became evident that nothing longer be automatically recognized as refugees but would be achieved if Hanoi were not brought into would be classified as asylum seekers. They would the picture. However, given the prevailing political then be subject to an individual refugee status climate, no government was willing to extend an determination procedure, and those recognized as invitation to the Vietnamese. Instead, they refugees would be resettled. Those not qualifying expected UNHCR to do so. However, the high for refugee status would be repatriated, voluntarily commissioner rejected the proposal, considering it or forcibly, under an amnesty program monitored too political. It was not until the director of the US by UNHCR that provided that they would not be Bureau for Refugee Programs, Ambassador prosecuted for illegal departure. In parallel, the Jonathan Moore, informed the commissioner that ODP would be widely expanded to provide a he fully supported the initiative that Jambor realistic alternative to departure by boat for those received approval to proceed at his own risk. who qualified. Jambor then requested the UNHCR representa - By October, the drafting process, which was still tive in Hanoi to invite a Vietnamese delegation to informal, had produced a basic document that come to Bangkok to take part in the next round of reflected a general consensus and provided a deliberations organized by the quartet. framework from which a more official plan could Simultaneously, and acting on their own initiative, emerge. Toward this end, in October, the govern - Jury and Appave informed the Vietnamese ment of Malaysia called for a “pre-meeting” in ambassador in Bangkok that the purpose of the Kuala Lumpur, inviting all concerned governments invitation was not to embarrass or censure the to attend in an official capacity. Vietnamese, but rather to involve them in a Thus, while the original text had been conceived constructive process seeking to bring to an by representatives in Bangkok, the “pre-confer - honorable end the boat people exodus. While ence” sought to involve the capitals. UNHCR Hanoi never replied to the invitation, several weeks headquarters also developed its own draft CPA, later, the Vietnamese ambassador in Bangkok, which Ambassador Kasit publicly tore up at the accompanied by a vice minister, arrived opening of the meeting, declaring that the text unannounced at the New Imperial Hotel where the produced in Bangkok was the only one to work on. group was holding one of its regular meetings. Ultimately, the Bangkok-produced text was What followed over the next several months was adopted with a single modification requested by the an unofficial drafting process from which emerged Vietnamese: on the issue of returning those who the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese were denied refugee status, the word “must” was Refugees (CPA). replaced by “should.” Having been endorsed (albeit MANAGING THE “BOAT PEOPLE” CRISIS 5

informally) by the Kuala Lumpur “pre-confer - on the understanding that it would not entail ence,” the draft penned in Bangkok was now bodily harm. In addition, Hanoi and UNHCR confirmed as the founding document of the CPA. had signed a memorandum of understanding in Polishing and promoting it fell to UNHCR’s Asia December 1988, which specified that the bureau, and in March 1989 the CPA was finalized returnees would not be subject to the penalties in Kuala Lumpur. imposed by Vietnamese law for illegal FOUNDATIONS OF THE CPA departure. This guarantee was to be monitored by UNHCR, which would also provide the While the CPA essentially served as a regional returnees with a reintegration allowance. document, the fact that it provided for extra- regional resettlement gave it an international 4. The ODP was to be streamlined to bolster dimension—with a corresponding international intergovernmental collaboration afforded under responsibility—that the countries of ASEAN the CPA. Initially it had been managed by wished to emphasize. The UN Secretariat, however, UNHCR and was subject to continued obstruc - was lukewarm about getting involved in the tion by Vietnamese authorities. Under the CPA, process. To circumvent this reluctance, ASEAN rather than remaining a bone of contention prevailed on the UN General Assembly to adopt a between Hanoi and Washington, it became the resolution formally requesting UN Secretary- first cooperative venture between the two General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to convene an governments. Its operation was ultimately taken International Conference on Indo-Chinese over by the International Organization for Refugees to adopt the CPA. 5 The conference, Migration (IOM). attended by seventy-five states, was duly convened 5. There would be a “mass information” campaign in Geneva from June 13 to 14, 1989. It adopted the in Vietnam to ensure that potential boat people CPA and created a steering committee, based in would be aware of the CPA’s provisions. Southeast Asia, which would regularly meet to The rationale for the creation and delivery of an 6 review implementation. information campaign was that Vietnamese people The CPA included five mutually supportive should be informed that the situation had changed components: and that resettlement from countries of first asylum 1. It provided that all new arrivals would be was no longer automatic; it was now subject to the screened for refugee status. This would be granting of refugee status, for which many would undertaken by officers from the countries of not qualify. Those who did not qualify would be first asylum, trained and supervised by returned to Vietnam, while those who did qualify UNHCR. While the cases of those “screened in” could leave through the ODP rather than on boats. as refugees were generally accepted, all Ultimately, the information campaign sought to “screened out” cases would be reviewed by enable potential boat people to make an educated UNHCR, which retained the authority to grant decision about leaving, thereby encouraging them refugee status to any boat person independently not to leave in the first place. It was, in other words, of the decision of the screening officers. deterrence through information. 2. All those granted refugee status would be The concept had never been tried before, and automatically entitled to resettlement on the there was no guarantee of success. But when it had basis of the procedures currently in place. been raised informally in Hanoi, the authorities had been intrigued and promised the full support 3. All those denied refugee status would have to of the Vietnamese state media, on the return to Vietnam. Return would preferably be understanding that UNHCR would take the lead voluntary, but forcible return was not excluded, and pay the costs.

5 The foreign ministers of the countries of ASEAN issued a Joint Statement on Indo-Chinese Refugees on July 4, 1988. This led to General Assembly Resolution 43/119 (December 8, 1988), UN Doc. A/RES/43/119. 6 See UN General Assembly, Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action of the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees: Report of the Secretary- General , UN Doc. A/44/523, September 22, 1989. 6 Alexander Casella

REACTIONS TO THE PLAN war, the idea of return was also not easy to accept. The signing of the CPA was not met with It was even more difficult to accept for the large widespread support—far from it. While govern - number of Vietnamese living in the United States ments were relieved that a contentious issue had who had benefited from an across-the-board been brought under control, at least in the short resettlement policy that would now be denied to term, the reaction outside of governments was a their relatives. combination of concern, disbelief, and outright Last but not least, the human rights and advocacy hostility. community, which had just emerged on the Within UNHCR, lawyers had always looked international scene, proved unsparing in its askance at the ODP. For them, refugees were, by censure of both the screening system and the definition, individuals outside their home country, return policy. from which they had fled to escape persecution. While these fountainheads of dissent were not For an agency whose task it was to protect refugees enough to derail the CPA, anti-CPA efforts—often to operate inside a refugee-producing country in well-meaning but generally based on unsubstanti - order to help people leave legally—which could ated claims about the persecution faced by returned imply that they were not persecuted and thus not Vietnamese—contributed to politicizing the issue refugees—went against the grain. They also found in American politics. This, in turn, made the CPA’s it objectionable that screening for refugee status implementation more difficult and its closure more could be undertaken in and by countries that were protracted. 7 not signatories to and did not adhere to the princi - ples underpinning the UN Refugee Convention. Implementing the Plan Although UNHCR retained the right to oversee every decision, thus guaranteeing that no genuine PUTTING THE PROCEDURES IN refugee would be left unidentified, this oversight MOTION was seen as a technicality. And while this techni - The first upshot of the adoption of the CPA was cality ensured that asylum would be preserved, that pushbacks came to an immediate stop. With UNHCR’s objection was one of principle. the ASEAN countries now assured that all boat Among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), people who landed on their shores would either be hostility toward the CPA was widespread. Many resettled or repatriated, deterring them from NGO staff working in camps for displaced landing became unnecessary, and countless lives Vietnamese had developed personal attachments to were no doubt saved. the Vietnamese there and were profoundly It then fell to UNHCR to set up a comprehensive disturbed by the idea that, if denied refugee status, screening system to identify who among the boat they ran the risk of being forcefully returned to people was entitled to refugee status. This entailed Vietnam. hiring and training lawyers from the countries of Moreover, many were distressed by the fact that first asylum who, under UNHCR supervision, return was envisaged in the CPA at all, even if it would adjudicate cases. It also put in place appeals were “voluntary.” During the Cold War, the procedures, with UNHCR retaining the right to concept of “refugee” was predicated on the belief have the final say in each case. that the communist regimes were so abhorrent that However, for many of the newly arrived the simple fact of having left illegally entitled a Vietnamese boat people, the screening process person to refugee status. This was the principle that proved confusing. It was difficult to comprehend had been applied in Europe and in Vietnam until that friends or relatives who had arrived in the adoption of the CPA. countries of first asylum just weeks or days before, For the many tens of thousands of Americans were automatically entitled to resettlement while who had fought or worked in Vietnam during the they were not. Corruption also became a problem.

7 For example, US Representatives Christopher Smith and Robert Dornan led an attack on the CPA using arguments fed to them by certain elements of the US Vietnamese community. For an example of unintended consequences of this politicization, see Charles P. Wallace, “Rep. Dornan Blamed for a New Flood of ‘Boat People,’” LA Times , May 14, 1991. MANAGING THE “BOAT PEOPLE” CRISIS 7

Although the issue was never raised in public, there from Washington. Instead, an American consular were cases of boat people offering to pay screening official who had worked for years in Vietnam, officers to grant them refugee status with money spoke fluent Vietnamese, and was now involved received from relatives who had already been with the ODP agreed to give an interview to a local resettled in Western countries. Ultimately, cameraman; the tape was then given to the UNHCR chose to address corruption on a case-by- Vietnamese TV crew. In addition, because case basis on the principle that the lesser evil was to voluntary repatriation of those denied refugee err on the side of generosity, and granting a few status had just begun, albeit slowly, the TV crew people refugee status for the wrong reasons was was able to return to Hanoi by air on a repatriation preferable to wrongly denying refugee status to flight chartered by UNHCR. even one person. The one-hour film was factual and to the point. It THE MASS INFORMATION CAMPAIGN showed the prosperity of Hong Kong, as well as life While UNHCR put in place the complex adminis - in the camps, where food was adequate and trative mechanism for dealing with the screening housing no worse than in Vietnam. But it also process and its various appeal mechanisms, the emphasized that, for those denied refugee status, exodus continued. UNHCR therefore decided to there was only one option: return to Vietnam. The start the mass information campaign. To film was aired on March 15, 1990, and rebroadcast implement the campaign, UNHCR created a on the three following evenings. At the same time, position of “special adviser” in Bangkok, and the six copies were made and distributed to mobile film job was assigned to the staff member who had teams, which went with a projector and a generator conceived the idea for the project. The time had to villages without access to TVs. come to give substance, if substance there was, to Just six days after the first airing of the film, the idea. arrivals in Hong Kong were down by some 70 The arrival of boat people from Vietnam in percent compared to the same period the previous countries of first asylum was essentially regulated year. When the sailing season was over, the total by weather patterns. In northern Vietnam, the peak arrivals in Hong Kong numbered some 3,500, sailing season to Hong Kong, which was the compared to 30,000 for the same period the year preferred destination, was March, and the average before—an 88 percent decrease. In financial terms, sailing time to the British colony was one week. The with the cost of the upkeep of one boat person in peak sailing season from the south was May. Based Hong Kong amounting to $1,800 per year, the total on this data, it was decided that the first mass savings came to some $45 million. With an information campaign would be undertaken in operational budget of $150,000, the mass informa - northern Vietnam and would target the exodus tion campaign more than paid for itself. And more toward Hong Kong. The campaign would explain importantly, the results were long-lasting. While it that a new situation had arisen in which refugee took a few more years to reduce the residual status had become a prerequisite for resettlement, caseload in Hong Kong, mass inflow from the 8 and that those denied refugee status would have to north was now over for good. return to Vietnam. The sailing season from southern Vietnam to the In January 1990, a Hanoi TV crew arrived in countries of ASEAN reached its apex in May. Hong Kong—a first. With the support of the However, despite departures steadily continuing, it authorities, the crew was given free run of the city, was too late to move the mass information including the port, the stock market, and the campaign to the south, so the endeavor was refugee camps. Among the many interviews postponed until 1991. By this time, news of the planned, potentially the most convincing would updated screening procedures had reached the have featured an American consular official south, but boat departures continued. This was explaining the CPA in Vietnamese. This, however, largely due to those in the south having a higher would have required waiting months for approval chance of being granted refugee status than their

8 While the information campaign was not solely responsible for the decrease in departures, a survey undertaken in Hanoi indicated that many people decided, after watching the film, that leaving for Hong Kong was not worth the cost and effort. 8 Alexander Casella northern counterparts, as well as feeling generally to bring the issue to a close: the CPA. Its implemen - disaffected with the regime. The ODP, which did tation had been a sideshow. Now it was a priority not exist in the north, could also provide a realistic that would permit the region to turn a page on the alternative to illegal departure if fully implemented. Vietnam War. The film for the south, which was produced by Once the exodus came to an end, however, Ho Chi Minh City TV, focused on two elements: implementation of the CPA became a matter of first, that the chances of being granted refugee routine for UNHCR. Refugee status screening and status were very low and often not worth the risk the resettlement of those recognized as refugees and the cost of the journey, and second, that the was an ongoing process, and those denied refugee ODP was now a realistic alternative to illegal status were quietly set aside for repatriation. With departure. Additionally, forms that readers could the mechanics of the CPA under control, interest in fill out and send to apply for the ODP were printed Asia within UNHCR waned. The director of in all the main newspapers in the south. UNHCR’s Asia bureau was reassigned, as was the The results of the campaign in the south were special adviser overseeing the mass information impressive. In May 1990, boat departures from the campaign, which by this point was no longer south totaled around 6,000; in May 1991, the figure necessary. had dropped to around 400. From then on, the THE PROBLEM OF REPATRIATION mass exodus of boat people from Vietnam was a As UNHCR’s focus shifted away from the region, thing of the past. implementation of the CPA began to falter, and by The mass information campaigns alone did not the spring of 1995, it was on the verge of collapse. bring the exodus to a close, nor did the CPA’s Besides the mass information campaign, the CPA provisions for first asylum, screening, resettlement, was composed of four mutually supportive and return. Rather, it was provisions within the components: first asylum, screening, resettlement, CPA together with a changed situation in Vietnam and return. If one component were to fail, the that created enabling conditions for the informa - whole edifice would collapse—and now one was tion campaign to be seen as credible. This said, if failing. Repatriation to Vietnam had come to a halt, the information campaign had not been profes - and more and more Vietnamese who had been sionally managed and had not taken into account denied refugee status were arriving to the camps. cultural sensitivities, it would likely have been of Return was the most controversial component of little consequence. the CPA, but also one of its most significant. THE END OF THE EXODUS—AND OF UNHCR was responsible for refugees, but those THE COLD WAR screened out were, by definition, not refugees. By The situation in Vietnam changed drastically including the concept of return among its following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. provisions, the CPA extended UNHCR's mandate For the leadership in Hanoi, it was a shattering to service a new category of people considered experience. For half a century, they had viewed illegal migrants. As a result, the refugee issue could themselves as the vanguard of the “world revolu - not be addressed without simultaneously tion” in Southeast Asia. Now, a world revolution addressing the migration issue. In this respect, the ceased to exist. Not only had they lost their ideolog - CPA was indeed “comprehensive,” because it ical compass, and their only patron evaporated; sought to address population movements in overnight they had become orphans. Their foreign general, including both asylum and migration. policy of occupying Cambodia, taunting ASEAN, If the corollary of asylum was resettlement, the vexing China, and irritating the US could no longer corollary of illegal migration was repatriation. This, be sustained. however, not only required the active involvement As a result, Vietnam’s leadership recognized that of the country of origin, but it also implied that they would have to normalize relations with their Vietnam was now a “normal” country and that its neighbors. The boat people exodus had been one of citizens could not claim to be subject to persecu - the major irritants in their foreign relations with tion. The CPA was the first example of the West both ASEAN and the US. Now they had a blueprint declaring that individuals who fled a communist MANAGING THE “BOAT PEOPLE” CRISIS 9

country were not automatically refugees and that Hanoi, which would approve them on a case-by- they could be repatriated. case basis. But while UNHCR had submitted some Granted, when the CPA was adopted, Vietnam 20,000 names, the Vietnamese government was was still a one-party state that did not tolerate any clearing them very slowly. Eventually, clearances political dissent. At the same time, however, the completely stopped after the head of Vietnam's way in which the regime exercised its authority had immigration service felt that he had been publicly profoundly changed. By the time the CPA was insulted by the director of UNHCR's Asia bureau adopted, Vietnamese nationals were no longer during an official meeting. It did not help that subject to restrictions on their freedom of UNHCR had no representative in Hanoi to address movement, freedom to choose their profession, the problem. With the CPA due to end on June 30, and economic freedom. Thus, the average 1996, it was imperative to resume repatriation. Vietnamese person could no longer claim to be After UNHCR appointed a new director of the fleeing a totalitarian environment and to face Asia bureau, Vietnamese authorities explained that automatic persecution if repatriated. It was a clearance for returnees from the south was delayed contention that many could not countenance, and due to communication problems. The background these opponents continued to hinder the of returnees had to be checked at their last place of implementation of the CPA. 9 residence, which was often an isolated village. Most The other contentious issue was how repatriation of these villages did not have any communications should be implemented. In December 1989, Hong infrastructure, and it took an inordinate amount of Kong had forcibly returned to Vietnam a group of time for the results of the investigation to reach the fifty-one boat people who had been denied refugee provincial capitals. Solving this problem required status. Though the British would never have taken communications equipment that cost $60,000. The the political risk of repatriating Vietnamese who director immediately approved the purchase. would have been in danger of persecution on Two months later, in January 1996, the number return, the international outcry was such that, for of clearances skyrocketed, and UNHCR called an one year, Hong Kong suspended all forced returns informal meeting of ASEAN in Bangkok to and only proceeded with voluntary returns. officially review the situation. The real reason for Nonetheless, deportation was now more than a the meeting, however, was to catalyze the countries theoretical option. So for those denied refugee of ASEAN and the Vietnamese into formally status, the message was clear: your only choice is to ending the CPA. The CPA was supposed to end on return voluntarily or be forcefully deported. June 30 th of that year, but suddenly the urgency All governments favored voluntary return, as it seemed to have faded. With an absence of new was easier to organize and less stressful for all arrivals, Malaysia and Indonesia were in no hurry concerned. At the same time, they recognized that to close the camps; the presence of a few thousand without the threat of forced return, there would be Vietnamese whom UNHCR was paying for was far fewer candidates for voluntary return. This something they could live with. applied in particular to the US. Both for domestic But not so in Washington. With the camp political reasons and for reputational concerns, population diminishing and clearances for return Washington had officially expressed disapproval of suddenly snowballing, a massive advocacy forced return. In private, however, US diplomats campaign originating in the US began. It targeted conceded that the option of forced return should be the remaining camp population, encouraging them maintained so as to preserve the momentum of to oppose repatriation at all cost and inaccurately voluntary repatriation. claiming that new opportunities for resettlement But by 1995, that momentum had been lost. The were just around the corner. It became clear that agreement on voluntary repatriation between this campaign—supported by US politicians with UNHCR and Vietnam provided that UNHCR large constituencies of Vietnamese émigrés and would submit the bio data of potential returnees to seeking to embarrass the administration—would

9 A number of advocacy and human rights groups argued that those returned to Vietnam were jailed or persecuted for their decision to flee, but there are no documented cases of this happening. 10 Alexander Casella endure as long as there was a single Vietnamese left tional community as a whole. Likewise, the in a single camp. Closing the camps therefore implementation of the ODP, by requiring some became a priority for the US administration—and degree of collaboration between Washington and if returns were to be forced, Washington would Hanoi, paved the way for subsequent exchanges look the other way. 10 that, over the years, led to the normalization of To increase pressure to meet the CPA deadline, relations between the two countries. during the ASEAN meeting UNHCR announced All refugee situations are different; the lessons that it had run out of funds and, as of June 30 th , derived from one cannot readily be applied to would no longer pay for the upkeep of the camps. another. But this said, the CPA does provide In reality this was not the case. Rather, it was the lessons that extend beyond refugees from agency's attempt to incentivize the ASEAN Indochina. countries to make one last effort to engage directly 1. Decisive action sometimes depends on initia - with Vietnam to empty and close the camps. After tives undertaken by enterprising individuals in an hour of negotiations, ASEAN and Vietnam had the field. There would likely have been no CPA come to an agreement: repatriation would now be if the Ford Foundation had not called a meeting by ship, would take place under a mandatory in Cha-Am and if four of the participants, acting Orderly Repatriation Program, and would on their own initiative, had not decided that commence as soon as possible from Malaysia and some action was required. With UNHCR Indonesia, with UNHCR bearing the costs. headquarters largely inactive, plans to address The last obstacle was internal to UNHCR. The the Indochinese refugee crisis only progressed representative in Kuala Lumpur refused on because US Ambassador Jonathan Moore principle to execute an order for mandatory return personally prevailed on the high commissioner until she was prevailed upon to do as instructed. to authorize, albeit reluctantly, UNHCR’s Having revised her position, she enlisted the Bangkok office to proceed. services of the Malaysian police, who descended on 2. New approaches to refugee crises are bound to the camp. In three systematic sweeps, the 2,500 be controversial. Opposition to the CPA was remaining Vietnamese were hustled onto three widespread. While the NGO community did a naval landing ships chartered by UNHCR and credible job in the day-to-day management of dispatched to Vietnam. The operation was the camps, it was not attuned to a wholesale repeated in Indonesia. On June 30, 1996, UNHCR rethinking of the refugee crisis and was against proclaimed the closure of the CPA. it. The same sentiment was shared by the Vietnamese émigré community in the US and Conclusion by the human rights and advocacy community. The CPA brought to a close a problem that had, at 3. Comprehensive solutions require the commit - one point in time, looked as if it was beyond a ment and involvement of the country of origin. solution. It had endured for some fifteen years, and It was only once Vietnam became involved that had resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. But a solution to the crisis became possible. While not only did the CPA save lives; it did so without Vietnam was involved from early on in the compromising the principle of asylum. It ensured process, it was not fully committed until the both that refugees be given the protection they collapse of the Soviet Union. Without this were entitled to and that non-refugees, while not change in external conditions, the CPA may benefitting from a status for which they were have stagnated, as had the ODP after initially ineligible, be treated in a humane way. agreed on in 1979. Once Vietnam was committed to implementation—even without a But the impact of the CPA extended well beyond substantive change in its regime—repatriation the realm of humanitarian action. It became one of of those denied refugee status became possible. the main drivers behind Vietnam’s slow reintegra - tion into the ASEAN community and the interna - 4. UN crisis response can be most effective when

10 For more information, see Tim Weiner, “New Effort by U.S. and Vietnam to Return Boat People Home,” New York Times , December 4, 1995. MANAGING THE “BOAT PEOPLE” CRISIS 11

a single agency is in the lead. Within the UN 7. Durable solutions must address both refugees system, the implementation of the CPA was and migrants. Probably the main achievement spared the demands of “interagency coordina - of the CPA was to bridge the asylum-migration tion” due to UNHCR being the only agency conundrum and replace it, in fact if not in substantively involved in the plan. While IOM words, with a solution to population movement took over the management of the ODP, this was in general. Within this movement, some might essentially a technical operation. The UN have been forced to move for reasons covered by Secretariat in New York appeared risk-averse the Refugee Convention; others might have and was involved in the process only in name. been forced by other circumstances. Ultimately, Politically, there was only one UN player: solving the problem of the refugee component UNHCR. of the movement required a parallel solution to 5. Countries’ involvement in responding to its non-refugee component. The CPA was refugee crises does not necessarily translate therefore comprehensive not only in terms of into them adopting refugee law. While the solutions adopted—first asylum, screening, UNHCR did succeed in training a core of resettlement, and repatriation—but also in screening officers from the ASEAN countries, addressing population movement beyond the the region’s rejection of the Refugee Convention convention. endured unchanged. None of this would have occurred without the 6. Refugees and migrants are easy victims of right circumstances. But these circumstances alone rumors and disinformation. One of the reasons would not have sufficed. What carried the day, the CPA was successful was not only that it had ultimately, were the right people at the right place been set up but that it was known to exist. The at the right time. This did not in any way mean that information campaign enabled potential boat the international bureaucracies, with their set people to make an educated decision about procedures, administrative routines, lawyers, and whether to leave by boat, while also explaining accountants could be dispensed with. But it did the mechanics of the ODP. Setting up a credible confirm that, in times of crisis, when the situation information program using available means of demands more than a “business-as-usual” communication to target refugees and migrants approach, there is no substitute for the odd should be a priority for any comprehensive maverick who dares to take an initiative, and for response. whom doing the right thing comes before doing things right.

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