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Notes

1 AND THE CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE ON COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

1. This ironical situation, imbued with contradictions, has further margin• alized Muslim communities across the . For instance, the British Sikhs of Punjabi ethnic stock are a separate ethnic/racial category whereas the Punjabi belonging to the same Punjabi ethnicity are not a separate category. Efforts at providing umbrella legislation to decry all sorts of discrimination have not been successful despite the sympathetic concern of prominent bodies like the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and some solitary parliamen• tary voices. Based on a personal interview with the Chairman of CRE in London, March 1996. 2. For instance, see Aziz al-Azmeh, /slams and Modernities, London, 1994. However, such a view, though apparently quite powerful and very 'dangerous' from an orthodox Muslim viewpoint, still remains unsub• stantiated. It may be the agenda for a rigorous intellectual dialogue in the twenty-first century, but still appears to be too generalist. No single community, however minuscule it may be, like the Parsis or the Jews, could be characterized as a monolithic entity, so that expecting Islam to build an all-pervasive and uniformed identity is itself an unrealistic reading of Islamic history. 3. For many Western authors and certain Muslim scholars like Maulana Maududi, Islam and the West are poles apart. Half-baked ideas about Islamic specificity in recent decades are either rooted in ignorance or are contrived to suit a narrow agenda for Islamization. Several other Muslim thinkers see a basic coherence in the two traditions without any justification for mutual negation. Similarly, or the empowerment of various sections of Muslim society including women and minorities do not pose any conflict in redefining Islam. 4. See Javaid Saeed, Islam and Modernization, Westport, 1994; John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York, 1993; and M. Youssef Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, London, 1990. 5. For a pertinent perspective, see Albert Hourani, Islam in European Thought, Cambridge, 1993 (reprint); and Michael Gilesenan, Recognizing Islam, London, 1982. 6. Montgomery Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, Edinburgh, 1994; also Norman Daniel, Islam and the West, Oxford, 1993; and Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam, London, 1988. 7. Gerhard Endress, An Introduction to Islam, trans. by Carole Hillenbrand, Edinburgh, 1994. 8. Mervyn Hiskett, The Course of Islam in Africa, Edinburgh, 1994.

263 264 Notes

9. Richard Bulliet, Islam: the View from the Edge, New York, 1994. 10. In a postmodern sense, the teleological definition of terms like 'West' or 'Western' pose conceptual problems. While, at present, Muslims are an integral part of Western traditions, Western cultural artefacts have themselves been appropriated by non-Western societies. Like Islam, both Christianity and Judaism have roots in the Near East and, in a historical sense, are by no means 'Western' religions. 11. See Asghar Engineer, The , New , 1994; also, Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State, London, 1987. 12. Engineer, op. cit., p. 137. 13. Ibid., p. 201. 14. Khalid b. Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, Albany, 1995. 15. Ibid., p.19. 16. Ibid., p. 168. 17. For such a critique, see John Ware, 'Put to the Sword: How Saudi Judges Mete Medieval Justice', The Sunday Times, 31 March 1996; also, 'Death of a Princess', Panorama, BBC1, 1 April1996. 18. For more on this, see Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islam and the State, London, 1991. Some recent and quite significant studies, while dealing with the modern phase, prefer to be country-specific, given the vast and diversified areas of the discipline. For instance, see Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, New Haven, 1992. 19. The institutionalization of traditions such as purdah or similar latter• day attitudes in Muslim societies, largely canonized on the basis of diversified Quranic injunctions, has resulted in their perpetuation. 'Probably because of the religious associations it took on, it has been harder to discard veiling in Muslim countries than it has been to get rid of it or parallel customs in non-Muslim countries .... What is special about Islam in regard to women is the degree to which matters relating to women's status have either been legislated by the Quran, which believing Muslims regard as the literal word of God as revealed to the Prophet, or by subsequent legislation derived from interpretation of the Quran and the traditional sayings of the Prophet. Thus, innovators in this, as in many other matters, have to deal not merely with some customary belief that may be relatively easily replaced by another, once the newer one becomes more functional, but with the heart of religion, which is the holy law or .' ('Introduction', Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (eds), Women in the Muslim World, Cambridge, Mass., 1978, p. 25.) 20. For instance, attitudinal changes among rural women who henceforth began imitating the urban petit bourgeoisie (bazaari) in donning the veil for status purposes, while earlier, only women from upper Muslim classes (ashra'af) would observe purdah. Also, some of the urban compatriots of these rural women began to face more segregation and isolation in the towns as their menfolk pursued a busy sedentary life and kept their wives in the domestic sphere largely because of their rural origins. 21. In many former colonies, early feminism demanding better educational Notes 265

facilities and wider participation in the sociopolitical set-up embodied a strong strand in contemporary nationalist movements. See K. Jayawardena, Feminism and in the Third World, London, 1988. 22. One may include the novels by Deputy Nazir Ahmad, satirical poems by Nazir Akbarabadi, or posthumous writings by the ulama from both the Brelvi and schools upholding such views, where women's role is strictly domestic. An early religious education imparted by female teachers within the cha'ardiwari is recommended by such schools. In , the Jama'at-i Islami, various sections of the Jamiat and individual scholars like Dr Israr Ahmed in their speeches and writ• ings, have raised serious objections to co-education and female participation in public life, besides criticizing women professionals. Bahishti Zaiwar () a comprehensive book on the role and duties of an Islamic woman by Maulana Ashraf Thanawi, has remained a best• seller since its publication in 1926. Similarly, Maulana Maududi's Purdah (Urdu), a critique of feminism, has remained an influential work decrying the mores and norms of Western liberated women, since its publication several years ago. For more on Maududi's views of women, see his Purdah, , 1972. 23. The best example is Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist, who through a reinterpretation of the Quran, Hadith and early primary sources on Islamic thought and history has attempted to present a different picture of the status of women in early Islam. 'Ample histor• ical evidence portrays women in the Prophet's raising their heads from slavery and violence to claim their right to join, as equal participants, in the making of their Arab history. Women fled aristo• cratic tribal Mecca by the thousands to enter Medina, the Prophet's city in the seventh century, because Islam promised equality and dignity for all, for men and women, masters and servants. Every woman who came to Medina when the Prophet was the political leader of Muslims could gain access to full citizenship, the status of sahabi, Companion of the Prophet. Muslims can take pride in their language that they have the feminine of that word, sahabiyat, women who enjoyed the right to enter into the councils of the Muslim umma, to speak freely to its Prophet• leader, to dispute with the men, to fight for their happiness, and to be involved in the management of military and political affairs. The evidence is there in the works of religious history, in the biographical details of sahabiyat by the thousand who built Muslim society side by side with their male counterparts.' See Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam: an Historical and Theological Enquiry, translated by Mary Jo Lakeland, Oxford, 1992, p. viii. 24. For instance, see F. A. Sabbah, Women in the Muslim Unconscious, New York, 1984. 25. Leila Ahmed brings out this point very convincingly. See Women and Gender in Islam, pp. 36-7. 26. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, New York, 1986, quoted in Women and Gender in Islam, p. 13. 27. Quoted in ibid., p. 29. The Aristotelian views were widely and readily 266 Notes

accepted by the peoples in the Near East and West. 28. Mernissi goes to great lengths in deciphering the origin of commonly held but 'false' traditions such as the following: 'Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity'. See Women and Islam, pp. 3 and 49-61. 29. Fazlur Rahman, Islam, London, 1966, p. 5. 30. For an inside view, see Tehmina Durrani, My Feudal Lord, Lahore, 1991; and Jean P. Sasson, Princess, London, 1993. 31. She writes powerfully in her treatise on a representative system constructed within the Islamic ethos. See her Islam and Democracy, London, 1993. 32. For a pertinent work, see Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge, 1990. 33. Its publication in London in 1988 resulted in massive demonstrations in the United Kingdom, South Africa and South Asia. It remains banned all over the Muslim world and the author has been in hiding since 1989 when the late Imam Khomeini of issued a death verdict (fatwa) on him for committing blasphemy. The existing blasphemy laws in Britain do not cover an insinuation against Islam or Prophet . 34. In fact, his publishers had been warned by , the distinguished Indian writer and editorial adviser to Penguin Books , who had forewarned about the controversial nature of the novel: 'I read the manuscript very carefully and was positive it would cause lot of trouble.' He had found a number of: 'derogatory references to the Prophet and the Qur'an. Muhammad is made out to be a small-time impostor.' Singh had conveyed his personal reservations directly to P. Mayer, Chairman of Penguin, hinting that the book would definitely be banned by the . See his interview with C. Banerji, Sunday, 2 October 1989, p. 78. 35. In an interview, he told an Indian journalist: 'Actually one of my major themes is religion and fanaticism. I have talked about the Islamic reli• gion because that is what I know the most about.' India Today, 15 September 1988. 36. Malise Ruthven, A Satanic Affair, London, 1990, p. 22. 37. His own family 'accepted Rushdie's loss of faith (which left him with a "God-shaped hole inside") and his marriages, first to an Englishwoman, Clarissa, mother of his son, and latterly to Marianne Wiggins, the American author, who is [was] more than a match for his writing talent.' The Sunday Times, 19 February 1989, as quoted in Lisa Appignanesi and Sara Maitland (eds) The Rushdie File, London, 1989, p. 3. 38. Ziauddin Sardar and Meryl Wyn Davies, Distorted Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair, London, 1990, p. 2. 39. See Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: a Biography of the Prophet, London, 1995. 40. Such a disciplinary problematic is becoming more obvious given the emphasis on ahistorical studies of fragments rather than of communi• ties in their entirety. Such a trend worries orthodox historians, seeing Notes 267

young anthropologists becoming 'experts' on the Frontier or Pushtun societies overnight without knowing more than two words of Pushto or even without a basic understanding of Islam, state, community forma• tion and the role of historical cross-currents interlinking these communities with a plethora of wider issues and realities. 41. The revivalists, while reinterpreting a more puritanical and austere form of Islam- as seen in cases like the Wahabi movement in Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama'at-i-Islami in Pakistan- take the Prophet as their reference but have been opposed to synthesis. 42. 'Perhaps the cruellest irony of all is that all these forces have been unleashed by people on all sides who have never read the book and are battling over it ... ', Farrukh Dhondy, 'Reflections' in Appignanesi and Maitland, op. cit., p. 201. 43. This was a point lost on many other contemporary writers who felt as if the mobs had misappropriated the writing itself by writing off its author. To such groups, even after reading the novel, Muslim reader• ship was so carried away with the theological nature of their objections that they totally lost interest in the aesthetic value of the novel, which again is linked with this whole misimage of Muslims being unable to relate with Western intellectual traditions. 44. For more on this, see Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! The Salman Rushdie Affair, London, 1989. 45. Many Muslims ready to pardon Rushdie were taken aback when, after tendering apology, he insisted on the publication of a paperback edition. To many observers, he was not only maliciously irresponsible, he equally suffered from extreme greed and a blinding ego while lacking humility and modesty. 46. From several private meetings with various prominent Muslims in Europe it emerged that a more formidable condemnation of the novel was essential as a deterrent against such future efforts. Many of them, however, lamented the lack of available channels to articulate the proper Muslim position on the issue not only for the Westerners but equally for sceptical Muslims. 47. One cannot go into the symbolic or scriptural details that Rushdie employs to parody the dictates and virtues of Islamic teachings as personified by Muhammad, identified as Mahound, with Ayesha as a prostitute, not to mention many more proclivities. 48. The British hanged Ilam Din amidst violent Muslim demonstrations across the subcontinent and subsequently added a law to the Indian penal code proscribing any inflammatory material/action in the future. Rajiv used the same law to ban the book in India in 1988. 49. Such a view had been suggested by a number of authors who find nothing unusual or provocative in an otherwise objectionable piece of fiction with characters having strange but unreal hallucinations. 50. There are well-familiar scenes portraying Muslims, varying from breast-beating Lebanese Shias, to protesting Iranians and lines of believers prostrate in prayer. In popular cultural manifestations, Muslims are always shown en masse and violent. Beard, turban, black robes, bloodied bodies and hidden women convey extreme images of 268 Notes

the community, with a careless confusion of Islamic with Muslim. 51. Bhiku Parekh, 'Reflections', in Appignanesi and Maitland, op. cit., p. 149. 52. Many influential scholars are substantiating this theory of Islam versus the rest. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), Summer 1993,22-41. 53. Non-democratic Muslim regimes, while finding listening ears in the Western capitals, have assumed further repressive policies by taking fundamentalism as an alibi. As both the West and the Muslim states tend to recognise only the fundamentalists, the reformist elements remain marginalized and unrecognized. Conversely, the fundamental• ists, buoyed up by internal and external legitimacy, take on the reformers and in the process find convergence with the repressive regimes in systematically eliminating the sane voices of civil society. 54. For further details, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Beyond Ayodhya: Implications for South Asian Security', Asian Affairs, X, October 1993, 290:303. 55. For details, see Ruthven, op. cit. 56. Despite the formation of the BJP regime in 1998 and the growing power of sectarian ruling parties like Shiv Sena in , one does not see any change in official policy towards the novel in India. 57. Paul Brass, a leading American expert on South Asia, in a special session of the annual conference of the American Association of Asian Studies (AAAS) in April 1990 in Chicago had been persistent in suggesting that the uproar in Pakistan was merely a political showdown by 's opponents. He refused to accept the fact that it was a more complex issue which had generated a massive resentment among Muslims from various walks of life and was not just a routine political affair, though politicians from the Jama'at-i-Islami and its rival religio-political parties did try to make political capital of it. 58. These arguments are found in Ruthven's work but have been aired by a number of people. Professor Bhiku Parekh, in a private interview in 1991, paternalistically lamented the absence of an effective and articu• late Muslim representation in the West to counter attacks on Islam. The question is: would anybody listen to them while Muslims and Islam remain objectified without being equal partners in a much-needed debate? 59. I do not agree with the view that the entire agitation over the novel was a mundane affair and the Muslim youths were discussing it in the public houses rather than available institutions. On a rather crucial note, it bridged the gap between two generations. 60. I was astonished to see this vocal reiteration across the UK, and Germany especially among the Muslim intelligentsia, which shows that the Rushdie affair proved a major catalyst for all the classes within the diasporic Muslim communities. 61. I was confronted by a number of Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims on several occasions with a query that despite so many Muslim pogroms in an otherwise democratic polity like India, no Hindu ever wrote a novel or 'biting story' on Hindu extremism of the level and dimension of Notes 269

Lajja, and why it is only the Muslim sceptics and rabblerousers like Rushdie and Nasreen who are so quickly adopted and protected in such quarters. For a commentary on the controversy surrounding Lajja, see Taj Hashmi, 'Women and Islam: Taslima Nasreen, Society and Politics in ', South Asia, vol. XVIII, no. 2, December 1995. 62. For such a perspective, see Karen Armstrong, Muhammad, London, 1991.

2 ISLAM AND THE WEST: POLITICS OF MISPERCEPTIONS AND MISIMAGES

1. Rana Kabbani, 'Why Muslims fear the future', The Guardian, 21 August 1992. In a moving article written soon after the mortar-attack killing and wounding numerous civilians in a market in Sarajevo - 'the saddest place in the saddest city in the whole world' - Kemal Kurspahic, a Bosnian journalist, observed: 'My city is living, and dying under a triple death sentence. First from Serbian gunners aiming at and hitting civilian neighbourhoods, market places, hospitals, helpless citi• zens. 'Second from misery. In the midst of the second winter of terror, Sarajevo is windowless and without heat, food, water, electricity or gas supplies. 'Third from international indifference. The civilised world just watches us being exterminated, shows no will to protect us and even imposes an arms embargo that deprives us of the right to self-defence'. Kemal Kurspahic, 'A Rescue Plan for Bosnia in Three Words: Lift, Arm and Strike', International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1994. For a pictorial view of the destruction just in Sarajevo, see Royal Festival Hall, Edge of Madness: Sarajevo, a City and its People under Siege (catalogue of photographs by Tom Stoddart and Alastair Thain, with a foreword by Martin Bell), 1997; and for a contemporary account, Martin Bell, In Harm's Way, London, 1996. 2. The tradition of seeing Islam as the 'Other' was invented in medieval Europe with subsequent individuation in the modern era when anti• intellectualism, intolerance, militarism and tribalism were added to it. Such Muslim particularities were seen as contrasted with the Enlightenment, , and urbanism of the West. 3. Judith Miller, 'The Challenge of Radical Islam', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (2), Spring 1993, p. 45. 4. Leon T. Hadar, 'What Green Peril?' ibid., pp. 27-42. 5. The famous Persian poet of the tenth-eleventh century, Firdausi, in his famous epic poem, Shahnama, while celebrating ancient imperial Persia, lamented the destruction of Sassanid Persia by the nomadic - 'lizzard-eating bedouins'. Much later, lbn-e-Khaldun would find tribal asabiya as the genius of any civilization and would differen• tiate between Khilafa and Malukiya. 6. This has been amply illustrated by Edward W. Said in his Orienta/ism, New York, 1979. 270 Notes

7. ' have fought a war and committed their military and diplo• matic power to secure the survival of the most fundamentalist state of all- Saudi Arabia'. Leon T. Hadar, op. cit., p. 32. 8. For two case-studies, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics: Islam, Ethnicity, and the State',Asian Survey, XXXII, (10), October 1992, pp. 888-901. 9. Leon T. Hadar, op. cit., p. 31. 10. For more on this eighteenth-century reformer, see Fazlur Rahman, 'The Thinker of Crisis: Shah Waliy-ullah', Pakistan Quarterly, VI, (2), 1956. 11. For more on this leading Pan-Islamist of the nineteenth century, see Nikki Keddie, Jamal al Din al Afghani: a Political Biography, Berkeley, 1972. 12. For more on Abduh and his contemporaries, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939, London, 1962. 13. For a very pertinent study on this subject, see Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Oxford, 1964. 14. For instance, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, /slams and Modernities, London, 1993. The author, largely dwelling on the typical Arab-Western debate, fails to notice the commonalities in the Muslim experience and the book, despite promising a new field of inquiry, ends up dilating on familiar themes. 15. The best example could be Pakistan, which itself has become the land of refugees and immigrants from India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, Burma and elsewhere. While every seventh Pakistani is an migrant/refugee (economic, political or religious) from somewhere, one fails to notice any mass-based anti-foreign resentment against such a visible alien presence. There is no other way to explain this at a time when, even in the most developed countries, immigration was legally controlled quite a few decades back. It is certainly an amazing example of Islamic solidarity to help 'thy neighbour' in distress which is certainly specific to Islam. 16. For a very pertinent analysis of the new groups of Muslim militants and their ideological postulations, see Ghassan Salame, 'Islam and the West', Foreign Policy, No. 90, Spring 1993, pp. 22-37. 17. For example, even while discussing the Afghan imbroglio, theses such as Pushtun gun-culture and the opium trade would be invoked. While recounting the tribulations of post-Soviet Afghan societies, allegorical references to groups like the Assassins are made to prove presumptions about the innate backwardness of Muslims. For instance, see Peregrine Hodson, 'On The Opium Trail', The Observer Magazine (London), 6 February 1994, pp. 38-42. In narratives on the brutalization of , reference to Islamic Pakistan, Afghan Mujahideen or even organizations like the lSI (Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan) are routinely mentioned so as to dilute any sympathy a reader may feel for the ordeal. It is generally assumed by Muslims that the West will act only when Muslims are killing Muslims or others but would not move if the non-Muslims are killing Muslims. 18. See his The Political Theory of Islam, Lahore, 1939; and Charles J. Notes 271

Adam, 'Mawdudi and the Islamic State', in John Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford, 1983. 19. Many non-Muslim experts on Islam accept the duality in the Muslim experience where the ideal of an unattainable Sharia-based Islamic order is different from the reality of feasible Muslim states. See E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, 1965. 20. Perhaps, one finds more in common with views put forth by Syed Ahmed , , Allama Shariati and Fazlur Rahman. For a useful commentary, see Suroosh Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship?, London, 1983. 21. For a useful background, see Edward Said, Covering Islam, New York, 1981. 22. This is not to underrate the anguish caused by Rushdie's insinuations against the sensibilities of one billion Muslims across the globe. 23. Ironically, many academics are not sure even about the very concept of citizenship among the Muslims - an Orientalist cliche that reinforces Muslims being tribal, barbarian, 'Moorish' in a very pejorative sense. 24. To see how the Western media, in general, spare no opportunity to present Muslims as the 'Other', one may recapitulate the media portrayals of the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in early 1993. Even before any formal legal indictment, Muslims had been incriminated by the press through splashing headlines which made the existence of the Muslim community in North America unbearable for quite some time. In Britain itself a vast majority of inhabitants expressed strong-to-ambivalent anti-Muslim views in an important study conducted by the reputable Runnymede Trust. See The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: a Challenge for Us All, London, 1997. 25. It is no wonder that even countries like India, with the largest Muslim minority, have used the Islamic 'bogey' to evade the declining commu• nalization of the polity. Rather than pinpointing the failure of the system itself, various parties like the communalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Shiv Sena or Vishwa Hindu Parishad routinely use the threat of Muslim fundamentalism to hide their unrelenting campaign against the beleaguered Muslim minority and to malign neighbouring states, Pakistan and Bangladesh. While it is quite apparent to any impartial observer that it is the Muslims in India who over the succes• sive decades have been on the receiving end from intermittent incidents of organized violence, desecration of mosques and psycho• economic seclusion, yet it is quite common to see anti-Muslim mayhem being portrayed simply as the Hindu-Muslim riots. To appear 'balanced' and egalitarian, the media intentionally equates victims with the perpetrators. While the entire sub-continent agonized over the pre• planned demolition of the contentious mosque in Ayodhya followed by worst-ever anti-Muslim campaigns in India, inclusive of the most cosmopolitan cities like Bombay, media pundits were reassuring Western readers and others that India's secular and democratic tradi• tions would eventually triumph as if there was no need to worry. While Ball Thackeray of the Hindu extremist organization, Shiv Sena, 272 Notes

declared that 125 million Muslims should be expelled from India, and K. L. Advani's rath yatra (the chariot march across India by the leader of the BJP) fomented anti-Muslim venom, causing widespread slaugh• ter, the media only harped on India's tolerant and liberal traditions assuming that majoritarian fascism was merely a temporary aberration. For more details on the subject, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Beyond Ayodhya: Implications for Regional Security in South Asia', Asian Affairs, XXIV, Part III, October 1993, pp. 290-303. Sadly, some of the predictions in this essay came true when the BJP assumed power in 1998. 26. The Spectator, 3 February 1990, p. 13. Another article, appearing a week later in the same magazine, penned by Bernard Barchard, titled 'Muslims, Be Men Not Mice' manifested typical Western ambiguity toward the world of Islam. 27. For such a representative discussion, seeP. J. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, London, 1987. 28. It is not surprising that many historians see the evolution and articula• tion of Muslim political thought in the sub-continent largely through the prisms of an Islamic idiom. For instance, see Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in , 1857-1947, Cambridge, 1989. 29. For example, Salman Rushdie, in one of his articles, while speaking for the rights of freedom of speech in the Muslim world, traced the problem within an uneasy combination of religion and politics resulting only in Islamic fundamentalist extremism. See his 'Islamic Curses', The Guardian, 13 July 1993. Such a verdict is rooted in a commonly held premise that only Westernization and modernization can alleviate the Muslim predicament. One wonders about a successful model like or even predominantly Muslim Malaysia which, without being proto• European, have largely acquired a consensus-based synthesis. 30. For instance, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, Chicago, 1979. 31. For a useful debate, see Anwar H. Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, Lahore, 1984. 32. Bosnia evokes harrowing memories of Andalusia among the Muslims since a whole community known for its common secular and ethnic commonalities with the Serbs and Croats was being systematically exterminated in the very European backyard exactly five centuries after the fall of Granada. While the Western media did its best in highlight• ing the tragedy of Bosnia, the Western political establishments remained indifferent towards the holocaust. In a TV debate, while Mohammed Sacirbey, the Bosnian envoy to the UN, asked for the minimum- lifting of the arms embargo- Alan Clark, Conservative MP, resiliently kept showing his indifference by stating 'It is not our war' and asking 'Why should our men lay down their lives?'. 'Bosnia', Newsnight, BBC 2, 6 February 1994. 33. The Muslims were confounded not only by Western inaction but also by the exclusivist approach towards Bosnia prohibiting any initiative from any other direction. To them, imposing an arms embargo on Bosnia was both discriminatory and a clear violation of Article 51 of the Notes 273

UN charter which allows member-states a right to defend themselves. Based on interviews with Bosnian intellectuals in Oxford and London. 34. The Arabian frustration in the wake of the and signing of treaties with are construed as the defeat of such elements who have controlled the Arab destiny for so long. 35. Speculations on intentional Muslim ghettoization or segregation outside the Muslim heartland do not make any sense at all. 36. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' The National Interest, 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18; and, 'Reply to My Critics', ibid., 18, Winter 1989-90, pp. 21-8. 37. Henry Porter, 'Fukuyama's Future Shock', The Guardian, 3 March 1992. 38. 'The "end of history" was therefore not a crystal ball for predicting the future, but an observation that liberal democracy alone had won broad acceptance and that the trend in that direction would continue over a long time'. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History is Still Nigh', The Independent, 3 March 1992. 39. Francis Fukuyama, 'An American in Paris', New Statesman & Society, 6 March 1992, p. 15. Also, Margot Norman, 'The End of History: Is It Really All Bunk?' The Sunday Telegraph, 8 March 1992. 40. For a useful American perspective, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'What New World Order?', Foreign Affairs, 71, (2), Spring 1992, pp. 83-96. 41. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Foreign Affairs, 72, (3), Summer 1993, pp. 22-31. 42. It is amazing that his sources of information on Islam as being the new leader of anti-Western cold war are Bernard Lewis and M. J. Akbar, whose views on Islam and Muslims are too well-known. In particular, M. J. Akbar, an apologist for the , suffers from his own identity crises as an Indian Muslim, who unlike millions of his coreligionists who are relegated to the lowest strata in the society increasingly vulnerable to majoritarian fascism, speaks for the estab• lishment and suffers from a vehement anti-Pakistan paranoia. Bernard Lewis, on the other hand, sees 'an irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judea-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide expansion of both'. Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, September, 1990, p. 60; Time, 15 June 1992, pp. 24-8. (Emphasis added) 43. In a seminar, a British Labour MP observed that if in Bosnia Christians had been the bereaved community with the Muslims as perpetrators, the West would have come to the rescue of their coreligionists long ago. Ken Livingston, 'The Islamic World and the Challenges Facing It', a presentation at the Commonwealth Institute, London, 25 January 1994. In the same seminar, John Simpson, a noted BBC journalist, questioned speculations about an anti-Muslim 'hidden agenda' in the West. 44. 'A Confucian-Islamic military has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons tech• nologies needed to counter the military power of the West'. Huntington, op. cit., p. 47. 274 Notes

45. Many observers do not find events and developments in the Muslim world so unique as they see similar trends even within the Christian world. For a useful comparative analysis, see Edward Mortimer, 'Christianity and Islam', International Affairs, 67, (1), 1991,7-13. 46. One may refer to a number of quality magazines like Dialogue (London), Newsline () or The Herald (Karachi) and a number of human-rights groups actively engaged in these debates. On issues like the status of women, one sees more vocalization in terms of orga• nization and articulation. Muslim sociologists are challenging the whole genre of Muslim chauvinist literature on gender. For instance, see Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam: an Historical and Theological Enquiry, translated by Mary Jo Lakeland, Oxford, 1992. 47. For instance, see Ernest Gellner, 'Islam and Marxism', International Affairs, 67, (1), 1991, pp. 1-6. 48. For a very useful and rare perspective, see Robin Wright, 'Islam, Democracy and the West', Foreign Affairs, 71, (3), Summer 1992, pp. 131-45. 49. The Bosnian crisis soon after the Gulf wars (-Iran and Iraq-the rest) characterised by fratricide, and the Muslim genocide in India have given more space to extremists who fume at the inaction from their own ruling elites. The Muslim incapacity to come to grips with the severe crises confronted by the Muslims all the way from the Spanish Sahara, Somalia, Sudan, , the Gulf, Afghanistan to South and Southeast Asia, has deeply dismayed Muslim reformers, both moderate and orthodox. Such an irony is not lost on any observer, as was duly noted by The Times: 'Islamic states are in confusion, unable to act as an umma or concerted Muslim nation. The war in Bosnia is highlighting the powerlessness of Islam to respond to a conflict that threatens a whole Muslim community. So despite strident calls for arms shipments to be sent to the Bosnian Muslims, despite the appeals for jihad, no Arab leader ventures close to Sarajevo .... The impotence of Islam is also evident outside the Balkans. When 20,000 Indian Hindus ransacked the mosque of Ayodhya, there was a lukewarm response, even from Iran, which merely appealed to the Indian government to make "wise and calculated decisions". The famine in Somalia should have pressed Islamic states into urgent action. The country is, after all, a member of both the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organisation.' 'Muslims Awake. Who Isn't Going to Sarajevo This Year?' (editorial), The Times, 22 December 1992. 50. There is no denying the fact that among the Islamists there are a number of groups who differ on the interpretation and strategies to implement Islam. Similarly, there is difference in emphasis on Islamization with varying individual to collective models, and selective sectors to life in toto. One of the major dilemmas for Western analysts and likewise for many Muslim ruling elites is their inability to compre• hend the ideological and sociological roots of the Islamists. They quite conveniently lump them together as a single monolithic group and exhibit complete nonchalance towards them. If democratization would have been allowed in these Muslim societies early on, political Notes 275

volatility in the name of Islam would have been largely tapered off. Similarly, the global dismissal and denigration of the Islamists, who in most cases are middle-class, articulate, literate sections, unlike the general misimage of emotional, illiterate crowds, also push them towards extremism. 51. One may also suggest that the Afghan quagmire is certainly a result of the Cold War, where the Afghans are convinced that they have been totally ignored by those forces - both the Russians and the West - who used them for a decade simply for their own imperatives. The Afghan activists and a number of Western analysts fervently believe that it was their resistance which pioneered the rolling-back of Soviet power. See Anthony Arnold Novato, The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire, Oakland, 1993. However, today, Afghanistan has been left by its former benefactors and detractors to rot and decay, a point brought out very poignantly in the BBC inter• views with the Afghans who blame the West for a major betrayal. Based on 'Afghanistan', a report by George Allagiah, Newsnight, BBC 2, 7 February 1994. 52. In an interview, Ball Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena, the fascist Hindu party in control of Bombay, observed: 'I want to teach Muslims a lesson .... If they are going, let them go. If they are not going, kick them out. If Pakistan feels Muslims in India are being harassed, let it, please, take this lot back .... This is a Hindu rashtra (nation) .... In poli• tics it's Shivaji. The third eye is now opening. Burn them!' Time International, 25 January 1993. Also, 'Kill All the Muslims', Newsweek, 7 June 1993. 53. The situation became so bad that in 1997-98, it became impossible for Pakistani artists to perform in Bombay (renamed as Mumbai) due to the ruling Shiv Sena threatening: 'We'll break their legs.' Even the prominent secular Indian Muslims were not spared from the Sena's brutalities. The house and studios of F. M. Husain, India's leading painter, were ransacked by the Sena followers on the excuse that he had done the portrait of Goddess Saraswati in the nude. In fact, he had done it two decades back but was being harassed simply for his Muslim name. The Independent on Sunday, 7 June 1998. 54. According to one reliable source, Russian troops have killed more than 50 000 Tajiks in recent months in the name of curbing tribalism and fundamentalism, a fact largely under-reported in the media outside. Z. Brzenzski, 'Problems of Post-Communism', a paper presented in a seminar in the Alistair Buchan Club Series, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, 4 February 1994.

3 SOUTH ASIAN ISLAM AND PAKISTAN: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATE

1. The debate preceded colonization but was accentuated with the estab• lishment of the colonial state, leading to a multiple contestation among various Indian communities. 276 Notes

2. In the same sense, the Muslim diaspora, despite certain unique advan• tages, betrays signs of intellectual ambiguity or extremism as typified by Salman Rushdie or Kalim , respectively. 3. More recently, there has been a noticeable trend to appropriate the Indus Valley past as 'the ancient Pakistan'. See Aitazaz Ahsan, The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan, Karachi, 1996. The Indus Valley civilization itself has invoked greater archaeological attention due to easy accessibility to the sites and its own disciplinary challenges for the subject specialists. See Jonathan Mark Kenoyer, Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilisation, Karachi, 1998. 4. It appears to be a rather simplistic overview of the major trends, though one has to be cognizant of the variations and a multipolar nature of intellectual debates among the historians within each category. 5. One could refer to valuable studies by Peter Hardy, Barbara Metcalf, David Lelyweld, Khalid B. Sayeed, Hafeez Malik, Lawrence Ziring, Pnina Werbner, Hamza Alavi, Anwar Syed, Stanley Wolpert and K. K. Aziz. 6. One may mention exceptional cases like Asghar Ali Engineer, and Mushirul Hasan, but pressures from extremists on such intellectuals have been quite overpowering. 7. Curiously, the views on by the Indian nationalists as well as liberal scholars including Bipin Chandra, Sumit Sarkar, Gyan Pandey or Ashis Nandy appear similar, zeroing in on the role of the state in defining, categorizing, accentuating and exploiting intra-Indian differences, as if they did not exist before. 8. Pakistan's own governability problems, followed by those of Bangladesh, equally fed into such an anomalous position. 9. In an aura of misperceptions, disciplines such as South Asian Muslim studies have been almost peripheralized, between a major interest in pre-Islamic classical studies and a greater intimacy with the contempo• rary. In the former case, interest in classical Indian languages remains intact while in the latter case, Persian, Arabic and Urdu are conve• niently bypassed. Equally, as has been suggested by many Muslim historians, there is an unstated uneasiness towards specialisms like South Asian Islam. 'Being Pakistani [or Bangladeshi] and a Muslim are dual disadvantages even to obtain an initial professional recognition not to mention a competitive position', is routinely heard from Muslim scholars. The notions about Muslims being less objective academically do permeate such exclusivist thinking. As a necessary fall-out, people without sufficient intellectual background in Muslim culture, religion or history may have advantages over Muslim scholars, no matter how objective they are. 10. Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1960-1923, Delhi, 1993 (reprint); and , The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1994 (reprint). 11. For an interesting debate on this subject, see Paul R. Brass, 'Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia', in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp, eds, Political Notes 277

Identity in South Asia, London, 1979, pp. 35-77; and, Francis Robinson, 'Islam and Muslim Separatism', in ibid., pp. 78-112. 12. For his views, see Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1926-I928, New Delhi, 1979; and, 'Sectarianism in Indian Islam: the Shia-Sunni divide in the United Provinces', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, XXVII, (2), 1990, pp. 210 and 227. 13. For instance, see David Page, Prelude to Partition: the Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, I920-I932, Oxford, 1982. Robinson's own students have produced useful historical studies on the Punjab and dilating on imperial control over the region through the landed intermediaries. See Ian Talbot, Khizr Tiwana: the Punjab Unionist Party and the , London, 1996; and Sarah F. D. , Sufis, Saints and State Power: the Pirs of Sind, I943-1947, Cambridge, 1992. 14. F. Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonia/India, 1860-I947, Cambridge, 1989. 15. Quoted in E. H. Carr, What is History? London, 1990, p. 49. 16. A. J. P. Taylor, From Napoleon to Stalin, Oxford, 1950, p. 74. 17. Richard Reeves, Journey to Peshawar, New York, 1983. This and the following two books were written by visiting journalists whose observa• tions, not always untrue, were rather over-dramatic. 18. Emma Duncan, Breaking the Cwfew: a Political Journey through Pakistan, London, 1988. 19. Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah, London, 1991. 20. One wonders about the absence of significant studies done on similar subjects. For instance, , in India and Pakistan 1857-1964, London, 1964; Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Muslims, Delhi, 1988; David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, London, 1988; Imran Ali, Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947, London, 1989; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of Partition of India, 1936-1947, Delhi, 1987; Stephen Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: the Independence Movement in india's North-West Frontier Province, Durham, 1988; Ian Talbot, Punjab and the , 1849-1947, Delhi, 1988; and Sarah Ansari, op.cit. 21. Jalal, op. cit., p.60. 22. Ibid., p. 135. 23. Ibid., p. 70 fn. 24. Mountbatten's accolades and platitudes for Jinnah are no secret but his policies, based on a derisive attitude, cost the Indians in general and the Muslims in particular heavily. For details, see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, London, 1994. 25. Viceroy's report No.5, 1 May 1947 in ibid., p. 267. 26. Shaikh, op. cit. 27. Ibid., p. 5. 28. Ibid., p. 79. 29. A recent comparative study has tried to bridge this gap. See Ayesha J alai, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Cambridge, 1995. 30. A. Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-58, Delhi, 1995. 278 Notes

31. This is a view which was upheld by the Muslim nationalists in India. See Wali Khan, Facts are Facts, New Delhi, 1991. For a counter-argument, seeM. S. Korejo, The Frontier Gandhi, Karachi, 1994. 32. Maulana A K. Azad, India Wins Freedom, New Delhi, 1991, p. 198; also, Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, Islamic Seal on India's Independence, Karachi, 1998, pp. 268-71. 33. Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence, London, 1997. 34. Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: the Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, Boulder, 1992. 35. While Bangladesh is itself a focus of a separate historiography, its joint career with the rest of Pakistan cannot be separated from a discussion on party politics in the pre-1972 era. The redefinition of Bengali, Muslim Bengali, Muslim Indian (Pakistani), Bangladeshi and Muslim Bangladeshi identities have necessitated the need for a better under• standing of the early phase in its political career. Here, biographical or interpretive studies remain crucial. For a useful and long-awaited biog• raphy of a Muslim Bengali leader, see Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Karachi, 1991. 36. It took Benazir Bhutto almost two years to replace Wattoo with her own party faithful as the chief minister of Punjab. Sardar Arif Nikai, unlike Wattoo or , was a loyalist and would not pose any threat to . In the same vein, Bhutto appointed quite a few retired generals as governors and ministers largely because they were either Punjabi or Pushtun and secondly, unlike any ambitious politi• cian, would not defy Islamabad. Sharif, assuming power for the second time in 1997, selected his own brother, Shahbaz Sharif to head the Punjab cabinet. 37. For a viewpoint from 'below', see Ian Talbot, Freedom's Cry: the Popular Dimension in the and Partition Experience in North-West India, Karachi, 1996. 38. Imran Ali, op. cit. 39. For an overview, see Suhail Zaheer Lari, A History of Sindh, Karachi, 1996. 40. For further details on conflictive pluralism in Sindh, see Tahir Amin, The Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1988. 41. See Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Karachi, 1993; and Anwar Syed, The Discourse and Politics of , New York, 1993. 42. For useful recent studies on the subject, see M.S. Korejo, The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History, Karachi, 1994; and National Documentation Centre, The Referendum inN. WF.P., 1947, Islamabad, 1995. 43. Wali Khan, op. cit. 44. For a commentary on such inter-related themes, see Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, London, 1997. 45. In the fiftieth anniversary year of Pakistan, several publishers in Pakistan such as the Oxford University Press, Sang-i-Meel, Vanguard and others, have deeply enriched the academic debate on the country. Notes 279

Numerous valuable publications came out on subjects dealing with the country's history, politics, economy and culture. For details, see Ian Jenkins, Fifty Years of Pakistan, Karachi, 1997; and, Victoria Schofield, (ed.) Old Roads, New Highways: Fifty Years of Pakistan, Karachi, 1997. 46. For a useful study, see Hastings Donnan and Pnina Werbner, eds, Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society, London, 1991. 47. Akbar Zaidi, ed., Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan, Lahore, 1992. 48. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, New York, 1996. 49. For events leading to the separation of its eastern wing, see Leo E. Rose and Richard Sisson, War and Secession: India, Pakistan and the Creation of Bangladesh, Princeton, 1990; Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of , Karachi, 1994. 50. Hamza Alavi, Feroz Ahmed, Mumtaz Ahmed, Tahir Amin, Charles Kennedy and I. Baloch have written extensively on the subject. For a recent and comprehensive study rich in empirical data, see Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi, 1996. 51. Mushtaqur Rahman, Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan, Lahore, 1993. 52. Studies by Rounaq Jahan, H. Gardezi, , Charles Kennedy, Louis D. Hayes, G. W. Chowdhry, Lawrence Ziring, Stephen Cohen, Rafique Afzal, Rasul B. Rais, Mohammad Waseem, Robert Wirsing, Rodney Jones, Leo Rose and Vernon Hewitt have dwelt on such themes. 53. See Noman, The Political , London, 1988; Golam W. Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, London, 1988: Anthony Hyman, et al., Pakistan: Zia and After, London, 1988; M. Nazrul Islam, Pakistan and Malaysia: a Comparative Study in National Integration, New Delhi, 1989; Denis Wright, India-Pakistan Relations, 1962-1969, New Delhi, 1989. 54. Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge, 1995. 55. Some of the retired generals, the former colleagues of Zia, including General Faiz Chishti, Rao Farman Ali and K. M. Arif, published their memoirs. General Gul Hasan, an army chief under Z. A Bhutto and Brigadier Mohammad Yusaf, the kingpin between the Pakistani lSI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and the American CIA during the Afghan resistance, and General A A K. Niazi, of East Bengal reputation, published their autobiographical books in the 1990s. 56. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991. 57. Ibid., p. 151. 58. Ibid., p. 322. 59. Ibid., p. 342. 60. Ibid., p. 343. 61. Alastair Lamb, Birth of Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Hertingfordbury, 1994. 62. See No. D0/35-3054, Kashmir, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London. 280 Notes

63. Janet Morgan, Edwina Mountbatten: a Life of Her Own, London, 1991. 64. A thorough study of the papers dealing with the Boundary Award for British Punjab raise a number of significant issues about the rationale behind the demarcation. SeeM. Sadullah et al. (comp.), The Partition of the Punjab, 4 vols, Lahore, 1993. The map sent from Delhi to Lahore on 8 August 1947, included in the fourth volume of the series, shows some of these regions in Pakistan, but a few days later, they were trans• ferred to India. got hold of this map following the departure of the British governor of the Punjab, Sir Ian Jenkins. Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, a senior Muslim civil servant, had happened to see a similar map in George Abell's office. See his The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, 1967, p. 125. 65. Recent research on Lord Louis Mountbatten supports Pakistani suspi• cions about his partiality. See Andrew Roberts, op. cit. 66. M. J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Veil, New Delhi, 1991. 67. Robert G. Wirising, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, London, 1994. For other recent studies, see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, London, 1996; Vernon Hewitt, Reclaiming the Past: the Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary and Kashmir, London, 1995; Iftikhar H. Malik, The Ongoing Conflict in Kashmir: Regional Detente in Jeopardy, London, 1993; and Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, 1992. 68. P. I. Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58, London, 1990; also Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge, 1990. 69. For a recent perspective, see Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York, 1993; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment: a Study of Foreign Policy, New York, 1993. 70. Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: the , India, and Pakistan, New York, 1994. 71. For further discussion, see Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56, London, 1995. 72. For a background, see Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Proliferation in the , London, 1991; also Leo Rose and K. Matinuddin, eds, Beyond Afghanistan: Pakistan-United States Relations, Berkeley, 1989.

4 BRITAIN, MUSLIM INDIA AND PAKISTANIS: A TRANS• CULTURAL RELATIONSHIP

1. For a useful political and historical perspective on such themes, see Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery: the United States, India and Pakistan, New York, 1994; and, Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56, London, 1993. 2. For a discussion on the American 'factor' vis-a-vis Pakistan and a Notes 281

theoretical discussion on the concept of public diplomacy itself, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'American Public Diplomacy and Pakistan in the 1980s', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova) XIV, No. 2, 1990: 65-90. 3. It is only recently that one comes across socio-intellectual studies on mutual images and image-makers. For instance, see Tapan Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal, Delhi, 1988. 4. A number of former Mughal officials subsequently working for the British East India Company visited Britain in the eighteenth century and left memoirs and travelogues based on their cross-cultural experi• ences. Three of such authors, Itisam a! Din, Muhammad Husain and Abu Talib, while writing in Persian, left their accounts of contemporary Britain in particular and Europe in general. Other members of the elite, like Murtaza Husain Bilgrami, Abd al Latif and Ghulam Husain Khan, wrote on the British residents in India. For a recent study of such authors and their view of Britain and contemporary Western civilisa• tion, see Gulfishan Khan, 'Indian Muslim Perceptions of the West during the Eighteenth Century', D. Phil thesis, 1993, University of Oxford. This thesis has recently been published in Pakistan. 5. Individuals like Dr Mohammad Iqbal, despite being critical of its mate• rialism, were not totally dismissive towards Western civilization and sought a synthesis between Islam and the West. 6. For a further debate, see Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, London, 1997; Khalid B. Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, New York, 1995; and Asghar A. Engineer, The Islamic State, New Delhi, 1994. 7. The very rejection of secularism by the Bharatiya Janata Party in India and emphasis on - - is part of the similar debate which has gone on in Pakistan for decades, with religio-political parties like Jama'at-i-Islami demanding implementation of pristine Islamic values. 8. The Labour Party, a traditional supporter of the INC, showed indiffer• ence to Pakistan until the Conservative victory in 1951. The British Left remained ambivalent, occasionally hostile to the Muslim League in the pre-1947 era. For details, see John Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, London, 1950, pp. 168-9. As late as 1959, in a television inter• view, Lord Attlee derided Jinnah as an arrogant politician and far from being a good Muslim. For details, see The Listener, 22 January 1959. (It is interesting to note that such derogatory remarks were subsequently expunged from Attlee's biography. See, F. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, London, 1961, p. 211.) 9. Pakistanis have maintained all along that certain hostile elements in the British administration led by Lord Mountbatten did their maximum to hurt Pakistan from its very inception. See Chaudhari Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, 1967; and Latif A. Sherwani, The Partition of India and Mountbatten, Karachi, 1986. Their views have been substantiated by recent research affirming 282 Notes

Mountbatten's hostility towards Jinnah and the Indian Muslims. His own megalomaniac attitude, coupled with closer associations with Pandit Nehru and V. P. Menon, played a debilitating role in the forma• tive months of the infant state. For details, see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, London, 1994. 10. Radcliffe's arbitrary decisions in demarcating the Indo-Pakistan boundary played a crucial and equally damaging role in assigning vital Muslim areas in the Punjab to India. The allotment of Muslim-major• ity sub-divisions in Gurdaspur district facilitated India's entry into the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir whereas similar decisions in Ferozepur district resulted in further loss of the territory which, until 8 August 1947 had been officially shown to be within Pakistan. For the relevant official documents of the Boundary Award, see Mian Muhammad Saadullah, compl., The Partition of the Punjab, 1947 (4 vols), Lahore, 1993. The fourth volume contains the map sent by George Abell from New Delhi on the said date to Jenkins, the Punjab Governor, showing these areas in Pakistan. The Boundary Award was changed under the Congress influence brought upon Radcliffe through Mountbatten. In 1992, Christopher Beaumont, the secretary to Redcliffe, exposed the secret and radical changes made on the award. 'So Mountbatten interfered and Radcliffe allowed himself to be overborne. Grave discredit to both,' wrote C. Beaumont in his statement, now available to researchers. See his The Truth of the Partition of the Punjab in August 1947 in the Library of All• Souls College, Oxford. Also see his interview with Simon S. Plummer in The Daily Telegraph, 24 February 1992. 11. Though most of the files on Kashmir at the India Office Library and Records and the Public Record Office largely remain classified, one does come across quite a few inter-departmental queries regarding the Boundary Award and its rationale. Despite pressure from the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Office and journalists like Guy Wint, Radcliffe refused to divulge any information regrading his controver• sial decisions. See The Punjab Boundary Award, DO 35/-3054, PRO, London. 12. Such a 'vivisection' was also attributed to communalism with Jinnah interpreted as the spoiler of Indian unity. Curiously, such interpreta• tions defined communalism as the characteristic of Muslim minority, as if Hindu majority had nothing to do with it. 13. One could refer to host of such writings: see Abdul Wali Khan, Facts are Facts: the Untold Story of India's Partition, New Delhi, 1990; and, Ayesha Jalal, The Political Economy of Pakistan's Defence, Cambridge, 1990. 14. On such a view, since Pakistan joined the alliance-based relationship to serve Western interests in the region, a neutralist like Nehru lost his interest in resolving the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. (It is a strange argument since all the way from 1947 to 1954 Nehru showed no enthu• siasm for resolving the dispute. All that time, Pakistan's neutrality failed to make the Indian prime minister relent.) For the aforemen• tioned view, see Gowher Rizvi, 'Nehru and the Indo-Pakistan Rivalry Notes 283

over Kashmir, 1947-1964', Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995; 'India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem', in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, 1992. 15. Patel was convinced that he could not deal with the Muslim League and 'he was prepared to leave a part of India if only he could get rid of the Muslim League. Patel was the founder of India's partition'. Further on, Azad observes: 'I have often wondered how Nehru was won over. ... He is also impulsive and very amenable to personal influences. I think one factor responsible for the change was the personality of Lady Mountbatten. She has a most attractive and friendly temperament.' Maulana Abu! Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Delhi, 1991, p. 198. The veteran Muslim Congress leader further noted:' ... Now a situation had arisen where we were becoming greater supporters of partition than Jinnah .... History would never forgive us .... The verdict would be that India was divided not by the Muslim League but by the Congress.' Ibid., p. 202. 16. Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir, 1947, Hertingfordbury, 1994, p. 141. 17. For further discussion, see Anita Inder Singh, op. cit. 18. For pre-1947 attitudes, see Iftikhar H. Malik, U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1940-47: American Attitude towards Pakistan Movement, London, 1991; and for subsequent analysis, see Robert J. McMahon, op. cit. 19. For a historical background, see Iftikhar H. Malik, US-South Asia Relations, 1784-1940: a Historical Perspective, Islamabad, 1988. 20. See, for instance, Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London, 1963; and, John Richard Symonds, op. cit. 21. It is interesting to see that even before Pakistan entered into an alliance with the United States, general American opinion was favourable to a young, monotheistic society promising to be democra• tic. The entire experience of immigration, unlimited problems and independence from the British created receptivity towards Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani ruling elite left no stone unturned in convincing Americans of their unequivocal support for the US-led Western bloc. See Harold Isaacs, Scratches on Our Mind: American Images of and India, New York, 1958. 22. For a well-informed study on this subject, see Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923, Delhi, 1993 (reprint). 23. For further details, see K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India: a Study of British Public Opinion vis-a-vis the Development of Muslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947, London, 1962. 24. Ibid., p. 33. 25. The Times, 2 January 1907. 26. Quoted in Hugh Tinker, 'Between Old and New Delhi', in Robert E. Frykenberg, ed., Delhi Through the Ages, New Delhi, 1986, p. 352. 27. For an interesting study, see A A Powell, Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India, London, 1992. 28. See his letter in The Manchester Guardian, 14 November 1939. 284 Notes

29. Edward Thompson, Enlist India for Freedom, London, 1940, p. 58. It must also be remembered that Thompson made the claim two years after Iqbal's death. However, the quoted letter is a rejection of the 'contemporary' postulation of 'Pakistan' as envisioned by student• activists like Chaudhary Rahmat Ali and is not a repudiation of Muslim nationalism. For Iqbal-Thompson correspondence, see Edward Thompson Papers, the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 30. For details, see K. K. Aziz, op. cit., p. 147. 31. The Economist, 15 July 1944. 32. The Statesman, 15 July 1944. 33. The Guardian, 14 July 1945. 34. For details, see Ian Stephens, op. cit., pp. 192-211. Stephens inter• viewed Mountbatten for the last time on 26 October 1947. 35. Reginald Coupland, Oxford-based historian, on the other hand, had done a rather systematic study of the constitutional problems in India and avoided any outright denunciation of either view. 36. For a further discussion on these variegated views, see K. K. Aziz, op. cit., 137-65. 37. For a well-informed and the only study of this type, see John Richard Symonds, Oxford and Empire: the Last Lost Cause?, London, 1986. 38. It is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter to enumerate all the names of 'the Oxbridge crowd'. Suffice to say that Allama Iqbal, a former graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, envisioned a new polit• ical destiny for South Asian Muslims, whereas Rahmat Ali of Immanuel College coined the very word 'Pakistan'. 39. I do not suggest that all the undergraduates coming from affluent family backgrounds may be falling prey to frivolous life-styles since there may be some exceptions. In addition, it will be unfair to simplis• tically attribute the entire responsibility to these universities for the cliche, but there is no denying the fact that the Oxbridge 'crowd' is a separate class unto itself even within the United Kingdom itself. 40. K. K. Aziz, op. cit., p. 146. 41. See Sir Francis Mudie to Sir Maurice Hallett, 11 November 1948, Sir Francis Mudie Collection, India Office Records & Library (IOR&L), London. 42. In more recent years, Pakistan's stature has increased largely due to a democratic set-up though the inertia and polarization of youthful Pakistani leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, while similar worries about newcomers like have only added to general dismay. See 'Imran to Declare' (editorial), The Times, 23 May 1996. 43. It is difficult to list various works on the Pakistani/Kashmiri communi• ties in Britain, as the literature keeps on growing. For instance, see Muazzam Ali, ed., Pakistanis in Europe, London, 1982; Muhammad Anwar, Pakistanis in Britain: a Sociological Study, London, 1985; and Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain, Oxford, 1988. 44. One may list several well-meaning studies from the Institute of Policy Studies or by individual academics in this category which, inadvert• ently, end up seeing the entire subject through Western typologies and concepts lacking an intimate exposure to the cultural, doctrinal, Notes 285

regional or linguistic realities of the these communities. 45. There is a multitude of such studies which have furthered our knowl• edge about such minority communities, but, their ambitious outlay does pose a number of problems. For instance, see Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West, London, 1997. 46. See The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: a Challenge for Us All, London, 1997. 47. Benazir Bhutto carried on her political work in exile in Britain until she went back in April 1986. Her exile along with that of many other PPP activists suited the late General Zia-ul-Haq in a way as they were away from Pakistan itself. But they equally raised concern for his govern• ment given their contacts with the influential sections in the media, academia and politics in the West. For her own account of her exile, see Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East, London, 1988. Altaf Hussain, the founder of the MQM, living in London since 1991, has kept himself in touch with his followers in Pakistan, the Middle East and North America through a well-organised media network and electronic tech• nology. Funds and volunteers came from all over to serve the leader who has remained in London ostensibly on health grounds but is basic• ally escaping from his enemies and law-enforcing authorities. Until the military crack-down in Sindh in June 1992, the MQM received explicit coverage from the ethnic press, dominated by Urdu speakers, who either supported the MQM for ideological reasons or were simply coerced into doing so. See Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan: a Commentary on MQM', South Asia (Armidale), Vol XVIII, No. 2, 1995, 49-72. The Benazir Bhutto administration in the mid- 1990s tried to pressurize the British government to extradite him to Pakistan but due to the absence of such a bilateral treaty, and Islamabad's unwillingness to have such a treaty, British desire to main• tain links with all kinds of forces in countries like Pakistan, the need to protect economic interests in Karachi, continue negating any Pakistani desire to repatriate Hussain and hundreds of his camp-followers living on British social security benefits and donations from Pakistan. In the meantime, Hussain goes around dictating politics in Pakistan's biggest and most important city. Here in the United Kingdom, he has main• tained the tempo through an organized network of followers, themselves looking for some role model and identity. Most of these followers- men and women - are on official benefits and protect each other's interests as a class. Hussain's recommendations, in several cases, have helped many of these exiles in gaining political asylum in this country. Hussain and his secretariat are always eager to be interviewed by Europeans, irrespective of their background, but, despite their avowals on accessibility, prefer not being accessible to Pakistani scholars, even if they are based in the West. Most of his interviews with Western students are characterized by prolonged harangues against Punjabis, feudals, troops and Sindhis. These interviewers share a wide-ranging disillusionment with his monologic style, and the personality-centred character of the MQM in the UK and elsewhere and have complained 286 Notes

of his disregard for their queries. The participation in the MOM rallies has also borne out the autocratic and regimented nature of the MOM with a great emphasis on verbosity and rhetoric. In addition, great efforts are made to build up the image of Altaf Hussain with explicit fascist undertones that also go against the middle-class reformism of the MOM. Interview with A. Hussain in London, 12 July 1998. 48. G. M. Khar, one of the former governors of the Punjab and a close associate of Z. A. Bhutto, lived in London and conspired with the Indian intelligence to overthrow Zia. He even undertook clandestine visits to India to meet the late Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. For details, see Tehmina Durrani, My Feudal Lord, Lahore, 1991. 49. The attitude among British Muslims towards the British government and media underwent a major change with their continued support for Salman Rushdie, the Gulf war and the bankruptcy of the BCCI. Similarly, many British Muslims were angered over official objections to the US efforts in helping the beleaguered Bosnian government. 50. The inter-generational relationship among Pakistanis and the British is not totally tension-free. The latter have been sometime derided as BBCD's - British-born Confused Desis, while the latter do have their own stereotypes of the former. 51. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, according to a report, are the lowest in terms of per capita income and educational achievements. The Indian, Chinese and Afro-Caribbean minorities have overtaken the Muslim communities in the UK who, at present, make a massive 'underclass': Quoted in a special report in Panorama, BBC Television, 29 March 1993. The investigative telecast coincided with a study on the subject published the same day. See Trevor Jones, Britain's Ethnic Minorities, Poole (PSI), 1993; also The Guardian, 29 March 1993. 52. This has been borne out by various studies done at the University of Manchester. See Pnina Werbner, 'Factionalism and Violence in Pakistani Politics', in P. Werbner and Hastings Donnan, eds, Economy & Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society, London, 1991; and, 'On Mosques and Cricket Teams: Religion and Nationalism among British Pakistanis', a paper presented at International Conference on Pakistan, Oxford, 13 June 1992. 53. Most of the semi-literate parents belonging to 'pioneer' immigrants have difficulty in relating with their children. 54. According to a report about six to seven British women per week were converting to Islam in Britain solely by their own choice. Morning News, BBC TV, 28 September 1994. (To some observers, the figures have been rather inflated.) 55. Some distinct studies on crucial issues have definitely left an indelible mark. For instance, see Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991. 56. For instance, see Emma Duncan, Breaking the Curfew: a Political Journey through Pakistan, London, 1989; and Christina Lamb, Waiting For Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy, London, 1991. (Needless to say, despite many sweeping generalizations, such books did expose the seamy side of the Pakistani ruling elite contrasted with the naivete Notes 287

of the masses.) 57. Dervla Murphy, Where the Indus is Young, London, 1976. 58. See lsobell Shaw and Hilary Adamson, A Traveller's Guide to Pakistan, Islamabad, 1983. This happens to be the most up-to-date and a very friendly account of all the places of scenic and cultural significance to visit in Pakistan. It is based on minute details and a deep admiration for the country's heritage. Also see Isobell Shaw, Pakistan Handbook, London, 1991. 59. See Geoffrey Moorehouse, To the Frontier, London, 1983. The book won the Thomas Cook Travel Award in 1984 and is characterized by a lucid style, giving personal accounts of travels across Pakistan. 60. Sir Maurice James, Pakistan Chronicle, London, 1992. 61. It does not mean that its relationship with the government decreases its influence world-wide, since even the Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe are being accredited with a major contribution in bringing about post- 1989 global changes in the former Eastern bloc. See Czeslaw Milosz, 'Keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Going', International Herald Tribune, 4 March 1993. 62. Asa Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting, London, 1961, p.3. This study makes the first volume in a four-volume work authored by the former BBC senior executive under the general title The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. 63. James McDonell, Public Service Broadcasting: a Reader, London, 1991, p. 11. 64. Ibid., p. 5. 65. See J. C. W. Reith, Broadcast over Britain, London, 1925, p. 7. 66. For more on Reith, see Andrew Boyle, Only the Wind Will Listen; Reith of the BBC, London, 1972. The study was also meant as a tribute to the BBC on its fiftieth anniversary. 67. Words like 'broadcast( ed)' or 'listen( -in)' were debated all through the 1920s. See, Briggs, op. cit., p. 242. 68. Following statistics on the circulation of the three magazines merit special attention:

Radio Times World Radio The Listener 1927 1939 1927 1939 1927 1939 851657 2588433 60308 76464 27773 49692

Source: Asa Briggs, The Golden Age of Wireless, London, 1965, p. 281. 69. Ibid., p. 370. 70. The liaison with the Foreign Office created new tensions, though according to Briggs 'it did not influence programme policy'. Ibid., p. 404. 71. Asa Briggs, The War of Words, London, 1970, p. 16. 72. Such a debate began soon after the war when the BBC ventured into telecasting. For details, see Asa Briggs, Sound and Vision, Oxford, 1979. 73. Gerard Mansell, Let Truth Be Told, London, 1982, p. 206. Bokhari, 288 Notes

subsequently, became the Director-General of All-India Radio. 74. See Government of India, Memorandum on the Proposed Hindustani Service by the BBC, 4 April1940, the BBC Archives, London. 75. Gerard Mansell, op. cit., p. 209. 76. A Delhi-based Muslim author wrote to the BBC: 'There is a great hatred of the British in this country, where the British were regarded as "just exploiters".' See Note by Ahmed Ali, 17 April 1943, BBC Archives, quoted in ibid., p. 209. 77. For his views, see Mark Tully, No Full Stops in India, London, 1991. Other BBC-connected writers on South Asian affairs included Nicholas Nugent, George Arney and more recently, David Loyn, who respectively wrote on Rajiv Gandhi, Afghanistan and Kashmir. 78. The BBC, Annual Report and Handbook 1987, London, 1986, p. 116. 79. Ibid., p. 117. People heard on the BBC about the warm reception at Lahore given to Benazir Bhutto on her return to Pakistan on 10 April 1986. Even the sustained movement staged by academics from the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in early months of 1985 against the repressive curbs and presidential ordinance became an event of national and international concern largely due to the BBC World Service. The BBC's claims for impartiality and promptness have certainly played a major role in the politicization of the Third World. Political elite and citizens' groups consider it as an influential medium to reach the masses and the rulers of their own country, since in many cases, the former are not afforded access to officially controlled media. 80. For related statistical information, see ibid., p. 181. 81. The BBC, Annual Report and Accounts 1991/92, London, 1992, p. 50. 82. Ibid., p. 57. 83. For further details on such statistics, see BBC, Guide to the BBC 1992, London, 1992, p. 32. 84. It does not mean that a defensive attitude is being suggested here. It is both incorrect and impossible to isolate the community from being part of the 'global village'. 85. For detailed history and budgetary statistics, see Frances Donaldson, The British Council: the First Fifty Years, London, 1984. 86. The British Council, Annual Report and Accounts 1990/91, London, 1991, p. 39. 87. Quoted in Donaldson, op. cit., p. 137. 88. There have been rumours, sometimes even reported by The Times Higher Education Supplement, of some British official reservations against South Asian post-graduate students in disciplines such as nuclear physics. 89. He was born in Hertfordshire and migrated to South Africa in 1870 for health reasons. 'Much of his energy was devoted to extending British influence northward in Africa, and he obtained a royal charter for a British South Africa Company to administer the territory which was eventually named after him, Rhodesia .... Rhodes' life is part of the history of Southern Africa.' Rhodes House, The Rhodes Trust and Rhodes House, Oxford, 1992, p. 3. Notes 289

90. The Board consisted of prominent individuals like Lord Milner, Rudyard Kipling, Earl Grey, Earl Baldwin and Lord Hailey of Shahpur. 91. His original will provided for 52 scholarships each year with 20 for the areas forming the , divided as following: Canada 2 New Zealand 1 Australia 6 Newfoundland 1 South Africa 5 Bermuda 1 Rhodesia 3 Jamaica 1 Thirty-two scholarships were for the United States while, subse• quently two were added for Germany. See Rhodes House, The Rhodes Trust and Rhodes House, Oxford, 1992, pp. 3-4. 92. For details see Rhodes House, A Register of Rhodes Scholars, 1903-1981, Oxford, 1981, p. iii. 93. In 1992, following was the annual distribution of Rhodes scholarships: USA 32 Kenya 2 Canada 11 Bermuda 1 South Africa 9 Jamaica 1 Australia 9 Nigeria 1 India 4 Singapore 1 Germany 4 Malaysia 1 Zambia & Zimbabwe 3 Pakistan 1 British Caribbean 2 Hong Kong 1 In addition to these, there are eight European Rhodes Scholars. Each candidate is selected through a country committee served by a national secretary appointed by the trustees. , the Chairman of the Senate, was the secretary for the Pakistan committee in 1993-94. The son of a judge, he was born in 1941 in Jullundar in East Punjab, India, and had been a Rhodes Scholar (1964-67) before begin• ning his legal practice in Lahore. He lectured at Law College, Lahore, on a part-time basis prior to entering public life under General Zia, himself a refugee from East Punjab. 94. For further details, see A.J.P.K, Sufl!ey of Rhodes Scholars' Experience of the Scholarship, Oxford, December 1992. 95. Another new programme, the Oxford Reuters Fellowship, affiliated with Green College, has been occasionally selecting individual Pakistani journalists for its training and research programme. By 1998, three Pakistani grantees had been affiliated with this programme. The South Asian Visiting Fellowship (SAVSP), financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation, has offered occasional short-term research bursaries to a few Pakistani scholars, though in recent years there has been a sharp and rather curious decline. 96. From 1989 to 1992, there had been only two Pakistani trainees in the programme and from 1992 to 1998, there were none. 97. It must be acknowledged that the Oxford University Press in Pakistan, in recent years and especially in 1997, has sponsored scores of valuable books on Pakistan in the areas of history, politics, archaeology, sociol• ogy, economics and culture. Most of these interesting biographies and scholarly works appear in the present volume as source material. 98. For further details, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'The British Association for 290 Notes

Pakistan Studies', IIAS Newsletter (Leiden), No.7, Winter 1996, p. 23. By late 1998, BAPS had sponsored 32 seminars on several academic issues dealing with Southern and Western Asia. 99. Declassified British documents at the IOR&L and PRO belonging to the early years of Pakistan highlight the 'personal' nature of the rela• tionship between London and Karachi. 100. There have been quite a few regional/national newspapers and maga• zines catering to the needs of Pakistanis in Britain including Daily lang, Daily Awaz International, and Weekly Watan, all based in London. The last two newspapers ended their circulation in 1994-95, while more recently, Nation and The Asian Times, daily and weekly papers, both based in London, have been started by Pakistani expatriates. 101. Some of the favourite programmes have been Family Pride and Traffic, shown on Channel4, whereas BBC Network East carried programmes on political and cultural themes. Late-night music programmes or dramas like Pakistani TV's Tanhayyan, Wan-is and Dhoop Kinaray remained popular among the Asian viewers. Some of the programmes like the BBC's Panorama on Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, or Channel 4's Man-iages with Quran and Karachi Cops caused quite an uproar among many in the community who found such presentations biased. In 1997, the BBC's Princess and the Playboy, an investigative documentary about Benazir Bhutto and her husband's corrupt activi• ties like kick-backs and money laundering, was an eye-opener for several pro-PPP elements. In 1997-98, there were several visual presentations on Imran Khan, Bhutto and Pakistan's nuclear programme. The print media also carried special reports on Pakistan• related issues, much to the chagrin of the country's ruling elite. For instance, see 'Benazir Bhutto's Booty', The Sunday Times, 12 April 1998; and a similar report on corruption by Nawaz Sharif appeared in The Observer, 27 September 1998. 102. For a long time, marriages with Wilayat-returned had been considered a status-symbol and a sure means of security for the Pakistani youth, but lately this trend seems to be declining. Firstly, because a number of such marriage are failing and, secondly, given the increased size of the community, there are quite a few suitors available within Britain.

5 ISLAM, MUSLIM NATIONALISM AND NATION-BUILDING IN PAKISTAN: ISSUES OF IDENTITY

1. It is not being suggested here that after 194 7 Islam should have been banished from national political life; rather, the argument is that a simplified view of Islamic cohesion slackened the quest for a common, durable and consensual nationhood. Islam was used both by the state and various societal groups to silence the healthy dissent demanding debate, enfranchisement and wider democratization. 2. This argument is further linked with a rather curious view of Islam lacking a critical tradition -something like Protestant revolution and a continued scepticism of the Word. Notwithstanding the desirability of Notes 291

such an honest critique, the greater zeal to seek 'alternative explana• tion' itself becomes deconstructive. For instance, see Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, Vol. I, London, 1996, and, Vol. II, London, 1997. The author, instead of a stated alternative interpretation, churns out a totally annihilative discourse. 3. It is interesting to note that in the 1960s, Islam meant a radical politics aimed at obtaining greater self-recognition. Following the Black Muslims Movement as espoused by the contemporary Nation of Islam, groups like 'Red Muslims' in North America- not Muslim in the theo• cratic sense - demanded wider equality for such marginalized communities. Islam, in such and other anti-colonial cases, operated as the bastion of . 4. Generally viewed as Islamophobia, the particularist views of Islam come from wider and influential 'mundane' sections including politi• cians, academicians and media pandits. Unlike the erstwhile missionary onslaught, such Huntingtonian nationalist groups in several cases are apparently secular elements. On the other hand, religious circles are gradually showing greater understanding for Islam though it will be too soon to expect a greater sense of equality on all sides. Christian schol• ars like Kenneth Cragg, Michael Nazir-Ali or Karen Armstrong represent a new dimension. See Kate Zebiri, Muslims and Christians Face to Face, Oxford, 1997. 5. Islam and politics are inter-connected the way Islam and modernity seem to have a common though undefined interface. Modernity within Islam is a fait accompli, yet, like the ambiguity on 'whys' of politics of Islamic nomenclature, it remains undefined. Modernity meant devel• opment and a march towards globalization but has also produced commercialization, colonization and ethno-political xenophobia. In the same way, Muslim nationalists used modernist arguments to wrest independence but in post-colonial periods are confronted with monop• olist, neo-colonial structures and, like a disputed nationalism, the state itself has become the arena for feuding interests. 6. Some Islamicists, with their intolerant and rejectionist agenda, would like us to believe in that, yet, for the ordinary masses, intermediate classes and a vast variety of ruling elites, their national identities, state systems and politicisation, however misdirected or exploitative they may be, are the ultimate realities. 7. One may suggest various ideological constellations seeking legitimacy from Islam yet lacking a consensus and substitutive alternative. Perhaps the answer is not in 'either' or 'or' but rather in a synthesis without a total vetoing of modernity and tradition. As seen in several cases across the board, any ideological uniformity could become total• itarian, disallowing tolerance and basic human rights. 8. In Britain, religion, despite its hierarchical structural relationship to royalty, remains a powerful partner in the nation-building project. The very definition and rather simplified view of ethnicity in Ulster as sectarianism in common parlance is an acceptance of the reality. In Bosnia, one of the most secular, multi-ethnic countries, ethnic cleans• ing owed itself to a bizarre religion-based communal division. It is not 292 Notes

only in countries like France, Germany and Russia, that ultra-national• ists seek self-justification in religion; even in diverse cases such as India, otherwise democratic and liberal, religion remains a paramount deter• minant in public policies, at least at the local levels. Countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh have openly anchored their political identities upon majoritarian religions/sects within their respective population. In Britain itself, where discussion on multi-culturalism is conducted in the perspective of class, race (colour or regional/national origin) and culture (religion in this case), there is a greater scholarly recognition of redefining nationalism. See Harry Goulbourne, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post• Imperial Britain, Cambridge, 1991. The feeling among several British Muslim intellectuals is that while the Afro-Caribbean Britons may be discriminated against on the basis of colour, Muslims lose out largely because of their culture; there are others who believe it is class and colour not religion which underwrite racism. See, Tariq Modood, Sharon Beishon and Satnam Virdee, Changing Ethnic Identities, London, 1994. In a recent study conducted by the Runneymede Trust across Britain it was found out that an overwhelming number of Britons simply disliked Muslims. Such attitudes are rooted in all the three mentioned factors besides a greater amount of cultural disinterestedness, imperi• alist hang-over, economic escapism and media voyeurism. See, 'British Found to be a Nation of Muslim Haters', The Independent (London) 21 February 1997; and, The Runneymede Trust, Islamophobia: a Challenge for Us All, London, 1997. 9. Ideology will largely mean shared views, values and objectives mani• festing collective and considered opinions. 10. 'It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and inde• pendent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of the society. This model is available in writing; it is equally and symmetri• cally available to all literate men, and to all those willing to heed literate men. These rules are to be implemented throughout social life.' Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge, 1993 (reprint), p. 1 11. Such a theory of statecraft, warfare and peace is amply discussed in Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore, 1961 (reprint); and, Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Islamic Discourse on Jihad, War and Violence: Interpretations and Typologies', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, XXII, No.2. 12. However, it is curious to note that whereas the Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) in British India was critical of the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan, the Deobandi ulama had no qualms in supporting the Indian National Congress espousing the case for a . 13. Gellner, op. cit., p. 5. 14. Ibid., p.7. 15. See his 'Islam and Marxism', International Affairs, 1991, pp. 1-6. 16. All these three groups have been largely lower-middle-class, bazaree sections. While the first two assumed more populist postulations the JI has mostly remained exclusivist. But all three of them, despite their Notes 293

varied puritanical and scriptural emphasis, are modernists in their tech• niques and strategies. They all have been trying to wrest the state powers in their individual states to implement their authority. Under its third amir, Hafiz Husain Ahmed- a Pushtun- the JI has tried to popu• larize its appeal to gain wider electoral support but its membership remains quite restrictive. The Khomeinists are populist-modernists; as they are not merely the defenders of the faith, they equally move within the parameters of the territorial state. They have maintained most of the pre-revolutionary institutions and have used media and educational institutions to the hilt to popularize themselves. For more on this, see Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism, London, 1993. 17. Owen, while defining a state, finds two major definitional elements: 'the notion of state as a sovereign political entity with international recognition, its own boundaries, its own flag, and so on; and the notion of the state as the supreme coercive and rule-making body'. Roger Owen, State, Power & Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London, 1994, p. 3. 18. Its characteristics could be its mundaneness, centralization, rent collec• tion, limited political and class-based expediency, disregard for constitutional and civil prerogatives of the vast echelons of society, arrogance and emphasis on grandeur and appearances. 19. There is an ever-growing literature on the subject, starting with the concept of the state being totally alien to Muslims, to more recent works discussing the complex and often misunderstood relationship between the state and society. Categories such as strong, weak, weak• strong, total, totalitarian, dogmatic, theocratic, industrial, elitist, pariah, notional, national, minoritarian, majoritarian, plural, unitary, confederal, federal, monarchical, democratic and military states reflect a wide variety across the political spectrum. 20. SeeP. J. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State, London, 1987. 21. For more on this, see Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State, London, 1989, p. 121. 22. Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', New Left Review, No. 72, 1974; and, also his chapter in H. Gardezi and J. Rashid, eds, Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship, London, 1983. 23. Tala! Asad, 'Conscripts of Western Civilization' as quoted in Roger Owen, op. cit., p. 3. 24. Focusing on twelve Arab states, Ayubi finds them lacking cohesive, consensual and national characteristics since they 'are "hard" states, and indeed many of them are "fierce" states, few of them are really "strong" states. Although they have large bureaucracies, mighty armies and harsh prisons, they are lamentably feeble when it comes to collect• ing taxes, winning wars or forging a really "hegemonic" power block or an ideology that can carry the state beyond the coercive and "corpo• rate" level and into and the moral and intellectual sphere.' Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, London, 1995, p. xi. 294 Notes

My own thesis aims at investigating the unevenness between the state and civil society leading to an official manipulation, ideological fragmentation and ethnic polarization. I see the Pakistani state enjoy• ing vetoing powers over civil institutions and coercive through intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces but weak in delivering on social sector or grassroots empowerment. See Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, London/New York, 1997. 25. Gellner, op. cit. (1993), p. 47. 26. The term was originally used by Leonard Binder in his study of Islam and politics in Pakistan. See his Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Los Angeles, 1961, p. 7. 27. For a useful overview, see Edward Said, Covering Islam, London, 1994. 28. John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford, 1995. 29. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, London, 1996. 30. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, London, 1979. 31. Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power, London, 1982; and also 'Christianity and Islam', International Affairs, 67, 1, 1991. 32. See Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islam, London, 1997. 33. The best case-studies in recent history could be of Jamal-al-Din al• Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, Rashid Rida, Muhammad Iqbal, Fazl-i-Husain, Shah Din, Muhammad Shafi, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Allama Shariati and several others. In British India, the establishment of educational, religious and cultural associations, called anjuman, invigorated the conceptualization of cultural identity, which in the twentieth century turned into Muslim nationalism. The earliest such societies included Movement, All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference, Anjuman-i• Islamiyah (Lahore), Anjuman-i-Islamiyah (), Anjuman-i• Himayat-i-Islam (Lahore) and Anjuman-Islamiyah (Bombay). This graduation from a cultural identity into political community fits in with the modernist typology of nationalism presented by Benedict Anderson. I have discussed this in greater detail elsewhere: 'Pluralism, Partition and Punjabisation: Politics of Muslim Identity in British Punjab', International Journal of Punjab Studies, 5, 1 1998. 34. This is quite apparent in recent years, especially after the assertion of Hindutva. In private interviews Indian Muslim intellectuals focus on Pakistan as an ambivalent reality. 35. It is a reality accepted by various India-watchers. See Paul Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, Cambridge, 1995. The assumption of power by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in March 1998, to several observers, may lead to various scenarios leading to further intensity in inter-community relationship. It may further stifle the debate on Indian Muslim identity; could further aggravate Indo-Pakistani and Indo• Bangladeshi relations; but could also show a more realistic and moderate attitude towards internal and regional pluralism. 36. Like several other Orientalist views, such liberal Hindu elements Notes 295

presumed an unchanging non-Indianness among Indian Muslims. On the other extreme, B. G. Tilak, Swami Dayananda Saraswati (the founder of Arya Samaj), Swami Sharaddhanand, Lajpat Rai, B. C. Chatterji, Lala Hardayal and several other orthodox Hindu notables refused to accept the Indian credentials of the Muslims. They were viewed as foreigners, barbarian and fierce, who had kept India in bondage for so many centuries and always operated as a single commu• nity. See Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence, London, 1997, pp. 40-46. It is interesting to remember that most of Professor Mushirul Hasan's writings are aimed at highlighting the fissures among the Indian Muslims and focus on the non-inevitability of Pakistan. Curiously, the lack of a Muslim commu• nitarian cohesiveness is contrasted with a stronger horizontal bonds with the Hindus. Pakistan comes out as a tragedy for the whole of India and especially for Muslims. Similarly, books by other secular national• ist Muslims like M.J. Akbar go out of their way in building up Azad by debunking Jinnah. See his Nehru: the Making of India, Delhi, 1988. Despite the mystique and tragedy of Partition, fifty years on, the debate must also move forward. 37. Hasan, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 38. Iqbal Akhund, Memoirs of a Bystander: a Life in Diplomacy, Karachi, 1997, p. 456. In all fairness to the author, it must be acknowledged that he is hopeful of a positive sense prevailing between the two. 39. Such an interpretation was a sort of impassioned retaliation against Indian questioning of Pakistan and Western scepticism towards its rationale and viability. One may include Professor Ishtiaq Husain , Abdul Hamid, K. K. Aziz, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad and Waheed• uz-Zaman among those who saw in Pakistan a rediscovery of Islam. Such an interpretation, basing itself in the UP and , concentrates on the AIML, with focus on Muslim minority provinces. The Muslim majority provinces have got nothing mentionable to offer and joined the bandwagon only when the movement became 'pervasive and too powerful'. Such an explanation is fraught with simplifications incorporating dangerous portents for . Its ongoing acceptance as the mainstream interpretation simply betrays the lack of innovativeness in Pakistani historiography. 40. Similarly, just by concentrating on a few individuals or zeroing in on the institutions of state, one cannot comprehend the complex processes during the nationalist period. Jalal provides us a reinvented Cambridge interpretation whereas Anita Singh concentrates on the centrality of Congress's role. The works on regional histories are a welcome addition to provide a non-centrist alterative. See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan Cambridge, 1985; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1937-1947, Delhi, 1987; David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, London, 1988; Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947, Delhi, 1988; Stephen Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: the Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, Durham, 1988; and 296 Notes

Sarah Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: the Pirs of Sind, 1943-1947, Cambridge, 1992. 41. I have dealt with this historiographical debate and need for region• based scholarly studies in greater details in my paper presented at the Smithsonian Institution. See Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan: a Thematic Study of Historiography', presented at Pakistan Conference, Washington, DC, 1996. 42. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1947, London, 1967; and S. M. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, Lahore, 1995 (reprint). 43. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906, Delhi, 1981; and Farzana Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947, Cambridge, 1989. 44. However, to several recent scholars, the imperial mode of politicking since the diarchy and the convergence and divergences between the colonial state and regional elites have largely fashioned recent Indian Muslim history. See A. Yunas Samad,A Nation in Turmoil, Delhi, 1996. 45. I have discussed this in reference to the Khaksar Movement, seeking a continuum of such a dialogue, though it will be preposterous to suggest that the articulation did not lack ambiguity. 'Regionalism or Personality Cult? Allama Mashriqi and the Tehreek-i-Khaksar in British South Asia', in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, eds, The Partition of Punjab, Karachi, forthcoming. 46. See various articles in C. M. Nairn, ed., Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: the Vision and the Reality, Syracuse, 1979. 47. Fazlur Rahman, 'Iqbal, the Visionary; Jinnah, the Technician; and Pakistan, the Reality', in ibid. 48. For a rather emotional treatment, see , Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan, Karachi, 1996. However, an early thesis based on archaeological evidence was presented several decades back by Sir Mortimer Wheeler in one of his early works. See, Robert Eric Wheeler, Five Thousand Years of Pakistan, London, 1950. 49. Though it will be incorrect to hold that the forces like the BJP or Shiv Sena are temporary aberrations. See, Fred Halliday, op. cit., pp. 172-7. 50. One tends to agree with Professor Khalid Bin Sayeed that all the various models of political Islam - Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia- are flawed. Within a global Western dominance and a contin• ued Muslim legacy of corrupt and authoritarian regimes, the Islamic alternative is still a charade. See his Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, Albany, 1995. 51. 'A little over five years ago I left Karachi with a gnawing feeling of unfulfillment. I had spent nearly a year reading and talking about this idea of an Islamic constitution which so many Pakistanis seemed to hold so dear, and which seemed so consistently to elude them .... Now more than five years later I know it is not yet ended and perhaps never will be'. Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Los Angeles, 1961, p. vii. 52. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 260-73. 53. Studies in the 1960s suggested that the clericalism symbolizing trad- Notes 297

itionalism would give way to the marching forces of modernity. Development was welcomed as a leveller in ethnic and sect-ridden soci• eties. The entire class-based and ideological schism was seen as a retaliation by religious groups against state-led modernization. See Wayne A Wilcox, Pakistan: the Consolidation of a Nation, New York, 1966. 54. For example, a seasoned author and former diplomat opined rather unclearly: 'The Quaid-i-Azam believed in Pakistani nationalism rather than in Muslim nationalism.' Afzal Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, Delhi, 1984, p. 41. The question is, how would you define and differen• tiate between the two? 55. For instance, a political analyst, baffled at Pakistan's rhetorical focus on Islam rather than on mundane nationalism, opined: 'The political and social essence of Pakistan is Islam.' Louis D. Hayes, Politics and Pakistan: the Struggle for Legitimacy, Boulder, 1984, p. 40. 56. To Binder, the of 1940 was neither nationalistic nor Islamic. See his 'Pakistan and the Modern Islamic Nationalist Theory', The Middle East Journal, 12, Winter 1958, p. 51. 'Pakistan's emergence was not the emergence of a new state. It was interesting because it had a certain ideo-religious atmosphere. Never before in the history of the world has any nation emerged which opted for a state to realise its dream of a utopian society.' Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, London, 1966, p. ix. 57. The absence of an Islamic Reformation, to many observers, may appear as a pertinent fact, while to the Islamicists, it may smack of Eurocentricism, since to them Islamic perfection as a din is divinely guaranteed. See Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, 1965. 58. Charles Adams, 'The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi', in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton, 1966, p. 390. 59. For a critical evaluation of his views, see various articles in M. Asghar Khan, ed., Islam, Politics and the State: the Pakistan Experience, London, 1985. 60. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, New York, 1996. 61. For a useful discussion, see Anwar H. Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, Lahore, 1984; also, Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'The Jamaat-i-Islami Movement in Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, XXX, 2, 1957. 62. One must not forget the Tablighi Jama'at which, despite its emphasis on individual religious purification, has transformed itself into an extra-regional, international and multi-class body through internalizing a puritanical and rigorous form of Islam. 63. Syed, op. cit., pp. 7-10. 64. Slogans like Islamic socialism, Islamic democracy, Islamic economics, however raw or opportunistic they may look, did try for some synthesis. However, intellectual constructs like Muslim feminism deserve serious attention and could be the ultimate way out. 65. Other than ethnic turmoil in Karachi, uncertainty in Kabul and tension in Kashmir, Pakistani society in the mid-1990s witnessed the worst 298 Notes

phase in the Shia-Sunni conflict. See 'Confronting an Enemy Within' (editorial), The Guardian (London), 9 March 1995. In a selective campaign to eliminate the middle-class Shias and Sunnis, both the ASSP's Sipah-i-Jhangvi and Sipah-i-Muhammad had killed more fellow-citizens in the first six months of 1997 than the total death-toll in Karachi due to ethnic turmoil. Despite various official crack-downs, the selective killing of religious intellectuals and professionals all across Pakistan went on sporadically. In late March 1998, a Shia gathering in Hangu near Kohat was strafed by unknown assailants riding a vehicle, followed by days of sectarian clashes in this Frontier town. The Sunnis had warned the Shias against celebrating Nauroze, the Iranian New Year and on the latter's insistence resorted to indiscriminate strafing. See The Guardian, 14 April1998. To some observers, the emergence of Taliban as the ruling party in Afghanistan had provided a greater impetus to ASSP. The killing of Iranian diplomats in Multan in 1996 and of two engineers in 1998 in Karachi were linked to the extra• national support for sectarian militants. See Iftikhar H. Malik, 'What is Wrong in Karachi?', The Economic and Political Weekly, 5 September 1998; The Guardian, 5 January 1999. 66. In early 1998, in Lahore, the home base of Mian Nawaz Sharif, during a Shia funeral, several worshippers were gunned down by Sunni assailants. The police were unable to protect the mourners despite the early warnings to the effect. Despite the arrest of several ringleaders, especially from amongst the Sipah-i-Jhangvi, the network seems to have remained intact. 67. Sectarianism and violence in the name of Islam are massively condemned by Pakistanis as is obvious from an unprecedented and pioneering nation-wide survey. It indicated that 80 per cent of respon• dents across Pakistan were in favour of banning sectarian parties and desired ulama to confine their Friday sermons to only religious subjects. See 'Fifty Years: Fifty Questions', The Herald (Karachi), January 1997; also, Arif Humayun, 'A History of Hatred', Newsline (Karachi), June 1997. The divergences between the statist forces and the civil society have, in a powerful way, contributed in sectarian mili• tancy. 68. There have been serious policy reversals in this area due to the Shariat Court's verdict upholding the Islamic sanction of private property. 69. The issue of the Hub Power Project is a classic case where a sizeable foreign investment suffered roadblocks due to demand for an interest• free economy. 70. The Jamiats and Jama'at have tried to seek populist support by banking on the issues of corruption, poverty and accountability. The cases of massive corruption involving Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zarrdari, and the close associates of Mian Nawaz Sharif in the form of loan defaulting, undue commission on foreign investments and exports and embezzlements by the senior civil servants, generals and the chief executives of the banks, mills and other public sector establishments are an open secret in the country. The lack of transparency and accountability not only multiplies pervasive disillusionment but also Notes 299

provides willing recruits to fundamentalist and other such militant outfits. 71. It is opined that the Resolution was inducted as a policy instrument by merely to please Maulana Shabbir Ahmed . The information was conveyed by . See Star (Karachi), 29 September 1983, quoted in Afzal Iqbal, op. cit., p. 41. 72. Commentators, formerly part of the establishment itself, writing during Zia's time, usually highlighted this anti-Mullahism in Muslim national• ism. See Afzal Iqbal, op. cit; and, Muhammad Munir, From Jinnah to Zia, Lahore, 1980. For an academic discussion, see Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: an Analysis of the Ideological Controversy, London, 1987. 73. The mutilative transformation of the polity, sometime given out as Islamic resurgence or reassertion, smacked of totalitarianism- a model seen in several other countries as well. It will not be appropriate to say that the demand for Islamisation came from scripturalists who were largely not 'indigenous' to the areas of Pakistan. (This is the point Afzal Iqbal [p. 128) made in reference to Zafar Ahmed Ansari, Syed Maududi and Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. He ignores the pervasive appeal of Islam as an ideology of protest and displacement within Pakistan itself.) For further discussion on the ramifications, see Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan, Richmond, 1994; and, Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, The Hudood Ordinance: A Divine Sanction? Lahore, 1990. 74. For an early theoretical perspective on Two-Nation Theory, Pan• and Pak-Islamism as evident in Pakistan's external policies, see Arif Hussain, op. cit.

6 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN: IMPERATIVES AND CONSTRAINTS

1. One is overwhelmed by an extensive amount of theoretical and empir• ical studies on the civil society. For a recent perspective, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Morals, Revolution and Civil Society, London, 1997. 2. See John A Hall, Civil Society: Theory and History, London, Polity, 1996; C. M. Haun, Civil Society, London, 1996; Michael Walzar, Towards a Global Society, London, 1995; and A Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, Princeton, 1995. 3. Keith Tester, Civil Society, London, 1992, p. 5. 4. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government, London, 1924. 5. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, New Brunswick, 1980 (reprint). 6. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston, Harmondsworth, 1968. 7. Lewis White Beck (ed.), Kant: Selections, New York, 1988. 8. D. D. Raphael and A L. Macfie (eds), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Oxford, 1976. 9. Karl Marx, Early Texts, trans. by David McLellan, Oxford, 1971. 300 Notes

10. Quoted in Bronislaw Geremek, et a!., The Idea of Civil Society, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, National Humanities Center, 1995, p. 1. 11. Ibid., pp. 2-9. 12. Ibid., p. 28. 13. See Colin Grouch and David Marquand, 'Reinventing Collective Action', in Grouch and Marquand (eds), Reinventing Collective Action (The Political Quarterly), Oxford, 1995, p. 5. 14. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London, 1994, pp. 1-5. 15. For further discussion on these two models, see Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, Cambridge, 1993. 16. See, for instance, his 'Islam and Marxism', International Affairs, 67, 1, 1991. 17. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, p. 15. To him, the colonial state with all its technological and military power destroyed the rural, self-sufficient and defiant communities so as to establish its centralized authority. Population explosions, urbanization and urban supremacy only added to atomization and the traditional mediator-saints disappeared. Such processes have been further accelerated in the national period and the culture of High Islam has become more pervasive. 18. One may enhance the list by adding Pakistan, Bangladesh and several other states formerly under the military regimes, which sought legiti• macy in Islam. Several other autocratic states like Syria, Libya, Egypt or Iraq have routinely coopted Islamic elements and symbols for self• justification. A recent study sees Islamism as a counterpoise to Western hegemony and promises to go beyond the Saidian Orientalist expose of Western imperialist discourse. It sees the Muslim world within the prisms of two divergent models: Kemalist and Khomeinist, with the second stipulating a dehegemonization. See Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London, 1997. 19. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith, London, 1971, pp. 208-9. 20. For further discussion, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London, 1990 (reprint). 21. For a useful commentary, see Khalid B. Sayeed, Western Domination and Political Islam, London, 1994. 22. See Irfan Hussain, 'Our Colonial Heritage', Dawn, 4 October 1997. 23. Amjad Hussain, 'Reverting to Type', Dawn, 18 October 1997. 24. Ardeshir Cowasjee, 'Breathing Space', Dawn, 12 October 1997. 25. There is already enough literature on Pakistani state-formation, its elitist and non-representative character in reference to class and ideol• ogy. It is only in recent years that state- and security-centred studies have started giving way to hitherto neglected areas like ethnicity, gender and class. 26. See my 'Ethno-regionalism in Pakistan: a Study of Thematic Historiography', a paper presented at Smithsonian Conference on Pakistan, September 1996. Notes 301

27. Most of the Pakistani books on the country's existence end up giving single-factor explanations. Such simplistic narratives are repeated all the way from primary schools to the universities. See K. K. Aziz, The Murder of History, Lahore, 1992. 28. I have explained this elsewhere: see 'Islam, Nationalism and Nation• Building in Pakistan: the Issues of National Identity', a paper presented at the International Conference on Pakistan, Wake Forest University, 29 August 1997. 29. Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Pluralism, Partition and Punjabisation: Politics of Muslim Identity in British India', The International Journal of Punjab Studies, 5, 1, 1998. 30. This argument has been made in reference to contemporary Arab states. See, Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State, London, 1993. 31. All across Pakistan, opinion seems to converge on accommodative rather than confrontational postures involving the Supreme Court, Prime Minister and the President. See editorial comment, Dawn, 26 November 1997. 32. For a recent and useful overview of Pakistani experience, see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: a Political History, Karachi, 1997. 33. For a colonial heritage of Pakistan, see D. A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, London, 1991. 34. This is in reference to the infighting between the Bugtis and Raisanis in the mid-1990s. 35. It is agonizing to read investigative reports about such 'disclosures' of billions of pounds having been unabashedly whisked away from Pakistanis by their leaders who have been acting as robbers. For details on money-squandering and the plunder of national assets, see Newsline, October 1997. 36. This survey, unique of its type in Pakistan, was carried out by Macro Management Systems for Dawn Publications, whose reputable papers and magazines have an established international credibility. In view of the country's 50th anniversary the survey was carried out in Karachi, , Quetta, Peshawar, Multan, Lahore and • Islamabad. The survey covered three different stages so as to reflect all the three strata beside a proper consideration of age, gender and region. Thus, 1260 respondents selected for sampling represented the width and breadth of Pakistan and were interviewed 'by members of their own gender'. The nation-wide margin for error 'is less than three percentage points'. For further details on methodology, statistics and interpretations, see 'What do Pakistanis Really Want: Fifty Years, Fifty Questions', The Monthly Herald, January 1997, pp. 139-92. 37. In a carefree moment, Bhutto himself acknowledged to one of his closest associates that he had, in fact, conspired with General in 1968-69 to bring down 's regime. For more details on his plan, secretly called 'Ceylon Tea Party', see Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967-1977, Karachi, 1997, p. 327. Bhutto's disregard for fellow politicians and constitutional norms eventually led to his own downfall, pushing Pakistan into the deepest abyss of a very 302 Notes

repressive for the next 11 years. 38. This has been capably handled in a recent study: Paula Newberg, Judging the State, Cambridge, 1995. 39. Generally, the opinion groups found Sharif's posture unecessary, 'self• destructive' and costly. See Nasim Zehra, 'Sharif's good fortune', and Zafaryab Ahmed, 'Getting Tuned to Democracy', The News, 7 November 1997. 40. The Eighth Amendment had been introduced by General Zia in 1985 allocating vital powers to the president including the dissolution of parliament. All the successive dissolutions of the elected regimes in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996 through presidential decrees were justified on the basis of this amendment. Thus, a sizeable portion of public opinion viewed the amendment as a major roadblock towards a full• fledged democratic order based on parliamentary sovereignty. However, in an earlier verdict, the Supreme Court had declared the amendment to be a valid part of the constitution. In the light of this verdict, the petitioner sought the Court's position on the Thirteenth Amendment which had replaced the Eighth. 41. About three years back, while hearing a similar petition, the Supreme Court had passed a mild rebuke against the serving army chief. In fact, in a press conference, Beg had boasted of influencing the Court through an emissary, Wasim Sajjad, the vice-president of the country. For early details, see Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics ofAuthority, Ideology and Ethnicity, London, 1997, p. 98. 42. 'Sc's Quetta bench suspends CJ', Dawn, 27 November 1997. The next day, similar benches in Peshawar and Lahore issued abeyance orders against the Chief Justice. 43. CNN, 28 November 1997. Also, The News International (London), 29 November 1997. 44. Though the new acting chief justice came from the Urdu-speaking community of Muhajireen, the three most powerful offices of president, prime minister and the chief of army staff were held by Punjabis. In a plural country with a volatile ethnic demography such a 'Punjabization' only smacked of personal expediency disallowing federal participatory spirit. Such regional imbalances were also apparent during March-April 1998 when the government initiated an overdue census. The exercise was neither properly explained nor was presented as the harbinger of structural changes. On the contrary, , the Information Minister, in a press conference, ruled out any possibil• ity for any changes in the electoral or politico-economic order. Such an unrealistic attitude questioned the very rationale of the exercise if the government was so adamant on the status quo. 45. For an excellent study see, Zamir Niazi, The Press in Chains, Karachi, 1987. 46. For such anti-establishment press, see two representative collections compiled posthumously: Mazhar Ali Khan, Pakistan: The First Twelve Years - The Pakistan Times Editorials of Mazhar Ali Khan, Karachi, 1996; and, I. H. Burney, No Illusions, Some Hopes and No Fears: the Outlook Editorials, Karachi, 1996. Notes 303

47. Ms Noor's fanatic husband tortured her sadistically and had caused grievous injuries to her vagina and uterus by hurting her with an iron rod. Saima Waheed, the daughter of a religious, Lahore-based trader, had married a lecturer in a civil court without seeking prior permission of her parents. Her parents accused him of committing zinna and sought punishment under the Hudood law. The defence was fought and won by Asma Jahangir, the chairperson of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission. She received death-threats for her role as the defence lawyer of the accused couple. During the trial, Saima had to be kept in a shelter-house (Darulamaan) for security reasons. In February-March 1998, Karachi was rocked by a similar furore caused by a love marriage between Riffat , a Pushtun girl, and Kanwar Yunas, a Muhajir youth. The couple, fearful of a retaliation by her parents, fled to the Punjab; her parents and relatives set off violent street demonstrations. A city already scarred by ethnic militancy suffered for days with massive protests for the recovery of the girl and her 'abductor'. The entire city came to a standstill until the married couple were appre• hended near Lahore and were brought back to Karachi. Despite a significant police escort the relatives of the girl, incensed by anger, succeeded in grievously injuring Kanwar Yunas. His survival was mirac• ulous. The girl finally made a confession that she had married on her own accord yet the couple had to be kept in secret police custody to ward off any more attempts on their lives. They planned to leave Pakistan as they knew they would not be allowed to live peacefully given the hurt caused to the tribal sense of honour. This case, like that of Saima Waheed, once again highlighted the often painful tensions between traditional values and modernist choices. 48. The report was published by the Progressive Women's Association and was reported widely in the national media. See The lang International (London), 7 November 1997. (One is to be mindful of the fact that many such cases go unreported.) The foreign press frequently reports on violence against women, which may have both positive and negative results. It may add to moral pressure but could also feed into a 'siege mentality'. For a similar expose, see Jane Wheatley, 'Till Death Us Do Part', The Times Magazine, 7 December 1996. 49. The Herald, January 1997, p. 173. 50. The blasphemy law was added to the Pakistani constitution through Statutes 295B and C in 1985 by General Zia to appease the orthodox elements. It stipulates the death penalty for blaspheming the Prophet. Since its implementation several cases, curiously most of them against Christian citizens, have been brought before the courts though nobody has so far been executed. Out of personal apprehensions many lawyers refuse to defend such accused individuals. Several of these cases are linked with some nefarious desire by a local influential to grab property owned by Christian families. In this particular case, Ayub Masih, a Christian peasant, had been sentenced to death for 'speaking favourably about the British author Salman Rushdie' The Times, 11 May 1998. 'Lawyers believe that the charges were fabricated to force 15 Christian families to drop a land 304 Notes

dispute in his village. After being attacked in court by Muslim zealots, he was subjected to a closed prison trial in which he was not allowed to defend himself.' According to the Minister for Religious Affairs, Raja Zafrul Haq, 'the law of the jungle will prevail' if these statutes were ever abrogated. See, 'The Last Lesson' (editorial) Ibid. The suicide of a 67-year old pastor and head of a human-rights group created a moral dilemma for Nawaz Sharif, though India'snuclear tests a few days later diverted the attention to security issues. 51. Based on a recent report of the State Bank of Pakistan, as commented upon in Dawn, 27 November 1997. 52. Excepting Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the whole of South Asia has become the most underprivileged region in the world, with the highest concentration of the illiterate and the poor. As suggested by Human Development in South Asia (1998), prepared by Mahbub ui-Haq, schools have 'completely failed in teaching children the core skills needed for a productive life'. Half the region's 800 million adults are illiterate, and only one in three women can barely read or write. 'Education of girls and women in the majority of South Asian countries has been, till recently, a victim of political rhetoric, bureaucratic apathy and discriminatory cultural practices.' The malady is quite acute: 'South Asia's multilingual, multi-age, multigrade classrooms are nothing short of a multiple disaster zone.' The malady is further compounded by ghost schools, ill-paid teachers and lack of basic infra• structure. A regional freeze on defence expenditure could itself give impetus to the negelected social sector assuring a better future to almost one billion people in the region. See Christopher Thomas, 'South Asia Tops Illiteracy League', The Times, 2 April 1998. Under such circumstances there is all the more reason to combine the forces of state and civil society to move out of this growing morass. 53. The World Report, 1996, pp. 200-16. 54. Tariq Banuri, et al., 'Human Resource Development', in Just Development: Beyond Adjustment with a Human Face, Karachi, 1997, p. 57. Women in larger cities using contraceptives accounted for 30 per cent of the total figures, compared to 11 per cent in towns and 5 per cent in rural areas. 55. For a regional overview and comparison with East Asia, see Mahbub ui-Haq, Human Development in South Asia in 1997, Karachi, 1997. 56. For a first-hand overview, see Akhtar Hameed Khan, Orangi Pilot Project: Reminiscences and Reflections, Karachi, 1996; for a review, Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Professor Akhtar Hameed Khan: a Visionary Activist', The News International (London), 7 November 1996. 57. Under the scheme the teachers are given proper training prior to their appointment; suitable buildings are erected, allowing ample space for instruction and sports and the pupils are given milk and biscuits for snacks. The charity running the programme waives the fee for deserv• ing families. For details, see The Newsline, December 1997. 58. Khawar Mumtaz, 'NGOs in Pakistan: an Overview', in Banuri, op. cit., p. 171. 59. Quoted in Ibid. Notes 305

60. While there is a greater need of transparency and indigenization of the NGOs there is an equal need to acknowledge their constructive role in highlighting the coercive and exploitative nature of certain societal and statist institutions. The maligning of human-rights groups in Pakistan is quite apparent especially due to their expose of the criminalization of state structures and deprivation of individuals of their rights due to familial or societal pressures, legitimated in the name of tradition.

7 RELATIONS WITH INDIA: NATIONALISM IN CONTESTATION

1. The allegations remained unsubstantiated a year later. In October• November 1993, the Indian security forces besieged the Hazrat Bal shrine in , the holiest place in Kashmir, apparently to 'flush out' some militants. The siege went on for almost five weeks amid Indian propaganda that there were some Pakistani infiltrators 'holed up' along with the militants who wanted to steal the hair of the Prophet deposited in the shrine. Curiously, no Pakistani or foreigner was ever discovered by the troops when the siege was lifted. This happened at a time when Shiv Sena, the militant Hindu organization, responsible for anti-Muslim riots in Bombay in early 1993, had sent Pakistani crick• eters death-threats during international cricket-matches across India. For the reason, the Pakistani cricket team did not visit India. Such a nose-dive in Indo-Pakistani relations heralded the second tenure of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister on 19 October 1993. However, in 1997, there seemed to be a lessening of tensions, largely due to the various meetings between Nawaz Sharif and I. K. Gujral. The domestic political wrangling in both the countries in 1997-98 and lack of accommodation over Kashmir did not allow any major break• through. As seen in 1997, during the visit by Queen Elizabeth to both countries, both New Delhi and Islamabad seemed insistent on pursuing divergent policies. Whereas Pakistani officials felt elevated by the British Foreign Secretary's offer of mediation over Kashmir the Indians were deeply annoyed and Robin Cook was made to retract his views. Even before their nuclear tests, both rivals were engaged in another spate of mutual recriminations. 2. Quoted in a news report on Radio Excel, Birmingham, 9 July 1996. These explosions in the relatively safe province of Punjab began on 14 April1996, when Imran Kahn's cancer hospital in Lahore was severely damaged. By 8 July, 80 deaths and hundreds of severe injuries had been caused in so many days by such explosions occurring in the buses and at train stations across central districts of the province. News International (London), 9 July 1996. In late August 1996, the Pakistani authorities were able to apprehend the main culprit from a border village and he confessed responsibility for all the blasts. As he admit• ted, the Pakistani youth, out of frustration and poverty had offered himself for work with Indian intelligence. The statement of his arrest was made by the prime minister in a televised news conference. 3. The interests of various pressure groups within the establishment on 306 Notes

both sides of the borders are major factors in keeping the conflict volatile. It is not suggested here that national and ideological views in the two countries are the same, or unreal but, despite being different, the two countries do not have to be at loggerheads. A widely reported breakthrough in bilateral relations could redefine the situation in regional rather than national terms. 4. For a contemporary journalistic reportage of the events both in Karachi and New Delhi, see Mildred A. Talbot to WalterS. Rogers, 27 August 1947 and Phillips Talbot to WalterS. Rogers, 29 August 1947, in lftikhar H. Malik, US-South Asian Relations, 1940-47: American Attitude towards the Pakistan Movement, London, 1991, pp. 305-6. 5. The Calcutta riots of August 1946 have become notorious, with the Suhrawardy administration in Bengal receiving the major blame. But it is not widely known that the Muslims at places like were being tormented by anti-Pakistan non-Muslim organizations. Recent studies show the alarming figures in Muslim casualties. This argument is based on a seminar given by an Indian scholar in Oxford highlighting the main findings of her doctoral research at the University of Cambridge. See V. Damodaran, 'Violence in the Countryside: Agrarian Unrest and Communal Rioting in the Villages of Bihar, November 1946', South Asian History Seminar Series, St Antony's College, Oxford, 8 May 1990. 6. The serious extent of agitation and the disturbances caused by it were largely under-reported in the media owing to official censorship. Thus, both in the sub-continent and the United Kingdom, very few people knew about it, as was claimed by a contemporary British civil servant in a paper in 1990. Douglas Stanton-He, 'Sunset of the Raj: a View by the ICS', Commonwealth History Seminar Series, Nuffield College, Oxford, 2 February 1990. 7. Mutinies by certain sections in the Royal in Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta, followed by similar incidents in the Royal , dented British morale. The British exit plan as prepared by the Wavell Administration underlined the British decision to withdraw from the region. The only problem was how to conduct an orderly with• drawal and whom to hand over the power to following the dissolution of British supremacy. For further details on such concerns between Delhi and London, see the Attlee Papers, MS 32, Folios 274-89, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. 8. For contemporary reportage, see The Times, 3, 21 and 24 February 1947. 9. Such views are openly expressed both by Indian and Pakistani intellec• tuals and human rights groups who are building up a gradual momentum through 'Track-II Policy'. Such private peace initiatives, sometimes with support from the Western NGOs like the Asia Society and the Ford Foundation, are taking a higher profile. There is a growing realization that the ruling and religious elites are not going to allow any such non-governmental initiative which has led to a growing cynicism. Occasionally, in small and selective meetings, suggestions for external arbitration are frequently heard. Based on interviews during Notes 307

Track-II meetings in Islamabad, 27 July 1996. 10. For a conceptual framework, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in American Politics, Princeton, 1974. 11. Many celebrated Indian and Pakistani visual presentations of historical events with popular appeal are very selective and discretionary in source-material. Such portrayals fed into the communalization of South Asian history, especially during the Muslim period. 12. It is very illuminating to see how the inhabitants of both countries view each other, with religious identity overruling other identities. For instance, in a discussion in Oxford, an Indian journalist asked a Pakistani visiting professor: 'Do the common Pakistanis view India as a "Hindustan" or something else?' The respondent quickly retorted, 'Exactly the same way you view Pakistan in India.' One could read between the lines that mutual perceptions on both sides, fashioned over the years, have remained the same. 13. Curiously, such sentiment is very strong in Bangladesh as well, despite the Indo-Bangladeshi cooperation during the war against Pakistan in 1971 and strong anti-Pakistan rhetoric in the early 1970s. The reaction to events in Ayodhya over the Baburi Mosque has been far more severe in Bangladesh than in Pakistan. It seems as if religion remains the major determining factor in communitarian identification in the region, as is evident from case-studies including the growth of the BJP, the or in the inter-caste turmoil over the Mandai Commission's recommendations for a quota system in India. Perhaps, in South Asia as such one may encounter several secular individuals and sections but not secular societies as yet. 14. It has been quite apparent among the British Hindus since the early 1990s when the mosque-temple controversy assumed dangerous proportions. 15. Such perceptions were totally untrue as, for instance, Persian, as the official and main literary language in India until very recently, in the nineteenth century guaranteed a major Muslim representation in teaching positions. But following the displacement of Persian and the Urdu- controversy, the Muslim share in such professions plum• meted in provinces like the UP, Punjab and Bengal. In some cases, the policy-makers intentionally preferred Hindus over Muslims for such positions. As a natural consequence, most of the Muslim reform move• ments like the Aligarh, Anjuman-i-Islamiyah (Amritsar) and the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam concentrated their efforts on the promo• tion of education among the Muslims. 16. This has been amply borne out by Maulana Azad, the prominent Congress Leader, who considered Nehru and Patel responsible for partition. See A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom: Complete Version, Delhi, 1991. 17. After the initial euphoria, such hard realities began to confront the Indian government. Within the lower house of the Parliament, a number of opposition MPs criticized the regime for recklessly destroy• ing India's lead over Pakistan both in nuclear and conventional weapons. For details, see International Herald Tribune, 1 June 1998. 308 Notes

18. To pursue this line of argument, see Hamza Alavi, 'Nationhood and Nationalities in Pakistan', Economic and Political Weekly, XXIV, 8 July 1989. Some quarters in Pakistan believe that a true Islamic order encompassing every aspect of individual and societal life could be the only guarantee for any Muslim country including Pakistan, since the very concept of ummah is trans-territorial and cannot be visualized in terms of prerequisites of a western-type nation-state. See Tahir Amin, The Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1989. 19. For further discussion on this subject, see Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, Berkeley, 1990. 20. For a contemporary account, see Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton, 1954. 'It made little sense for India to try to cling to Kashmir so soon after having conceded the principle of partition on communal lines and indeed even pushing it to its logical conclusion by partition• ing the Punjab and Bengal. Kashmir not only had [has] an overwhelming Muslim majority, it was contiguous to Pakistan, with its rivers and natural lines of communication linking with Pakistan. Historically, culturally and economically it was closer to Pakistan than to India'. Gowher Rizvi, 'Arms Control and Indo-Pakistan Relations', in Gerald Segal, ed.,Arms Control in Asia, London, 1988, p. 116. 21. The arbitrary annexation of the state with India at the behest of the later was readily accepted by Lord Mountbatten who, in this hasty manner, bequeathed a continuum of hostility and violence for the sub• continent. S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: a Historical Analysis, London, 1973, p. 25. The partisan role of the last British viceroy has been proven by the latest research based on contemporary archives in the India Office Records, London, as was suggested in a seminar on Kashmir at Oxford. Alastair Lamb, 'The Kashmir Crisis: Historical Origins', Queen Elizabeth House, 23 June 1990. 22. Quoted in The Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 2 January 1952. 23. For an excellent study, see Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1861-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991. 24. 'Kashmir: a Lifetime Ago', The Economist, 31 October 1992. 25. For various positions on Kashmir, see Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, 1992. 26. Frequent reports of Indian violations of human rights including indis• criminate killings of civilians, rapes and arson have been reported in the world media. See Christopher Thomas, ' Uses Torture in Kashmir', The Times, 12 November 1991; 'Kashmir and the Bomb', (editorial), The Washington Post in IHT, 5 May 1992; and 'The Pain of Kashmir', Newsweek, 7 December 1992. 27. For example, in Sopore, 25 miles from Srinagar, on 6 January Indian troops went berserk, killing more than 60 residents indiscriminately in addition to injuring more than 200, besides torching hundreds of shops and houses. The Indian government itself acknowledged the military's responsibility for staging this unprovoked disaster. See International Herald Tribune, 7 January 1993; 'Outcry in Delhi over Kashmir Massacre', The Independent, 8 January 1993; and 'India Admits Police Ran Amok in Kashmir', International Herald Tribune, 8 January 1993. Notes 309

28. This and other solutions are being discussed in various forums. See Selig S. Harrison, 'South Asia and the United States: a Chance for a Fresh Start', Current History, 91, 563, (1992), p. 18. 29. This scheme was originally suggested in 1950 by Sir Owen Dixon, the UN arbiter on Kashmir, and despite Pakistan's acceptance was rejected by Nehru. For contemporary evidence, see UK High Commissioner (New Delhi) to Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 3 August 1950, in Kashmir, D0/35/2048 (unpublished documents), Public Record Office, Kew, London. 30. A number of new proposals by South Asian and the US-based opinion groups can be considered for reducing regional tensions and ending human-rights violations so as to open the way forward. For some constructive proposals, see Kashmir Study Group, Report, New York, 1997. 31. See Dawn, 2 June 1998. 32. In a letter to President Clinton, A. B. Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, justified the testing due to 'an atmosphere of mistrust' between China and India. The letter was published in The New York Times and was viewed as 'completely idiotic' by Indian analysts like Giri Deshingkar, the Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. 'To organize the letter completely around the Chinese threat to India was a blunder. There was no earthly reason to do it', he noted. 'India Tried to Ease Diplomatic Chill with China', International Herald Tribune, 1 June 1998. Visibly, Pakistan definitely remains India's main worry, but this has only led to contradictory statements and decisions like nuclear testing itself which has made her security 'more precarious than ever'. Steven R. Weisman, 'India and Pakistan Were Better Off before These Tests', ibid. 33. 'There was a time when India was given to lecturing the West from a position of moral superiority. But now lofty India wants to be one of the nuclear boys. People who can't read or write or feed their children are forgetting these lamentable circumstances in the ghastly gloom of being able to burn the palms of their enemies to a crisp'. Mary McGrory, 'Nuclear Boys, Behaving Badly, Defy the Rest of the World', International Herald Tribune, 1 June 1998. 34. For a useful study, see Urmila Phadnis, 'Role of State in Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict', Mainstream, XXIX, 5, 24 November 1990, pp. 15-21. 35. 'Might vs. Right', Time International, 18 January 1993; and, 'Bombay Burns India's Future', Newsweek, 25 January 1993. 36. See 'India Lurches towards Hindu State', The Observer, 13 December 1992; 'Hindu Zealots Gloat as Killing Spreads in India', The Sunday Times, 13 December 1992; and 'India's Holy Wars', Newsweek, 21 December 1992. 37. 'Indian Army Fails to Quell Rioting in Bombay', The Independent, 13 January 1993; 'Homeless Muslims Try to Flee Bombay', The Times, 13 January 1993. 38. See International Herald Tribune, 12 January 1993; and The Telegraph, 13 January 1993. 39. 'The Fire of India's Religions', The Economist, 16 January 1993. 310 Notes

40. Based on interviews in July-August 1996 in South Asia. 41. Many analysts in both countries expressed their desire for a break• through showing a complete disbelief in official interest and capability to break the log-jam. On the contrary, some intellectuals felt that the involvement of the Asia Society or the Ford Foundation in encourag• ing such negotiations among the intellectuals and non-official groups may signal something sinister. 42. The extensive polls conducted in both the countries witness 60 to 70 per cent people supporting friendship and peace between the two coun• tries. See The Herald (Karachi), January 1997; India Today (New Delhi), August Independence Issue, 1997 and The Frontline (New Delhi), 15 August 1997; also, Iftikhar H. Malik, 'The Long Road Ahead', Newsline (Karachi) August 1997; and The Indian Express (New Delhi), 10 August 1997. 43. Even during the heat of the Afghan crisis, Pakistanis resented their unilateral arm-twisting by the US government which through the Symington and Pressler Amendments, frequently adopted a difficult attitude towards its ally. For details, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Pakistan's Security Imperatives and Relations with the United States', in Leo E. Rose and K. Matinuddin, eds, Beyond Afghanistan: the Emerging U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Berkeley, 1989. 44. The treaty between India and Pakistan not to attack each other's nuclear installations negotiated and signed in 1989-90, came into force on 28 January 1991, connoting a very pleasant turn of events implying mutual respect for their respective sovereign interests. International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1991. Yet, all through the preceding decades, some Indian strategists proposed action against Pakistan's nuclear research programme which undoubtedly added to mutual distrust. Frequent articles or reports on the 'clandestine' Pakistani nuclear programme at Kahuta, first in the Western and then in the Indian press, do not go unnoticed by Pakistanis. For instance, on the eve of US presidential certification in October, the leading British and American newspapers, followed by their Indian counterparts, published a whole series of reports and leaders accusing the country of a 'sinister' nuclear programme. See Paul L. Leventhal, 'Stop Playing Silent Partner in Pakistan's Nuclear Drive', International Herald Tribune, 9 October 1990; 'Stop Helping Pakistan', a leader carried from The New York Times, in International Herald Tribune, 8 October 1990; 'No Nukes, Please', Newsweek, 22 October 1990; 'Pakistan to Speed Up Nuclear Programme', The Financial Times, 11 November 1990; Edward W. Desmond, 'Allies in Crisis', Time, 10 December 1990; Michael Fathers, 'Pakistan "Secretly Enriching Uranium'", The Independent, 11 November 1990. In an article, an Indian author revealed that the Bush administration and some other western allies had informed V. P. Singh 'that Pakistan now had nuclear bombs and had revised its military strat• egy to use them first instead of last, in any future conflict with India'. Prem S. Jha, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Capability', India Abroad, reproduced in The Daily lang (London), 10 January 1991. 45. 'For India's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the face Notes 311

of international pressure was meant to safeguard national pride as much as security .... India's firm talk played well at home, and strength• ened in recent months the nuclear hawks opposed to the treaty.' 'Zero Yield', Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 August, 1996, pp. 14-15. For an Indian response to Western criticism, see Mr Singh's letter in The Times, 5 September 1996. 46. While Benazir Bhutto made Pakistani willingness to join the CTBT conditional on India's, several Pakistani officials, at one stage, felt that they should sign the treaty but withhold its ratification. To them, this would mean added pressure on India. The opposition, led by Nawaz Sharif, presented its own prerequisites, like the plebiscite in Kashmir. For details, see The Economist, 31 August 1996. 47. 'It will be unfortunate if India is allowed to get away with its efforts to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at a time when all the five nuclear powers have reached consensus and the date of its finalisation- August 15 -draws near. ... Placing a state seeking conces• sions through blackmail is not going to help the passage of the draft. India may have a nuisance value at the present juncture,but it must be realised that the bigger nuisance are the three threshold states together.' 'CTBT Hurdle' (editorial), The News (Islamabad), 10 August 1996. 48. The Times, 31 August 1996. A year earlier, Rifkind's predecessor, Douglas Hurd, had annoyed Pakistanis by insisting on seeing Kashmir in its contemporary perspective rather than referring back to the Partition. To a large extent, Washington and London have been advis• ing both Pakistan and India to resolve the issue bilaterally. On 31 July, United Nations Security Council, to the great embar• rassment of the Pakistani government, decided to omit the Kashmir dispute from its agenda. Following Pakistani protestations, it agreed to restore its earlier status but with a pre-qualification that Pakistan would notify the UN each year for its yearly extension. For details, see News International (London), 29 and 31 August 1996. 49. Just before the Pakistani tests, a poll carried out by Dawn showed an overwhelming number of its readers demanding detonation by Pakistan. Pakistan's friends abroad, in several cases, felt that to restore some credible level of balance of power, Pakistan must follow India's suit. Based on informal interviews in the UK in May 1998. 50. According to a report, the Japanese government offered arbitration between India and Pakistan. Dawn, 3 June 1998. 51. StephenS. Rosenfeld, 'Do We Bow to a Bomb In India?', International Herald Tribune, 18 January 1993. 52. Earlier in 1993, the US government gave Pakistan six months to prove its 'credentials' as a state not involved in sponsoring terrorist activities. Pakistan denied any such role. See International Herald Tribune, 11 January 1993. 53. Stories like the secret transfer of sophisticated technology and delivery system from China are frequently 'leaked' in the press to malign Pakistan. For instance, see 'China Said to Deliver Missiles to Pakistan', International Herald Tribune, 6 December 1992. In August 1996 the US 312 Notes

media published stories of a joint Sino-Pakistani missile project near Islamabad to develop delivery systems for Pakistani nuclear devices. 54. In early 1996, the US government allowed delivery of military hardware to Pakistan but refused to release 28 F-16s to her for which she had already paid $700 million. By August 1996, the military equipment, except for the aircraft, had started reaching Pakistan. 55. Harish Kapur, 'India's Foreign Policy', a paper presented at the University of Oxford, 30 January 1992. 56. 'Few states emerged from colonial rule with as many disadvantages as Pakistan.' Francis Robinson, review of State of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence by Ayesha Jalal, in Modern Asian Studies, 26, (3), 1991, p. 626.

8 KASHMIR AND PAKISTAN: POLITICS OF NATIONALISM, REGIONALISM AND ISLAM

1. Pakistani and Kashmiri sources put the death figures well above 50 000. 2. A number of studies have been devoted to the Kashmir dispute over the years. All the books and articles by Pakistani scholars dilating on foreign relations contain special sections on Indo-Pakistan relations with Kashmir as the key issue. For instance, see S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an Historical Analysis, Karachi, 1990; G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966, London, 1966; Z. A Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, London, 1969; M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, London, 1967; P. I. Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58, London, 1990; Iftikhar H. Malik, The Ongoing Conflict in Kashmir. Regional Detente in Jeopardy, London, 1993; and, Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: 1967-1977, Karachi, 1997. 3. Several books by Indian authors highlight the centrality of the Kashmir dispute to the Indo-Pakistan imbroglio though one notices a wide• ranging consensus in such writings to resolve the issue within the framework of the Indian Union. See, for instance, Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: a Study in India-Pakistan Relations, London, 1967; J. B. D. Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, The Hague, 1968; A G. Noorani, The Kashmir Question, Bombay, 1964; Kuldip Nayar, 'Kashmir: a Way Out', The Hindustan Times, 15 July 1991; M. J. Akbar, Kashmir behind the Veil, New Delhi, 1991; and Subhash Kak, 'The Poplar and the Chinar: Kashmir in Historical Outline', International Journal of Indian Studies, 3, 2, 1993. 4. Though some academics would question such a trans-regional unanim• ity. See Yunas Samad, 'Kashmir and the Imagining of Pakistan', and Mehtab Ali Shah, 'The Kashmir Problem: a View from Four Provinces of Pakistan', Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995. 5. The BBC WM (Radio) monitored in Birmingham, UK, 1 June 1995. 6. , 'Double Standards that Hurt South Asian Security', News International (London), 15 March 1996. (It is the reproduction of the Pakistani envoy's speech at George Washington University.) Notes 313

7. For an eye-witness account of the early phase in the current revolt, see Edward Desmond, 'The Insurgency in Kashmir (1989-1991)', Contemporary South Asia, Volume 4, No. 1, 1995. 8. Privately, many Pakistanis admit their inability to push the Indians out of Kashmir by sheer military force. A growing realization in Pakistan testifies to the fact that even after so many sacrifices and agitation, the Indian hold on Kashmir cannot be thwarted, largely due to global apathy. The global disinterestedness is perceived either as a muffled support for India or is viewed as a rejection of the Pakistani stance. The politico-economic issues within their own country and disillusionment over Afghanistan have all fed into this feeling. 9. Such views are expressed more openly in the private meetings but do get prominent coverage in the English press. 10. For a comprehensive overview of various viewpoints on the future of Jammu and Kashmir, see Robert Wirsing et al, Kashmir Study Group's Report, New York, 1997. The report is based on extensive interviews and fact-finding missions and suggests various measures to curb violence against the populace besides helping both India and Pakistan towards a resolution of the dispute itself. 11. Despite restrictions on Kashmir-related official files at India Office Records and Library (IOLR) and the Public Record Office (PRO), new archival evidence and personal memoirs have dramatically changed the entire perspective on the events leading to the partition and the fraudulent handling of the Boundary Award. In addition to Alastair Lamb's persuasive study, the publication of Eminent Churchillians has already exposed the serious nature of Mountbatten's partisan decisions, incompetence and gerrymandering in vital matters related to the future of the Indian Muslims. See the chapter on Mountbatten in Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, London, 1994. Subsequently, a very useful overview has been presented in K. Hussain Zia, 'Mountbatten and Partition', Regional Studies, XIII, No. 3, 1995. 12. The Kashmir dispute has caused quite a few useful studies in recent years. See Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991; Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Hertingfordbury, 1994; Vernon Hewitt, Reclaiming the Past: the Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir, London, 1995; Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, London, 1994; Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, 1992, and Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, London, 1996. 13. To such groups, given the international bias for the territorial integrity of existing states, it is not possible to cultivate opinion for Kashmiri self-determination. India's economic and geopolitical significance neutralizes any major concern for . In addition, the global concern of fundamentalism and terror has been expeditiously beseeched by the Indians to project the Kashmir revolt as another example of Muslim fundamentalism, supported by cross-border assist• ance. In addition, the peripheral nature of the region in the global 314 Notes

economy and geopolitics precludes the possibility of any radical global interest in Kashmir. Its relegated position on the UN's back-burner betrays a lack of urgency to resolve it. 14. Based on the interviews with Kashmiris of various ideological back• grounds in the United Kingdom and North America. 15. This is how Farooq Abdullah, Amanullah Khan, Balraj Puri and some other Azad Kashmiri leaders share a convergence in views, no matter how much this is at the expense of people in Jammu, Northern Areas or Ladakh. 16. In addition toM. J. Akbar, one may mention a few from among Muslim Kashmiris, including the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. See, Balraj Puri, 'Kashmiriyat: the Vitality of Kashmiri Identity' and Riyaz Punjabi, 'Kashmir Imbroglio: the Socio-political Roots', Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1995. 17. In private talks with the author, many Bangladeshis upheld Kashmir's right for self-determination. 18. It is curious to note that the support for Indian official policy, unlike support for Pakistan policy, has usually varied from indifference to non-commitment. With more awareness on Kashmiri rejection of Indian control, many Indians, in recent years, have lost interest in the issue. Indian official repression in the Valley has further alienated concerned citizens. Such a major transformation with a definite tinge of bitterness is privately expressed by numerous Indian intellectuals. 19. There are quite a few Kashmiri organizations in South Asia and abroad advocating the case for self-determination. For instance in the United States, the Kashmiri-American Council is a very articulate body, supported by well-placed Kashmiri intellectuals and professionals and has carried on publications and lobbying in North America. In the UK, the International Institute for Kashmir Studies sponsors serious acad• emic studies on the dispute, holding seminars and conferences on Kashmir across Europe. Similarly, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) with its headquarters in Rawalpindi and Luton, has been quite vocal in its demand for Kashmiri independence. The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference has a massive following among the Azad Kashmiris in Pakistan, Gulf and the UK. In addition, Tehrik-i-Kashmir, with a large membership among the Kashmiris in Britain, has been engaged in numerous activities to promote Kashmir's integration with Pakistan. There are numerous Kashmiri groups in Britain lobbying with the Parliament, media and the universities. They are linked with sister organizations across the continent and similar networks in North America and the Gulf. An immense amount of literature is being produced by such organizations who, beside organizing special events, lead frequent protests against human-rights violations in the Valley. Despite diversified shades of opinions, such groups cooperate in holding demonstrations on special occasions in various metropolitan cities across the continents against Indian occupation of Kashmir. With the emergence of second-generation Kashmiris in diaspora, one sees further articulation and sophistication in such lobbying and publishing activities. Notes 315

In Pakistan, from among a number of Kashmiri efforts to publicize the case for Kashmir, The Times of Kashmir and Daily Insaaf have been noteworthy efforts by resolute individuals like Mir Abdul Aziz, a senior journalist based in Rawalpindi. Mir fled from Srinagar into Pakistan in 1948 with state troops on his heels. 20. Such wide-ranging laws and measures have been documented by various writers, both Hindu and Muslim. Just to give one example, the State, equal in size to the United Kingdom, with 77 per cent Muslim population, did not have a Muslim prime minister until late 1947. Abdullah, known for pro-Congress views and hitherto incarcer• ated, was made the Prime Minister over and above the wishes of the Maharajah, at the insistence of Pandit , who felt that his friend would lead Kashmir for a complete union into India. The same Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, kept Abdullah behind the bars for most of his life after 1953. 21. It was mainly a Kashmiri Muslim movement supported by the Muslims from the Punjab and NWFP though, to some Indian historians, it has been a secular movement. See Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: a Study in India-Pakistan Relations, London, 1967. 22. On Jinnah's visit to Kashmir, seeK. H. Khurshid, Memories of Jinnah, Karachi, 1990, pp. 6-16. 23. For more details, see Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London, 1963, pp. 192-211. 24. The Economist, 31 October 1992. 25. For all these documents and details, see D0/35-3054, The Punjab Boundary Award, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Kew, London. 26. For interesting and revealing documentary evidence, see 'Sir G. Abell to Mr. Abbott', 8 August 1947, R/3/1/157: f 255 in The Transfer of Power, XII, p. 579. (See the 'explanatory' notes by Sir Penderel Moon in the footnote regarding the map sent to Governor Jenkins and the subsequent secraphone message of 13 August saying: 'Eliminate Salient'. The map is not in the volume as it along with Abell's above• mentioned letter and the message came into the possession of Pakistani officials after independence.) 27. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 1953, p. 85. 'If a Muslim had been in V. P. Menon's position and was known to maintain a liaison with Jinnah, no Viceroy could have toler• ated it without laying himself open to the charge of partisanship; in any case, the Congress would have made it impossible for such an officer to continue in that position.' Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, 1967, p. 125. 28. Lord Mountbatten made no secret of his hostility towards Jinnah. For details, see Ian Stephens, op. cit., pp. 192-211. Ian Stephens had inter• viewed Mountbatten on 26 October 1947, when the latter vented his hatred for Jinnah. 29. For details, see Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, op. cit., pp. 218-19. 30. 'Mountbatten interfered and Radcliffe allowed himself to be over• borne. Grave discredit to both', noted Christopher Beaumont, 316 Notes

Radcliffe's secretary in his statement, deposited with All Souls College, Oxford. Beaumont, subsequently, decided to go public and in a press interview, gave out the details on the machinations leading to the tempering of the final award. See Simon Scott Plummer's interview with Christopher Beaumont, The Daily Telegraph (London), 24 February 1992. 31. Patel had openly declared in Mussoorie even before the British depar• ture form India: 'Kashmir remains within Indian Union even if a division of India and partition of Punjab takes place.' Quoted in The Times of India, 29 May 1947. 32. For a further statement on the politics of misperception, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Indo-Pakistan Relations: a Historical Reappraisal. Lost Case or Turning-Point?', Contemporary South Asia, I, (1), 1992. 33. In a letter sent to London on 28 September 1947, Marshal Claude Auchinleck observed: 'I have no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the on a firm basis ... '. Quoted in John Connell,Auchinleck, London, 1959, pp. 920-1. Both Wavell and Auchinleck were resentful of the official poli• cies and especially of Mountbatten's hostility towards Indian Muslims and the League. For contemporary information, see Penderel Moon, ed., Wavell: the Viceroy's Journal, London, 1973; and, , Disastrous Twilight, London, 1986. 34. Roberts, op. cit., p. 55. 35. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: an Official Biography, London, 1985. 36. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 1951. 37. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, London, 1975. 38. His decisions were provided with umbrella support by the Attlee government, who totally underestimated the pluralist composition of the South Asian region and projected Jinnah as a communalist. Even after the creation of Pakistan, the British Government continued to degrade and snub Pakistan, several times without reason. In their effort to build India in the image of the Raj, the British leaders found it simpler to ignore and denigrate Pakistan. See Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56, London, 1993, pp. 25-35. 39. 'By 31 October (1947), Lord Ismay (on behalf of Nehru by way of Mountbatten) was asking Sir Terence Shoon to make sure that London included from time to time in its messages to the Indian leadership some passage explicitly critical of Pakistan.' Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy, Hertingfordbury, 1994, p. 141. Some recent studies find Mountbatten, despite his anti-Jinnah animus, even-handed in his deci• sions as the last Viceroy. See Patrick French, Liberty or Death, London, 1997. 40. For an Indian criticism of Nehruvian policies, see Khushwant Singh, 'Was Churchill Right? The Decline Began in Nehru's Lifetime', Newsweek, 3 June 1991. 41. If Pakistan was being portrayed as a vivisection of a mythical united Notes 317

India, so was India a latter-day artefact, easily lost to the Indian mind. India's episodic unification in the past reflected only a politico-admin• istrative dispensation and that too under empires, a top-down, superimposed phenomenon rather than an indigenous, down-upward reality. It is no wonder that a young still remains a battleground for ethnic sub- and religious extremism. 42. It is amazing that Jinnah, despite the 'ethnic cleansing' in the wake of independence, in his message to India on 11 August 1947, while desir• ing coexistence, wished peace and prosperity for her. 43. For further discussion on this ideological polarization within India creating severe dilemmas among its Muslim citizens, see Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Beyond Ayodhya: Implications for Regional Security in South Asia',AsianAffairs, XXIV, (3), 1993. 44. After the demolition of Baburi Mosque on 6 December 1992, followed by anti-Muslim riots in Bombay, one is amazed at a great sense of unity among various shades of Pakistanis. To many erstwhile objecting Pakistanis, seeing the Indian Muslims caught in a quagmire of hatred and underdevelopment, 'Pakistan' symbolized the best alternative at least to the Muslims in Muslim-majority areas of the sub-continent. Based on interviews in the UK, USA and Pakistan during 1992-3. 45. It is surprising that India which, in normal conditions, should have been perceived a deliverer by the Bangladeshi nationalists has only gener• ated hostility and mistrust among the masses and elites in the young country. The reaction over the Baburi mosque was many times stronger in Bangladesh than in Pakistan. 46. V. P. Menon had been deputed to Kashmir by Mountbatten: 'V. P. Menon was back in his Delhi home late on the evening of that same Sunday, 26 October. Alexander Symon, Britain's Deputy High Commissioner, joined him for a drink a few minutes after his return. Menon was jubilant. He poured them each a stiff drink. As they sat down, an enormous smile spread across his face. He raised his glass to Symon. Then he pulled a piece of paper from his jacket pocket and waived it gaily towards the Englishman. "Here it is", he said. "We have Kashmir. The bastard signed the Act of Accession. And now that we've got it, we'll never let it go"'. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, London, 1975, p. 356. 47. See Alastair Lamb, The Indian Claim to Jammu and Kashmir: an Appraisal, London, 1993. Both Menon and M. C. Mahajan were in Delhi on 26 October while the Maharajah was on his way to Jammu, so there is no way they would have been able to get his signature on 26 October as is generally claimed by India. (The Times (London), in its issue of 28 October, confirmed their presence in Delhi that day.) Moreover, the Indian government's White Paper on Kashmir (1948) contains, amusingly, only a blank, unsigned instrument of accession. The copy of the instrument used by Durga Das in his compilation of Patel's correspondence is a typed version of the text but the month of August (typed) has been scored out by pen and substituted by October in handwriting, making the whole case quite suspect and open to legal and moral questioning. 318 Notes

A G. Noorani would not mind the absence of the document because to him, the word and the policies of the Maharajah themselves show his decision to join India. See his 'J&K Accession: Indo-British Designs 1947', The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), 30 December 1995. To Tavleen Singh, such a historical debate is irrelevant: efforts should, rather, be made to resolve the crisis in its contemporary context. See her review of P.S. Jha's Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (Delhi, 1996) in India Today, 26 February 1996. 48. Even long before independence, V. P. Menon, the States Commissioner, had prepared an annexation proforma for accession to India. No such proforma existed at that stage for Pakistan. For details on the matter and the accompanying blank form, see V. P. Menon to Sir P. Patrick, 2 August 1947, L/P&S/13/1848:FF 101-4 in The Transfer of Power, XII, pp. 467-73. 49. In other words, India's intervention predated the so-called 'accession'. 50. It could never be accepted that Lord Mountbatten did not know about the troop movement in advance. Even before independence, Nehru and Patel were consulting on possible strategy to acquire Kashmir. A high-power committee inclusive of the both and Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, had been operative to implement the strategy. 51. Abdullah suffered from a credibility crisis both in the sub-continent and abroad, as is amply substantiated by recently-declassified contem• porary British official reports. See File No. D0/35/3043, Kashmir, PRO, Kew, London. 52. Karan Singh, Autobiography (1931-1967), Delhi, 1989, pp. 57-8. 53. 'Within a period of about eleven weeks of starting in August, system• atic savageries, similar to those launched in East Punjab and in Patiala and Kapurthala practically eliminated the entire Muslim element in the population amounting to 500,000 people. About 200,000 just disap• peared, remaining untraceable, having presumably been butchered, or died from epidemics or exposure. The rest fled destitute to West Punjab.' The Statesman (Calcutta), 4 February 1948. 54. The Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) 2 January 1952. 55. See UK High Commissioner (New Delhi) to Commonwealth Relations Office (London), 31 August 1949; 7 September 1949; 27 July 1950 in D0/35/2588 & 2589; and 29 August 1952, in D0/35/6626, Kashmir, PRO, Kew, London. 56. UK High Commissioner (New Delhi) to Commonwealth Relations Office, 3 August 1950, D0/35/2048, Kashmir, PRO. 57. See V. C. Martin, 'Notes of Visit to Kashmir 6th-15th June, 1952', in UK High Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 5 July 1952, No. P/75, D0/35/6632, Kashmir, PRO; also, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Roy Thurston), 10 January 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1948, Vol. VI, Part 1, Washington, DC, 1975, pp. 276-8. 58. Para. 4(ii) of the agreement between India and Pakistan mentions 'a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir' as one of the outstanding issues. Basing its case on Para. l(i), Pakistan stresses that the UN Notes 319

Charter 'shall govern' Indo-Pakistan relations, without making the dispute simply a bilateral issue outside the UN. 59. As late as early 1992, India, though reluctantly and temporarily, acknowledged a continuing UN role in the dispute. When confronted with a Kashmiri protest march organized by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) from the Azad Kashmir side of the Line of Control (LOC), India, in a panic, approached the ambassadors of the permanent UN members in New Delhi to pressurize Pakistan to ban the march. In the world media, it was reported as India's recognition of the UN factor in the issue. See Leonard Doyle and Raymond Whitaker, 'Volte-face by India on UN in Kashmir', The Independent, 8 February 1992. The presence of UN observers in Kashmir since 1948 and inclu• sion of Kashmir in the UN Secretary-General's annual report as an issue belie India's claims of its being a 'domestic' irritant. 60. Pakistani insistence on a reference to the UN is supported by a wide variety of global forums. For example, see 'A UN Role in Kashmir' (editorial), International Herald Tribune, 23 March 1992. 61. Based on a seminar on the Boundary Award and Kashmir dispute by Alastair Lamb at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 12 November 1992. 62. In 1947, on the eve of partition, in the State's assembly, out of a total of 21 members, 16 belonged to the Muslim Conference, a rival to Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference, which fervently advocated the State's union with Pakistan. The National Conference had boycotted the election as it questioned Maharajah's authority and legitimacy. Curiously, Sheikh Abdullah, on his conditional release from the prison, tendered a written apology to the same Maharajah and accepted the legality of the former's accession treaty with India. 63. For details, see Karan Singh, op. cit., pp. 77-8, and 81-4. 64. See, 'A Beam in India's Eye', The Times (London), 11 May 1991; Tony Allen-Mills, 'Delhi's Sledgehammer Turns Paradise into Hell', The Sunday Times (London), 2 June 1991; Edward A. Gargan, 'Kashmir, a Paradise Lost to Violence', International Herald Tribune, 29 October 1991; Christopher Thomas, 'Indian Army Uses Torture in Kashmir', The Times, 12 November 1991; and, John Rettie, 'Bags of Rice the Price of a Kashmiri Life', The Guardian, 13 July 1993. 65. Robin Raphael, the assistant secretary of state at the US State Department, articulated the American official policy on Kashmir, much to the chagrin of the Indian authorities. See, 'India furious at US remarks on Kashmir status', The Financial Times, 1 November 1993; and, 'US doubts over Kashmir cause dismay in Delhi', The Times, 1 November 1993. 66. See 'Kashmir and the Bomb' (editorial), The Washington Post in International Herald Tribune, 5 May 1992; and 'End Kashmir's Misery' (editorial), The New York Times, 22 March 1992. 67. Christopher Thomas, 'Nuclear Arms Race Feared in Asia as India Tests Missiles', The Times, 29 January 1996. 68. Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Sub-Continent, London, 1991, pp. 134-7. 69. Sumit Ganguly, 'South Asia after the Cold War', Washington Quarterly, 320 Notes

V, 4 (1992), p. 178. The Director of the Indian Institute of Chinese Studies also considered the reference to the Chinese threat as a justifi• cation for nuclear detonation simply absurd. See International Herald Tribune, 2 June 1998. 70. Rodney W. Jones, 'Beyond Afghanistan: U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations', in Leo E. Rose and Kamal Matinuddin, eds, Beyond Afghanistan: The Emerging U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 52-6. 71. 'Because of the vagaries of US legislation, Pakistan has suffered much more from sanctions than has India, but it has also dug in its heels and refuses to abandon its programme. Pakistan, however, has been creative on the political front offering to sign the NPT if India will, as well as suggesting a variety of other measures to defuse the nuclear situation in South Asia. Although Islamabad sees these proposals as a way to keep political pressure on India and to demonstrate its own forthrightness to the US audience, the proposals have intrinsic merit. New Delhi's failure to respond creatively has underlined the inflexibil• ity of its position.' Thomas P. Thornton, 'The United States and South Asia', Survival, XXXV, 2, (1993), p. 120. 72. Under vigorous external pressure in the wake of a continuous failure to quell the revolt, India finally agreed to hold the seventh round of talks with Pakistan in early January 1994. She finally admitted - and that after much bickering and bloodshed - the centrality of the Kashmir question in the bilateral relationship. However, given India's past record, many commentators, especially Pakistanis and Kashmiris, expressed a mixed reaction. The Daily Telegraph, 25 November 1993. 73. Nehru to Patel, 27 September 1947, in Durga Das, ed., Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50, Vol. I, Ahmedabad, 1971, p. 45. 74. See H. S. Stephenson to British High Commissioner (Karachi), 13 September 1947, L/P&S/13/1845B, India Office Records and Library (IOR&L), London. 75. He added: 'And let me make it clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either Dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that state.' Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Broadcast to the Nation', All-India Radio, 2 November 1947. 76. For discussion to the effect, Gowher Rizvi, 'India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem, 1947-1972', in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: the Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder, 1992, pp. 74-5. 77. For an excellent study, see Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, UK, 1991, pp. 101-45. 78. Prem Nath Bazaz, Truth about Kashmir, Srinagar, 1950, pp. 4-5. 79. Jayaprakash Narayan, 'Our Great Opportunity in Kashmir', and, 'The Need to Rethink', The Hindustan Times, 20 April and 14 May 1964. 80. Arthur Bernon Tourtellot, 'Kashmir: Dilemma of a People Adrift', Saturday Review, 6 March 1965. 81. See A G. Noorani, 'The Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity', in Raju Thomas, op. cit. 82. For a graphic account, see M. J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Veil, New Delhi, 1991, p. 258. Notes 321

83. The Indian security forces applied in the Valley, belonging to different religio-ethnic stocks, have adopted a colonial role energized by reli• gious hatred. All Muslim Kashmiris are perceived as secessionists and Pakistani agents cooperating with India's Muslim enemies across the LOC. Such a demonization results in severe backlashes and massive violations of human rights. 84. See A. Jasbir Kaur, 'More on Kashmir Dispute' (review), Economic and Political Weekly, XXVII, (3), 18 January 1992, p. 95. 85. In fact, it was given out that the official intelligence organizations had carried out these attacks, which led to the murder of several innocent civilians. 86. Based on interviews with Professor Ashraf Saraf and other Kashmiri leaders from IHK in Washington, DC August 1991 and October 1993. 87. N. C. Chatterjee, quoted in Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, 'Kashmir, India and Pakistan', Foreign Affairs, 43, (3), April1965, p. 528. 88. Based on interviews with Kashmiris in diaspora both in the UK and the USA, during 1990-98. 89. For example, see M. Y. Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, 2 vols, Lahore, 1978-79. 90. S. M. Burke, op. cit., p. 21. He once told a British official: 'In the same way that Calais was written on Mary's heart, Kashmir is written on mine.' Quoted in Hector Bolitho, Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan, London, 1954, p. 206. 91. SeeK. Sarwar Hasan, The Strategic Interest of Pakistan, Karachi, 1954. 92. Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian Politics: the as a Case Study', The Round Table, 322, 1992, 203-14. 93. See Iftikhar H. Malik, 'The Kashmir Dispute: a Cul-de-Sac in Indo• Pakistan Relations?' in Raju G. C. Thomas, op. cit. 94. Mushahid Hussain, 'The Kashmir Issue: its New International Dimensions', in Raju Thomas, op. cit. 95. This was pointed out time and again by well-placed and articulate Kashmiri intellectuals like Ayub Thukkar, Mir Abdul Aziz, Ghulam Nabi Fai, Nabi Mir and many more who prefer to remain unidentified. 96. See, Ghulam Nabi Fai, 'The Plebiscite Solution for Kashmir: Why and How?', in Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., op. cit. 97. For instance, see , India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody, London, 1992. 98. For further details, see Coordination Committee on Kashmir, Human Rights Situation in Kashmir Valley, May 1992 (Justice Tarkunde Report), London, 1992 (reprint). Also, PHRO, The Kashmir Massacre: a Report by Punjab Human Rights Organisation, Ludhiana, July 1990. 99. Human Rights Watch, Kashmir under Siege (An Asia Watch Report), New York, May 1991. Another treatment involves moving a roller machine on the body of an inmate while he is lying on the floor. 100. For details on crimes against hospital staff, see Physicians for Human Rights (UK), Kashmir 1991, London, 1991. 101. For a recent example, see Bernard Levine, 'India's Army on the Rampage', The Times, 10 August 1993. 322 Notes

102. See 'Carnage in Kashmir' (editorial), ibid., 17 August 1993; John Rettie, 'Indian Troops Beat Kashmir Rebels', The Guardian, 20 October 1993. 103. International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1993. 104. A few years back, Patanjali Varadarajan changed his profession. He joined The Times first as their correspondent in Spain followed by an assignment in the United States. 105. For further details, see Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de !'Homme (FIDH), Rapport, Paris, 1993. 106. Ibid. 107. See 'A Worrying Activism', India Today, 15 March 1994. 108. 'Still Hostage' (editorial), The Times, 28 August 1995. Also Christopher Thomas, 'Caught in Someone Else's War', ibid., 15 August 1995. 109. Tim McGirk, 'The Lure of Kashmir', The Independent Magazine, 22 July 1995. 110. The Daily Telegraph, 29 January 1996; and The Times, 29 January 1996. 111. Every year, on India's Independence Day, Kashmiris stage massive demonstrations against New Delhi. Similar protests on the Republic Day result in numerous deaths. As testified by Scandinavian tourists, many Kashmiri Muslims had boycotted India's fiftieth anniversary cele• bration by hoisting black flags. On the contrary, a day earlier, they had celebrated Pakistan's anniversary by hoisting her flag on their houses, shops and other prominent places. Based on interview with a group of tourists in New Delhi on 15 August 1997. 112. It appears that the US Government does not foresee any solution and has been trying to persuade Pakistan to accept restoration of electoral politics in the state with India reciprocating to grant more internal autonomy for the state. Pakistanis interpret it as a freeze. 'Pakistan has rejected the proposal. It continues to demand the implementation of the UN Security Council's resolution of 1948, which called for a plebiscite to determine which country Kashmiris want to join.' The Economist, 29 August 1996. Curiously, Dr Farooq Abdullah of the pro-India National Conference also demanded the restoration of pre-1953 status for Kashmir, which meant local autonomy, with the Indian government only looking after defence, foreign affairs and communications.

9 PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM WORLD: NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES AND ISLAMIC TRANS-TERRITORIALITY

1. Even two years later, when Gulbaddin Hekmatyar joined the Burhan• ud-Din Rabbani regime in Kabul as prime minister, Pakistan found it rather problematic to totally support him. On the one hand, Islamabad had all along been questioning the legality of the Rabbani regime for its overstay in contravention of the treaty, while, simultaneously it had been supporting Hekmatyar in his anti-Kabul campaign. Rashid Dostum and Hekmatyar were teamed up against Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, who sought Indian military support to protect their Notes 323

regime in the capital. It was the first time since the mid-eighteenth century that the Push tun majority had lost control of Kabul. Ethnicity, tribalism and sectarianism had completely engulfed post-1992 Afghanistan. In 1993-94, Pakistan saw a glimmer of hope in regaining influence in Kabul when the Taliban, the graduates of Muslim madras• sas, began their campaign of disengaging the Afghan fighting factions. Their march towards Kabul turned volatile and suffered from faction• alism until Hekmatyar joined the Rabbani regime with his guns now turned against the predominantly Pushtun Afghan Taliban. All these groups invariably had been recipients of Pakistani assistance in one form or another. In May 1996, several Pakistani opinion groups criti• cized the lack of clear and uniformed direction in official policy on Afghanistan with different officials and departments patronizing different Afghan factions. However, by August 1996, Pakistanis had begun to seriously negotiate with the Kabul regime through Hekmatyar without totally abandoning the Taliban groups. In 1998, the Taliban, however, were favoured by Pakistan with a marginalized Hekmatyar now living in exile in Iran and Masood and Rabbani both waiting for another opportunity to reach Kabul. 2. The Pakistani mission in the UN only came to know of this significant development three days later, which further shocked the nation. A week later, Pakistani objections were submitted through a petition and it was in late August that the working group agreed to re-include the item on the agenda with a precondition of a yearly request by Pakistan. Many observers feel that Pakistan was able to apply pressure through forums like the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). For details, see Dawn, 17 August 1996 and News International (London), 29, 30, August 1996. 3. In pre-1971 years, Pakistan's anomalous situation could have been an equally positive factuality had relations between the two young republics begun on a cordial note. Pakistan's two wings ideally allowed a South Asian outreach into Western and Southeastern Asia besides providing an effective definition to a trans-regional relationship. 4. 'Few states emerged from colonial rule with as many disadvantages as Pakistan': thus began a review by a leading scholar on South Asian Islam. See Francis Robinson, review of State of Martial Law: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence by Ayesha Jalal, in Modern Asian Studies, 26, 3, (1991), p. 626. 5. For a useful background, see S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Karachi, 1990. 6. For his own ideas on foreign policies, see Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Karachi, 1969; Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, London, 1992, and Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Karachi, 1993. 7. The NAP, led by , son of the late , evolved from the cadres of former Red Shirts, disgruntled Bengali and Baloch leaders who felt that Pakistani politics was being monopolized by the Punjabis and Urdu-speakers. The NAP formed provincial governments in 1972 in the NWFP and while 324 Notes

Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party ruled supreme in Pakistan. In early 1974, Bhutto, after the discovery of an arms cache in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, dismissed the NAP-led coalition government in Balochistan. A few days later, the NAP government in the NWFP also resigned in protest, followed by a military action in Balochistan which ended with the dissolution of the Bhutto government in 1977. Bhutto, while banning the NAP, instituted the trial of its leadership. After the trials were withdrawn by the martial law regime the leaders formed a new party called (ANP) from among the same cadres, though Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, the Balochi leader, formed his own separate political party. 8. Many scholars both inside and outside Pakistan did take such a threat very seriously. For instance, see Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York, 1981. 9. The Muslim (Islamabad), 17 May 1983. 10. See G. W. Choudhury, Pakistan: the Transition from a Civilian Government, London, 1988. 11. See Craig Baxter, ed., Zia 's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State, Boulder, 1985. 12. It was felt that without an economic independence the cultural, politi• cal and intellectual sovereignty will remain meaningless and religion will continue to be used both as a coercive force and smoke screen for larger-than-life forces. Ziaul Haque, 'Islamisation of Society in Pakistan', in M. Asghar Khan, ed., Islam, Politics and the State: the Pakistan Experience, London, 1985, pp. 114 and 122. 13. 'Interview with Asma Jahangir', Viewpoint (Lahore), 5 December 1991. 14. For more on Bhutto, see Shahid J. Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, London, 1990 (second edition); and, Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Karachi, 1996. 15. In common parlance, the Russian invasion of the Southwestern country was viewed as Brezhnev's Christmas present to General Zia. 16. Pakistan also became a focal point for CIA-led activities against Moscow: 'The CIA station in Islamabad was one of the biggest in the world'. Bob Woodward, Veil: the Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-87, London, 1987, p. 311. The decade saw the warming-up of US-Pakistan relations in 'non-political' areas as well. 17. There is an abundance of Afghanistan-related literature in the post- 1980 era. For instance, for various views on regional and bilateral issues, see Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Berkeley, 1988. 18. It was believed that South Asian Muslim reformers from Shah Wali Allah (1703-63) and Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938) had provided the intellectual framework to Iranian activists like Dr Ali Shariati for an Islamic renaissance. See Suroosh Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? London, 1983. 19. The extent of Iranian credibility can be gauged from a single example. In November 1979, during the Haj, there were riots in and around Kaaba; the Iranian Radio was being quoted to follow the fuzzy events. Anti-US, anti-Israel rhetoric, mingled with ambiguity on the actual Notes 325

nature of the events, created a state of fury across the country, causing the storming of the American Embassy in Islamabad and torching of a number of other important Western offices across the country. It is not a mere coincidence that the gheraoing of the US Embassy in Islamabad symbolized a contemporary Iranian tradition. 20. Initially, Iranian revolutionaries worried the Sunni Balochis both in Iran and Pakistan but gradually a more accommodative policy lessened the fears of the Shia leadership. It is also interesting to note that the ideological factionalism among the Iranians in Quetta and Karachi, for some time worried Pakistani authorities in the 1980s, but it never assumed major proportions. The disenchantment of many Pakistani expatriates in the Gulf region with what they perceived as the lax atti• tudes among the rich Arab Muslims, proved another reason to adore Imam Khomeini, who constantly rebuked these as 'blots' on the Muslim character. 21. In more recent years, the country's powerful intelligence agencies are said to have established their own 'invisible government' and have been routinely destabilising political processes. For an interesting study, see Munir Ahmed, Pakistan Mein Intelligence Agencion Ka Siyasi Kirdar (The Political Role oflntelligence Agencies in Pakistan), Urdu, Lahore, 1993. Corruption has remained a major concern of Pakistani civil society and, despite a great demand for transparent accountability, several generals, bureaucrats and politicians remain beyond public reproach. Several governments have been dismissed on charges of corruption yet no such mechanism has been evolved which could apprehend these elements. For a detailed expose, see 'Benazir's Booty', The Sunday Times, 12 April 1998; Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Stop the Loot!' News International, 10 May 1998; and 'Pakistan PM Probed Over "Secret Fortune'", The Observer, 27 September 1998. 22. 'Many Pakistanis would like Mr Qureshi to stay on. One diplomat said: "For the first time in 40 years they've seen what good government is, and they know that in a week's time they are going to have to give it up'". Gerald Bourke, 'Caretaker PM Says Reform Irreversible', The Guardian, 30 September 1993. 23. Despite a price-hike, Pakistanis overwhelmingly welcomed Qureshi's reforms and on the eve of the elections, they even desired the contin• uance of his government. 'Moeen is a hero to many voters because he exposed corrupt politicians, started to chase down drug barons and pulled the country back from the verge of economic collapse'. 'A Result that Nobody Wanted', Newsweek, 18 October 1993. 24. Strikes after the national budget of 1996 presented by Benazir Bhutto amid higher taxes, currency devaluation and the price-hike displayed massive anger towards the PPP-led regime. It was viewed that the PPP, apprehensive of losing elections, was reneging on its early commitment to hold local council elections. Interviews across the Punjab showed great disenchantment towards the Bhutto regime, especially after Imran Khan's decision to launch his campaign to end VIP culture and . Interview with Imran Khan in Oxford in November 1995 and interviews with several Pakistanis in Lahore, 326 Notes

Islamabad and in May-August 1996. To many observers, the situation became worse in 1997 due to a long-drawn-out crisis in the upper echelons of government. 25. For a historical study of more than a century-long dilemma of the Muslim Kashmiris, see Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991. The books by Robert Wirsing, Vernon Hewitt and Victoria Schofield all highlight such anomalies. 26. See Asia Watch, The Crackdown in Kashmir, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1993; Kashmir under Siege, New York, 1991; Patanjali M. Varadarajan, Rapport (Kashmir), Paris, Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de !'Homme, 1993 and, several reports by Amnesty International, London (1991-96). 27. Selig Harrison, 'South Asia and the United States: a Chance for a Fresh Start', Current History, 91, (563), 1992, p. 102. 28. This was first suggested by Sir Owen Dixon, the UN special envoy in 1950. For details, see D0/35/2048, Kashmir, Public Records Office, Kew, London. 29. For various scenarios, see Iftikhar H. Malik, The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Detente in Jeopardy, London, 1993. 30. In November 1993, following a continued siege of the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar- the holiest place for Kashmiri Muslims -both Britain and the USA counselled India to find a political solution to the issue by involving Pakistan and Kashmiris. Robin Raphael, the US Under• Secretary of State, even infuriated India by reaffirming that the US government considered Kashmir an unresolved international issue. But, in 1997-98, both Britain and the USA were suggesting a strictly regional solution to the bilateral dispute. 31. Anti-Muslim riots in Bombay in early 1993, organized by Shiv Sena, exposed a deep element of hatred against their fellow-citizens by a majoritarian communalism challenging the plural nationalism and offi• cial secularism. Pakistan ya Qabristan (Pakistan or Graveyard) is the avowed creed of these communal organizations in India. 'Kick Them Out', an interview with Bal Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena in Time International, 25 January 1993. 32. There is no doubt that within Pakistan there is a wider acceptance for Indian Muslims being part and parcel of the Indian nation. 33. Despite the words of caution from certain officials in the KGB in 1979, many senior Soviet officials chose to assist communists in Kabul. The Soviet leadership felt as if the Afghans, like other underdeveloped soci• eties, were ripe for communism, and ignored the extent of resistance and difficult nature of the terrain. Moscow began to funnel about £5 billion a year into Afghanistan which, according to Russian estimates, cost them 15 000 Soviet lives. However, the decision to extricate them• selves from the country despite a possible collapse of the Kabul regime, 'was the first and most difficult one' followed by similar decisions elsewhere. For further details, see International Herald Tribune, 16-17 November 1992. 34. 'Afghanistan's Chance', in The Washington Post, 9 March 1993. 35. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Soviet Prospects in Afghanistan', in Hafeez Notes 327

Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York/London, 1993, p. 96. 36. Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics: Islam, Ethnicity and the State', Asian Survey, XXXII, 10, (1992) p. 901. 37. Lawrence Ziring, 'Dilemma and Challenge in Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan', in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan: I992, Boulder, 1993, p. 17. 38. For a useful American academic perspective, see Joseph, S. Nye, Jr, 'What New World Order?', Foreign Affairs, 71, 2 (1992), pp. 83-9. 39. To many scholars, given the rapidity of reaction and vast scale of destruction of a small country, the Gulf war has been, in fact, a global war led by the First World against a Third World society. See Andre G. Frank, 'Third World War: a Political Economy of the Gulf War and the New World Order', Third World Quarterly, XIII, 2, (1992), p. 267. 40. See Ghassan Salami, 'Islam and the West', International Affairs, 90, (Spring 1993), pp. 22-37. It is important to note that several Western scholars like John Esposito and Fred Halliday have rejected the 'myth' of an Islamic threat. See Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London, 1996; John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford, 1995; and Salim Rashid, ed., 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Asian Responses, Karachi, 1997. 41. Such Western attitudes stem from a lack of interest in and appreciation for Muslim societies. For instance, Fukuyama, in his euphoric study, found it easier to relegate Islam to fascism and dictatorship, destined to be replaced by 'liberal democracy'. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, London, 1991, pp. 45-6. 42. Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, India and America after the Cold War, Washington, DC, 1993. 43. Edward A. Gargan, 'Indian Troops are Blamed as Kashmir Violence Rises', The New York Times, 18 April 1993. 44. See Michael R. Gordon, 'US Accuses India on Chemical Arms', ibid., 21 September 1993. 45. In a meeting of G-8 in June, it was agreed to suspend non-humanitar• ian aid and loans to both India and Pakistan though no radical decision to cut off the entire economic relationship was undertaken. However, both India and Pakistan were advised to refrain from further nuclear weaponization. Both India and Pakistan did send mixed signals for talks, with Pakistan urging a focus on Kashmir while India still avoided it. Based on CNN News Reports monitored in Oxford on 11-13 June 1998.

10 IDEALS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN PAKISTAN

1. Examples like the situations in Bosnia, Kashmir, Palestine, Lebanon and Chechenya are forwarded to highlight US apathy toward such a trauma while, on the contrary, her hypersensitivity towards Iraq, espe• cially after 1990, is generally viewed as typical of American 328 Notes

double-standards towards the Muslim world. They are further inter• preted as an unresolved contestation between the Muslim and Judea-Christian worlds. 2. In a sense, this has been equally visible in other South Asian states. Given US-South Asian relations centred on security-related issues, Britain, soon after decolonization, gave way, albeit reluctantly, to a more assertive USA in its former colonies such as the sub-continent. For a recent perspective, see Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1947-56, London, 1993. 3. Since the imposition of the US arms embargo against Pakistan in 1990, the major news-item in Pakistani print and visual media has been the issue of undelivered F-16s and similar hardware for which Pakistan had already paid in cash. To the Benazir Bhutto government, a major achievement has been the partial lifting of the embargo through the Brown Amendment in early 1996leading to release of some of the mili• tary equipment. Pakistan was, however, refused the delivery of the F -16s as American officials suspected Pakistan of using the aircraft to deliver her allegedly nuclear payload. When some of the conventional hardware reached Islamabad in late-August 1996, the prime minister herself went to the airport 'to receive it', victoriously symbolizing its significance. For her speech and photo session at the Islamabad terminal, see News International, 3 September 1996. Pakistani leaders, both in the opposition and the government, have always tried to use their office 'to influence' the US administration through professional lobbyists. In the same vein, the armed forces have maintained their direct contacts with the Pentagon. 4. See Robert McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, New York, 1994. 5. Amid a dismissive British attitude towards Pakistan in her preference for India, the Pakistani establishment began looking for allies in North America. The US government itself, motivated by the Cold War prerogatives and mindful of the post-war British limitations, exhibited reciprocity towards the young Muslim state. For early British attitudes towards Pakistan, see Anita Inder Singh, op. cit. 6. For further details, see Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler, Lahore, 1993, pp. 112-23. 7. Certain authors, while studying early US-Pakistan relations, easily succumbed to the idea of an 'exaggerated' American factor within the Pakistani political spectrum. For instance, see M. S. Venkataramani, American Role in Pakistan, Delhi, 1983. 8. Sec Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: the Evolution of an Influence Relationship, New York, 1982. 9. Robert C. Keohane, 'The Big Influence of Small Allies', Foreign Policy, No.2, 1979. 10. For a general overview, see Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, New York, 1969. In case one may enumerate several studies. For example, see Sattar Baber, The United States Aid to Pakistan, Karachi, 1974; and Baber Ali, 'Pakistan-US Military Relationship in the 1980s', Economic and Political Weekly, XXII, No. 14. Notes 329

11. The term was coined some years ago by the Useems of Michigan State University in studying the interaction between the Americans and Indians. See John and Ruth Useem, 'The Interface of a Binational Third Culture: a Study of the American Community in India', Journal of Social Issues, No. 23, 1967. 12. Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age, New York, 1984, p. 2. 13. Ibid., p. 1. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 16. Quoted in Lois Roth, Public Diplomacy and the Past: Studies in U.S. Information and Cultural Programs (1952-1975), US Department of State, April 1981, p. 1. 17. Hansen, op. cit., pp. 103-5. 18. Ibid., p. 103. Also, Kenneth L. Alderman, 'Speaking of American Public Diplomacy in Our Time', Foreign Affairs, 59, No.4, 1981, p. 429. 19. William Pfaff, 'The VOA Is a Voice Too Many', International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1993. 20. Czeslaw Milosz, 'Keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty Going', ibid., 4 March 1993. It is interesting to note here that William Pfaff, a supporter of such an argument, himself worked for Munich-based RFE/RL during the 1950s. He found fault with the VOA but exoner• ated the other two sister stations of any emission. 21. In the summer of 1986, there was quite an uproar in the Pakistani press against some returning affluent Pakistani students of Yale University for throwing extravagant parties in expensive hotels in the name of social get-togethers. Their critics raised objections to their 'showy' trends. 22. For an early treatment, see David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy, New York, 1966. 23. Ibid., pp. 22-5. For an official view, see USIA, Facts About A.I.D. (Telegraph Message No. 2080) Washington, DC, European Wireless File, 13 November 1986, in the Reference Section, US Embassy, London, UK. 24. For statistics, see USAID, USAJD in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986, p. 6. 25. See USAID, Development in Makran, Karachi, 1988; and Nek Buzdar, Socio-Economic Survey of the Makran Division of Baluchistan, a USAID study, Islamabad, 1988. 26. USAID, Change in Gadoon-Amazai, Islamabad, 1987. 27. It will be useful to remember that Ami! Kansi, a Baloch, accused of murdering two CIA agents in 1993 outside the CIA Headquarters, Langley, had been on the its payroll before migrating to the United States. After the murders, he apparently came back to Pakistan to esconce himself in some secret hide-out though the US government had announced a significant reward for his arrest. The US government, through Pakistani official help, was able to arrest him in 1996 from , the native district of Farooq Leghari, the then pres• ident of Pakistan. Several media reports criticized the official collaboration in handing over a Pakistani national to the Americans 330 Notes

without seeking recourse to the country's own judiciary. Kansi's rela• tives pledged revenge, and the death of three American oil-executives and their Pakistani driver in Karachi a few months later is allegedly linked with Kansi's arrest. Kansi, in the meantime, is incarcerated in America though it will be quite some time before the truth about his recruitment and that of other Balochis by the CIA is known. 28. Pakistan's economic travails, owing to imbalances in terms of prioriti• zation of the non-development sector through a greater dependence on foreign loans, added to corruption, posed a serious dilemma for the country. In 1998, on the eve of the nuclear testing and probable impo• sition of sanctions, Pakistan's external debt stood at $50 billion with $4.5 billion required for annual servicing. The country's foreign exchange reserves stood at a meagre $1.2 billion. The people were bracing themselves for severe hardships when Nawaz Sharif undertook a flurry of visits to the oil-rich Arab states seeking urgent economic assistance. Pakistan was facing a severe crisis in its fiftieth anniversary year. For more information, see Karina Robinson, 'Crunch time for Pakistan', The Independent on Sunday, 7 June 1998. 29. For the USIA's role vis-a-vis the , see Stephen Cohen, Security Decision-Making in Pakistan, US State Department, Washington, DC, 1984, pp. 74-5. 30. The AlPS organized a major international conference in Washington, DC in September 1996 followed by another in 1997 at Wake Forest University. The first conference aimed at investigating the evolution of during the half-century independence of the country, while the second was devoted to multi-disciplinary issues. The acade• mic body has sponsored a number of publications on Pakistan-related subjects. For instance, see Jonathan Mark Kenoyer, Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilisation, Karachi, 1998. 31. For further details on the programme, see Humphrey Fellows and USIA, IO Years: the Humphrey Program, Newsletter No.7, November 1988. 32. For more information on the Fulbright programme and its grantees in Pakistan, see Charles Boewe, USEFP Directory, Karachi, 1967; Bruce A. Lohof, Thirty Years of Fulbright: a Directory of Scholars, Islamabad, 1982; and AlPS & USEFP, Bibliography, Islamabad, 1983. 33. For further details on APIN, see the Asia Foundation Center for Asian Pacific Affairs,AP/N News, Winter 1989, p. i. 34. The Asia Foundation, Annual Report, 1987, San Francisco, 1989; see portion on Pakistan, pp. 55-7. 35. See Noor A. Hussain and Leo E. Rose (eds), Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Berkeley, 1986; Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Berkeley, 1988; and, K. Matinuddin and Leo E. Rose, eds, Beyond Afghanistan, Berkeley, 1989. Also, The Asia Foundation Quarterly, San Francisco, Summer and Fall 1988. 36. See Annual Report 1987, p. 56. 37. Both the Ford Foundation and the Asia Society have been encouraging Track-II diplomacy between India and Pakistan to develop non-official channels. Since 1993, they have organized a number of workshops on Notes 331

issues like Kashmir and nuclear proliferation. The Ford Foundation, through its offices in India and Bangladesh sponsored the South Asian Visiting Scholars Programme (SAVSP) at Oxford. Based at the Queen Elizabeth House, South Asian scholars would engage in research and seminars along with meeting fellow academics. So far about 12 Pakistani grantees have been on the fellowship, varying from three to nine months. Several Indians, Bangladeshis, Nepalese and Sri Lankans have also availed themselves of this visiting fellowship. 38. For a historical background, see Iftikhar H. Malik, U.S.-South Asia Relations, 1784-1940: a Historical Perspective, Islamabad, 1988. 39. Dawn (Karachi), 16 August 1989. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis desirous of migrating to the USA applied for a similar second campaign in 1996. 40. Dorothy B. Jones, The Portrayal of China and India on the American Screen, 1896-1955: the Evolution of Chinese and Indian Themes, Locales, and Characters as Portrayed on the American Screen, Cambridge, 1955. 41. Iftikhar H. Malik, U.S.-SouthAsian Relations, 1940-7, London, 1991. 42. Each August, the Pakistani community in the United States organizes a huge independence day parade. In 1996, 50000 Pakistanis partici• pated in such a parade through Manhattan. Dawn, 17 August 1996. 43. For instance, see Laurey Khan, 'An American Pursues her Pakistani Past',Asia (New York), March-April1980. 44. For more details, see AlPS, American Institute of Pakistan Studies, Report ofActivities: 1973-1987, Durham, 1987. 45. Hafeez Malik, Pakistan-American Foundation: Progress Report, 1973-1987, Villanova, 1987, p. v. 46. Ibid., p. 19. 47. The information is based on exclusive interviews in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi, in addition to several small towns and villages. 48. It equally raised a level of anti-Americanism among both liberal and reli• gious groups in Pakistan. Coming on the heels of a 'Muslim-bashing campaign' soon after the explosion at World Trade Center, New York, and blasts in Bombay in early 1993, Pakistanis felt a convergence between India and the Democrat administration in the United States. India, earlier under world pressure due to Hindu-Muslim riots espe• cially after the demolition of the Baburi Mosque on 6 December 1992, followed by worse riots in Bombay resulting in massive Muslim expulsions from the cosmopolitan city, rejoiced at the Pakistani predica• ment. The US media and related quarters, looking for 'another enemy' after the communists, in most cases found Muslims and many Muslim regimes as easy substitutes. Rao Rashid, a former interior secretary and close associate of Z. A. Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto, saw the Nawaz Sharif-Ishaque Khan problem as owing to American pressure on Pakistan to roll back its nuclear programme. of the JI felt that the USA was arm-twisting Pakistan due to its hostility towards Muslims. See TheAwaz International, (London), 2, 8, April1993. There was a flurry of such visits in 1998 when Sharif's government tried to apprise the Americans of their geostrategic and military 332 Notes

vulnerabilities following the Indian nuclear detonations. Despite heavy American pressure, Islamabad, however, went ahead with its own nuclear tests. 49. It is no wonder that in common parlance, the US ambassador to Pakistan is always considered to be an extremely important person. Robert Oakley, a former ambassador, who arrived in Islamabad, soon after the demise of General Zia-ul-Haq, top generals and the Ambassador Raphael in an air-crash on 17 August 1988, was locally known as 'the Viceroy' due to his high-profile role in Pakistani politics. He was instrumental in bringing the army chief, the president and Benazir Bhutto together through an accord before Bhutto was allowed to become prime minister in 1988. He was the mending/breaking force in the 'troika' of power. In the final days of the Bush administration, Robert Oakley, an expert on terror, then serving on a special peace mission in Somalia, secretly visited Islamabad in the second week of December 1992 to warn Pakistanis of their being included on the list of terror-sponsoring countries and counselled for retreat on the nuclear programme and the Kashmir issue. For details, see The Herald, (Karachi), January 1993. In June 1998, the U.S. ambassador was counselling Pakistanis to analyse his country's policies on nuclear proliferation cool-mindedly without expecting any special concessions. 50. The involvement of the CIA in running a most expensive (decade-long) venture against the by helping and arming the Afghan resistance has certainly posed serious threats for Pakistan. Not only the refugees and armed Afghan groups, but also the Pakistani collabora• tors both civil and military, are now targeted for global criticism for gunrunning and drug-trafficking, resulting in the character assassina• tion of the entire nation. Common Pakistanis resent being used and abused by their 'friends'. The most obvious examples involving Pakistan are the two incidents taking place in the USA: the killing of two CIA officials presumably by some whistle-blower from Balochistan in January 1993, and his possible 'escape' to Pakistani tribal territory. The second incident involved the alleged co-planner in the New York blasts of February 1993, Abu Halima, an Egyptian, who was assumed to have left for Pakistan to join his Afghan friends. Pakistanis interpreted such verdicts on their country by the Western media as an orchestrated effort to declare it a terror-sponsoring state. For typical, blown-up reports see, 'Search for CIA Killer Moves to Pakistan Desert', The Sunday Times, 14 February 1993; 'Possible Ringleader of N.Y. Tower Blast May Be in Pakistan', International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1993. Nuclear proliferation, military support for Sikhs and Kashmiris and drug-trafficking have been the other 'routine' charges against Pakistan, leaving Pakistanis with a bitter taste. See, ibid., 23 March 1993; and The Guardian, 3 February 1993. 51. 'India Furious at US Remarks on Kashmir Status', The Financial Times, 1 November 1993; and, 'US Doubts over Kashmir Cause Dismay in India', The Times, 1 November 1993. 52. 'It (the Pressler Amendment) was a narrow political fix for a broad security problem. To remove Pakistan's strategic equalizer without Notes 333

seeing that Pakistanis had equivalent security was a doomed effort', noted The Washington Post in an editorial. See 'A Mixed Nuclear Cast', International Herald Tribune, 1 December 1993. 53. Saddam Hussein has never been a favourite Muslim leader for Pakistanis but comparing American support for Israel with its silence on Chechenya only betrayed a selective discretion in official policies, interpreted as indifference or total hostility towards Muslims.

EPILOGUE

1. The changes within the Muslim world due to domestic prerogatives accentuated by external forces including colonialism, discretionary globalization and the diasporic transfusion have caused a variety of intellectual and ideological responses. All these groups represent new and some old forces; agree on the urgency of change, yet differ on means and methods. Their differences turn violent because of lack of mediating institutions. The contentious issues include the composition and legitimacy of the state, the type of nationalism and its relationship with the rest of the community (ummah) or the ethnic groups, attitudes towards gender-related issues, the need for egalitarian education, the relationship among the Muslim sects and also with the non-Muslim minorities and majorities. The suppression or denigration of such groups irrespective of their ideological orientation by simply denigrat• ing them as militants or fundamentalists has only exacerbated cleavages leading to recurrent violence. Even among the fundamental• ists, there are several ideological divisions but Islam as a rallying point, identity-marker and harbinger for change remains the pivotal force. Thus, it is imperative for Muslim elites - political, religious, ethnic, liberal, diasporic or whatever position they may belong to - to see the issues in the perspective of dialogue, accommodation and reformism. Several scholars have been identifying the multiplicity of such groups which, in a way, shows the persistence of an increasingly effective debate and desire for change. For instance, see Abubaker A. Bagader, 'Contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab World', in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London, 1994; also, A. Jerichow and J. B. Simonsen (eds.), Islam in a Changing World, London, 1997. 2. Even the conservative, pro-Western Muslim countries in the Middle East are cognizant of retaliatory Muslim anger directed against Western dismissiveness and their own incompetence to resolve their issues. Saddam Hussein, to the Muslim masses, is not a hero yet the American willingness to use him to club the Iraqi populace or to obtain some domestic electoral gains is translated as an international conspiracy against Islam. 3. Similar views are expressed about the Western projection and 'adop• tion' of Taslima Nasreen, the controversial Bangladeshi novelist. 4. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that people may like to kill in the name of religion but not many will volunteer to die for it. 334 Notes

5. For instance, the culprit responsible for blasting Imran Khan's cancer hospital in Lahore in early 1996 admitted that it was a sense of frustra• tion in an extremely corrupt society that pushed him towards extremism. His inability to find a job and a continuous degradation by the haves led this poor adolescent from the border areas to become a willing recruit for Indian intelligence. Another young man also arrested in Lahore on the charge of kidnap• ping a famous physician in August 1996 stated his personal circumstances for turning into a criminal. This physician had charged this poor, unemployed graduate an exorbitant fee of Rs. 70 000 for an unnecessary operation on his wife which left him totally impoverished and indebted. He witnessed similar other patients being exploited by the doctor. The surgeon, otherwise capable in his skill, was known for his wealth and skimming the patients. The youth, unable to make both ends meet after paying the huge fee, turned revengeful. Similarly, in another case, the dacoits allowed a former civil servant to proceed in a Karachi street only when he vocally admitted that the biggest dacoits were those who ran the government. All over the Muslim world, young, educated, unemployed mis-directed youths are turning into willing recruits for gangsters, drug barons or simply join Islamic militant groups promising a better life after death. 6. These were the South Asian Muslims who were killed in anti-Rushdie riots though Rushdie himself remained safe in the West by becoming a heroic symbol of intellectual dissent. But the campaign made it further difficult for social critics to uphold any tradition in dissent especially in a state of siege. The Iranian regime also used the Rushdie affair for its own interests by further scuttling dissent within the country. 7. In Britain, in the post-1989 agitation over The Satanic Verses, several individuals advocated some form of undefined Muslim separatism. Activists like the late Kaleem Siddiqui organized a self-appointed Muslim parliament but such a reaction was largely out of anger leading into introversion. Still, the majority of Muslims in Western Europe and North America preferred a moderate view though one did come across occasional rejectionist voices. 8. For details, see Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, Karachi, 1972. 9. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the lama 'at-i-Islami of Pakistan, Berkeley, 1994. 10. His ideas have been promoted by a whole generation of articulate Muslim scholars, including Marayam Jameelah, a convert from Christianity residing in Pakistan. See Islam and Modernism, Lahore, 1988; and Islam versus the West, Lahore, 1988, and Who is Maudoodi?, Lahore, 1973. 11. Maududi, like Syed Qutb and other revivalists, did not differentiate between modernism and Westernism largely because, unlike Muhammad Iqbal or Muhammad Abduh, he was not intellectually trained in Western knowledge and philosophical traditions. To him and his followers, the West always symbolized corruption, nudity, material• ism and profanity. To him, the West was not a mere territorial or cultural unit away from the Muslim world but was triumphantly present Notes 335

among Muslims through its modernist 'agents' who had to be dealt with forcibly to wrest the leadership of the community. For more on him, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi & the Making of Islamic Revivalism, Oxford, 1996, and Asghar Ali Engineer, The Islamic State, Delhi, 1993. 12. The Ahmedis, after their exclusion from the mainstream Muslim society of Pakistan through legislation, have opted to live abroad with London as their major centre. They pursue their own form of exclu• sivist policies which, like those of the Jama'at, are very clannish. With an exceptional rate of literacy, mobility and prosperity, they like to be considered as modernists. However, their rejection of common Muslims for ideological reasons brings them closer to the Jama'at. The Jama'at has deeply institutionalized itself in the West though its early concentration in Saudi Arabia is on the wane following the Jama'at's support for Saddam Hussein and continued assistance to the Afghan activists, who, in some cases are seen to be destabilising the conservative Muslim regimes. The Jama'at may dislike the West but has established powerful multi-purpose establishments in North America and the UK. The Islamic Foundation in Leicester, UK Islamic Mission and Impact are three major organs of the party in addition to numerous booklets, journals, think-tanks and periodic workshops. The Jama'at played a crucial role in the establishment of the Muslim Students' Association of North America in the 1960s, presently known as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). There are quite a few other bodies like the World Islamic Mission, the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) and quarterlies like The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (Washington, DC), founded by the Jama'at activists. The Jama'at followers are mostly professionals and their pres• ence in South Asian universities is quite high. However, they are definitely different from Hizbal Tehreer and such other groups. The Tablighi Jama'at, unlike the Jama'at-i-Islami, concentrates on all kinds of Muslims and believes in individual reformation through religious action whereas the latter is more into political and organiza• tional enterprise. The Tablighis are purists but exhibit a high order of tolerance and generally avoid physical intimidation. More recently, there have been stories of their militancy in Balochistan against the Zikri tribe of the Makran district. The Anjuman-i-Tulba-i-Islam (ATI) is an organ of Brelvi Islam which believes in saints and pirs and is against westernization. Such Islamists are quite different from the Ismailis, the followers of the Aga Khan, who are tolerated by the other Muslims in their personality• centred, clannish pursuit with the hope that they may eventually join the mainstream Muslim community. 13. Many erstwhile liberal and leftist Muslims have begun 'to confront' their own Muslimness in a different perspective. In meetings across Western Europe and North America, it became apparent that a serious self-appraisal has been taking place among the Western Muslims. Issues of class and colour, to a great extent, appeared to have been overtaken by factors such as culture. 336 Notes

14. It is not to deny that the Muslim intellectuals 'back-home' are totally beleaguered and placid. Despite various impediments and massive disempowerment, the demand for freedom and accountability is increasing. In societies like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India and Turkey, journalists, women's groups and various think-tanks are coming alive as powerful organs of young civil societies. 15. Even the religious elements, who earlier fought nationalists, have accepted the reality and necessity of nationalism. 16. In a meeting of 80 Muslim scholars, journalists and artists, a serious interest was exhibited in pursuing a healthy dialogue with the Muslim and Western rejectionists. It was opined more than once that Islam is largely a misunderstood religion and is being used by all sides for oppression and has to be retrieved as a human, rational and tolerant heritage through debate and research. The meeting took place in London on 6-9 September 1996 and is symptomatic of healthy trends among the diasporic Muslims actively engaged in this multi-dimen• sional debate, especially in the West. 17. Such a predicament is augmented by the lack of proper and value-free terminology which can be applied to Muslims' cultural experiences without hurting their sensibilities. 18. Such groups suffer from the absence of institutional support and are thinly spread across the globe, while belonging to different professions. Unlike the conservative Islamists, they do not have common, high-level platforms or financial sponsors and given the newness and challenging nature of their tradition, they confront several roadblocks. Generally, the feeling is that the Western powers and the ruling Muslim elites recognize only the ruling hierarchies and the traditionalist Muslims, and tend to ignore the modernists and reformers who are seriously trying to making a sense of the Muslim predicament. 19. Pakistan continues to attract serious scholarship, many times more than any other such developing state. For instance, in a research journal of international repute, out of five total research articles three were devoted to Pakistan's political culture. See The Asian Survey (Berkeley), XXXVI, July 1996. 20. An increasing number of Indian scholars, like Asghar Ali Engineer, A. G. Noorani and Kuldip Nayyar, believe that the dispute has to be resolved through negotiations so as to break the regional log-jam. 21. In June 1998, Pakistan's economy had reached a precarious brink. According to the head of the State Bank of Pakistan, any major with• drawals from the country's foreign exchange accounts could cause a major financial crisis since the foreign exchange reserves were already quite low. See his report in News International, 11 June 1998. Bibliography

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

Christopher Beaumont Papers, All Souls College, University of Oxford. Edward Thompson Papers, The Bodleian Library, Oxford. Sir George Cunningham Papers, India Office Records & Library (IOR&L), London. Ian M. Stephens Papers, The Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge. Sir Francis Mudie Collection, India Office Records & Library (IOR&L), London. L!P&S/13/1845B, Diplomatic Correspondence, IOR&L.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE/DOCUMENTS

Asia Foundation, Annual Report, San Francisco, 1989. --, The APIN News (prepared by the Asia Foundation Center for Asian Pacific Affairs), San Francisco, Winter 1989. --, The Asia Foundation Quarterly, San Francisco, Summer & Fall1988. British Council, The British Council Annual Report, 1995-96, London, 1996. --, The British Council Annual Report and Accounts, 1994-95, London, 1995. --, The British Council Annual Report and Accounts, 1993-94, London, 1994. --, The British Council Annual Report and Accounts, 1991-92, London, 1992. --, The British Council Annual Report and Accounts, 1990-91, London, 1991. Department of State, US Government, Security Decision-Making in Pakistan (authored by Stephen Cohen), Washington, DC, 1984. --, Public Diplomacy and the Past: the Studies in U.S. Information and Cultural Programs, (authored by Lois Roth), Washington, DC, 1981. Government of (British) India, Memorandum on the Hindustani Service of the BBC, 4 April 1940, BBC Archives, London. , Quaid-e-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements as Governor-General, 1947-1948, Karachi, 1948. --, Population Census of 1981, Islamabad, 1981. --, Report of the Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women, Islamabad, 1985. H. M. Government, Kashmir, D0/35/ 2588, 2589, 3054, 6626, 6632 Public Record Office (PRO) London. --, Pakistan, D0/35/ 2983, 3188 and 5106, PRO. --, The Punjab Boundary Award, D0/35/ 3054, PRO.

337 338 Bibliography

--, Mansergh, N., and Moon, Penderel, et a!., eds, The Transfer of Power 1942-47, Vol. IX, London, 1980. USAID, USAID in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986. --, Change in Gadoon-Amazai, Islamabad, 1987. --, Development in Makran, Karachi, 1988. --, Socio-Economic Survey of the Makran Division of Baluchistan (authored by Nek Buzdar), Islamabad, 1988. USEFP, Bibliography (co-prepared by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies [AlPS]), Islamabad, 1983. --, Thirty Years of Fulbright: a Directory of Scholars (prepared by Bruce A Lohof), Islamabad, 1982. --, USEFP Directory (authored by Charles Boewe), Karachi, 1967. USIA, Facts About A.I.D. (Telegraphic No. 2080, European File 13, US Embassy, London), Washington, DC, 1986. --, 10 Years: the Humphrey Program, Newsletter No.7, November 1988.

SPECIAL REPORTS AND SEMINARS

American Institute of Pakistan Studies (AlPS), Report of Activities, 1973-1987, Durham (NC), 1987. Amnesty International, India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody, London, 1992. Brzenzski, Z., 'Problems of Post-Communism', Alistair Buchan Lecture Series, St Antony's College, 4 February 1994. Coordination Committee on Kashmir, Human Rights Situation in Kashmir Valley, May 1992, London, 1992. Federation Internationale des Leagues des Droits de !'Homme (FDIH), Rapport, Paris, 1993. Human Development Centre, Human Development in South Asia, 1997, Karachi, 1997. --, Human Development in South Asia, 1998, Karachi, 1998. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 1997, Lahore, 1998. Human Rights Watch, Double Jeopardy: Police Abuse of (An Asia Watch Report), New York, 1992. --, Kashmir under Siege, New York, 1991. Ife, Douglas Stanton, 'Sunset of the Raj: a View by the ICS', a paper presented in the Commonwealth Seminar Series, Nuffield College, Oxford, 2 February 1990. Jones, Trevor, Britain's Ethnic Minorities: a PSI Report, Poole, 1993. Kapur, Harish, 'India's Foreign Policy', a paper presented in the Contemporary South Asia Seminar Series, Queen Elizabeth House, 30 January 1992. Malik, Hafeez, Pakistan-American Foundation. Progress Report: 1973-1987, Villanova, 1987. PHRO, The Kashmir Massacre: a Report by Punjab Human Rights Organisation, Ludhiana, 1990. Physicians for Human Rights, Kashmir 1991, London, 1991. Bibliography 339

Rhodes House, A Register of Rhodes Scholars, 1903-1981, Oxford, 1981. Royal Festival Hall, Edge of Madness: Sarajevo, a City and Its People under Siege, London, 1997. Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: a Challenge for Us All, London, 1997. Werbner, Pnina, 'On Mosques and Cricket Teams: Religion and Nationalism among British Pakistanis', a paper presented at International Conference on Pakistan, Oxford, 13 June 1992.

BOOKS

Afzal, M. Rafique, Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958, Vol. I, Islamabad, 1986 (reprint). Ahmad, Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964, Oxford, 1967. Ahmed, Akbar, S. and Donnan, Hastings, (eds) Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London, 1994. Ahmed, Ishtiaq, State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia, London, 1996. --, The Concept of an Islamic State, London, 1987. Ahmed, Leila, Women and Gender in Islam, New Haven, 1992. Ahmed, Muneer, Pakistan Mein Intelligence Agencion Ka Siyasi Kirdar, Urdu, Lahore, 1993. Ahmed, Rafiuddin, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: a Quest for Identity, Delhi, 1981. Akbar, M. J., Kashmir: Behind the Veil, New Delhi, 1991. Akhtar, Shabbir, Be Careful with Muhammad! the Salman Rushdie Affair, London, 1989. Alavi, Hamza and Halliday, Fred (eds), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, London, 1987. Al-Azmeh, Aziz, !slams and Modernities, London, 1994. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, 1967. Ali, Imran, Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947, London, 1989. Ali, Muazzam (ed.), Pakistanis in Europe, London, 1982. Ali, Mubarik, Sindh: Khammoshi Ki Awaz, Urdu, Lahore, 1992. Ali, Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, Harmondsworth, 1983. Amin, Tahir, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and Inter- national Factors, Islamabad, 1988. Anjum, Wakeel, Siyasat Kay Firoan, Urdu, Lahore, 1992. Anwar, Muhammad, Pakistanis in Britain: a Sociological Study, London, 1985. Ansari, Sarah F. D., Sufi Saints and State Power: the Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947, Cambridge, 1992. Appignanesi, Lisa and Maitland, Sara, (eds) The Rushdie File, London, 1989. Armstrong, Karen, Muhammad: a Biography of the Prophet, London, 1995. Azad, A. K., India Wins Freedom, New Delhi, 1991. Aziz, K. K., Britain and Muslim India: a Study of British Public Opinion vis-a-vis the Development ofMuslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947, London, 1962. Baloch, Inayatullah, Greater Baluchistan: a Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart, 1987. 340 Bibliography

Barth, Frederick, Leadership among the Swat Pathans, London, 1972. Baxter, Craig, eta!., Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq, Boulder 1991. Bhutto, Benazir, Daughter of the East, London, 1988. Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, The Myth of Independence, Karachi, 1969. Binder, Leonard, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley, 1961. Brass, Paul, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Cambridge, 1974. Bulliet, Richard, Islam: the View From the Edge, New York, 1994. Cheema, P. 1., Pakistan's Defence Policy, I947-58, London, 1990. Chishti, Faiz Ali, Betrayals of Another Kind, London, 1989. Choudhury, G. W., Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, London, 1988. Choueiri, M. Youssef, Islamic Fundamentalism, London, 1990. Donnan, Hastings, and Werbner, P. (eds), Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society, London, 1991. Duncan, Emma, Breaking the Cwfew: a Political Journey through Pakistan, London, 1989. Durrani, Tehmina, My Feudal Lord, Lahore, 1991. Endress, Gerhard, An Introduction to Islam, trans. by Carole Hillenbrand, Edinburgh, 1994. Engineer, Asghar Ali, The Islamic State, New Delhi, 1994. Esposito, John L., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York, 1993. French, Patrick, Liberty or Death! India's Journey to Independence and Division, London, 1997. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, London, 1991. Gardezi, H., and Rashid, J. ( eds ), Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship, London, 1983. Gauhar, Altaf, Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler, Lahore, 1993. Gilesenan, Michael, Recognizing Islam, London, 1982. Gilmartin, David, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, London, 1988. Halliday, Fred, Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, London, 1996. Hansen, Allen C., USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer Age, New York, 1984. Hardy, Peter, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972. Harrison, Selig S., In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York, 1981. Harrison, Selig S., and Kemp, Geoffrey, India and America after the Cold War, Washington, DC, 1993. Hasan, Mushirul, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence, London, 1997. --, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, I926-I928, New Delhi, 1979. Hashmi, Taj-ul-Islam, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: the Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, Boulder, 1992. Hewitt, Vernon, Reclaiming the Past: the Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir, London, 1995. Hiskett, Mervyn, The Course of Islam in Africa, Edinburgh, 1994. Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Bibliography 341

Reality, Cambridge, 1990. Hourani, Albert, Islam in European Thought, Cambridge, 1993. --,Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939, London, 1962. Ikramullah, Begum Shaista Suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy: a Biography, Karachi, 1991. Irfani, Suroosh, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship?, London, 1983. Jalal, Ayesha, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Cambridge, 1995. --, The State of Martial Rule in Pakistan: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge, 1990. --, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1985. James, Lawrence, Raj: the Making and Unmaking of British India, London, 1997. James, Maurice, Pakistan Chronicle, London, 1993. Jansson, Erland, India, Pakistan, or Pakhtunistan? The Nationalist Movement in the North-West Frontier Province 1937-47, Stockholm, 1981. Jayawardena, K., Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, London, 1988. Kandiyoti, Deniz (ed.), Women, Islam and the State, London, 1991. Keddie, Nikki, Sayyid Jamal al Din al Afghani: a Political Biography, Berkeley, 1972. Keddie, Nikki, and, Beck, Lois (eds), Women in the Muslim World, Cambridge, Mass. 1978. Kennedy, Charles H. (ed.), Pakistan 1992, Oxford, 1993. --, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Karachi, 1987. Kepel, Gilles, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, London, 1997. Khan, Wali, Facts are Facts, New Delhi, 1991. Khan, M. Asghar (ed.), Islam, Politics and the State: the Pakistan Experience, London, 1985. Khuro, Hamida (ed.), Sind through the Centuries, Karachi, 1987. Korejo, M.S., The Frontier Gandhi, Karachi, 1994. Lamb, Alastair, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Hertingfordbury, 1994. --, Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Hertingfordbury, 1991. Lamb, Christina, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy, London, 1991. Lateef, Shahida, Muslim Women in India. Political & Private Realities: 1890s-1980s, London, 1990. Low, D. A. (ed.), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, Cambridge, 1990. Magdoff, Harry, The Age of Imperialism, New York, 1969. Malik, Hafeez, (ed.), Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan, New York, 1993. Malik, Iftikhar H., State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, London, 1997. --, The Continuing Conflict in Kashmir: Detente in Jeopardy, London, 1993. --, U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1940-47: American Attitude towards Pakistan Movement, London, 1991. 342 Bibliography

--, U.S. -South Asia Relations: a Historical Perspective, Islamabad, 1988. Maududi, Maulana, Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Hind aur Mussalman, Urdu, Lahore, 1974 (reprint). --, Purdah, Urdu, Lahore, 1964. --, Mussalman aur Maujuda Siyasi Kashmakash, Urdu, Vol. III, Pathankot, 1942. McMahon, Robert J ., The Cold War on the Periphery: the United States, India, and Pakistan, New York, 1994. Mernissi, Fatima, Islam and Democracy, London, 1993. --, Women and Islam: an Historical and Theological Enquiry, trans. by Mary Jo Lakeland, Oxford, 1992. Mirza, Sarfaraz Hussain, Muslim Women's Role in the Pakistan Movement, Lahore, 1981 (reprint). Moorhouse, Geoffrey, To the Frontier, London, 1983. Morgan, Janet, Edwina Mountbatten: a Life of Her Own, London, 1991. Moshaver, Ziba, Nuclear Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, London, 1991. Mumtaz, Khawar and Shaheed, Farida, Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward. One Step back? London, 1987. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revolution, New York, 1996. Newberg, Paula R., Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge, 1995. Novato, Anthony Arnold, The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire, Oakland, 1993. Page, David, Prelude to Partition: the Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, I920-32, Oxford, 1982. Powell, A. A., Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India, London, 1992. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, Ulema in Politics, Karachi, 1974 (second edition). Rahman, Fazlur, Islam, London, 1966. Rahman, Mushtaqur, Land and Life in Sindh, Pakistan, Lahore, 1993. Rashid, Salim, cd., 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Asian Responses, Karachi, 1997. Raychaudhuri, Tapan, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal, Delhi, 1988. Read, Anthony and Fisher, David, The Proudest Day: India's Long Road to Independence, London, 1997. Rizvi, Hasan-Askari, Pakistan and Geostrategic Environment: a Study of Foreign Policy, New York, 1993. Roberts, Andrew, Eminent Churchillians, London, 1994. Robinson, Francis, Separatism among Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims 1860-1923, Cambridge, 1974. Rose, Leo and Matinuddin, K., (eds), Beyond Afghanistan: Pakistan-United States Relations, Berkeley, 1989. Rosenthal, E. I. J., Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, 1965. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge, 1990. Ruthven, Malise,A Satanic Affair, London, 1990. Sabbah, F. A., Women in the Muslim Unconscious, New York, 1984. Saadullah, M. et al. (eds), The Partition of the Punjab, 4 vols, Lahore, 1993. Bibliography 343

Saeed, Edward W., Orienta/ism, New York, 1979. --, Covering Islam, New York, 1981. Saeed, Javaid, Islam and Modernization, Westpost, 1994. Samad, Yunas, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-58, Delhi, 1995. Sardar, Ziauddin, and Davies, Meryl Wyn, Distorted Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair, London, 1990. Sasson, Jean P., Princess, London, 1993. Sayeed, Khalid B., Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, Albany, 1995. Seyyid, Bobby, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London, 1997. Schimmel, A.M., Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, Leiden, 1980. Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in the Crossfire, London, 1996. Shaikh, Farzana, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947, Cambridge, 1989. Shaw, Alison, A Pakistani Community in Britain, Oxford, 1988. Sherwani, Latif A., The Partition of India and Mountbatten, Karachi, 1986. Singh, Anita Inder, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo- American Relationship, 1947-56, London, 1993. Sisson, Richard and Rose, Leo E., War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, Berkeley, 1990. Smith, Donald E. ( ed. ), South Asian Religions and Politics, Princeton, 1966. Syed, Anwar H., The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, New York, 1992. --, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, Lahore, 1984. Symonds, John Richard, Oxford and Empire: the Last Lost Cause? London, 1986. --, The Making of Pakistan, London, 1950. Talbot, Ian, Khizr Tiwana: the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India, London, 1996. --, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947, Delhi, 1988. Taylor, David, and Yapp, Malcolm (eds), Political Identity in South Asia, London, 1979. Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, The United States and Pakistan: the Evolution of an Influence Relationship, New York, 1982. Thomas, Raju G. C., (ed.), Perspectives on Kashmir, Boulder, 1992. Vatikiotis, P.J., Islam and the State, London, 1987. Watt, Montgomery, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, Edinburgh, 1994. Williams, F., A Prime Minister Remembers, London, 1961. Wirsing, Robert G., India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, London, 1994. Wright, Denis, India-Pakistan Relations, 1962-1969, New Delhi, 1989. Wolpert, Stanley, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times, Karachi, 1993. --, Jinnah of Pakistan, New York, 1984. Yusuf, Mohammad and Adkin, Mark, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, London, 1992. Zafar, Fareeha (ed.), Finding Our Way: Readings on Women in Pakistan, Karachi, 1991. 344 Bibliography

Zaheer, Hasan, The Separation of East Pakistan, Karachi, 1994. Zaidi, Akbar (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan, Lahore, 1992. Ziring, Lawrence, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, Karachi, 1997. --, Pakistan: the Enigma of Political Development, Durham, 1980. --, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, New York, 1971.

ARTICLES AND RESEARCH PAPERS

Alavi, Hamza, 'Nationhood and Nationalities in Pakistan', Economic and Political Weekly, XXIV, 8 July 1989. Alderman, Kenneth L., 'Speaking of American Public Diplomacy in Our Time', Foreign Affairs, 59, 4, 1981. Frank, Andre G., 'Third World War: a Political Economy of the Gulf War and the New World Order', Third World Quarterly, XIII, 2, 1992. Fukuyama, Francis, 'The End of History?' The National Interest, 16, Summer 1989 & Winter 1989-90. Gellner, Ernest, 'Islam and Marxism', International Affairs, 67, 1, 1991. Ganguly, Sumit, 'South Asia After the Cold War', Washington Quarterly, V, 4, 1992. Hadar, Leon T., 'What Green Peril?' Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, 1993. Harrison, Selig, 'South Asia and the United States: a Chance for a Fresh Start', Current History, 91, 563, 1992. Hasan, Mushirul, 'Sectarianism in India Islam: the Shia-Sunni Divide in the United Provinces', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, (2), 1990. Hashmi, Taj-ul-Islam, 'Women and Islam: Taslima Nasreen, Society and Politics in Bangladesh', South Asia, XVIII, 2, 1995. Huntington, Samuel P., 'The Clash of Civilisations', Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, 1993. Kennedy, Charles H., 'The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh', Asian Survey, XXXI, (10), 1991. Khan, M. Ayub, 'The Pakistan-American Alliance: Strains and Stresses', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, (2), January 1964. Lewis, Bernard, The Roots of Muslim Rage', The Atlantic Monthly, 266, September 1990. Malik, Iftikhar H., 'The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Crisis to Crisis', Asian Survey, XXXVI, July 1996. --, 'Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan: a Commentary on MQM in Sindh', South Asia, XVIII, 2, 1995. --, 'Identity Formation and Muslim Party Politics in the Punjab, 1897-1936', Modern Asian Studies, 29, 2, 1995. --, 'Beyond Ayodhya: Implications for South Asian Security', Asian Affairs, X, October 1993. --, 'Islam, State and Ethno-Nationalism; Contemporary South Asian and Central Asian Politics', Asian Survey, XXXII, (10), 1992. --, 'Indo-Pakistan Relations: a Historical Reappraisal. A Lost Case or a Turning Point?' Contemporary South Asia, 1 (1 ), 1992. Bibliography 345

--, 'Ethnicity and Contemporary South Asian Politics: the Kashmir Conflict as a Case Study', The Round Table, 322, April 1992. --, 'Islam, the West and Ethno-Nationalism', The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, IX, (1), 1992. Miller, Judith, 'The Challenge of Radical Islam', Foreign Affairs, 72, 2, 1993. Morris-Jones, W. H., 'The Transfer of Power, 1947', Modern Asian Studies, XVI, 1982. Mortimer, Edward, 'Christianity and Islam', International Affairs, 67, (I), 1991. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza, 'Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami Jami'at-i• Tulaba in Pakistan', The Middle East Journal, XXXXVI, (1), 1992. Nye Jr., JosephS., 'What New World Order?' Foreign Affairs, 71, 2, 1992. Rahman, Fazlur, 'The Thinker of the Crisis: Shah Waliy-ullah', Pakistan Quarterly, VI, 2, 1956. Rizvi, S. Gowher, 'Nehru and the Indo-Pakistan Rivalry over Kashmir, 1947-1964', Contemporary South Asia, IV, 1, 1995. Salame, Ghassan, 'Islam and the West', Foreign Policy, 90, Spring 1993. Sayeed, Khalid Bin, 'The Three Worlds of ', Contemporary South Asia, I, (1), 1992. --, 'The Jamaat-i-Islami Movement in Pakistan', Pacific Affairs, XXX, (2), 1957. Talbot, Ian, 'The Role of the Crowd in the Muslim League Struggle for Pakistan', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XXI, (2), 1993. --, 'British Rule in the Punjab, 1849-1947', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XIX, (2), 1991. Thornton, Thomas P., 'The United States and South Asia', Survival, XXXV, 2, 1993. Weinbaum, M.G., 'The March 1977 : Where Everyone Lost', Asian Survey, XXII, 1977. Wright, Robin, 'Islam, Democracy and the West', Foreign Affairs, 7, (3), 1992. Zaidi, S. Akbar, 'Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan: Some Directions', Economic and Political Weekly, 11 February, 1989. Ziring, Lawrence, 'Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan's Nationality Problems: the Legacy of Zia-ul-Haq', Asian Survey, XXVIII, (8), 1988.

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Amrita Bazar Patrika Dawn Economic and Political Weekly Far Eastern Economic Review India Today International Herald Tribune lang Mainstream Nawa-i- Waqt News line 346 Bibliography

Newsweek News line Pakistan Profile Sunday Takbeer The Awaz International The Daily Telegraph The Economist The Financial Times The Friday Times The Guardian The Herald The Hindustan Times The Independent The Independent on Sunday The Muslim The Nation The New York Times The News International The Observer The Sunday Times The Times The Washington Post Time International Urdu Digest Viewpoint Index

Abbas, Chaudhary, Ghulam, 180 Ali, Imran, 54-6 Abbasids, 102 Ali, Shahnaz Wazir, 243-4 Abdali, Ahmed Shah, 150 Ali, Syed Ameer, 72, 79 Abduh, Muhammad, 8, 9, 24, 103, Aligarh Muslim College/University, 130 42-3, 78 Abdullah, Farooq, 196 Allah, Shah Wali, 9, 46 Abdullah, Sheikh, 180, 184, 188 Allama Iqbal Open University Abell, George, 65, 182 (Islamabad), 93 Abkhazia, xvi, 256 All Souls College, Oxford, 65 Abrahamic religions, 22 Al-Mawardi, 8, 102 Abu Hashim, 52 All-Pakistan Women Association, Abu Yusuf, 8 144 Advani, L. K., 35, 48, 166; on American(s), 218-19; aid to Kashmir, 198-9 Pakistan, 234, 236-7; ambivalence Afghani, Jamal-ud-Din, 8, 24, 130 on Kashmir, 247-8, 249; colleges Afghanistan, xvi, xvii, 16, 60, 113, (Barnard, Vassar, Radcliffe and 121, 130, 136, 157, 172-3; crisis, Hamilton), 233; cultural influence 80-1,87,158-9, 164,213-15,215; in Pakistan, 221, 235-6, 244, and Central Asia, 215; Daood's 246-9; foundations in Pakistan, Coup of 1973, 203; Mujahideen, 223; history courses in Pakistan; 26,33-4, 213-15; Najibullah investments in Pakistan, 249; regime, 202, 203, 214; refugees, media portrayals of Muslims, 221; 35, 88, 193, 215; Soviet departure, missionaries, 243; models of 30; Taliban, 119, 200, 214-15, 251; modernization, 234; Muslims, UN efforts, 214-15; Uzbek forces, 254; official policies towards 214-15 Muslims, 248; policy towards Africa, 251; and Asian religions, 24; Pakistan, 69-70, 220; pressures on historiography, 5; Afro-Asian Japan, 169; private and public world, 164, 261 interests, 274; public diplomacy, Africanists, 5 xix; public relations firms, 244: Agha Khan Rural Support Network, teachers in Pakistan, 243-4; tele• 144 vision networks, 227; universities, , 91 234, 242; visitors to Pakistan, Ahmad, Aziz, 9, 46, 109 229-31 Ahmed, Farooq, 196 American Institute of Pakistan Ahmedis, 119, 256 Studies (AlPS), 225, 238, 239, 245 Akbar, M. J., on Kashmir, 67-8 American-Pakistan Research Albanians in Kosovo, 20 Organization (APRO), 225, 238 Al-Bashir, General Muhammad, 6 American Studies Research Center, Algeria, xvii, 6, 16, 26, 30, 105, 113, , India, 228 130, 136, 254; Algerians, 217-18 Amery, Leopold, 79, 80 Al-Ghazali, 5, 8, 102 Amnesty International's reports on Ali, Chaudhary, Rahmat, 78-9, 111 Kashmir, 194-5

347 348 Index

Amritsar, 179 Balkans, 4, 5, 23 Andalucia(s) 23; syndrome, 3 Bangladesh,2,30,34,35,39,50, 153 Anderson, Benedict, 129 Bangladeshi(s), 20, 47; nationalism, Anderson, John, 77 53; in the UK, 81-2 Andrews, C. F., 76 Bannu, 59; resolution of the Red Anjuman-i-Sipah-i-Sahabha of Shirts, 59 Pakistan (ASSP), 115, 118, 119 Bazaz, Prem Nath, 189 Ansari, Mukhtar, 50 Behbud Association, 144 Arab civilization, 101; nationalism, Bengal, 35; partition (1905), 151; xviii; nationalists, 68; tribes, 22 riots, 148; Tanka and Tabagha , 127 movements, 51-2 Arabic, 42 Bengali(s), 152-3; Muslims, 183, 202 Arabs in Pakistan, 247 Beaumont, Christopher, 65-7 Arab-Sawahilis, 6 Berkeley Urdu Program, 237-8 Aristotle, 12 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 16, 34, Arkansas,225,237 41,146,153,160, 173;government, Arya Samajists, 148 213: -ledyatras, 35; official policy Asia, 31 on nuclearisation, 147, 201; on Asia Foundation, 224, 225; fellow• Kashmir, 198-9; on Muslims, 159 ships, 241-2; in Pakistan, 240-2 Bhutan, 34, 153 Asia Watch on Kashmir, 195 Bhutto, Benazir, 17, 52, 62-3, 87, Association of South East Asian 132, 161,209-10,242,244,257; Nations (ASEAN), 172,217,259 and Pakistani press, 140; and the Assad, Muhammad, 116 Supreme Court, 137; and the US, Attlee, Clement, 80 248; corruption, 134; dismissal Aurat, 144 (1996), 248; foreign policy, 200-1 Aurengzeb (Mughal Emperor), 102, Bhutto, Murtaza, (murder), 210 150, 255 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 80, 87, 135, Awami National Party, 60 257; foreign policy, 202-3; Ayatollah(s) of Iran, 8, 113, populism, 120 Ayer, Rao, 180-1 Bihar, 67; riots (1946), 148 Ayer, V. D., 65 Binder, Leonard, 114 Ayesha (Prophet Muhammad's Birmingham, 179 wife), 15 Bogra, Muhammad Ali, 222 Ayodhya Mosque, 16, 41, 87 Bokhari, Zulfikar, 86 Azad, Maulana Abu! Kalam, 8, Bombay, 35, 44, 160; blasts (1993), 47-50,58,73,81,117 141 Azad Kashmir, 161, 176, 190, 198; Boorstin, Daniel, 95 Kashmiri refugees, 196-7; Bosnia, xv, xvi, 16, 159 regional economies, 192 Bosnian(s), 20, 89; refugees, 193 Azerbaijan, 16 Boundary/Radcliffe Award (1947), 65-9, 73 Baburi Mosque at Ayodhya, 16, 41, Bradford, 26, 179 87,160,213 Brass, Paul, 45 Bahrain, xvii, 30 Brazil, 91 Baloch communities, 53; feuds, 133; Briggs, Asa, on the BBC, 85 nationalists, 207, 203 Britain, 24; and India, 72-7; Balochistan, 60, 112, 132; nuclear Kashmir and South Asia, 69-71, tests (1998), 163 78-80 Index 349

British academics in Pakistan, 93-7; Burmese, 20, 92: Rohinga Muslims, attitudes towards Pakistan, 69-70; 35 Asians, 81-3, 93; Cabinet (1947), Bush, George, 244 78; cession of Poonch, 179; colonies, 90; East India Cabinet Mission Plan, (1946), 49, Company, 78; government 86-7, 73, 151 84, 90-3; higher education, 83; Calcutta, 147, 189 human rights groups, 80-1; India, Caliphs, 25 34, 103-4, 109, 142, 151; influ• Cambodia, 240 ence in Pakistan, 220; Cambridge University, 13, 65, 78, intellectuals, 74-6; Jews, 26; Left, 83, 93; Cavendish Laboratories, 80; media portrayal of Muslims, 96; School of South Asian history, 81-2; Muslims, 13, 83; opinions 40-2, of India and Muslims, 78-80; Campbell-Johnson, Alan, (on policy on Kashmir, 170; public Mountbatten), 181, 182 diplomacy, 90-3; Punjab, 178; Canada,24,33, 217 Raj, 39, 72-7; sale of Kashmir, Caucasus,23,26,256 179; South Asian journals, 96; Cawnpore Mosque issue, 42 teachers in Pakistan, 243-4; trad• Centre for Asian Pacific Affairs, 241 itions in South Asia, 72; views of Central Asian Republics (CAR), Pushtuns, 75; withdrawal from xvii, xviii, 5, 6, 87, 103, 126, 157, South Asia, 148 159, 173, 175; and Pakistan, British Association for Pakistan 215-16 Studies (BAPS), 97 Central Europe, 31 British Broadcasting Service (BBC) Charles Wallace Memorial 83-90, 226; Bengali Service, 88; Fellowship, 93 Eastern Service, 86-7; Foreign Chatterji, B. C., 50 and Commonwealth Office, 66-7, Chaudhary, Nirad, 108 73-4, 90; Gujarati Service, 86; Chechenya, xvi, xvii, 4, 16, 136, 159, Hindi Service, 88; Hindustani 252,256 Service, 86; in India, 85-6; Latin Chicago, 233 American Service, 85; Overseas China, 22, 165 Service, 85-6; Pashto Service, 88; Christian(s), 6; heartland, 22; demo• Persian Service, 86; TV Asia, 84; cratic concerns, 126 Urdu Service, 87, 89; World Christianity, xv, 21, 27, 76, 101, 125; Service, 84; World Service Catholicism, 23 Television (BWSTV), 88-9 , I. I., 44 British Council's budgets for South Churchill, Winston, 80 Asia, 92; in Bangladesh, 93; in CIA, 221, 234 Europe, 92; in India, 90-1; in Clinton, William, 95 Middle East and North Africa, 92 CNN, 84,89 Brogan, Denis, 87 Coatman, John, 79, Brown, Francis Yeats, 79 Cold War, xvi, xvii, 26, 31, 69-70, Bryce, James, 75-6 73, 80, 136, 144, 166, 185, 217, Buddhism, 24 223; and Afghanistan, 206 Buddhist/Confucian civilization, 31; Commonwealth of Independent Buddhists, 35, 81 States (CIS), 226 Buffalo, 179 Community and Consensus in Islam, Bulliet, Richard, 5 45 350 Index

Communist(s) 24, 27 Faisalabad, 235 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Faiz, Faiz Ahmed, 51 (CTBT), 162-3, 165, 167, 222 Farangi Mahal, 42 Coupland, R., 80 Farrakhan, Louis, 254 Crackdown in Kashmir, The, 195 Fascist India, 77 Cripps, Stafford, 80; mission, Fazl-i-Husain, 45 (1942), 80 Ferguson, Adam, 124 Crisis in Kashmir, 64 Ferozpur, 65, 189 Crusades,22,26, 75,251 Fiqah-based differences among Curzon, Lord, 78 Muslims, 2 fitna (feud), 8 Dante, A., 23 Fletcher School of Law and Darling, Malcolm, 86 Diplomacy, 241, 224 Deobandi ulama, 255 Ford Foundation, 225, 242 Delhi Sultans, 150 Foreign Affairs, 31 Dharan bomb blasts, 26 Foreman Christian College, Lahore, Dixon, Owen, 64, 185; Formula, 185 243 Dogra autocracy, 179 Forster, E. M., 86 Dostum, Rashid, 214-15 French Revolution, 105, 125 Dubai, 179 Fukuyama, Francis, 30 Duncan, Emma, 44 Fulbright, J. W., 95, 225; Program, Dutt, R. P., 77, 80 223-7, 237-40 Fundamentalist Islam, 4 East Pakistan, 159, 183, 185, 202; and India, 146; and Pakistan Army, 80; Gadoon-Amazai in the NWFP, 235 refugees, 193-4; Rhodes scholars, Gandhi, Indira, 52, 87, 227; and 96; separation, 154 Bangladeshi nationalists, 202 East-West Fellowship, 224, 225, 237 Gandhi, Mahatma, 43, 50, 57, 64, Eastern Europe/bloc, xv, 23, 27, 28, 77; -Jinnah Talks, 77 31, 123, 172, 216; societies, 104 Gandhi, Rajiv, 16-17, 160 Economic Cooperation Gauls, 23 Organization (ECO), 121, 204, Gellner, Ernest, 103, 104, 126 216-17 Germany, 262 The Economist, 77 Ghauri (missile), 165 Edwina Mountbatten: a Life of Her Gilgit, 179; Agency, 179, 186 Own, 80 Gibbon, Edward, 23 Egypt, xvii, 6, 9, 10, 30, 136; US Gilmartin, David, 55 assistance, 234 Girl Guides Association, 144 Eliot, T. S., 86 Glancy Commission, 180 Engineer, Asghar Ali, 7, 8 Glasgow, 179 Englishlanguage,91,92,93 Goldston, James, 195 Enlightenment, 13-14, 124 Goldzihr, Ignaz, 4 Esposito, John, 107 Gooch, G. P., 76 Europe(an), 125, 224; and India, 80; Gordon College, Rawalpindi, 243 civilization, 72; colonization, 27, Gossman, Patricia, 195 205, 255; conquest of Africa, 5, 6; Gowda, Deve, 161 federalism 30; literature, 24; 'Greater Balochistan', 203 Union, 31, 100, 126, 172,216,217, Greater Serbia, 33 252,259 Greece, 12; Greek city-states, 174; Index 351

philosophy, 22 151, 155, 181 Greenwood, Arthur, 77 The Guardian, 20, 66, 77 Ibn Khaldun, 5, 102, 106; model of Guddu Barrage, 54 state, 126-8 Gujral, I. K., 147, 161 Ibn Taymiyya, 8 Gulf, xvi; crisis, 15-16, 26, 222; Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), 6, 8, states, 30; war, 71, 89, 162, 172 29,104,256 Gurdaspur, 189 Imam Khomeini, 11, 17, 20, 28, 117, Guru, Ahad, 196 207; Khomeinism, 107; Khomeinists, 104, 204 Hadith, 11, 35-6 India(n), xviii, 16, 20, 34, 89-91, Haksar, P. N., 67 240; -American relations, 70-1, Halliday, Fred, 107 91; Army in Kashmir, 184; atroci• Haq, Fazlul, 45, 52 ties in the Kashmir Valley, 175; Hardayal, 50 blockade of Nepal, 155; Border Harvard, 93, 232, 244 Security Forces, 196-7; Hasan, Mushirul, 43-4, 48-50 Constituent Assembly, 59; elite, Hashmi, Taj-ul-Islam, 51-2 174; Hindu majority, 34; Hawke, Robert, 95 Hindu-Muslim tensions, 35, 108; Hausa Muslims, 7 Hindiization, 108; Hinduization, Havel, Vaclav, 125 31; history, 41; in the 1960s and Hekmatyar, Gulbaddin, 214-15 1980s, 154-5; Institute of Mass Herald (Karachi), 140 Communication, 89; Islam, 108 Himalayas, 166 Kashmir and Pakistan, 174-99; Hindi, 91; -Urdu controversy, 42 leaders, 164, 182; liberals, 41; Hindu(s) 81, 103; communalism, mathematics, 22; Muslims, 13, 117; fundamentalism, 49, 108, 38-70,72-7, 107, 109-10, 150-1, 176, 192, 213; Mahasabha, 118, 173; Muslims and Kashmir, 148, 151; -Muslim relations, 183; 175-6; National Front -Muslim riots, 48, 148, 150-1, Government, 160-1; nationalists, 157, 261-2; nationalists, 108; 40-2, 108, 111; Northeast, 34; revivalism, 42 nuclear test in 1974, 187, 202; , 24, 48, 101 Office, 85; -Pakistan boundary Hindustani, 153 conflicts, 151, 154; parliament, 16; Hindutva,41,48, 112,160 pluralism, 34, 192; Punjab, 52, 34, Hizbal Tahreer/Hizbut Tahrir, 3 87, 88, 146; regional preeminence, Hollywood in India, 245; in 164; secularism, 160; security Pakistan, 246 concerns, 170-1; troops in the Hong Kong, 84 Valley, 156; Union, 174 Horn of Africa, 32-3 Indian Institute, Oxford, 78 Human Rights Commission of Indian National Congress (INC), Pakistan, 144 39-45, 75-6, 80, 111, 153, 173, Hunter, W. W., 75 181-2, 189, 213; leaders, 87; Huntington, Samuel, 4, 30-1, 107 Ministries (1937-39), 151; and the Hunza, 144 Hindu domination, 151; and the Hussain, Altaf, 56, 210 Raj, 111, 148; Hussain, Saddam, 26, 207, 217 Indo-Bangladeshi relations, 183 Huxley, Julian, 86 Indo-Chinese relations, 166 Hyderabad (Deccan), 61, 73, 117, Indo-Pakistan conflict, 39-62, 87, 352 Index

Indo-Pakistan conflict- continued xv, 16, 27, 256; humanism, 257; 108-9, 146-73, 174-99, 211-13, globalism, 115; identity, 25; ideol• 223, 261; and Kashmir, 80; ogy, 121; militancy, 253; Kashmir and Punjab, 164; and modernism, 9, 257-8; polity, 22; South Asia, 166; people-to-people radicalism, 99 reformism, xvii; dialogue, 147 renaissance, 36-7; Sharia, 2; Indonesia, xvii socialism, 99, 257; social justice, Indonesians, 20 130; state, 8, 118; studies, 4; Indus river, 154; Basin, 57, 235; Summit in Lahore, 1974, 202-3; Valley Civilisation, 111 symbols, xvi, 102; threat, 24; Institute of Strategic Studies, uniformity, 3; utopia, 102 Islamabad, 242 Islamicists/Islamists, xvi, xviii, 28, Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI), 210 29, 100, 102, 103, 107, 116, 114, International Monetary Fund 118, 261 (IMF), xvii, 142 Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, 252 International School of Islamabad, Islamization, 102 243 Islamophobia in the West, 81-2 Iqbal, Muhammad, 8, 9, 24, 46, 77, Israel, 169, 252 78, 110, 111, 130; Address of 1930, 261 Jagmohan and Kashmiri Pundits, Iran, 3, 6, 9, 16, 17, 99, 169, 173, 190 178, 186; -Iraq war, 170, 207-8; Jalal, Ayesha, 42, 43, 44, 45, 111 the Shah, 6, 10, 62, 203, 204, 251 James, Maurice, 83 lranian(s), xvii, 20, 101; revolution, Jama'at-i-Islami, 8, 9, 11-12, 29, 26,87,206-7 104, 114-18, 255-6; and General Iraq, 169, 247; invasion of Kuwait, Zia-ul-Haq, 207 208,217 Jamiat-i-ulama-i-Hind, 29, 109, 111, , 20 117, 118 Ireland, 33 Jamiat-i-ulama-i-Islam, 115 Islam, xvi, 21; as a Din, xvii; as a Jammu and Kashmir, 180, 181; moral system, 253; as a religion, Hindus, 191 xv; as a vehicle for change, 8; as Japan,31,32, 165, 169,219,262; the 'other', 4; and the civil society, -US Friendship Commission, 240 136; and Hinduism, 146; mis• Jehangir (Mughal emperor), 255 images, 251; and modernity, Jenkins, Evan, 65-6 106-7; and nationalism, 112-13, Jews, 20; in Britain, 81; Jewish 115-16; and Pakistan, 98-122; and cemeteries, 26; Judaic-Christian unity, 28; collective identity, 1-19; heritage, 4, 32, 75; Judaism, 101 in the contemporary historio• Jihad, 100, 251; movements in graphy, 9; and Jihad, xvii; in Africa, 6 Africa, 5, 6; in South Asia, 38, Jinnah, M. A., 40-60, 68, 73, 120, 129-30; in the West, 12; relations 151, 152, 257; and the Muslim with the West, 9, 250-61 cause, 80, 103, 107, 109-10, 111; Islamic activism, 121; brotherhood, and the Muslim League, 187; and umma/ummah, xix; clergy, 113; constitutionalism, 112; in Lahore, conquests in Spain, 23; elite, 6; 183; Jinnahists, 49-50 ethos, 22, 24; decline, 24; Demo• Jinnah, Fatima, 117 cratic Alliance of Nawaz Sharif Jones, William, 78 (IDA/IJI), 63; fundamentalism, Jordan, 26, 30 Index 353

Joseph, John, 142 regional population, 190-1; Journal of South Asian and Middle Western hostages, 198 Eastern Studies, 245 Kashmir: a Disputed Legacy, 64-5 Jowett, Benjamin, 94 Kashmiri(s), 152; activists, 166, 175; Junagarh, 73, 151, 155, 181,210-11 defiance, 136, 189-90, 198-9; elite, 177, 192; guerillas, 195-6; Kabbani, Rana, 20 identity, 67, 157; in Britain, 92-3, Kabul regime, 204; and the Soviet 189, 191; middle class, 179, 193; Union, 202 Muslims, and the Maharajah, 177, Kabul-New Delhi-Moscow axis, 203 178, 189, 191-2, 196-7; predica• Kant, Immanuel, 124-5 ment, 176; refugees, 191, 193-4; Karachi, 16, 44, 61, 74, 91, 132, 133, revolts in Northern Areas, 184; 184, 248; American Society self-determination, 179, 212; School, 243; Basti Programme, separatism, 175 144; Edhi Foundation, 143-4; Kashmiriat, 67, 177, 191, 192-3 Indian involvement, 146; Orangi Kemal, Mustafa, 130, 257; Pilot Project, 143; violence, 211, Kemalism, 107, 128 213,249 Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, 57-60 Kashmir, xvi, xvii, 15, 16, 34, 47, 73, Khan, Abdul Ghani, 59 73, 88, 121; brutalization of the Khan, Abdul Wali, 58, 60 people, 194-6; Charar Sharif inci• Khan, Akhtar Hameed, 143 dent (1994), 197-8; dispute, xviii, Khan, Amanullah, 57 87, 97, 155-7,171,176,211-13, Khan, Ayub, 70, 222 261-2; FDIH's Rapport, 196-7; Khan Brothers, 57-60 Hazratbal Mosque, Srinagar Khan, Ghulam Ishaque, 62, 247; and (1993), 197; human rights viola• the 8th Amendment, 210-12 tions, 176; Hurriyat Party, 198; Khan, Liaquat Ali, 68-9, 70, 222 Indian intervention, 183; Indian Khan, Sikandar Hayat, 45, 55, 111 policies, 194; Indo-British collu• Khan, Syed Ahmed, 9, 72-3, 75, 78, sion, 186; Instrument of 130 Accession, 183-4, 192; incident (1997), 142 International Red Cross, 194, 195; Khattak, Yusuf, 66 Jammu and the Valley, 179; Jihad Khilafat, 28; Movement, 22, 42-4, movement, 179; Kargil, 185; Line 56, 76 of Control, 197; Muslim revolt in (Red Shirts), Poonch, 184; and China, 175; and 59-60 nuclearization of South Asia, Kipling, Rudyard, 85 186-7; 'Operation Tiger', 195; and Kinnaird College, Lahore, 243 Pakistan, 174-99; and Indian Korean war, 70 constitution, 192; partition, 177; Kosovo, 252 police, 197; and SAARC (South Kripalani, Acharya, 50, 58, 181 Asian Association for Regional , xvi, xvii, 16, 193 Cooperation), 187-8; Simla Kurram Agency, 207 Agreement, 185; in South Asian Kuwait, 29, 30 history, 63-71; State troops, 184; Third Option, 175; Valley and Lacey, Partrick, 77 India,65-71, 175,196, 212-3; and Ladakh, 191; Ladakhi Buddhists, 191 the United Nations, 184-5, Lahore, 55, 147, 179, 238; American 189-90, 193, 199; Valley and School, 243 354 Index

Lamb, Alastair, 64-6 Mesopotamia, 12 Lamb, Christina, 44 Mian, Justice Ajmal, 138 Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, 115, 136 Middle Ages, 251 Laski, Harold, 76, 86 Middle East, xvii, 5, 61; politics, 80 Latimer, Robin, 66 Midnight's Children, 13 Latin America, 96 Miller, Judith, 107 Lebanon, xv, xvi, 20, 159 Mirza, Iskander, 68-9, 222 Leghari, Farooq, 138-9, 248 Mission Hospital, , 243 Lenin, V., 43 Modern Asian Studies, 96 Lewis, Bernard, 107 Monier-Williams, William, 75 Library of Congress, 241 Moon, Penderel, 66, 182 Listener, The, 85 Moorehouse, Geoffrey, 83 Locke, John, 124-5 Morgan, Janet, 67 London, 13, 74,78,82 Mortimer, Edward, 107 Los Angeles, 179 Moscow, 104 Lovett, V., 80 Mother India, 48 Luton, 179 Mountbatten, Louis, 47-8, 59-60, Lyall, Alfred, 75 64-9, 73-4, 77-8, 80; visit to Kashmir, 189 Macaulay, Babington, 76 , 105 Madani, Maulana Hussain Ahmed, Muhajir(een), 53; in Sindh, 61; 48, 110-11 Qaumi Movement, 56, 82, 140, Maharaja(h) of Kashmir, 67-9, 210 155-6, 180, 189; flees to Jammu, Muhammad, Elijah, 254 184; and accession, 186 Muhammad, Ghulam, 62, 69 Makkah, 7 Muhammad, Waris Din, 254 Makran, Balochistan, 235 Muir, William, 75 Malakand, NWFP, 119 Mujib-ur-Rahman, 87 Malaysia, 2, 30 Munich, 226 Maldives, 34 Murphy, Dervla, 83 Malik, Hafeez, 238, 245 Murray College, , 243 Manchester, 179 Murray, Gilbert, 87 Mangla Dam, 235 Christian School, 244 Manohar, Murli, 35 Muslim League, All-India, 39-45, Manto, Saadat Hasan, 51 76-7, 79,80,98, 109,110,111, Manzilgah issue in Sindh, 51 148, 151, 255; Lahore resolution Marabous/Marabouts, 6 (1940), 261; struggle for Pakistan, Marahattas, 153 256 Marshall Plan, 233 Muslim(s), xv, 6, 7, 20, 24; activism, Masih, Salamat, 119 260; and Britain, 262; and Martin, Kingsley, 85-6 Christians, 23, 251; and Jewish Marx, Karl, 125; Marxists, 126 exodus from Spain, 23; agnostics, Maududi, Syed Abu! A'ala, 8, 25, 253-4; anger, 14, 17, 20; apolo• 29, 116-18 gists, 11; Brotherhood, 9, 12; Mayo, Katherine, 245 Central Asians, 26; civil society, Medina,22,28, 101 iv, 29, 254; communities, xvi, 21, Menon, Krishna, interview, 189 27, 260; Conference (in Kashmir), Menon, V. P., 65-7, 156, 183, 189 180, 188; converts, 3; countries Mernissi, Fatima, 12 and communities, 12; cultures, 10; Index 355 demand for Pakistan, 148-9; women, 3, 7, 11; world, xv, xvi, dilemma, 21; elites, 6, 21, 260; xvii, xix, 1, 2-5, 11, 19, 21, 23-4, ethos, 25; exodus from Bombay, 28-9,30-2,73,100, 123;youth,2 157; feminism, 11-12, 259; femin• ists, 11-12; fundamentalism, 15, Nagar, 179 23; generals, 7; hierarchies, 260; Napoleon, 43 history, 7, 14, 117; humanism, Narayan,Jayaprakash, 189 260; identity, xvii, 2, 17-19; in Nasreen, Taslima, 18, 253 Asia and Africa, 256; in Bosnia, Nation in Turmoil, A, 46 18; in Britain, 15; diaspora, 258; Nation of Islam, 254 in France, 17; in India, 16, 34-5, National Awami Party, 60 44, 77-8, 135, 160; in Spain, 251; National Conference, 180 in the West, xv, 1, 2, 258; intellec• National Front-Left coalition in tuals, 1, 2, 7, 9, 14, 18, 20, 25, 33, India, 213 250-62; jurisprudence, 35; jurists, Near East, 4; Near Eastern reli• 8; Kashmiris, 174-99, 191; gions, 21 landowners in Punjab and Sindh, Nehru, Pandit, 34, 41, 47-8, 58-9, 52; leaders, 1; liberation move• 67-8,70,78-9,80,91,148,164, ments, 103; Muslim majority 181, 182, 184; and Sheikh regions in South Asia, xviii; Abdullah, 186, 187-9, 193; and massacres in Kapurthala and the UN, 184-5; and the USA, Patiala, 184; masses, 7, 9, 75, 113, 69-70; dynasty, 67; government, 117, 254, 257; media, 3; militancy, 183; on Kashmir, 156; Report, 151 xvi; militants, 27; modernists, Nepal, 34, 35, 153 xviii, 28, 103, 104, 118, 256-7, 259, Newberg, Paula, 62 260-1; nationalism, xviii, 79, 98, New Delhi, 161 103,109-11,120,131-2, 151,261; Newsline, 140 nation-states, 29, 40-2; Near NGOs in Pakistan, 192 East, 28, 31; observers, 2; past, Nichols, Beverley, 77, 79-80 117; political economies, 259; Nicholson, Godfrey, 77 politics, 2, 8; populists, 266; Nigeria, 6 predicament, 9; reformists, 14, Nizamal-Mulk, 8 259-60; intellectual renaissance, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 3,9,39,260,261;responseto 62, 170,216-17 changes, 1; response to modern• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 71 ity, xvii; revivalism, 205; revivalists Noor, Zainab, 141 in the West, 258; rulers, 8; ruling North Korea, 240 elites, 249; scholarship, 5, 21; Northern Areas, 176; and KKH scripturalists, 101; sectarianism, (Karakoram Highway), 192 121; sensitivities, 20; separatism, North Africa, 4, 31 131; society, xviii, xix, 12, 33, Nuclearization of India and 35-7, 128; South Asians, 100, 109; Pakistan, 71 tribulations, 25; view, xv; views on NWFP, 52, 88; geopolitics, 56; poli• gender, 11-12; views on tics, 57-60; referendum of 1947, Nationalism, 251-60; views on 181 Islam, 250-62; views on moder• nity, 251-62; votes in India, 16; Objectives Resolution (1949), 120 and the West, 14, 217, 250-62; O'Brien, Conor Cruise, 125-6 Westernized elite, 117, 130; Oklahoma bombing, xv, 26, 248 356 Index

One-Unit scheme, 112; and Dr USA, 162, 167-9, 202; opinion on Khan Sahib, 59 Muslims, 137; opinions on Organisation of Islamic Conference women's rights, 141; participation (OIC), 62,121,204,216-17 in the war of 1971, 92; People's Orientalism, xvi, 4, 23, 28, 79, Party (PPP), 60, 82; People's 99-100, 251; Orientalists, 5, 20, Party government (1996), 210; 26,27 press, 139-40; Punjabi-Muhajir Orthodox Church, 23 primacy, 131; relations with India, Ottoman(s) empire, 32, 106, 126-7; xviii, 63-71, 98, 146-73; relations and Eastern Question, 75 with Iraq, 208; relations with the Oxford, 78, 83, 93 Muslim world, xix, 121, 150, Overseas Development Agency 200-19; Supreme Court, 136-9, (ODA), 90 241-2; Saudi Arabia and Iran, 206-8; security, 68-9; social order, Pacific Rim economies, 216 262; stance on Kashmir, 177-81; Pakistan, xviii, 2, 6, 9, 10, 16; and state structure, 208-9; Studies in Afghanistan, 200-19; and the US, 238; -UK relations, xviii alliances, 97, 188-9; and 72-98; University Grants Americans, 74; and Central Asia, Commission, 242; -US relations 171, 200; and China, 80, 200; and xviii, 72, 201, 221, 223, 262; with• Islam, 121-2; and the West, 72; drawal from the Commonwealth, -American culture, 246-7; 92; women's groups, 14-15 -American Cultural Center Pakistani(s), 118; and Indians, (P ACC), 238; -American 146-73; anti-American sentiment, Foundation, 245; American 222; associations in America, 245; cultural influence, 221-49; attitudes towards Britain, 72-3; American intellectual influence, and Bangladesh, 160 and BBC, 244; anti-Qadiani/Ahmedi move• 87-90; corruption, 142; in Britain, ment (1953), 120; civil society, 61; 81-4, 89-90, 97; in North Constituent Assembly, 60; consti• America, 245-6; Christians, 119, tution, 68; courts, 61; defence and 141-2; civil society, 123-45; criti• foreign policies, 68-9, 201-19; cism of American policies, 220; economy, 119, 120, 132-3, 139, elites, 79; embassy in Kabul, 200; 142, 262; education, 142-3; elec• expatriates in the Gulf, 246; toral politics, 30, 34, 38-71; Fulbright scholars, 237-40; higher elitism, 44; feminism, 141-2; courts, 137-8; historiography, 134; gender politics, 140-2; geo• intellectuals, 74; leaders and the politics, 68-70; Gulf war, 200-1; US, 222; middle class, 2; national• historiography, 98-104; in the ists, 40-2, 131; nationhood, 119, 1950s, 154; Iranian and 136; official visitors to Britain, Afghanistan, 203-7; lobby in 93-4; opinions towards the Gulf, England, 79; affair, 248; politics, 115; public opinions, 138; Ministry of Information, 135; public opinion on the US 139-40; Ministry of Law, 214; assistance, 172; Punjab, 52-3, 146; Ministry of Economic Affairs, Rhodes scholars, 95-6; Rhodes 241; movement for, 155-6, 255; women scholars, 95-6; role in National Assembly, 241-4; NGOs, Afghanistan, 136; ruling elite, 74, 133, 140-5; National Press Trust, 244, 247-8; society, 247; state• 139; nuclear programme and hood, 62, 129;supportfor Index 357

Kashmiris, 247; visitors to Radio Times, 85 America, 229-31; writers on Rafsanjani administration in Iran, Kashmir, 193; youth, 246 17 Palestine, xvi, 6, 16 Rahman, Fazlur, 9, 46, 130 Palestinians, 20 Rai, Lajpat, 50 Panikkar, K. M., 108 Raj, 44, 108-9; and India, 185 Pan-Islamic feelings, 150 detonation (1998), 165 Parsis, 182 , 160 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 47-8, 50, Rangeela Rasul, 15 67, 73, 181 Rao, Narsimah, 160, 198 Pathankot, 117 Raphael, Robin, on Kashmir, 197-8, Peoples of the Book, 22 249 Persian statecraft, 22 Rawalpindi, 68, 141 Peshawar, 147 Red Shirts (NWFP), 59-60, 111 Pilot, Rajesh, 198 Reed, Stanley, 80 Pious Caliphs, 7, 25, 101, 117, 255 Reeves, Richard, 44, 245-6 Polack, Henry, 80 Reith, John, 84-6 Poles, 23 Reuters, 85 Political Islam, xvi, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 28, Rhodes, Cecil John, 94-5; 99, 107, 113, 118, 120, 130 Fellowship at Oxford, 94-7; Poonchis in the Second World War, House, 94; scholars, 95; Trust, 184 94-5 Populist Muslims, 256-7 Rida, Rashid, 8 Pressler, Larry, 95 Rifkind, Malcolm, 163 Prophet Muhammad, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, Roberts, Andrew, on Mountbatten 15,22,26,28,101,251,259 and Partition, 181-2 Protestants and Catholics, 24 Robinson, Francis, 42-4, 45 Puckle, Frederick, 86 Rockefeller Foundation, 225, 242 Punjab, 61; centrality, 53-4; Romans, 22, 101 language, 53-4; Punjabis, 53-4, Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 124-5 153 Roy, Rammohan, 72 Purdah, 117 Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 'Pushtunistan' or 'Pukhtunistan', 78,97 59-60 Rubin, Barney, 107 Pushtuns/Pathans, 46, 56-60, 153 Rubinstein, Alvin, 223 Rugby, 13 Qaddafi, Colonel Moammar, 257 Runneymede Trust, 82 Queen Elizabeth House Fellowship Rural Support Network (RSPN), 144 (Oxford), 96 Rushdie, Salman, xvi, xv, 252, 253, Quetta, 179 254; affair, 1, 13-17,26,81-2,83, (1942), 77 258 Quran, 11, 20, 35-6, 255; verses, 100 Rusk, Dean, 95 Qureshi, Moeen, 52, 209 Russia, 27, 31, 32

Radcliffe, Cyril, 65-70, 73, 180; Sadaat, Anwar, 227 Award (1947), 180-1 Sahib, Dr Khan, 45, 57-9 Radhakrishnan, 108 Salafis, 6, 25 Radio Free Europe (RFE), 226, 228 Salah-ud-Din of Takbeer (Karachi), Radio Liberty, 226, 228 140 358 Index

Samad, Y., 46-7 Sindh, 58, 61, 112; ethnic criminal• Saracens, 23 ization, 206; Hindu moneylenders, Sargent, John, 9 56; Urdu-speakers (Muhajireen), Sarnoff, David, 85 56; violence, 140 Satanic Verses, The, 1, 13-17,26,44, Sindhi(s), 53, 153; haris, 145; intel• 81-3,258 lectuals, 56; politics, 56-7; Syeds, Saudi Arabia, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 30, 54, 56; Waderas,pirs and haris, 56 105, 113, 128, 248, 254; Saudis, 8 Singh, Gulab, 179 Sayeed, Khalid B., 9, 10, Singh, V. P., 68, 153, 160 Schmidt, Helmut, 227 Sino-Indian relations, 158; war Scolasticism, 23-4, (1962), 164, 223 Schuster, George, 79 Sino-Pakistani relations, 70, 202-4 Second World War, 84 Sipah-i-Muhammad, 115, 119, 136 Seal, Ani!, 108 Smith, Adam, 124-5 Seeley, J. R., 75 Somalia, xvi, xvii, 113, 130, 218 Semitic theologians, 21 Somalis, 20 Serbs, 217 Sorabji, Cornelia, 78 Shah, Justice Sajjad Ali, 137-8 South Africa, 7, 168 Shahidganj issue, 51 South Asia(n), 4, 5, 19, 125; Shaikh, Farzana, 43, 46, 109 Association for Regional Shame, 13 Cooperation (SAARC), 63, 154, Shantinagar (Khanewal) incident, 155, 163, 170-3, 203-4; cold war, 119 40, 219; democratic movements, Sharia!Shariah, 6, 101, 114-16, 118, 208; history, 13, 261; Islam, 17, 119,126-7,255-6 99; languages, 41-2; migrants, 35; Shariati, Ali, 9, 130 Muslims, xviii, 13, 34,42-4, Sharif, Mian Nawaz, 52-3, 60, 132, 98-105, 148-73; Muslim elite, 98; 147, 161, 169; and Benazir Muslim historiography, xviii, Bhutto, 210, 247; corruption, 134; 38-71; nuclearization and NPT, and Ghulam Ishaque Khan, 209; 162-3, 165, 167-9, 174, 187; and Sajjad Ali Shah, 210; and the opinion groups on Indo-Pakistan Supreme Court, 136-7; and the relations, 172-3; states, 84; US, 248-9; and the 13th studies, 10; studies at Cambridge Amendment, 211 and Oxford, 96-7; studies in the Shaw, G. B., 85 US, 245; sub-continent, 146-73 Shaw, Isobell, 83 South Asianists, 41-3 Sheikh ibn Baz, 10 Southeast Asia, 5 Shia(s); and Sunnis, 42; Islam 30; Soviet Union, xv, 1, 34, 73, 123; and -Sunni conflict, 5, 114, 115 Eastern Europe, 129; bloc, 30; Shirkat Gah, 144 Central Asia, 33; intervention in Shiv Sena, 16, 153, 160, 182 Afghanistan, 62, 69, 170, 186; Shone, Terence, 73 withdrawal from Afghanistan, Shooracracy, 22 157,175,214 Siachin Glacier, 71, 166, 175,211 Spaniards, 101 Sialkot, 179 The Spectator, 76 Sikandar-Jinnah Pact (1937), 55 Spender, Stephen, 86 Sikh(s), 81, 182; Sikhism, 150; Sri Lanka, 16, 34, 35, 88, 153: -Muslim relations in Punjab, 148 Northeast, 159 Simla Agreement, 202 Srinagar, 155 Index 359

Stanford, 232 47,61,127 The Statesman, 77 Ummayyids, 8, 101 , 255 United Nations and Kashmir, 80, Suhrawardy, Huseyn, 52 156, 195; UNDP study on NGOs Sukkur, 61 in Pakistan, 144-5; Human Rights Sunni Islam, 30; -Shia conflict, 249 Commission (Geneva), 200-1; Surush, Abd al-Karim, 9 Security Council, 169 , 151 Unionist Party in (British) Punjab, Swat, 119 54-6, 111 Syed, Anwar, 118 United Kingdom (UK), see also Syed, G. M., 45, 56, 60 under Britain, 2, 13 Sykes, Frederick, 80 UP Muslims, 42, 43, 113, 1176 Sylhet referendum (1947), 181 United States of America (US), and Symon, Alexander, 183 Kashmir, 186-7, 222; and South Symonds, John Richard, 78 Asia, 63-71; and South Asian Syria, 30, 219 nuclearization, 219; civil society, 125; Congress, 162, 226, 249; Tablighis, 25 Department of Commerce, 240; Tajikistan, 16, 35; Tajiks, 193 Department of Education, 237-8; Taliban, 119, 251; and Mazar-i- Department of State, 30, 222, 225, Sharif, 214-5; in Kabul, 200; 234; Education Foundation in international recognition, 214 Pakistan (USEFP), 225, 237-40; Tamils, 35, 153 foreign policy, 215, 232, 252; Tarbela Dam, 235 Fulbright-Hays Act (1961), 225; Tarar, Rafiq, 139 government, 84; Information Taylor, A. J.P., 43 Service (USIS/USIA) and IVP, Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-J a' afria 224, 225, 227-33; international (TNFJ), 115, 118 students, 232; Near Eastern Thackeray, Bal, 48 Bureau of the Department of Thatcher, Margaret, 164, 227 State, 234; New World Order, 31, Third World, xv, 133, 166, 216-17; 216-17; -Pakistan alliances, 70-1, debilitation, 30-1 74, 247; -Pakistan security rela• Thompson, Edward, 77, 80 tions, 166-7, 249; Peace Corps Tilak, B. G., 50 Program, 242; policy on CTBT, The Times, 76, 77 222; policies and Muslim anger, Toynbee, Arnold, 76 249; policies towards the Muslim Transfer of Power series, 44 world, 10; Pressler Amendment, Truman Doctrine, 233 166-7; pressure and India, 195; Tsarist empire, 31 public diplomacy, 220-7; public Tufts, 224 diplomacy and Pakistan, 220-49; Tully, Mark, 187 PL 480, 233; Republican Tunisia, 247 Administration in the 1980s, 206; Turkey, 2, 6, 26, 28, 105; eviction -USSR/Soviet relations, 34, from Europe, 76; military, 22; 69-71,233 Rifah Party, 104 University of California, Berkeley, Turks, 23 233,242 Two-Nation Theory, 131 Urdu, 15,42,80,97; Urdu Encyclopedia of Islam, 241 Umma/Ummah, 8, 24, 29, 33, 34, 46, USAID, 225, 233; and NGOs, 234; 360 Index

USAID- continued media and Islam, 26; models of and Pakistani elite, 234-6; democracy, 4, 113; monotheisms, Baluchistan Area Development 104; Muslims, 258; Pakistanis, Project (BALAD), 235; in 248; paradigms of social sciences, Pakistan, 233-7 112-13, 110; particularism, 16; Usman, the Pious Caliph, 7-8 politics, 100; powers, 5, 27, 31, 32, 152, 159, 262; powers and Bosnia, Vajpai, Atal B., 48 29, 252; societies, xv, 21, 27, 250; Verdict on India, The, 77, 79-80 thought, 27; threat, 16; univer• Vienna, 23 sities, 4; view of diversity, 25; Vietnam, 240 world, 21 VOA, 84, 88, 223, 225, 226, 228; Westernization, xvi, 38, 258; of Urdu and Pashto Services, 228 Pakistanis, 248 Wickham, W. R. L., 91 Wahabi Movement, 9 Williams, Rushbrook, 86 Waheed, Saima, 141 Wint, Guy, 66-7 Waiz, Mir, 180 Wirsing, Robert, 68 Wanchoo, H. N., 196 Wisner, Frank, 198, 222 Washington, DC, 161-2 Wolpert, Stanley, 246 Washington Post on Kashmir, 195 Women's Action Forum (WAF), Watt, Montgomery, 4 144 Wattoo, Manzoor, 52 Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, 225 West, xix; Europeans, 166; and World Bank, 129 Indo-Pakistan relations, 63-71; Wright, Robin, 107 and (in) Islam, 26, 31-2, 250, 254; Europe, 14 Yale, 93 Western(ized) academics, 9; Yugoslavia, 217 analysts and the Soviet threat, 32; Yusuf, Mir Waiz, 180 Asia, xviii, 62, 74, 219; civilization, 14, 23, 24, 31, 32, 39, 127; civiliza• Zalm-e-Pakhtun, 59 tion and Pakistan, 90; Zetland, Lord, 77 conservatism, 20; dominance, xvi, Zia-ul-Haq, 6, 80, 115, 229; and xix, 11, 136; domination of the Afghanistan, 213-14; and the Muslim world, 9, 29, 258; elite, xv, Pakistani constitution, 210-11; 10, 29; financial institutions, xv; and women, 140-1; and Z. A. governments, xvii hegemony, 9, Bhutto, 205-7; Hudood 18, 107; hostility towards Islam, Ordinances, 120; Islamization, 26; imperialism, 104; indifference 204-6 to Islam, 15; intellectuals, 11, 18; , 33 intelligence, 165; liberalism, 30; Zira subdivision in 1947, 65 liberals, 13, 254; media, 3, 9;