Issue 63, 4th Quarter 2011

FUTURE OF DEFENSE

CYBER STRATEGY 2011 ESSAY CONTEST WINNERS

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Inside Issue 63, 4th Quarter 2011

Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 Letters to the Editor Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. In Memoriam: How General John Shalikashvili “Paid It Forward” to Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 4 500,000 Others By Andrew Marble Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Visual Design Editor Tara J. Parekh Forum Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich 6 Executive Summary Design Jon Raedeke, Jamie Harvey, Chris Dunham, U.S. Government Printing Office 8 An Interview with Norton A. Schwartz The Looming Crisis in Defense Planning By Paul K. Davis and Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 13 Peter A. Wilson by 21 Thoughts on Force Design in an Era of Shrinking Defense Budgets By Douglas A. Macgregor

NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Linking Military Service Budgets to Commander Priorities cross-component, professional military and 30 academic publishing house. It publishes books, By Mark A. Gallagher and M. Kent Taylor journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national 38 Harnessing America’s Power: A U.S. National Security Structure for the security strategy, defense policy, interagency 21st Century By Peter C. Phillips and Charles S. Corcoran cooperation, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. 47 The Limits of Tailored Deterrence By Sean P. Larkin This is the official U.S. Department of Defense Special Feature edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without Estonia: Cyber Window into the Future of NATO By Häly Laasme permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 58 Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever Stuxnet and Strategy: A Special Operation in Cyberspace? By Lukas Milevski material is quoted from or based on its content. 64 70 Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack By Gary D. Brown COMMUNICATIONS Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Essay Contests Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more Winners of the 2011 Writing Competitions on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of 74 JFQ articles, and access to many other useful 76 Enduring Attraction: America’s Dependence On and Need to Secure Its NDU Press publications. Constructive com- Supply of Permanent Magnets By Justin C. Davey ments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial communications to the 84 The Empire’s Newest New Clothes: Overrating China By Steve Coonen link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 92 U.S.-China Relations: No Need to Fight By Daniel S. Larsen National Defense University Press 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Commentary Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 95 Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan By Alexs Thompson Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 102 Vietnam and Iraq: Learning from the Past? By Brent C. Bankus and Email: [email protected] James Kievit JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu

4th Quarter, October 2011 ISSN 1070-0692 Features PUBLISHER GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA Read, Think, Write: Keys to 21st-century Security Leadership 110 PRESIDENT, NDU By James G. Stavridis VADM Ann E. Rondeau, USN Understanding Strategic Thinking and Developing Strategic Thinkers 113 ADVISORY COMMITTEE By Douglas E. Waters Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces Col Michael F. Belcher, USMC Marine Corps War College Pulling Back the Curtain: Developing Strategic Thinkers at ICAF LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., USA U.S. Army Command and 120 General Staff College By Mark McGuire RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist By Scott A. Carpenter Brig Gen Stephen T. Denker, USAF Air Command and Staff College 125 LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC The Joint Staff Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet By Michael J. Grismer, Jr. VADM William E. Gortney, USN The Joint Staff 132 Brig Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College Recall RADM Douglas J. McAneny, USN National War College MG Gregg F. Martin, USA U.S. Army War College Col Royal P. Mortenson, USMC Marine Corps Command and 140 Operation Enduring Freedom X: CJTF–82 and the Future of COIN Staff College By R.D. Hooker, Jr. John A. Nagl Center for a New American Security VADM Daniel T. Oliver, USN (Ret.) Naval Postgraduate School Book Reviews ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command Maj Gen (select) Joseph S. Ward, Jr., USAF Joint Forces Staff College Clausewitz Reconsidered 148 EDITORIAL BOARD Reviewed by Douglas Peifer Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Beer, Bacon and Bullets 149 Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Reviewed by Tiffany G. Petros COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College 150 Dangerous Times? Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar and Cyber War Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College 151 Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Review essay by Brian R. Salmans Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Joint Doctrine Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College 153 Command Relationships By George E. Katsos James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense Col Troy S. Thomas, USAF The Joint Staff 156 Improving Joint Fires for Special Operations: A Mandate for the Joint Force LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Fires Coordinator By Michael Wastila CONTRIBUTIONS Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. ABOUT THE COVERS Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Cover: F−15E Strike Eagle is refueled by KC−10A Extender during Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal Operation Odyssey Dawn (Tyler Placie/U.S. Air Force). Table of designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security contents (left to right): Soldiers navigate rice paddies and cornfields policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; on combat patrol in Alingar District, Afghanistan (Ryan Crane/U.S. and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to Air Force); Sailor mans primary flight control system during flight meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. operations aboard USS Ronald Reagan in Indian Ocean (Shawn J. Stewart/U.S. Navy); Marines return Afghan boy to his village aboard The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the V−22 Osprey after treatment at Camp Bastion medical center (Charles contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of T. Mabry II/U.S. Marine Corps); and Airman prepares to swap engine the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. on KC−135R Stratotanker (Ken Johnson/U.S. Air Force). ndupress.ndu.edu LETTERS

To the Editor— In “Who Is a Member of the expertise” is, and how one would know when ■■ achieving and maintaining courage, Military Profession?” (JFQ 62, 3d Quarter the Army NCO corps (or any other profes- candor, competence, commitment, and 2011), Colonel Matthew Moten, USA, brings sional enlisted force) has achieved specialized compassion. up some valuable points in his discussion expertise, and by whose standards. Is there of the professionalization of career enlisted an established peak or defined scale by which If this is what is expected from the NCO Servicemembers, but it would be useful to one measures individual or group progress, corps, one would have to measure against know his data points. His final arguments other than to say, “You are progressing”? It these tasks to determine when expertise has are directed at the noncommissioned officer seems that comment would be nebulous at been achieved. Of course, if the problem is (NCO) corps (not petty officers), so I would best considering that Colonel Moten never that these are not the correct 10 functions of like to know if his data are based on his seems to point out anything where the Army the NCO Support channel, that is an entirely experiences across the Services, or mainly NCO corps lacks specialized expertise. Nor different discussion, which is not addressed in based on his observations and study within his does he contrast how other groups have Colonel Moten’s article. own branch. mastered specialized expertise over the I believe recent developments in the Though observant of and an occasional NCO corps. Army NCOs draw their skills, Army NCO corps have mostly negated the researcher of other Services’ use of their pro- knowledge, and attitudes from policies that remainder of his argument. We recently fessional enlisted forces, I speak only about lay out their roles and responsibilities. I try celebrated the second year of the Institute the modern U.S. Army NCO corps when to use Army Command Policy and Proce- for Noncommissioned Officer Profes- addressing Colonel Moten’s point that “their dures (Army Regulation [AR] 600–20) as a sional Development (INCOPD), which is [the NCO corps] professionalization is incom- guideline, which has been influenced by a dedicated to the advancement of professional plete in the areas of formal and theoretical successive group of Army leaders who have military education for NCOs. Additionally, education, accumulation of specialized exper- laid out the responsibilities of the NCO corps the Command Sergeant Major Corps was tise, and autonomous jurisdiction over a body vis-à-vis the NCO Support channel. A quick entrusted with leading the development and of professional knowledge. The NCO corps look shows the current 10 functions of the education of NCOs with the appointment of is professionalizing, but not yet professional.” NCO Support channel as: an enlisted Commandant of the Sergeants I understand that this assertion is not the Major Academy. Recent efforts—such as same as stating the “NCO corps is unprofes- ■■ transmitting, instilling, and ensuring the INCOPD program of life-long learning, sional,” which one could easily and incorrectly the efficacy of the professional Army ethic structured self-development (SSD), and career conclude. I imagine a parallel could be drawn ■■ planning and conducting the day-to- tracker—bridge “the operational and institu- with the theory that an individual found not day unit operations within prescribed policies tional domains of Army training for enlisted guilty of a crime is not saying he is innocent. and directives Soldiers. From Private to Command Sergeant I would suggest that the Army began ■■ training of enlisted Soldiers in their Major, SSD will ensure learning is continuous professionalizing its NCO corps in October Military Occupational Specialty as well as in and enduring.” 1975 when the Deputy Chief of Staff for Per- the basic skills and attributes of a Soldier My last point is on the concern of a lack sonnel started phasing in the Enlisted Profes- ■■ supervising unit physical fitness train- of “autonomous jurisdiction over a body of sional Management System (EPMS). Before ing and ensuring that unit Soldiers comply professional knowledge.” I suggest the triad of that, career programs for enlisted Soldiers were with the weight and appearance standards of the Sergeant Major of the Army, the NCO-led spotty at best, and most have heard the story AR 600–9 and AR 670–1 Sergeants Major Academy, and INCOPD, that a Soldier’s stripes resided in the regiment. ■■ teaching Soldiers the history of the under the direction of the U.S. Army Training If an NCO were to move, it was often at a loss Army, to include military customs, courtesies, and Doctrine Command’s Command Ser- of rank. Not only was EPMS a major jumpstart and traditions geant Major, fills the bill for the “autonomous to professionalizing the enlisted force, but 3 ■■ caring for individual Soldiers and jurisdiction,” but in a hierarchical organiza- years earlier, an NCO college had been created: their families, both on and off duty tion such as the Army, who truly self-governs the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. I ■■ teaching Soldiers the mission of the or acts independently? I suggest those three would be curious as to what length Colonel unit and developing individual training pro- positions act autonomously as a platoon leader Moten went through to evaluate the current grams to support the mission on patrol or a company commander maneu- curriculum in determining the breadth and ■■ accounting for and maintaining indi- vering his forces. width of the sergeant major course, par- vidual arms and equipment of enlisted Sol- ticularly in how it relates to his definition of diers and unit equipment under their control —Daniel K. Elder “formal and theoretical education.” ■■ administering and monitoring the Command Sergeant Major, USA (Ret.) One would have to ask what the NCO professional development program, and measure of the “attainment of specialized other unit training programs

2 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu To the Editor— I applaud Colonel Matthew the title of our article, that is a matter for in nuanced analysis of globally motivated Moten’s effort to define who is a member of him to take up directly with the editors of violent nonstate actors such as al Qaeda (not the military profession (“Who Is a Member of JFQ and not us!) to mention nonkinetic threats such as the the Military Profession?” JFQ 62, 3d Quarter As for the remark that irregular Muslim Brotherhood). For a modest rework- 2011), but I am concerned that his definition is warfare is solely conducted by irregular ing of Clausewitz’s “wondrous trinity” for use too historically based (it is probably an occu- threat groups, I think SEAL Team Six, the in the current threat environment, Mr. Owens pational hazard). heroes of Abbottabad, would strenuously could refer to my piece entitled “The Age of The future security requirements of disagree. Irregular warfare describes a type Irregular Warfare: So What?” (JFQ 58, 3d the Nation demand a broader definition that of warfare, not just a type of actor. (This is Quarter 2010). includes civilians. For example, the intelli- in fact recognized in the official Department Finally, General Sherman did indeed gence field has many civilians educated at the of Defense Joint Operating Concept for also state that “war is war.” However, our National Defense Intelligence College who are Irregular Warfare.) analysis was not focused on civil wars actively participating in military operations. With regard to our discussion of (which fall under a special category all their Is the person who identifies the target any less irregular versus regular or conventional own), but on the unique challenge posed a part of the process than a person who pulls warfare, the main point was not simply to by nonstate actors such as al Qaeda or the the trigger? Most modern enemies would not note that irregular warfare occurs three Taliban. That is why General Ospina’s stop to differentiate as strictly as the colonel times as much as regular conflict but to version of the phrase was chosen, given that seems to want. illuminate what the word regular implies he is recognized as dealing the death blow I remember General George Joulwan’s and how it distorts development of doctrine to the FARC of Colombia—a threat that far motto for the Bosnian operations: “One Team, and planning for future capabilities. Surely, more resembles the numerous challenges One Fight.” Recently, civilian instructors from if history demonstrates conclusively—as the that the United States faces today than do Fort Leavenworth demonstrated this again Correlates of War Database proves—that the forces of the Confederate South. by deploying to U.S. Africa Command for nations most often go to war with nonstate involvement in recent contingency planning. actors, then this reality should be reflected —Dr. Sebastian L.v. Gorka As Colonel Moten notes, the military profes- in not only how we think about war, but also sion is a lifelong calling, and I would add that how we prepare for it. This is far beyond it is a broad-based collegial effort. semantics. I am mystified by Mr. Owen’s —James Crick comment, “I am struggling to think of any Instructor, useful description of warfare ‘based on U.S. Army Command and putative generational changes in warfare General Staff College or the asymmetry of combatants’ that is in common use.” Really? A casual Google search for the terms fourth generation To the Editor— I write in response to warfare and asymmetric warfare generates William F. Owen’s letter (JFQ 61, 2d Quarter 126,000 and 656,000 hits, respectively (and 2011) regarding my article co-authored that is without using quotation marks to with David Kilcullen in JFQ 60 (“An limit the search). In fact, both the U.S. Army Actor-centric Theory of War: Understand- and Department of Defense have organic ing the Difference Between COIN and elements that use the phrase asymmetric Counterinsurgency”). warfare in their official titles. Our analysis is indeed built upon a While I too am a great admirer of the taxonomy of warfare rather than a new strategic master Colin Gray, he must be recog- theory of warfare. However, we never pur- nized as planted firmly in the Clausewitzian ported to provide the latter, but simply to camp, a fact the good professor openly admits. open the debate on a new theory that better All I would suggest is that since the Prussian reflects the realities of conflict in a decid- master himself only devoted five pages of his edly post-Westphalian world. (Alas, authors On War to the topic of irregular warfare—and rarely choose the titles for their work; that was not a great fan of it at all—his work is is in the purview of the all-mighty Editor, of most general application in the interstate so if Mr. Owen feels hard-done-by given arena of war and has decidedly limited use

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 3 DOD (Russell Roederer)

General John M.D. Shalikashvili, USA IN MEMORIAM

How General John Shalikashvili “Paid It Forward” to 500,000 Others

By ANDREW MARBLE

he world lost a great warrior- at the time, told the audience that General Lieutenant General Shalikashvili, who was diplomat with the recent Shalikashvili had “worked a miracle” in serving in Germany at the time, was tapped passing of General John northern Iraq. by SACEUR General John Galvin, USA, to Malchase David Shalikash- Indeed, a miracle was required. For head this massive rescue attempt. General T Shalikashvili had a reputation as an intelli- vili, USA. The General will likely be most it was a crisis of epic proportions that had remembered for his tenures as Chairman arisen in northern Iraq in April 1991. Over gent, hardworking, and low-key officer skilled of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) from 500,000 Iraqi Kurds—men, women, and in diplomacy and logistics. 1993–1997, as Supreme Allied Commander children—were trapped in the inhospitable The choice was even more fitting Europe (SACEUR) from 1992–1993, and mountains along the Turkish border. They because General Shalikashvili understood as Assistant to CJCS General Colin Powell had been chased out of the Iraqi lowlands what it was like to be a refugee. He was born from 1991–1992. Notable as well is General by the Iraqi military. It was payback for a in Warsaw, Poland, in 1936 to refugee parents Shalikashvili’s distinction as the first failed Kurdish attempt to overthrow Saddam who had fled the Russian Revolution. After draftee, the first immigrant, and the first Hussein in the immediate aftermath of the the violent Warsaw Uprising of 1944—which graduate of Officer Candidate School to rise first Gulf War. Barred from crossing the the family survived by hiding in cellars and to the position of Chairman. border by a fearful Turkey, and expecting scurrying through sewer pipes—he too Yet among his many achievements, it that they would be shot or even gassed if they became a refugee. The Shalikashvilis fled was Operation Provide Comfort—the first returned home, the Kurds were in dire straits. westward to Germany, their train coming major international humanitarian crisis ever Subject to the harsh mountain elements and under Allied air attack along the way. They tasked to the U.S. military—that was General lacking food, water, sanitation, and shelter, settled in the Bavarian village of Pappenheim, Shalikashvili’s defining moment. the refugees were dying at a rate of about At a 1992 ceremony awarding the 1,000 per day. Dr. Andrew Marble is currently writing a biography General his fourth star prior to being pro- The United States responded by of General John Shalikashvili. A preview of the moted to SACEUR, General Powell, CJCS launching Operation Provide Comfort. Then- biography is available at www.shalibiography.com.

4 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu where they were supported by the kindness of being,” one who “understood what it was to be David Halberstam fittingly wrote that relatives and assistance from the International a refugee.” General Shalikashvili had “an immigrant’s Refugee Organization. The Shalikashvilis And indeed, many times during the special appreciation for America and a belief were able to emigrate to the United States in operation, General Shalikashvili would visit that this country, not just in the eyes of its 1952 with the help of distant relatives who the Kurdish camps. As he strolled among the own citizens, but in the eyes of much of the provided sponsorship, a safe ocean passage, makeshift tents, he would seek out the refugee world, was the place the least fortunate turned housing, jobs, and even college scholar- ships. These benefactors “didn’t know us from beans,” General Shalikashvili would General Shalikashvili jerry-rigged a miracle, later recall. bringing an end to the suffering and death Almost four decades later, this former World War II refugee found himself at a tem- porary command headquarters in Incirlik, children, particularly the orphans. They would to as the court of last resort.” When the crisis Turkey, faced with the herculean task of res- chat together—and laugh. Asked once about in the Iraqi mountains occurred, the General cuing these 500,000 Gulf War refugees. those visits to the camps, the General replied, thus willingly answered the call. All his lead- What a complex operation it would be. “When you see youngsters who are muddy and ership gifts were called into play, but it was Over 35,000 soldiers from 13 countries and dirty and near death, and then see them a few with a heart attuned to the refugee plight, a volunteers from over 50 nongovernmental weeks later cleaned up and playing and feeling sense of indebtedness to past benefactors, and organizations (NGOs) would be involved. like kids again—if you walk away from that the desire to pay it forward to 500,000 others How does one coordinate so many national without your heart beating fast, then you are that General Shalikashvili “worked a miracle” armies or coax mutually distrustful sol- made out of something different than I am.” in northern Iraq. JFQ diers and NGO workers to cooperate? Just imagine overseeing the largest airdrop in history, one that exceeded even the scope of the Berlin Airlift. There was also the General Shalikashvili monitors logistical task of quickly building temporary progress of humanitarian airlift to refugee camps and way-stations, and then Goma, Zaire, 1994 undertaking the delicate diplomatic mission

of convincing tribal leaders to urge the (Andy Dunasway) U.S. Air Force Kurds to return home. Moreover, there was the challenge of keeping the Iraqi troops at bay, requiring equal parts diplomacy and displays of raw military power. Shalikashvili adroitly directed all of this—and in the critical glare of the international media spotlight. There was no blueprint to follow for this unprecedented operation. It could have turned out to be a nightmare, but somehow General Shalikashvili jerry-rigged a miracle, bringing an end to the suffering and death and persuading 500,000 Kurds to willingly return to their homes in Iraq in an astonish- ingly short 90 days. No wonder Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon Sullivan would later liken General Shalikashvili to the great jazz improvisational artist Dave Brubeck: highly trained in the classical approach but able to operate successfully, almost magically, in new conceptual territory. What deep motivations might have inspired General Shalikashvili to such a vir- tuoso performance of leadership? At the ceremony where General Sha- likashvili received his fourth star, General Powell had also lauded him for being “not only a gifted leader but a sensitive human ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 5 Executive Summary

oint Force Quarterly has succeeded But jointness is not a science, U.S. Air Force (Andrew Rodier) over the years due in no small part it is surely not static, and the to the mentoring of its publisher, march is by no means over. We the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of need this journal, we need it J to be open-minded, and above Staff. This issue is the last produced under the leadership of Admiral Mike Mullen, who all it must be accessible. When has been a constant source of support for our you think back to General Billy work and that of our contributors. JFQ will Mitchell’s frustrating crusade General John M. Shalikashvili greets resident in Kaposvar, remain, as he and each of his predecessors to educate the Armed Forces Hungary, during Operation Joint Endeavor, January 1996 intended, a forum for open and frank discus- about the dawn of airpower, sion of those issues that matter to the joint General George Marshall’s tireless efforts to today and tomorrow, everyone—in Congress, force. We wish Admiral Mullen fair winds form a unified military establishment, or the the Department of Defense, and the Active, and following seas. more recent efforts by our own Congress—in Reserve, and civilian components—has a We open this issue by noting the passing the face of considerable military stubborn- key role to play. Only by working together of the 13th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ness—to formulate and pass the Goldwater- in a spirit of cooperation can we realize the General John Shalikashvili, USA. His family Nichols Act, it only emphasizes why we need greatness the Nation expects and deserves has approved an in-depth article on his JFQ. There is always room for improvement in the new century.” As General Shali would service that we will publish in a future issue. and there is a ceaseless challenge to adjust to have expected, JFQ will continue to support Every Chairman since General Colin Powell new developments. contributors who seek to explore ideas for has championed the mission of JFQ and joint the future of the joint force and the world in professional military education (JPME). In the past four years alone, our Armed Forces which it operates. General Shalikashvili supported General participated in 29 major joint operations. This issue’s Forum debuts a series of Powell’s vision for 15 issues of JFQ (nos. 2–16), Each and every one has been different. They interviews with the Joint Chiefs by talking helping to cement the journal’s place as a plat- have ranged from a large-scale conventional with General Norton Schwartz, U.S. Air Force form for discussion of matters of substance war in the Gulf through the embargo pressures Chief of Staff. General Schwartz has logged for the joint force. In his first column, General we are even now applying against the dictators more joint time than any of his fellow chiefs Shalikashvili had these thoughts: holding Haiti in their grip. Withal there are and has a unique perspective on the Air Force countless new lessons and observations which and on the joint force of today and tomorrow. There are no boundaries on who should impact on the future of jointness. At the same In addition, the Forum presents five be writing for this journal. Napoleon was time, literally hundreds of possible reforms, articles by authors with different views on the a young and relatively unseasoned officer criticisms, and suggestions are percolating future of national security, force structure, when his brain was forming the electrifying inside the think tanks that ring Washington, and defense strategy. First, RAND researchers ideas that would revolutionize warfare and within our own Congress, and between Paul Davis and Peter Wilson discuss the near- overpower nearly every army in Europe. A ourselves. They need to be explored, their term crisis in defense planning and stress “the little over a century later, a young, medically strengths assessed, and their warts exposed. need for vigorous and competitive exploration discharged captain named Liddell-Hart was We have to distinguish between those worth and competition of ideas.” Next, Douglas struggling to get Britain’s senior military embracing and those that are dysfunctional Macgregor offers an insightful concept that he leaders to hear his controversial views on or risky. believes would meet most of the constraints warfare. Unfortunately, his own military Davis and Wilson discuss: the fielding of a wouldn’t listen, but its future enemy did. In his last column, General Shalikashvili force design “structured and equipped for When it comes to good ideas, neither rank nor discussed the results of the recently published dispersed, mobile warfare inside an integrated age confers a monopoly. inaugural Quadrennial Defense Review maneuver-strike-intelligence, surveillance, Report, which was featured in that edition. reconnaissance (ISR)-sustainment complex JFQ is intended to stay at the vanguard, to The Chairman gave support to continuing to that combines the Nation’s ground maneuver raise and air controversies, to tell us what we work on the issues of the day, as the report sig- forces with strike, ISR, and sustainment capa- don’t understand. Since World War II, we naled the need for serious reform within the bilities from all of the Services.” Built with have moved a long way toward jointness. It Department of Defense (DOD). His closing joint command and control as a basis, this has been a prolonged march, punctuated by words in the column were just as powerful design is seen by Colonel Macgregor as best occasional disagreements, but ushered by a then as they are today and serve as a reminder able to adapt rapidly to the range of potential recognition that unity is dangerous as a bat- of what JFQ supports as we go forward: “To engagements our joint and coalition forces tlefield advantage over disunited opponents. achieve the goal of a trained and ready force will encounter across the spectrum of warfare.

6 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ELIASON

Two members of the Air Staff’s Studies As always, we are pleased to present the University students his keys to successful stra- and Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons three winning essays from the 2011 Secretary tegic leadership. Continuing on the strategic Learned Division, Mark Gallagher and Kent of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs leadership theme, we offer three JPME-related Taylor, suggest a new method to evaluate of Staff Essay Contests. The Secretary of articles and one piece that focuses on how to alignment of the DOD budget with combatant Defense Essay Contest winner, Colonel Justin go forward in the area of strategic airlift. On command operational requirements. Galla- Davey, USAF, provides an in-depth look at the JPME front, Captain Doug Waters, U.S. gher and Taylor provide insights on how their one of the strategic ingredients of our national Navy faculty member at the U.S. Army War proposal could be implemented while identi- security: permanent magnets. The winners College, presents how war colleges should fying the advantages and risks in doing so. of both categories in the Chairman’s contest develop strategic thinkers, a critical require- Next, two 2011 National War College capitalized on a theme prevalent among this ment that has come under some fire of late. graduates, Commander Peter Phillips, USN, year’s entrants. Steve Coonen, of the Office Mark McGuire from the Industrial College and Colonel Charles Corcoran, USAF, provide of the Secretary of Defense, assesses China of the Armed Forces provides his college’s a new approach to the U.S. national security as less of a concern to our security than approach to the same problem. Commander structure that seeks to solve the continuing many would have us believe, and Colonel Scott Carpenter suggests that DOD identify problem of achieving an efficient and effective Daniel Larsen, USA, tells us that we should and implement a specific career management coordinated executive branch response to a not demonize China but keep monitoring plan for joint professionals, a plan he sees as national crisis. The final Forum article, by their progress in all aspects, not just military necessary to strengthen our joint organiza- recent Naval War College graduate Colonel capability, while continuing to be engaged tions. The reader can be the judge of the Sean Larkin, USAF, takes on the issue of “tai- at all levels of their society and maintain the merits of each case, and in future editions, we lored deterrence,” arguing that this concept traditional balance of power in the region. look forward to continuing and expanding and our current joint doctrine are out of step The Commentary section has a pair this discussion on JPME. Finally, Lieutenant with the canon of existing deterrence theory. of interesting works that should add to our Colonel Michael Grismer, USAF, offers an article on how best to increase our airlift with more creative and cost-effective use of the F−16s return to Aviano Air Base, Italy, after mission supporting Operation Odyssey Dawn Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The Recall section is back, offering an interesting recent history article on Afghani- stan by Colonel R.D. Hooker, USA (Ret.), of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense College, who details his experiences in and evaluates the impact of Combined Joint Task Force–82. Rounding out this issue are four engaging book reviews along with J7’s joint doctrine update and an important discussion on doctrine from Lieutenant Colonel Mark Wastila, USMCR, who presents a well-reasoned approach of how to improve joint fires support to special operations. We are planning to offer more book reviews on the NDU Press Web site to keep readers up to

U.S. Army (Tierney P. Wilson) U.S. Army (Tierney P. date on new publications in a timelier fashion than a quarterly journal can allow. The Special Feature addresses the reflection of the impact of operations in At Joint Force Quarterly, we continue to growing number of issues associated with Afghanistan and Iraq. University of Chicago work hard at bringing you the best ideas for cyber warfare. The first of three offerings is doctoral student Alexs Thompson, who is and from the joint force for your consider- from Häly Laasme, who provides a look into currently working for the Army’s Directed ation and discussion. We also congratulate the Estonia’s role in the development, adequacy, Studies Office, provides a good look at how 2011 Secretary of Defense and Chairman of and implementation of the North Atlantic to address the religious portion of relating the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Contest winners Treaty Organization cyber defense policy. to Afghan culture. Brent Bankus and James and hope to see great things develop from The next two articles tackle the Stuxnet virus Kievit of the U.S Army War College have their work. Each author has readily demon- attack on Iran last year. Lukas Milevski, a developed a useful assessment of the last strated that we can count on your support in doctoral student under the mentorship of 8-plus years in Iraq using the lens of the U.S. continuing to meet the Chairman’s intent of Professor Colin Grey, suggests the features experience in Vietnam. an energetic discussion of the matters that are of the Stuxnet attack mirror a special opera- In the Features section, we lead off with important to the joint force. We look forward tion in cyberspace. Finally, Colonel Gary a “keeper” from Admiral James Stavridis, a to hearing from you. JFQ Brown, USA, assesses Iran’s view of last year’s National War College class of 1992 graduate, cyber attack. who offered the incoming National Defense —William T. Eliason, Editor ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 7 U.S. Air Force

General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force

An Interview with Norton A. Schwartz

JFQ: When you talk to the public and without the threat of attack from above by other side. So ISR in all of its dimensions— Congress, how do you describe the Air Force an adversary. It is fundamental to the way overhead, air-breathing, multiple sensors, et role in implementing U.S. national security we operate as a joint team, and it is clear that cetera—and, more importantly, the capacity policy? What unique capabilities does the Air this will be an enduring capability for the Air to digest that data stream and turn that [intel- Force bring to the table? Force going forward. ligence] product into useful information are Second is intelligence, surveillance, and enduring capabilities. General Schwartz: I think there are reconnaissance [ISR], and clearly that’s been The third area clearly is lift—the capac- essentially four things that I would describe as an ascendant capability in the last 10 years as ity to get shooters to the fight, and to extend enduring qualities of our Air Force—things we have transitioned from general purpose the range of those platforms that do the airlift that are relevant now and will be relevant in force/major force engagement scenarios to mission and the platforms that conduct strike the future. what I would characterize as the more man- missions as well. So the lift part of this, as well One is what I would call domain hunting kind of role that we currently have. as the air refueling piece, is a key part of what control, and that applies both in the air and We also now apply our ISR capabilities more we do for the joint team. in space, and to some degree, in cyberspace often in direct support to small units on the Finally, global strike is something as well. That is securing some part of these battlefield, so that when these small units go that is almost unique to the Air Force, and domains so that the other members of the around the corner, through a window, or over it manifests itself in a number of different joint team can accomplish their missions a wall, they’re not surprised by what’s on the ways. Fundamentally, this is about being able to reach out to put targets at risk, wher- ever they may be on the planet. That has Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., Editor of Joint Force Quarterly, interviewed both deterrent effects and clearly warfight- General Schwartz at his Pentagon office. ing implications as well.

8 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHWARTZ

There’s also another capability impor- the ones that have gained the most attention periods of more intense collaboration than tant to this, and that is how we command and as these conflicts have unfolded—although at other times. It’s been what I would char- control those four enduring features of our both the Navy and Air Force have made not- acterize as ad hoc—certainly positive—but Air Force. We have the capacity to command inconsequential contributions to battlefield not at a consistent level. So one of the things and control the tools that we have at our dis- activity, to be sure. that [Admiral] Gary Roughead [Chief of posal on a scale that is something others don’t However, the Libya scenario is a differ- Naval Operations], [General James] Conway approach. So that too is an important feature. ent one. Here’s a case where it’s a much more [Commandant of the Marine Corps] at the Again, I would say command and air-centric campaign, and we naturally gain time, [General James] Amos [Commandant control, ISR, lift, domain control, and global more attention there than does the Army of the Marine Corps] now, and I decided to strike are the features of an Air Force like or Marine Corps—although we’re certainly do, recognizing that the Navy and Air Force ours, and which are required now in the grateful that in the early days, the Marine are the two Services with global perspective, kinds of irregular warfare fights that we’ve Corps helped rescue one of our aviators. was to cooperate routinely in the global been in during the last 10 years or so, and will But it’s a team sport. It’s all about trust and commons. Access to the global commons is be required in other fights that we might see confidence and keeping promises. As a team, vital to the country for both strategic and in the future. we have come to rely upon one another to a national security reasons, but also economic greater degree than ever before. Regardless of reasons, so we concluded we needed to col- JFQ: For several years, the Air Force Service, there is a level of confidence that, if laborate at a different level. has been operating closely with its joint team- someone promises he will be there to deliver AirSea Battle really came about in three mates in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the an effect that’s essential for another member dimensions. One is the institutional dimen- Air Force’s role has not always been front and of the team to accomplish his mission, it will sion to normalize this collaboration—make center. What can you tell our readers about happen or we’ll die trying. That continues to it not an episodic thing but something that the Service’s involvement in these conflicts, be our ethic, and it certainly will continue to is much more routine between Marines, and how have they influenced your thinking be so in the future. Sailors, and Airmen at the headquarters level about future operations? on down. The second dimension was at the JFQ: You’ve joined forces with the Navy operational level. Clearly, the antiaccess/ General Schwartz: This isn’t about and Marine Corps to develop the AirSea area-denial environment is intensifying, and who gets the credit, and it’s clear that the Battle Concept. Why is this new concept this is an issue again for the Services on which campaigns that we’ve been in, at least in Iraq so important? the country depends a great deal for power and Afghanistan, have been largely ground- projection. So how do we at the operational focused. It shouldn’t be a surprise that the General Schwartz: The Air Force and level maximize our collective power projec- Army and Marine Corps are predominantly Navy have had, over the course of time, tion capability in a more systematic way? We

U.S. Air Force (Charles Larkin, Sr.)

General Schwartz speaks with Airmen about national defense and force management

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 9 FORUM | Interview have gone about this in a manner that I think is much more thoughtful. This is not so much about new systems as it is really about how we better employ what we have at our collective disposal for maximum effect.

While this may be a bit far-fetched, (Scott Ash) U.S. Air Force here is an example that gives you an idea of what we’re thinking about. There are funda- mentally two stealth platforms in the DOD [Department of Defense] portfolio. Clearly, the Air Force has one of them with the B–2. Clearly, the Navy has one of them with their fleet of submarines. It’s something that I quite frankly had never thought much about and that we haven’t collectively given much thought to in the past: Is there a way for those two stealth capabilities in the defense port- folio to better reinforce one another? Maybe there’s not, but this kind of thinking has potential to make better use of the resources we do have at our disposal and to moderate those capabilities out there that have the potential of making power projection a higher risk proposition for our country. Finally, the third piece of how we are approaching AirSea Battle is on the acquisi- tion side. I would argue that a good example is Global Hawk for the Air Force and the BAMS [Broad Area Maritime Surveillance] program for the Navy. We’re using essentially the same platform; the only difference really is the sensor: one for an environment largely maritime-focused, and one for us largely overland-focused. But why should the Navy and Air Force have two different depots? Why should the Navy and Air Force even have different training pipelines or base such similar systems at different locations? So part General Schwartz is interviewed at his Pentagon office of AirSea Battle is to make sure that, in those areas where we are clearly in the same space, we are making the best use of our resources— General Schwartz: This is an imma- full potential. That is the vision for Cyber common ground stations, common training, ture area, and one in which there’s still a Command. common basing, common logistics supply great deal of uncertainty in terms of what Within the Air Force, we see this in two chain, et cetera, to the extent possible. our capacities are, what our legal authori- contexts. One, naturally, is defending our None of this is rocket science, but this ties are, and how we operate in peacetime network, and that’s not a trivial job. We’re is a level of institutional commitment that I versus wartime. Cyberspace is another one certainly focused on that. Second, there are don’t think has existed before. It will make of those areas where traditional geographic places for us to apply cyber in a more offensive a difference in preserving one of America’s boundaries don’t apply. There are probably context, but only in support of traditional strong suits: power projection. still more questions than answers here, but Air Force missions. For example, you could it is absolutely clear that we depend on our take down an air defense capability kineti- JFQ: JFQ recently featured an article cyber capabilities to orchestrate the tools of cally. We do that with F–16 CJs. We’ve done that suggested the need for better integration warfare and that cyber capabilities them- that recently in Libya. However, you might of cyber operations into the joint force com- selves have the potential of performing instead choose, for good reasons, to disrupt mander’s command and control. What is military missions. So this is why we now an air defense capability with electrons. It your assessment of the way ahead for cyber have a U.S. Cyber Command—to bring this will depend on the circumstances and the operations for the joint force? nascent capability, for which we don’t yet commander’s intent, but there is a place for have an end-to-end understanding, to its that. The Air Force is focusing on things that

10 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHWARTZ support traditional Air Force missions, and change their funding streams, making it dif- people expect. So we’re making sure that we not anything beyond that particular role. ficult to hold people accountable on both sides have the right people—the critical mass of of this, in both government and industry. human capital—in order to do this job well. JFQ: Having experienced lengthy and So the key things are requirements stability, We’re ensuring we manage this pool at times difficult times with Air Force acqui- resource stability, and, in between, more cost- as a key resource of our Air Force, and that sition of major platforms such as the F–22 consciousness on the part of both industry those who work in this area know that this and the new tanker aircraft, what lessons and government. is a profoundly important mission involving have you learned that can be applied to the Nation’s most lethal weapons and which achieve more timely fielding of capabilities JFQ: After a long period of decline requires a level of professionalism that leads in the future? marked by a number of incidents, the Air the force in many respects. We’re making Force took steps to restore the nuclear sure these folks know that we as an institu- General Schwartz: This is not some- enterprise. Can you give us a sense of where tion value that commitment and that we will thing that applies just to the Air Force, the Service’s contribution to nuclear forces reward that commitment. That’s why sustain- although we have had significant challenges stands today? ing the nuclear enterprise is our number-one in the area. I think there are three major priority—we cannot back off of that. Again, pieces to this. One is that we must have General Schwartz: The Air Force has I think this is a whole lot less about force requirement stability. Our discipline in this two of the three legs of the triad, and it is true structure. What it is really about is reassur- area has abated over the last 10 years. When that we went through a period when people ing people who do this demanding work that money is plentiful, discipline on require- questioned our competence in this important it’s worthy work, that it’s valued, and that it’s ments tends not to be as good as we’d like. mission area. So we went about repairing essential to the Nation’s security. One of the things we have done is to get our that by standing up Air Force Global Strike arms around what the drivers of capability Command on the operations side and estab- JFQ: Given the continuing pressures of are, and to make sure that if there are any lishing the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center the global economy and impacts of reductions changes, they are approved at the appropri- ate level. I’m the requirements officer for the Air Force. While I’m not as expert on the breadth of the requirements as some folks who focus on this every day, in the end, it is my responsibility along with the other Service chiefs. We have worked hard to discipline the requirements side of this, (Shelia deVera) U.S. Air Force and the KC–46/KC–X competition is a case in point. We didn’t wiggle, and we will not going forward. We have a [specification], we signed a contract, we have a contractor, and we’re going to buy the airplane that we spec’d. We’re not going to change require- ments, at least on the initial increment, because we can’t afford to. That brings on the second piece of this. The attribute of affordability has to have higher relevance in our acquisitions. I acknowledge that there are times when it doesn’t matter what it costs. The Osama bin General Schwartz presents Purple Heart to security forces officer at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan Laden mission is a case in point. But in acqui- sition, we’re going to increasingly be in a situ- ation where cost-consciousness will matter a for the sustainment of the nuclear enterprise. in the Federal budget, can you discuss what lot. The new Long-Range Strike platform is an But I think apart from the organizational measures you are considering in terms of example, where the Secretary of Defense has pieces, which were not unimportant, this is reductions or restructuring of Air Force per- said that cost will be an independent variable also a human capital question. Over time, sonnel, force structure, and operations, and for this acquisition program, or it won’t go. I for reasons that are understandable—I’m not their impact on your efforts at recapitalizing think that probably won’t be a unique circum- saying justified, but understandable—the the force? stance going forward. focus on the people who did this work dimin- Finally, I think there will be a need for ished. It is very demanding work. This is an General Schwartz: There’s going to stability in program funding. This is easier area where zero defects—perfection—is the be pressure, there’s going to be friction, and said than done. However, we ask a lot of standard. These people are under the micro- we’re going to have to make choices. We program managers, and then we sometimes scope all the time. That’s what the American recently worked through the DOD efficiency ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 11 FORUM | Interview

process to squeeze overhead and look for prior combatant commander has made me NEW excess, overlaps, duplication, and so on in a better Service chief. You understand the from NDU Press order to move about $33 billion from support demand side of the equation. You are part for the Institute for to mission-critical activities. Now we have of a network that the Service chiefs are not, National Strategic Studies additional targets. The trend lines are clear. given the division of labor in the Goldwater- The collective view of the Service chiefs is Nichols Act. Being selected as Air Force chief that we are not going to allow a return to the of staff was unexpected, but it has proven to period when the Armed Forces actually went be very valuable to have migrated through the hollow. We’re not going back there. You’ve COCOM [combatant commander] ranks to heard the Secretary of Defense say that we become a Service chief. may be a smaller force, but we’re going to Additionally, I was lucky enough to continue to be a superb force. That is the establish relationships and credibility with a bottom line on this, but we will probably have range of teammates over the years, and that to get smaller. certainly has proven valuable and helpful to We will not reduce manpower first, the Air Force in making the case that we’re however. We tried to do that some years ago all in and that the Air Force will do what- and discovered that it really didn’t save that ever’s necessary while people are dying in much money. We went from about 355,000 the current conflicts. There is a level of trust to 320,000, and it didn’t save a nickel that I think started out in the captain years, because the cost of personnel continued with Doug Brown, Pete Schoomaker, Eric Strategic Forum 270 to escalate. We have a ceiling right now of Olson, and lots of other people who are now about 332,000, and we will squeeze force doing important things for the country as structure before we squeeze manpower. well. We should all be proud of who we are Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army There are negotiations under way both and where we come from, but a reality is that in Central Africa for debt ceiling considerations and future as you become more senior, you have to be OMB [Office of Management and Budget] able to be bigger than where you came from. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been numbers for the DOD, and we’ll see what The joint experiences I’ve been fortunate one of Africa’s most brutal militia forces for over two decades, having spread from they turn out to be. It is clear, as the Secre- enough to be exposed to have enabled me to northern Uganda to cover an expansive tary of Defense stated, that Defense is not be bigger than where I came from, and have area that is outside the day-to-day control off the table, and while we can become more hopefully allowed me to be an asset to the of regional governments. In this paper, efficient, there are certainly ways to save Air Force and to my fellow Service chiefs. Andre Le Sage examines the LRA in depth, on the costs of operations. I do think that Everything has its time, but I do think that including its historical development, inability reductions will be significant and will prob- having a broad base matters in a job like of past offensives to succeed against it, and ably require us to get a bit smaller. We’re this. I was fortunate to have opportuni- the current force disposition of the group. prepared to make those choices. I think the ties along the way, and to have people take Dr. Le Sage then examines current U.S. and key thing is that we’re going to need the help chances with me. international thinking on how expanded of our partners in Congress. As we make We came to this job unexpectedly, of efforts to counter the LRA could work best in adjustments, some places will lose force course, but having that larger network of the field. He also highlights how U.S. strategy makes a range of assumptions that must be structure and others may gain. One hopes folks has benefits, and it sure made it easier met in order for counter-LRA operations to that it’s possible for us to reach consensus when we joined the Joint Chiefs in 2008. succeed. He concludes that—in the absence with the various delegations on how to go My wife Suzie and I have been longtime of greater, direct U.S. military engagement— about this. friends with George and Sheila Casey, as the United States must be willing to make well as with Jim and Annette Conway. Gary significant investments in support of regional JFQ: You are a graduate of two of our Roughead and I had the opportunity in and peacekeeping partners to defeat the LRA. joint professional military education colleges the past to work with one another. These and have served more joint time than any of relationships go back decades, and that your peers on the Joint Staff, including the is not trivial. I think it’s something that Chairman. How well did your joint education strengthens our Armed Forces and is a and experience prepare you for these posi- reason for staying the course in this area. If tions, including being a member of the Joint we think back to the late 1990s, we are light Chiefs? With such a wealth of experience to years better than in those days. You can see draw on, what is your assessment of where the difference; this is roughly 30 years of jointness is today and to go in the future? joint business, and it has made a huge dif- ference. It does not mean that the Services Visit the NDU Press Web site General Schwartz: You know, it’s better aren’t vital—they clearly are—but it also has for more information on publications to be lucky than good. I have had a range of created a generation of military leaders who at ndupress.ndu.edu experiences, and I think that having been a are bigger than where they came from. JFQ

12 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu THE LOOMING CRISIS IN DEFENSE PLANNING

By PAUL K. DAVIS and PETER A. WILSON

period of discontinuity in defense planning looms because of a “perfect storm”— that is, the confluence of technology diffusion, geostrategic changes, and the range of increasingly well-armed adversaries (states and networked nonstate A actors). These are leading to the United States having to deal with a demanding mix of counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism on the one hand, and traditional challenges on the other; the likelihood of major difficulties in projecting forces in some important circumstances; related block obsolescence of U.S. forces and concepts of operations; and the need for a new grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.1

Paul K. Davis is a Senior Principal Researcher at RAND Corporation and Professor of Policy Analysis in the Pardee RAND Graduate School. Peter A. Wilson is a Senior Defense Research Analyst at RAND.

Soldier uses Defense Advanced GPS Receiver to document position during patrol in Parwan Province, Afghanistan

U.S. Army (Kristina Gupton)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 13 FORUM | The Looming Crisis in Defense Planning

To make things worse, obstacles exist article is about s­ harpening that appreciation. A larger country, such as Iran, can afford to to taking on these challenges—notably, the Finding solutions is another matter. buy significant numbers of advanced surface- demands of current wars, military compla- to-air missiles. Many cyberwar capabilities cency due to decades of military overmatch, Technological Developments are inexpensive and technically undemand- and severe national fiscal constraints. Incre- For decades, the U.S. military has ing, such as denial-of-service attacks. Some mental changes will not suffice, but no con- enjoyed technological overmatch in domains antispace system capabilities are similarly sensus is yet emerging about options for the from sophisticated communications through inexpensive and straightforward (for example, way ahead. Taken together, the problems pose precision weapons and space systems. This is GPS jammers).5 In some cases, U.S. responses a once-in-a-century challenge. All of this is changing, as indicated in table 1, which lists are already under way and will have at least summarized in figure 1. Although each of the classes of military technology that are now or some success at affordable prices. However, factors we mention is recognized individu- can soon be available to some U.S. adversar- more broadly, the trends are quite adverse. ally, we do not believe that either the perfect ies—even some lesser states and nonstate From the viewpoint of competitive strate- storm situation or absence of consensus on gies, the United States is now on the wrong good ideas about how to move forward is yet side of the economics: It is much cheaper for appreciated. Currently, much of the debate precision mortars and other adversaries to cause great difficulties for U.S. within and outside of the Pentagon is over such weapons can seriously forces and operations than it is for the United finding a new balance between investments change what is feasible for States to respond effectively. This is true for for traditional combined arms warfare and ground forces both low-end and high-end adversaries and what are now called complex operations— competitors. whole-of-government actions that involve combinations of irregular warfare, COIN, military organizations. Some of the related Collision of Revolutions stabilization, and perhaps humanitarian assis- items are inexpensive, such as cell phones or To put matters into perspective, it is tance, usually with other nations or groups other devices using the Global Positioning useful to conceptualize changes occurring in involved. As important as this balancing System (GPS). Precision weapons are avail- the 21st century in terms of four 20th-century effort is, we believe that the national security able today to nonstate actors, as illustrated by revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). The issues now challenging the Nation are even Hizballah’s use of guided missiles and other strategy of industrial warfare emerged con- more profound for reasons touched on by tactics in the 2006 Lebanon War.3 Precision spicuously from 1917 onward with mass pro- a few authors and in portions of the 2010 mortars and other such weapons can seriously duction of self-propelled vehicles of all types. Quadrennial Defense Review.2 By intent, this change what is feasible for ground forces.4 It matured in World War II, and its influence

Figure 1. Diagnosis: An Impending Crisis in Defense Planning

THE IMPENDING CRISIS IN DEFENSE PLANNING

Mix of “complex Extreme Block obsoles- Need for new Obstacles Shortage of operations” and difficulties in cence of U.S. grand strategy • Current wars concepts and traditional force projection military strategy, in Asia-Pacific • Military options challenges; force structure, complacency fragmentation and concepts of • Fiscal and distractions operations constraints

Inexpensive, Fundamental changes in Wide range of available technol- geostrategic landscape adversary types, ogy; leveling of • Emerging powers some well armed playing fields • Proliferation • Nations • New “theaters” of • Networked space and cyberspace nonstate actors

14 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu DAVIS and WILSON

Table 1. Illustrative Technological Sources of Concern military ­transformation since the 1990s.7 Some aspects, such as new forms of organiza- Technology Examples tion and operation (for example, swarm- Inexpensive communications Internet, multimedia, cell phones, commercial ing tactics) and exploitation of robotic or for coordinated, distributed encryption, inexpensive global positioning system remotely controlled systems, have been only operations of small groups sets partially implemented. Precision mortars, guided rockets, and both short- A common impression is that a given Precision weapons and long-range missiles threatening ground forces, RMA occurs within a nominal date range ships, airfields, and mobile air defense missiles and is subsequently replaced by the next Advanced mobile and man-portable surface-to-air one. In contrast, we see RMAs as having Advanced air defenses missiles started at nominal times but continuing thereafter in a measure-countermeasure Air-independent propulsion submarines, high-speed Advanced antiship weapons homing torpedoes, antiship ballistic and cruise dynamic with competition among all four of 8 missiles, smart and mobile mines them (see figure 2). Industrial warfare, for example, evolved to include aircraft carriers, Denial-of-service attacks, trojans and other advanced tank armies, and modern air forces. Warfare Cyberwar capabilities worms, nuclear and nonnuclear electronic pulse weapons will again be undergoing major change, but we do not yet know whether the result will Antisatellite systems, jammers of global positioning Anti–space system capabilities be a hybrid of all four RMAs or something satellites, radio frequency weapons new. Wealthy countries with traditional Long-range missiles for delivery military forces will continue to invest in of nuclear weapons North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and others tanks, aircraft, and surface ships—the fruits India, Israel, and perhaps Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, South of industrialization and combined arms Space-launch capability Korea, North Korea, and others, depending on (RMA I). Many state and nonstate actors, inclusion criteria including terrorists and criminals, will Nuclear proliferation Pakistan, North Korea, and perhaps Iran and others continue to adopt the insurgent strategy (RMA II). They will benefit from selective Nonnuclear mass disruption or Radiological bombs, traditional bioweapons, new acquisition of weapons and systems associ- weapons of mass destruction innovations from so-called do-it-yourself biology ated with RMA IV. Nonetheless, some states may conclude that their only reliable defense is through deterrence enabled by WMD is central in all modern combined arms have proliferated and might continue to do so, (RMA III). A worrisome possibility is that military establishments. It underlies what was perhaps even to nonstate actors. Other forms some states, such as a future nuclear-armed long called the American way of war.6 of WMD, especially biological weapons, are Iran, might use their nuclear force (RMA RMA II, the strategy of the insurgent, also a concern. III) as a shield while pursuing or supporting had roots in early partisan or guerrilla RMA IV, the strategy of information aggressive operations (probably indirectly) warfare, such as by colonialists in the Ameri- technology, became increasingly visible in using the methods of RMA II and RMA IV. can Revolution and by Native Americans the late 1980s. It was marked by precision- In summary, we see the future as involving in the settling of the West. However, it is guided weapons, information technology, a mingling, even a collision, of continuing associated specifically with the innovations and the use of space, as in network-centric RMAs, as well as new developments (the of Mao Zedong in the 1930s when it became warfare. It has been the central feature of first genuine RMA of the 21st century). a form of total political and cultural warfare. A central feature of this type of war is often Figure 2. The Dynamics of Measure and Countermeasure the sophisticated and sustained use of terror- ism for coercion. A resurgence of this type = Counter of warfare has come from al Qaeda and its affiliates. Iran supports this type of strategy and related terrorism through Hamas and Hizballah. RMA III, the strategy of weapons of RMA I RMA II RMA III RMA IV RMA V (mechanization) (revolutionary (nuclear weapons) (precision/network- (emerging?) mass destruction (WMD) and strategic warfare) centric warfare) bombardment, began in World War II with nuclear weapons and long-range means of bombarding the adversary’s homeland (pri- marily with bombers, but also with Germa- ny’s first-generation long-range ballistic and cruise missiles). Since then, nuclear weapons ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 15 FORUM | The Looming Crisis in Defense Planning

Geostrategic Developments flashpoints can be identified that justify dubious rhetoric about preventing it. In some The geostrategic changes in recent caution—especially given China’s behavior instances (North Korea and Iran among decades are many and varied. China is over the last year.11 them), a major purpose of developing nuclear now a major power with impressive, high- China, of course, is not the only rising capability is to deter attacks by the United momentum military developments9 in power. India is emerging as a powerhouse States. At some point, countries such as South addition to its economic accomplishments. in South Asia, one with its own ambitions, Korea and Taiwan may come to doubt the China’s buildup has long been anticipated particularly making the Indian Ocean a credibility of U.S. extended conventional and can be regarded as both natural and his- sphere of influence and having significant deterrence—especially if conventional force torically normal. It is possible and perhaps power at chokepoints such as between the projection itself becomes substantially more even likely that China, its neighbors, and Indian and Pacific Oceans (for example, the dicey for the United States. the United States will have mostly good Strait of Malacca) and between the Arabian relations for many years into the future— Sea and Indian Ocean (Strait of Hormuz and Block Obsolescence of Forces and strongly consistent with the interests of all Bab-el-Mandeb).12 Concepts of Operations concerned. Nonetheless, there are reasons It is possible and even likely that India Against this background, we see the to worry. Two years ago, most China experts and the various regional states of East and obsolescing of U.S. force structure and concepts of operations with respect both to a peer competitor and to lesser adversaries that combine methods of insurgency with what might emerge is a dynamic cool war of competition, modern technology. Problems exist across the cooperation, containment, and possible conflict board, but table 2 illustrates them for force projection. To be sure, our assessments are subjective, and uncertainties have less to do in the United States would have referred South Asia will, along with the United States, with technology trends, which are observable, only to hypothetical concerns based on provide a kind of balancing of China through than with whether in fact potential adversar- geography and historical experiences and a combination of economic, political, and mil- ies exploit them as we project. would have ended with a recitation of why itary activities over time. What might emerge Some key points underlie these conclu- the nations have interests in continuing is a dynamic cool war of competition, coop- sions relating to traditional forces and tradi- peace and prosperity, and how they had—so eration, containment, and possible conflict. tional operational concepts:13 far—shown restraint and, by and large, This will be an era of strategic improvisation statesmanship. Unfortunately, more signs and not the rigid and nearly monochromatic ■■ Concentrated ground forces and of trouble have arisen. Some of these are strategic competition of the early phases of the concentrated logistics are potentially quite economic, some military, and some political Cold War. vulnerable to an expanding spectrum of preci- within China. In 2010, China has seemingly Other geostrategic realities include, of sion weapons, including short-range guided taken an increasingly hard line regarding course, the continuing struggle with violent mortar bombs, precision-guided rockets, and sovereignty over a number of small islands radical extremists, notably al Qaeda and a precision-guided short- and medium-range and waters, especially in the South China network of loosely affiliated jihadist organiza- ballistic and cruise missiles. This has been Sea. Although the issues are longstanding, tions worldwide. No end is in sight for that more than hypothetical since the 2006 war in Beijing has recently become much more struggle—even if U.S. withdrawal from Iraq Lebanon. assertive about its territorial claims along its occurs on schedule without civil war, and ■■ Aircraft are potentially quite vulner- littoral in the Yellow Sea (on the west side of even if progress continues slowly in Afghani- able to precision weapons if based within the Korean Peninsula) and the South China stan, which is even more uncertain—espe- the countries of operations or relatively close Sea (between Vietnam and the Philippines), cially given linkages to the troubles within to shore. If based at long range to improve which it now claims as a “core interest” of Pakistan. Osama bin Laden’s death has not survivability, these aircraft will be unable to sovereignty.10 changed this. Nor have the upheavals of the maintain high sortie rates over contested areas, For obvious reasons, China’s asser- Arab Spring, the long-term implications of whether for purposes of achieving air tiveness has worried such regional states which are not yet clear. superiority or for suppression of air defenses as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Another new geostrategic reality is the and support of ground operations. Vietnam, and Indonesia. Economic tensions advent of new wartime theaters of operation: ■■ These vulnerabilities would be exac- are now considerable as well, and will likely space and cyberspace. The U.S. military is erbated if the adversary used area munitions, continue, with even the possibility of an extremely dependent on both and experi- such as the cluster weapons that the United expanding trade war emerging as importer ences many serious vulnerabilities as other States has used for decades, or fuel-air explo- states consider tariffs and other measures to nations improve their own capabilities in sives, such as those developed by the United protect jobs and improve balances of pay- both, and as some nations, such as China, States, Russia, Great Britain, and China. Such ments. Although the future should be one do so zealously precisely because of the U.S. weapons have been used recently by Libya of cooperation and mostly good relations, dependence. against rebels. and we are not among those who exagger- Finally, nuclear proliferation contin- ■■ The challenges to traditional ate China’s current power, many potential ues, despite years of unsuccessful effort and forced entry capability will continue and

16 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu DAVIS and WILSON

Table 2. Fading Viability of Traditional Concepts of Operations

Component Previously Now, and Increasingly in Near Future

Limited forward presence Nonproblem Restrained but not especially risky

Risky due to vulnerable bases and regional waters; risks Large-scale deployments to stem from air-independent propulsion submarines and Nonproblem regional waters and bases precision antiship weapons (including land-based missiles); large standoff ranges will likely be needed

Challenges exist but are much less daunting when not in Broad naval supremacy Nonproblem close-in regional waters

Nonproblem in most domains, but not, for example, close Achieving air supremacy Nonproblem to Chinese mainland

Destruction is difficult because of Risky for above reasons and advanced mobile and man- Suppressing air defenses cover and deception but suppression is portable surface-to-air missiles quite feasible.

Strategic strikes are possible early with stealthy aircraft; large-scale operations Risky and difficult because of modern air defenses, the Offensive air operations are a nonproblem after suppression of need for long-range operations, and the difficulty of air defenses against fixed and known finding mobile and hidden high-value targets high-value targets.

Risky because of vulnerabilities of forces during entry and Entry of traditional ground Nonproblem after gaining air of bases and other logistics. Area weapons pose special forces and infrastructure supremacy concerns.

Later ground maneuver Moderately risky, with air support constrained due to operations with close air support Supreme skill of U.S. forces residual surface-to-air missiles, and with vulnerabilities to and battlefield shaping residual precision weapons

Feasible on a small scale, or on the Feasible on a small scale, or on the Iraq scale with Large follow-up operations (for Iraq scale with mobilization; forces mobilization; operations are risky for adversaries having example, stabilization in large at risk due to improvised explosive precision or area weapons and some defenses against countries) devices and other asymmetric tactics; drones. Special needs for mine-resistant vehicles, persistent large manpower requirements surveillance, and substantial manpower.

 = feasibility is in question  = feasible but with high risk  = risky or difficult  = feasible with acceptable risk

worsen. Arguably, the two premier forms of vulnerability to air defenses. Heavy amphibious operation are losing viability, we sketched ­theater-wide forcible entry, the mass airborne forces such as the recently canceled armored three illustrative possibilities for new ones and amphibious operation mechanisms, are expeditionary fighting vehicle will be vulner- to sharpen discussion of capability needs. already obsolete for many environments. able to direct fire guided munitions. Even sea- They stem from asking how force projection Brigade-level airborne drops have long been bases could be vulnerable to precision missile could proceed given a lethal environment more of a theoretical option than something fires at significant ranges offshore. (sometimes discussed as an antiaccess anticipated; large-scale over-the-shore environment). amphibious assault will be seen as both risky Perceiving the Way Ahead, Darkly Make Deliberate, Phased Entry with and potentially costly given the threat from Against this background of sobering Defense. This concept would be, in some improved coastal intelligence, surveillance, and diagnosis, we have attempted to sketch the respects, a modernized version of the classic reconnaissance, mines, and direct and indirect outlines of a way ahead. That outline involves concept. However, significant suppression precision weapons. Maneuver from the sea new military capabilities, concepts of opera- of adversary capabilities would be accom- using longer range vertical takeoff and landing tion, and grand strategy. plished with long-range strike platforms aircraft, such as the V–22, will remain limited We focused largely on issues of force (and cyberwar), after which the ground in scope because of range-payload issues and projection. Since traditional concepts of and air forces deployed into the country ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 17 F−35C, U.S. Navy Joint Strike Fighter variant, has larger wing surfaces and reinforced landing gear for greater control during carrier takeoffs and landings

Lockheed Martin

(perhaps from seabasing) would have reliable insertion of large ground forces and instead with terror networks that cannot be deterred defenses against missile and drone attacks depend on sustainable strike capabilities in the ordinary sense. from short, medium, and long ranges. The guided by persistent surveillance from These possibilities are neither defenses would be accompanied by the ability survivable platforms. Special forces and mutually exclusive nor exhaustive (for to quickly detect and attack the launch sites unconventional warfare operations pivoting example, they do not include space-based of any attacks (by analogy with the Army’s around indigenous allied forces could also weapons that could be used both for offen- current counterbattery fire). Furthermore, play a major role. Thus, the concept could sive purposes and to suppress or destroy there would be the need to support Army include large numbers of small, dispersed, enemy defenses), but they illustrate a range and Marine ground maneuver forces by long- networked ground forces.14 Given suf- of different thrusts—each with its own range airlift flying from protected land- or ficient local forces, this tack might suffice, severe shortcomings. seabases. Multibrigade ground forces could perhaps be supported by airlift with the new technology of precision airdrop, although history continues to show the need for substantial that would be challenging for some classes of “boots on the ground” to control territory supply such as fuel and ammunition. Airlift- ers would overfly low-altitude air defenses and would not need to use forward airfields but history continues to show the need for At this stage, it is not clear which or under threat from long-range precision fires. substantial “boots on the ground” to control which combination of these concepts will The concept of the defended seabase also territory. be viable. This suggests priorities on certain appears attractive. Recently, the Navy has Make Rapid Entry. A third example types of capabilities if they can in fact be developed a new at-sea connector, the mobile would emphasize prior surveillance by surviv- achieved at tolerable cost. The following land platform, that has conceptual promise able and possibly covert means; first strikes or list is itself less remarkable than recogniz- to provide at-sea support to a multibrigade- preemptions in the form of sudden, decisive ing how challenging the related technical size Marine and Army expeditionary force, strikes with long-range missiles and aircraft, requirements are (and by noting differences although budget pressures might preclude cyberattacks, and specialized ground forces; from current de facto priorities, such as related investments. and followup actions by larger numbers of modernization of current platform types): Surveil, Strike, Punish from Afar, and ground forces, both those of the country being Insert Small, Networked Ground Forces. assisted and external projection forces. Such ■■ high-confidence defenses at tacti- An alternative approach would be to eschew attacks might be especially relevant to dealing cal and operational levels ranging from

18 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu DAVIS and WILSON

­countering precision mortars to countering ■■ What is the appropriate portfolio mix ■■ Given the extent of China’s develop- long-range missiles of capabilities across missions (COIN versus ments, it is no longer appropriate to assess the ■■ survivable and truly persistent surveil- force projection)? Circumstances of adequacy? adequacy of U.S. force structure by playing lance and reconnaissance strike (episodic ■■ What is necessary to deal with discrete, through simulated wars over the Taiwan Strait. coverage will be insufficient) Service-specific challenges? With joint chal- The focus must change to broader conceptions ■■ comprehensive defense suppression lenges, such as network security and hedges of the power balance that include the arc from ■■ long-range sustainable strike against network failure or penetration? the Middle East through the Indian Ocean to ■■ effective munitions, including muni- ■■ What is the appropriate portfolio mix Northeast Asia. tions for deeply buried targets of Active, Reserve Component, and civilian ■■ Imperatives in the new conception ■■ survivable at-sea basing capabilities? will include deterrence and crisis stability; ■■ means of accomplishing complex deterring small and limited aggression, as operations with fewer U.S. forces, even when Again, the generic questions are less well as larger scale aggression; and ensuring adversaries are embedded in populations. remarkable than the specifics. Should ground that, in periods of tension, the combination force projection deemphasize large, tradi- of the sides’ lethality and vulnerability does We see likely cross-cutting stratagems tional units in favor of small, networked unit not create perceived imperatives for preemp- as involving dispersion, networking, and (swarming) tactics? What kind of seabasing tive action. Avoiding errors that might cause swarm tactics; major efforts to ensure network makes sense, and for what distances? What war will be crucial for the great powers and security while hedging in not-yet-identified is the future role of short-range tactical important regional powers. A major issue is ways against predictable network failures or air forces? How will long-distance strike how deterrence can be made stronger than it penetration; and massive use of robotics and capability be sustained in the event of a large has been in the past. remote control systems. For each military and lengthy conflict? And, in the realm of ■■ Challenges of deterrence and, espe- Service, the crucial questions seem to be these: complex operations, what capabilities are cially, extended conventional deterrence will needed to accomplish the missions with much be exacerbated by proliferation of nuclear ■■ What are the appropriate new-era reduced numbers of U.S. ground forces? weapons. building block units (for example, analogues to ■■ A core issue is the relative emphasis on older units, such as brigades or squadrons, but Toward a New Grand Strategy regional cooperation and power-balancing and often with a more joint character)? The other crucial element of the way between formal and informal balancing. And, ■■ What are the appropriate joint- and ahead will be a new grand strategy. The most of course, what role should be played by both component-level concepts of operations? Cir- obvious need is to rethink grand strategy for the United States and the many nations of the cumstances of feasibility? the Asia-Pacific super region. We conclude: Asia-Pacific region?

U.S. Marine Corps (Benjamin R. Reynolds) U.S. Navy (Jeramy Spivey)

GT–18 surface-to-air missiles fired at incoming aircraft during nighttime USS Stout launches Tomahawk cruise missile at radar and antiaircraft warfare training, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma sites along Libya’s Mediterranean coast in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 19 FORUM | The Looming Crisis in Defense Planning

■■ The military component of strategy Finally, in some respects (the primary 7 See Paul K. Davis, “Military Transformation? will seek to maintain conventional warfighting difference being the unavoidable long struggle Which Transformation, and What Lies Ahead?” and war-winning capabilities where feasible with international violent religious extrem- in The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy and War, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Dulles, but will include more deterrence-oriented ism that threatens the United States and its VA: Potomac Books, 2010), 11–42. capability, such as the ability to inflict serious worldwide interests), the Nation is in a situ- 8 As examples, the North Atlantic Treaty pain with conventional strikes, devastate ation reminiscent of that of the Eisenhower Organization fielded tactical nuclear weapons infrastructure with conventional strikes, and administration as it considered grand strat- (RMA III) to help deter perceived RMA I superior- maintain supremacy at sea—if not in major egy. It seems likely that, in broad terms, grand ity of the Red Army during the 1950s. Modern powers’ littoral waters, then certainly on a strategy will need to evolve with an emphasis superheavy tanks with advanced passive and active larger regional and global scale that includes on rejuvenating and sustaining the country’s armor are an RMA I response to the proliferation the sea lines of communication to the Middle economic vitality while relying increasingly of early antitank-guided munitions (an early mani- East and Africa. on credible forms of deterrence (rather than festation of RMA IV). More recently, RMA IV tools ■■ The United States has a major deci- clear-cut superiority) in certain balance of and methods used as part of the Army’s Task Force sion to make regarding the degree to which power issues; and on alliances, improvement Odin are a response to the methods of insurgents (RMA II). of allied capabilities, and use of international 9 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military organizations. What is needed, arguably, is a and Security Developments Involving the People’s national security strategy of comprehensive because the way ahead Republic of China (Washington, DC: DOD, 2010). militarily is unclear, we see balancing rather than just a rebalancing of 10 Ibid., 26. military capabilities. JFQ 11 the need for vigorous and China’s behavior has included aggressive use of computer network exploitation as described in competitive exploration and William J. Lynn, “Defending a New Domain: The competition of ideas NOTES Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs (Septem- ber–October 2010). One reason for China’s asser- 1 This article is based on a longer and more tiveness may be an increasing military influence fully referenced paper: Paul K. Davis and Peter A. it should prepare for manpower-intensive on government policy; see John Lee, “The End of Wilson, Looming Discontinuities in U.S. Military Smile Diplomacy,” National Interest, September 23, operations, such as COIN and stabilization. It Strategy and Defense Planning: Colliding RMAs 2010. Other reasons may include Chinese domestic is not obvious that such operations should be Necessitate a New Strategy, Occasional Paper politics, overconfidence, and a notion of U.S. the primary basis for force planning, despite OP–326–OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). decline as discussed in Joseph S. Nye, “China seems 2 events of the past decade. If they are, then the Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: to have made wrong call on its relations with U.S.,” economic consequences will be acute because Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Scotsman, March 17, 2010. Some within China they would come in addition to the demands Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009); Depart- probably exaggerate the strategic significance of of evolving balance of power and force projec- ment of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense the tiny islands in areas of disputed sovereignty. tion issues that are themselves demanding. Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, 2010); Official Chinese documents suggest that calmer Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The assessments prevail within elite circles; see China’s Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for Although arms control should also be National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information the Next Pentagon Team,” Washington Quar- an element of grand strategy, it is unlikely that Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic terly 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008), 59–76; Andrew F. of China, January 2009). it will substantially alleviate the major U.S. Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: 12 David Brewster, “An Indian Sphere of Influ- national security challenges identified. The Eroding Foundations of American Power,” ence in the Indian Ocean,” Security Challenges 6, Foreign Affairs (July–August 2009), 18–33; and John no. 3 (2010), 1–20. Necessity-driven Experimentation Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transforma- 13 Most of these challenges were anticipated Because the way ahead militarily is tion of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, more than a decade ago. See Paul K. Davis et al., unclear, we see the need for vigorous and 2008). Transforming U.S. Forces: Suggestions for U.S. Strat- 3 competitive exploration and competition of See Matt Matthews, We Were Caught egy, Issue Paper IP–179 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, ideas. The past decade’s experiences have not Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Fort 1998). been encouraging: Visions have sometimes Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 14 See especially Arquilla. 2008). 15 Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Plans Steps to gotten far ahead of technology; reason, criti- 4 See Dakota L. Wood, The U.S. Marine Corps: Reduce Budget and Jobs,” The New York Times, cism, and competition have not been suf- st Fleet Marine Forces for the 21 Century (Washing- August 9, 2010. Steps in dissolution of U.S. Joint ficiently valued; and joint experimentation ton, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- Forces Command continue; see, for example, has been neither sufficiently ambitious nor ments, 2008). Cheryl Pellerin, “Odierno Details Joint Forces 5 rigorous. Ironically, at a time when U.S. Joint See Defense Science Board Task Force, The Command Disestablishment Plans,” American Forces Command is arguably needed most, a Future of the Global Positioning System (Washing- Forces Press Service, February 9, 2011. decade’s disappointments caused former Sec- ton, DC: DOD, October 2005). retary of Defense Robert Gates to call for the 6 See Russell Frank Weigley, The American command’s dissolution.15 A priority should be Way of War: A History of United States Military placed on rethinking how to do the explora- Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Univer- tions needed to inform once-in-a-century sity Press, 1977). decisions.

20 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MACGREGOR

Commanding general of Regional Command Southwest looks over village of Chineh in Helmand Province, near Combat Outpost Ouellette

U.S. Marine Corps (Jesse J. Johnson)

Thoughts on Force Design in an Era of Shrinking

Defense Budgets By DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR

orce design is an essential tool in direct military power can dramatically reduce General [Douglas] MacArthur so delicately the hands of national political and risk across the range of alternative future put it.”1 When Secretary Gates’s remarks are military leaders to counter uncer- national security needs. viewed in the context of reduced Federal F tainty in conflict or crisis. An In recent remarks to the Corps of Cadets spending on defense, they reinforce the agile force design can both create options and at West Point, former Secretary of Defense criticality of developing the right force design reduce risk should events take unexpected Robert Gates implied the need for fundamen- to ensure policymakers avoid shortsighted turns. No force design or national military tal change in force design when he insisted solutions that sacrifice critical current and strategy can address or eliminate all uncer- that “any future defense secretary who advises tainties, but an agile force design that provides the President to again send a big American Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA (Ret.), is the national and allied political and military land army into Asia or into the Middle East Executive Vice President at Burke-Macgregor leaders with the means to comprehensively or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as Group, LLC. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Thoughts on Force Design future capabilities on the altar of near-term America’s political and military leaders more lethal. If adopted, the recommendations economy. should take the following steps: outlined in this article will create the foun- Put differently, today, the greater Middle dation for an enduring American strategic East, Africa, and Southwest Asia are at the ■■ recognize that current and future stra- military advantage at a point in time when the center of U.S. and allied security concerns. tegic environments require changes in U.S. and United States must economize on defense— Tomorrow, far more serious military chal- allied force development strategies saving hundreds of billions of dollars in the lenges to U.S. and allied security may emanate ■■ devise a new operational concept for years ahead. from Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Armed Forces appropriate to current and Latin America. In contrast to the recent past, future strategic environments Understanding What Is Changing these crises are likely to involve interstate ■■ within the fiscal means available, reor- At the heart of all national military conflicts for regional power and influence ganize existing U.S. forces into a more efficient strategy is the desire to increase the state’s that overlap with the competition for energy, and integrative force design under regional capacity for independent action. Inde- water, food, mineral resources, and the wealth unified commands to execute the new opera- pendent people and organizations enjoy these create.2 tional concept greater latitude for action at a time and This article argues that American ■■ use the resulting annualized savings— place of their choosing. The same is true for political and military leaders have an oppor- between $100 billion and $150 billion3—in the United States and its allies. However, tunity to expand the Nation’s range of stra- manpower and resources both to pay down to craft a force development strategy to tegic options while reducing costs by finally the national debt and to reorient our invest- achieve this goal, America’s political and breaking with the industrial age paradigm ment in military power to support the devel- military leaders must understand what is of warfare. The United States can do this by opment of future military capabilities and new changing in military affairs. building a 21st-century scalable “Lego-like” operational concepts. First, military power is no longer force design, one structured and equipped based on the mass mobilization of the for dispersed mobile warfare inside an The trendlines are unambiguous: mili- manpower and resources of the entire state. integrated maneuver-strike-intelligence, tary establishments that integrate functions Conscript armed forces, the norm in the surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)-sustain- and capabilities across Service lines, and, in 19th and 20th centuries, are gradually being ment complex that combines the Nation’s the allied context, across national lines, while replaced with professional military estab- ground maneuver forces with strike, ISR, simultaneously eliminating unneeded over- lishments inundated with technology. and sustainment capabilities from all of the head not only are less expensive to operate Second, precision effects (kinetic and Services. To construct this new force design, and maintain,4 but they also are likely to be far nonkinetic) using a vast array of strike U.S. Air Force (Marc I. Lane) (Marc U.S. Air Force

Airmen prepare B−1B Lancer for mission in support of NATO operations over Libya

22 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MACGREGOR forces enabled by the rapid and timely the operational and strategic conduct of Networked information systems cannot ­dissemination of information through net- warfighting operations. replace killing power or organic survivability worked ISR capabilities point the way to a Fourth, the conditions shaping dispersed in the form of armored forces, especially in fundamental paradigm shift in the character mobile warfare do not eliminate the close fight close combat. Ground maneuver forces (light, of warfare. For example, a military contest in ground combat operations whether these medium, or heavy) that cannot rapidly dis- on the model of Kursk in July 1943—a battle operations involve interstate or subnational perse to avoid presenting lucrative targets to that involved nearly 940,000 attacking conflicts. Nor do they eliminate uncer- the opposing force risk destruction. German forces and 1.5 million defending tainty, surprise, or confusion from warfare. Fifth, surprise in warfare is still attain- Soviet forces in a geographical area the size Regardless of how well new technologies able. Countermeasures in many forms includ- of England—would result in catastrophic are networked, they cannot provide perfect ing cyber warfare ensure the fog of war will losses for the defending side. Today, any situational awareness or perfect informa- persist. Many nation-states are acutely sensi- ground combat force that immobilizes itself tion. Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen will never tive to these trends, and they are preparing to in prepared defenses on this World War II know everything that happens inside their fight under these conditions in the future.5 The model would be identified, targeted, and battlespace, and what they do learn will often more advanced scientific-industrial powers are annihilated from a distance. be of fleeting value. Commanders must still building a large, diverse, and reliable range of Third, integrative command struc- think and act on short notice with incom- conventional ballistic missiles for deep preci- tures and new organizations for combat are plete information within the framework of a sion strikes designed to operate within terres- essential features of this shift. Aircraft and known operational intent. trial- and space-based sensor networks.6 ships involved in strike operations, both Mines, rocket-propelled grenades, Smaller powers with competent armed manned and unmanned, have excellent machineguns, mortars, chemical agents, forces but less sophisticated technology are sensors that can be linked to other ele- barbed wire, and air defense systems are still adapting to these changing conditions as well. ments of the fighting force to support the effective against ground forces, even in this For instance, the Yugoslav army adjusted translation of collected information into era of precision strikes. Mobile armored fire- with considerable success to cope with U.S. actionable intelligence. As a result, ISR and power inside the ground maneuver force will and Allied striking power during the Kosovo strike are mission areas that cut across all be more important than ever given the speed crisis. Thousands of small, mobile elements, domains (land, sea, air, and space). In addi- with which information must be assimilated, skillfully concealed in rough terrain and aided tion, ISR and strike capabilities now have synthesized, and delivered in time to be by marginal weather conditions, were dif- the capacity to influence not only tactical exploited. A ground force that cannot take ficult to target from high altitudes. Overhead strike and maneuver operations, but also hits and keep fighting will collapse quickly. surveillance turned out to be more limited U.S. Air Force (DeNoris Mickle) U.S. Air Force

10th Special Forces Group fast-rope from CV−22 Osprey during exercise Emerald Warrior 2011

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Tomahawk cruise missile launches from USS Barry operating in Mediterranean Sea in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn

U.S. Navy (Jonathan Sunderman) and more susceptible to deception than creates powerful new military capabilities. persed mobile warfare, integrated “all-arms” anticipated. In the absence of an attacking Embracing new technology is important, warfare is the overarching joint operational North Atlantic Treaty Organization ground but it should not be done indiscriminately, concept for warfighting operations. force, the Yugoslav ground forces were never out of fear of being left behind. Technology All-arms operations integrate the func- compelled to mass or concentrate.7 should be chosen for integration on the basis tional capabilities of maneuver, strike, ISR, All of these points suggest an enormous of what it can do today, as well as its potential and sustainment across Service lines inside a strategic advantage will accrue to military for future development. It is therefore vital seamless unified command and control (C2) establishments with an integrated military to establish the form that warfare will take, operational framework. In fact, success in command structure and the right force design then, to determine the right joint operational contemporary and future warfare on land, to orchestrate military capabilities across concept and the appropriate force design to at sea, or in the air demands the ability to Service lines in the conduct of decisive opera- exploit technology. maneuver from a dispersed configuration, tions. As the global experience in the private Ubiquitous strike capabilities and the concentrating effects and, for brief periods, sector demonstrates, fewer but smarter people proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ground combat forces at decisive points in with intelligent technology can accomplish (WMD), nuclear or nonnuclear, now make time and space when conditions demand it. more than masses of troops with the brute the concentration of large land, naval, or Clearly, the most favorable conditions force tools of the past.8 air forces dangerous. As a result, dispersed on land exist when ground forces operate mobile warfare—a condition that elevates within the framework of an integrated Defining a New Concept tactical dispersion to the operational level of network of maneuver-strike-ISR-sustain- Form defines warfare more than war—is replacing warfare on the World War ment functions, hereafter referred to as the numbers or technology. The interaction of II model of defined continuous fronts as the complex. Within the complex, attacking technology with organizational paradigms dominant form of combat. Moreover, in dis- ground forces compel opposing enemy

24 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MACGREGOR forces to mass in response or else risk defeat dinated to the Stavka (General Headquarters) generally focused on supporting operations, in detail. and its subordinate command echelons— not on determining their course.12 Today, To effectively and economically defend front and army—ensuring uncontested unity this Army-centric approach with its roots U.S. and allied interests in the 21st century, of action on the strategic and operational in World War II is no longer relevant. The forces should be organized to operate inside levels of war.9 degree of capability integration required in this complex to ensure responsive and accel- It is also fair to characterize the Soviet dispersed mobile warfare cannot be achieved erated decision cycles at all levels. Precision command and control structure that tri- inside restrictive, hierarchical, single-Service strikes from the air and sea can incapacitate umphed in World War II as a highly central- Cold War command systems suffering from enemy command and control, but the con- ized, top-down, ground force–dominated, information overload and too many levels of fusion and paralysis thus engendered are attrition-based, mechanized/industrial one command. always temporary. Without the experience of that squandered human life and resources On land, simply breaking existing corps warfare, people (including those in uniform) on a scale beyond Western comprehension. and divisional structures into smaller pieces forget that the enemy is a reactive system. However, regardless of the profound cultural will not change the industrial age warfighting Future adversaries, regardless of differences that separated the United States paradigm, reduce or eliminate echelons of national identity, will work hard and rapidly and Europe from the Soviet Union, these are unneeded C2, or advance integrative, seamless to restore communication connections. They jointness on the operational level. Geographi- will also seek other ways to communicate cally dispersed land-, air-, and sea-based that are less vulnerable to strikes and discover without the experience of forces require a high level of command coher- ways to preserve operational coherence ence through technologically and intellectu- without being detected. Over time, future warfare, people forget that ally shared battlespace awareness. This condi- nation-state and nonstate opponents should the enemy is a reactive system tion dictates the requirement for integrative be expected to recover from the initial disrup- command structures on the operational level tion that strikes cause. that magnify the larger fighting power of the It is essential, then, to destroy the virtuous military outcomes worthy of emula- integrated joint force. opponent before recovery, which is why tion by U.S. and allied forces. The proliferation of WMD and related ground combat forces with tactical mobility, In the West, neither the Germans nor strike weapons now compels the transfer and devastating firepower, and effective armored Western Allies created similar arrangements. integration of capabilities once found only protection must be tightly integrated within For the Americans and British, Sir Winston at the Army division and Marine Corps/ the complex. Achieving this outcome requires Churchill’s complaint that the “chiefs of staff Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) levels, or the establishment of an integrated military system leads to weak or faltering decisions— only in the naval and air forces down to lower command structure designed to employ or rather indecision”10 went unheeded. In command echelons (see figure). These new dispersed and distributed combat elements as the United States, the Service chiefs together command echelons must also be tightly inte- capability-based forces from all of the Services with policymakers in Washington set out to grated with the war-winning ISR and strike inside the complex. institutionalize the way that the United States capabilities found in all of the Services. In this fought World War II in the 1947 National sense, ISR must be viewed as the key integrat- Reorganizing Forces Security Act. Subsequent legislative attempts ing function for warfighting and operational Because the simplest tasks in war are to reduce the excessive bureaucratic power of design, planning, and execution. difficult, complex command arrangements the separate Services to fund and equip them- U.S. forces are in a position to integrate involving fragmented authority must be selves independently, as well as the influence current Marine Corps/MEF and division C2 avoided. How information is used during of single-Service warfare doctrine and orga- into a joint C2 structure such as the notional conflict or crisis reflects the structures of the nizations, have been limited in terms of how joint task force (JTF) command. This information flow, as well as the thinking and operations are conducted, as well as in terms operational-level headquarters is designed mentality of the people who use the informa- of staggering American defense costs.11 to orchestrate the effects that will compel tion. The two influence one another and are The point is unambiguous. For reasons the internal collapse of an opponent through inextricably intertwined. of cost, as well as survivability and lethality, maneuver and strike without reliance on World War II battles in which the Soviet less overhead and more combat power at the destructive time- and resource-consuming Union was involved were generally decided in lowest level are organizing imperatives in attrition warfare or mass armies. favor of the Soviet Union in part because its 21st-century dispersed mobile warfare. Part of Combining strike and maneuver into a leadership organized and employed its armed the solution is to implement a new integrated single joint operation inside a JTF command forces under a unified military command operational military command structure is the core of operational art. Striking the structure that compelled integration of core designed to conduct U.S. and American-led enemy throughout the entire depth of opera- service capabilities under a single operational allied operations at home and abroad. tional deployment simultaneously and, at commander. But the Soviet leadership was the same time, introducing rapid, mobile, able to maximize combat power (land, sea, Establishing the Construct mutually supporting air and ground forces and air) where it was needed and economize In the United States, Armed Forces through the disrupted force to fight a series of where it was not needed. The branches of the operational decisionmaking in other- actions for which the enemy is not prepared Soviet armed forces were thoroughly subor- than-ground-maneuver headquarters was is the essence of this form of warfare. These ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Thoughts on Force Design

XXXX Old Organization for Combat: ARMY Too many single Service C2 echelons HQ XXX Too slow to decide Corps Too expensive to modernize HQ XX Too vulnerable to WMD Division HQ X Brigade II

Battalion I New Organization for Combat: Combatant Company Fewer integrated C2 echelons Commander Faster decision cycle Fighters Cheaper to modernize Joint Task Force Command Mission- focused Capability II Package Battalion I

Company

Fighters

conditions are no less applicable to the defeat One major general within the JTF capabilities. The evolution from deploy- of loosely organized guerrilla forces operating leads the close combat forces deployed to able teams to liaison officers to permanent in complex or urban terrain.13 The mission the conflict area. The deputy commander party experts was a key element in increas- to implement this operational concept in for maneuver directs the operations of the ing the effectiveness of space capabilities the information age falls to the lieutenant ground maneuver elements in ways similar to as geographic theater commanders gained general or vice admiral in JTF command what division or MEF commanders do today. more influence over space requirements and headquarters. He brings an appreciation of the critical role integration.16 Strike capabilities should be Battlefields have been emptying for the employed by similar officers with special- last 50 years in response to new and more ized expertise. In this capacity, the deputy lethal weapons technologies. Supporting these battlefields have been commander for strike can exploit capabilities dispersed forces will not be easy. For these emptying for the last 50 years residing in all Service strike and maneuver reasons, a two-star flag officer focused exclu- in response to new and more forces to support maneuver and suppress or sively on sustainment functions is a deputy defeat enemy air defenses as well as enemy commander for sustainment inside the JTF lethal weapons technologies missile attacks. command structure. In addition to these JTF “force employ- With the expansion of strike and that positional advantage plays in the calcu- ment” headquarters, two sets of future information assets, it is critical to supply lus of war to the planning and execution of resource pooling or management headquar- the JTF commander with deputies and operations. ters could be formed to provide capabilities staffs committed to employ the full Another major general or rear admiral across the various theaters of operations to the complement of ground, air, electronic, (upper half) commands strike operations. combatant commanders, as well as to the JTF and information operations capabilities. With the emergence of U.S. and allied strike commands. These functionally based com- The emergence of a deputy commander complexes inside the regional unified com- mands would include: for ISR marks a shift from the World War mands, the links from deputy commander for II/Cold War mindset that treats ISR as a strike to ground combat formations, as well ■■ Theater Strike and Missile Defense supporting function to a new understand- as to the strike assets in all the Services, are Command ing that, in the 21st century, ISR integrated pivotal.15 With his links to strike coordina- ■■ Theater ISR Command with strike and maneuver operations can tion officers in every ground maneuver force ■■ Theater Maneuver Command be both operationally and strategically and across the Services, he is simultaneously ■■ Theater Sustainment Command. decisive.14 the critical connection to air and naval strike

26 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MACGREGOR

Two sets of these resource management head- need is fleeting, and traditional Army and The CMG combines the command element, quarters would be capable of managing the Marine command structures that cannot fighting power, and support element into force and asset management tasks on a global jump on this intelligence and exploit it have a ­stand-alone, mission-focused capability basis. been compelled to change thinking and package. The CMG is commanded by a briga- These JTF commands would exist in behavior.17 dier general with a robust staff, including a sufficient quantity to command and employ What emerges from the experience of deputy commander and a chief of staff, both U.S. and allied forces on land, at sea, or in the the last 9 years is the growing recognition of whom are colonels. air. All forces would be designed as mission inside the Army (and, more recently, inside The CMG drives the joint command, control, communications, computers, intel- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in land warfare, the next logical step in force design is a 5,000- (C4ISR) plugs to lower levels, compressing the to 6,000-man formation called a Combat Maneuver Group tactical and operational levels to the point where maneuver and strike are integrated at a much lower level than is currently pos- capability packages organized for employ- the Marines with the standup of a large, sible. Maneuver, strike, ISR and sustainment ment under one-star commanders. American independent Marine brigade battle group formations become clusters of joint combat air and naval forces routinely assemble forces in Afghanistan) that a new self-contained power that have the capacity for operations organized around ISR, strike, sustainment, combat formation is needed18—one smaller on land reminiscent of the way ships operate and maneuver tailored to specific missions. than a division, but larger than a standard at sea. Translated into terms that Soldiers and Sometimes these are composite wings or brigade, a formation capable of limited inde- Marines understand, the new force design surface action groups. However, ground forces pendent action that eliminates unnecessary must offer the following features: have only recently begun to think in terms of command levels and drives jointness to a mission-focused capability packages. Move- much lower level.19 ■■ ready on call, quickly deployable, and ment toward harmonization—and away from All of these points suggest that in employable by joint force commanders Cold War notions of C2 synchronization—has land warfare, the next logical step in force ■■ adaptable for a range of operations been critical to this outcome. Increasingly, the design is a 5,000- to 6,000-man formation ■■ easily integrated and networked within sort of intelligence that Soldiers and Marines called a Combat Maneuver Group (CMG). the joint force

MQ−1 Predator provides airborne reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for coalition forces in Iraq

U.S. Air Force (Brian Ferguson)

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■■ supportable despite distance and ashore on June 6, 1944, was Brigadier General is ready to fight on short notice than is the dispersion Theodore Roosevelt, the only American case today. The importance of making routine ■■ survivable against any adversary general officer who arrived with the first wave deployments more predictable, ensuring ■■ trained with the other Service compo- of troops on D-Day. When Roosevelt real- regular periods of rest for American troops, nents so that they are capable of “integrated ized that the initial assault force had landed cannot be overstated. joint warfighting” on short notice. 2,000 yards south of where they should have The cost savings involved in reducing on Utah Beach, Roosevelt adjusted the plan, unneeded wear and tear on equipment and In the new C2 organization modeled on telling the company commanders precisely people should now be self-evident, but these the JTF command structure, there is a Strike where they were and directed their movement savings do not entirely address the probable Coordinator. These coordinators supplant inland along new routes. The result was rapid savings in manpower and equipment. For existing fire support officers in the ground penetration, in a few hours, by American instance, sea control is no longer a mission forces and become specialists in all the Ser- infantry several miles inland that Army that demands a large surface fleet on the vices with joint training to qualify them to intelligence analysts predicted would take World War II model. America’s nuclear sub- direct strike operations on behalf of ground several days. marine fleet augmented with fewer surface combat groups or similar mission-focused On Omaha Beach, where there was combatants employing long-range sensors, capability packages from the air and sea. no general officer present, the situation was manned and unmanned aircraft, com- They are designed to be an extension of the far more confused and more costly in terms munications, and missiles can dominate the strike structure into every land, naval, or air of American dead. The proposed model for world’s oceans, ensuring the United States formation.20 Force Employment within the New Opera- and its allies control access to the maritime The end result of this process is a tional Concept will similarly improve the domain that supports 91 percent of the world’s module of combat power that can deploy in effectiveness of American tactical operations commerce. smaller configurations below 5,000 to 6,000— and their efficient integration into opera- Annualized savings resulting from of 2,500, 1,100, and 500—or with augmenta- tions designed to support national strategic change associated with the maneuver-strike- tion from allies or other combat groups for objectives. ISR-sustainment complexes in the various small-scale operations. They can also deploy regional unified commands would also run with other modules (ISR, strike, sustainment) Reorienting Modernization into the tens of billions of dollars as combat- for larger contingencies. However, they do not The compression of reduced C2 over- ant commanders and Service chiefs restruc- require augmentation from higher echelons to head while combining existing single-Service ture the conduct of overseas presence mis- be joint interoperable. With joint C4ISR, these echelons into a flatter, multi-Service integra- sions and determine those overseas facilities formations become building blocks that are tive C2 structure will definitely contribute to they no longer deem operationally useful. The federated to create larger forces as required. long-term cost savings. The point is to reduce method used to identify and capture these Transforming all Service forces into the bloated C2 overhead, a legacy of the Cold savings is a detailed blueprint for change in a mission-focused force packages that can be War, while maximizing ready and deployable Force Design Roadmap. For every capability assembled into larger joint operational forces combat power. Combining the implementa- gap identified, selected equipment sets and is essential if maneuver, strike, ISR, and sus- tion of the integrative command resource supporting jobs will be identified for elimina- tainment capabilities are to be effectively inte- management structures inside the regional tion to liberate resources for investment to grated to pose more complex threats to new maneuver-strike-ISR-sustainment complexes close those gaps. enemies. In practice, this scheme for military with the compression of today’s six regional power depends on evolving integrated, joint unified commands (U.S. European, Central, Closing Thoughts systems and a technical architecture (a set of Pacific, Southern, Northern, and Africa Com- To leverage uncertainty and judiciously building codes) for successful aggregation. mands) into four (potentially U.S. Pacific, select from the warfighting concepts and There are many benefits to this Atlantic, Northern, and Southern Com- technologies of the present to field new inno- approach. Eliminating some of the career mands) would accomplish both objectives: vative organizations and capabilities for the gates on the Service ladder changes career increasing capability while achieving annual- future within the fiscal constraints imposed patterns, allowing more time for lieutenant ized savings in current defense spending of at by economic stringency, the United States colonels and colonels (as well as naval equiva- least $100 billion. should chart a new course into the future. lent ranks) to become educated and qualified Implementing the Navy’s rotational As implied at the beginning of this article, for joint operations—something current readiness model across American (and change in military affairs is inevitable. Bill Service career patterns obstruct. Reorganizing potentially allied) forces would also result in Gates stated it best, warning that when waves ground maneuver forces into 5,000- to 6,000- additional efficiencies, while simultaneously of change appear, “You can duck under the man combat formations under brigadier gen- improving unity of effort and rationalizing wave, stand fast against the wave or, better erals provides a larger, ready, deployable, joint the training, modernization, deployment, and yet, surf the wave.” Put another way, the faster combat force of Soldiers. reconstitution of U.S. and allied forces. Rotat- you can accurately assess a situation, make Another benefit is the appointment of a ing U.S. forces through four readiness train- “good enough” decisions on what to do about brigadier general to command on the tactical ing, deployment, recovery, and reconstitution it, and act decisively to deal with it, the more level. Here, the historical record is illuminat- phases of 6 to 9 months each guarantees a competitive you become.21 ing. Accompanying the first infantrymen larger portion of the current U.S. joint force

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The time has come to begin reorganiz- 4 Scott Gebicke and Samuel Magid, Lessons ponent of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) ing the manpower and capabilities inside the from Around the World: Benchmarking Perfor- during Operation Desert Storm. CENTAF was Nation’s Armed Forces within an integrated, mance in Defense, McKinsey on Government responsible for integrating the offensive air func- (Pittsburgh: McKinsey & Company, Spring 2010), tion throughout USCENTCOM headquarters. joint operational framework to provide a 12–13. 13 Nancy A. Youssef, “Pentagon Rethinking larger pool of ready, deployable fighting forces 5 John Depres, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Value of Major Counterinsurgencies,” McClatchy Whaley, “The Timely Lessons of History: The Newspapers, May 13, 2010. Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy,” Report 14 David A. Deptula and R. Greg Brown, “A the future points toward Prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense and House Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, R–1825– Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air Power smaller, more lethal force NA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, July 1976). Trans- Journal (December 2008), 21. packages designed for lated Soviet after action reviews identify tracked 15 Richard Hart Sinnreich, “Air-Ground Inte- missions of limited duration armored fighting vehicles as the only equipment gration Requires More Than Patchwork,” Lawton and scope capable of operating and surviving in Manchuria’s (OK) Constitution, October 6, 2002, 1. diverse desert, mountain, swamp, and forested 16 Keth W. Balts, “Intell, Satellites + Remotely terrain. The Soviets point to tanks as having been Piloted Aircraft,” Air and Space Power Journal the decisive weapon platform in all of Manchuria. (Fall 2010), 19. Balts writes, “While this evolution on rotational readiness. Building maneuver- 6 For instance, the Chinese counter U.S. occurred at the junior-officer level, a similar one strike-ISR-sustainment complexes inside the military strength in “asymmetric” ways. Instead of occurred at the senior level, although it lagged the regional unified commands is a way to create trying to match U.S. Air Force deep strike capabili- junior-level process by several years. Senior space the foundation for enduring American mili- ties, they are building a large, diverse, and reliable officers served as liaison officers, deployed, and tary power on a global level at a time when the range of conventional ballistic missiles for deep then eventually became permanent members of Nation’s public debt—if honestly calculated precision strike. Instead of trying to match the U.S. theater headquarters as directors of space forces, to include $7 trillion of additional deficit ability to develop and operate advanced aircraft, positions created to facilitate coordination, spending through 2015—will approach $18 they are investing in technologies or entire aircraft integration, and staffing activities in support of trillion.22 and adapt them to their own needs, and comple- space-integration efforts for the combined force air Enduring strategic power is vital in a ment them with similarly obtained advanced sur- component commander.” face-to-air missiles. Instead of trying to match U.S. 17 “Deptula: ISR Surge Will Overwhelm Mili- world where the proliferation of WMD makes Navy aircraft carriers, they are building long-range tary’s Ability to Process Intel,” Inside the Air Force, future operations from large, expensive fixed conventionally armed ballistic missile systems October 23, 2009, 5. installations like those in Iraq and Afghani- designed to attack those carriers and are deploying 18 Jason Sherman, “Army Plans ‘Comprehen- stan extremely dangerous. Instead, land, a network of sensor systems to target them. sive’ Review of How to Modify Brigade Design,” naval, and air forces must mobilize organic 7 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Inside Defense.com, October 26, 2010. combat power that is disproportionate to Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment 19 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: their size and numbers inside an integrated (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, Thoughts on Twenty-first Century Warfare, framework. The future points toward smaller 2001), 242–248. (London: Brassey’s, 1985), 290. but more lethal force packages designed for 8 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and 20 Clearly, the Air Force will need to be con- missions of limited duration and scope, not Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-first vinced that these new strike coordinators know mass armies created for territorial conquest Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), 77. how aircraft, manned or unmanned, fly, how 9 Michael Deane, Ilana Kass, and Andrew they fight, how they are at risk if misused, what and occupation. In this sense, the imple- Porth, “The Soviet Command Structure in Force aircraft can and cannot do, and how to use them mentation of integrated all-arms operations Design,” Strategic Review (Spring 1984), 64–65. with minimal fratricide/collateral damage risk. In within the maneuver-strike-sustainment Notice, however, that fronts (equivalent in size to addition, the Army will need to be convinced that complex outlined here not only promises to American armies) were also fully joint commands. the strike coordinator knows artillery, rockets, save money in national defense, but also pro- When the Soviet Union’s 40th Army deployed to mortars, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, vides the basis for a coherent, unified view of Afghanistan in 1979, it did so as part of a joint what they can and cannot do, what tools are avail- warfare that is missing from today’s Armed task force (JTF) structure that was fully joint. On able, and how to use them with minimal fratricide/ Forces. JFQ the other hand, jointness stopped at the JTF level, collateral damage risk. which caused serious problems on the tactical level. 21 Robert L. Cantrell, Outpacing the Competi- 10 Sir Winston Churchill, quoted by Steven F. tion: Patent-based Business Strategy (New York: NOTES Hayward, Churchill on Leadership (Rocklin, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 260–261. Prima Publishing Forum, 1997), 40. 22 David Stockman, “Four Deformations of the 1 Quoted by Colin Clark, “The Gates Doctrine: 11 Nathan Hodge, “Pentagon Looks to Save Apocalypse,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2010. Avoid Big Land Wars,” DoDBuzz.com, February 27, $100 Billion Over Five Years,” The Wall Street 2011. Journal, June 3, 2010, A11. 2 Miriam Elder, “President Dmitry Medvedev 12 For instance, during Operation Desert Storm, said that Russia should unilaterally claim part of divisions had organic military intelligence (Combat the Arctic, stepping up the race for the disputed Electronic Warfare Intelligence) battalions and energy-rich region,” Reuters, September 17, 2008. signal battalions, while Third Army had a military 3 “Debt, Deficits and Defense: A Way intelligence brigade and a signal brigade. An Forward,” Report of the Sustainable Defense Task example of a parallel external headquarters is U.S. Force, June 11, 2010, 16. Air Forces Central (CENTAF), the Air Force com-

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 29 LinkinMilitary Service Budgets to Commander Priorities

By MARK A. GALLAGHER and M. KENT TAYLOR

n May 2011, the Government Account- Worth noting is the scope of this pro- oversight, and the organizational and opera- ability Office (GAO) reported to the posal. Specifically, it is not our intent to create tional arrangements, both formal and infor- congressional committees on armed an algorithm whereby a bunch of budget mal, among the Office of the Secretary of Services regarding the influence of numbers and COCOM priorities are smashed Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs I together and the output is declared to be the the U.S. combatant commanders (COCOMs) of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command on the development of joint requirements as DOD budget. This analytical approach is System, the Military Departments, and the part of the Department of Defense (DOD) intended to inform DOD decisionmakers, not Congress. acquisition process.1 The increased COCOM role in developing joint requirements was legislated by the Weapon Systems Acquisi- we are proposing quantifiable and tractable measures of how tions Reform Act of 2009 and the Ike Skelton well military department budgets align with COCOM priorities National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The GAO reported mixed results regarding the implementation of the legislation—specifically, they found that to make their decisions for them—that is, we The Packard Commission presented find- the COCOMs are now enfranchised vis-à- do not intend to turn the DOD budget into ings and recommendations organized around vis the Joint Capabilities Integration and an engineering problem. Furthermore, we are four topics in their interim report as submitted Development System (JCIDS) for the devel- not proposing any changes to current authori- to the President on February 28, 1986: opment of military requirements. However, ties; we are simply proposing quantifiable the COCOMs are still at the mercy of the and tractable measures of how well military ■■ national security planning and Services when it comes to actually develop- department budgets align with COCOM budgeting ing the DOD budget and acquiring materiel; priorities. ■■ military organization and command the COCOMs only provide “advisory guid- ■■ acquisition organization and ance to the larger acquisition and budget Establishment of COCOMs procedures processes.” On July 15, 1985, President Ronald ■■ government-industry accountability. In this article, we review the establish- Reagan signed Executive Order 12526 and ment of the COCOMs per the Goldwater- created the President’s Blue Ribbon Commis- Though DOD was faced with an Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- sion on Defense, chaired by David Packard.2 increasing demand for joint planning and tion Act of 1986, briefly discuss the current The final report released in June 1986 quotes DOD resource allocation process, and then President Reagan’s direction for the Packard Dr. Mark A. Gallagher is the Technical Director, propose a construct to evaluate the extent Commission as: Studies and Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons to which the DOD budget is aligned with Learned, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. M. Kent Taylor COCOM operational requirements. We also The primary objective of the Commission is a Senior Operations Research Analyst assigned discuss how to implement this proposal along shall be to study defense management poli- to the Force Structure Analyses Directorate, Studies with advantages and potential concerns based cies and procedures, including the budget and Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned, on implementation of this proposal. process, the procurement system, legislative Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

30 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GALLAGHER and TAYLOR

operations across the domains, the commis- to U.S. Code Title 10 that continue to impact 10 regarding COCOMs, specifically subtitle sion found that the Services were planning the management and functions of DOD. The A, part 1, chapter 6, “Combatant Commands.” and conducting operations as independent, overall congressional intent for the Goldwater- Chapter 6 was subdivided into six sections often competing organizations with little Nichols legislation was outlined in Section 3: and addressed the following topics: collaboration and cooperation. Similarly, the commission found that each Service advo- ■■ to reorganize DOD and strengthen ■■ §161, establishment of COCOMs cated and acquired systems to accomplish civilian authority in the department ■■ §162, assignment of forces to their assigned roles and missions indepen- ■■ to improve the military advice pro- COCOMs dently—as though each Service was the vided to the President, National Security ■■ §163, role of the Chairman of the primary, if not sole, producer and consumer Council, and Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with respect to of its materiel. In rare instances when they ■■ to place clear responsibility on the COCOMs did work together, the Services typically commanders of the unified and specified com- ■■ §164, COCOM responsibilities and closed ranks as a last resort so as to frustrate batant commands for the accomplishment of authorities to Commander Priorities attempts by the Secretary of Defense to missions assigned to those commands ■■ §165, administration and support to impose top-down direction that would other- ■■ to ensure that the authority of the COCOMs wise impede the status quo for the Services. commanders of the unified and specified com- ■■ §166, COCOM budget proposals. Packard Commission recommendations batant commands is fully commensurate with were primarily implemented in two ways. the responsibility of those commanders for the Though two sections and three subsec- First, National Security Decision Directive accomplishment of missions assigned to their tions were added in subsequent legislation 219, dated April 1, 1986, implemented virtu- commands between 1986 and 2003, three sections of ally all of the commission recommenda- ■■ to increase attention to the formulation chapter 6 are of particular interest when it tions that did not require legislative action. of strategy and to contingency planning comes to issues related to DOD budgeting Second, the remaining recommendations ■■ to provide for more efficient use of and resource allocation, notably §163, §164, were addressed via congressional legislation defense resources and §166. Subsection (b) (2) of §163 specifies, that was introduced on November 24, 1985, ■■ to improve joint officer management among other things, that the CJCS “serves as H.R. 3622, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorga- policies as the spokesman for the commanders of nization Act of 1985.” Congress enacted it ■■ to otherwise enhance the effectiveness the combatant commands, especially on as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of of military operations and improve the man- the operational requirements of their com- Defense ­Reorganization Act of 1986, and agement and administration of DOD. mands.” It further specifies that the CJCS President Reagan signed the legislation into shall “evaluate and integrate” information law on October 1, 1986 (Public Law 99–433).3 Section 211 of Goldwater-Nichols legis- related to COCOM requirements, “advise and Goldwater-Nichols made sweeping changes lation created a new chapter in U.S. Code Title make recommendations” to the Secretary of Department of State (S.K. Vemmer)

Secretary Panetta meets with GEN David Petraeus and LtGen John Allen at Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 31 FORUM | Linking Budgets to Commander Priorities

Defense regarding COCOM requirements force training, contingencies, and selected JCIDS process for the development of joint (individually and collectively), and “com- operations. requirements, we focus on the DOD budget- municate” COCOM requirements “to other While COCOMs should focus on ing process and, to a lesser extent, DOD elements of the Department of Defense.” warfighting rather than organizing and acquisition. Otherwise stated, the CJCS is the middle- equipping units, they should be able to The Office of the Secretary of Defense man between the COCOMs and the rest of influence the types of units available. In an (OSD) leads the annual Planning, Program- DOD with respect to COCOM operational analogy to professional sports, the net effect ming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) requirements. of §164 and §166 is akin to a coach having process and builds the DOD budget. The Section 164 addresses COCOM full control of the team on the practice field Army, Navy (which includes the Marines), responsibilities and authorities. Of note, §164 and full control during actual games, but and Air Force begin the PPBE process subsection (b) (1) specifies that the chain having very little say over who is actually by submitting their proposed budgets, of command flows from the President to on the team. Ideally, all levels of the sports called Program Objective Memorandums the Secretary of Defense to the COCOMs. franchise—ownership, coaches, players, and (POMs), to OSD. OSD then leads the It also describes COCOM authorities for support staff—are working together when it Program and Budget Review (PBR), which establishing subordinate commands, orga- comes to decisions on personnel, individual adjusts the Service proposals with inputs nizing their forces, employing their forces, training, team practices, game tactics, and across DOD, including the COCOMs. The and so forth. Finally, §164 specifies the CJCS so forth. PBR product, through the Office of Man- advisory role is established with respect to agement and Budget, becomes the DOD working at the behest of the Secretary of DOD Resource Allocation Process portion of the President’s annual budget. Defense to ensure the COCOMs have “suf- Three interrelated DOD decision In turn, Congress reviews and revises the ficient authority, direction, and control over support systems must be synchronized in President’s budget and sends approved leg- the commands and forces assigned to the order for COCOMs to have the general islation back to the President, who signs it command to exercise effective command over purpose forces they need to accomplish their into law. Each Service budget authorization those commands and forces.” The section assigned missions. The interrelationship includes funding requests to enable it to leaves budget authority for the forces with of these three decision support systems is fulfill its Title 10 responsibility to organize, the military departments so the COCOM depicted in the accompanying figure, along train, and equip forces. Consequently, the may focus on the warfighting missions. The with brief descriptions of each decision Services control the vast majority of the extent of COCOM authority for budgetary support system as posted on the Defense DOD budget. matters is confined to §166; specifically, Acquisition University portal.4 Of the five appropriation categories in COCOM budget proposals are limited to four Given the purpose of this article and the the DOD budget, three are germane to our specific COCOM activities: joint exercises, relative maturity of the COCOM role in the discussion of how materiel is acquired by the

Requirements: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff established JCIDS in 2003 to assess and resolve gaps in military joint warfighting capabilities. To effectively integrate capabilities identification Joint Capabilities and acquisition, the JCIDS guidance (CJCS Instruction 3170.01G Integration and and JCIDS Manual) was developed in close coordination with Development System acquisition regulations (DOD 5000 series).

Budgeting: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). The PPBE Process is the DOD strategic planning, pro- gram development, and resource determination process. DOD Planning, uses PPBE to craft plans and programs that satisfy national Defense Programming, Acquisition Budgeting, and security strategy demands within resource constraints. System Execution Process Acquisition: Defense Acquisition System. DOD uses the Defense Acquisition System to manage the acquisition of weapons systems and automated information systems. Although based on centralized policies and principles, the sys- tem allows for decentralized and streamlined acquisition. The system is flexible and encourages innovation, while maintain- ing strict discipline and accountability.

32 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GALLAGHER and TAYLOR

Services and used by the COCOMs. In practi- Regarding the parochialism in the Services’ ratings to quantify the relative contribution of cal terms, these three categories capture what approach to budgeting, he wrote, “We look specific budget programs to the accomplish- DOD is spending for future materiel, what at our forces horizontally when we think of ment of each COCOM’s assigned military DOD is building now, and what DOD is using combat functions, but we view them verti- missions. These priority ratings would now, respectively: cally in developing the defense budget.”5 The serve as quantitative evaluation criteria to establishment of COCOMs has significantly be included during the PPBE process and ■■ research, development, testing, and modified the requirements process; however, would incentivize the Services to account evaluation (RDT&E) the budget process remains essentially for COCOM priorities in the annual Service ■■ procurement (PROC) unchanged. The COCOMs do submit budget submissions and deliberations. ■■ operations and maintenance (O&M). Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) to OSD and Using the President’s budget submis- the Joint Staff indicating challenges that the sion to Congress from the previous fiscal The current DOD budgeting process budget should address. In addition to this year as a baseline, each COCOM would has perceived problems of inefficiencies. A status quo of making marginal recommen- provide COCOM-weighted priority ratings common complaint is that the Services are dations to the PPBE process, this proposal for the Service’s RDT&E, PROC, and O&M. somewhat parochial (and arguably myopic) would give each COCOM a quantifiable Anyone—in a Service, OSD, the Joint Staff, or in constructing their budgets by advocating prioritized input to Service budgets. Congress—could apply COCOM prioritized and funding new systems that are typically Service- or domain-centric as though the Services were living in a pre–Goldwater- Nichols time warp. When they advocate and a common complaint is that the Services are somewhat fund parochial systems, they often do so at parochial (and arguably myopic) in constructing their budgets the expense of funding the acquisition and O&M for materiel that would provide the COCOMs with joint capabilities (that is, across Services). Service-centric budgeting is A COCOM Priority Rating Proposal ratings to proposals in the next fiscal year’s not a new condition; in fact, it was a problem We propose a prioritized rating schema budget and assess the impact of individual or described by General Maxwell Taylor in so that the Services’ budget alignment with collective changes. For the sake of simplic- his 1960 book The Uncertain Trumpet. In each COCOM’s needs could be evaluated ity, RDT&E and PROC will be considered this book, General Taylor describes the throughout the DOD budgeting process. In together as a composite category for acquisi- budget and strategy obstacles he faced in the particular, we propose that the COCOMs tion (ACQ). ACQ scores are intended to give Pentagon during the mid- and late 1950s. score budget proposals using prioritized long-term preferences across years that are in

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley and Chief of Staff Gen Norton Schwartz testify on fiscal 2012 Service budget request before Senate subcommittee Department of State (S.K. Vemmer)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 33 FORUM | Linking Budgets to Commander Priorities both the baseline budget and the budget being tank programs is $2 billion, the program score affecting that COCOM’s overall score. Funds evaluated. Using ACQ as the sum of RDT&E for tanks by the first COCOM is 2. Similarly, could be transferred between tank units and PROC better indicates the extent of the the second COCOM rates tanks at 0.5, so and plane squadrons without changing acquisition, and it allows the Service budget the product with funding of $2 billion is a the first or second COCOM overall score. to adjust within years to account for cost, program score of 1. The bottom row shows the Thus, COCOM priority ratings that do not schedule, or performance issues. We contend sum of the columns. In particular, the sum of vary much across the programs have little that O&M gives a short-term evaluation, so the program scores, which are the weighted impact on the total scores when the Service we recommend limiting it to just the next products of funding and ratings, indicates the budgets are modified. The third COCOM fiscal year. We recommend using the exact level of support those Service programs (and rated funding ships twice as valuable as plane same years in evaluating these measures in associated program elements) provide to each squadrons, so every additional dollar to fund the baseline and new budget to avoid the COCOM. Subtotals of these scores could be ships has twice the impact on the overall score impacts of production programs starting in used to highlight contributions from various as the same additional dollar allocated to the first year or terminating in the last year sources, such as individual Services or major plane squadrons. The more COCOM ratings of the Future Years Development Program commands. vary across the programs, the more sensi- (FYDP). We also contend that evaluating This illustrates several points. First, tive the overall score is to adjustments in the these budget categories of acquisition (ACQ = each COCOM has a unique military funding. RDT&E plus PROC) and O&M will highlight mission assigned to it. Therefore, each of the Let us examine how these priority ratings would be useful in evaluating a pro- posed alternative in the next budget cycle. the more COCOM ratings vary across the programs, the more Continuing the previous example, consider the alternative funding depicted in table sensitive the overall score is to adjustments in the funding 2. In this instance, a proposal to increase the funding for tank units from $2 billion to $4 billion changes the first COCOM’s the linkages and disconnects between Service COCOMs will prioritize Service programs corresponding product to $4 billion times budgets with the programs (that is, forces differently according to their assigned mili- the priority rating of 1 for a score of 4, or capabilities) required by the COCOMs to tary missions and perception of the likelihood which is a 100 percent increase over the accomplish their assigned military missions. and severity of future operations. The various baseline score of 2. The decrease in funding The other appropriation categories, including priority ratings reflect their COCOM com- for airplanes from $3 billion to $2 billion, military personnel and military construction, manders’ subjective assessments of the rela- with the first COCOM priority weight of will follow O&M and ACQ to align without tive contribution of that Service’s programs 1, causes the product to decrease from the requiring direct COCOM ratings. in accomplishing their current and future baseline of 3 to a value of 2. This proposed In table 1, we show a simplified notional missions in either their assigned geographic measure enables anyone knowing the example to explain the scoring proposal given area or functional responsibilities. A prior- COCOM’s priority rating to calculate the to four separate DOD budget programs: ity rating of zero indicates that the given resulting scores of either funding increases airplanes, ships, tanks, and education. We Service’s program does not contribute to that or decreases. The sum of both these included education as a representative of COCOM’s mission. Hence, Service funding funding changes for the first COCOM is an much of the Service infrastructure that does of unrated programs could change or even be increase to a total score of 6, which is a 20 not directly affect the warfighting capability eliminated without changing the COCOM’s percent increase over the baseline value of of COCOMs. In our proposal, Programs listed overall score. In this example, ships do not 5. Similarly, the combined changes result in in the first column represent a compilation contribute to the first two COCOMs, and a total score increase of 20 percent for the of Service program elements related to the tanks do not contribute to the third COCOM. second COCOM and a 23 percent decrease given program. The Baseline funding in the COCOMs would not be expected to score pro- for the third COCOM. second column of this example could be either grams that indirectly support their mission, The relative values, rather than the the sum of the acquisition over the FYDP or such as professional military education. absolute values, of a particular COCOM’s O&M for equipped units for the next fiscal An intended consequence of this pro- priority ratings are what matter. If the year. For each COCOM, the Priority rating posal is that the Services would be incentiv- ratings are multiplied by a factor, the sum reflects COCOM reliance upon the given ized to reduce their indirect costs to an extent product is also multiplied by the same program in terms of meeting their assigned that did not affect the quality, and hence the factor; however, the percentage change is missions. The Program score is the product ratings, of their operational units. The Ser- not affected. In the first example depicted of baseline funding times the priority rating vices could burden the operational units with in table 1, the priority ratings of the second (that is, the Program score combines the level some indirect costs; however, these additional COCOM are simply a factor 0.5 times the of effort and desirability of those particular costs would make their operational units first COCOM’s ratings. Hence, the percent programs and corresponding operational appear less efficient. Priority ratings of the changes are the same, so if the evaluations units). For the example in table 1, the first same value indicate that programs support are not concerned with the relative differ- COCOM assigned a priority rating of 1 for that COCOM equally; hence, funding could ences of support to different COCOMs, the tanks. Thus, since the baseline funding for be moved between these programs without

34 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GALLAGHER and TAYLOR

Table 1. Baseline Funding and COCOM Priority Rating Example, Part 1

Baseline First COCOM Second COCOM Third COCOM Service funding program (billions) Priority rating Program score Priority rating Program score Priority rating Program Score

Airplanes $3 1 3 0.5 1.5 1 3 Ships $5 0 0 0 0 2 10 Tanks $2 1 2 0.5 1 0 0 Education $1 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL $11 5 2.5 13

Table 2. Alternative Funding and COCOM Priority Rating Example, Part 2

First COCOM Third COCOM Baseline Alternative Service funding funding program Priority Baseline Alternative Priority Baseline Alternative (billions) (billions) rating score score rating score score

Airplanes $3 $2 (−33%) 1 3 2 (−33%) 1 3 2 (−33%) Ships $5 $4 (−20%) 0 0 0 2 10 8 (−20%) Tanks $2 $4 (+100%) 1 2 4 (+100%) 0 0 0 Education $1 $0.5 (−50%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL $11 $10.5 (−5%) 5 6 (+20%) 13 10 (−23%)

Table 3. Revised Funding and COCOM Priority Rating Example, Part 3

First COCOM Third COCOM Baseline Revised Service funding funding program Priority Baseline Revised Priority Baseline Revised (billions) (billions) rating score score rating score product

Airplanes $3 $2 (−33%) 1 3 2 (−33%) 1 3 2 (−33%) Ships $5 $5.5 (+10%) 0 0 0 2 10 11 (+10%) Tanks $2 $3 (+50%) 1 2 3 (+50%) 0 0 0 Education $1 $0.5 (−50%) 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL $11 $11 (0%) 5 5 (0%) 13 13 (0%)

total magnitude of the individual COCOM’s assigned weight; the result would be less Decisionmakers in the PPBE process ratings does not matter. assessed impact of Service budget changes. may determine that the aggregate impact to In a further refinement, OSD or the The Secretary of Defense could assign each the third COCOM is too severe in the pro- Joint Staff could implement this proposal to COCOM its total prioritized dollar sum posal in table 2. A revised funding alterna- reflect specified preferences for the various as an indication of a relative importance tive proposal is shown in table 3. This revi- COCOMs by requiring each COCOM’s of that COCOM mission. For example, a sion increases funding for tanks and ships overall total score, the sum of the weighted geographic COCOM may be given a limit in order to compensate for reduced airplane funding, not to exceed an assigned limit. of twice the summed weighted program funding. This alternative, while adjusting A lower limit would result in some com- funding of a functional COCOM. Prescribed various program funding, has no overall bination of reduced individual ratings limits for the COCOMs’ values would facili- impact to any of the original COCOM’s or reduced number of programs with an tate combining scores across COCOMs. aggregate measures, shown in table 1. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Linking Budgets to Commander Priorities

Implementation law—may apply the approach and use the Whereas current COCOM requirements OSD or the Joint Staff could direct measures to evaluate a budget decision. (for example, as reflected in the COCOM COCOMs to provide scores as proposed. ■■ It highlights the direct linkages (and IPLs) can reflect unconstrained or unrealistic However, the approach could also be imple- potential disconnects) between Service demands, this proposal produces achievable mented partially in at least three ways: budgets and COCOM priorities. indicators of demand since the COCOMs are ■■ It maintains roles and responsibilities bound within the collective Service budgets ■■ Any Service could request the consistent with current Title 10 regulations. in the baseline. Funding exactly the baseline COCOMs to provide scores as part of the Ser- budget again would result in each COCOM vice’s internal POM preparations. First, this proposal is not complicated achieving a 100 percent weighted score. ■■ A COCOM could unilaterally score to understand, implement, or evaluate—the Restricting the COCOM ratings within a the previous President’s budget and announce COCOM prioritized rating schema provides DOD budget baseline, such as the President’s to the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD the desire a clear, transparent, indisputable, quantitative budget submission, enforces that the rationale to maintain the total of weighted funding. indication of each COCOM’s unique priorities in the process at the expense of new and emerging joint military requirements cannot be indicated within this approach. Like the U.S. Army (D. Myles Cullen) analogy to the marketplace, customers can only purchase what is for sale; however, producers are concerned about responding to customer demands to maintain future business. Second, this budget scoring proposal would change the incentives and behavior among and within the Services. Within the Services, there are different communities (for example, major commands) that often compete for a larger portion of their Service’s budget. This scoring system would likely shift the funding allocation toward programs that the various COCOMs rated as high priority. Program managers and unit commanders who want to maintain their funding would want to convince the COCOMs to rate their systems high. Presumably, the best way to advocate for COCOM support would be to deliver desired joint military capabilities. ISAF Joint Command Commander LTG David Rodriguez and Army Chief of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey meet Hence, an expected benefit is increased dia- in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2011 logue between the Services and COCOMs regarding what the COCOMs really require and how the Services can meet these needs. ■■ A Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM) over the vast range of Service programs. Since Thus, the Services would be incentivized to could request the COCOMs to score the the COCOM ratings are confined to a base- add value as perceived by the COCOMs. Service programs under its authority. line, such as the previous President’s budget, Moreover, this proposal would provide the resulting measures are realistic. Given incentive to reduce indirect costs to the extent OSD or the Joint Staff could also direct COCOM priorities, anyone may evaluate a that they do not contribute to adding value one of these partial implementations to test proposed Service budget change and assess its to the COCOMs. The COCOM would not the value of this approach and work out the impact to each of the COCOMs; these mea- generally perceive value in indirect costs that implementation details. sures may influence decisions in the Services the Services encounter to provide capabilities. preparing their budget submissions, in PBR Hence, a COCOM would be unlikely to give Advantages and Potential Concerns discussions among the Services, COCOMs, a priority rating to any indirect program. For This budget scoring proposal has three Joint Staff, and OSD, and in congressional example, we would not expect a COCOM intended main advantages: debates and votes. The score may be evalu- to score professional military education or ated for changes from a single program to academic education. The Service would still ■■ The proposal is simple, quantitative, many changes throughout the budget. These want to continue education to the extent that fiscally constrained, and transparent; anyone COCOM priority weightings would be it provides a perceived quality of its units to throughout the budget process—including a useful in evaluating Service budget options the COCOMs. The Services would have two Service developing its POM, OSD evaluating throughout the PPBE and budget enactment choices: either fund these indirect costs sepa- PBR alternatives, or Congress debating final processes. rately, realizing that education is not going

36 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GALLAGHER and TAYLOR to be scored by the COCOMs, or add the were not readily able to address or prioritize on programs with apparent increased costs “burden” for these costs into their operational future acquisitions. With the increased role of because they would not provide proportion- units. However, as the costs and budgets of COCOMs in the JCIDS requirement process, ally more benefits for the associated resources. the operational units and programs increase, the COCOMs have created the equivalent of A limit on total COCOM scores would further the COCOMs could perceive a decrease in the a J8 office to address future acquisition issues. inhibit high scores for programs with inflated benefit relative to the cost and would likely Hence, while the COCOMs of the late 1980s funding. The transparency and nonbinding reduce the priority ratings. Thus, whether would have difficulty implementing this approach of this proposed process result in the Services leave the indirect costs separate approach, the COCOMs of today have offices little risk of testing this scheme. or incorporated into their budgets for opera- that are already involved in decisions regard- tional units, they would be incentivized to ing future acquisition programs. Goldwater-Nichols legislation estab- minimize indirect costs that do not reflect in Second, COCOMs could attempt to lished the roles of the Services as materiel pro- the quality, and hence, in COCOM priority game the program scores—for example, a viders and COCOMs as materiel customers. ratings. Like corporations, Services would be COCOM commander could inject parochial Subsequent legislation provided COCOMs motivated to control their indirect costs. bias into providing high priority weights for with direct input to the development of operational requirements. This proposal extends those legislative actions by provid- favoring a particular group of programs with high scores does ing a simple approach for the combatant not necessarily increase those programs’ funding commands to provide priority weights and quantitative scores to Service budgets. The net result would be the creation of a “market” Third, Services, not the COCOMs, programs proposed by his own Service. Two where programs (vis-à-vis operational units) retain acquisition responsibility and author- aspects of transparency and impact mitigate compete to initiate and maintain funding. ity, so the Services’ Title 10 responsibilities this risk. First, these commanders would The Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff, OSD, and to organize, train, and equip remain intact. have to withstand scrutiny from OSD, the Congress could use the COCOM program The Services maintain flexibility to address Joint Staff, and Congress. Their priority scores to validate RDT&E, PROC, and O&M issues, such as program cost, schedule, and ratings should match their request for funding and to evaluate potential changes performance tradeoffs. The COCOMs retain forces. After a few years of implementation, in the development of the next budget. The their focus on accomplishing their assigned a significant departure from a predecessor’s COCOMs would be fiscally limited to recom- missions without getting involved in detailed ratings would result in a call for justifica- mend priorities within the existing Service acquisition programmatic issues. tion. If scores lack credibility, they could budgets to ensure realistic requests. The Ser- There are three potential concerns be discounted with a default of returning vices, including their internal fiefdoms, would regarding this budget scoring proposal: to the current process. Second, high or low be incentivized to deliver capabilities that scores do not directly affect the Service the COCOMs highly valued through scores ■■ level of effort required for programs. Favoring a particular group of to maintain their funding. The approach is implementation programs with high scores does not neces- compatible with all existing budget processes. ■■ ability for combatant commands to sarily increase those programs’ funding. The approach may be implemented, at least on game the system High scores from a COCOM would make a partial scale, by any COCOM, Service, the ■■ ability of Services to game the system. the Service have to justify reduced funding; Joint Staff, or OSD. JFQ hence, the Services lose some flexibility First, this proposal requires a relatively from high scores. While low or zero NOTES small amount of overhead for either the scores allow programming flexibility, they 1 Government Accountability Office, “Defense COCOM or Services. Unlike their roles in would undermine any attempt to object Management: Perspectives on the Involvement of developing IPLs or participating in the CPM about those programs being reduced. This the Combatant Commands in the Development of process, the COCOMs do not have to identify double-edged sword of high ratings with Joint Requirements,” available at . JCIDS, IPLs, and CPMs, the COCOMs are budgeting flexibility would tend to enforce 2 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on already evaluating Service programs. This honest ratings. Defense, Final Report, June 30, 1986, available at proposal would provide them a means, with Third, the Services could attempt to . little additional effort, to provide quantita- game this scoring system in a couple of ways. 3 Public Law 99–433, section 3, October 1, tive assessments. The ease of application and First, they could maintain acquisition scores 1986, available at . 4 “DOD Decision Support Systems,” available than the IPLs. budget profiles for RDT&E or procure- at . is that, from inception, the COCOMs tradi- reviewing the approach. Second, the Services 5 Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet tionally had a short-term focus on operations. could inflate their budget values; however, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 123. Hence, the commanders and their staffs the COCOMs would likely reduce ratings ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 37 FORUM | Linking Budgets to Commander Priorities

HARNESSING AMERICA’S POWER

A U.S. National Security Structure for the 21st Century

By PETER C. PHILLIPS and CHARLES S. CORCORAN

uccessfully contending with the with the necessary authority, resources, and ally defined as physical security, economic challenges of the 21st-century oversight to shape the environment and prosperity, value preservation at home, and environment requires an exten- conduct efficient and effective crisis response value projection abroad.1 In the bipolar world S sive overhaul of America’s operations. of the Cold War, national security policy national security bureaucracy. In the execu- primarily focused on defending the homeland tive branch, nearly every department has and major allies from Soviet attack and com- a strategy document citing the need for cooperation among executive munist aggression. The doctrine of the day greater interagency cooperation, but little is agencies is generally a was containment, and the goal was to sup- being done to facilitate such efforts. Current reactive phenomenon, press any problems that arose to prevent esca- authority, funding, and oversight structures lation. Key players in executing this strategy reward independent stovepiped action rather resulting from a cobbled- were the Department of State and Department than interdependent, whole-of-government together response to crisis of Defense (DOD), as well as various intel- approaches to national security issues. As a ligence agencies. result, cooperation among executive agencies Today, while U.S. interests have not is generally a reactive phenomenon, resulting Defining National Security changed, the concept of security has evolved. from a cobbled-together response to crisis, Despite some minor adjustments, the According to a study from the Project on rather than a proactive application of all core organizations and structure of the U.S. National Security Reform: instruments of national power in a concerted national security bureaucracy have remained effort to shape the environment in favor of largely unchanged since their establishment Commander Peter C. Phillips, USN, is a Naval Special U.S. interests. This article proposes a solution. with the signing of the National Security Act Warfare (SEAL) Officer. Colonel Charles S. Corcoran, Specifically, it provides a blueprint for an of 1947. The system was designed to advance USAF, is a Command Pilot with over 2,400 hours in integrated, agile national security apparatus America’s national interests, which are gener- the F–15A-D and the F–22A.

38 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS and CORCORAN

Defense Secretary Panetta conducts first Pentagon press briefing

DOD (R.D. Ward)

National security is the capacity of the United could be contained with reactive engagement. tion in an increasingly open global market States to define, defend, and advance its posi- Applying a similar mindset to the potential has translated directly into rivalry for scarce tion in a world characterized by turbulent security threats of the 21st century could energy resources and worldwide reliance on forces of change. The objectives of national lead to catastrophe. While it is refreshing to a fragile and vulnerable system of currency security include—(i) security from aggression hear the Nation’s leaders espouse a proactive and capital flows. Numerous countries are against the nation by means of a national approach, the unfortunate reality is that the facing demographic challenges, whether capacity to shape the strategic environment; to national security bureaucracy has not kept from aging populations with long-term anticipate and prevent threats; to respond to pace with either the rhetoric or the changing care issues or bulging youth populations attacks by defeating enemies; to recover from concept of security. with limited employment opportunities. In the effects of attack; and to sustain the costs of addition, many governments in the devel- defense; (ii) security against massive societal The 21st-century Environment oping world struggle to provide the most disruption as a result of natural forces, includ- Although changes in the security basic needs, such as food and water, to their ing pandemics, natural disasters and climate landscape are often attributed to the transi- citizens. Simply stated, today’s environment change, and serious challenges to our national tion from a bipolar to a multipolar world, is exponentially more complex than it was economic and financial systems; and (iii) secu- it is perhaps more appropriate to associate even 10 years ago—and the trend is likely to rity against the failure of major national infra- today’s challenges with the transition from continue. The most important actors in this structure systems by means of building robust the industrial to the information age. Stated complex environment are human beings. systems, defending them, and maintaining the another way, if the Soviet Union had not col- Humans make unpredictable choices and as capacity for recovering from damage.2 lapsed, America would likely still be dealing such are the greatest variable in any system. with the issues it faces as a direct result of In the bipolar, industrial age world of 1947, Shifting from a “suppress and contain” globalization. Access to information has led there were far fewer human actors operating to a “shape and solve” mentality is significant. to the erosion of borders and empowerment at the strategic level than there are in today’s Suppression is inherently reactive in nature, of individuals and nonstate organizations, multipolar, information age world where while the desire to manage and solve problems including terrorists, organized criminals, nearly any individual with Internet access efficiently and effectively requires a more nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), can spur an instant global crisis with the proactive approach. Cold War problems and multinational corporations. Competi- push of a button. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 39 FORUM | Harnessing America’s Power

Given this diverse array of challenges, our policies are seen as legitimate in the this bureaucratic dysfunction can be traced it could be argued that America’s “greatest eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.”6 directly to current authority, funding, and vulnerability by far is linked to the legitimacy Ultimately, it is our policy actions and not oversight mechanisms that are inherent in the of our leadership” as we attempt to steward our words that will carry the day, but we must process. the international community through this begin by expanding our national security Authority. In the current system, there new array of nontraditional security threats.3 vocabulary. are two entities in the bureaucracy with the In other words, absent fundamental, system- Another important addition to this authority to direct interagency efforts: the wide changes to the American national secu- acronym is the D for development. The U.S. Chief of Mission (COM) and the Assistant rity apparatus, perhaps the greatest threat to Agency for International Development has to the President for National Security, more America may be America itself. played an integral role in advancing America’s commonly referred to as the National Security soft power image since its foundation in 1961. Advisor (NSA). Per the Foreign Service Act Instruments of Power Despite the agency’s numerous contributions of 1980, the COM is defined as the “principal Legitimate leadership requires smart to furthering U.S. interests, until recently officer in charge of a diplomatic mission of application of all elements of national power. it was rarely included in U.S. foreign policy the United States or of a United States office For many years, the acronym DIME (diplo- dialogue. However, in the past year, the Secre- abroad which is designated by the Secretary matic, informational, military, and economic) taries of State and Defense have both renewed of State as diplomatic in nature, including has been used to describe the instruments the U.S. commitment to the role of develop- any individual assigned under section 502(c) of power. The names of the instruments ment by making it part of their 3D (diplo- to be temporarily in charge of such a mission point directly to the major executive branch macy, development, and defense) approach or office.”9 As noted in the State Department actors in power application: State and DOD, to foreign policy. If American leaders wish Foreign Affairs Manual, “Pursuant to the as well as the Department of Commerce to shape today’s environment, then develop- and intelligence agencies. It is now clear that ment is, without question, a key instrument of “the day is past when a single government national security power. many challenges require agency or organization—even one as large as regional approaches and the DOD—can manage a key foreign policy Geared to Respond issue.”4 While it would be naive to believe Despite the desire for a proactive, whole- multilateral solutions U.S. strategists and policymakers do not of-government approach to U.S. national understand that there is a much wider array security policy, the bureaucracy continues of agencies involved in the development and to operate in a reactive, responsive mode. As President’s letter of instruction, the COM implementation of national security policy, David Rothkopf noted: has authority over every executive branch to further legitimize U.S. leadership for the employee in the host country, except those broader audience, a whole-of-government Despite the best efforts of many national secu- under the command of a U.S. area military term might better define U.S. instruments of rity advisors, efforts to establish strategic plan- commander, or those on the staff of an inter- power. For example, the acronym MIDFIELD ning sections within the NSC [National Secu- national organization.”10 (military, informational, diplomatic, financial, rity Council] have typically faltered. The result Meanwhile, the NSA presides over the intelligence, economic, law, and development) is that the general state of mind within this National Security Council. According to the conveys a much broader array of options (a critical institution is one of constant, frenzied National Security Act of 1947, the “function much larger tool kit) for the strategist and reaction. Planning seems not only a luxury, but of the Council shall be to advise the President policymaker to use. almost a dereliction of duty given the pressures with respect to the integration of domestic, One of the most important additions to of the moment. This would be dangerous under foreign, and military policies relating to the this new acronym is the letter L. Americans any circumstances but it is worse in the absence national security so as to enable the military take great pride that their nation is governed of basic marching orders of the sort that existed services and the other departments and agen- by the rule of law: “Our past, and the past of during the Cold War. Leaders must make a cies of the Government to cooperate more every other nation, tells us that law and war commitment to breaking this cycle.7 effectively in matters involving the national were opposites, two means to resolve differ- security.”11 ences, one guided by commonly agreed-upon According to the vice chair of the 9/11 Simply stated, the COM directs tactical- standards of justice, the other resolved by the Commission, “The interagency process simply level coordination of the instruments of power calculus of power.”5 Reaffirming the Ameri- does not function well. The NSC is over- within a limited geographic area (except the can commitment to the rule of law by simply whelmed and has underperformed.”8 Whole military instrument), while the NSA directs adding it to our national security dialogue of government cannot mean everyone devel- strategic-level coordination in the meeting is a step in the right direction to restoring ops his own plan and then we come together rooms of Washington, DC. As the Center for what Joseph Nye termed soft power, which he and decide which way to go. To break free of Strategic and International Studies Commis- defines as the “ability to get what you want this cycle, the incentives must change. Success sion on Smart Power highlights, this model through attraction rather than coercion or in the organization should equate to finding is ineffective: “U.S. foreign policy institutions payments.” Nye contends that soft power ways to collaborate, systematically and at the are fractured and compartmentalized. Coor- “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s management level, rather than finding ways dination, where there is any, happens at either culture, political ideals, and policies. When for “my agency to win.” The root causes for a relatively low level or else at the very highest

40 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS and CORCORAN levels of government—both typically in crisis approach to the problem.”15 Since regional and Ward did an excellent job stating the case for settings that drive out long-range planning. multilateral coordination is above the COM this missing regional link in the U.S. national Stove piped institutional cultures inhibit authority level, the NSC is left managing day- security bureaucracy: joint action.”12 The report recommends that to-day coordination of interagency efforts to the government “realign agency authorities ensure smart power application in concert Regional cooperation is critical, whether it be and resources to match agency roles and with national policy directives. In addition neighboring countries working together against responsibilities in mission areas ranging to known issues, crisis situations seldom fall mutual threats, or region-wide efforts to estab- from homeland security and combating ter- within the borders of a single COM’s area of lish common security networks, such as the rorism to stability operations and combating responsibility. Even when they do, COMs do [African Union’s] cooperative security archi- WMD.”13 Clearly, the current system does not generally have access to sufficient inter- tecture. Our approach focuses on mutual inter- not promote the application of smart power agency resources to respond independently. ests, fostering interoperability and common to shape the environment, allow for optimal Again, in a crisis situation, the NSC is left situational awareness, regionally-oriented crisis response operations, or foster strategic holding the bag, responsible for managing capacity building, and enhancing relationships thought.14 the response operation. Since the NSC is busy built on trust and cooperation. The more the Many challenges require regional conducting daily policy operations and crisis countries of Africa work together, the greater approaches and multilateral solutions. A response, it does not have time to focus on the likelihood that the continent will achieve perfect example is the effort to counter the its main purpose of providing strategic-level lasting stability.16 threat posed by the narcotics trade, as well advice to the President. as other illicit trafficking, particularly in There is one executive department that Since the military has this unique the Western Hemisphere. According to a has the all-important middle or operational structure and accompanying resources in senior DOD official familiar with the issue, level of both planning and implementation place, it has increasingly been called on to “Although strong bilateral relationships with resources built into its structure: DOD. implement nonmilitary policy. Some combat- several countries have resulted in tactical Organized around regional combatant com- ant commanders, recognizing the interagency successes, strategic victory will be impos- mands, it is uniquely suited to deal with many coordination void at the regional level, have sible without a comprehensive, ­region-wide of these issues. In U.S. Africa Command’s taken steps to improve the situation. Admiral (­multi-lateral), whole-of-government 2010 Posture Statement, General William James Stavridis of U.S. European Command

Air Force Space Command Commander General William Shelton discusses budget request for national security space activities before House Armed Services subcommittee U.S. Air Force (Scott M. Ash) U.S. Air Force

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 41 FORUM | Harnessing America’s Power Boeing

B–52H Stratofortress carrying X−51A Waverider scramjet taxis to runway for test flight designated his State Department advisor as U.S. Southern Command and the new U.S. intermediate level of interagency coordina- his deputy, granting this civilian full authority Africa Command. Both Commands are tion to the bureaucracy would not completely to direct operations in his regional command. envisioned as having a “shaping” rather than solve this issue. To understand the entirety of He also established new branches of his staff warfighting mission. Their goal is to lead U.S. the problem, one must also examine current to coordinate interagency operations (J9) government efforts in ameliorating the sources funding and oversight practices. and public-private operations (J10).17 General of conflict and instability in their regions.19 Funding. Competition among various Douglas Fraser of U.S. Southern Command executive agencies for an increasingly limited has 25 personnel from 13 separate govern- Stewart warns this increased use of slice of the budget pie fosters independent, mental agencies working side by side at Joint the military “poses risks to the coherence rather than integrated, approaches to solving Interagency Task Force–South in Miami. As a of U.S. foreign policy, the image of the U.S. national security challenges. In “Turning senior DOD official recently noted, “Everyone abroad, and the sustainability of U.S. efforts Ideas into Action,” the Project on National in the interagency wants to work together. The to build stable, democratic, and economically Security Reform clearly defined the problem: strain in the system is due to questions of both prosperous states in the developing world.”20 “In the current system, funding is distributed authority and funding.”18 He states, “If not carefully managed, it could program by program, department by depart- Unfortunately, the increasing use of the distort broader U.S. foreign policy goals by ment. In theory, this is designed to produce military to fill the bureaucratic gap is not lost putting a military face on U.S. global engage- desired mission outcomes. In practice, on outside observers and does not bode well ment; undermine development objectives however, the process focuses on means rather for America’s image as a smart powerbroker. in target countries; and exacerbate the long- than ends and relies on policy entrepreneurs As Patrick Stewart noted in his keynote standing imbalance in resources the U.S. within the interagency space to work around address to the 2009 Humanitarian Summit: currently budgets to military and civilian the bureaucratic impediments to achieve suc- components of state-building.”21 cessful mission outcomes.”22 We have seen a trend toward using the DOD’s Interagency coordination authority is Much like the authority issues addressed Regional Combatant Commands as platforms clearly lacking at the regional level, and the already, many of today’s funding chal- for coordinating regional activities of not only military is increasingly called on to fill this lenges are a result of the failure to update a the U.S. military but U.S. civilian agencies. void, perhaps to the long-term detriment bureaucracy put in place following World This trend is most apparent in the cases of of U.S. security interests. Simply adding an War II.23 While this approach may have been

42 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS and CORCORAN

execution.”29 The United States must adopt a resourcing construct that rewards interagency cooperation to achieve strategic ends. To do so, the branch of government charged with allocating resources and conducting oversight will have to change fundamentally its way of conducting business. U.S. Army (Maria L. Asenbrener) Oversight. Every executive depart- ment and agency that receives congressional funding must also answer to Congress. Unfor- tunately, the current committee structures in the legislative branch foster a stovepiped approach to business in the executive. Each department and agency answers to a different committee or committees, reporting on indi- vidual actions and use of allocated resources. No single committee in either the House or Senate has a holistic view of U.S. national security aims. As a result, “little deliberate and regular assessment of policy outcomes occurs, making it difficult to achieve the feedback required to alter flawed strategies, remedy resource shortfalls or build on initial successes. This situation also makes it dif- ficult to hold people accountable for failures or to reward superior performance.”30 Current efforts in Afghanistan provide an excellent illustration of the problem:

USCENTCOM Commander General James Mattis is briefed by Soldiers at Patriot missile site in Southwest Asia The Afghanistan situation . . . provide[s] a daily reminder on Capitol Hill of the pro- appropriate for Cold War policies, it is not an is no systematic cross-agency process in the nounced need for aligning and integrating effective way to confront 21st-century issues, White House for giving agencies guidance strategy and resources. Members of Congress and it is certainly not conducive to a whole-of- for applying resource planning to strategic presently struggle to see the big-picture inter- government, environment-shaping approach priorities.”27 relationship among all elements of national to national security policy.24 Poor resource allocation decisions com- power. Instead of structuring itself to catalyze Funding challenges are exacerbated by pound the authority issues addressed earlier. interagency approaches, Congress reinforces the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In fact, “Between 1990 and 2000, while inter- outdated, department-centric practices. Although OMB has an exceptional reputation national affairs budgets were shrinking and Existing committees examine the activities of for responsive, accurate, and impartial work, the Foreign Service was growing smaller by individual departments and agencies, but no one committee has a whole-of-government perspective on national security. It will take effective allocation of resources is the single greatest aligning congressional structures to 21st- determinant of successful policy execution Century challenges to change this.31

No single agency provides a clearer illus- it is much like other executive agencies in that the year, the budgets of the military regional tration of the dysfunctional oversight issue its “internal culture does not always promote commands grew rapidly. Each of the five area than the Department of Homeland Security cross-agency perspectives and knowledge,” combat commands saw budget increases of at (DHS). DHS was formed after 9/11, melding making it difficult to “carry out true cross- least 35 percent.”28 This growth has led to an together nearly two dozen agencies in order to agency resource planning on a systematic increased use of the military for nonmilitary “better coordinate the government’s resources basis because of stove-piping.”25 While the missions to fill the interagency void at the for handling terrorism and other national NSC and OMB work closely together, it is on regional level. emergencies.”32 While the executive branch an ad hoc rather than a statutory or Presiden- To solve this issue, the incentives must was transforming itself to deal with new reali- tially directed basis.26 So 21st-century security change: “According to budgeting experts, the ties, Congress proved unwilling to give up any issues require cross-agency efforts, but in the effective allocation of resources is the single authority. As a result, “DHS gets marching current resource allocation scheme, “there greatest determinant of successful policy orders from more than 100 committees and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 43 FORUM | Harnessing America’s Power

Marines learn to build Joint Modular Protective System developed by U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremiah Handeland) U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremiah U.S. Navy (Greg Vojtko) U.S. Navy (Greg

Engineer presents briefing on self- sustained solar power array for gunnery range microwave relay towers to be installed at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point

44 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS and CORCORAN subcommittees—a number that has grown insight on the overall execution of national ■■ direct executive departments to dis- in the past seven years, despite the 9/11 Com- security strategy. solve all regional planning and implementation mission’s recommendation to consolidate Implementing this proposal ensures staffs and work with regional bureaus to inte- those tangled lines of authority.”33 Clearly, any execution of NSC-level decisions through grate former department-level functions in the meaningful national security reform proposal a unified interagency regional command, newly established interagency regional bureaus must include an overhaul of the congressional providing the foundation for unity of effort ■■ direct NSC to focus on national grand committee structure to improve the way Con- and a whole-of-government approach on all strategy and the regional bureaus to conduct gress participates in the process. issues. Simply establishing such a common day-to-day implementation of strategy and organizational structure familiar to all par- crisis response within regions A Proposed Solution ticipating agencies would likely yield a more ■■ establish permanent OMB–NSC coor- By examining the weaknesses and efficient process—one in which success would dination office on NSC staff responsible for strengths in the current system, we can become more dependent on sound policy than oversight of funding for regional interagency develop a sound model for reform. Weak- the ability of select individuals to overcome commands. nesses include the lack of an authorized inter- institutional parochialism while navigating a agency leader between the COM and NSA maze of bureaucracies. Critics of such drastic reform would levels, and a stovepiped approach to funding Specific proposals include that Congress likely point to several areas of concern, includ- and oversight that promotes individual should: ing increased size of the bureaucracy, diluted agency successes rather than overall national authority for COMs, blurring of the military security goals. Strength lies in unity of effort ■■ mandate alignment of foreign policy chain of command, and unsuitability of this and command at the strategic level with the actors under regional bureaus (grant regional model to the homeland security mission. Each regional combatant command approach to bureaus authority to execute, as directed by of these criticisms deserves further explana- engagement and partnership-building. Meanwhile, today’s environment demands collective regional and multilateral placing regional staffs from disparate agencies in the same approaches to solve the major security chal- room and on the same team will decrease duplication of lenges faced by the community of nations. effort and free up resources The sum of this analysis lends itself to the following conclusion: the United States must develop a civilian-led interagency structure the President, all foreign policy actions within tion. First, this initiative would decrease the with the authority, funding, and oversight to geographic boundaries; and direct agencies to overall size of the bureaucracy and make act at the regional level. assume force provider functions for regional it more integrated and agile. The proposal Regional, civilian-led (Presidential bureaus) combines the regional bureaus at the Depart- appointees confirmed by the Senate), ■■ streamline funding of foreign policy ment of State, DOD, and regional combatant interagency bureaus charged with applying by moving execution funding from individual commands, as well as the regional staffs at the all U.S. instruments of power, including agencies under various authorities to regional NSC. Other agencies or departments, such military, within their geographic area would bureaus under a single authority for each as some of the military Services, could shed solve many of the problems with the current region regional staffs as well. Placing regional staffs system. First, the bureaus would free up the ■■mandate OMB–NSC collaboration to from disparate agencies in the same room and NSA and NSC to focus on national-level ensure continuity of resource-policy discus- on the same team will decrease duplication of strategy. In the current system, the NSA and sions from administration to administration34 effort and free up resources. NSC must coordinate day-to-day interagency ■■ reorganize congressional committee Critics contend this initiative would operations for everything above the COM structures to ensure proper funding and over- dilute the authority of the COM. On the level. Regional interagency bureaus could sight of regional national security bureaus contrary, that authority would not change. handle most if not all of these duties, includ- ■■ mandate professional interagency edu- The COM would remain the President’s ing normal shaping and engagement as well cation and interagency career paths as mile- representative on the scene and maintain the as crisis response. Cross-region issues may stones/promotion requisites for both military authority for all interagency activities within still require arbitration at the national level, and civilian personnel. the appointed area. No longer will the COM but it would be arbitration with a few high- need to report to a regional bureau at the State level commanders rather than numerous Also, the President should: Department, coordinate interagency issues agencies. Second, regional bureaus would with various Washington-based agencies, or require a new method of budgeting. Each ■■direct the NSC to develop a staffing appeal to the NSC for arbitration of conflicts. region chief would submit a national security plan for each regional bureau. Every region, Instead, the COM can handle those issues budget for his area of responsibility, outlining with the exception of North America, should with one phone call to the respective regional a holistic view of regional resource applica- have the same organizational structure. The interagency chief. tion to implement the overall national secu- structure for the North American region The potential to blur the military chain rity strategy. This system would also provide requires unique features due to homeland of command is another concern with this an improved opportunity for congressional legal issues. reform. The current chain of command flows ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 45 FORUM | Harnessing America’s Power from the President to the Secretary of Defense interests. The only real choice is clear: the 19 Patrick Stewart, “Impact of the Department to the regional combatant ­commander. This United States must transform the national of Defense Initiatives on Humanitarian Assis- reform advocates a chain of command from security bureaucracy to confront today’s tance,” keynote address to the 2009 Humanitarian Summit, Cambridge, MA, March 2009, qtd. in Pre- the President to the regional interagency chief security challenges. hospital and Disaster Medicine, vol. 24, supplement to the regional combatant commander, a Change in any organization is difficult, 2, s239. linkage that maintains civilian control of the but it is even more so in the politically charged 20 Ibid., s240. military and does not unnecessarily lengthen environment of Washington, DC. Reform 21 Ibid. the chain of command. The Secretary of requires a bipartisan effort as well as congres- 22 PNSR, v. Defense would still advise the President. sional and executive leadership. According 23 Ibid., 77. Additionally, this structure would likely to the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, 24 Ibid. increase the chance of success because the “Our long-term security will come not from 25 Ibid., 62. interagency chief in charge of U.S. strategy our ability to instill fear in other peoples, but 26 Ibid., 68. 27 for the region would direct the application of through our capacity to speak to their hopes.”36 Ibid., 69. 28 military force. For example, such ownership Unless and until we reform our national secu- Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in U.S. Foreign would likely increase interagency involve- rity bureaucracy, we will be unable to achieve Service (Washington, DC: Georgetown University ment in postconflict planning and improve such noble strategic security goals. JFQ Press, 2008), 117. its quality. 29 Ibid., 47. Finally, some may argue this model 30 PNSR, 14. NOTES is not adaptable to the U.S. Northern 31 Ibid., vii. Command region and homeland security 32 Karen Tumulty and Ed O’Keefe, “History 1 Terry Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic mission. This criticism fails to recognize the Shows Obama’s Effort to Reorganize Government for American Statecraft (New York: Cambridge connection between national security and Could Be an Uphill Battle,” The Washington Post, University Press, 2007), 126. January 28, 2011. homeland security, which are, in the age of 2 Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), 33 Ibid. globalized terror, one and the same. Unique Turning Ideas into Action (Washington, DC: PNSR, 34 George and Rishikof, 75. legal aspects and coordination issues of September 2009), 179. 35 Ibid., 2. homeland defense must be addressed, but 3 David Rothkopf, Running the World: The 36 National Security Strategy (Washington, those cannot be impediments to implement- Inside Story of the National Security Council and the DC: The White House, May 2010), iii, available ing the overall regional interagency system Architects of American Power (New York: PublicAf- at . 4 Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The This article offers a proposal to restruc- National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Laby- rinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University ture the U.S. national security bureaucracy to Press, 2011), 332. achieve the tasks our nation has so eloquently 5 Rothkopf, 463. outlined on paper but has yet to implement. 6 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success In the current system, the “basic deficiency in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), x. is that parochial departmental and agency 7 Rothkopf, 458–459. interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze 8 PNSR, 13. the interagency cooperation even as the 9 Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual variety, speed, and complexity of emerging Volume 2 Handbook 2—Post Management Organi- security issues prevent the White House zation, September 22, 2010, 2–3, available at . 10 The failure to build a new national security Ibid., 3–4. 11 Rothkopf, 5. structure leaves the United States with two 12 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., equally unattractive options. First, continue CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More th to react to the world in 20 -century fashion, Secure America (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, using hard power, including the use of force, 2007), 7–9. to resolve problems. The likely result of such 13 Ibid., 18. a course is a continued decline in American 14 Smart power refers to the application of both soft power, an increasing drain on a severely hard and soft power. Using smart power refers to strained economy, and, in the long run, a making the correct choice between hard and soft less secure America. The second option is to power to achieve the intended strategic results. 15 withdraw from the world stage. While this National Defense University lecture. 16 approach may seem more attractive in the General William Ward, USA, U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement, March 9–10, 2010, 11. short term, particularly given current fiscal 17 Coordinating public-private operations refers constraints, it is also likely to result in a drain to government efforts to coordinate with nongov- of soft power, as well as a long-term security ernmental organizations. environment that is less favorable to U.S. 18 National Defense University lecture.

46 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARKIN

Marine instructs Senegalese and Malian counterterrorism team members on tactics prior to urban terrain environment training scenario

U.S. Air Force (Jeremiah Erickson)

eterrence is back. Although the Cold War concept lost its The Limits of centrality in security policy for D many years, the United States embraced a modified version of it in its 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies.1 The Tailored Deterrence original concept of deterrence—preventing an attack by credibly threatening unacceptable By SEAN P. LARKIN retaliation—has been reborn as tailored deter- rence. Tailored deterrence seeks to customize whole-of-government deterrence strategies to specific actors and scenarios. Ideally, this approach would address the flaws in rational deterrence theory, which assumes that adver- saries will make decisions exclusively on the basis of the expected costs and benefits of a contemplated course of action. However, the U.S. approach to tai- lored deterrence largely ignores decades of theoretical development and criticism of rational deterrence theory. The Department Colonel Sean P. Larkin, USAF, is Commander of of Defense (DOD) Deterrence Operations the Global Threat Analysis Group, National Air and Joint Operating Concept (DO–JOC) describes Space Intelligence Center, at Wright-Patterson Air a deterministic approach that combines Force Base, Ohio. rational deterrence theory with effects-based ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 47 FORUM | The Limits of Tailored Deterrence

Most theorists and practitioners agree theoretical quest for a complete understand- on deterrence’s requirements. A deterring ing of the art of intimidation. actor must communicate to an opponent a Robert Jervis adroitly categorized the credible threat that is of sufficient magni- development of deterrence theory into three tude to change the results of the opponent’s waves.7 The first wave of deterrence theory cost-benefit analysis.5 However, agreement emerged immediately after World War II on deterrence’s broad definition and require- as academics struggled to understand the ments has not settled the long-running implications of the atomic bomb for war and dispute over its effectiveness or proper role international relations. Bernard Brodie and in national security policy. More than a half- others led the wave with their 1946 book, The century of debate has produced a diverse, Absolute Weapon, which presciently discussed compelling, and incomplete collection of the possibility of a nuclear arms race and DOD theories that cannot reliably predict or explain remarked that in “the atomic age the threat deterrence success or failure. of retaliation is probably the strongest single Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept 8 Version 2.0, December 2006 means of determent.” The authors grasped Evolution of Deterrence Theory the Pyrrhic nature of victory in a nuclear The advent of the nuclear age elevated exchange, leading to Brodie’s famous observa- the concept of deterrence to prominence tion that the U.S. military must shift its focus ­operations concepts. Consequently, tailored in U.S. academic and governmental circles. from winning wars to averting them.9 deterrence neglects some of the most impor- tant elements of contemporary deterrence theory, including the uncertainty and cogni- tive biases inherent both to intelligence assess- the incomparably destructive power of nuclear weapons and ments and to international relations. Cold War bipolarity triggered a theoretical quest for a complete While deterrence remains relevant, the understanding of the art of intimidation U.S. objective to “decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus”2 over- states tailored deterrence’s potential and does Deterrence was particularly attractive to The second wave of deterrence theory not adequately acknowledge its shortfalls. many American academics since it was con- followed in the 1950s. Confronted with the The U.S. approach to tailored deterrence is sistent with the Realist school of international nuclear-armed superpower standoff that flawed because of its reliance on two errone- relations to which they already subscribed.6 first-wave theorists predicted, second-wave ous assumptions: that the Nation can reliably Although deterrence was an old concept, the scholars sought to define how to prevent a assess an adversary’s decision calculus, and incomparably destructive power of nuclear disarming Soviet first strike. In 1958, Albert that it can decisively influence an adversary’s weapons and Cold War bipolarity triggered a Wohlstetter warned that a small nuclear choices. The United States must recognize that deterrence is a blunt instrument, not a scalpel, and modify its deterrence strategies accordingly.

Deterrence Definition and Requirements The persistent popularity of deter- U.S. Air Force (Robert Barney) U.S. Air Force rence can largely be attributed to its apparent simplicity. It is not difficult to understand the concept of intimidating or otherwise convincing an adversary not to take an action. DOD defines deterrence as “prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”3 Theorists further subdivide deterrence into two categories: deterrence by punishment is the threat of retaliation if an adversary takes an action; deterrence by denial is the threat of successfully defeating an adver- Joint terminal attack controllers and tactical air control party Airmen conduct overwatch and close air sary’s action.4 support training

48 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARKIN U.S. Army (Martin Greeson)

Joint U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command logistics workshop participants discuss Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and Joint Operating Environment arsenal would be insufficient for deterrence, second-wave extended deterrence theory was unitary actors—the theory does not address and counseled that “to deter an attack means Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to leadership personalities or internal politics.15 being able to strike back in spite of it.”10 chance.” This concept holds that ambiguous In addition to rational deterrence Thomas Schelling employed game theory to or implausible threats can still deter aggres- theory’s three formal assumptions, there are demonstrate that the probability of conflict sion between nuclear powers since even a several implied requirements. The theory is between adversaries depends on their per- conventional test of extended deterrence risks limited in scope since it only deals with hostile ceptions of each other’s intentions and their inadvertent nuclear war.14 relationships between states.16 The theory fear of being attacked first.11 Thus, a secure Second-wave deterrence theory is requires that actors incorporate new infor- second-strike capability and clearly com- also known as rational deterrence theory mation into their decisionmaking process, municating a threat to retaliate became the since it relies on specific assumptions about so they realize when a prospective gain has bedrock of second-wave theory. the actors involved. First, rational deter- turned into a loss. Actors must also consider These theorists also grappled with the rence theory assumes that the actors are the probabilities of various possible outcomes concept of extended deterrence. Schelling rational and that they will make choices that when making a decision.17 Finally, the theory’s considered deterrent threats to respond to an maximize their expected utility according principle explanatory assumption implies that attack on the defender’s homeland inherently to microeconomic theory. In other words, all actors have the same risk tolerance.18 credible, while threats to extend deterrence to actors will always make decisions in order Second-wave theory proved persuasive, allies “must be made credible.”12 Second-wave to maximize their gains and minimize their and Washington dutifully implemented theorists postulated several ways to make losses. Second, the theory relies on a prin- many of its prescriptions.19 The United States extended deterrence threats convincing, ciple explanatory assumption: the only dif- developed a large nuclear second-strike including maintaining a reputation of loyalty ference between actors’ behavior stems from capability, strove to establish the credibility to one’s allies, stationing forces in defended differing opportunities, not other influences of its extended deterrence commitments, countries, and convincing the adversary such as culture or norms. Third, consistent and occasionally attempted to make Moscow that retaliation would be essentially auto- with its Realist origins, second-wave theory doubt Washington’s restraint.20 Second-wave matic.13 Perhaps the most powerful aspect of assumes that states will behave as if they are deterrence theory provided a cost-effective ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 49 FORUM | The Limits of Tailored Deterrence

U.S. Navy (Emmanuel Rios)

Army Special Forces Soldier leads Iraqi special operations soldiers in movement techniques during foreign internal defense training in Baqubah, Iraq

Sailors conduct patrol boat maneuver training for maritime security and combat operations against small tactical, waterborne, and unconventional warfare units

U.S. Navy

50 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARKIN way for the Nation to pursue the ends of its Despite the success of the empirical and Such tailoring requires an in-depth under- containment strategy. psychological approach in casting doubt on standing of the capabilities, values, intent, Robert Jervis identified the third rational deterrence theory, third-wave theory and decision making of potential adversaries, wave of deterrence theory as beginning in did not resolve the deficiencies it identi- whether they are individuals, networks, or the 1970s with the search for evidence to fied.28 No grand unified theory of deterrence states. Deterrence also depends on integrating support or refute the second wave.21 The emerged in the decades after Jervis identified all aspects of national power.”32 third wave successfully applied both empiri- the trend. Third-wave deterrence theory did Defining Tailored Deterrence. Despite cal analysis and psychology to question the not replace rational deterrence theory, but it the change in administrations, the 2006 assumptions and implications of second- did create an intellectual counterweight to its DO–JOC remains the definitive open- wave theory. influential antecedent. source description of the U.S. approach to Empirical analysis, most famously Deterrence theory continued to evolve tailored deterrence. U.S. Strategic Command Alexander George and Robert Smoke’s 1974 in concept and application as theorists and (USSTRATCOM) led the creation of the Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, found strategists reframed their views to reflect document, but it reflects a DOD-wide concept that the history of conventional deterrence significant world events. The end of the Cold that was approved by Secretary of Defense failures did not support the predictions of War shifted attention from the Soviet Union Donald Rumsfeld.33 Since its publication, second-wave theory. Even when the theoreti- to deterring rogue states; the 9/11 attacks USSTRATCOM leaders have repeatedly cal conditions for success (that is, commit- stimulated more discussion of deterring non- reemphasized the DO–JOC’s principles for ment, communication, and a credible threat) state actors and their sponsors. Ultimately, the “waging deterrence,” finding them “perfectly were met, deterrence often failed in the United States sought an approach that would satisfactory” as recently as 2010.34 real world.22 Third-wave theory contended apply to the entire spectrum of challenges. The DO–JOC seeks to describe how that the second wave failed to incorporate DOD will work with the rest of the U.S. critical factors, including variations in the U.S. Policy and Tailored Deterrence Government to “decisively influence the aggressors’ risk-taking propensity, utility of President George W. Bush’s administra- adversary’s decision-making calculus in order rewards in addition to threats, and influence tion introduced the term tailored deterrence to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital of domestic politics on decisionmakers.23 The into U.S. national policy documents in 2006 interests.”35 The Nation must identify which adversaries it wishes to deter and what actions they are to be deterred from taking, then psychological factors often cause decisionmakers to behave in tailor operations to the characteristics of each ways that contradict rational deterrence theory’s assumptions adversary and scenario.36 The DO–JOC assumes that adversary decisions to act or not are based on deliberate third wave also focused more analytical effort with the release of the administration’s second calculations of the value and probability of on the aggressor’s decisionmaking process National Security Strategy (NSS) and Qua- the outcome of alternate courses of action. as opposed to the second wave’s nearly drennial Defense Review (QDR). These docu- It also assumes that the United States can exclusive emphasis on the credibility of the ments represented a major shift in national identify and assess at least some elements of defender’s threats.24 security policy, as President Bush’s 2002 NSS each adversary’s decision calculus.37 Beyond Consequently, third-wave theorists had downplayed the effectiveness of deter- these assumptions, the DO–JOC breaks the sought to demonstrate that psychological rence and advocated preventive war to remove adversary decision calculus down into three factors often cause decisionmakers to behave threats from rogue states.29 elements: benefits of an action, costs of an in ways that contradict rational deterrence Four years and one such preventive action, and consequences of restraint (that is, theory’s assumptions. Misperception is war later, however, the Bush administration what could happen if the adversary does not one of the most important psychological resurrected and reinvented deterrence. The take the contemplated action). factors—the defender may misunderstand the 2006 QDR heralded a shift “from ‘one size The DO–JOC also assumes that the threat, and the aggressor may fail to appreci- fits all’ deterrence to tailored deterrence for United States will be able to influence at least ate the defender’s resolve and/or capability to rogue powers, terrorist networks and near- some adversary “values and perceptions rel- retaliate.25 Contrary to the requirements of peer competitors.”30 The QDR offered few evant to their decision-making.”38 It states that rational deterrence theory, third-wave theory details on how the new brand of deterrence the methods the Nation will employ to achieve proposes that decisionmakers are not good would operate; the 2006 DO–JOC served this its ends will be “credibly threatening to deny at estimating risks and cannot make fine purpose. benefits and/or impose costs while encourag- adjustments to cost-benefit analysis based The Obama administration appears to ing restraint.”39 The DO–JOC envisions mili- on anything but the most drastic change in have continued the Bush-era tailored deter- tary deterrence operations as part of a larger probabilities.26 Similarly, powerful cognitive rence policy unaltered. The 2010 NSS and national deterrence strategy that integrates all biases affect both sides of the deterrence QDR discuss tailored deterrence in much elements of national power. These interagency relationship. Since people prefer consistency the same terms as their 2006 predecessors.31 activities are to be conducted on a daily basis to dissonant information, actors are likely to According to the 2010 QDR: “Credibly during peacetime, crisis, and war.40 interpret new information in accordance with underwriting U.S. defense commitments will The DO–JOC purports to offer “a new preexisting beliefs.27 demand tailored approaches to deterrence. approach to understanding the ways and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 51 FORUM | The Limits of Tailored Deterrence U.S. Air Force (Brian J. Valencia) U.S. Air Force

B−2 Spirit stealth bomber performs flyover at air show

means necessary to achieve the ends of deter- actor assumptions, requiring instead that each effects and systems perspective—had a rence.”41 Despite the document’s use of an adversary be viewed as a complex system of profound impact on tailored deterrence. First, effects-based operations and transformational unique decisionmakers. The DO–JOC also the DO–JOC states that deterrence planning lexicon, however, the DO–JOC describes little uses third-wave theory by allowing for varia- must include identifying what effects the that is new. When compared to its theoretical tions in adversaries’ risk-taking propensities. United States desires to have on an adversary’s roots, tailored deterrence appears to be old Nevertheless, tailored deterrence largely decision calculus.44 The doctrinal use of wine in a new jar. ignores some of the most important elements effects leads the DO–JOC to seek measures What Theory Drives the Practice? The of third-wave theory. The DO–JOC pays of effectiveness in order to assess the success DO–JOC approach to tailored deterrence— little attention to psychological factors that or failure of deterrent actions. The document “credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or undermine deterrence, including cognitive initially acknowledges the near impossibility impose costs while encouraging restraint”42— barriers to perception and decisionmaking. of measuring the contribution of deterrent is an amalgam of second- and third-wave The DO–JOC acknowledges and discusses actions to adversary restraint. However, the deterrence theory, heavily influenced by several areas of uncertainty, but presents these DO–JOC goes on quixotically to discuss how effects-based operations concepts. Denying ambiguities as solvable problems rather than such elusive metrics should be constructed.45 benefits and imposing costs are simply inescapable fog and friction. The DO–JOC’s This approach to assessment clearly empha- alternate names for deterrence by denial language indicates that tailored deterrence sizes the deterministic perspective of effects- and deterrence by punishment, respectively. based operations over the views of both Encouraging restraint incorporates Schelling’s second- and third-wave deterrence theorists, and third-wave theorists’ ideas of offering the denying benefits and imposing who maintain that deterrence success is dif- adversary reassurance or rewards for main- costs are simply alternate ficult to assess in historical retrospect, much taining the status quo.43 less in real time.46 The DO–JOC relies on many second- names for deterrence by Second, and more revealing, is the wave assumptions but rejects others in favor denial and deterrence by DO–JOC’s statement that “a systems approach of third-wave considerations. Consistent punishment, respectively to understanding the adversary and the with rational deterrence theory, the DO–JOC operating environment underpins deterrence assumes that choices are based on rational operations.”47 The systems perspective in calculations of the expected costs and benefits owes more to the deterministic concepts of joint doctrine emphasizes understanding an of an action. Similarly, the DO–JOC accepts effects-based operations than it does to the adversary by constructing models of inter- second-wave theory’s implied assumption that more Clausewitzian cautions of third-wave related systems in order to identify effects actors will continually incorporate new infor- deterrence theory. and centers of gravity.48 As many critics have mation into their decision calculus. However, Although effects-based operations con- pointed out, however, the systems approach tailored deterrence rejects second-wave theo- cepts were never fully incorporated into joint is most appropriate for understanding and ry’s principle explanatory and unitary rational doctrine, two elements that were absorbed— predicting effects on closed systems, such as

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U.S. Air Force (Joe Davila) electrical powergrids. Open systems, such as and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait as other societies and national leadership structures, case studies of deterrence failures.51 In all tend to defy both the systems approach to these examples, the defenders assessed that understanding them and deterministic, their presumably rational adversary would effects-based attempts to influence them.49 refrain from action because upsetting the status quo would result in a net loss. Assessing the Adversary Decision However, the deterrence failures listed Calculus above cannot be attributed to irrationality. Tailored deterrence requires that the As Keith Payne observed, there is an often United States understand each adversary’s unappreciated difference between rational decision calculus with a high level of certainty and reasonable decisionmaking.52 If actors in order to design deterrent actions that will are rational, they make decisions that achieve decisive influence over adversar- logically link to their objectives. However, ies’ choices. However, tailored deterrence’s whether or not an actor’s decisions are assumptions oversimplify the basis on which reasonable is a matter of perspective. If an people make decisions. People make choices outside observer does not share or under- based in part on their perceptions of expected stand the adversary’s goals and values, the utility, but they are also influenced by other adversary’s decisions may appear unreason- factors, including their personal perspectives able, and will therefore be unpredictable.53 and cognitive biases. Many of these factors Second-wave theory and tailored deterrence are enigmatic even to the actors themselves, both correctly assume that irrational actors making the decision calculus exceptionally are rare, but fail to appreciate how little this difficult to assess and leaving adversaries’ assumption matters when compared to the choices largely unpredictable. impact of the actors’ divergent perspectives History provides many examples of on a deterrence relationship. Minuteman III ICBM launched from Vandenberg deterrence failures in which the defender The Adversary’s Perspective. Opposing Air Force Base intercepted target over 4,000 miles misunderstood the adversary’s decision leaders frequently see the world uniquely away in Marshall Islands calculus and was therefore surprised by an because of the large differences in the leaders’ “irrational” action. Keith Payne cites the individual expectations and beliefs. Cogni- Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, China’s tive psychology shows that all people develop differing contexts, leaders may interpret the entry into the Korean War, and the Soviet unique belief systems, or schemata, based on same situation quite differently. For example, deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba as their experiences, to help organize and inter- while the United States confidently concluded examples in which U.S. estimates of the pret information. These schemata are neces- that China would stay out of the Korean War, adversary decision calculus predicted the sary to functioning in a complex world, but Mao Zedong attacked the U.S. Eighth Army opposite outcome.50 Janet Gross Stein uses they also “constrain and condition how and in North Korea because he probably believed Egypt’s 1973 surprise attack against Israel what leaders perceive.”54 As a result of these China was being encircled by America.55 Leaders’ perceptions are also shaped by U.S. Navy (Eric Tretter) the mental shortcuts, or heuristics, that all people use to selectively process and recall information. One of the most powerful Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS heuristics results in the availability bias—the Maryland transits Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway tendency for people to interpret events in terms of other events they can easily remem- ber.56 This results in leaders being dispropor- tionately influenced by historical events that they or their country experienced directly.57 Saddam Hussein’s perspective on combat in the Iran-Iraq War led him to disregard U.S. airpower; he similarly concluded from the U.S. experience in Lebanon that America was casualty averse and would not be able to remove him from Kuwait.58 Third-wave theory also maintains that domestic political considerations are often a critical factor in adversaries’ decisions. This factor is consistent with Jervis’s observation that leaders often make a decision based on ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 53 FORUM | The Limits of Tailored Deterrence

U.S. and South Korean marines practice weapons handling during interoperability training program

U.S. Marine Corps (John Kennicutt) one value dimension (for example, domestic Analysts also tend to be biased toward This tendency results in defensive avoidance politics) without fully considering its impact viewing the adversary’s actions as the result techniques to selectively process information on other dimensions.59 Thus, Anwar Sadat’s of centralized direction and to underestimate that supports their favored policy to reduce primary concerns in 1973 were domestic other explanations, such as coincidences, acci- anxiety. In May 1967, pressure from domestic politics, regaining lost honor, and the con- dents, or mistakes.63 The centralized direction and Arab constituencies probably motivated sequences of not attacking, rather than the bias is particularly troublesome for the analy- Egypt’s overestimation of its chances of probable military outcome.60 sis of an adversary decision calculus since it winning a war with Israel. Egypt’s leaders The Deterrer’s Perspective. In its esti- causes analysts to “overestimate the extent initially assessed that war would result in low mation of the adversary decision calculus, to which other countries are pursuing coher- benefits and high costs. However, contrary the United States is constrained by the same ent, rational, goal-maximizing policies” and to rational deterrence theory’s requirements, cognitive barriers that influence an adver- to “overestimate the predictability of future Egypt’s leaders reversed their estimate a few sary’s viewpoint, as well as other biases that events in other countries.”64 The power of this weeks later and chose war.67 commonly undermine intelligence analysis bias and the unpredictability of even a well- Third-wave theory and case studies and policymaking. known adversary were highlighted in 1962, demonstrate that misperception and bias Intelligence estimates are prone to the shortly before the United States discovered are the norm, not the exception, in intel- bias of mirror-imaging, which is the assump- Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Washington ligence and international relations. Given the tion that the adversary thinks and operates erroneously concluded in a Special National pervasive nature of such misperceptions, the like the analyst’s country.61 Mirror-imaging Intelligence Estimate that the Soviet Union assumption that the United States can reli- is closely related to the availability heuristic, would not put offensive weapons in Cuba ably assess an adversary’s decision calculus since when reliable intelligence is lacking, because such a move would be inconsistent is clearly in error and represents a significant analysts and policymakers will tend to fill in with the observed patterns of Soviet behavior flaw in tailored deterrence. the blanks with information that is readily and American estimates of Nikita Khrush- recalled: their nation’s capabilities, plans, and chev’s decision calculus.65 Influencing Adversary Choices intentions. For example, Israel’s emphasis on Decisionmakers may also be affected The U.S. assumption that it can deci- airpower drove it to judge Egypt’s readiness by motivated biases, which result from sively influence an adversary’s choices is in 1973 by an Israeli standard. Due to this subconscious psychological pressure that the second flaw in tailored deterrence. This mirror-imaging, Israel ignored compelling distorts perception. Motivated biases differ assumption is erroneous for three reasons. evidence of an imminent Egyptian attack, from cognitive biases because the source First, misperceptions and biases limit an believing that Sadat would be deterred at least of the error is the person’s fear and needs, actor’s ability to send effective deterrent until Egypt reconstituted its air force.62 rather than expectations or cognitive limits.66 messages. Second, adversaries are similarly

54 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARKIN constrained in their understanding of such North Vietnamese behavior via incremental deterred since such messages would seek only signals. Third, tailored deterrence campaigns airstrikes and carefully calibrated force to reinforce an existing perception. are limited by a lack of interagency unity of deployments. Although these messages were Since adversaries’ beliefs are resistant effort and inescapable friction in execution. sent from the highest levels of government to change, it follows that adversaries’ percep- These limitations suggest that only the most in Washington, Hanoi did not notice the tions of credibility and interests are dominant overt, overwhelming, and credible deterrent subtleties, nor did it receive any messages factors in deterrence outcomes. First, deter- threats have utility, while attempts to deter compelling enough to modify its decision rence signals cannot create credibility that gradually via precise messages are often calculus.74 does not exist in the mind of the adversary. misguided. Adversary Perceptions of Deterrent Unambiguous scenarios where survival Challenge of Sending Effective Deter- Messages. Deterrent messages that are clear interests are at stake, such as the superpowers’ rent Messages. In addition to difficulties and credible to the sender and impartial defense of their homelands during the Cold in understanding an adversary’s decision parties may still be missed, misunderstood, or War, provide clarity that reduces the chance calculus, a deterring actor is constrained by discarded by the receiver.75 Achieving decisive of misperception.80 In contrast, America’s ambiguous policy toward South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990 left much more room for to change a person’s attitude, new information must adversary error. overcome many layers of subconscious defenses Second, carefully crafted deterrence messages cannot balance an inherent asym- metry of interests. The United States and biases that accompany attempts to influence influence over an adversary’s choices requires South Korea have apparently deterred a others. The egocentric bias leads people to that deterrent signals overcome cognitive second North Korean invasion since 1953, overestimate their influence over others and biases and persuade the decisionmaker to but have been unable to deter Pyongyang to see cause-and-effect linkages that do not change core beliefs about the likely results of from building nuclear weapons or conduct- exist. This tendency can cause policymak- a contemplated course of action. However, ing deadly attacks on South Korean forces. ers to perceive an adversary’s behavior as strongly held beliefs, such as a leader’s convic- Despite the substantial U.S. commitment to targeted toward them or to presume that the tion that war is necessary, are the most resis- preventing all three scenarios, North Korea adversary’s behavior was caused by the poli- tant to change.76 clearly possessed a much greater interest in cymaker’s previous actions.68 The egocentric To change a person’s attitude, new acquiring a nuclear deterrent and in manufac- bias may inflate the policymaker’s belief that information must overcome many layers turing crises. an adversary can be deterred. Additionally, of subconscious defenses.77 A person’s first Limitations of the Whole-of-Govern- the bias can result in erroneous assessments defense is failing to see that new information ment Approach. Even when making a clear that deterrence is working when the adver- contradicts existing beliefs. The information and credible commitment, tailored deterrence sary’s restraint is actually explained by other can be evaded by ignoring it or interpreting requires a coherent effort that integrates all factors.69 it to fit the person’s views, particularly if the elements of national power to implement a Another common limitation on an data are ambiguous. The second mechanism national deterrence strategy. In 2009, then- actor’s ability to send deterrence messages is a is to accept that the information is discrepant, commander of USSTRATCOM, General lack of empathy for how an adversary sees the but to reject its validity. A third defense is to Kevin Chilton, called for an innovative world.70 Policymakers have powerful beliefs reject the source of the information as unreli- process “to consider and include interagency about their nations, and they spend so much able. Subsequent defenses include acknowl- deterrence courses of action, to make whole- time immersed in their own plans that they edging the contradiction but setting it aside of-government decisions on what courses have trouble imagining that an adversary and bolstering the belief by seeking a new of action to implement, and to coordinate may have different views.71 For example, the justification for an old decision.78 their execution upon selection.”81 Yet the U.S. United States failed to understand Japan’s The extent to which subconscious Government’s structure and bureaucratic perspective before Pearl Harbor. While Wash- factors encourage people to cling to their friction ensure that the DO–JOC’s vision of ington thought that Japan would view the beliefs makes it extremely difficult to deter day-to-day, interagency deterrence campaigns prospect of war with America as disastrous, an adversary gradually with discrete mes- will go largely unrealized. Only the highest Japanese leaders concluded they had no other sages. A sufficiently motivated or confused priority issues and crises will garner a robust choice but to attack.72 adversary can ignore deterrent signals such interagency response. A third bias, which is related to the as diplomatic messages or the deployment of For example, the State Department egocentric bias and lack of empathy, is military forces, especially if such signals are would play a vital role in any interagency overconfidence: people tend to overestimate sent incrementally. Adversaries can accom- deterrence effort, given its primacy in diplo- their capacity to make complex judgments. modate isolated messages without changing macy and the DOD objective of influencing Overconfidence leads policymakers to their beliefs, but are more likely to reevaluate adversaries’ political decisions. Yet the State overestimate their ability to influence an their convictions if a large amount of contra- Department does not appear to share the adversary via discrete messages.73 There is dictory information arrives all at once.79 By military’s view of tailored deterrence. State probably no better example of such hubris this same logic, subtle signals should have Department officials are more likely to view than U.S. attempts to decisively influence more use against an adversary who is already deterrence as intrinsic to the broad and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 55 FORUM | The Limits of Tailored Deterrence

­continuous process of diplomatic engagement heavily influence the outcome of a tailored to sway adversaries from pursuing their inter- rather than as an isolated campaign. The deterrence campaign. ests are only credible when the United States Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development has a commensurate interest in the status quo Review (QDDR) does not discuss tailored Conclusion and when the situation is unambiguous. deterrence, and the State Department’s other Tailored deterrence is flawed because Deterrent strategies have the most utility public statements on deterrence focus on of its erroneous assumptions that the United when an adversary’s pondered action is an narrower issues such as nuclear proliferation States can reliably assess an adversary’s unambiguous and attributable affront to vital and arms control.82 Despite working closely decision calculus and decisively influence U.S. interests rather than an action on the together for shared objectives worldwide, the adversary choices. Nevertheless, deterrence margins. In such unambiguous scenarios, relationship between the State Department remains an indispensable tool of U.S. national threats to deny benefits and impose costs and DOD is typical of the entire interagency security policy since not all potential threats should be simple, overt, and overwhelm- system: each department fiercely defends its can or should be preempted. The United ing. Deterrence by subtlety is vulnerable to own perspectives and priorities. States should modify tailored deterrence to misperception and betrays an egocentric bias As a result, true interagency unity of reflect third-wave theory in order to provide and overconfidence that the adversary is both effort is the exception, not the rule. The State policymakers with realistic deterrence options able and willing to decode and respond to the Department’s QDDR quoted Secretary of instead of panaceas. These modifications faintest U.S. signals. Defense Robert Gates’s description of the should include accepting ambiguity, recogniz- Finally, tailored deterrence and its prac- interagency process as “a hodgepodge of jury- ing the importance of an adversary’s interests, titioners require humility rather than hubris. rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and replacing hubris with humility. A more realistic approach would acknowledge and complex patchwork of authorities, per- Third-wave deterrence theory and that adversaries cannot be imagined as inert, sistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy innumerable case studies demonstrate that closed systems vulnerable to decisive influ- processes.”83 These limitations are both struc- an adversary’s decision calculus will remain ence. Instead, deterrence campaigns will be tural and intentional, as the executive branch largely opaque regardless of the extent of based on a vague understanding of an adver- sary’s decisionmaking process and motives. unauthorized actions and accidents can be more persuasive Given these uncertainties, deterrent actions will be blunt instruments that are subject to than polished strategic communications friction and misperception, and their true influence on an adversary’s choices will nor- departments, National Security Council, the intelligence collection effort. Ubiquitous mally remain unknown. Such a recalibrated and interagency system were organized first cognitive biases frequently frustrate accurate approach reflects the reality that the United and foremost to advise the President’s deci- assessments and also shape adversary percep- States can influence world events, but cannot sions. The system is intrinsically slow and tions of their environment in idiosyncratic dictate them. JFQ deliberative unless a crisis elevates an issue and often unknowable ways. Tailored deter- to the Principals Committee or National rence should accept this irreducible uncer- Security Council for a decision.84 Even the tainty as a limitation rather than assuming NOTES imperatives of a decade of war have not trans- that ambiguity can be removed from the 1 The National Security Strategy of the United formed the interagency into the chimerical equation. This intrinsic ambiguity could States of America (Washington, DC: The White whole-of-government, as reform efforts have be tamed to a certain extent through such House, March 2006), 43; National Security Strategy 85 consistently failed to launch. Consequently, methods as red teaming, psychological profil- (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010). the United States will wage deterrence with ing of adversary leaders, developing multiple 2 Department of Defense (DOD), Deterrence the interagency it has—not the interagency it decision calculus models, and analyzing many Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 might want. potential courses of adversary action. Yet the (DO–JOC) (Washington, DC: DOD, December After reaching an interagency com- Nation should not be overly surprised when 2006), 5. promise on a deterrence course of action, an adversary fails to follow the script. 3 Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of the United States will also encounter friction Tailored deterrence’s deterministic and Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: in execution. Orders to perform specific effects-based foundation implies that deter- The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, as amended deterrence actions may be misunderstood rence applies in nearly all situations. However, through May 15, 2011), 135. 4 Jeffery W. Knopf, “Three Items in One: by subordinates or executed differently the U.S. approach should accept that large Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and than expected, garbling the intended deter- asymmetries of interests are common in inter- Political Issue,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in 86 rence signals. As demonstrated by the Abu national relations and that such disparities the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, Ghraib scandal and the Air Force’s improper can render deterrence irrelevant. Schelling’s and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago transport of nuclear weapons, unauthorized “threat that leaves something to chance”—the Press, 2009), 38. actions and accidents can be more persuasive fear of nuclear escalation that overshadowed 5 T.V. Paul, “Complex Deterrence: An Intro- than polished strategic communications. Cold War confrontations—is not credible duction,” in Complex Deterrence, 2–3. As in all types of conflict, fog, friction, when an adversary’s actions are on the low 6 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” and chance are irreducible factors that will end of the conflict spectrum and U.S. survival World Politics 31 (January 1979), 289. 7 interests are not at stake. American attempts Ibid.

56 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARKIN

8 “Atomic Age: Absolute Weapon?” Time, 34 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging 63 Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and June 10, 1946; Arnold Wolfers, “The Atomic Bomb Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century,” Strategic Evidence,” 196; Heuer, 131. in Soviet-American Relations,” in The Absolute Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009), 31–42; Michael 64 Heuer, 131. Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Elliot, “21st Century Security Environment and 65 Payne, 412. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Implications for Deterrence,” 2010 Strategic Deter- 66 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Company, 1946), 134. rence Symposium, Panel 5, Omaha, NE, August 12, Misperception of Threat,” 257; Jervis, “Rational 9 Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to 2010. Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” 196–197. Long War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 1. 35 DO–JOC, 5. 67 Lebow and Stein, 216. 10 Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of 36 Ibid., 44. 68 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Terror (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 37 Ibid., 11. Misperception of Threat,” 253. 1958), 3. 38 Ibid. 69 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception 11 Thomas C. Schelling, The Reciprocal Fear of 39 Ibid., 3. in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Uni- Surprise Attack (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpo- 40 Ibid., 24, 48. versity Press, 1976), 346. ration, 1958), 1; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy 41 Ibid., 56. 70 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 42 Ibid., 3. Misperception of Threat,” 250. 1960), 207. 43 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 75; Long, 10; 71 Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Mispercep- 12 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 304–305. tion,” World Politics 20 (April 1968), 474; Stein, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 36. 44 DO–JOC, 47–48. “Building Politics into Psychology: The Mispercep- 13 Long, 13–15; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 45 Ibid., 48, 52–54. tion of Threat,” 250. 39–40, 47. 46 Achen and Snidal, 165; Lebow and Stein, 222; 72 Payne, 411. 14 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 188–189, Morgan, 128. 73 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The 190–192. 47 DO–JOC, 9. Misperception of Threat,” 254. 15 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, 48 Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations 74 Ibid; Payne, 413. “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative (Change 2) (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Sep- 75 Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Case Studies,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 150. tember 2006, updated March 2010), II–23, IV–4. Evidence,” 198. 16 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 293. 49 Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen, “Chaos 76 Ibid., 291; Stein, “Rational Deterrence 17 Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Versus Predictability: A Critique of Effects-Based Against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?” 63. against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries? No Common Operations,” Security Challenges 2, no. 1 (2006), 66, 77 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in Inter- Knowledge,” in Complex Deterrence, 60–61. 69–70; James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s national Politics, 289–290. 18 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Guidance for Effects-based Operations,” Param- 78 Ibid., 291–295. “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I eters (Autumn 2008), 22. 79 Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” Deter,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 209–210. 50 Keith B. Payne, “Fallacies of Cold War Deter- 465–466. 19 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 290. rence and a New Direction,” Comparative Strategy 80 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 20 Long, 15; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 40. 22, no. 5 (2003), 411–412. 311–312. 21 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 289, 51 Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into 81 Chilton and Weaver, 36. 301. Psychology: The Misperception of Threat,” Political 82 Department of State, The First Quadrennial 22 Knopf, 47–48. Psychology 2, no. 2 (1988), 249; Janice Gross Stein, Diplomacy and Defense Review: Leading Through 23 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–91: Civilian Power (Washington, DC: Department of 303–304, 312. A Failed or Impossible Task?” International Secu- State, 2010), 10; Rose Gottemoeller, “Exploring the 24 Knopf, 48. rity 17, no. 2 (Autumn 1992), 147–149. Many Facets of Deterrence,” remarks to the U.S. 25 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 52 Payne, 412–413. Strategic Command 2010 Deterrence Symposium, 307–308. 53 Ibid. Omaha, NE, August 12, 2010; Ellen Tauscher, 26 Ibid., 308–310; Stein, “Rational Deterrence 54 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The remarks to U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries?” 63. Misperception of Threat,” 248–249. Symposium, Omaha, NE, July 30, 2009. 27 Stein, “Rational Deterrence Against ‘Irratio- 55 Payne, 411. 83 Department of State, 200–201. nal’ Adversaries?” 63. 56 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The 84 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and 28 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 314; Misperception of Threat,” 252. Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Amir Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of 57 Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory Process: The National Security Council and Inter- Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research and Evidence,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), agency System (Washington, DC: Industrial College Agenda,” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2010), 196. of the Armed Forces, October 2010), 27, 35–37. 708. 58 Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the 85 Lewis Irwin, “Filling Irregular Warfare’s 29 The National Security Strategy of the United Gulf, 1990–91,” 174–175. Interagency Gaps,” Parameters (Autumn 2009), 65. States of America. 59 Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and 86 Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” 30 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Wash- Evidence,” 196–197. 312–313. ington, DC: DOD, February 2006). 60 Lebow and Stein, 211–212; Payne, 413–414. 31 National Security Strategy, 22; Quadrennial 61 Richard J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intel- Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, ligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study February 2010), 13–14. of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 32 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2010), 181. 14. 62 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The 33 DO–JOC, ii. Misperception of Threat,” 252.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 57 Meeting of Cyber Defence Experts, January 2011

NATO

Estonia: Cyber Window into the Future of NATO

By HÄLY LAASME or the development of the new unauthorized access. Hence, until April 2007, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- the Atlantic Alliance had mainly concentrated tion (NATO) Strategic Concept, a on securing its own operational systems F group of experts chaired by Mad- without realizing that it also should have been eleine Albright recommended that: assisting its members in protecting theirs. As a result of the assaults on Estonian electronic NATO must accelerate efforts to respond to infrastructure in April and May 2007, NATO the danger of cyber attacks by protecting its changed its common security trajectory by own communications and command systems, extending the development of cyber defense helping Allies to improve their ability to capabilities also to its individual Allies.2 prevent and recover from attacks, and devel- oping an array of cyber defence capabilities 1 aimed at effective detection and deterrence. Häly Laasme is a Policy Analyst from Estonia. A graduate of Columbia University, she has conducted The Alliance has always adamantly policy research for various Washington think tanks, protected its communications and informa- including a panoptic research study of the European tion systems against harmful attacks and Defence Agency.

58 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LAASME

How did such a small nation end up as Coincidentally, during the same time, searching for the cyberterrorists who the the driving force of the cyber defense policy of three world-renowned IT experts were visiting evidence suggests were based in its country. NATO? This article examines Estonia’s role in Estonia, and they assisted the Estonian Com- What might be more troubling than the the development of the NATO cyber defense puter Emergency Response Team with defenses assault itself is that a group of Russian policy, the adequacy of the current cyberspace against ping attacks, botnets, and hackers.7 The hackers has taken responsibility for it, imply- concepts for defending NATO, and the Alli- experts were Kurtis Lindqvist, CEO of Netnod ing that there exists a kind of private militia ance’s embracing of this new challenge with Internet Exchange, which operates one of the or stateless power13 in Russia that can take the help of the cyber center in Estonia. 13 Domain Name System’s root servers in the down the commerce and government of world,8 Patrik Fältström, senior consulting any country in the world. Even though the Attack on e-Estonia engineer with Cisco and cyber security advisor Estonian case was not the first major cyber Estonia, a small country with a popula- to the Swedish government,9 and Bill Wood- attack in the history of the Internet, it was the tion of only about 1.3 million, is considered cock, research director of Packet Clearing most publicized because it crippled an entire the most wired realm on the planet. Almost House and member of the board of directors of nation that is enormously dependent on everything in this tiny nation, which gave the American Registry of Internet Numbers.10 network communications and offered empiri- birth to Skype, is done over computer net- They happened to be at the right place at the cal proof of hacking having evolved beyond works and by use of mobile devices. Estonia right time to utilize their years of collective the instrument of espionage. ranks second in the world after the United Arab Emirates in mobile phone subscrip- tions, with each person in Estonia owning at almost the entire country is covered by a free Wi-Fi network least one device on average—188.2 devices because Internet access is considered by Estonians as per 100 people.3 Almost every activity in a basic human right Estonia is done over the Internet: its society is inundated with e-government, e-voting, e-parking, e-banking, e-identification computer expertise and contacts among Inter- Role of NATO systems, e-taxes, and live-streaming public net service providers by sending out bursts According to Article 5 of the NATO television, to name a few.4 Almost the entire of emails to the network operators around charter, an armed attack against any Ally is country is covered by a free Wi-Fi network the world to block the Internet Protocol (IP) considered an attack against all. In such cases, because Internet access is considered by addresses that were sending harmful traffic to Allies are called upon to assist each other Estonians as a basic human right. Estonia’s Estonia’s international connections.11 with necessary measures, including the use of pervasive Internet-driven culture is the Ultimately, the country’s electronic armed forces, to restore and maintain secu- realization of the dream of one man, Veljo infrastructure was hit by almost one million rity.14 Estonia has been a member of NATO Haamer, who wanted to make the Internet to computers simultaneously, most of them since 2004, but in the case of the 2007 cyber Estonia what electricity is to the rest of the hijacked from the United States by unknown attacks it could not invoke Article 5 because world.5 As impressive as this extraordinary elements inside Russia.12 The Russian gov- there was no agreed-upon enemy to retaliate achievement is, it will soon be eclipsed by the ernment has denied any involvement with against, and among Allies there existed ambi- European Union–supported €384 million the attacks and has exhibited no interest in guity over what exactly constituted a weapon project “EstWin,” which aims to provide 100 megabits per second broadband service NATO for every Estonian by 2015.6 In summary, Estonia as an e-experiment is a window into the future for the rest of the NATO members and the world. Unfortunately, this ubiquitous Internet dependence has brought not only techno- logical freedom but also various defense and security risks. The national security of Estonia was threatened in April 2007 when a near-cat- astrophic botnet struck almost the entire elec- tronic infrastructure of Estonia. Never before had an entire country been a digital target and the government forced to defend its population and commerce in cyber war. All that Estonian information technology (IT) managers could do was block the international connections to the servers, which was akin to a modern blockade of a country without the concomitant deployment of any conventional weapons. NATO and Estonian representatives sign memorandum of understanding on cyber defense cooperation

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 59 SPECIAL FEATURE | Cyber Window into the Future of NATO under the Alliance’s charter. This was a war of operations; the battlefield was cyberspace, Why a Digital Agenda for Europe? in an absolutely different dimension; it was a and the identification of the enemy was quite virtual war that encompassed computers from ambiguous, not simply a defined number of all over the world. computers from a certain country. In addi- tent + Bor Con der of les n s S Hitherto, NATO had not considered tion, this event raised another imperative io e t rv a ic re e attacks by cyberterrorists as armed attacks. ethical dilemma: if one cannot definitely s C Lack of investment Accordingly, a collective self-defense was prove the government of a particular country in networks Rising cybercrime Lack of inapplicable, even though years earlier the is the attacker, then should that government and low trust interoperability Allies tested the charter with an “unfamiliar still be equally responsible for the hackers who FRAGMENTED DIGITAL MARKETS R arsenal of weapons” by declaring the Sep- attack another country? As anyone can infer, d o n l Insufficient Lack of l a - tember 11 terrorist attacks with commercial the area of “cyber defense and security” is still o R + D skills m u e t Fragmented answers D o airliners to be armed attacks and invoked profoundly uncharted territory and its doc- to societal challenges e f c 15 N i e rv Article 5. But this might all change in the trine far from empirical realization. Neither in t e w S or of 2007 nor today are there any internationally ks e eas accepted definitions on the subject of cyber Incr one could not have defense and security. What one nation consid- used conventional ers a “cyber attack” might appear more like a “cyber war” to another or even a simple “cyber Europe needs a new action plan for counterinsurgency strategies 19 crime” to a third. making the best use of information and or tit for tat because there Since 2001, the Council of Europe’s was no tangible theater of communication technologies (ICT) to Convention on Cybercrime has addressed speed up economic recovery and lay operations; the battlefield was the procedural laws in the signatory coun- the foundations of a sustainable digital cyberspace tries for investigating cyber crime while future. The new action plan proposes to promoting cooperation in law enforcement, remove current obstacles to maximizing but it does not go beyond the basic necessi- the potential of ICTs, with long-term near future because NATO’s new Strategic ties for solving identity theft or protecting investments to minimize future problems. Concept includes cyber attacks as a significant intellectual property.20 In October 2005, the 16 threat to Euro-Atlantic security that might United Nations Institute for Training and The Digital Agenda identifies where Europe 17 warrant consultations under Article 4 and Research published Ahmad Kamal’s The Law needs to focus its efforts to put this even lead to collective defense measures under of Cyber-Space. The book describes in more virtuous cycle in motion. What is the focus 18 Article 5 if necessary. Furthermore, even detail different forms of cyber risks and notes of the Digital Agenda? if retaliation would have been justifiable, in that cyber war can occur between govern- this situation one could not have used con- ments and nonstate actors, but nevertheless The Agenda outlines seven priority areas 21 ventional counterinsurgency strategies or tit be financed by states. This might have for action: for tat because there was no tangible theater happened in the case of Estonia had there n creating a Digital Single Market NATO n improving the framework conditions for interoperability between ICT products and services

n boosting Internet trust and security

n  guaranteeing the provision of much faster Internet access

n  encouraging investment in research and development

n  enhancing digital literacy, skills, and inclusion

n  applying ICT to address social challenges such as climate change, rising health care costs, and aging populations. Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges delivers opening statement at meeting of Cyber Defence Experts

60 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LAASME been solid proof of the Russian government financing the hackers. The book also defines NATO cyber war as “the deliberate use of informa- tion warfare by a state, using weapons such as electro-magnetic pulse waves, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, etc., which target the electronic devices and networks of any enemy state,” and cyberterrorism as “attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein, with the objective of intimidating or coercing a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.”22 De facto, there is only one distinction between these defini- tions: the classification of the conspirator as state or nonstate. Hence, cyberterrorism can evolve into cyber war if the state finances the terrorists. But even if the quarreling parties have been identified, there still exists a juris- prudence dilemma because unlike the inter- Estonian president meets with Secretary-General at NATO Headquarters national trade disputes that can be filed with the World Trade Organization, there is no such globally recognized entity or appellate in a computer and/or computer network, or a memorandum of understanding for the body for cyber conflicts. Every country is on the computer and/or computer network itself” establishment of a Cooperative Cyber Defence its own on translating how the domestic and and noted that “a computer network attack Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in the Esto- international laws cover the different actions is a type of cyber attack.”24 However, the nian capital, Tallinn.25 This was the 10th Center in the cyber world and how to penalize the definition still lacks a ranking of offenses for of Excellence accredited by NATO, and its aim mischievous cyber-citizens. This problem has identifying the severity of an attack: whether has been to enhance the Allies’ capabilities and become highly relevant again because of the it should be considered as just a sophisticated interoperability in cyber defense by emphasiz- recent Internet publication by WikiLeaks of and malicious hacking or as an act of war that ing doctrine and concept development, aware- U.S. diplomatic cables. This action has in the requires retaliation by allies, and then what ness and training, research and development, short term more or less flabbergasted the U.S. kind of counterinsurgency strategies would analysis and lessons learned, and consulta- Department of Justice over how exactly to be adequate. Unfortunately, NATO’s new tions.26 Given that the CCDCOE does not discipline such deeds. Strategic Concept has not contributed much belong to the NATO command structure, its To progress with advancing technolo- toward clarifying these ambiguities for the capital and administrative costs are covered by gies, in 2002 the Alliance included develop- Allies. Even though it might not be NATO’s the host country, Estonia, while the rest of the ment of cyber defense capabilities in its mission to classify and define everything in expenses and operating costs are shared by all agenda and established the NATO Computer cyberspace, it is the Alliance’s role to prevent the sponsoring states.27 In June 2010, Hungary Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) as crises, manage conflicts, and defend one joined the Centre as a sponsoring state, and part of the newly implemented Cyber Defence another against attacks, including against the United States and Turkey have both shown Programme.23 In 2008, after 6 years of labor new threats—none of which can be conducted great interest in joining in the future.28 Consid- in bringing the NCIRC up to full operational with vague directions and abstruse concepts. ering the increased involvement of U.S. experts capability, the Alliance’s member states rati- In the global context, this means that the role in the activities of the CCDCOE, membership fied the NATO Cyber Defence Policy and of NATO in defining cyberspace concepts and might not be too far off. created the Cyber Defence Management linking them to the applicable and tangible Since its establishment, the CCDCOE Authority in Brussels, all prompted by what counterinsurgency strategies should be con- has worked vigorously to educate its members had happened almost a year earlier to Estonia. sidered as pertinent as was the redefining of on cyber security issues and has already NATO finally realized that some form of the post–Cold War security environment. organized several cyber defense conferences. common strategy had to be developed for In June 2009, it sponsored the first interna- defending the electronic infrastructures of The Cooperative Cyber Defense tional Conference on Cyber Warfare, where its member states. Nevertheless, it still took 2 Centre of Excellence speakers from 13 countries delivered 29 cyber more years for the Alliance to make a contri- The cyber incident with Estonia was warfare presentations. During the 3-day bution to the development of a global cyber- a wake-up call for the Alliance. After an event, besides various other subjects, par- lexicon. On January 22, 2010, NATO finally all-inclusive evaluation of its cyber defense ticipants received analysis on China’s intel- defined in its glossary the term computer capabilities, in May 2008 Estonia, Italy, Spain, ligence collection network, GhostNet, which network attack as “Action taken to disrupt, Slovakia, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, and had infiltrated high-level computers in more deny, degrade or destroy information resident the Allied Command Transformation signed than 100 countries, including an u­ nclassified

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 61 SPECIAL FEATURE | Cyber Window into the Future of NATO computer at NATO headquarters;29 on mea- and balance any policies and laws in the open with engineering constructive solutions for suring techniques of distributed denial-of- environment of cyberspace without infringing its customers whose computers have been service attacks; on the concept of borders in on its current innate premise—client/user infected with malware containing a backdoor cyberspace; and on botnet countermeasures.30 equality—that essentially makes the World component while being protected by Syman- The conference was the first clear indication Wide Web so powerful for its users. tec security products.36 of the intent of NATO and its Allies not to For NATO, it does not matter if the Information technologies are developing dawdle, but to consider every aggression in theater of operations is cyberspace or conven- beyond the pace of our collective ability to cyberspace seriously. Similar to the Russian tional terrain; the success of operations still provide secure defense. While computers and hackers who assaulted Estonian electronic depends on the asymmetry of information. thousands of software applications for mobile infrastructure, the Chinese government has Meanwhile, preservation of international devices make our daily lives more efficient, denied any involvement with Chinese hackers security in the nonvirtual world sometimes they also lead to more complex cyber defense who operate GhostNet. Yet this is another necessitates offensive strategies for avoiding issues. example of groups of sophisticated program- extensive collateral damage in the long run; Almost everything in our electronic mers who are capable of hacking into com- on the other hand, achieving security in infrastructure is a dual-use technology that has puter systems around the world becoming the cyber world often entails more defense applications for military operations as well as a more prevalent and serious security issue. strategies because presently tracking down for civilian tasks like operating systems, secu- NATO members have started to realize that the dynamic IP addresses and retaliating rity software, and networking protocols. Many in managing cyberspace, any kind of vulner- appropriately are more complicated processes commercial applications and interfaces were ability can lead to dangerous consequences in than well-prepared cyber deterrence. To originally developed under defense research, defense, even when the hackers’ aim might be including the Internet. It is cost-effective and only economic espionage to acquire cutting- profitable to develop dual-use technologies edge technology or scientific know-how. even if some means to because demand in the military market is Various security problems can be secure the cyber domain are much smaller than in the commercial market. solved and offensive strategies created by technologically feasible, we are In cyberspace, the most imperative hiring capable and seasoned programmers. limited by laws and policies dual-use technologies are products based In 2007, Estonia was extremely lucky in on cryptography. It has become increas- finding three highly experienced IT talents ingly obvious that the protection of critical in country who were ready to apply their advance members’ cyber defense capabilities, infrastructures necessitates strong encryption efforts on Estonia’s behalf, but in reality in May 2010, the CCDCOE, together with capabilities.37 The encryption and decryption many companies and countries do not have the NCIRC, organized the 13th NATO Cyber algorithms allow secure messages to be sent such experts sitting around to protect their Defence Workshop and in October 2010, between defense and security entities as well servers. Therefore, security issues have to be it co-hosted with Allied Command Trans- as between civilians by common interfaces tackled long before they become dangerous, formation a workshop called NATO in the like Blackberries. Therefore, developments in and explicit procedures for dealing with Cyber Commons, which was strictly aimed at these kinds of dual-use technologies require consequences must be defined. In brief, we identifying the Alliance’s vulnerabilities and high vigilance from defense and commercial need an internationally accepted body of prin- developing relevant capabilities.33 consumers and inclusive collaboration among ciples and rules to govern cyber affairs and all pertinent parties. conflicts—cyberspace’s very own ex ante and Dual-use Technology ex post regulations. Global policies and laws The CCDCOE emphasizes the need for are lagging decades behind the fast-advancing collaboration in research between various Estonia became the driving force of technologies. As the director of the CCDCOE, military and civilian entities. On November NATO’s cyber security policy because its citi- Colonel Ilmar Tamm, has noted, “Even if 3, 2009, the Centre signed a 3-year research zens dependence on technology in their every- some means to secure the cyber domain are cooperation agreement with one of North- day lives was greater than the other Allies. technologically feasible, we are limited by laws ern Europe’s leading financial groups, SEB With the 2007 cyber war, Estonia experienced and policies.”31 (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken), to explore firsthand how unprepared NATO was to Consequently, the CCDCOE progressed the best practices of information-securing defend its members in this new reality. Thus, even more swiftly in educating the Allies by in the private sector,34 and on January 11, calling for a NATO common cyber security hosting a second cyber security symposium, 2010, Symantec Corporation announced its policy was the only option for defending the Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy Conference, participation in the collaborative study that country against future cyber attacks because, in September 2009. The event, which was is expected to address the threats that under- in foreign policy, intentions to do something organized jointly with the George Mason mine online systems.35 Although Symantec’s can often work as deterrents. Since there have University Center for Infrastructure Protec- engagement in international security issues been no major cyber attacks on the country tion, explored rules and regulations in cyber should be highly welcomed, de facto, the during the last 3 years, it does seem like this conflict management.32 This debate is not just sophistication of the hacking community strategy has worked. Now that NATO’s Stra- vital but also highly sensitive because people has evolved beyond this NASDAQ–100 com- tegic Concept has been developed, it is vital to who use the Internet generally believe that pany’s capability. According to its consumers, comprehend the array of new challenges that it will be incredibly challenging to manage Symantec’s capability seems to be struggling cyberspace imposes on the Alliance. Estonia

62 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LAASME can be an excellent case study for NATO, 6 European Union, “State Aid: Commission October 28, 2010, available at . 24 Estonian example and incorporate cyber- Estonia,” press release, Brussels, July 20, 2010, at NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glos- . . and critical because it is almost impossible to Most Wired Country in Europe,” Wired Maga- 25 NATO, “NATO Opens New Centre of defend any country’s electronic infrastructure zine 15, no. 9 (August 2007), available at . update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html>. international policies that regulate cyberspace 8 Internet Society, “The Seven Stages of IPv6 26 NATO, Transformation Network, “Coopera- only concentrate on commercial and civil- Adoption: Panelist,” March 24, 2009, available at tive Cyber Defence (CCD) COE (Estonia),” July ian matters to protect minors from indecent . 2009, available at . of Things Europe 2010, A Roadmap for Europe: 27 Ibid. corporations from loss of profits. Speaker,” June 1, 2010, available at . lence (CCDCOE), “Hungary Joins the Centre,” not been effectively discussed and the actions 10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation CCDCOE News, June 23, 2010, available at . Utilizing the Cyber Defence Centre in Estonia 10, 2009, available at . Network,” Information Warfare Monitor (March the cyber world, but it will not be effective for 11 Davis. 2009), available at . 14 30 trend of increased dilemmas seems to suggest NATO, “What Is Article 5?” February 18, CCDCOE, “Conference on Cyber Warfare,” the cyber future will bring. Until now, NATO 2005, available at . fare/3.html>. members and the developed countries have 15 Ibid. 31 CCDCOE, “President of dealt with isolated cyber attacks. But what if 16 NATO, “New Strategic Concept: Active Estonia Opened International Cyber Conflict these assaults evolve into something much Engagement, Modern Defence,” November 19, Legal and Policy Conference,” September 9, 2009, more serious, like purposely shutting down 2010, 4, available at . html>. satellites, or stealing and publishing some- 17 According to the North Atlantic Treaty, 32 CCDCOE, “Cyber Conflict Legal and Policy thing considerably more sensitive and classi- Article 4 states, “The Parties will consult together Conference 2009,” available at . territorial integrity, political independence or 33 CCDCOE, “NATO in the Cyber Commons,” security of any of the Parties is threatened.” NATO, CCDCOE News, October 19, 2010, available at NOTES “The North Atlantic Treaty,” December 9, 2008, . available at . SEB,” CCDCOE News, November 5, 2009, available (NATO), “Strategic Concept: NATO 2020: Assured 18 NATO, “Strategic Concept: NATO 2020: at . Security; Dynamic Engagement,” May 17, 2010, Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement.” 35 CCDCOE, “Symantec and Cyber Defence 12, available at . “Estonia and NATO Article Five,” Glance at the Threats,” CCDCOE News, January 11, 2010, avail- 2 NATO, “Defending Against Cyber Attacks: Mirror 2008, February 23, 2009, 6, available at able at . How Did the Policy Evolve?” January 29, 2009, . Articles,” available at ; NATO, “Addressing the Technical 20 Council of Europe, “Convention on Cyber- connect/search/apachesolr_search/backdoor>. and Political Aspects,” March 31, 2008, available crime,” November 23, 2001, available at . asp?NT=185&CL=ENG>. Age,” University of California, July 28, 2003, 6, 3 World Economic Forum and INSEAD, 21 Ahmad Kamal, The Law of Cyber-Space available at . 2009–2010,” March 25, 2010, available at . kamal/thelawofcyberspace/The%20Law%20of%20 4 Republic of Estonia, “e-Estonia,” available at Cyber-Space.pdf>. . 22 Ibid., 13. 5 Indrajit Basu, “Estonia Becomes E-stonia,” 23 NATO, “Defending Against Cyber Attacks: Government Technology, April 9, 2008, available at NATO Cyber Defence Policy and Activities,” .

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 63 STUXNET AND STRATEGY A Special Operation in Cyberspace?

By LUKAS MILEVSKI yberpower has posed a challenge of “fire and forget” missiles, and it has caused for strategists since its advent, and concerns that cyber war may achieve the same the questions have only grown catastrophic results in the highly networked more pressing with the revelation 21st century that superpower nuclear war C th 1 of the Stuxnet malware attacks on Iranian would have had in the 20 . Neither com- nuclear sites. Many interpretations currently parison is particularly apt. Instead, the most abound in an attempt to provide a framework constructive way of thinking about Stuxnet within which to think about Stuxnet and is to conceive of it as a special operation in about cyberpower more generally. Stuxnet cyberspace. The strengths and weaknesses has been described as the digital equivalent of Stuxnet correspond to the strengths and

Satellite image of Natanz nuclear facility in Isfahan Province, Iran Space Imaging Middle East

64 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILEVSKI weaknesses of special operations. Although digital infection. However, Stuxnet is excep- concerning secret nuclear facilities, particu- Stuxnet may be judged a tactical success but a tional despite staying within the limits of what larly in the additional context of Western dis- strategic failure, it serves a pioneering purpose is tactically possible for cyberpower because covery of the Qom facility in 2009. Its view of and holds the door open for the serious con- through manipulation within those limits, it the quality of goods it obtains through smug- sideration of cyber attack as an instrument of was able to reach beyond them. It broke previ- gling might also have been damaged, and it strategy and policy. ous patterns of political uses of cyberpower may assume the task of producing more of the by spreading indiscriminately, while only requisite materials and machines domesti- Cyberpower and Stuxnet activating on very particular machines. It cally despite limited industrial capabilities at Cyberpower has been steadily growing exploited four vulnerabilities, including two the necessary level. Finally, given how widely in prominence over the past decade, but for zero-day vulnerabilities, in Microsoft operat- Stuxnet has proliferated, particularly in Iran, the most part it seemed to offer only a limited ing systems to gain access to Siemens pro- those working in the nuclear program will toolset to strategists. Danny Steed in a recent grammable logic controllers and control of the have to take extra care to prevent reinfection.5 article suggests that it can be used as a tool or operation of centrifuge-operating computers, otherwise elicit effects in five different ways. at which point it displayed decoy signals to Stuxnet as a Special Operation First, it can be a potent tool of intelligence, indicate normal operation even as it followed Special operations expert James Kiras affecting the scope of and speed with which instructions that broke those centrifuges.3 It has explored the relationship between special information can be gathered. Second, it was the first time that such a comprehensive operations and strategy, arguing that “the root greatly optimizes the use of one’s own hard package—one common in the criminal cyber of strategically effective special operations is power—the foundation of Western military underworld, capable of spreading by itself, an appreciation for how special operations prowess. Conversely, the third use of cyber- forces perform in extended campaigns by power can disrupt the network that underpins inflicting moral and material attrition in con- the enemy’s hard power. Fourth is a greatly Stuxnet broke previous junction with conventional forces.” He goes expanded conception of the third use: direct patterns of political uses on to define special operations as “unconven- cyber attack on national infrastructure, as of cyberpower tional actions against enemy vulnerabilities seen in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia a year in a sustained campaign, undertaken by later. Finally, it may have significant impact specially designated units, to enable conven- on morale, particularly on the home front, as hiding itself, and attacking by itself—was tional operations and/or resolve economically casualties and accidents are typically made employed against a specific target to achieve, politico-military problems at the operational known, either by the media or the govern- or at least facilitate, a particular strategic or or strategic level that are difficult or impos- ment, with a celerity that far outstrips the political effect. sible to accomplish with conventional forces achievement of tactical success, let alone Its physical effect was significant: 1,000 alone.” As one of his concluding thoughts, he strategic success. However, there are two centrifuges were destroyed, out of a total of suggests ultimately that “at the strategic level, important military applications that the Steed 9,000 at Natanz, but Iran has been estimated however, special operations are less about an analysis claims that cyberpower cannot do. to have only stockpiled the material to build epic Homeric raid than they are about the First, it cannot directly cause corporeal harm, 12,000 to 15,000 centrifuges. Nine thousand combined effects of disparate unorthodox either to human beings or to their physical are deployed at Natanz, and 2,000 are broken activities in the ebb and flow of a campaign or creations. Second, it cannot occupy actual either through routine operation or by series of campaigns.”6 That is, if used properly, terrain. Ultimately, the analysis concludes that Stuxnet—and with no easy chance for Iran they are ultimately the best option available “cyberpower will never coerce in the way that to avoid international economic sanctions.4 to policymakers in those particular situations sheer physical force can do.”2 Institute of Science and International Secu- where more conventional force is unwise. This pertains to conventional cyber- rity experts on the Iranian nuclear program Does Stuxnet meet the requirements of what power. These are the tactical limits within argue that Stuxnet must have had significant makes a special operation, albeit in digital which the vast majority of cyberpower will implications for Iranian morale as well due form? fall. Strictly speaking, Stuxnet also belongs to the uncertainty surrounding the attack. Kiras focuses on special operations within these limits, despite purportedly Before the discovery of the malware itself, the within the context of a wider war; his resulting in the destruction of 1,000 Iranian sudden damage to so many centrifuges must examples draw almost entirely from World centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. have thrown serious doubt upon the reliability War II for the good reason that it offers such a This destruction was a second-order effect of the quality assurance program necessary to wide selection of special operations. Arguably, of the malware; it created the context within run such a facility and diverted Iranian atten- however, one of the great advantages of special which the destruction occurred but did tion and effort into emergency mitigation. operations is that they are suitable not just to not directly inflict it. The first-order effect Even Stuxnet’s discovery could only have fed war but also to the murky zone between war remained at the eternal limit of cyber assault: Iran’s sense of vulnerability, particularly given and peace. Cyberpower by its very character the immensely detailed specifications Stuxnet also occupies this niche area, and anonym- Lukas Milevski is a Doctoral Candidate at the would have required to achieve the results it ity online is one of the Internet’s defining University of Reading under Professor Colin Gray did: information “far beyond what the [Inter- features. Additionally, the very construction and Winner of the 2010 RUSI Trench Gascoigne national Atomic Energy Agency] knew.” This of Stuxnet was designed to preclude attribu- Essay Competition. fear could easily impact Iranian decisions tion. It has been suggested that “Stuxnet’s

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 65 SPECIAL FEATURE | Stuxnet and Strategy core capabilities and tradecraft, including the of its own accord, or be a product of political countries, and ships belonging to the Islamic use of multiple zero-day exploits, render it neglect, innate lack of resources or industrial Republic of Iran Shipping Lines are unwel- more of a Frankenstein patchwork of existing capacity, or still other internal factors. It may come in many ports. It is difficult for Iran to tradecraft, code, and best practices drawn also be imposed by an outside party, both in acquire either more uranium or more materi- from the global cyber-crime community than war and in peace, through a variety of actions, als required for its current generation of cen- the likely product of a dedicated, autonomous, including the attritional effects of successive trifuges. The major hub of Iranian smuggling advanced research programme or ‘skunk military engagements and operations in war. is currently Asia, but many of Asia’s major works.’”7 Whether due to deliberate design or The United States has a method of achiev- ports belong to American allies, adding to simply the casual practices of veteran cyber ing such material shortage in selected states Iranian difficulties. As already noted, the Ira- criminals, deniability of responsibility for the during times of peace, particularly if it can act nians are estimated to have the materials for attack is a byproduct of Stuxnet’s design. in a multilateral context, which multiplies its only about 12,000–15,000 of their IR–1 cen- The essential requirement of special effectiveness if properly implemented by all trifuges. Eleven thousand have been deployed, operations, however, is that they augment involved parties—sanctions. of which 2,000 have been broken through other, more conventional efforts. Special In June 2010, the United Nations Secu- routine use or by Stuxnet. Iran’s cushion operations acting entirely on their own rarely rity Council passed Resolution 1929 to adopt a against accident or hostile action is becoming achieve a significant level of effect if their fourth round of sanctions against Iran and the increasingly thin as a result of its inability to target can devote all his resources to counter- toughest multilateral sanctions yet designed to procure materials for more IR–1 centrifuges. ing and mitigating the results of any given inhibit the development of the Iranian nuclear It is currently developing next-generation special operation. However, working alongside program. Beyond this, the United States centrifuges, the IR–2 and IR–4, the latter conventional military operations is not the and the European Union have also imposed of which requires additional material, but only context in which special operations could further unilateral sanctions. Despite the these have yet to be deployed beyond limited have considerable effect; conditions suitable nay-saying of the Russians, the sanctions are testing. These new generations are expected to for special operations can be manufactured. slowly having an effect, both on the Iranian increase enrichment efficiency significantly, Writing about the Arab Revolt of World War nuclear program and Iranian society at large, allowing for fewer centrifuges to achieve the I, T.E. Lawrence suggested that “the death of although neither is at the breaking point. same enrichment rates as the many thousands a Turkish bridge or train, machine or gun or Resolution 1929 represents the culmination Iran currently has deployed. For any actor charge of high explosive, was more profitable of a long-term sanctioning campaign against concerned with delaying the Iranian nuclear to us than the death of a Turk.”8 What the Iran, a campaign that has steadily decreased program and feeling that sanctions were not Turks in Arabia lacked was hardware, not Iran’s options for the procurement of neces- taking effect quickly enough, the time to manpower. Special operations can be usefully sary materials for its nuclear program and strike covertly had to be before the new cen- employed to attrite resources that the other that has also, to varying extents, cut into Iran’s trifuges were introduced en masse. side is short of or reliant upon, whether hard- ability to function economically, both inter- Conventional means are clearly inad- ware or manpower. A state of affairs in which nally and externally, with other states. For equate against the Iranian nuclear program. materiel is worth more than manpower due example, IranAir is losing gasoline contracts The dispersal of existing plants, their loca- to its relative scarcity may sometimes exist and finding itself unable to refuel in certain tions within mountains and other difficult terrain, and secrecy surrounding planned facilities all prevent an easy military response such as the Israeli attacks on Osirak and the alleged Syrian reactor in 2007. Sanctions newjestic.com have not yet had sufficient effect to dissuade the Iranians, and quite plausibly will not, as long as the Iranian political calculus remains steadfast and finds sufficient attraction to and utility in its chosen course. The Iranians view diplomacy as a method of keeping the international community at bay rather than a way to resolve the situation in an agreeably Western manner. A special operations strike of some sort was clearly necessary if one’s goal was the delay of the nuclear program, but the very character of that program also pre- cludes easy destruction by a limited number of operatives. A cyberstrike must have been much more compelling as an option. Stuxnet’s abilities to self-replicate, quickly proliferate across systems, and disguise its presence until Computer circuit board activated all indicate that it was specifically

66 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILEVSKI U.S. Army (Martin Greeson)

National Security Agency official discusses cyber ecosystem at U.S. European Command’s Cyber Defense/Information Assurance Conference, Stuttgart, Germany

designed to counter the security measures in the systems being attacked. He suggests and operating system vulnerabilities that the put in place to prevent a conventional or that any cyber attack must of necessity have previous iterations of the malware attacked, unconventional attack on the Iranian nuclear two fundamental bases: “(1) the exposure of they are also assuredly now particularly sensi- program. All three characteristics were target systems to the rest of the world, coupled tive to a potential similar attack that would necessary to approach and infect the relevant with (2) flaws in such systems which are then take advantage of different weaknesses. computers and damage a portion of the cen- exploited.”9 By jumping the air gap, Stuxnet The vulnerabilities that attacks like trifuges at Natanz. There could have been no surprised the Iranians and weakened their Stuxnet exploit are one of the major factors that distinguish them from more conven- tional cyber attacks such as the sustained dis- cyber war is ultimately about confidence, particularly tributed denial-of-service assault on Estonian confidence in the systems being attacked cyber infrastructure in 2007. Kiras warns that special operations forces “conduct missions of strategic importance, yet exist in finite quanti- other sure way for Stuxnet to have jumped confidence in their ability to preclude cyber ties, and must therefore be used wisely.”10 the air gap between the wider Internet and attack altogether through disconnection. Similarly, Libicki has noted that, although computers at Iranian nuclear facilities without Even severing a direct connection to the cyber vulnerabilities are by their very char- self-replicating and proliferating wildly across wider Internet does not remove exposure. acter unknown until exploited (or discovered computers and onto USB sticks and other por- The further infection of computers in Natanz and fixed), “cyber attacks are self-depleting.”11 table data transfer devices, and hiding its pres- after the penetration of the air gap only That is, there are only so many vulnerabilities ence until it reached precisely the computers it increased the Iranians’ realization of their that can be exploited, and to some extent had been coded to infect and control. own insecurity despite the measures they had the character of the vulnerability may also Martin Libicki, an expert on cyber- taken. Although the Iranians have now most define the limits of what the cyber attack may power, argues that cyber war is ultimately likely removed all traces of Stuxnet from their achieve. One would think that this would about confidence, particularly confidence systems and may have addressed the software lead to very selective use of cyber attacks that

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 67 SPECIAL FEATURE | Stuxnet and Strategy rely on exploiting system flaws, in the same into computer systems because Symantec has An inability to find the flaw allowing cyber way as special operations forces are only used updated its malware definitions and because attacks or to perceive that a cyber attack is selectively because there are relatively so few Microsoft and other relevant companies may actually under way—as with Stuxnet, which of them and they are difficult to replace. This have patched those particular vulnerabilities took control of the feedback systems to inform is not necessarily the case, however, as there in their own software. This inherent dynamic those monitoring the centrifuges that every- are other pressures involved. in cyberspace concerning system flaws is such thing was normal even as it was tearing 1,000 First, the available vulnerabilities, that an operator’s first instinct is to try imme- of them apart—also allows vulnerabilities to whether known or unknown, are finite in diately to exploit any discovered weaknesses last longer than in ideal theoretical condi- number, as Libicki implied—to use them is for fear that otherwise someone else will, and tions. Some known vulnerabilities have per- to deplete them, as they will inevitably be that ultimately however the vulnerability is, sisted for years, across multiple generations of corrected. More important, the available or is not, used, it will be patched and that software, without being addressed. Others are vulnerabilities are largely collective. That is, avenue of attack will be closed off. For those exterminated immediately upon discovery. whereas any one nation’s special operations concerned with national security, this instinct The individual organizational or communal forces are purely that nation’s to use as, when, must be balanced by the need to achieve ben- culture frequently determines the alacrity and how it wishes, this is not the case with eficial effect in service of strategy or policy. with which flaws are fixed. cyber vulnerabilities. Such flaws, being a col- Is there sense in using a recently discovered, One of the major fears that has yet to lective pool, are open to anyone and everyone powerful cyber vulnerability on a target of low be borne out from the Stuxnet attack is the importance solely to make sure it is not used possibility that it could serve as a blueprint for against oneself or fixed before it can be used? others for their own cyber attacks, potentially cyber vulnerabilities are by Ultimately, the question of when to including those hostile to the West. This their very character unknown exploit a cyber vulnerability is answered by seems unlikely if Stuxnet really is the digital until exploited human judgment. Judgment is also required equivalent of a special operation, for special concerning when to protect against a known operations are immensely context-dependent. flaw. Other cyber actors may detect one while As Colin Gray notes, “Findings on the con- seeking to use or fix them. If one country’s fixing a previously unknown flaw and decide ditions for the success or failure of special hackers discover a new flaw, it is probable that quickly to exploit the defect before the patch operations cannot sensibly be presented as a any other country’s hackers may already have, proliferates and destroys their chances of formula, a kind of strategist’s cookbook.”12 or will in the future. Furthermore, while such capitalizing on it. A defender may be so confi- Stuxnet was designed to take advantage of hackers, depending on their motives, may dent in his defenses—such as an air gap—that particular flaws of specific operating systems desire to hold the potential exploit secret for he neglects basic security on the machines and programmable logic controllers of select personal, commercial, or national use, there behind that gap, with the result that already nuclear facilities to overwhelm the physical are also firms whose duty is to discover and known and fixed vulnerabilities may yet be limits of particular centrifuges. This points to patch such vulnerabilities out of existence. available for exploitation. Software firms may an extended period of gestation for Stuxnet Stuxnet may no longer find it possible to use also be lazy or duplicitous about address- simply to discover such a succession of vul- the same avenues of exploitation to break ing vulnerabilities in their own software. nerabilities, flaws, and the breaking point of

Left: National Cybersecurity and Estonia Today Communications Integration Center director speaks to press at Department of Homeland Security, 2010 U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Left: President George W. Bush visits Estonia, 2006

Right: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrives for meeting with Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2008 Embassy of the United States

68 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILEVSKI

IR–1 centrifuges. Stuxnet would seem to have clearly it did not increase as much as it could troubles. Whether or not Stuxnet had an little to offer in terms of concrete ability actu- have, had the damage not been done. Fur- effect on Bushehr is irrelevant: the potential ally to reproduce such an attack against a dif- thermore, Iran was able to replace the lost for attacks in parallel has already been noted. ferent facility: vulnerabilities and flaws would centrifuges, and it still maintains a buffer of Yet not having achieved the necessary necessarily be different and the purpose and materials remaining to build additional IR–1 level of success at Natanz is not surprising. aims of the attack would differ as well. What centrifuges as necessary. This remainder Any sort of friction could have intruded upon can be extrapolated from Stuxnet is a design may be sufficient for only 1,000 more, or Stuxnet’s infection and control of Natanz philosophy, and perhaps inspiration for possibly up to 4,000 more, and Iranian smug- enrichment facilities, and solitary special further innovation in the creation of serious gling efforts may increase these numbers. It operations rarely have such decisive effect on cyber attacks. Due to the character of Stuxnet is unknown whether those responsible for their own, although “solitary” may not gel alluded to above—the Frankenstein of best Stuxnet are heartened by their success, or are well in possible future cases of a massively practices—all the tools already existed, for the frustrated by having failed to destroy more, parallel assault on multiple facilities. None- most part. It was just a matter of using them but either reaction may motivate further theless, as the first special operation in the in concert in the specific way in which they attacks. Regardless of motive, further attacks cyber dimension of war, and with the purpose were used. would be necessary to affect the Iranian of causing physical damage, Stuxnet was oper- nuclear program significantly; as long as they ating entirely in unknown territory. Now, the Conclusion can replace centrifuges, lost centrifuges only right lessons need to be learned. JFQ Special forces are “military assets represent relatively minor time lost to the designed and trained to conduct tactical Iranians. Another cyber attack, however, will actions delivering strategic outcome out undoubtedly be expected, and the Iranians NOTES of proportion with their size and that if are on guard. Surprise, the best ally of special 1 James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, conducted by conventional units may have operations, is now missing. “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” Survival disproportionate negative impact on policy.”13 The Stuxnet malware, in the context of 53, no. 1 (January 2011), 24. See also the Econo- The West, fearing such a disproportionate international sanctions, ultimately has not mist cover for July 3–9, 2010: a digitized nuclear negative effect, has been shy of the prospect affected Iranian political will to a sovereign explosion. of armed conflict with Iran. The preferred nuclear program or Iranian capabilities suf- 2 Danny Steed, “Cyber Power and Strategy: So method has been a mixture of sanctions and ficiently that their goal cannot be pursued What?” Infinity Journal 2 (Spring 2011), 21–24. diplomacy. Given the slow effect of sanctions regardless of intent. What would a strategi- 3 Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric thus far, employment of Stuxnet to attrite the cally successful Stuxnet look like? That sort Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Symantec, February physical capacity of Iranian nuclear plants, of attack would have to be destructive enough 2011, available at . 4 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Iranian ability to replace broken machinery, redundancy available to their nuclear pro- Walrond, Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of fits in well with overall policy. Strategically, it grams. It would also have to be able to over- ISIS December 22, 2010 Report (Institute for Science makes sense: first, one prevents the importa- come increased Iranian nuclear efficiencies. and International Security, February 2011), 4, avail- tion of necessary materials, and then one Such success may be possible, since able at . to expend his limited stocks without being advantage over physical special operations: 5 Ibid., 4–5. able to renew them, as stock limitation on its unlike actual people, a program can be in 6 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strat- own is hardly potent without a context that multiple places at once—hundreds of thou- egy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism makes those limits meaningfully damaging. sands, millions, or more—if necessary. It (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2, 5, 115. 7 The disproportionate effect is simul- should be possible to attack multiple specified Farwell and Rohozinski, 25. 8 taneously both confirmed and doubtful. targets with a single virus exploiting a set of T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 194. Stuxnet destroyed 1,000 centrifuges, but vulnerabilities common to all targets—that 9 Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberwar as a Confi- it could not remove from operation the is, compress a special operations campaign dence Game,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 remaining 8,000 at the Natanz facility. For a in time to orchestrate a massive attack in (Spring 2011), 133. program, however malicious, ultimately to parallel, rather than a sequence of missions. 10 Kiras, 115. achieve that level of physical destruction of Stuxnet may even have been designed to 11 Libicki, 133. infrastructure, even if only as a second-order achieve this, too. Iran has admitted that 12 Colin S. Gray, “Handful of Heroes on effect, is disproportionate considering how Stuxnet found its way into their Bushehr Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations inexpensive such an attack is compared to nuclear power plant and, in early 2011, nearly Succeed?” Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 3. other, less attractive policy options. Impor- 170 fuel rods had to be removed from the 13 Simon Anglim, “Special Forces—Strategic tantly, however, Iranian production of lightly reactor soon after inserting them—an occur- Asset,” Infinity Journal 2 (Spring 2011), 16. enriched uranium did not drop; it actually rence not unheard of elsewhere in the world, increased somewhat during the period it was but hardly frequent. Some have speculated on affected by Stuxnet as the Iranian nuclear the existence of a link between Stuxnet’s infil- facilities improved their efficiency—although tration of the Bushehr facility and its recent

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 69 Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack

By GARY D. BROWN

n July 2010, news broke that a new automated tasks in many industrial processes. occurred on systems in Iran.2 In fact, at least computer virus had been discovered. PLCs are part of industrial control systems, one system Stuxnet was programmed to target To casual observers, it probably elicited most commonly referred to as Supervisory controlled centrifuges critical to the produc- I little more than a yawn. After all, there Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) tion of nuclear material. It appears that Iran’s seems to be a new “cyber threat” reported systems. SCADA systems are critical to the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz was every day. The detection of new computer modern industrial world, controlling such the specific target.3 After Stuxnet became viruses is announced routinely. In most cases, things as water plants, auto manufacturing, public, Iranian officials issued a statement by the time the event is publicized, the major and electrical powergrids. that the delay in the Bushehr nuclear power antivirus manufacturers have already devel- Stuxnet could not spread directly plant being operational was based on “techni- oped a patch to address whatever software through SCADA systems. It propagated over cal reasons,” but did not assert it was because flaw the malware was designed to exploit. computers running the Windows operating of Stuxnet.4 At a news conference, President To more experienced cyber players, system. From there, it searched for a certain Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that malicious however, this July 2010 event was far from computer-to-SCADA interface system. If software damaged the centrifuge facilities, routine. “Stuxnet,” as the virus came to be the interface was present, Stuxnet was pro- although he did not specifically mention known, was far more complex than run-of- grammed to determine if it could target a Stuxnet or Natanz.5 The passive posture it the-mill hacker tools. The complicated and PLC—but not just any PLC. Stuxnet singled took on Stuxnet indicates Iran concluded that powerful code was a self-replicating worm out PLCs made by Siemens.1 a public statement that it had been the victim that targeted programmable logic controllers The Stuxnet code showed up on of a cyber attack would not have been in its (PLCs), the simple computers used to perform computer systems around the world, where best interest. This article examines some of it parked on hard drives, remaining inert the possible reasons why Iran may have drawn if it did not find what it was seeking. The this conclusion. Colonel Gary D. Brown, USAF, is currently serving as numbers indicate it was aimed at Iran; nearly Before Stuxnet, the most notable actions the senior legal advisor in U.S. Cyber Command. 60 percent of reported Stuxnet infections in cyber were probably the events in the

70 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN

Republic of Georgia and in Estonia. Neither or injury to persons or damage or destruction arguably violated the law of war. The law rose to the level of a cyber attack. In Georgia, to objects.” of war requires that attacks be discrimina- distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) assaults The Stuxnet event was as clearly a tory, meaning they must be directed against on government Web pages began in about cyber attack as any publicly announced event military objectives only. Stuxnet was a self- Why Iran Didn’t Admit mid-July 2008. Three weeks later, the assaults to date. Intentionally designed malware replicating worm. It contained certain con- significantly increased and were accompanied directed against a nation-state resulted in the trols, but demonstrably not enough to prevent by the Russian military crossing the border physical destruction of state-owned equip- it from inserting itself into civilian systems into South Ossetia, a Georgian province.6 ment.10 The centrifuges were destroyed as around the world. Stuxnet Was an Attack Ultimately, the conflict resulted in over 1,000 effectively as if someone had taken a hammer casualties and tens of thousands of displaced to them,11 and these were not just random Iranian Motivations civilians. The cyber portion of the armed bits of equipment. The destroyed centrifuges What would motivate Iran not to just conflict in Georgia did not meet the common were a critical component of Iran’s nuclear admit it was attacked? As the victim of an definition of an attack and, in any event, paled ambitions.12 Whether the rest of the world attack, it could possibly have gained support beside the destruction and death resulting likes it or not, Iran is working toward an from the international community. At a from the invasion. independent nuclear capability. Another minimum, it might have hoped for statements The situation in Estonia in 2007 was nation interfering with that clearly infringes of condemnation to dissuade future similar different in that it was not accompanied on Iranian sovereignty. That means that not attacks against it. by a kinetic event. After the Estonian only was Iran attacked, but also the attack Discussed below are several reasons Iran government relocated a World War II–era resulted in injury to a significant aspect of might have chosen not to declare Stuxnet an Soviet statue from the center of Tallinn to government policy. attack. Although I have no insight into why a military cemetery, Russian “hacktivists” Iran’s “non-position” on the Stuxnet Iran chose this course of action, I discuss the (hackers motivated by patriotism or event has been frustrating to practitioners in possibilities basically in order of probability, ideology) began to launch denial-of-service the field of cyberspace operations. Finally, starting with the most probable. and DDoS actions against Estonian Web there was a well-documented, unambiguous Embarrassment. It is possible Tehran sites. Ultimately, the activity resulted in cyber attack to dissect! And yet there was little is simply ashamed that it lost a significant making government, banking, and many official discussion of the issue because Iran portion of its hard-obtained ability to create other commercial Web sites unavailable to passed up its opportunity to complain of an nuclear weapons material to a computer bug, Estonians.7 Estonia contacted the North unjustified attack. especially when it portrays itself as having Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to It is unusual that a nation would be a significant cyber capability of its own.13 ask for support, but was rebuffed. There attacked and not be willing to state as much. Furthermore, to make things worse, the most was agreement that, as serious as the The community of nations (for example, commonly suggested perpetrator of the event cyber action was, it did not qualify as a the United Nations, the Arab League, or was Iran’s archenemy, Israel. cyber attack. The Estonian experience led to the conclusion that NATO simply does not con- whether the rest of the world likes it or not, Iran is working sider cyber action worthy of being called an toward an independent nuclear capability attack. For NATO, an attack would trigger a potential self-defense response by the Alli- ance. “Not a single NATO defence minister some other international organization) A video screened at the retirement would define cyber-attack as a clear military may be reluctant to tell a nation it has been party for the head of the Israel Defense Forces action at present.”8 However, NATO’s posi- attacked when it apparently feels otherwise. indicated at least some level of involvement tion on aggressive cyber activities may be After all, if a nation does not feel it has been by Israel in the cyber attack on Iran’s nuclear changing.9 wronged, it is not really within the purview program: “The video of Lieutenant General There were initial indications after the of the international community to try and Gabi Ashkenazi’s operational successes discovery of Stuxnet that Iran might state the convince it otherwise. This unusual situation included references to Stuxnet, a computer obvious. In the immediate aftermath of the is perhaps unique to cyber. It is difficult to virus that disrupted the Natanz nuclear Stuxnet event, an Iranian official indicated interpret artillery bombardments or invasions enrichment site [in 2010].”14 Iran had come under “cyber attack,” but he by troops as anything other than attacks. Irrelevance. Iran may have felt that its was quickly silenced. Since then, there has However, in the cyber arena, there is a danger complaints would not be taken seriously since been no further indication of how the event to the international community in this benign it is already on the outs with the international would be characterized in Iran. neglect. community over its nuclear program: “The Although there is no formally agreed- The problem with turning a blind eye United Kingdom and many other countries upon definition of cyber attack, most scholars to the event is that, not only was Stuxnet an have serious concerns about the Iranian would define it in a manner similar to a more attack, it also was quite possibly an illegal Government’s policies: its failure to address traditional, physical attack. A common defi- attack under international law. In addition serious international concerns about its nition of cyber attack is “a cyber operation to violating the general prohibition against a nuclear programme; its support for terrorism which is reasonably expected to cause death use of force against another nation, this event and promotion of instability in its region;

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 71 SPECIAL FEATURE | Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack and its continued denial of the human rights A similar consideration might just be techniques make it tough to know the origin to which its own people aspire and which called “unclean hands.” If a country is up to of an activity, much less the originating actor. Iran has made international commitments to anything it should not be doing, its govern- In this case, although Iran may feel protect.”15 ment might not feel it prudent to complain there are some obvious suspects, they may According to an article in the New York when the cookie jar lid pinches its fingers. not be able to prove who was behind Stuxnet. Times, “The United Nations Security Council For example, an alleged Soviet pipeline explo- One example of how the Internet has created leveled its fourth round of sanctions against sion reported in the early 1980s may have new challenges in attribution is the rise of Iran’s nuclear program on Wednesday, but the qualified as a cyber attack—but one that was independent actors on many levels. Cyber measures did little to overcome widespread possible only because the Soviets had stolen techniques now allow anonymous coordina- doubts that they—or even the additional infected pipeline management software from tion between actors, so action can be more steps pledged by American and European Canada.18 As a result, even if the Soviet Union effective and devastating, but the risk of dis- officials—would accomplish the Council’s covery is smaller. longstanding goal: halting Iran’s production Of particular note are the hacktivists, of nuclear fuel.”16 who began to garner notice in 2007 with

Agência Brasil events in Estonia, followed by other signifi- cant activity in Lithuania and Georgia the this event arguably violated following year. In a wonderful example of the law of war blurring the line between state policy and independent criminal actors, a group known as StopGeorgia facilitated the cyber assault on Besides, even if Iran had been able to Georgia. This group of nationalistic hackers convince the United Nations it ought to take provided DDoS kits to novice hackers, along action, the chances are slim that any action with lists of Georgian targets. They also against, or even condemnation of, Israel offered more sophisticated malware, complete would survive a journey through the Security with instructions on how to employ it. These Council. services were available to anyone who went to Preserving Future Options. Iran cannot the group’s Web site.19 hope to compete in the traditional military Not all hacktivists are Russian, however. sphere with the West, so it is apparently The Web site WikiLeaks accepts and pub- attempting to level the playing field by devel- lishes sensitive information “leaked” to it oping a nuclear capacity. Similarly, it may be by members of the public. After the site hoping to develop an asymmetric cyber attack Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed published classified documents that had ability for the same reason. There are reports Stuxnet virus did not affect nuclear operations been stolen from the U.S. Government, many this is the case. private companies in the United States took General Ali Fazli, acting commander steps in an attempt to make WikiLeaks less of the Basij, was quoted by Iran’s state-owned realized it had been “victimized,” it may not effective. Most of the actions were taken by newspaper as saying Iran’s cyber army is made have been inclined to complain. financial companies that refused to process up of university teachers, students, and clerics. Belief the Action Was Legal. Although payments for WikiLeaks.20 As a result of the He said its attacks were retaliation for similar most legal experts would conclude that financial companies’ actions, the loosely affil- attacks on Iran, according to the semi-official an offensive cyber action resulting in the iated hacker group Anonymous responded Mehr news agency. There were no further physical destruction of property is an attack, by freely distributing downloadable malware details about the possible targets or the time of there is no definitive evidence on the topic. with instructions on how to use it to harm the the attacks: We have little insight into what Iran believes targeted companies. is the state of play on cyber legality. From The activity reported to have been taken Iranian hackers working for the powerful the inaction of the community of nations, by Anonymous hacktivists did not result in Revolutionary Guard’s paramilitary Basij we can infer there are no international physical damage to computers. Even if it had, group have launched attacks on websites restrictions on purely cyber activities. More- however, it may not have made sense to treat of the “enemies,” a state-owned newspaper over, other than the legally unchallenged the action as a cyber “attack” because the per- reported Monday in a rare acknowledgment Stuxnet, there is no indication that it is petrators were individual civilians, acting only from Iran that it’s involved in cyber warfare. lawful to actually destroy things in another under suggestion from a higher organization. . . . “As there are cyber attacks on us, so is country—even if the destruction is caused Because it is often impossible to know the our cyber army of the Basij, which includes by a purely cyber event. individuals behind a nefarious cyber action, university instructors and students, as well as Difficulty of Attribution. It is the nature at least in real time, some countries are more clerics, attacking websites of the enemy,” Fazli of cyberspace and the Internet that makes it comfortable treating all cyber events as crimi- said. “Without resorting to the power of the challenging to find out who is responsible for nal cases rather than potential acts of war. Basij, we would not have been able to monitor any given action. Appropriated computers, This may be how Estonia viewed the action and confront our enemies.”17 intermediate hop points, and many other against it in 2007: “It was clear to the Estonian

72 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN authorities that the cyber attacks could—and enough evidence to establish conclusively that 9 “Defence Ministers Approve Cyber Defence should—be treated as cyber crime.”21 On the Israel was responsible. Even if it had, no effec- Concept and Take Next Step in Defence Reform,” other hand, even Estonia might see things tive action was likely to survive contact with March 10, 2011, available at . differently if the “cyber attack” were destruc- the United Nations Security Council. 10 Sharon Weinberger, “Is This the Start of tive—like Stuxnet—rather than a denial-of- It is unfortunate that the clearest Cyberwar?” Nature, June 9, 2011, 142. service attack or something similar. example of cyber attack appears to have 11 Ibid., 143. Also see Jeffrey Carr, “What Is As a subset of this rationale, in the passed by without a conclusive determination, Cyberwar?” August 12, 2011, available at . possible (although it has not been widely sug- ment from the victim country. Stuxnet may 12 Gross. gested) that Iran itself concocted the Stuxnet now fade into the sunset like so many other 13 “Commander Stresses Iran’s Capability scheme to make it appear a victim of Western offensive actions that were famous in their to Repel Cyber Attacks,” July 8, 2011, available at powers, while at the same time providing an day—Titan Rain, Moonlight Maze, Opera- . 14 theory is purely speculative, and no evidence uncategorized cyber action, and we may Christopher Williams, “Israeli Security Chief Celebrates Stuxnet Cyber Attack,” The Telegraph, is offered to support it. have missed our best opportunity to begin February 16, 2011, available at . apply to Iran’s motivation in this case. Even So far, the customary practice of nations 15 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, if they are not relevant in the case of Stuxnet, in cyberspace seems to be, “Do unto others “Britain’s Relations with Iran,” available at . sense of cyber operations. a major player like the United States suffers a 16 Neil MacFarquhar, “U.N. Approves New Fear. In theory, a country could be catastrophic cyber event, it appears likely to Sanctions to Deter Iran,” The New York Times, June afraid of the reaction of the adversary to being stay that way. JFQ 9, 2010. 17 called out. A cyber adversary might suddenly Nasser Karimi, “Iran’s Paramilitary decide more aggressive options were in order Launches Cyber Attack,” Associated Press, March if they were caught in the act. However, the NOTES 14, 2011. 18 Richard A. Clarke, Cyber War: The Next circumstances here make it unlikely that fear 1 Seán P. McGurk, Department of Homeland Threat to National Security and What to Do About played a role in Iran’s decision. Security, statement before the U.S. Homeland It (New York: Ecco/HarperCollins, 2010), 93. Deception. It is possible the victim of a 19 Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, The group’s Web site was available at . Jeffrey Carr, “The Rise of the Non- of the attack a secret. The offended nation 2 Michael Joseph Gross, “Stuxnet Worm: State Hacker,” Inside Cyber Warfare (2010), 15. may want to gather intelligence on adversary A Declaration of Cyber-War,” Vanity Fair (April 20 Fahmida Y. Rashid, “PayPal, PostFinance tactics, for example. This constraint would 2011); Symantec, “W32.Stuxnet,” September 17, Hit by DoS Attacks, Counter-Attack in Progress,” probably disappear once the attack becomes 2010, available at . com/c/a/Security/PayPal-PostFinance-Hit-by-DoS- Overcome by Events. If a cyber attack 3 Yossi Melman, “Computer virus in Iran Attacks-CounterAttack-in-Progress-860335/>. 21 occurs in the context of kinetic activities, it actually targeted larger nuclear facility,” Haaretz. Tikk, Kaska, and Vihul, 25. 22 David Eshel, “Cyber-Attack Deploys may not merit mention. This is similar to com, September 28, 2010, available at . story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/ tion did not merit much attention—although 4 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic dti/2010/09/01/DT_09_01_2010_p42-248207.xml>. that case did not rise to the level of cyber Republic of Iran, weekly briefing, October 5, 2010, 23 Kevin Hall, “The 7 worst cyberattacks in attack. This is also what happened when Israel available at . available at Syria before an air raid 5 Mark Clayton, “Stuxnet: Ahmadinejad of-the-most-d.php>; “A New Approach to China,” that destroyed a military construction site Admits Cyberweapon Hit Iran Nuclear Program,” January 12, 2010, available at . “attack,” but when it is done in conjunction available at . debris. 6 Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” Parameters (Winter In the end, it probably does not matter 2008), 60. in this specific case that Iran did not officially 7 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, declare it had been attacked. Although there International Cyber Incidents (Tallinn, Estonia: are reasons as detailed above to conclude that Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Israel was behind Stuxnet, it is doubtful the 2010), 33. international community would have found 8 Ibid., 26n106.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 73 The NDU Foundation Congratulates the Winners of the 2011 Writing Competitions

Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition U.S. Army/AMVID (Eboni L. Myart) The 5th annual competition in 2011 was intended to stimulate new approaches to coordinated civilian and military action from a broad spectrum of civilian and military students. Essays were to address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the core competencies of our national Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, presents first place certificate for 2011 security institutions. The NDU Foundation awarded the first place winner a generous gift certifi- Secretary of Defense Essay Competition to Colonel cate from Amazon.com. Justin C. Davey, USAF

FIRST PLACE SECOND PLACE THIRD PLACE Col Justin C. Davey, USAF JoAnne Wagner, Department of State COL David H. Carstens, USA Air War College “Enduring Attraction: National War College “‘Going Out’: Is Chi- U.S. Army War College “Building Resiliency America’s Dependence on and Need to na’s Skillful Use of Soft Power in Sub-Saharan into the National Military Strategy” Secure Its Supply of Permanent Magnets” Africa a Threat to U.S. Interests?”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition

This annual competition, in its 30th year in 2011, challenges students at the Nation’s joint PME institutions to write research papers or articles about significant aspects of national security strategy to stimulate strategic thinking, promote well-written research, and contribute to a broader security debate among professionals. The first place winners in each category received a

generous Amazon.com gift certificate courtesy of the NDU Foundation. U.S. Army (Sun L. Vega)

Strategic Research Paper Strategy Article FIRST PLACE Steve Coonen, Office of the FIRST PLACE COL Daniel S. Larsen, USA Admiral Mullen presents first place certificate for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy U.S. Army War College 2011 CJCS Strategic Research Paper Competition to National War College “U.S.-China Relations: No Need to Fight” Steve Coonen, Office of the Secretary of Defense “The Empire’s Newest New Clothes: SECOND PLACE COL Ricky J. Nussio, USA Overrating China” U.S. Army War College DOD SECOND PLACE COL Mark David Maxwell, “Gates’s Speech, Rumsfeld’s Vision, and USA Future Warfare” National War College THIRD PLACE David J. Greene, “Targeted Killing, the Law, and Terrorists: Department of State Feeling Safe?” National War College THIRD PLACE LtCol Douglas John “U.S. Strategy in Southeast Asia: Power Broker, MacIntyre, USMC Not Hegemon” Naval War College “Emerging from Behind the U.S. Shield: Japan’s Dynamic Deterrence Policy and Resurgence in Asia” Admiral Mullen presents first place certificate for 2011 CJCS Strategy Article Competition to Colonel Daniel S. Larsen, USA 74 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu The National Defense University (NDU) Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly writing competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 17–18, 2011, during which 22 faculty judges from 15 participating Professional Military Education (PME) institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages.

Joint Force Quarterly Each year, judges select the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues of Kiley Awards JFQ. Three outstanding articles were singled out for the Kiley Awards, named in honor of Dr. Frederick Kiley, former director, NDU Press:

Best Forum Article Best Feature Article Best Recall Article Sebastian L.v. Gorka, Maj G. John David, USMC, and Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.) College of International Security Affairs Paul S. Reinhart, Defense Intelligence “Unity of Command in the Pacific During “The Age of Irregular Warfare: So What?” Agency World War II” “A Joint Staff to Believe In”

Distinguished Judges NDU Foundation Twenty-two senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition. NDU Press (Tara Parekh) The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization established in 1982 to support and enhance the mission and goals of the National Defense University, America’s preeminent institution for military, civilian, and diplomatic national security education, research, outreach, and strategic studies. The Foundation promotes excellence and innovation in education by nurturing high standards of scholarship, leadership, and professionalism. It brings together dedicated individuals, corporations, organizations, and groups that are committed to advancing America’s national security and defense capabilities through the National Defense University. The Foundation provides NDU with privately funded resources for:

■■ Education, Research, Library, and Teaching Activities Front row: Dr. Doug Hime, Naval War College; Dr. Donna Connolly, Naval War College; Dr. Hal Winton, School ■■ Academic Chairs, Faculty Fellowships, and of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Charles Chadbourn, Naval War College; Dr. Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, Student Awards Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Larry Miller, U.S. Army War College; Dr. James Mowbray, Air War College; ■■ Endowments, Honoraria, Seminars, and COL Robert Taylor, USA (Ret.), U.S. Army War College; Dr. John Schuessler, Air War College; CAPT Joanne Fish, Conferences USN, Joint Forces Staff College; and Dr. Mark Clodfelter, National War College. Back row: CAPT Bill Marlowe, ■■ Multicultural, International, and Inter- USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Sebastian Lukasik, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Benjamin agency Programs Cooling, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Dr. Ken Moss, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Dr. Brad ■■ National Security and Homeland Defense Meyer, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting; Dr. Paul Romanski, Naval War College; Dr. Robert Bruce, Outreach Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Dr. Tim Sanz, Army Command and General Staff College; Dr. Peter Keep informed about NDU Foundation activities Thompson, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Bill Eliason, Editor, Joint Force Quarterly. by visiting online at: www.nduf.org Not Shown: Dr. Joseph Collins, National War College; Dr. James Lacey, Marine Corps War College

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 75 Soldier uses magnet locator while searching for evidence of extremist activity in Bezel, Iraq Enduring ATTRACTION America’s Dependence On and Need to Secure Its Supply of Permanent Magnets

By JUSTIN C. DAVEY U.S. Army (David J. Marshall)

76 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu DAVEY

he United States is the world’s preeminent military power, due in large part to its technological T superiority. This lead in innova- tive technology supporting national security also includes advances in new and “green” Enduring energy applications. A common ingredient U.S. Department of Agriculture enabling the production of many of these applications is a group of minerals known as rare earth elements (REEs). Two REEs in particular, the refined metals neodymium and samarium, are key components in the manufacture of miniature high-tempera- ture-resistant permanent magnets. These magnets are essential to wind turbines, hybrid car engines, and computer hard Rare earth oxides such as neodymium and samarium are By JUSTIN C. DAVEY drives. Moreover, they are critical for mili- vital to manufacture of permanent tary applications including precision-guided magnets used in military applications munitions, tank navigation systems, and electronic countermeasures equipment. The demand for REEs is steadily In order to break the pattern of dependence a vast and growing number of uses. Since increasing in the world. Simultaneously, on China, the United States should recon- there are only minor differences in their the supply of REEs is shrinking—or rather figure its National Defense Stockpile (NDS) chemical properties, REEs are commonly China, which annually produces 97 percent to provide a buffer supply of REEs to meet found clustered in mineral deposits, but in of the rare earth minerals on the world defense needs for 5 years, while providing widely varying concentrations. market and controls some 37 percent of the government incentives such as tax breaks or The term rare in REEs is not accurate. planet’s known reserves,1 is steadily reducing loan guarantees to aid resurgent domestic It persists due to a combination of misunder- its exports. China dramatically restricted its REE mining and refining firms. It is critical standing and indifference that characterizes exports by 72 percent in the last 6 months of 2010 to satisfy its rapidly expanding national appetite for REEs.2 China is also progressively there are concerns that the United States may trade its reliance acquiring the industrial base to manufacture on Middle East oil for dependence on REEs from China permanent magnets and their end products at the expense of American businesses, which China systematically purchases and relocates the government also be on guard against public perception. REEs are actually relatively within its borders. The entire supply chain of further sale and export of such U.S. compa- abundant throughout the Earth’s crust, about REE permanent magnets is now in China.3 nies to China. Simultaneously, the United the same as some major industrial metals As the American military and industrial States should continue funding research into (copper, zinc, and chrome) and even greater sectors continue their move toward increased permanent magnets using alternative materi- than several precious metals (gold, silver, reliance on miniaturized high-performance als that could balance the demand for REEs. and platinum).7 Nevertheless, these deposits electronics and strive to adopt more energy- are not concentrated, at most ranging up to efficient technologies, there are concerns that Rare Earth Elements a few hundred parts per million by weight. the United States may trade its reliance on REEs have been described as “vitamins Although REEs are present in most massive Middle East oil for dependence on REEs from of modern industry” because of their neces- rock formations and sources exist around China. This article illustrates how REEs have sity and wide application across the fields of the world, such low concentrations make become a deeply ingrained need throughout energy, defense, and computer technology.4 the mining and recovery processes difficult the American economy and, in particular, However, they are scarcely familiar to the and expensive. Nor can the industrial base how rare earth magnets are now indispensable general public. There are 17 minerals in required for production be created quickly. to the defense industry. It also explores how the family of REEs: 15 from the chemical From the time a deposit is discovered, it takes the United States should react to a threat to its group known as lanthanides, plus scan- 10 to 15 years of development and construc- lead in the technological innovation of mili- dium and yttrium.5 These elements share tion of the infrastructure needed to establish tary applications that use permanent magnets. similar geochemical characteristics and are a full-scale REE recovery operation.8 Conse- qualitatively comparable to the chemistry of quently, it will require long-term vision and Colonel Justin C. Davey, USAF, wrote this essay aluminum.6 However, the slight variances immediate action to wean the United States while a student at the Air War College. It won the in atomic structure between the REEs yield from its almost total dependence on foreign 2011 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay diverse optical, electrical, metallurgical, and sources as world competition for REEs Competition. magnetic properties that lend themselves to escalates.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 77 ESSAY WINNERS | Enduring Attraction

have over 10 times the magnetic energy Map shows 14 locations of rare product. Accordingly, a much smaller earth deposits in amount of magnet is required for any par- United States ticular application. This attribute makes them ideal for miniaturization of motors, U.S. Geological Survey electronics, and electrical components, including possible nanotechnologies.15 The advent of these tiny, powerful magnets ushered in the era of the Sony Walkman, personal laptop computer, and more.

Permanent Magnets NdFeB and SmCo magnets are ingrained in the commercial high-tech, auto- motive, and energy markets of the United States. For instance, miniaturized multi- gigabyte disk and DVD drives, a mainstay in portable computers, are not possible without such magnets.16 Those electronics are also used in automobiles for pollution-control- ling catalytic converters and hybrid car engines—high-temperature environments where regular magnets would rapidly fail. Moreover, the use of REE magnets reduces Applications defense applications that are indispens- the overall weight of a vehicle, making it Rare earth elements are vital to an able. Consequently, rare earth permanent more energy efficient. A typical Toyota Prius ever-increasing number of industries. magnets comprise the widest use of REEs.12 uses 2.2 pounds of neodymium, one-tenth According to the U.S. Geological Survey the mass of corresponding iron magnets.17 (USGS), “These uses range from mundane Neodymium and Samarium Americans will buy approximately 180,000 (lighter flints, glass polishing) to high- Neodymium and samarium make Priuses this year, resulting in the consump- tech (phosphors, lasers, magnets, batter- up only a portion of the REE market, tion of 198 tons of neodymium in the United ies, magnetic refrigeration) to futuristic which is an even smaller part of the global States for this one model of vehicle. NdFeB (high-temperature superconductivity, safe metals market, but these two metals have magnets are also in demand in the renew- storage and transport of hydrogen for a a disproportionate influence on all high- able energy market as more wind turbines post-hydrocarbon economy).”9 Two of the tech businesses, especially the defense come on line. The generators used in newer most common uses for REEs in the United industry. They combine with other ele- wind turbines require up to 2 tons of these States are metallurgical applications and ments (specifically iron, boron, and cobalt) magnets. However, neodymium magnets as catalysts in the petroleum refining and to make exceptional permanent magnets. lack the extreme temperature resistance auto industries.10 Other widely recognized Samarium-cobalt (SmCo) magnets have the qualities of their SmCo counterparts and products include lasers, fiber optics, super- conductors, rechargeable batteries, and fluorescent bulbs, as well as REE-enhanced neodymium and samarium have a disproportionate phosphors in LCD television screens, cell influence on all high-tech businesses phones, and laptop computers.11 Like a golden thread in a tapestry, these unique and indispensable minerals are woven through the fabric of American society highest known resistance to demagnetiza- initially presented challenges in the larger and businesses. Their contribution to the tion.13 This capability, meaning the magnet turbine applications. The answer: more quality of life and security of this country is has higher coercivity, allows them to func- REEs. Scientists discovered that the addition considerably greater than expected consid- tion in high-temperature environments of other REEs (terbium or dysprosium) to the ering their relative obscurity and decreas- without losing magnetic strength—an NdFeB alloy helped to increase its coercivity. ing availability. Exceptionally notable is essential attribute for most military appli- This makes for a better product, but is indic- how REE alloys revolutionized the magnet cations. Similarly, neodymium-iron-boron ative of increasing U.S. dependence on the trade and subsequently enhanced the (NdFeB) magnets are incredibly strong— availability of rare earth metals, especially products of all other businesses relying on the most powerful commercial magnets from foreign sources. Nowhere is this trend that industry, namely consumer electronics available. Compared to an equal mass of more unsettling than in the field of national that are now considered commonplace and traditional ferrite magnets, NdFeB magnets security.

78 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu DAVEY

Miniature high-temperature-resistant permanent magnets are a key factor in developing state-of-the-art military technol- ogy. They pervade the equipment and func- tion of all Service branches, starting with commercial computer hard drives contain- ing NdFeB magnets that sit on nearly every Department of Defense (DOD) employee’s desk. Precision-guided munitions depend on SmCo magnets as part of the motors that manipulate their flight control surfaces. Without these advanced tiny magnets, the motors in “smart bombs” like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) would require a hydraulic system that is more expensive and three times as large. The gen- erators that produce power for aircraft elec- trical systems also rely on samarium-cobalt magnets, as does the stealth technology used to mask the sound of helicopter rotor blades by generating white-noise concealment. Navy officer prepares to test drive new conventional hybrid vehicle, which uses Other permanent magnet applica- permanent magnets in engine tions include “jet engines and other aircraft U.S. Navy components, electronic countermeasures, underwater mine detection, antimissile concern.19 The explosive growth of the order to restore the lifeblood that enables defense, range finding, and space-based sat- ­electronics and energy industries changed Japanese companies to manufacture prod- ellite power and communications systems,” all of that. World demand is anticipated to ucts that are the cornerstone of its electronic according to USGS.18 The Army relies on rise to 180,000 tons per year by 2012 and and automotive industries. The embargo REE magnets for the navigation systems in surpass 200,000 tons annually in 2014.20 finally ended in late November, but the its M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, and the Although China’s production is expected threat of future restrictions still looms.23 Navy is developing a similarly dependent to increase each year, it will not likely keep The United States does not want to suddenly electric drive to conserve fuel for its Arleigh pace with demand. A shortfall of up to find itself in a similar predicament. Burke–class destroyers. The Air Force’s 40,000 tons per year may come about over F–22 fighter uses miniaturized permanent the next 5 years. U.S. Challenges magnet motors to run its tail fins and China is the world’s principal provider Neodymium and samarium are critical rudder. While REE applications, especially of REEs. Its propensity to use this posi- to the strength of the U.S. national defense products dependent on NdFeB and SmCo tion as a diplomatic “stick” and element of industry, but the current supply of these permanent magnets, have given the United economic power, combined with a growing metals is entirely external to the country. States a tremendous technological advan- domestic appetite for these elements, Moreover, demand for permanent magnets tage, the increased reliance on these metals threatens to exacerbate the anticipated is expected to increase 10 to 16 percent coupled with dramatically decreased domes- global shortage. In early 2010, following the per year through 2012.24 Nonetheless, the tic mining and the international export of disclosure of a multibillion-dollar arms deal United States has never included REEs in American refining and manufacturing capa- with Taiwan, several Chinese military news its NDS requirements as a hedge against a bility puts the United States in a precarious sources and Web sites urged the government future shortfall.25 Some industry experts position. to completely ban the sale of REEs to U.S. are becoming more vocal about what they companies as a means of retaliation.21 This see as growing risks posed by the scarcity Market Forces is not a hollow threat, as Japan, the world’s of domestic suppliers. For instance, the The global economy currently con- largest REE importer, discovered in Sep- United States Magnet Materials Association sumes an estimated 134,000 tons of REEs tember 2010. Following a diplomatic clash (USMMA), an alliance of firms from the each year. However, worldwide annual with Tokyo over the detention of a Chinese aerospace, electronics, and medical materi- mining production is only 124,000 tons. fishing boat captain (who rammed his boat als fields, published a plan in February For the time being, the delta is bridged into two Japanese coast guard vessels in 2010 listing actions Washington can take using materials stockpiled at various com- a disputed area of the South China Sea), to address what they see as the impending mercial mines around the world. This will China ceased nearly all REE exports to that rare earth crisis.26 This group insists that the not suffice for long. In 1998, by comparison, country.22 Japan was left scrambling to patch current situation portends a serious threat to total annual consumption was about 50,000 relations with China and simultaneously the economic well-being and national secu- tons, and there was no future availability began searching for alternative sources in rity of the United States. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 79 ESSAY WINNERS | Enduring Attraction

China is credited with holding 37 shares of the Western Hemisphere’s sole rare mining and oxide production are not iso- to 43 percent of the world’s known REE earth oxide producer, Molycorp Minerals, lated, nor are they coincidental. reserves, but the United States is not without is up over 400 percent since July 2010.33 its own REEs. America is estimated to have Although the Molycorp Mountain Pass Chinese Strategy 13 percent of known rare earth reserves. processing facility produces about 3,000 There is little distinction in China However, American mining operations pounds of REE oxides per year, including between private industry and the govern- essentially ceased in 2002 with the closure neodymium, it does so from a residual ment, making it increasingly difficult for of California’s Mountain Pass mine because stockpile of ore mined over 8 years ago.34 U.S. firms to compete on an equal footing of environmental concerns and declining Those oxides must still be sent to China for and remain profitable. An insightful student profitability as a result of low Chinese prices final processing because the United States of China’s maneuverings observed, “The in the previous decade.27 Gareth P. Hatch, lacks the necessary industry to produce rare Unocal [purchase attempt] involved the a REEs specialist with Technology Metals earth metals ready for end-use manufactur- provision of a soft loan from the Chinese Research, commented, “I’m not sure I ing. Changing this trend will be costly and government to the company [CNOOC]. This believe that there is a high probability of the time consuming. is not like a commercial loan. The Chinese U.S. losing access to the raw materials, semi- The method of separating neodymium government protects its state companies at finished and finished rare-earth products and samarium oxides from mined raw home and supports them financially over- that its defense contractors need. . . . On the ore, then reducing those oxides to a usable seas. But these companies are essentially other hand, should such a scenario occur, metallic element, is difficult. The industrial expected to be an arm of national foreign the effects would very likely be devastating, complex required to house thousands of policy in their foreign investment, rather and I would argue that this is an unaccept- stainless steel tanks, complicated arrays than to create value.”40 China’s growing able risk.”28 of chemical baths, extracting agents, and population and modernizing economy are in China has slowly reduced its REE equipment needed for the process covers an need of ever-increasing amounts of perma- exports since 2006, cutting them by 5 to 10 area the size of a football field.35 Start-up nent magnets. Its expanding domestic wind percent each year.29 This is due to increased costs of a separation plant are likewise over- energy production could soon consume the internal development (China constitutes whelming, ranging from $500 million to $1 world’s entire supply of neodymium.41 Those about 75 percent of global REE consump- billion, with construction expected to take at internal demands plus China’s aspirations tion), but is also part of a persistent strategy least 8 years.36 Consequently, no individual to be a regional hegemon and world super- to entice, if not force, foreign investment company is eager to risk that much capital in power drive its policies. To that end, China and manufacturing industry onto Chinese a market where China’s state-owned mines is pursuing a two-fold strategy: corner the soil.30 This was dramatically illustrated in have the influence and backing of an entire market on REEs and develop a manufactur- July 2010 by the Chinese Ministry of Com- country to drive REE prices artificially low ing base to make the high-tech products that merce’s sudden announcement of a decision in order to crush the competition. REEs require. to reduce export quotas by nearly three- Nonetheless, Molycorp is working China is methodically acquiring U.S. fourths. That drastic 72 percent cut imposed to modernize and expand its Mountain companies that produce rare earth magnets, on the last half of 2010 should serve as a Pass processing facility. Under the firm’s transferring that production technology wake-up call, highlighting how dependent “mine-to-magnets” strategy, it has a goal of to China, and then shutting down the the United States has become; import source generating 20,000 tons of rare earth oxides plants in America. This was the fate of GA data for 2005–2008 reveals that 91 percent of by 2012 and reestablishing its domestic Powders, Environmental Laboratory, and America’s REE imports came from China.31 magnet manufacturing business.37 Equally Magnequench.42 The latter company was important are plans to resume mining of purchased by a China-based conglomerate fresh ore having an approximate 12 percent in 1995. Magnequench’s NdFeB-magnet America is estimated to have content of neodymium and samarium.38 production line in Indiana was quickly 13 percent of known rare This development is encouraging, but duplicated in Tianjin, China. Once the earth reserves makes it even more disturbing to remem- Chinese company was sure its new plant ber that this mine, perhaps the largest worked, the Indiana facility was shut down non-Chinese rare earth deposit in the and some of its precision machine tools China’s announcement led some companies world, was nearly purchased by China’s were relocated to China. Magnequench was to increase the price of their permanent state-owned China National Offshore Oil the last U.S. company making rare earth magnet products by an average of 20 Corporation (CNOOC) as part of their magnets. Moreover, thousands of those percent.32 Continued restrictions will lead bid for the oil company Unocal in 2005.39 permanent magnets went into servos for the to a greater shortage of supplies, which has Unocal acquired Molycorp in 1978, but JDAM guidance system. A senior strategic industry leaders closely watching the situa- this fact and its REE supply implications trade advisor for DOD, Peter Leitner, rec- tion. The price of neodymium is more than were overlooked during the congressional ognized the paramount need to secure this 2.5 times what it was in the summer of 2009, uproar over the threat to U.S. energy secu- kind of technology, noting that rare earth and the stock values of non-Chinese mining rity, which drove the Chinese company to magnets “lie at the heart of many of our companies have jumped dramatically more withdraw its bid. Such efforts by Chinese most advanced weapons systems, particu- recently. Most notably, the closing price for businesses to control international REE larly . . . precision-guided weapons” and that

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China is “trying to replicate the capabilities terbium (needed for increased magnet coer- such minerals were sold by 1998, and they the U.S. has.”43 civity).48 GWMG also owns a magnet alloy were never classified as strategic miner- In addition to acquiring mines and producer in the United Kingdom and is als.54 In their February 2010 proposal to manufacturing technology, China can planning to build a refinery near its Cana- Washington, the USMMA recommended undercut its global competition thanks to dian mine. The company just entered into stockpiling a 5-year supply of REEs to its weak environmental regulations and partnership with the South African firm support the government’s critical needs abundance of cheap domestic labor. Its RareCo to purchase all of the output from while the domestic supply chain is rebuilt.55 focused efforts in the 1990s drove many that company’s Steenkampskraal mine. The Another recent report to Congress went non-Chinese firms out of business and left first deliveries are expected by late 2012.49 beyond merely recommending the addition China with a disproportionate share of This moves GWMG another step closer of these critical elements to the stockpile, the market.44 The longer China continues to becoming the first fully integrated REE instead urging that the NDS be completely its export restrictions on REE oxides and producer outside of China.50 There are REE reconfigured to be the Strategic Material refined metals, the greater the pressure Security Program (SMSP).56 This newly on foreign industries to move their manu- proposed program would have the power facturing operations to China, at least the China can undercut its global to aggregate materials requirements across portions that are dependent on REE raw competition thanks to its DOD and other cooperating Federal agen- materials. Conversely, China’s restrictions weak environmental cies in order to establish long-term stra- breathe new life into the market for alterna- regulations and abundance tegic sourcing measures. The SMSP could tive products and reinvestment in domestic of cheap domestic labor leverage the combined buying power of production. If the United States expects to all participating government departments surmount China’s strategy, it needs to con- that share a dependence on REE imports. front this challenge on multiple fronts. mines in Tanzania and the Democratic However, a firm commitment from these Republic of the Congo as well.51 agencies and a consistent flow of funds are Options REE industry expert Jack Lifton sur- required to enable the SMSP to capitalize In order to stem the tide of dependence mises that as production of neodymium and on favorable timing of markets. on China for permanent magnets, the United other rare earths comes on line in Canada, It would be wise to follow the Defense States should pursue several options: secure South Africa, Idaho, and Montana in 2015 National Stockpile Center’s recom- REE sources outside of China (preferably and beyond, by 2020 the world will be mendation to reconfigure the NDS into within its own borders), establish an NDS to independent of China as its source of rare an expanded and more capable SMSP. meet military needs for permanent magnets, earth metals.52 This is encouraging, but However, this action will likely require develop suitable substitute materials, and there are still uncertainties in the decade some reworking of the Nation’s procure- employ DOD acquisition policies to improve ahead. China could again flood the market ment bureaucracy to establish the neces- the REE market for domestic suppliers. with REEs in a short-term effort to devalue sary interaction of all affected government Non-Chinese Sources. Prior to 1990, permanent magnets, therefore hobbling departments. Such a consolidation of the United States was largely self-sufficient start-up ventures before they can become purchasing priorities for REEs promises the in meeting its REE and permanent magnet self-sustaining. In order to counter China’s greatest long-term leverage of finances, but requirements. Mountain Pass was the direct control and funding of Chinese firms, the system will take time to establish. At dominant source and the only large ore the U.S. Government should provide incen- present, Congress should classify neodym- deposit mined just for its REE content, tives (tax breaks, contract preferences, and ium and samarium as strategic minerals for having reserves of 20 million tons.45 Rekin- so forth) for domestic companies striving to the next 5 to 10 years, adding them to the dling this and other domestic supplies revive REE mining, refining of neodymium NDS, while the domestic supply chain for would be ideal. As Molycorp prepares to or samarium, or production of rare earth permanent magnets is reestablished. restart mining at Mountain Pass, other magnets. The USMMA urged the Depart- Alternative Materials. According to American deposits being explored include ment of Energy to use $2 billion in grant George Hadjipanayis, co-inventor of the North Fork, Idaho, where samples revealed and loan guarantees to spur reestablishment NdFeB magnet, “It’s been 28 years since the neodymium concentrations as high as 3.7 of U.S. mining and refining operations and discovery of neodymium-iron-boron, and percent.46 According to the U.S. Govern- increase government support of training we have not yet found a better magnet.”57 ment Accountability Office, rare earth and workforce development in the resurgent There are substitutes with similar proper- deposits also exist in Colorado, Missouri, industry.53 Greater attention should also be ties available, but just not as good regarding Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. accorded to the planned purchase of any weight or strength.58 Since 1983, U.S. magnet Other nations that have REE reserves U.S. company involved in the production of development has been lackluster, but the include Australia (5 percent), India (3 permanent magnets. It was partly through search has received renewed emphasis in percent), and several other countries with a this legal avenue that America lost its REE recent years. combined total of 22 percent of the Earth’s independence. Resurgent domestic efforts DOD has research, development, and known reserves.47 Deposits in Canada, must be more carefully guarded. science and technology money it can use owned by Great Western Minerals Group National Defense Stockpile. The to fund exploration of alternative materi- (GWMG), may contain dysprosium and United States has no REEs in its NDS. All als.59 Such efforts could also be done in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 81 ESSAY WINNERS | Enduring Attraction concert with other agencies. For instance, alternatives, and that the intended action cal instrument, portends greater conflict the Department of Energy’s Advanced is the most mission-effective and cost- over this shrinking resource, relative to the Research Projects Agency–Energy, which effective.62 One way DOD could influence demand for it. backs high-risk, high-reward projects, com- the REE market is with limits imposed Changing the trend of U.S. reliance missioned a $4.6 million research effort through the Defense Federal Acquisition on REE imports will be costly and time- looking for a replacement for the NdFeB Regulation, such as restricting the use of consuming, but is incomparable to the price magnet. Hadjipanayis leads this search for foreign-produced REE magnets in products of crippling national security. The probabil- a “next generation magnet.”60 The effort it purchases in order to stimulate the resur- ity that America will lose all of its access to proceeds on three simultaneous fronts. gence of American industry and ensure permanent magnets is relatively low, but the The University of Nebraska is trying to the survival of those domestic suppliers. consequences of such a situation would be develop a permanent magnet without using Intentionally high standards must be met catastrophic. Fortunately, the limited supply REEs. The Department of Energy’s Ames before enacting such direct intervention. of REEs resulting from China’s increased Laboratory is experimenting with combina- In addition to ensuring the most judicious consumption and reduction of exports has tions of rare earth, transition metals, and use of limited DOD resources (anticipat- made mining and refining operations poten- other minerals that have not previously ing greater expenses due to imposed limits tially profitable again. been tried with magnets. The University of on competition), stimulating industries There are several firms stepping up Delaware, where Hadjipanayis is a professor through greater innovation that increases to reestablish their place in the market. of physics, is working to fashion a new mag- competition is always preferred over artifi- However, these endeavors will take time netic material that may reduce neodymium cial market restrictions. and require great investment of capital. and samarium content by 30 or 40 percent, Molycorp’s recent efforts to revive its yet be double the strength of today’s NdFeB The United States is clearly dependent domestic magnet manufacturing process magnets.61 Their timeline is ambitious, on REE permanent magnets to satisfy its and restart mining operations at Moun- allowing 3 years for materials experimenta- demand for consumer electronics, fuel tain Pass, California, are encouraging. tion and assembly of a prototype magnet. its automotive and energy industries, Similarly, there is potential for mining The immediate focus for the United and most important, to maintain its lead operations in six other states and estab- States should be on reestablishing its in state-of-the-art military technology. lished ventures in Canada and South domestic REE supply and permanent Although America used to provide for its Africa that promise to open new sources magnet production capabilities, but not to the exclusion of pursuing better tech- changing the trend of U.S. reliance on REE imports will be nology. This requires a delicate balance costly and time-consuming, but is incomparable to the price of because it increases the financial risk that companies are taking to reestablish cradle- crippling national security to-grave REE magnet manufacturing in America. Funding should be appropriated for research into alternative materials. own permanent magnet requirements, this of neodymium and samarium in the next However, the government must then be independence eroded over the past two 5 years. This is a tenuous time, as the careful not to mandate the use of a result- decades and is now primarily gone. There possibility of Chinese maneuverings to ing product only for the sake of justifying are no active domestic REE mining opera- flood the market (as it did in the 1990s) its investment. The principles of free- tions or permanent magnet production and drive prices down threatens to swamp market capitalism must be honored in lines fully in the country. The United States the reemerging competition. U.S. Gov- harmony with the need for national is entirely dependent on external sources, ernment interposition to ensure that the security. Moreover, this manner of govern- which essentially means dependence on its reemerging industry is not squelched by ment support must be pursued collabora- largest economic competitor and fastest- Chinese government–funded competi- tively between private enterprise (having growing military challenger, China. tors will help hedge against these possible experience with the most efficient ways to “There is oil in the Middle East; schemes. Continued exploration of alter- pursue production) and DOD (knowing there is rare earth in China,” stated Deng native materials and technologies will also best what the requirements are to support Xiaoping, who ruled China from 1978 to balance America’s dependence on rare national security). 1997 and inaugurated China’s systematic earth elements. Department of Defense Policy. campaign to dominate the world’s supply While the permanent magnet corner- DOD already has a regulatory framework of REEs.63 The significance of Deng’s stone of the U.S. defense and energy indus- established to initiate government action observation has grown exponentially tries is at risk, recovery is not insurmount- to preserve domestic industrial capabilities with the explosion of world demand for able. Realizing the existence and scope of vital to national security. DOD Instruction REEs and permanent magnet technology. the threat, and applying the same creative 5000.60 provides guidance for verifying China’s own hunger for REEs to feed its thought and persistent action that once put the warfighting utility of the industry in modernizing economy, combined with its America at the forefront of this technology, question, that the specific capability is demonstrated willingness to use its near- will ultimately return the Nation to its pre- unique and at risk, that there are no feasible monopoly on global production as a politi- eminent place in this field. JFQ

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24 46 NOTES Humphries, 3. Jeremy Hsu, “Exclusive: Boeing Launches 25 John T. Bennett, “U.S. May Stockpile Rare Search for Crucial Rare Earth Elements,” Tech- 1 Nayantara Hensel, “China produces Earth Minerals,” Defense News, March 22, 2010, 30. NewsDaily, September 20, 2010, available at . 47 2 Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: ary 15, 2010, 16. Humphries, 6. 27 48 The Global Supply Chain (Washington, DC: Con- Hensel. Ibid., 7. 28 49 gressional Research Service, July 28, 2010), 4. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” The Washing- Irma Venter, “SA Mine May Make Small, 3 “Rare Earths Deposits Listed as Most ton Times, October 14, 2010, 8. but Significant, Dent in China’s Rare-earths 29 Important by USGS,” Mining Engineering, Ibid. Market Dominance,” Mining Weekly, September 30 March 1, 2010, available at . December 29, 2010, available at . small-but-significant-dent-in-chinas-rare-earth- 31 Jiaxiang, “Applications and Development Trends Hedrick, 128. market-dominance-2010-09-17>. 32 50 of Rare Earth Materials in Modern Military Tech- “Shin-Etsu Announces Price Increase for “Great Western Minerals Group Signs nology,” Hunan Rare-Earth Materials Research Rare Earth Magnets,” press release, August 13, Agreement to Purchase 100% of Rare Earths Academy [Chinese], April 16, 2006, cited in Cindy 2010, available at . release, August 10, 2010, available at . 51 Enablers of Modern Living,” JOM 50, no. 10 2010, available at . Conflicts and Partnerships,” USAF Institute for 35 J. Orris, Rare Earth Elements—Critical Resources Bounds. National Security Studies (Colorado Springs: U.S. 36 for High Technology, Fact Sheet 087–02 (Reston, VA: Jeremy Hsu, “U.S. Sitting on Mother Lode Air Force Academy, 2010), 9. 52 U.S. Geological Survey, 2002, modified 2005). of Rare Tech-Crucial Minerals,” TechNewsDaily, Jack Lifton’s Instablog, “Is the Rare Earth 8 Humphries, 3. March 8, 2010, available at . . 53 11 Humphries, 2. ing Business,” press release, September 30, 2010. United States Magnetic Materials Asso- 38 12 Cindy A. Hurst, “China’s Ace in the Hole: “Molycorp Minerals to Commence Rare ciation (USMMA), “Magnet Materials Supply Rare Earth Elements,” Joint Force Quarterly 59 Earth Exploration Program,” press release, March 1, Chain Players Propose Six-Point Plan to Address (4th Quarter, 2010), 124. 2010, available at . netmaterials.com/press-releases/Six-Point-Plan- 39 a New Magnet for Electronics,” TechNewsDaily, Jeremy Hsu, “U.S. Military Supply of Rare Letter-2-04-10.pdf>. 54 April 9, 2010, available at . com/us-military-supply-of-rare-earth-elements- Defense National Stockpile Center, 15 “The History of Rare Earths,” JOM 50, no. not-secure-0430/>. Reconfiguration of the National Defense Stockpile 40 10 (October 1998), 37. Maria Kielmas, “China’s Foreign Energy (Washington, DC: Defense National Stockpile 16 Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris. Asset Acquisitions: From Shopping Spree to Fire Center, April 2009), 18. 57 17 Hensel. Sale?” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3, Hsu, “Scientists Race to Engineer a New 18 Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris. no. 3 (2005), 29. Emphasis added. Magnet for Electronics.” 41 58 19 Bounds, 38. Jeremy Hsu, “Shortage of Rare Earth Hedrick. 59 20 Humphries, 3. Elements Could Thwart Innovation,” TechNews- Defense National Stockpile Center, 14. 60 21 Wang Dake, “Consider Banning the Sale Daily, February 12, 2010, available at . Magnet for Electronics.” 42 62 in Hurst, 122. Scott L. Wheeler, “Missile Technol- Department of Defense Instruction 22 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Recycles Minerals ogy Sent to China,” Insight on the News, 5000.60, Defense Industrial Capabilities Assess- from Used Electronics,” The New York Times, February 18, 2003, available at . Checkmate,” The Anchor House, Inc., October 43 html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=japan%20recycles%20 Ibid. 10, 2006, available at . Hensel. com/2006/10>. 45 23 Hensel. Haxel, Hedrick, and Orris. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 83 White House (Pete Souza)

President Obama with Chinese President Hu Jintao during state visit in January 2011

The Empire’s Newest New Clothes Overrating China By STEVE COONEN

here is a potentially danger- domination, while its menacing purchase of ­America’s top diplomat pulled out the ous obsession in America America’s debt-gone-wild is allegedly making Chinese bogeyman card in an attempt to regarding China. The Middle American leaders increasingly beholden ward off Congress’s penny-wise and pound- Kingdom’s awe-inspiring to their Chinese debt-masters’ political foolish proposed sacking of State Depart- T 2 climb from a state of backwardness and manipulations. Meanwhile, China’s rapidly ment public diplomacy programs. abject poverty to a thriving economy, expanding manufacturing base is moving Assertions of Chinese dominance are second only to the United States, in just beyond lead-based painted toys, poisoned pet beginning to ring true with the American over 30 years has not merely inspired jus- food, and toxic drywall to supersonic stealthy public as well. By a margin of 60 to 27 tifiable pride within the People’s Republic; fighters, high-speed rail, clean energy, and percent, Americans see China’s economic it has also provoked anxiety and fear in the world’s fastest supercomputer.1 strength as more of a problem than their the West. On the surface, fear is an under- military strength, and 47 percent also According to many, the “Chinese standable emotional response. The United incorrectly identified China as the world’s model” now serves as an enlightened States is seemingly losing to China in a largest economy (only 31 percent correctly beacon to other developing states, while no-holds-barred global economic competi- identified the United States). Equally unset- the liberal free-market model languishes tion, and there is no dearth of Cassandra- tling is the zero-sum perspective for 47 in disrepair along with its decrepit and like assertions from government leaders, percent of Americans who consider China’s lethargic American makers. China’s overseas unions, the press, and academia portending growing economic power a bad thing.3 investment strategy in energy, minerals, doom, gloom, and America’s decline. Even The incessant sensationalism surrounding and other resources is portrayed as para- sitic in nature—ravaging the Earth of all Steve Coonen wrote this essay while a student at the National War College. It won the Strategic Research that is useful in a competitive quest for Paper category of the 2011 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

84 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu COONEN

China’s economic prowess almost obliges one to wonder where the United States derailed to have permitted China to climb to such heights, as though America can control China’s destiny but not its own. DOD (Cherie Cullen) However, despite the outpouring of declarations claiming China’s unstoppable ascent and its menacing nature, reality depicts something quite different. China is confronted with a number of significant economic and noneconomic challenges that Chinese Defense will inevitably retard its continued growth. Minister in Singapore Yet China’s troubles are no reason for during 10th annual America to rejoice; it is hardly in U.S. inter- International Institute ests that China, or any state, fails to develop for Strategic Studies economically. Wealth tends to engender Asia Security Summit, June 2011 peace, stability, and, some contend, demo- cratic reforms in autocratic societies.4 This article focuses on the two main challenges that limit a proper understanding drawn to the misconception that the United Commodities and Overseas Invest- of China’s economic relationships and con- States is in a zero-sum economic competi- ments. Similarly, opinions about China’s dition. First is the misunderstanding about tion with China, overlooking the simple fact foreign direct investments (FDI) have taken the mutually beneficial nature of economic that companies compete, states do not.5 The on a troublesome tone in America. The relations between the United States and assertion assumes that wealth is finite and misperceptions characterize Chinese FDI as China. Second is an underestimation of the thus every dollar China earns can only come a competition—a race for resources—that economic challenges that China faces. The at a reciprocal loss to the United States. compels an equivalent U.S. response, or at article concludes with U.S. policy recom- While this is certainly true in the casinos minimum a dirigiste strategy, before the mendations that encourage China’s return to of Las Vegas or Macau, it is not true in the Chinese assume ownership and control of market-based reforms. economic relations between nations. all the world’s resources. This assumption ignores that wealth This anxiety demonstrates a fun- Fears and Fallacies can be created and that trade can be mutu- damental misunderstanding concerning Prior to delving into China’s numer- ally beneficial. These economic truths the nature of commodities. Commodities, ous problems, one should address those misleading assertions that depict Sino- American economic relations in a less than nowhere has the misnomer of competition for resources been positive light or project them forward on a more pronounced than in the panic-stricken assertions of confrontational trajectory. Alarmist indict- China’s alleged attempt to corner the energy market ments taint America’s perspective with negative biases and an adversarial mindset. If not understood, instead of responding help to explain how the global economy such as oil, iron, and wheat, are fungible with appropriate policies to address China’s grew from $22.8 trillion to $53.3 trillion and are generally purchased on the world’s very real and growing problems, the United between 1990 and 2007, or that there are “no commodity spot markets at prices that the States risks focusing on falsehoods or examples of countries that have risen in the markets bear. If China is able to assist states flawed understandings of Sino-American ranks of global living standards while being in the exploitation of natural resources trade relations, the market, and America’s less open to trade and capital in the 1990s through its overseas investments, then those appropriate leadership role. These fears than in the 1960s.”6 In this light, China’s who consume the commodities will likewise and fallacies need to be addressed and dis- economic growth should be viewed as benefit from increased global supplies. missed before moving on to China’s more wholly positive. Economically, it represents Nowhere has the misnomer of competi- pressing challenges. a growing market and wealthier trading tion for resources been more pronounced The list of imaginary economic perils partner for the United States. Morally, it than in the panic-stricken assertions of that China poses to the United States is as means that millions of people are now living China’s alleged attempt to corner the energy lengthy as it is troubling. However, the bases outside of chronic poverty. Politically, there market. It is somehow imagined that Chinese for the alleged threats are laden with logical is no reason why China should not follow national oil companies (NOCs), operating fallacies. The most significant misunder- the precedent of other former autocratic under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) standing surrounds the notion that if China states whose oppressed citizens increasingly direction, are gobbling up foreign energy is growing—winning—economically, the demanded a greater voice in how their new- assets and hoarding their output, flowing United States is somehow losing. Many are found wealth was spent. from the wells into Chinese tankers (which ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 85 ESSAY WINNERS | The Empire’s Newest New Clothes: Overrating China are virtually nonexistent) or pipelines to Chinese refineries before being prolifically consumed by over a billion of the proletariat. The International Energy Agency describes a vastly different scenario. Like DOD (Cherie Cullen) their American counterparts, Chinese oil companies’ decisions directing the marketing of equity oil are largely based on commercial considerations. Even state- to-state energy arrangements are usually influenced by market conditions.7 China’s “new acquisitions do not translate neatly or exclusively into supplies flowing to China.”8 Erica Downs of the Brookings Institution observes what is apparently not obvious to many: “Any foreign oil production Current and former U.S. defense and diplomatic officials participate that China’s NOCs send to China merely in Track Two Dialogue with Chinese replaces oil that China would have to buy dignitaries to improve relations from other countries.”9 Thus, far from being a rapacious predator in the energy markets, China’s acquisitions in the energy arena actually increase the global avail- trade and investment surpluses are enor- Still, today there seems to be a general ability of oil.10 This is also true for China’s mous. China needs to park this excess sense of surrender to the economic myth investments in other commodities. capital somewhere and is fortunate that that is China. When compared to the Debtor-Creditor Relations. Fear the United States is, for the time being, bashing of Japan and Germany in the that China can exert undue political influ- profligate enough to assist China with its early 1990s, there is a notable absence of ence over the United States as the largest excess reserves dilemma. JPMorgan Chase counterarguments. It is as though at a single foreign owner of U.S. debt represents & Company predicts that China will keep certain level, America, bound by the grasp another misplaced worry.11 The anxiety buying U.S. treasuries “not only for the of recession, debt, and a general sense of nonetheless seems logical—that the creditor near-term stability of the global financial overall economic malaise, has resigned would have a certain degree of influence system, but also because there is no viable itself to decline. The lack of a counter- over the debtor—and the greater the debt, and liquid alternative market in which to response suggests apathy, resignation, the greater the influence. Yet when the invest China’s massive and still growing or something else—but surprisingly not specifics of the Sino-American credit-debt reserves.”15 Purchasing U.S. treasuries is disbelief. Yet there should be an element of relationship are evaluated, the disconcerting also one of the mechanisms by which China disbelief or at least a questioning of China’s aspects dissipate. can keep its currency pegged to the dollar. position relative to the United States, for China “owns” just over 8 percent of U.S. The resulting dollar-yuan exchange rate China also has economic challenges. So, debt.12 The American public (individuals, is one of the keys for China to maintain while the United States seems to be slowly institutions, and Social Security) actually its export-driven economic growth—an coming out of a cyclical economic stupor holds the greatest portion, and yet their influ- economic condition that the CCP views as and will continue to face grave challenges ence over U.S. policymakers is not derived vital in preserving a semblance of domestic associated with its annual deficits and from owning more than 2 out of every 3 stability. Ironically, China’s leaders have mounting debt into the foreseeable future, dollars of government securities. Instead, begrudgingly little choice but to “Buy China is presented with more serious long- their influence is wielded at the polls—a civic American”—in this case, debt.16 term structural issues that risk derailing responsibility and privilege unavailable to So how are Chinese debt-masters its economic miracle altogether. foreign U.S. debt holders. translating this alleged financial stranglehold Nor is China actually lending over America’s increasingly indebted policy- China’s Economic Challenges America money as it is “depositing” or makers? The actual details of the debtor-to- China’s economic revival came on the “investing” in U.S. treasuries.13 In fact, creditor political manipulation process are, heels of Mao Zedong’s reform failures and with last year’s historically low interest not surprisingly, rather vague. Alas, despite could scarcely have started at a lower point. rates, investors were receiving a negative owning over $1 trillion in U.S. treasuries, The Great Leap Forward was marked by return on their U.S. treasury purchases; China has been unable to convert the threat of economic regression and the deaths of tens China was in reality paying for the privi- its heavily debt-laden sword of Damocles over of millions. A few years later, the Cultural lege to purchase America’s debt.14 China the United States into any noteworthy acts of Revolution again brought economic growth consistently exports more than it imports political compellence.17 In his study, Daniel and education to a standstill and ensured a and tends to attract more foreign invest- Drezner concludes that “the power of credit decade of political violence that set China ment than it sends abroad. The resulting between great powers has been exaggerated.”18 back even further. It is out of this chaos that

86 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu COONEN

despotic regimes. Moreover, why should Chinese guards with African Union– autocratic leaders trust it? Regarding the UN Hybrid Operation recent demise of the advanced Western protect borehole democracies and their so-called free-market operated by model, authoritarianism as a reasonable eco- UN (Eskinder Debebe) Chinese engineering nomic model seems to have rebounded with company in Sudan China’s rise. Many in the West have become enamored with the mystique of Confucian- ism and apparent superiority of the Beijing Consensus. Or, if not infatuated with the model, they despairingly describe its ascen- dancy as preordained.22 However, attributing the recent financial meltdown to market failure dem- onstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the root causes that led to the crisis. One could easily highlight the genesis of the West’s economic challenges not as market failure, but rather as the failure of states in regulating new speculative financial instruments and encouraging irresponsible China could only improve, and it helps in number of poor people in the world. lending practices by diminishing market understanding its sizable initial successes.19 Remarkably, in 2007, the World Bank risk in guaranteeing private mortgages. The “Four Modernizations” claimed that “extreme poverty, in the sense For China’s leaders to base the perceived announced in December 1978 was a water- of not being able to meet the most elemen- superiority of their model on misleading shed economic policy decision of Deng tary food and clothing needs, has almost and false assumptions of the free market, Xiaoping and the Central Committee of the been eliminated [in China].”21 and move even further to the left of their CCP. It propelled China to amazingly rapid China’s economic success is a unique and relatively sustained economic growth. phenomenon that defies precise labeling. China’s economic success is On paper, the reforms focused on apply- Richard McGregor suggests that the “mul- ing science and technology to agriculture, tiple, head-spinning contradictions about a unique phenomenon that industry, and national defense. In reality, modern China” make attempts to describe defies precise labeling the plan called for incorporating foreign its system or model extremely difficult. investment and technology along with the Nonetheless, two things are certain. First, education of Chinese students overseas.20 economically, China straddles the free- increasingly illiberal model, is done at a China witnessed a liberalization in the market and command-economy models. great peril to their own continued eco- factors of production: a “free movement The economic success it has enjoyed to date nomic development. of people” in its urbanization efforts; an was generated by Deng’s reforms to liberal- When Hu Jintao came to power in attraction of foreign capital; and liberalized ize its economy. Furthermore, to meet its 2002, many had hoped that he would move trade with the rest of the world—ultimately political objectives, the CCP still interjects even faster and further in the market reform relying more and more on market forces itself through state-owned enterprises efforts initiated by his predecessors. Instead, rather than CCP production quotas or (SOEs) and the state-controlled financial Hu moved in the opposite direction.23 With other command-economy principles, which system. Second, politically, China remains the economic calamities that struck the were quickly abandoned. The autocratic firmly under the autocratic rule of the CCP. West, China’s leaders are now even more nature of the reforms, while not represent- The CCP’s primary purpose in exercising enthralled with their Eastern version of ing ideal free-market conditions, were its leadership over China’s economy is “to economic success. Today, this attitude nonetheless liberalizing enough that when ensure the survival and viability of the means that the CCP and its leaders are applied to a country of 1.3 billion, most of party.” This axiom indicates why China’s perhaps more inclined to divert even further whom were living in poverty, they launched leaders are turning away from the very from past liberal reforms measures, even China to unprecedented levels of continu- market-based reforms that permitted its if China’s membership in the World Trade ous economic growth. astounding economic growth in the first Organization (WTO) and other multilateral As less productive rural labor migrated place. From the CCP’s perspective, the firm and bilateral economic fora should temper to a dynamic urban manufacturing base, grip of tyranny cannot be entrusted to an drastic changes or oblige them to maintain wages and living standards rose rapidly. “invisible hand.” certain market-based principles. China’s record in reducing poverty was Shift Away from Market Economy. Many observers have noted this shift. impressive. It is difficult to imagine that The uneasiness of relying on something The government owns almost all major as recently as 1996, China had the largest invisible must be unsettling to leaders of banks and oil, telecommunications, and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 87 ESSAY WINNERS | The Empire’s Newest New Clothes: Overrating China media companies in China. Assets of SOEs resources away from private hands and allo- the party to lead their people out of poverty, total about $6 trillion, or 133 percent of cating them to largely inefficient SOEs. regain national pride, and reestablish China China’s gross domestic product (GDP).24 Internationally, the CCP’s underhand- as a regional and potential global power? Why The less-than-visible hand of the CCP is edness and further movement away from would they move backward to a more centrally increasingly clawing back major portions of previous liberalizing reforms through the controlled economy that has no historic long- the Chinese economy: from championing championing of huge SOEs are affecting term precedents of success, but only misery command-economy–style monopolistic the perceptions and bottom lines of foreign and failure? The answer lies in the party’s top SOEs to reimplementing price controls.25 firms. For example, foreign car makers see priority: to remain in power. The party leader- Domestically, Jialin Zhang writes that Beijing’s push for joint ventures as nothing ship needs to maintain social stability; leaving the state sector is making a comeback after more than a “technology shakedown” to continued economic growth to the whims of decades of official encouragement of private gain the capability and eventually become the market is a risk that the CCP is apparently enterprise. He suggests this backpedaling rivals. The actions of the CCP risk choking unwilling to take. Nowhere is this reversal is jeopardizing China’s relatively nascent off future foreign investment and technolo- better reflected than in the state’s increased market economy. In 2009, the CCP’s revi- gies that are necessary for China’s continued role in the allocation of resources through talization plan for 10 industries encouraged growth. “There is still a lot of optimism, but state-owned financial institutions. SOEs to merge with medium and small there are industry leaders talking about the China’s Weak Financial System. Own- enterprises.26 Eventually, this increase in challenges of doing business in China in ership of financial institutions is dominated state-owned monopolies will limit market a way they would not have 10 years ago.”27 by the state, leaving one to question the competition, weaken innovation and tech- These challenges are increasingly painting financial sector’s ability to serve the private nological progress, further contribute to China as an economic pariah. Given this sector and whether lending decisions are corruption, make investments riskier, and unfriendly business environment, some based purely on commercial considerations result in more bad loans—in short, it will international firms are reluctantly giving up or the whims of the party.28 McGregor become a greater impediment to China’s on the prospect of investing in China despite remarks that Chinese banks are not just com- continued growth. Notwithstanding the the size of China’s domestic market and its mercial institutions; they are also “instru- CCP’s focus on SOEs, domestic private potential for significant returns, unques- ments of national economic policy.”29 It is enterprises are still an important element tionably to each party’s detriment. revealing that in 2009, when confronted with of China’s economic growth. Yet the state is What could possibly have caused CCP possible major economic decline, the CCP increasingly diverting a greater portion of leaders to depart from reforms that permitted ordered the state-owned and “controlled” U.S. Army (Jonathan J. Springer)

UN Secretary-General meets with representatives of UN agencies in China comprising the UN Country Team in Beijing

88 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu COONEN banks to further open their already wasteful In 2007 alone, the U.S. Food and Drug either directly or indirectly to corruption, lending spigots. Banks lent nearly 50 percent Administration issued recalls or warnings pollution, land seizures, or the impres- more in 6 months than they had in all of on pet food, toothpaste, and farm-raised sion among the rural poor that others are 2008. However, the incestuous relationships seafood—all from China. More serious getting rich because they have connec- that SOEs had with their financial confreres health issues occurred in 2008: poorly tions with government officials. Francis through their party affiliations helped them manufactured heparin (an anticoagulant) Fukuyama suggests that China’s growing soak up a vast majority of the funds, leaving resulted in 246 deaths between January 2007 inequalities may lead to a revolt of the household consumers and private enterprises and May 2008, and contaminated infant middle class, which finds its aspirations with just 15 percent.30 Zhang adds that stymied.36 Regardless of the sources of fewer than 10 huge conglomerates provide unrest, they are becoming more frequent, 80 percent of the profits earned by centrally China is second only to the larger, and more violent. It is undoubtedly controlled SOEs, leaving most other SOEs United States in its share disturbing for CCP leaders and adds to the relying on government subsidies and credits of billionaires growing list of challenges to stability, party to survive, and also increasing structural control, and sustained economic growth. imbalances in the economy. The CCP may hope in “Chinese exceptionalism,” but history formula required the recall of products con- Recommended U.S. Courses of Action indicates that governments have exception- taining milk imported from China.31 The In welcoming President Hu Jintao to ally poor track records in allocating resources Consumer Product Safety Commission has America in January 2011, President Barack efficiently. also issued numerous alerts and recalls on Obama stated: In 2009, Derek Scissors of the Heri- products from China.32 tage Foundation speculated that the CCP’s Even as corruption weighs on the We have an enormous stake in each other’s obsession with growth might overheat domestic economy, it also negatively impacts success. In an interconnected world, in a the economy. Over the previous 4 years, U.S. investment decisions in China. Exten- global economy, nations—including our the CCP directed the lending of trillions sive government approvals are required for own—will be more prosperous and more of dollars through its banks, primarily to even the most routine processes, including secure when we work together. The United SOEs. With today’s inflationary pressure in those in banking, finance, government pro- States welcomes China’s rise as a strong, pros- China and probable increase of nonperform- curement, and construction.33 Corruption perous and successful member of the com- ing loans that were extended to unprofitable is also alleged to be pervasive among senior munity of nations. Indeed, China’s success SOEs, Scissors may be getting an answer officials and their family members, who has brought with it economic benefits for our to the rhetorical question he raised 2 years are rarely investigated. When this level of people as well as yours, and our cooperation ago: whether state-directed investment systemic corruption and slack government on a range of issues has helped advance sta- can increase by 25 to 30 percent every year oversight that produces unsafe products or bility in the Asia Pacific and in the world.37 without “crippling waste and a warped, environmental conditions is coupled with fragile economy.” CCP-led financial and economic cronyism President Obama’s comments reflect a This waste is often translated into in an increasingly SOE-focused economy, it pragmatic reality about the interdependent increased corruption along with its associ- cannot bode well for long-term growth and nature of Sino-American relations and the ated bedfellows of feeble government regula- efficiencies. It can also incite outrage and need for continued cooperation. Yet there tory enforcement and substandard quality. unrest among the masses. is a growing number that clamor for more These conditions also contribute to China’s Inequality and Unrest. “The correct aggressive responses, such as a policy of questionable economic condition and point leadership of CCP Central Committee and containment. America’s preeminent realist, to serious systemic shortfalls in governance. State Council, local government at all levels John Mearsheimer, suggests that “U.S. Corruption, Substandard Quality, were in accordance with the scientific concept interests would be best served by slowing and Slack Regulatory Enforcement. “Made of development and building a harmonious Chinese growth rather than accelerating in China” has an automatic, yet justifi- socialist society.”34 Notwithstanding the it.”38 Though China’s continued growth is able, negative connotation. The poor life CCP’s “correct” leadership, China’s inequities not necessarily inevitable, for the United expectancy of Chinese products is attributed continue to widen. The contradictions that States to actively seek to contain or prevent to shoddy craftsmanship, dismal quality define China cannot be more pronounced it would be foolhardy and risks backfiring.39 control, or poor regulatory oversight. Not than in the income inequalities within a so- Joseph Nye warns that “the best way to make only are the well-noted phenomena of recalls called communist state. Amazingly, China is an enemy of China is to treat it like one.” In and poor performance having a negative second only to the United States in its share of either case, the CCP leadership seems to be economic impact on companies and indi- billionaires. Yet while China’s economic boom doing a good job of stifling growth without viduals that market and purchase Chinese years between 1997 and 2007 birthed many of American interference.40 goods; there are also health and safety risks. its billionaires, the share of workers’ wages fell Rather than pursuing vague confron- Corruption feeds these bad practices in from 53 percent of GDP to 40 percent.35 tational policies that risk cementing an production as manufacturers bribe local Inequalities and other social ills are adversarial bilateral relationship, U.S. poli- officials to turn a blind eye on otherwise causing an increase in domestic unrest cymakers would be better served to heed the well-established guidelines and standards. and strikes. Most of the unrest is linked Chinese proverb “The ox is slow but the earth ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 89 ESSAY WINNERS | The Empire’s Newest New Clothes: Overrating China is patient” and simply bide time while adher- Not only does this assist in resolving issues leaders, bolstered by three decades of success ing to and encouraging the very broad prin- in a relatively nonconfrontational manner, and perceived Western decline, are moving ciples that define America: liberal democracy but it also further exposes and impresses further away from the free-market reforms and free markets. McGregor intimates upon China the good order obtained that guided China’s reemergence in the first potential fissures in the CCP’s continued grip through international rule of law. place. The CCP is unwittingly jeopardizing on power as its ability to transform with rapid The U.S.-China Strategic and continued growth and, as a consequence, the change fails to keep pace with the demands Economic Dialogue initiated under the very stability that it so desperately desires of an upwardly mobile and divergent society. George W. Bush administration and con- to retain power. A Chinese society that Bilateral efforts should focus on the construc- tinued by President Obama is an excellent enriches itself in a stable economic environ- tive: using tools of statecraft to encourage example of a useful forum to discuss and ment is more likely to transition toward positive behavior and judiciously using public advance the bilateral economic issues peaceful democratic political reforms rather condemnations, which do little to change and challenges listed above. Used appro- than ones borne out of chaos. undesirable behavior or advance cooperation. The United States should thus seek cooperative policies that would encourage these challenges require scalpel-like redress as opposed to China’s leaders to return to the liberal- cutlass-like generalizations waved about willy-nilly, izing reform efforts of the past as the best path for continued economic growth. This creating hostile domestic political environments recommendation does not dismiss the in the United States and China numerous imbalances in Sino-American trade and finance arenas that require rec- onciliation: currency, capital exchange, and priately, the dialogue can grow into a America should thus seek solutions trade distortions associated with an under- meaningful dispute resolution mechanism and policies to the mutual benefit of its eco- valued yuan; and legitimate complaints by short of bringing cases before the WTO, nomic partners, of which China is arguably U.S. manufacturers regarding their trade or to advance cooperative programs and the most important. The philosophical basis relations with Chinese firms or government policies that would facilitate mutually for such an approach is not established on officials, including intellectual property beneficial trade relations between private some elusive notion of American benevo- rights protections, China’s discriminatory U.S. and Chinese firms. lence, but rather on the free-market liberal practices, industrial policies to subsidize economic concepts and principles that and protect domestic firms from foreign have been the economic and foreign policy competition, and health and safety con- It seems that whenever the United bedrock of the United States for generations. cerns associated with Chinese products. States slips economically, a new chorus of It would be unfortunate to depart from these But these challenges require scalpel- pundits forms, chanting its fall. During the principles because of unfounded fears or like redress as opposed to cutlass-like gener- economic downturns of the 1950s, it was the negative emotions. The United States has alizations waved about willy-nilly, creating Soviets who were about to “crush” America. been down that road before, and it should hostile domestic political environments in During the cyclical declines of the 1990s, a be leery of policy proposals that repeat past the United States and China. A negatively neo-axis of powers was aligned to overtake mistakes, do not address the real issues of charged atmosphere limits maneuverability the United States in the name of Japan and the day, or make a mildly antagonistic Sino- for those striving to resolve problems while Germany. Today, with chances of a robust American relationship worse. JFQ emboldening nationalistic entrenchment on recovery encumbered by historically high both sides of the Pacific. As such, the United debt levels, China is proclaimed as the new NOTES States should pursue adjudication processes emerging threat and dominant global power 1 available through the WTO or other fora. while the United States goes into its prover- Don Clark, “Chinese Supercomputer bial tailspin, taking the liberal market along Likely to Prompt Unease in U.S.,” Wall Street Journal Online, October 28, 2010, available with it. Alarmists assert myths and half- at . that would chart a collision course for Sino- 2 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned American relations. the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “we Yet the United States continues to grow are in a competition for influence with China; economically and demographically. It con- let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good tinues to provide its citizens with significant side of what we believe in, and let’s just talk wealth, freedoms, and security. In short, one straight realpolitik.” See Daniel Dombey, “U.S. Struggling to Hold Role as Global Leader, Clinton Unoccupied building under construction finds the country on an upward, albeit flat- Says,” Financial Times, March 3, 2011. collapsed in Minxing District of Shanghai tening, trajectory. At the same time, China 3 Andrew Kohut, “Friend or Foe? How Ameri- when flood prevention wall failed is confronted by a growing list of economic cans See China; For the First Time, the Public challenges. To make matters worse, China’s Flickr

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16 Chinese leaders are concerned about the of industrial production for SOEs falling from 80 Thinks Asia Is More Vital to U.S. Interests Than dollar’s staying power in light of the economic percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 2008. Europe,” The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2011. decline and corresponding large increases in 27 H. Schneider, “China Has ‘Thumbed Nose’ 4 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George American deficit spending and debt accumula- at Spirit of Free Trade,” The Washington Post, Downs, “Development and Democracy,” Foreign tion. China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao has January 18, 2011. Affairs (September–October 2005); or Minxin expressed concern in the past: “We have lent a 28 Richard Herd, Charles Pigott, Pei, Economic Institutions, Democracy and Devel- huge amount of money to the U.S. Of course we and Sam Hill, “China’s Financial Sector opment, Carnegie Paper, World Bank Conference, are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be Reforms,” OECD White Paper, February 1, February 1999. honest, I am definitely a little worried.” See Keith 2010, available at . 6 Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World 17 For reasons mentioned above, it seems 29 Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 20; and China will continue to purchase U.S. treasuries. World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York: Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Should China be tempted to dump its current U.S. Harper, 2010), 52. Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 82. debt holdings, not only would it be painful for the 30 Ibid., 68. 7 Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, “Overseas United States in higher interest rates, but the price 31 The Chinese government reported that 6 Investments by Chinese National Oil Compa- China would obtain from such a sale would be children had been killed and 294,000 sickened nies,” International Energy Agency Information deeply discounted, at which time the U.S. Federal (51,900 requiring hospitalization); Wayne Morrison, Paper, February 2011. Erica Downs also confirms Reserve would invariably purchase back the debt China-U.S. Trade Issues (Washington, DC: Congres- that “contrary to conventional wisdom, China’s at a significantly reduced cost; Derek Scissors, sional Research Service, January 7, 2011), 28–29. NOCs are not merely puppets of the Chinese presentation to National War College Chinese field 32 Ibid. party-state that are expanding internationally for studies class, January 20, 2011. 33 The PRS Group, Inc., China Country the sole purpose of assuaging Beijing’s concerns 18 Daniel Drezner, “Bad Debts,” International Report (update), August 10, 2010, 15. about energy security.” See Erica S. Downs, Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009). 34 Statistical Communiqué on Labor and “Who’s Afraid of China’s Oil Companies?” 19 Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia’s Social Security Development in 2008, National Brookings Institution, available at . 20 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern comingevents/t20090522_402560900.htm>. 8 The International Energy Agency reports China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 619. 35 Richard McGregor, 56. that only a portion of its equity oil was actually 21 Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gertz, 36 Francis Fukuyama, “Is China’s Regime Next shipped to China and was sold to local or interna- “Poverty in Numbers: The Changing State of to Fall?” The Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2011. tional markets instead. See Jiang and Sinton. Global Poverty from 2005 to 2015,” Policy Brief 37 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by Presi- 9 Downs. 2011–01, Brookings Institution, 12, available dent Obama and President Hu of the People’s 10 Jonathan Pollack, “Energy Insecurity with at . gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/remarks-presi- lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 445. 22 The title of Stefan Halper’s book The dent-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic- 11 See, for example, Ken Miller’s “Coping Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian china-official>. with China’s Financial Power,” Foreign Affairs Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century 38 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the (July–August 2010). (New York: Basic Books, 2010) is sufficient for American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (Sep- 12 China owns $1.16 trillion of a total $14.16 understanding his claims. tember–October 2001). trillion American debt, Japan owns $882.3 23 Scissors, presentation to National War 39 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise billion, and the United Kingdom is the third College class. of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political largest foreign holder of U.S. treasuries at $272.1 24 Compare China’s 133 percent of gross Science Quarterly 125, no. 3 (Fall 2010), 362. billion; U.S. Treasury Department, available at domestic product to 28 percent for France, argu- 40 Ibid. . sectors; Jason Dean, Andrew Brown, and Shai Oster, 13 Arthur Kroeber, “Five Myths About “China’s ‘State Capitalism’ Sparks a Global Back- China’s Economy,” The Washington Post, April lash,” The Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2010. 11, 2010; Derek Scissors, “10 China Myths for the 25 Scissors notes the State Council “sets and New Decade,” Backgrounder, The Heritage Foun- re-sets the prices for all key services: utilities dation, January 28, 2010. and health care, education, and transportation” 14 Aline van Duyn, Michael Mackenzie, and as well as control over energy and grains (food); Nicole Bullock, “U.S. Treasury Sells Negative-Rate Derek Scissors, “Liberalization in Reverse,” The Bonds,” Financial Times, October 26, 2010, avail- Heritage Foundation, May 4, 2009. able at . major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while 15 Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “Clinton Urges letting the smaller ones sink or swim. In 1999, China to Keep Buying U.S. Treasury Securities,” the party announced SOEs could only remain Bloomberg, February 22, 2009, available at . and social welfare. This shift resulted in the share

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 91 ESSAY WINNERS | U.S.-China Relations: No Need to Fight

USS Ronald Reagan leads multinational formation of ships during interoperability exercise Rim of the Pacific 2010

U.S. Navy (Scott Taylor)

U.S.-China Relations

NO NEED TO FIGHT By DANIEL S. LARSEN

t a recent Canadian defense Led by the offensive realism of John as President Richard Nixon traveled to conference, a speaker from Mearsheimer, the “let’s fight” approach China, he identified three things China the U.S. Naval War College conflicts with stated U.S. positions, which wanted: “1. Build up their world credentials; demonized China and con- seek a “positive, constructive, and compre- 2. Taiwan; and 3. Get the U.S. out of Asia.” A 1 cluded with a phrase often attributed to hensive relationship with China.” His thoughts about what the United States Leon Trotsky: “You may not be interested The place and role of China on the and China both wanted included: “1. Reduce in war, but war is interested in you.” This world stage are not a new concern. In 1972, danger of confrontation and conflict; and unbalanced and unsophisticated approach is a hallmark of conflict theorists who maintain there simply has to be a fight Colonel Daniel S. Larsen, USA, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army War College. It won the between the United States and China. Strategy Article category of the 2011 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

92 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LARSEN

mainland in Asia and potentially the most powerful nation in the world.”9 While Morgenthau’s mainland Asian prediction echoes true today, others are less enamored with China’s potential. Robert Jervis puts Russia and China in close company when he says they “lack many of the attributes of great powers” and “can pose challenges only regionally.”10 Mearsheimer predicts an “aggressive” China “determined to achieve regional hegemony.”11 And regional is the key word. In the end, China is tougher to predict than most—almost everything except its economy is virtual, future, and opaque. Economically, it is already a global power. Militarily, it is a mainland Asia and regional Asia-Pacific power, but it is doubtful China President Obama talks with Chinese will become a global military power. The President Hu Jintao after bilateral meeting at G20 Summit People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is untested, “constrained largely by the lack of robust White House (Pete Souza) strategic lift capabilities,”12 needs modern- ization, and is not on par with the U.S. mili- 2. a more stable Asia.”2 That same year, limited resources will test China’s ability to tary. Technological discrepancies between Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote about a “2-1/2 continue its phenomenal economic gains the U.S. and Chinese militaries will require powers world,” where the United States and and rise to global power and leadership. In that China spend more to catch up or leap Soviet Union were the 2, and China was the an influential Foreign Affairs article, Zheng ahead. To correct perceived discrepancies, 1/2, wielding “considerable political lever- Bijian noted that because of China’s large the PLA has focused on new capabilities age” and whose impact was to “increase population, “Any small difficulty in its such as area denial, blue-water naval forces, uncertainty, to complicate planning.”3 economic or social development . . . could and limited power projection.13 These efforts Today, with a geostrategic emphasis shift become a huge problem.”5 Zheng posits that will continue, but they remain dependent from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, it will be 2050 before China will be a “mod- the world power situation is somewhat ernized, medium-level developed country.”6 changed—the United States and China While the Chinese may be lowballing China is a normal rising weigh in at one each, and Russia weighs in at their estimates and definitely their ambi- power with unique historical one-half. tions, it seems unlikely that they can indefi- This means we have to deal with nitely keep up their economic success, which legacies, and we must China. If our political and strategic is the foundation for their military develop- seek engagement approach is to demonize it, we risk a self- ment and modernization. The National rather than vilification fulfilling prophecy. The Chinese are not Intelligence Council estimates that the infallible, all-powerful, or malevolent. “pace of China’s economic growth almost China is a normal rising power with unique certainly will slow, or even recede, even with on Chinese economic performance and historical legacies, and we must seek engage- additional reforms to address mounting domestic constraints. China cannot buy ment rather than vilification. The United social pressures.”7 At that point, Chinese every piece of military kit it wants any more States should not approach engagement with leadership will face difficult choices regard- than it can buy all of Eurasia or the Eastern trepidation. China has significant domestic ing funding allocations for military versus Hemisphere. constraints that will limit its development as economic and social development. If Zheng In the meantime, the United States a global military power. China is more likely is right, stability could take precedence over cannot hedge its bets toward the optimistic to be a regional military power; therefore, it military modernization in order to avoid side. If China arrives in mid-century as will be neither adversary nor partner.4 huge problems rippling through more than a a “modernized, medium-level developed Although almost everything seems to billion people. country,” it will only be medium level using be made in China today, China’s economy Predictions of the heights to which fuzzy per capita math. Its military will be and resources are not unlimited and its sta- Chinese power can ascend vary widely. significantly more powerful than a medium- bility is not guaranteed. Nationalism, demo- Robert Kaplan has called China an “über- level country. Therefore, we must continue graphic pressures and premature aging, realist power” that is “beginning to turn to “monitor China’s military modernization increasing social pressures, regime survival, outward.”8 In 1968, Hans Morgenthau said, program and prepare accordingly to ensure environmental degradation, corruption, and “China is the most powerful nation of the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 / JFQ 93 ESSAY WINNERS | U.S.-China Relations: No Need to Fight that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and of the system and who makes them, as 3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Opinion: The globally, are not negatively affected.”14 well as issues of pride or prestige. Of these Balance of Power Delusion,” Foreign Policy, no. 7 The United States and China will have differences and issues, the last may be the (July 1972), 56. to interact because China is becoming a most important and dangerous regarding 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Geostrategic regional power, and that rise carries with Taiwan. In 1968, Morgenthau assessed the Triad: Living with China, Europe, and Russia it associated geostrategic and economic issue of Taiwan as being the “most likely (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Inter- shifts. There are numerous areas for casus belli between the United States and national Studies, January 2001), 9. cooperation, such as nuclear counter- China.”21 Knowing this, can the United 5 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to proliferation and counterpiracy, but there States work with the Chinese and Taiwan- Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 is no utilitarian harmony principle here; ese to ameliorate tensions and move toward (2005), 19. there will be divergent interests.15 Even a political settlement, while sustaining a 6 Ibid., 21. so, we cannot assume that every divergent vibrant democracy in Taiwan? 7 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Chinese interest derives from an underly- There is no need to fight with China. As Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, ing malign intent. M. Taylor Fravel notes President Obama has said, the “relationship DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 49. has not been without disagreement and dif- 8 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of ficulty. But the notion that we must be adver- Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (June we do not have a choice on saries is not pre-destined.”22 President Nixon 2010), 24. whether we will deal with was more hopeful and specific: “We must 9 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The United States China, but we do have a now ensure that the one quarter of the world’s and China,” International Studies 10, no. 1 choice on how we deal people who live in the People’s Republic of (January 1968), 23. 10 with China China will be and remain not our enemies Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era but our friends.”23 We do not have a choice on of Leading-Power Peace,” The American Political whether we will deal with China, but we do Science Review 96, no. 1 (March 2002), 2. that, so far, China has “pursued foreign have a choice on how we deal with China. 11 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great policies consistent with status quo and The Chinese will not get President Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 402. not revisionist intentions.”16 Opportunity Nixon’s third observation regarding what 12 M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations costs would increase were China to turn China wants—the United States out of Asia— Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s aggressive regionally or globally, assuming because the United States is also a Pacific Potential for Territorial Expansion,” International Chinese foreign policy follows a rational nation. Although always preparing for the pos- Studies Review 12, no. 4 (December 2010), 509. actor model. Some Chinese leaders and sibility of conflict, the United States needs to 13 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military actors may not act rationally, however. In identify choices that will engage the Chinese, and Security Developments Involving the People’s that event, these actors’ worldviews and establish confidence, and enhance security, Republic of China 2010 (Washington, DC: Depart- their misperceptions and miscalculations while binding China to the international ment of Defense, 2010), 29–33. could lead to an arms race, conflict spirals, system. The adversarial tenets and predictions 14 National Security Strategy, 43. and a security dilemma, not to mention by conflict theorists are to be closely inter- 15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and “signaling China’s ‘type’ as an aggressive rogated, albeit not wholly ignored. We need War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia rising power.”17 to educate our future senior military leaders, University Press, 1959), 88. Regardless of Chinese intentions, the not with a diet of hyperbolic enemy images, 16 Fravel, 506. United States should follow the “traditional but instead with a broad base in international 17 Ibid., 510. American interest in the maintenance of relations and a realistic understanding of 18 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Roots of Amer- the balance of power in Asia.”18 According China’s potential role, power, and challenges. ica’s China Policy,” The China Quarterly, no. 10 to Nicholas Spykman in 1942, this interest We must avoid a narrow focus on offensive (April 1962), 46. “predates the threat of the emergence of realism and power transition theories, 19 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in a great naval empire across the Pacific. It joined by the wrongheaded belief that war is World Politics: The United States and the Balance was originally inspired . . . by anxiety about inevitably interested in us. As Robert Jervis so of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), 155. our position as an Asiatic power.”19 While wisely notes, “Expectations of peace close off 20 Waltz, 29. trying to maintain the balance of power in important routes to war.”24 We should not let 21 Morgenthau, “The Roots of America’s Asia, the United States should understand a constructed enmity lead us down the wrong China Policy,” 26. how a conflict with China might develop. route to our future with China. JFQ 22 Department of Defense, “U.S.-China Such knowledge will help make it possible Defense Background,” January 8–14, 2011, to work with China to minimize potential available at Kenneth Waltz, tures/2011/0111_gates1/china.aspx>. “The search for causes [of conflict] is 1 National Security Strategy (Washington, 23 Richard M. Nixon, “Resignation Speech,” an attempt to account for differences.”20 DC: The White House, May 2010), 43. August 8, 1974, available at . ing spheres of influence, competition for ica’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon 24 Jervis, 3. resources, and disagreement over the rules to Clinton, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1999).

94 JFQ / issue 63, 4th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu THOMPSON U.S. Marine Corps (Orlando Perez)

Navy Muslim chaplain meets with leaders to promote cultural and religious understanding between ISAF and residents of Naw-Abad, Afghanistan

Religious Leader ENGAGEMENT in Southern Afghanistan

U.S. Marine Corps (Mary E. Carlin) By ALEXS THOMPSON

nteraction with religious leaders and institutions in Afghanistan has been inconsis- tently addressed by foreign military, diplomatic, and development officials. Recent efforts to correct that trend in southern Afghanistan make it clear that a sustained, I consistent, well-thought-out religious leader engagement program supports and advances the traditional components of counterinsurgency (security, development, and Alexs Thompson is a Ph.D. candidate in the Divinity governance). Systematic engagement of religious leaders at the provincial, district, village, School at the University of Chicago and is Senior and farm levels created another line of communication whereby the International Security Religion Advisor for Berico Technologies in the Army Assistance Force (ISAF) promoted its mission of stability and Afghans voiced their needs and Directed Studies Office. commitment to a stable future.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 95 COMMENTARY | Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan

One of the most pressing observa- Roles of Religious Leaders As a starting point for engaging tions made about U.S. military efforts in Religious leaders and institutions play a religious leaders, it is prudent to envision a the 21st century has been the need to lever- significant role in how the legitimate GIRoA future Afghanistan where religious institu- age culturally specific factors in support describes itself; the same is true for the tions and leaders are promoted as essential of counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. One enemies of Afghanistan.2 The primary ques- aspects of the social fabric—not eliminated of the most important—and underempha- tion, then, is not whether religious leaders or begrudgingly accepted. Even those reli- sized—aspects of Afghan society is the will continue to play a significant role in the gious leaders who currently support the importance of religious leaders in coun- future of Afghanistan, but rather how those enemies of Afghanistan find themselves tering anti-Afghan rhetoric.1 This article leaders and the institutions they represent seeking reconciliation with GIRoA from examines the role of religious leaders and can be fully integrated into stable, effective time to time, and pursue full participation institutions in Afghan society and identi- political processes. The highest priority is in the political process.4 If religious leaders fies them as a crucial dimension to stability not simply to provide counter “-religious” will be prominent in Afghanistan’s future, it operations in Afghanistan. It is argued that religious leader engagement is a core factor for expressing U.S. objectives, mitigating the it is prudent to envision a future Afghanistan where effects of kinetic operations, and legitimat- religious institutions and leaders are promoted as essential ing the Government of the Islamic Republic aspects of the social fabric of Afghanistan (GIRoA) through specifically Afghan modes of discourse and participa- tion. The observations and conclusions pre- ideology, but to counter specifically “violent” behooves the U.S. Government and ISAF to sented are informed by the author’s personal religious ideology that quells the voice and identify religious leaders who are amenable experiences in Afghanistan and his inter- will of the Afghan people.3 Undermining the to dialogue and integration with GIRoA; this views with others who have implemented impact of violent religious rhetoric, however, will set the conditions for the marginalization religious leader engagement programs in is primarily the responsibility of Afghans; of radical religious leaders in favor of those southern Afghanistan. Religious leaders, and they should encourage, publicize, and sustain who support stable political processes. It is of especially those at the district and village the incorporation of religious language, tremendous importance, then, that religious level who are regarded as representatives of individuals, and institutions in their own leaders from all dogmatic, geographic, and their communities, are powerbrokers whose vision of the future. One of the ways that the linguistic communities be engaged in con- position and authority situate them as key U.S. Government/ISAF can support Afghans sistent public dialogue so that Afghans can partners for stability and who should not be in this endeavor is to promote sustained pro- responsibly choose how they wish to advance ignored by the United States or ISAF. grams of religious leader engagement. a narrative that preserves their religious heritage and ensures long-term, sustainable political processes. Such a wide-ranging Army chaplain thanks program would require coordination across mullahs who attended the security, development, and governance shura to develop plans spectra with reliable leadership from GIRoA for achieving peace for residents of Paktika and ISAF. While it may be clear that engaging Province, Afghanistan religious leaders is a critical component of stability operations, what is less clear is how those engagements can be conducted in a way that does not undermine key ISAF objectives or alienate large swathes of the population. What follows are several examples of religious leader engagement in Helmand Province and recommendations for how religious leader engagement can be broadly conceptualized so that it respects local variations and supports stability operations.

Engagement in Southern Afghanistan Beginning in October 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Carroll, USMC (Ret.), and Patricio Asfura-Heim began to develop a religious leader engagement program for II Marine Expeditionary Brigade (IIMEB) that addressed the tendency for religious leaders to be ignored in military and diplomatic U.S. Army (Joshua A. Chittim)

96 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu THOMPSON U.S. Air Force (Marc I. Lane) (Marc U.S. Air Force

Navy chaplain presents digital Koran to teacher at daycare facility during volunteer community relations visit in Kabul, Afghanistan

engagements. Carroll explained that in the and who were at least neutral—possibly Helmand Ulema Council and the office of early period of his deployment, he traveled positive—to the presence of ISAF.”6 Carroll the Helmand Director of Hajj. Carroll and to six districts in Helmand Province to highlighted one of the most important Asfura-Heim found that religious leaders in assess the effectiveness of local government aspects of religious leader engagement: it is southern Afghanistan were open to direct structures. He went on to write, “My conclu- not necessary that religious leaders support engagement and had specific grievances sion was that we were thoroughly partnered ISAF (but they must at least be neutral that could be addressed through greater with the Afghan district governor and some toward it) so long as they support GIRoA integration of religious leaders. Primary of the officials from his tashkiel [organiza- and legitimate governmental processes. Such among the concerns of these religious tion] or other provincial line ministry tash- kiels. . . . When I asked about the engage- ment with influential religious scholars, such as mullahs or ulema [experts in Islamic religious leaders were key powerbrokers whose doctrine] . . . I heard comments like ‘The input should be included in discussions about economics, mullahs are not that important.’”5 security, and development projects In the wake of such prevalent dismissal of religious leaders, Carroll observed that even if mullahs served only a religious role, an attitude reflects the necessity for Afghans leaders was that they had been marginalized the primary argument of the Taliban is that to conceptualize and implement the future by the central government and had been they are pious individuals fighting foreign of their country; how religious leaders and sidelined in community discussions that did infidels, and therefore “the most credible institutions function in Afghan society is an not directly address religious issues.7 Given voices to counter the Taliban’s rhetoric were Afghan question. their personal experience with religious moderate mullahs themselves; i.e., Islamic In support of his observations, leaders at various levels of Afghan society, religious leaders who did not believe in Carroll and Asfura-Heim began a project Carroll and Asfura-Heim concluded that the Taliban’s extremist interpretations of to reintegrate religious leaders in their pro- religious leaders’ impact was not confined the Qur’an, who would support . . . GIRoA vincial religious organizations such as the to religious issues; religious leaders were

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 97 COMMENTARY | Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan key ­powerbrokers whose input should be In effect, Nicholson called for a Muslim chaplains in particular, could engage included in discussions about economics, systematic engagement of local religious with religious leaders, then those religious security, and development projects. Inte- leaders with the knowledge that these leaders could act as trusted partners for par- grating religious leaders at the provincial leaders are key nodes in the social network ticipation in legitimate political, commercial, level proved fairly simple with Carroll and and have increased capacity to spread the and religious institutions.12 What Nicholson Asfura-Heim’s ability to travel to provincial U.S. Government/ISAF message of support and Pelikan brought to the growing focus on headquarters; what was lacking, however, for GIRoA and rejection of violent religious religious leaders in Helmand was the value was consistent interaction with religious ideology.11 Command support is yet another of military chaplains. It was not enough for leaders at the subprovincial level. crucial factor for successful reintegration provincial-level IIMEB individuals to meet Attention to subprovincial religious of religious leaders. The logistical support with provincial-level religious leaders; there leaders was further strengthened with the requirements and the sometimes prevail- was a need for both groups to reach to the arrival of a U.S. Navy Muslim chaplain in ing attitude that religious leaders are not district and village levels where the message February 2010. Chaplain “Salam,” whose of central importance to building stability of stability has the most impact. The ability name has been withheld, is a naturalized can hamper the attempt to engage religious to extend to subprovincial levels was brought U.S. citizen and a naval chaplain who was leaders. Afghan religious leaders primar- about most effectively through the work of serving in the Washington, DC, area when ily serve the role of a mediator; as trusted military chaplains. he was asked to come to Afghanistan.8 leaders of their local communities, they are The introduction of a Muslim chaplain Based on his past experience with the U.S. local advocates to ensure that ISAF projects served as an “icebreaker” for many reli- military and foreign Muslim officials, it and intentions match those of the commu- gious leaders in southern Afghanistan and was determined that Chaplain Salam would nity. Concomitantly, as trusted partners to fostered trust between ISAF and the tens of be the ideal person to extend the reach of ISAF, Afghan religious leaders transmit and Afghans who traveled from remote villages the religious leader engagement program. reinforce the ISAF message of security and for the engagements.13 In particular, the reli- Chaplain Salam and Chaplain Philip effective governance. gious leader engagement team would sched- Pelikan did not act alone, however; they In addition to calling for a systematic ule their religious leader engagements such had the support of the IIMEB commander. engagement plan with religious leaders, that the Muslim chaplain would open with In recognition of the important role that Nicholson offered a paradigm for under- brief remarks that were followed by an open religious leaders and institutions play in standing that their target audience was discussion with local religious leaders. As the overall COIN effort, then–Brigadier “little ‘t’ Taliban.” “Little ‘t’ Taliban” were one example, the effects of these discussions General Lawrence Nicholson, command- those who were lured into the Taliban with had significant positive effects in Golestan ing general of IIMEB, inquired whether it promises of power, money, and stability—for District, Farah Province: “[the engage- would be possible and beneficial to facili- financial and social, not religious, reasons. ments] enhanced the ability of the Marine tate the visit of a Navy Muslim chaplain to If, Pelikan offered, local Afghan religious Company Commander at the Golestan Afghanistan. Chaplain Pelikan knew such a leaders could explain the ways that ISAF and Forward Operating Base (FOB) to commu- person and undertook a 6-month process to GIRoA were working to bring stability and nicate with the locals, determine better ways bring him to Afghanistan.9 clarify the opportunities for local Afghans to to assist the community with their many In an article he wrote for Small Wars participate in those programs, then it would ‘quality of life’ issues, and helped empower Journal, Chaplain Pelikan summarized be possible that Taliban rhetoric would be the local mullahs by connecting them Nicholson’s intent: undermined. If U.S. military chaplains, and with GIRoA through the Farah Provincial

By order of the Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Army chaplain offers prayer before lunch with Afghan Afghanistan, the Command Chaplain and a National Army mullah at Forward Operating Base Ghazni Muslim Chaplain (if obtainable), along with appropriate political specialists, governance advisors, and necessary security, were to engage with Islamic leadership in Helmand and Farah Provinces in discussions to enhance (Julie Brummund) U.S. Air Force the relationship with key religious leaders and the communities in which they serve in order to convey the good will and otherwise posi- tive intentions of U.S. Government and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)/ NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces operating in the region in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its military and police forces.10

98 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu THOMPSON

Director of Hajj.”14 There was certainly an Taliban by addressing the dominant source ­populations. Chaplains may represent an atmosphere of religious camaraderie in the of their claim to legitimacy: piety. ideal nexus for religious leader engage- reports about these meetings, but the most By engaging religious leaders at ment programs because of their intimate important aspect was the ability of local every level, UK and U.S. representatives knowledge of religious matters: “In the IIMEB commanders to open new channels were able to disseminate the message of general conduct of counterinsurgency of communication through religious leaders Afghan stability to the farthest reaches of operations the religious aspect is often and ensure that the needs of Afghans across their areas of responsibility with the face either overlooked or is simply thought of as the entire spectrum were being considered. and voice of Afghans. For example, while something to shy away from because many visiting Bakwa District, Farah Province, people feel unqualified to discuss religion. Other Perspectives the religious leader engagement team was We chaplains, however, are never ashamed Rajiv Chandrasekaran, who reported approached by a mullah who wore the to talk about religion. And our experience on these events for the Washington Post, mark of the Taliban—a crescent moon and in this operation proved that the direct noted that IIMEB was one of just a few star tattooed on the right hand—who was approach with the Afghan religious leaders units in Afghanistan that made a concerted deeply moved by the presence of Afghans was the right one.”18 Chaplains’ commit- attempt to engage religious leaders as part and Americans praying together: “He told ment to religious ideals is an invaluable of its campaign plan. Such a feat by the us that he was a Taliban Mawlawi [religious asset for developing relationships with local Marines stands as a testament to the reli- scholar] who taught in a Madrasa . . . just religious leaders, but that religious basis is gious and nonreligious impact of mullahs outside Bakwa. So tremendously impressed a means by which to develop relationships and other religious leaders in small, remote by our message, he stated, ‘Before today I that channel legitimate Afghan concerns villages in southern Afghanistan. Chan- drasekaran pointed out the impact of bring- ing one of only a few Muslim chaplains to the most important aspect was the ability of southern Afghanistan: “At his [the Muslim local commanders to open new channels of communication chaplain’s] first session with religious leaders through religious leaders and ensure that the needs of in Helmand, the participants initially Afghans were being considered thought the clean-shaven [chaplain] was an impostor. Then he led the group in noon- time prayers. By the end, everyone wanted just thought that all Westerners were infi- from the lowest to the highest levels of to take a picture with him.”15 The benefit of dels and I was against you. But today I saw Afghan society.19 The designation of chap- involving a Muslim chaplain in this religious something that I’d never seen before. And I lains as noncombatants is another consid- leader engagement program is undeniable: have changed my mind about Americans. I eration for how they can participate in sta- it bolstered existing relationships, weakened will work with you from now on.’”17 In this bility operations: “A potential controversy barriers to communication through shared way, Afghan religious leaders acted as force exists when a chaplain is asked for specific language and ritual, and fostered new and multipliers, strategic communicators, and information from commanders or intel- enduring relationships with religious leaders trusted allies in the fight for stability. As ligence officers related to his interaction at every level of Afghan society. more Afghan religious leaders are engaged, with local mullahs. Chaplains, as doctrinal The U.S. contingent in Helmand was Afghans themselves will carry the message noncombatants, could be placed in the not the only group to consider the role of of responsible development, effective gover- awkward position of providing targeting religious leader engagements, however. The nance, and sustainable security. information to commanders, a combatant United Kingdom (UK) delegation at the task.”20 The designation of noncombatant Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team Role of Chaplains has its limitations, but it is also a contribut- also constructed a religious leader engage- The involvement of chaplains was ing factor to presumptions of good-faith ment program in late 2009 that was intended central to the success of the religious leader interactions that allow chaplains to develop to undermine Taliban propaganda by having engagement program in southern Afghani- relationships that can ensure the faithful religious leaders act as reliable mediators stan, but the historic and doctrinal role transmission of the true objectives of ISAF between ISAF and the Afghan people. As of chaplains presents certain challenges and GIRoA in the face of anti-Afghanistan part of their efforts, the UK delegation for how these types of programs can be rhetoric.21 invited a group of Afghan religious leaders expanded. Chaplains have traditionally Military doctrine is continually to Great Britain; in response to their visit, been charged with providing for the morale adapting to more effectively describe one mullah said, “The Taliban tell everyone and spiritual well-being of their troops. and empower chaplains at every level. that Britain is an infidel nation hostile to As military operations have evolved in the Army Field Manual (FM) 1–05, Religious Muslims, but the mullahs were able to see 21st century, so have the responsibilities Support, appendix A, “Religious Support for themselves that in fact Britain is a toler- and expectations of chaplains; whether in Civil Military Operations,” for example, ant country in which Muslims can build by personal abilities or requests from describes specifically how U.S. Army mosques and practice their religion peace- various partners, chaplains have been chaplains ought to support civil-military fully.”16 The UK efforts, similar to those of regularly involved in stability operations operations. While reaffirming that the the United States, aimed at discrediting the through engagement and support of local primary duty of chaplains is to support the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 99 COMMENTARY | Religious Leader Engagement in Southern Afghanistan

religious leader engagement comes through Army chaplain meets with deputy minister of education and his interpreter at Camp Kiwi, Bamyan Province, Afghanistan continued involvement with religious leaders within the communities where they enjoy positions of authority.

Religious leaders and religious institu- tions play an undeniably important role in Afghan society, and it is in the best interest of the U.S. military to design, implement, and effectively sustain engagements with those leaders. Religious leader engagement programs in southern Afghanistan demon- strate that well-thought-out plans of action can have tremendous impact on GIRoA’s intent to counter anti-Afghanistan pro- paganda and address the legitimate needs of the Afghan people. In short, ISAF is a short-term solution to a long-term set of complex issues that can only be addressed by Afghans and the individuals they iden- tify as legitimate powerbrokers. Ultimately, no amount of foreign savvy can account for the credibility and sustainability of driving the religious leader engagement process through legitimate GIRoA-affiliated indi- viduals and institutions. To ensure the continued integra- U.S. Army (Robert Renny) tion of religious leaders at every level of Afghan society, religious leader engage- religious needs of Soldiers, the appendix formally tasked with engaging “indigenous ment programs should be routed through goes on to ­encourage chaplains to advise religious groups and leaders” to support official GIRoA channels to ensure that the commanders on the religious dynamics of stability operations; were such a change to be process can be sustained once GIRoA takes the local population and reinforces that implemented, chaplains could be identified full control of its affairs. In Helmand, for chaplains ought not to be the sole partici- as the primary partner for religious leaders, example, the director of Hajj and Religious pants in negotiations with host nationals or with those relationships occurring in concert Affairs, Sayed “Mullah” Mukhtar Ahmad in human intelligence collection.22 In this with security, governance, and development Haqqani, was a key partner in the fight way, chaplains are seen, primarily, as part objectives.23 to discredit Taliban ideology because “he was a dynamic and engaging man who immediately grasped our plan and inten- ISAF is a short-term solution to a long-term set of complex tions and took [Salam and Pelikan] ‘under issues that can only be addressed by Afghans and the his wing’ as we circulated throughout the individuals they identify as legitimate powerbrokers province together.”24 As Afghans determine how, when, and which religious leaders are actively involved in the process of their of a larger engagement team; where chap- Thus, while chaplains are uniquely own stabilization, ISAF and the U.S. Gov- lains are restricted in their behavior, other prepared to engage Afghan religious leaders ernment will accomplish their goals. members can take the lead. because of their sensitivity to religious From the perspective of ISAF and FM 1–05 represents the growing aware- issues, there are certain factors that should the U.S. Government, it should be kept ness that chaplains can play a leading role in be borne in mind to maximize their effect. in mind that religious leader engagement engaging local religious leaders of host nations, While chaplains are a vital tool in the fight is a distinct type of engagement that has but there still remain certain limitations to against a jihadi narrative, they are not the benefits and limitations that differ from how chaplains can be involved in stability sine qua non of religious leader engage- other types. Engagement with religious operations. For example, Chaplain William ments. As seen with IIMEB, chaplains can leaders should rest on a long-term, sustain- Sean Lee proposed that military doctrine be help open dialogue, lay a foundation of trust, able plan that specifically considers the role changed to include the title “religious liaison” and demonstrate ISAF commitment to the that religious leaders play in village-level for chaplains. In that role, chaplains would be Afghan people, but the sustained work of to national-level operations. U.S. military

100 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu THOMPSON chaplains are key to the creation and sus- NOTES stan 15 February–15 March 2010,” Small Wars tainment of religious leader engagements, Journal (December 28, 2010), 1–10, available at but their role does not need to be constant 1 William Sean Lee, Christopher Burke, and . batants. There is reason to believe that the ers: Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability 11 “An example of a senior Army chaplain doctrinal elements of chaplain responsibili- Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, who properly balanced his roles as a religious ties ought to be reconsidered and adjusted 2004), 5, available at . Force] 76 Chaplain in Afghanistan from March of the most beneficial aspects of religious 2 “The enemy has succeeded in establishing 2004 through March 2005. Continuing the work leader engagement in southern Afghanistan jihad as their pervasive, overarching narrative. of his predecessor CH (LTC) Ken Sampson, CH was the involvement of a Muslim chaplain; Consistently over time and space, all of their Adams-Thompson organized monthly meetings his presence broke down barriers between remarkably sophisticated information operations with local mullahs. The intent of these meetings local religious leaders and allowed for uniformly hammer home this religious message was to discuss religious issues, moral concerns, and more honest discussions about stability of jihad. Virtually all Taliban leaders, from to build clergy-to-clergy relationships.” Kenneth operations. senior military and political leaders down to sub- Lawson, “Doctrinal Tension: The Chaplain and One of the difficulties associated with commanders at the district level, are mullahs. The Information Operations,” Military Intelligence the religious leader engagement programs implications of this have not yet sunk in. We are Professional Bulletin 35, no. 2 (April–June 2009), was the availability of U.S. military Muslim fighting a counterinsurgency; the enemy is fighting 24–31, available at . to consider reaching out to nonmilitary end and how jihads end is historically nil.” Thomas 12 Interview with Pelikan. chaplains (at hospitals, universities, and H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Refighting the 13 Author interview with Patricio Asfura-Heim, prisons, for example) who would be willing Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Tem- February 14, 2011. to support religious leader engagements plate,” Military Review (November–December 14 Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program.” around the world. A robust chaplaincy 2009), 2–14, available at . Counterinsurgency?” The Washington Post, stability operations around the world. In 3 Jeffrey Cozzens, “The Culture of Global March 14, 2010, available at . zones; American foreign policy, in general, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation 16 Ministry of Defence, “Former Afghan can benefit from recognizing the role of and Political Violence, October 2008, available at Refugee Returns to Helmand with UK’s Stabilisa- religion in societies throughout the world. . detail.php?id=2634>. These engagements were of stability in Afghanistan have waged a 4 Johnson and Mason, 2–14. headed by Pamir Patang, who fled Afghanistan for war based primarily on violent ideology 5 Patrick Carroll and Patricio Asfura-Heim, Britain in 2000. See also Stabilisation Unit, “Salaam shrouded in religious language that cannot “Victory in Afghanistan Part 2: Countering the Aleikum—SU’s Pamir reflects on his Afghan expe- be bombed into submission. The most effec- Taliban Narrative Through Credible Religious rience,” available at . experience>. religious leaders cultivates meaningful 6 Ibid. 17 Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement Program.” relationships and empowers local leaders 7 Author interview with Patrick Carroll, Feb- 18 Ibid. to articulate ISAF and GIRoA commitment ruary 7, 2011. 19 Ibid. to stability. The primary effect of religious 8 Carroll and Asfura-Heim, “Victory in 20 Lawson; Department of the Navy SECNAV leader engagement has been to bring greater Afghanistan Part 2”; Carroll commented on the Instruction 1730.7b, October 12, 2000, prohibits legitimacy to GIRoA. By connecting local importance of bringing this Navy chaplain to the chaplains from being assigned compromising religious leaders with their district political religious leader engagement program: “Our efforts collateral duties or (in section 6g) being forced to and religious leaders, district officials with received an additional boost in early 2010 when the reveal sensitive information. provincial officials, and provincial officials G–3 Fires and Effects Coordination Cell/Informa- 21 See, for example, SECNAV Instruction with national leaders, ISAF was able to tion Operations and the MEB chaplain’s office 1730.7b, section 5e (4). undermine some of the most frequent causes arranged for a U.S. Navy Muslim imam to come out 22 See also FM 1–05, section 5–40, G–13, and of instability: political alienation, religious to the AO [area of operations].” G–18. extremism separated from mainstream 9 Author interview with Chaplain Philip 23 Lee, Burke, and Crayne. society, knowledgeable religious leaders Pelikan, January 10, 2011. 24 Interview with Pelikan. operating outside legitimate institutions, 10 Philip Pelikan, “Mullah Engagement and the allure of violent narratives. JFQ Program: Helmand and Farah Provinces, Afghani-

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 101 Navy Riverine Group Sailors conduct joint operation in Iraq

Vietnam and Iraq Learning from the Past?

By BRENT C. BANKUS and JAMES KIEVIT

102 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BANKUS and KIEVIT

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Soldiers advance on Viet Cong bunker near Bong Don, Vietnam, U.S. Army Operation Masher

eriodically, articles in both Certainly, in one aspect the two con- the mainstream media and flicts are similar, and indeed this similarity “blogosphere” have compared may be said to hold true for all conflicts, P operations in Iraq to previous conventional or unconventional: whatever U.S. operations in Vietnam. Sometimes, the time and place, warfare is complex— these articles are written by military ana- that is, a dynamic mix of traditional lysts, but more often they are produced by combat activities, including pitched battles journalists.1 Occasionally, the motivation of between heavily armed, well-organized members of the media in seeking similari- ties seems to have been mostly to discredit the current U.S. involvement in Southwest whatever the time and place, Asia in much the same fashion as did some warfare is complex members of the media for Southeast Asia in the late 1960s. Dr. Jeffrey Record and Dr. Andrew Terrill of the Strategic Studies Insti- forces and unconventional combat activi- tute, on the other hand, have published an ties involving smaller units, occurs, while extensive analysis arguing that a comparison more often than not simultaneously and of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War in in close proximity, the competing hostile the areas of U.S. military commitment, war entities are conducting—and attempting to aims, nature and scale of operations, loss disrupt opponents’—governance or nation- rates, pacification and state-building activi- building activities. ties, role of allies, and domestic political Beyond that perhaps “blinding flash sustainability reveals more differences than of the obvious” (even if, for many, it unfor- similarities between the two conflicts.2 tunately is not), all who would attempt

Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus, USA (Ret.), is a Regional Security Analyst in the National Security Issues Group at the U.S. Army War College. Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit, USA (Ret.), is a former Research Analyst in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. U.S. Army (Adelita Mead)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 103 COMMENTARY | Vietnam and Iraq: Learning from the Past? to draw analogies between Vietnam and step taken by the United States to create Viet Nam toward that objective may very well current conflicts, or lessons from the former more reliable armed forces for the South be the most complex problem ever faced by men for application to the latter, would do well Vietnamese government was to insist in uniform anywhere on earth.10 to first read carefully the article “Lessons upon the demobilization of 25 percent of of History and Lessons of Vietnam” by the existing regular army.5 Just as in Iraq Unfortunately in Vietnam, America’s then ‑Major, now‑General, David Petraeus. almost five decades later, this proved to be early failure to focus on the population due Originally published in 1986 but recently “an act both psychologically destructive to the perceived need to defeat large units republished in the U.S. Army War Col- and detrimental to the combat potential of Ho Chi Minh’s army of North Vietnam lege’s Parameters, the article begins, “[I]t of the [indigenous] armed forces.”6 In each enabled the Viet Cong to become more is important to recognize that history can case, subsequent efforts had to be made deeply entrenched in the 44 provinces of mislead and obfuscate as well as guide and to rectify the situation by enticing those South Vietnam, firmly establishing shadow illuminate. Lessons of the past, in general, who had been dismissed—in particular, communist cells in the hamlets and vil- and the lessons of Vietnam, in particular, experienced officers and noncommissioned lages. Aiding the Viet Cong and North contain not only policy-relevant analogies, officers—to return to the service.7 Mean- Vietnamese effort was the political weakness but also ambiguities and paradoxes;”3 and while, the enemy also “got a vote” on the of the government in South Vietnam. Thus, concludes, “Study of Vietnam—and of other historical occurrences—should endeavor to gain perspective and understanding, rather successful counterattacks by the United States and its allies than hard and fast lessons that might be during Tet in 1968 resulted in the Viet Cong largely ceasing to applied too easily without proper reflection exist as a viable fighting force and sufficiently rigorous analysis.”4 Keeping that caution in mind, the remainder of this article attempts to con- future course of each conflict, and in both although U.S. units were never defeated in tribute to analytical efforts comparing U.S. cases chose to continue hostilities with an engagements with the enemy’s large-scale military involvement in Vietnam with that emphasis on guerrilla or insurgency style forces and established an ability to maneu- in Iraq, particularly regarding efforts to combat activities. ver freely throughout the area of operations, create effective indigenous armed forces The initial U.S. response to this action the overall security situation was not actu- capable of defending the national interests of by the enemy, in Vietnam in the 20th century ally significantly improved for most of the a U.S.-supported local government. and in Iraq in the 21st, was conducting population of South Vietnam. Similarly traditional kinetic operations with U.S. in Iraq, the weaknesses of the new federal Similarities forces as the principal way to neutralize the government of Iraq and the shortage of U.S. The major objective in any counterin- insurgents. In Vietnam, General William forces in country prior to the 2007 surge surgency or unconventional type of war is Westmoreland (U.S. ground commander, meant that enemy forces could always find gaining and then maintaining the support 1964–1968) initiated a “big unit” strategy a municipality or neighborhood in which it of the population and not simply attriting of attrition. These “body count” or “search was fairly safe to base or operate.11 the enemy’s armed forces. Furthermore, it is and destroy” U.S. military operations were After more than 3 years of intensive U.S. of course true that it is difficult to gain and expected to establish a secure environ- operations in Vietnam, growing dissatisfac- maintain support of a population unless you ment while simultaneously protecting the tion in the United States with the human and can guarantee a reasonable degree of secu- fledgling South Vietnamese armed forces financial cost of the war exploded domesti- rity against hostile acts. Equally true is that and allowing them time to develop.8 In Iraq, cally when the forces of North Vietnam and determining and creating the proper balance American generals lacked the large numbers the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive, among security-focused activities and of troops that Westmoreland was able to call attacking most of the population centers in population-support activities are no easier upon, but nonetheless attempted to use their South Vietnam in January–February 1968. in Southwest Asia today than they were in available units to hunt down and eliminate This offensive demonstrated to the American Southeast Asia in the 20th century; nor are the enemy’s armed elements.9 people that the enemy was not yet defeated, in they likely to be easy in any future conflict Eventually, in both Vietnam and Iraq, contrast to the strategic communication mes- irrespective of locale. The conduct of war American leaders recognized the need to sages of the Lyndon Johnson administration. will remain an art, not a science. have the military execute a more population- In reality, of course, successful counterattacks There are other similarities between centric program over an extended period. As by the United States and its allies during Tet former operations in Vietnam and present- General Westmoreland stated: in 1968 resulted in the Viet Cong largely day operations in Iraq. The original U.S. ceasing to exist as a viable fighting force and strategy for each included a focus on Viet Nam is involved in two simultaneous and destroyed the combined enemies’ ability to eliminating “incorrect ideologists” within very difficult tasks. Nation building, and fight- wage offensive war for several years. Main- the existing indigenous armed forces as a ing a vicious and well-organized enemy. If it stream media stories of the day, however, mechanism to help build reliable and effec- could do either alone, the task would be very generally ignored or glossed over those hard- tive armed forces for the U.S.‑supported simplified, but it’s got to do both at once. . . . It fought battlefield successes of U.S. and allied national government. In Vietnam, the first won’t, can’t reach maturity overnight. Helping forces, instead focusing on how the Johnson

104 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BANKUS and KIEVIT

Army medic adjusts pediatric wheelchair provided by nonprofit group to children in Baghdad, Iraq U.S. Information Agency

USAID military health team member inoculates refugee against cholera, Vietnam, 1969

U.S. Army (Breeanna DuBuke) administration had deceived the public. The one command, called the Civil Operations In Vietnam, CORDS coupled the resultant domestic political turmoil under- and Revolutionary Development Support military and civilian development programs mined the ability to capitalize on the enemy’s (CORDS) program. The CORDS concept under one unified command. In addition to weakened state. was instigated by National Security security sector reform, CORDS focused on Advisor Robert Komer; upon its adoption infrastructure development and humanitar- Vietnam Reform: The CORDS Program he was assigned as a deputy to Abrams spe- ian assistance and education projects as well Nonetheless, as General Creighton cifically to implement the program, to help as programs to manage natural resources in Abrams (Vice Chief of Staff of the Army ensure military and civilian unity of effort the rural provinces of South Vietnam. For and deputy to General Westmoreland) during execution.12 example, under the auspices of CORDS, the took command later in 1968, positive steps Although similar to France’s sections U.S. Agency for International Development toward greater success began to be taken. administratives spécialisées (SAS)13 program helped establish numerous schools, hospitals Fully cognizant of the importance of a sup- during its Algerian experience a decade and health clinics, highways, hydroelectric portive population for the South Vietnam earlier, CORDS was both a much larger and plants, and farming cooperatives.15 Through government, Abrams aggressively imple- a more diversified program. In its time, the CORDS programs, essential services such as mented an increasingly effective security SAS was a groundbreaking concept con- sanitation, access to clean water and medical sector reform campaign in the hamlets and sisting of small units of primarily French treatment, in addition to assisting farming villages. This campaign’s principal—but army officers charged both with restoring practices and road improvements and other not exclusive—focus was on building secu- order and with initiating rural development natural resource management activities, rity sector capacity in local forces to defend projects. SAS activities in Algeria included improved the quality of life for the people. areas against residual Viet Cong elements conducting adult literacy and primary edu- As important, the Regional Force and Pro- or small unit actions of the North Vietnam- cation programs, building and repairing the visional Force security elements developed ese Army (NVA). regional feeder road system, undertaking under CORDS gained acceptance among the Furthermore, in order to create a local market and irrigation projects, and population and their local security activities more effective and coordinated whole- initiating a preventive medicine and dispen- subsequently often yielded positive results of-government approach, the military’s sary program. The SAS effort was credited beyond expectations. CORDS seemed to security sector reform and civilian devel- with successfully reducing the number of show promise that the South Vietnamese opment programs were combined under attacks on French troops.14 population might be won over to support of

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 105 COMMENTARY | Vietnam and Iraq: Learning from the Past? U.S. Army (Daneille Hendrix)

Children gather at market built with assistance of Vietnamese government and U.S. Agency for International Development

Iraqi children wait to receive book bags from Army Advise and Assist Brigade Soldiers during humanitarian aid mission, Ramadi

U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and—more important—of the still weak South Viet- namese government itself.16 Although the entities hostile to the new Iraqi government and U.S. and coali- tion forces in Iraq never managed to execute anything like a full-scale Tet Offensive, they nonetheless initially succeeded in conduct- ing episodic violent activities and inflicting increasing U.S. and Iraqi military and civil- ian casualties. As in Vietnam, the perceived inability of American, coalition, and Iraqi security elements to control and reduce the

level of violence led to an upsurge in U.S. U.S. Information Agency Information U.S.

106 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BANKUS and KIEVIT domestic political opposition to continuing leaving only the relatively small number of Petraeus, simultaneously emphasized the the conflict.17 The theater strategic response 50 military and 1,200 civilians assigned to need to protect the population.26 The focus was also similar, combining increased the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon and for both U.S. combat elements and Iraqi population-focused military security efforts approximately 5,000 American contrac- forces became counterinsurgency capabilities (by both U.S. surge forces and repatriated tors. Together, these individuals provided writ large, including the full integration of indigenous militias) with better coordinated technical assistance essential to the South other governmental and nongovernmental whole-of-government population support Vietnamese armed forces’ modernization lines of effort with military activities. U.S. activities led by combined military and and expansion programs, but were specifi- elements advising and training the Iraqi civilian reconstruction teams advising and cally directed to avoid providing advice on army, which actually had never expended assisting the local governance efforts at mul- military operations, tactics, or techniques much effort toward developing traditional tiple levels.18 of employment.22 Still, in 1974, Brigadier combat capabilities, abandoned those activi- With respect to creating viable indig- General James L. Collins, Jr., concluded the ties completely and focused solely on creating enous armed forces, even while focusing on Army’s study of the Vietnamization effort by an effective small-unit counterinsurgency counterguerrilla small unit tactics in training writing that “the U.S. approach in training force, neither equipped nor expected to of local forces, the United States and its allies [the ARVN] has been successful.”23 engage in combined arms maneuver opera- in Vietnam simultaneously worked to train In Iraq, due to the unexpected deci- tions against a conventional enemy. the regular armed forces of South Vietnam sion in May 2003 to disband the entire By mid-2010, the situation in Iraq sup- to perform conventional combat operations. existing Iraqi armed forces,24 advisory and ported a conclusion that the surge of forces in These activities further increased in the late training efforts focused on creating effec- 2007 and a focus on protecting the popula- 1969–1971 timeframe as recognition grew tive indigenous Iraqi military forces had an tion succeeded in decreasing the violence that, while the CORDS strategy might ulti- even steeper hill to climb than had been the and setting the stage for a U.S. withdrawal of mately prevail against the diminished Viet case in Vietnam. Initial efforts concentrated forces.27 At the same time, the advisory and Cong insurgent threat in the South and asso- on having civilian contractors train nine training effort was able to begin concentrating ciated attacks by infiltrated small unit NVA light infantry battalions. It quickly became at least partially on equipping and preparing forces, there still existed a significant conven- apparent that this approach was both insuf- some Iraqi army battalions and brigades for tional threat to the South Vietnamese state ficient and ineffective, and April 2004 saw conventional operations (for example, issuing from the potential combined arms maneuver the establishment of Multi-National Security M1 Abrams tanks).28 Thus, regarding coun- capabilities of North Vietnam’s large and rea- Transition Command–Iraq and the transfer tering the enemy insurgent or guerrilla forces, sonably modern regular army.19 of responsibility for advising and training Iraq in 2011 appears to bear a significant simi- By the early 1970s, all levels of the to the U.S. Armed Forces. At the same time, larity to Vietnam at the time of the American South Vietnamese security forces were dem- it was recognized that the number of Iraqi withdrawal in 1973. onstrating reasonable effectiveness as coun- troops required was two to eight times greater Unfortunately, of course, in 1975 the terinsurgency elements; however, despite than previously thought. Between 2004 North Vietnamese launched a full-scale con- significant U.S. training and equipping and 2007, the mission of U.S. advisors and ventional military invasion of South Vietnam:

On 1 March the [North Vietnamese] 968th U.S. elements advising and training the Iraqi army focused Division attacked several small outposts west on creating an effective small-unit counterinsurgency force, of Pleiku, focusing ARVN attention on the neither equipped nor expected to engage in combined arms threat to that city. On 4 March the [North maneuver operations against a conventional enemy Vietnamese main] offensive kicked off with an attack by Regiment 95A which overran several small ARVN outposts guarding Route 19 in efforts and even actual support activities by trainers was to get Iraqi soldiers and units the Mang Yang Pass, thereby severing ARVN’s U.S. elements during combat operations, the certified as quickly as possible so that they main supply route to its forces in the Central Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could accompany and then replace U.S. or Highlands. Farther east on Route 19 the 3d units were not consistently successful in coalition organizations on strike operations [North Vietnamese] Division launched its own actions against NVA regular forces.20 None- against insurgents, in support of the objective offensive, making further cuts on this vital road theless, the successful ARVN counterattacks of allowing coalition and U.S. forces to stand and tying down the ARVN 22d Division. The that reversed the widespread initial gains of down and withdraw from Iraq. As had been next day the [North Vietnamese] 25th Regi- the NVA during the April 1972 conventional true in Vietnam, the results of this approach ment cut Route 21, the only other road from the Easter Offensive21 helped convince the varied—some Iraqi units performed well and coast to the Highlands, between Ban Me Thuot North Vietnamese government to agree to others performed poorly—and the enemy was and Nha Trang. ARVN forces in the Central the terms for a ceasefire in the war, signed generally able to adapt his activities.25 Highlands were now isolated and completely in January 1973. In accordance with the In January 2007, President George W. dependent on aerial resupply.29 terms of that agreement, all U.S. combat Bush announced his decision to surge addi- forces and military advisory teams were tional U.S. forces into Iraq, and the newly On March 10, the NVA attacked Ban withdrawn from Vietnam within 60 days, appointed U.S. commander, General David Me Thuot with 12 regiments supported by

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 107 COMMENTARY | Vietnam and Iraq: Learning from the Past? armored, artillery, and engineer units; 32 do counterinsurgency but not multi-echelon and execution by multiple brigade-, division-, hours later, the defending ARVN division’s combined arms maneuver, or vice versa, will and even corps-level commanders, synchro- headquarters was overrun and captured.30 almost certainly discover that its opponent nizing the repositioning and application This was conventional combat in every sense, always chooses to fight the fight for which that of diverse elements of combat power being and success at Ban Me Thuot was followed by army and that nation are unprepared. brought to bear dynamically on the move, the commitment of additional divisional and Third, despite perceptions to the con- often while the headquarters themselves are even corps-size elements by the North Viet- trary arising from the difficulties of counter- moving to address or avoid specific threats. namese across the breadth and depth of South insurgency operations, it takes a longer time Company and battalion commanders still can Vietnam. ARVN leaders were unable to react and a greater effort for an army to be prepared be developed and made ready for this type of effectively to the NVA actions, and, just 55 to fight on the multi-echeloned, combined combat within relatively short timeframes, but days after the offensive began, South Vietnam arms maneuver battlefield. This is because the the skills and abilities required at the higher ceased to exist when columns of NVA tanks security operations of the counterinsurgency (brigade, division, corps) echelons that success rolled into Saigon.31 conflict are largely prepared and executed by at multi-echelon combined arms maneuver battalions and companies, and the synchroni- demands take far longer to develop through Conclusion zation of military activities to conduct those actual experience or experiential education. While no two wars are ever the same operations frequently can be accomplished Thus, the United States was instrumen- (rather, each is unique—and certainly this is by headquarters operating from fixed facili- tal in helping the ARVN become a successful the case of Vietnam and Iraq), three impor- ties with assets also prepositioned within the counterinsurgency force; it even managed tant insights are readily discernible from the theater. Successful company commanders to develop multi-echelon combined arms preceding brief comparison. can be educated and trained in a few years at fighting capabilities within selected ARVN First, every conflict requires both most, and battalion commanders in less than battalions and brigades, some of which fought military operations aimed at eliminating a decade during actual operations. Multi- very effectively during the final offensive of hostile threats and also whole-of-government echelon, combined arms maneuver opera- the Vietnam War in 1975. What the assistance activities aimed at establishing or restoring tions, on the other hand, demand preparation effort in Vietnam could not do was develop essential foundations (physical, psychological, cultural, and moral, among others) of good governance and civil stability. While it may be possible—even required—to prioritize between those two lines of effort, there is no choice between doing one and doing the other—both always must be accomplished. This is because in any operation, whether so- called traditional combat operations or any of the many various types of stability operations, security and protection are always important to the population at risk. A safe environment is an essential precursor to reconstruction of an affected area. If security is not achieved early and then sustained in any operation, the second- and third-level effects are usually disastrous. At the same time, no peaceful interregnum between conflicts will last long unless the operations that eliminate direct hostile actions also are accompanied by activi- ties that address existing or potential underly- ing catalysts of future conflict. Second, and in a similar vein, outside military advisory and assistance efforts cannot focus solely on preparing indigenous armed forces for counterinsurgency activities on the one hand, or for conventional large- scale combat operations on the other. Armed forces must possess both those capabilities if they are to successfully protect modern nation-states in the 21st-century national security environment, just as was required in Airman patrols outskirts of Joint Base Balad, Iraq th th the 19 and 20 centuries. An army that can (Quinton Russ) U.S. Air Force

108 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BANKUS and KIEVIT truly effective division and corps command- ; and Oliver North, can Opposition to Iraq War Growing,” July 23, tial learning over time regarding the specific “Vietnam and Iraq: Myth vs. Reality,” December 2005, available at . bined arms maneuver can do that. The U.S. story/0,2933,225911,00.html>. 18 Odierno; Provincial Reconstruction Team withdrawal in Vietnam came too early for the 2 Jeffrey Record and Andrew Terrill, Iraq and (PRT) Fact Sheet, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, June ARVN to be fully ready to take on the defense Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights 16, 2006, available at ; and the reports of the Iraq PRT the South Vietnamese army in 1975 provides 3 David Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Experience Project, U.S. Institute of Peace, available ample evidence that courageous, battle-tested, Lessons of Vietnam,” Parameters (Autumn at . overcome the inability of brigade, division, . Development and Training of the South Vietnamese synchronize the necessary actions of their dis- 4 Ibid., 58. Army 1950–1972 (Washington, DC: Department of persed commands across a fluid and dynamic 5 Cao Van Vien, Leadership (Washington, DC: the Army, April 15, 1974). kinetic battlespace. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), 25. 20 For an example of success, see “Cambodia: Today, it appears that the United States 6 Ibid. A Cocky New ARVN,” Time, June 8, 1970; for an has had reasonable success in Iraq in organiz- 7 Ibid. example of failure, see the description of Lam Son ing, educating, and training indigenous secu- 8 John H. Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tacti- 719 in Laos in Andrew A. Wiest, Vietnam’s For- rity forces to undertake counterinsurgency cal and Material Innovations (Washington, DC: gotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN and stability operations. This perception is Department of the Army, 1989), 169–178, available (New York: New York University Press, December encouraging discussion of a rapid withdrawal at . 21 See Frederick Lash, Jr., “Tet with Tanks— that Iraq’s potential enemies will pose a multi- 9 Specific information regarding an extensive The NVA Easter Offensive, 1972,” Military echelon combined arms maneuver threat in number of U.S. and coalition pre- and postsurge mili- History, September 11, 2007; and also G.H. Turley, the immediate future, the same cannot be said tary operations can be accessed at . sors, Vietnam, 1972 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval U.S. advisors, support, and the possibility 10 Quoted in the cover story in Time 87, no. 1 Institute Press, 1995). of U.S. intervention with combat capabili- (January 7, 1966), available at . Capitulation (Washington, DC: United States Army potentially invites a repetition of the “real” 11 See LTG Raymond Odierno’s speech, Center of Military History, 1985). lesson of Vietnam in Southwest Asia. “The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later,” March 23 Collins, 129. Similarly, any failure on the part of 13, 2008, The Heritage Foundation, avail- 24 “The Continuing Challenge of Building the the U.S. military to maintain professional able at . gress Armed Services Committee, June 27, 2007, their educational and experiential activities 12 Jeremy Patrick White, Civil Affairs in 13, available at . combat operations—particularly for senior- International Studies, January 2009), 1–2, available 25 Ibid. level leaders—would make the risk a global at . Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Deci- 13 Michael Thompson, Lessons in Counterin- sion,” Small Wars Journal, April 2011. NOTES surgency: The French Campaign in Algeria (Maxwell 27 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sover- Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff eignty,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2011). 1 See, for example, Robert Freeman, “Is College, 2008), 12, available at ; r&action=researchproject&objectid=5f3da growth-of-the-iraqi-security-forces/>. Danny Schetcher, “The Unreported Vietnam- 6fe-bb22-4d23-9fe3-5223add0e96c>. 29 Merle L. Pribbenow, “North Vietnam’s Iraq Parallel,” May 1, 2005, available at ; 15 M. Leepson, “The Heart and Mind Parameters (Winter 1999–2000), 58–71, available Melvin Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of of USAID’s Vietnam Mission, Most USAID at . December 2005), available at ; Warren Wilkins, “Iraq: . Eyewitness Report,” April 16, 2005, available at The New Vietnam,” May 1, 2008, available at 16 White, 10–11. .

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 109 National Defense University (Katherine Lewis) ADM Stavridis addresses audience at NDU Convocation ceremony

Read, Think, Write Keys to 21st-century Security Leadership

By J AMES G. STAVRIDIS

wenty years ago, on a hot not know or understand well: global politics smart, and willing to do the brain work; in August day in 1991, I arrived, and grand strategy, the importance of the the end, 21st-century security is about brain- like you, to begin a year at the “logistics nation,” how the interagency com- on-brain warfare. We will succeed not only T National War College. I met munity worked, what the levers of power and because we have more resources, or because striking and impressive classmates such as practice were in the world—in essence, how our values are the best, or because we have William “Fox” Fallon and Carrol “Howie” everything fits together in producing security the best demographics or geographic advan- Chandler, future four-stars who radiated for the United States and our partners. tages—all of those things matter, of course. leadership. No one could know it then, but In the year ahead, I hoped to close that But in today’s turbulent security environment, there would be several flag and general gap, and I did. You will, too. we will succeed and defeat our enemies by officers from our class. Everyone looked self- I want to give you a sense of what out-thinking them. To do that, and to be suc- assured, and everyone—this may surprise worked for us in the class of 1992 in the hopes cessful senior officers, you need to read, think, you—was a lot taller than me and had far that it will illuminate the voyage ahead for the and write. more executive hair than I did. class of 2012. Let me start with reading. You will get My daughters were very young. We lived The first thing I want to emphasize is plenty of assigned reading, which—as we in a little townhouse in Alexandria, Virginia, the gift you have been given—namely, the used to say in the class of 1992—is only a lot and I had just finished up a sea tour in an gift of time. To be given essentially a year in of reading if you do it! Of course, I certainly Aegis cruiser and many years at sea. I knew the middle of your career, far away from the what I was good at and what I knew well: grind of combat and the endless churn of staff Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, is Commander driving a destroyer or a cruiser, navigating work, is priceless. You have to decide how to of U.S. European Command and North Atlantic through tight waters, leading a boarding party spend it. Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander up a swinging ladder, planning an air defense In three words: read, think, write. Europe. This article is an edited version of Admiral campaign, leading Sailors on the deck plates The quintessential skill of an officer is to Stavridis’s remarks at the National Defense of a rolling ship. But I also sensed what I did bring order out of chaos. You have to be calm, University Convocation on August 15, 2011.

110 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu STAVRIDIS believe you should read what the faculty defend our union, while pursuing the goal of a views and thus make them stronger. You will here recommends, but you should also cast a just and lasting peace.” write plenty here for the faculty. But I would wider net during the year ahead. Your reading We stand here today at Fort Lesley J. strongly encourage you to set a goal of pub- should include not only history, politics, McNair. It was built more than 200 years lishing an article somewhere as a result of the diplomacy, economics, and so forth, but also ago to protect a fledgling capital against work you have done here. great fiction, books from distant cultures, and forces that wished to do it harm. Its defenses Share your ideas in print—a scholarly perhaps even a little poetry. were traditional—basic training, stockpiles journal, a military magazine, a literary Recommend to each other great books of weapons, and fortifications—and the journal, or even a blog post. Get out there that you have read. In your seminars, spend a battlefields were traditional as well. Fast with your ideas. Nail your whispers to the minute or two hearing what your classmates forward two centuries, and Fort McNair is still wall. Conclude the trilogy of read, think, and are reading beyond the syllabus. Talk about responsible for defending this nation, but the write—and try to publish. Is there “career what you have read. Keep a journal of your “battlefields” have dramatically changed, and risk” in publishing? I suppose. It hasn’t hurt writing and how it strikes you. Copy down the world today requires more from us all. me too badly over the years. What matters great passages. Read, read, read. In this world, we must think our way to more is testing your ideas on the field of intel- Can I offer a couple of titles from my success in incredibly complex scenarios: lectual battle, so to speak. recent reading? Try Matterhorn, a novel We need to challenge our staffs, friends, of Vietnam by Karl Marlantes. You will be ■■ a Westphalian system under attack shipmates, allies—the dedicated professionals pulled into combat in a real and visceral way, with nation-states fighting in unconventional who work with us every day. We need to con- and you will be able to reflect on how far we settings with unfamiliar tool sets stantly seek new relationships and forge new have come in logistics, medicine, tactics, air ■■ attacks by organizations bent on ideo- partnerships. With all that said, let me give support, and a thousand other things. Pick logical domination you more food for thought. up Colonel Roosevelt by Edmund Morris, ■■ aging demographics throughout We have too many walls in the world which concludes a trilogy of superb and Europe and many developed regions of security—we need more bridges. Our highly readable books about perhaps our ■■ a globalizing economy with perceived self-imposed legal, political, moral, and con- most energetic and brilliant President in the (and actual) winners and losers exacerbated by ceptual boundaries defining what constitutes final, sad decade of his life when the country the challenges of austerity combat versus criminal activity, domestic was politically polarized and the world order ■■ the exponential rise of environmental versus international jurisdiction, and govern- concerns directly linked to globalization mental versus private interest all provide oper- ■■ miniaturizing technologies producing ational space for potentially lethal opponents reading is the rock upon powerful effects and dangers to security with no such boundaries to respect. which you will build the rest ■■ transnational and transregional crimi- As we stand here in the shadow of a of your career nal organizations, trafficking in weapons, nar- building that bears his great name, I am cotics, people, money, and intellectual capital reminded of one of my favorite quotations of ■■ diffusion of weapons of mass destruc- Lincoln: “The dusty dogmas of the past are was changing day by day. Want to get a view tion—including biological and chemical insufficient to confront our stormy present. into Afghanistan? Try Flashman, the first of weapons As our world is new, we must think anew.” the extraordinary series of historical fiction ■■ the “cyber sea,” enabling global We must address the challenge of effectively by George MacDonald Fraser, which throws communication at potentially everyone’s employing our military across these boundar- Pashtun culture into vivid light, providing a fingertips—a “speed of thought” dialogue that ies without undermining the core values and view of one of the worst acts of generalship in occurs in a virtual and real 24/7 news cycle freedoms that underpin our society. history: Elphinstone’s disastrous 1842 retreat ■■ all of this taking place within the Here, you will look to expand our from Kabul during which the British lost competitive “marketplace of ideas,” which is understanding of conflict and security beyond 30,000 souls in 2 weeks. ultimately at the root of conflicts, requiring only lethal means and reexamine all our Reading is the rock upon which you sophisticated strategic communication to operations, including peacetime engagement will build the rest of your career. Here is your influence in both directions. and training activities, in order to leverage the chance to create real intellectual capital from vast knowledge—the “corporate knowledge,” which you will earn interest, draw dividends, You must think your way through all quite literally—of the private sector as part of and make withdrawals in the two decades to of these new challenges. Few of them will be a single national and multinational strategic come. In this way, I share Teddy Roosevelt’s solved solely by combat operations, and thus framework. mindset when he stated, “I am a part of every- tend to lurk in our intellectual seams and find In the course of your thinking, you thing I have read.” our bureaucratic and cultural blind spots. must focus on the value of understanding Let us now turn to thinking. When Next, let me share some thoughts about different languages and study one yourself; President Obama was on campus in March writing. Because after you read, and think, I understand different cultures; study deter- of 2009 to dedicate Abraham Lincoln Hall, would argue you must write. Writing is easy mined adversaries; and seek new ways to he commented, “Here at National Defense for some and hard for others, but it is essential develop cooperation and collaboration. This University, men and women come together to in communicating what we have learned, approach reflects another giant for whom one think, to learn, and to seek new strategies to as well as allowing others to challenge our of your academic buildings is named, General ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 111 FEATURES | Keys to 21st-century Security Leadership

National Defense University (Katherine Lewis) Afghan army (well over 100,000 today read) and partnering in telecommunications and other sectors. We need to continue doing this col- laboratively: within and across governments and their agencies; within and between public and private enterprises; throughout academic institutions; and, most importantly, within our shared homes. Security requires complex and coordinated responses that move at the speed of thought. Diversity of capabilities, capacities, and responses to any challenge should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, but only if the actions and tools can be used synergistically. This can only happen when all the interested ADM Stavridis opens academic year at National Defense University parties adopt a common vision for security built on the foundation of trust and confi- dence and achieved through coordination, George C. M­ arshall, who embodied the inter- months, from killing Osama bin Laden to cooperation, and partnering. agency community mindset before it became losing so many of their own. Yet they stand Again, in today’s security environment, fashionable. and deliver, determined and proud, each day. progress and success will result not from Let me say a word to our international There is also promise in geopolitics building walls, but from building bridges. We students and the interagency partners. You as rising democratic nations such as India, need to do this with speed. We will prevail if have a special and important role here as Brazil, Turkey, Poland, and Indonesia flour- we think about innovation, if we think about teachers to help internationalize the thinking ish—all of which are taking increasing roles of how to take the next step, if we recognize that of military students and teach them how the leadership and importance in their respective opportunities exist in real time and have a international and interagency communities regions. We are fortunate in the United States limited shelf life. We need to be prepared to work. Each person who passes through this to have positive relations with these nations move quickly in response to emergent oppor- university will play a different role in our col- and others, and many of those relations tunities. This is brain-on-brain warfare and lective security—some will wear a uniform, started in groups in educational settings, like that is how we will win in the end—by out- whether here in the United States or abroad in what I see before me. thinking our opponents. our partner nations’ armed forces; some will I’d like to close with an example from be diplomats; some will eventually work in the something that most of you are probably private sector. In the end, you will be the sum in today’s security familiar with and use every day—I know of what you teach each other. environment, progress and I do—Wikipedia. The vision statement of Optimism is a force multiplier, as Colin success will result not from Wikimedia Foundation, Wikipedia’s parent Powell always said. As you think about the building walls, but from company, is “A world in which every human 21st-century security environment, beware building bridges being can freely share in the sum of ALL of endless pessimism: the past is not all bad; [emphasis added] knowledge.” The sum of neither is the present nor future all challenges all human knowledge—all of us thinking and threats. Europe is still vitally important, and the together are smarter than any one of us think- Indeed, there has been what I call North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ing alone. “hopeful progress” over the past decades is a foundational element of global security. As I look out across this wonderful in places such as Peru, Colombia, and the At NATO and U.S. European Command, group, I cannot wait to see and learn what you Balkans, and in dealing significant blows to al our specific challenges run the gamut from will contribute to that sum. You will be part— Qaeda and transnational criminal organiza- Afghanistan and Libya to the more nuanced an important part—of the sum of all security. tions and cartels. We have also developed situations such as illicit trafficking, terror- I am full of the happiest of memories as I new and stunning technologies in everything ism, piracy, cyber security, and even strategic stand with you today. I remember my children from facial recognition to missile defense. Our communication. In these different missions, when they were small. I remember the incred- advances in Special Forces are incredible. we find that successfully meeting and then ible luxury of time to read, think, and write. Of course, the men and women in overcoming them require what we call the I remember the friendships of my classmates all our militaries—all volunteers here and comprehensive approach—bringing together that now stretch across two decades. All that increasingly so across the world—show us and synergizing the talents and abilities of is ahead of you in this next year, and I envy daily their courage, honor, and commitment. military and civilian, foreign and domestic, you the voyage. Our Special Forces have been through the public and private sectors. Afghanistan is Godspeed and open water to each of cycle of triumph and tragedy in the last few an example: we are teaching literacy to the you, Class of 2012. JFQ

112 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Understanding Strategic Thinking and Developing Strategic Thinkers

By DOUGLAS E. WATERS

Both public strategy documents from recent administrations and actual American strategic behavior suggest that U.S. political and military leaders have been increasingly inclined to equate strategy with listing desir- able goals, as opposed to figuring out how to achieve them. As a practical matter, strategy is about making insightful choices of courses of action likely to achieve one’s ultimate goals U.S. Army War College Public Affairs Office College Public Affairs U.S. Army War despite resource constraints, political consid- erations, bureaucratic resistance, the adver- sary’s opposing efforts, and the intractable uncertainties as to how a chosen strategy may ultimately work out.2

CSBA is not the only organization to question U.S. strategic competence. Congres- Army War College students participate in Capstone strategic decisionmaking exercise sional committees, other think tank–com- missioned studies, politicians, and academics have all recently made similar assessments.3 he U.S. Army War College The inherent complexity and ambiguity Whether or not the reader agrees with these (USAWC) begins the academic that exist at the strategic level are not solely assertions regarding U.S. strategic compe- year with a dedicated Strategic a challenge for USAWC students. In a recent tence, few would disagree that the outcomes T Thinking course, the first of installment of the Strategy for the Long Haul for many of the strategic decisions made over six core courses that, along with electives, series by the Center for Strategic and Budget- the past 50 years could have been improved comprise the 10-month resident curricu- ary Assessments (CSBA), authors Andrew if more up-front thought had been applied to lum. The primary mission of the USAWC Krepinevich and Barry Watts argue that the the ways and means of strategy and not just is to prepare students for the challenges strategic competence of the U.S. national the desired ends.4 In other words, a thorough of leadership at the strategic level, so it is understanding of strategic thinking and how appropriate to start the year with a course to apply it to complex security issues is a pre- on the cognitive skills required for success the inherent complexity and requisite to better strategy-making. While this at that level. However, for many newly ambiguity that exist at the competency is clearly essential for the strate- arriving students, strategic thinking is a gic leaders of the uniformed military, civilian new and somewhat perplexing concept. strategic level are not solely a Service secretariats, Department of Defense, They have been highly successful in their challenge for USAWC students and the rest of the national security establish- military careers to date, but most of their ment, it is not relevant solely for them. The experience is at the tactical level of war. staffs that support these strategic leaders, at Success at the strategic level requires addi- security establishment as a whole has been tional competencies and skills in order to declining for some decades. In their opinion, Captain Douglas E. Waters, USN (Ret.), recently navigate the volatile, uncertain, complex, this decline is fundamentally due to a lack of retired as a Faculty Instructor in the Department of and ambiguous landscape characteristic of understanding at the national level of what Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. the strategic environment.1 strategy is: Army War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 113 FEATURES | Strategic Thinking and Thinkers least down to the lieutenant colonel/O–5 level, By the mid-1980s, this criticism of should also be able to think strategically in strategic planning reached a tipping point. order to properly support their senior leaders. Those who felt that the de rigueur analytical While review of the strategic manage- planning processes of the day were insuffi- ment literature identifies a clear consensus on cient advocated a new approach. Mintzberg, U.S. Army War College U.S. Army War the importance of strategic thinking, there is a the most prominent advocate of the view wide variance of thought and opinion on how that strategic thinking relies more on cre- to conduct it (more on this below). Articles ativity and intuition than it does on analysis that contain a succinct discussion of strategic (that it is more art than science), presented thinking and provide a coherent framework his argument in his seminal book and 1994 that might help budding national security Root Hall at U.S. Army War College Harvard Business Review article, “The Fall professionals to understand what constitutes and Rise of Strategic Planning.” Mintzberg strategic thinking and how to go about identified shortfalls with strategic planning improving it, both individually and within an and provided a stark diagnosis: strategic organization, are difficult to find. This article planning is not strategic thinking. Mintz- attempts to address this vacuum by synthe- berg held, “Strategic thinking . . . is about sizing the major schools of thought within College U.S. Army War synthesis. It involves intuition and creativity. a strategic thinking framework developed The outcome of strategic thinking is an inte- to help USAWC students better understand grated perspective of the enterprise, a not- and employ this critical competency. The too-precisely articulated vision of direction.” article begins with a brief discussion of the In Mintzberg’s view, strategic planning is historical development behind the differing a separate process from strategic thinking, approaches to strategic thinking and a defini- U.S. Army War College seal one that should provide data and act as a tion of strategic thinking. It then discusses catalyst for true strategic thinking but cer- the USAWC approach to teaching strategic be attained by referencing the historic debate tainly not provide the “one right answer.” In thinking, to include the framework, within about strategy itself: is strategy-making art, fact, Mintzberg offered that strategic plan- the curriculum. science, or a combination of both? 6 ning, when used improperly, would actually Theorists who believe that the develop- thwart true strategic thinking.10 Approaches ment of strategy is based more in fixed, ana- A third approach to strategic thinking Authors from within the military and lytical processes (science) necessarily view has emerged more recently. It removes the national security literature deal extensively strategic thinking (or planning) in this light. stark differentiation between the strategy as with the theory of war, strategy development, This view was first brought to prominence science and strategy as art camps by viewing and strategic execution (for example, Clause- by the “father of strategic management,”7 strategic thinking as necessarily both art witz, Jomini, B.H. Liddell Hart, Edward Igor Ansoff, in his seminal 1965 work Cor- and science. As scholar Jeanne Liedtka of the Luttwak). These materials clearly provide porate Strategy, and later by Harvard pro- Darden School of Business succinctly stated, insights about strategic thinking in the broad- fessor Michael Porter with his “five forces “The literature draws a sharp dichotomy est sense, but most authors do not delve into between the creative and analytic aspects specific discussions of strategic thinking and of strategy-making, when both are clearly its conduct. For that, one has to turn to the creativity and a systems needed in any thoughtful strategy-making 11 business literature where strategic thinking approach, augmented by process.” This view recognizes that while has received extensive coverage. strategic planning is primarily analytical and While strategic thinking is a well- critical thinking, are the true strategic thinking clearly requires creativ- established concept within the strategic man- province of strategic thinking ity and synthesis, creativity is not enough. agement literature, there is not a consensus Strategic thinking requires both critical and definition of it. The fact that there are many creative thinking to be effective. In order to definitions does not indicate a debate about and value chain” analyses.8 As the strategic think strategically, leaders and their staffs the validity or effectiveness of strategic think- planning school gained traction, many com- must develop innovative strategic options and ing per se but is primarily due to the differing panies hired corporate planners who estab- then evaluate these ideas through effective approaches in how to conduct strategic think- lished formal long-range planning systems critical thinking. Insights gained from this ing within an organizational setting. Many that functioned in a detailed and logical analysis of options can inform, in an iterative schools of strategy-making have emerged over systematic process. Corporate leadership process, new idea generation. Once complete, the years; indeed, Henry Mintzberg, an inter- expected these processes to produce suc- the selected strategic options can be devel- nationally renowned strategic management cessful strategies, but organizational critics oped (and further analyzed) within formal academic and author, has categorized 10 dis- suspected that in most cases, the output was strategic planning processes. This divergent tinct strategy formulation schools.5 However, merely thick planning books and 5-year and convergent thinking process is essential to simplify things, insight into the significant financial projections increasingly viewed as to effective strategy development; one without differences in these schools of thought can irrelevant by top managers.9 the other is insufficient.

114 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WATERS

USAWC has traditionally taught this War College, the eminent strategist Bernard how to better posture your organization or balanced approach to strategic thinking. Brodie captured this nuance quite well: nation to succeed in the future, then you However, while stressing that strategic are conducting strategic thinking. Two thinking involves both analytic and creative let us remember that scientific method is USAWC faculty members have formally thinking processes, these processes were useful and is being used in exploring alter- defined strategic thinking as “the ability to generally given equal weight as to their native choices but not in making the final make a creative and holistic synthesis of importance to the strategic thinker. This choice. The latter depends ultimately on good key factors affecting an organization and author believes that both are indeed impor- judgment, which is to say on the informed its environment in order to obtain sustain- tant but that creativity and the ability to intuition of a person or of a group of persons able competitive advantage and long-term use systems thinking to holistically assess who have been brought up in a particular success.”14 Although this definition refers to all aspects of an organization’s internal and indoctrination and whose approach to their an organization and its environment, it is no external key factors are what truly empower work is fundamentally that of the artist, not of less true for a nation-state and the strategic effective strategic thinking. Critical think- the scientist.12 environment in which it exists. ing is perhaps the most important attribute for a military officer at all levels of the Strategic Thinking Defined Skills organization, but for the strategic thinker, it Strategic thinking is an intent- There are specific skills required to be is in and of itself insufficient. Creativity and driven activity.13 It ultimately has the goal a successful strategic thinker. Over the first 2 a systems approach, augmented by critical of facilitating good judgment to inform weeks of the academic year, USAWC students thinking, are the true province of strategic decisionmaking and the development of are presented with 10 discrete lessons that thinking. It is therefore fair to say that innovative strategies to align the organiza- introduce these thinking skills as well as while the author recommends a balanced tion’s future direction with the expected critical competencies such as self-awareness, approach to strategic thinking, there is a environment. The intended outcome is to openness to dialogue, and awareness of cul- subtle bias toward the importance of art in make the organization more competitive tural influences that are necessary to be an the execution. In a 1959 address to the Naval and successful. If you are thinking about effective strategic thinker (see table).

U.S. Army War College Strategic Thinking Course

Lesson Focus Description Seminar learning Competency (openness to Adult learning discussed; seminar learning environment for the dialogue) year established Course introduction Overview/introduction to Prominent strategic leader address to students; discussion of framework remarks and the Strategic Thinking Framework in seminar Critical thinking Thinking skill (analytic/ Gerras Critical Thinking Model (modified Paul and Elder model) convergent) discussed; application exercise Creative thinking Thinking skill (creative/ Allen faculty paper on creativity at the individual, group, and divergent) organizational levels discussed; application exercises Self-awareness Competency Presentation on Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). MBTI, 360 assessments, and other self-awareness tools discussed in seminar Systems thinking Thinking skill (synthesis/ Open systems theory and Senge’s The Fifth Discipline discussed; holistic) application exercise Ethical reasoning Thinking skill (analytic/ Ethical reasoning’s relevance to the strategic leader, nature of convergent) ethical dilemmas, and major philosophical traditions discussed; a disciplined approach to ethical reasoning explored Uses of history: Thinking skill (analytic/ Historiography, uses of history, and Neustadt and May’s Thinking Thinking in time convergent) in Time discussed Cultural influences Awareness of cultural Lewis’s When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures discussed; on thinking influences USAWC’s Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy Analytic Cultural Framework introduced (analytic/ convergent) Application of Integrative exercise Examination of a complex “wicked problem” (Israel-Palestine) strategic thinking to using all thinking skills per the Strategic Thinking Framework in a wicked problem order to achieve a higher level of understanding of the issue

Note: To locate the faculty papers on critical and creative thinking by Dr. Steve Gerras and Chuck Allen, respectively, go to the USAWC DCLM Web site at . Ethics clearly can have a moral or emotional basis that would tend to defy an analytical label. However, USAWC teaches ethical reasoning skills that leverage an analytical methodology to inform and aid strategic thinking. It is on this basis that it is classified as a variant of critical thinking. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 115 FEATURES | Strategic Thinking and Thinkers

Strategic Thinking Framework

Critical Thinking C o Future Strategy Thinking in Time n e v c e Risk n

r

e Synthesis g

g e Competitive r

n Judgment Alignment e

c Advantage e v Systems Thinking i

D Creative Thinking Anticipated Future Environment Futuring

Environmental Scanning

Strategic Thinker Current Strategy Foundation Organization/ Self-awareness Aligned? State Today (esp. Egocentric Tendencies, Current Assumptions, Biases) Environment Awareness of Cultural Influences History on Thinking Consideration of Ethics and Values Openness to both Discourse and Reflection

Strategic Thinking Framework During a recent visit to the USAWC, a senior In order to contend with this question The Strategic Thinking Framework Army leader who also has extensive strategic and develop insight into future direction, stra- (see figure) shows how these various skills leadership experience in the commercial tegic thinking requires critical, creative, and and competencies interrelate. It depicts the sector offered that there is a central issue systems thinking to be effective. The Strategic strategic thinking process and demonstrates that all senior leaders (in both military and Thinking Framework depicts an iterative the relationship between the past (history), commercial domains) are always thinking process of divergence and convergence, as cre- present, and desired future direction (or about: Do I have my strategies right, and ative thinking explores innovative new ideas, vision) for the organization. True strategic are they executable?17 Are the organization’s hypotheses, and potential opportunities, and thinking always involves thinking in time, as vision and the ends/ways/means devised to critical thinking analyzes data to fuel creative it seeks to answer the question: “Having seen attain it aligned with the anticipated future thought and evaluates generated options to the future that we want to create, what must environment? This is a critical question converge on the most promising opportuni- we keep from our past, lose from the past, and ties. This dynamic is difficult, given an innate create in our present, to get there?”15 It identi- tension between these two thinking skills. fies the interplay between critical and creative strategic thinking requires As Liedtka observed, “Strategic thinking is thinking processes and the central role of both creative and critical. Figuring out how to systems thinking to produce synthesis and critical, creative, and systems accomplish both types of thinking simultane- holistic appreciation of the key factors that thinking to be effective ously has long troubled cognitive psycholo- influence an organization and its environ- gists, since it is necessary to suspend critical ment. It importantly highlights the ultimate judgment in order to think more creatively.”19 intent of strategic thinking: the alignment of that strategic thinkers wrestle with on a While an individual may not be able innovative new strategies to the anticipated continuing basis. In today’s more volatile to conduct critical and creative thinking environment in order to achieve competitive and complex security environment, if an simultaneously, an accomplished strategic advantage. The framework rests on a founda- organization fails to ask this question and thinker can rapidly move from one to the tion of key attributes or competencies needed then adapt/transform itself as needed, it other as required. Use of analytical thinking by a strategic thinker.16 can quickly find itself poorly postured for skills provides insights and data that can be The process depicted in the Strategic continued success. As former Chief of Staff leveraged with creative thinking to aid in both Thinking Framework is not a linear one, but of the Army General Eric Shinseki was fond problem identification and construction as to better explain the framework, it is helpful of saying, “If you don’t like change, you’re well as the development of innovative ideas to start with the Organization/State Today. going to like irrelevance even less.”18 and hypotheses about the future direction of

116 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WATERS the ­organization (as illustrated by Mintzberg’s The insights generated from iterations The feedback loop is a critically impor- catalyst role discussed earlier). This idea of creative and critical thinking are leveraged tant piece of the Strategic Thinking Frame- generation must occur in an environment that by systems thinking to inform the develop- work. Mintzberg has described strategy-mak- is free from critical judgment or ridicule in ment of a holistic appreciation of the complex ing as both deliberate and emergent in nature; order to foster the creative process. However, issues at hand. This holistic view aids in the in other words, “strategies can form as well once hypotheses are generated, then conver- identification of key linkages and factors that as be formulated.”21 A learning organization gent/critical thinking is needed to evaluate influence the organization and its external should welcome emerging strategies that may these new ideas. It is important to note that environment that must be considered in any develop slowly, frequently from the bottom this is not done necessarily (or usually) in future strategy development. Creative poten- up, as an important augment to the deliberate a linear fashion, but critical and creative tial solutions and strategic options should be strategy-making process. Strategic thinkers thinking skills are exercised when appropri- considered through this systems approach should realize that they cannot possibly be ate throughout the learning process. This in order to better understand and predict smart enough to think through everything iterative process of divergent and convergent intended as well as unintended effects and in advance, so their deliberate strategies will thinking is more likely to result in promising reactions. This holistic systems-level view of be incomplete (and perhaps flat-out wrong strategic options that can be further analyzed both an organization and its environment is in some areas). Actual experience in imple- and developed within an organization’s critical to effective strategic thinking. Without menting a strategy will spark new insights formal strategic planning processes. a holistic appreciation of complex and ambig- and lessons learned that should be taken Systems thinking is also central to the uous issues, potential second- and third-order advantage of by the organization’s strategic strategic thinking process and, like creative effects of decisions may go unnoticed, and thinkers. Liedtka refers to this as “intelligent thinking, is a fundamentally different means strategic leaders and their staffs are likely to opportunism,” one of her five elements of of thinking than that used in traditional ana- become overwhelmed by complexity. strategic thinking, which “furthers intended lytical processes. Russell Ackoff described this This iterative synthesis of insights, strategy but that also leave[s] open the pos- difference in his book Creating the Corporate ideas, and identified key factors is used to sibility of new strategies emerging.”22 Military Future: develop improved judgment, which is a criti- officers will be familiar with this concept as cal output of the strategic thinking process. they reflect on the emergence of a counterin- Analysis looks into things; synthesis looks out This improved judgment will in turn inform surgency strategy over time during Operation of things. Machine-Age thinking was con- the development of strategies within the Iraqi Freedom. cerned only with the interactions of the parts organization’s traditional strategic planning This feedback loop is more than just of the thing to be explained; systems thinking processes that align the organizational vision noting lessons learned. To be true strategic is similarly concerned, but it is additionally with the future environment, thus making the thinkers and to enable organizational learn- occupied with the interactions of that thing organization more competitive and successful ing, the insights generated from implementa- with other things in its environment and with in that future environment. These strategies tion of deliberate strategies and the success its environment itself.20 then become the current strategy, and the or failure of emergent strategies must be cycle continues. leveraged through a higher level learning process within the organization. Professor Loizos Heracleous addressed this critical point when he outlined differing viewpoints on the nature of strategic thinking and its relationship to different levels of learning by examining the contributions of four promi- U.S. Army War College U.S. Army War nent academics.23 While these viewpoints all use different terminology, the central concept for all four is the same: the difference between strategic thinking and typical strategic plan- ning processes “involves thinking and acting within a certain set of assumptions and potential action alternatives; or challenging existing assumptions and action alternatives, potentially leading to new and more appropri- ate ones.”24 The latter involves true strategic thinking, and is facilitated through iterative divergent and convergent thinking and holis- tic, systems-level appreciation of key factors and linkages as described earlier. The Strategic Thinking Framework may appear to suggest a sequential process, but Students attend program on national security and human rights this is not the author’s intent, nor is it the case ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 117 FEATURES | Strategic Thinking and Thinkers in practice. For example, the decisionmak- Thinking Framework. The same is true for Army, and especially as described in joint ing procedure used by President George W. cultural influences on thinking, as culture doctrine, has a narrower application focused Bush to develop the “surge” in Iraq shows is a strong determinant in the development at the operational and theater strategic levels how nonlinear and untidy these processes of underlying assumptions, inferences, and of war, where it is used to apply critical and can be. President Bush gradually came to points of view for the strategic thinker and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and the realization that he needed to change his others, both internal and external to the orga- describe complex, ill-structured problems and thinking on the conduct of the war after nization. Openness to discourse and reflection develop approaches to solve them.27 considering intelligence reports, the analysis is necessary to ensure the strategic thinker is However, although strategic thinking of top aides and Cabinet members, and his receiving relevant data, insights, and points of and design are currently focused at different theater and field commanders’ assessments view on issues. A climate/culture (and leader) levels, the skills needed to execute both are, of the declining situation in Iraq. He began a that encourages this open dialogue on issues for all intents and purposes, the same. Officers deliberate process to develop a new strategy is critical; otherwise, the staff will only feed who become familiar and comfortable with that would turn things around. His vision or information that confirms the leader’s exist- design thinking at the operational level should strategic intent was unwavering, as what he ing views (and biases), resulting in suboptimal find the transition to strategic thinking at the termed as “victory” in Iraq was the goal. The decisions. Finally, ethics and values must institutional/strategic level easier. This may President sought out new ideas from wherever underpin the thinking and decisions of senior help to reverse CSBA’s purported decline in U.S. strategic competence (at least within the military), but only if the Services and DOD embrace these methods of thinking within self-awareness is necessary to ensure decisions are not biased their cultures. In order to effectively execute by cognitive “blind spots” established due to a failure to strategic thinking and design thinking across examine all relevant points of view on an issue the Army, the culture must encourage open- minded leadership that is receptive to, and indeed actively encourages, ideas that stray he could get them, including going outside leaders within the military, as the military is a from the current consensus. Leaders must be of traditional sources. Strategic reviews profession, and professions stand or fall based comfortable with, and encourage, subordi- were conducted throughout the national on the trust they engender with their client— nates who will challenge their assumptions security arena, including at think tanks, the in this case, the American people. A strong and biases during the thinking and learn- National Security Council, and the Penta- ethical component to the military’s expert ing process. While General David Petraeus gon. Conflicting data, analysis, ideas, and knowledge is critical to sustaining this trust.26 demonstrated this commitment within his ­recommendations came to the President and The organizational processes of command,28 his example may be more aberra- his staff through reports and formal meetings. environmental scanning and futuring and the tion than the norm. It is beyond the scope of Ultimately, after weighing all the evidence, concept of risk are depicted on the framework, this article to address this further, but it is the the President made the decision to order the but are not discussed in any detail during the author’s opinion that this cultural alignment development of a counterinsurgency strategy Strategic Thinking course. They are instead is central to the successful establishment of in Iraq and increase force levels to adequately covered within USAWC’s Strategic Leadership better strategic thinking and design within the resource the strategy. Application of critical, course and, in the case of risk, in other core military as well as the rest of DOD. creative, and systems thinking concepts was course curriculum. While environmental in evidence throughout. Nonetheless, strong scanning and futuring contribute to strategic points of view underpinned by unexamined thinking, and risk is integral to the calculated Strategic thinking is a critical compe- assumptions and cognitive biases were also relationship of ends, ways, and means, their tency for senior leaders and their staffs. It is present and served to complicate strategic coverage during the course is not required for a purposeful, deliberate activity that seeks to thinking regarding the issue.25 students to gain the necessary understanding generate innovative strategies and approaches The Strategic Thinker Foundation at of the framework and strategic thinking itself. to posture organizations for success in the the bottom of the framework is comprised of complex and ambiguous strategic environ- critical competencies that are prerequisites Linkages and Implications ment. The concept of strategic thinking was for becoming an effective strategic thinker. There are clear parallels between explained by presenting its history within the Self-awareness, particularly concerning one’s strategic thinking and the emerging concept strategic management literature, and identify- own assumptions, biases, and points of view, of design within Army problem-solving pro- ing three primary points of view organized is necessary to ensure that decisions are not cesses. However, strategic thinking and design across the strategy as art versus strategy as biased by cognitive “blind spots” established are not synonymous. Strategic leaders at the science debate. While both of these diametri- due to a failure to examine all relevant points institutional level of the Services and Depart- cally opposed viewpoints bring valid insights of view on an issue. This is also an important ment of Defense (DOD) are focused on stra- to the essence of strategic thinking, neither is component of critical thinking, but it is rein- tegic decisions impacting the budget, major sufficient in itself. The sound strategic thinker forced here because a lack of self-awareness acquisition programs, and policy issues that approaches the complex issues of the 21st will manifest itself in flawed thinking and shape and impact the enterprise as a whole. century in a balanced manner, bringing both decisionmaking throughout the Strategic Design, as currently implemented within the analysis and creative/intuitive processes to

118 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WATERS bear. USAWC’s Strategic Thinking curriculum strategic thinking that demonstrate both analytical was outlined, and serves as a means to develop and creative processes: strategic thinking incor- NEW strategic thinking skills that will continue porates a systems perspective; it is intent-focused; from NDU Press involves thinking in time; is hypothesis-driven; and to be honed throughout the academic year. is intelligently opportunistic. for the Institute for The Strategic Thinking Framework further 12 Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as an Art and a National Strategic Studies explains the components of strategic thinking Science,” lecture to the Naval War College, Septem- and provides an approach to inform senior ber 18, 1958, Naval War College Review (Winter leader judgment. The goal is to develop strate- 1998). gies that align an organization’s future direc- 13 See Liedtka, 122; and Gary Hamel and C.K. tion (or vision) with the future environment to Prahalad, “Strategic Intent,” Harvard Business gain competitive advantage. JFQ Review (July–August 2005), 148. 14 Charles Allen and Stephen Gerras, “Devel- oping Creative and Critical Thinkers,” Military NOTES Review (November–December 2009), 77. 15 Liedtka, 123. 1 Stephen J. Gerras, ed., “The Strategic Envi- 16 The Strategic Thinker Foundation is a more ronment,” in Strategic Leadership Primer, 3d ed. explicit variant of a previous Foundation (“Know (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Yourself, Know Others, and Reflect”) found in an 2010), 11–12. unpublished USAWC faculty paper by Dr. Richard 2 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Meinhart. Strategic Forum 269 Strategy for the Long Haul: Regaining Strategic 17 Army senior leader not identified due to the Competence (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic USAWC policy of nonattribution in effect during Chinese Military Transparency: and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), vii–viii. his visit. He said a second question is also central: Evaluating the 2010 Defense White Paper 3 Frank G. Hoffman, “The Strategic Thinking “Am I growing the right kind of leaders for the Deficiency: Diagnosis and Cure,” paper presented future?” On March 31, 2011, China released its 18 at the 2008 Joint Operations Symposium, Institute Eric K. Shinseki, “Remarks at the AUSA seventh biennial defense white paper, China’s for National Strategic Studies, National Defense ILW Army Medical Symposium, San Antonio, TX, National Defense in 2010. China began University, June 4–5, 2008, available at . www1.va.gov/opa/speeches/2009/09_0722.asp>. regional concerns about its growing military 19 4 The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is a recent Liedtka, 124. capabilities. However, Phillip C. Saunders and 20 pertinent example. Russell Ackoff, Creating the Corporate Future Ross Rustici examine the 2010 paper in detail 5 Henry Mintzberg and Joseph Lampel, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1981), 17. and find that it provides relatively little new 21 “Reflecting on the Strategy Process,” Sloan Man- Henry Mintzberg, “Crafting Strategy,” data and even less information about Chinese agement Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 1999), 21. Harvard Business Review (July–August 1987), 68. military capabilities and modernization than 22 6 Some may claim that the division of strategic Liedtka, 123. previous editions. Consistent with past white 23 thinking schools into an art versus science scheme Loizos Heracleous, “Strategic Thinking or papers, the 2010 paper offers no information is an oversimplification of a rich and complex Strategic Planning?” Long Range Planning 31, no. 3 about specific weapons systems or nuclear tapestry of competing thoughts. For the purposes (1998), 481–487. forces. Applying a methodology developed 24 of this article, however, it provides the right level of Ibid., 484. by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 25 detail without being empirically incorrect. The author’s very brief summation and anal- the authors further find that the 2010 paper 7 The description of Ansoff as the “Father of ysis of events relayed in Bob Woodward’s book on is less transparent than the 2008 edition and Strategic Management” can be found in multiple the subject. See Bob Woodward, The War Within: A provides less information than defense white sources, many of which attribute the phrase to Secret White House History 2006–2008 (New York: papers of other Asia-Pacific powers. Although Henry Mintzberg. Simon and Schuster, 2008). Chinese military officers assert that increased 26 8 M.E. Porter outlined his five forces and Don M. Snider, The Future of the Army Pro- transparency is intended to reassure neighbors d value chain in Competitive Strategy (1980) and fession, 2 ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 385. about its benign intentions, the authors 27 Competitive Advantage (1985) respectively. For Field Manual (FM) 5–0, The Operations conclude that the 2010 Defense White Paper more succinct discussions, see M.E. Porter, “How Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart- makes little progress toward that goal. Competitive Forces Shape Strategy,” Harvard ment of the Army, March 2010), 3–1. There is a Business Review (March–April 1979), 137–145; and design school within the 10 strategy formulation M.E. Porter, “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business schools identified by Mintzberg, and design Review (November–December 1996), 61–78. thinking can be used as a variant of strategic 9 M.E. Porter, “The State of Strategic Think- thinking. However, Joint Publication 5–0 defines ing,” The Economist (May 23, 1987), 21. design as an operational-level construct. The 10 Henry Mintzberg, “The Fall and Rise of Army definition does not specify levels, but appli- Strategic Planning,” Harvard Business Review cation to date has been at the operational/theater- (January–February 1994), 108. strategic level (and FM 5–0 discusses the need for 11 Jeanne Liedtka, “Strategic Thinking: Can It design at lower echelons as well). 28 Visit the NDU Press Web site Be Taught?” Long Range Planning 31, no. 1 (1998), Renny McPherson, “The Next Petraeus,” for more information on publications 121. In this article, Liedtka provides five elements of Boston Globe, September 26, 2010. at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 119 Pulling Back

he Industrial College of the statement: “to educate and develop leaders to Armed Forces (ICAF), one of bring strategic thinking skills and innovative three Joint Senior Level Educa- approaches to the challenges of transforming tion Institutions, is an integral organizations, and formulating and resourc- T 1 component of the Department of Defense’s ing our future national security strategy.” Joint Professional Military Education system. This article addresses the first half of The college provides a 10-month academic this mission statement: to educate and develop program that awards its graduates a master’s leaders in strategic thinking skills. While degree in resourcing the U.S. national security multiple strategic thinking skills are discussed strategy. During orientation, the Dean of in the SL course, this article addresses one Faculty and Academic Programs welcomes particular theory and several concepts for the student body of approximately 320 mili- student reflection as they progress on their tary, government, and industry leaders and developmental journey. The stratified systems challenges them to embark on a journey to theory (SST)2 explains why strategic leaders develop their strategic thinking skills. need to be strategic thinkers and offers a The primary objective of the ICAF general overview of the difference in the curriculum is to prepare students for work nature of leader tasks and work among direct, at the strategic leader level. This objective operational, and strategic level leadership implies that students need to understand what positions. The three concepts to be exam- strategic thinking is as well as develop those ined—strategic thinking, conceptual capacity, thinking skills required at the strategic leader and mental models—provide a foundation for level. While the entire ICAF curriculum is student understanding and development of designed to enhance strategic thinking skills, strategic thinking skills. Thus, this article has the Strategic Leadership (SL) Department a four-fold purpose. It is intended to enhance has particularly embraced this undertaking, student understanding of why strategic as evidenced by the department mission leaders need to be strategic thinkers, what Industrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense University (Katherine Lewis)

120 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu McGUIRE the Curtain Developing Strategic Thinkers at ICAF

By MARK Mc GUIRE

strategic thinking is, what a strategic thinker over the people whose cooperation is needed their own experiences as well as through is, and how strategic thinkers are developed to solve problems and make decisions. Exam- questioning the many military, government, at ICAF. ples of strategic leaders who invested a great and industry leaders who are guest speakers deal of their time building consensus include during the 10-month program. Regard- Strategic Leader Skills Generals Dwight Eisenhower as the Supreme less of which type of strategic leader skill The types of strategic leader skills Allied Commander and David Petraeus as the is considered most important, the current discussed in the SL course can be categorized Multi-National Force–Iraq Commander. literature recognizes that strategic thinking as conceptual, interpersonal, and technical.3 Some strategic leadership authors is a requisite skill. Many of the skills in these three categories emphasize one set of strategic leader skills are similar to ones that students have used more than others. For example, two authors Every Leader a Strategic Leader? during their careers, such as team-building, suggest that the critical individual differ- What makes strategic leaders different consensus-building, and critical thinking. ence variable in leader effectiveness is the than leaders at other levels? SST provides However, a major premise in the SL course is conceptual competence to do the required a general overview of the difference in the that strategic leaders exhibit these skills to a work.4 Another suggests that social capaci- nature of leader tasks and work among direct, different extent and in a different context than ties are equally as important as conceptual operational, and strategic leadership posi- they did over the first 20 years of their career. ones. This author defines social capacities as tions. This theory was developed based on For example, consensus-building can including both interactional skills (persua- initial research of an industrial age organiza- be considered part of the interpersonal skill sion, negotiation, conflict management) tion in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and set. Strategic leaders using this skill have an and reasoning skills of social perceptiveness tested via interviews in a study with Army enhanced requirement to deal with leaders (the capacity to be insightful regarding three- and four-star flag officers.6 Students are outside of their chain of command—peers the needs, goals, demands, and problems introduced to SST in the first week of school across other organizations, agencies, and of multiple organizational constituencies) through an article that describes how General nations. The increase in the requirement to and judgment.5 ICAF students study the Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint use consensus-building skills coincides with a interpersonal (team-building, consensus Chiefs of Staff, visited National Defense Uni- decrease in the degree of authoritarian power decisionmaking, and negotiation) and the versity annually to convey to students the dif- social intelligence (emotional, political, ferences between leadership at the operational Dr. Mark McGuire is a Professor in the Department and cultural) skills in the SL course and are and strategic levels—positions from which of Strategic Leadership in the Industrial College of encouraged to reflect on which set of skills some students had come and to which some the Armed Forces at the National Defense University. is most important for strategic leaders via might go.7 SST supports Powell’s arguments ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | Developing Strategic Thinkers at ICAF

who is immersed in the thinking, decision- Students create and recommend new national security strategy report during exercise making, planning, resourcing, and execution required by the work at that level, not simply a leader whose actions or decisions may have a single or an occasional strategic impact. Given this examination of the SST as the foundation for understanding strategic leadership and the necessity for strategic leaders to be strategic thinkers, students next explore what strategic thinking is.

What Is Strategic Thinking? Several authors have proffered a defini- tion of strategic thinking, three of which are outlined here. Gregory Foster states that strategic thinking is the “very essence of stra- National Defense University tegic leadership” and is an expected quality of leaders at the upper echelons of organizations, by depicting how performance demands that every leader is a strategic leader. The institutions, or states that claim superpower change qualitatively at particular points in the argument suggests that in today’s real-time, status. He defines strategic thinking as having organizational structure: around-the-clock media coverage environ- “far less to do with substantive content of ment, every leader’s decision has the potential what one thinks about than with the process The model contains three layers that reflect to make a strategic impact. Granted, leaders at of how one goes about thinking.”12 Finally, three functional domains. These layers direct and operational levels of organizations Foster claims that leaders who think strategi- incorporate seven strata . . . each successive can and do make international news and can cally must: layer and stratum represents an increasingly have a strategic impact at any time, but just complex operating environment with a longer having a strategic impact does not constitute take the long view, to focus on the big picture, to recognize the inherent interrelatedness of all things otherwise seemingly unrelated, to leaders at direct and operational levels of organizations can appreciate the residual and hidden conse- have a strategic impact at any time, but just having a strategic quences of action (and inaction), to anticipate impact does not constitute being a strategic leader and prevent unwanted events and conditions, and to identify the underlying causes of big problems rather than reacting to the more time span for the conduct of leadership pro- being a strategic leader, who is someone who proximate, visible symptoms of the moment cesses. In each of these seven levels, there is continuously performs the requisite work and that dominate politics, public policy, and public an explicit complexity of work, which may be operates on the time horizon as addressed in management.13 defined not only by the scope and scale of the the SST.11 Thus, a strategic leader is someone work, but also by the required cognitive pro- cesses of incumbents.8 ICAF students travel to conduct fieldwork at sites related to national security The concept of time span used in the SST is an index of the leader’s scope of vision of action over time as well as a measure of the leader’s ability to provide a meaningful context for subordinates.9 The authors of the SST claim that the mental models of strategic leaders must be more complex than those of leaders at lower organizational levels to accommodate the many more causal vari- ables and the interconnections among them in the environment.10 The research results of the SST strongly suggest that strategic thinking skills are essential for effective strategic leaders. Despite Powell’s lectures and the research provided by SST, some still posit Industrial College of the Armed Forces

122 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu McGUIRE

Another definition of strategic thinking scanning; decisionmaking where options are ­assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures proposed by Mark Grandstaff and Georgia consequential, situations may not have clear or images that influence how we understand Sorenson is that it: cause-and-effect outcomes, and/or a plau- the world and how we take action.”18 Aware- sible course of action may not yet have been ness that everyone has mental models and that focuses more on long term problems and developed or identified; reducing complex- they may be susceptible to individual biases, processes from a systems perspective rather ity; systems understanding; understanding memory faults, and perception errors is a than short term crises, and deals with more indirect effects; future focus and vision; and critical first step in student development. Each tenuous situations that are not susceptible to proactive reasoning.16 of our mental models is shaped by our experi- easy answers. ST [strategic thinking] includes A synthesis of the three definitions ences and hence carries all the biases from the different lenses and thought processes that are above may provide the best explanation of experiences with it. That is why it is so impor- useful in any endeavor, but they are critical what is involved in strategic thinking. All tant for strategic leaders to be aware of their for senior leaders in a time of accelerating three of the aforementioned definitions own biases and limitations, to solicit other change that brings both threats and opportuni- perspectives in thinking and decisionmaking, ties. In short, ST deals with problems that are and to continue to expand their exposure to much wider in scope, more intertwined with each of our mental models is other sources of perspectives to enhance their other problems, laden with ethical dilemmas, shaped by our experiences and own mental model of situations and problems. and that sometimes must be managed rather hence carries all the biases than solved.14 from the experiences with it Strategic Thinking Skills T. Owen Jacobs does not directly define Addressed in the Strategic strategic thinking but does offer that the offer several similar characteristics about Leadership Course ICAF experience focuses on thinking skills in the nature of strategic thinking. These char- general and strategic capacity in particular. acteristics include aspects of the required Jacobs defines strategic capacity not so much long-term, multiple, and systems (big picture) Creative thinking as the different facts that the decisionmaker perspective in dealing with more complex knows, but rather as the meaning the facts problems that have more indirect, consequen- Critical thinking have within the strategic context. Thus, he tial, and far-reaching outcomes than nonstra- contends that the primary objective at ICAF is tegic ­thinking. There is also an appreciation to build the meaning-making skills of analy- that strategic thinking requires a proactive Intuitive thinking sis, synthesis, and evaluation in students, as and anticipatory nature in scanning the envi- those will be the tools students will use during ronment, and identifying and dealing with Conceptual capacity the remainder of their career and beyond. future threats and opportunities. Similar to the concept of strategic thinking, In addition to the aforementioned Jacobs defines a strategic leader’s conceptual qualities of strategic thinking, the SL course Environmental scanning and decision skills as the ability to: addresses several specific types of skills that are important components of strategic think- gather information from external and inter- ing (see table). While students certainly used Future focus and vision nal sources, make sense of it, and provide these thinking processes and exercised these interpretations to subordinate echelons. They skills in their previous leadership experi- Mental models frequently are in a better position than most ences, the scope and quality (power) of the others to have the “big picture” information mental models used in employing these skills needed to understand a complex unfolding at the strategic leadership level are what set Metacognition/self-awareness situation in a way that permits early adap- them apart. tive action. The importance of this critical The SL course also introduces students Proactive reasoning function stems from the very long time-spans to the concept of the mental model, or the required for strategic initiatives to get planned, decisionmaker’s dynamic representation of resourced, and implemented. Lead-time is the decision space with which he or she must Reflective thinking consequently of immense value. To the extent deal. It can be considered a mini–decision that leaders can think further ahead, or think support system as it reveals cause and effect through complexity faster, they can create lead- linkages if it is accurate and comprehensive.17 Reframing/perspective-taking time advantage for their organizations that can Students are told that they will read the then be turned into competitive advantage.15 newspaper differently by the time they gradu- Systems thinking ate from ICAF because they will change and Jacobs goes on to identify seven key develop their mental models on all aspects functions concerning a strategic leader’s of national security issues as they progress Understanding indirect effects and conceptual skills that can be used to enhance through the program. Peter Senge states consequential decisionmaking this competitive advantage: environmental that “mental models are deeply ingrained ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | Developing Strategic Thinkers at ICAF

What Is a Strategic Thinker? tions of her/his mental models and under- NOTES Quite simply, a strategic thinker is stands how to compensate for them. She/ someone who exercises strategic thinking. he uses multiple frames of reference (her/ 1 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, In order to understand how to develop his own and that of her/his executive team) Department of Strategic Leadership, 2011 Strategic strategic thinkers, a more in-depth look and a multidimensional systems perspective Leadership Syllabus and Anthology, i. 2 at the concept is warranted. A strategic to solve complex wicked problems. She/he T. Owen Jacobs and Elliott Jaques, “Leader- ship in Complex Systems,” in Human Productivity thinker is one who has and can use mental reframes the problem as more information/ Enhancement, ed. Joseph A. Zeidner, vol. 2 (New models that are sufficiently complex to evidence from the environment is acquired York: Praeger, 1987), 7–65. address strategic issues. Becoming a strate- and continuously considers the long-term, 3 T. Owen Jacobs, Strategic Leadership: The gic thinker depends on having the requisite multiple-order consequences of her/his pro- Competitive Edge, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: conceptual capacity for and experience jected decisions. National Defense University, 2009), 84–88. from which these mental models are built. 4 Philip M. Lewis and T. Owen Jacobs, “Indi- Conceptual capacity, according to Philip Developing Strategic Thinkers at ICAF vidual Differences in Strategic Leadership Capacity: Lewis and T. Owen Jacobs, is the “breadth ICAF provides a valuable transforma- A Constructive/Development View,” in Strategic and complexity with which an individual tional opportunity for students to develop Leadership: A Multiorganizational-level Perspective, organizes his or her experience . . . [it] their strategic thinking skills. While the ed. Robert L. Phillips and James G. Hunt (West- reflects the level of sophistication of an curriculum cannot provide direct, hands- port, CT: Quorum, 1992), 121–137. 5 Stephen J. Zaccarro, The Nature of Executive individual’s organizing processes . . . [and on strategic level experience, it is designed Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of is a] description of the nature of the to enhance student conceptual capacity as Success (Washington, DC: American Psychological 19 meaning making process.” As these expe- well as to provide vicarious strategic-level Association, 2001), 293–294. riences become increasingly complex, with experience through its seminar discus- 6 Jacobs and Jaques. more obscure cause-and-effect relation- sions, readings, and exposure to strategic 7 George McAleer, “Leaders in Transition: ships, individuals require more abstract leaders across the military, government, Advice from Colin Powell and Other Strategic thinking abilities to develop the requisite and private sector via the guest speaker Thinkers,” Military Psychology 15, no. 4 (October cognitive maps.20 Lewis and Jacobs suggest program. According to Forsythe and 2003), 309–322. that for leaders, “There are advantages to Barber, “It is not enough simply to expose 8 Zaccarro, 26. 9 having a conceptual work capacity that students to a large amount of information; Ibid. 10 somewhat exceeds one’s current conceptual they must be challenged to organize the Ibid. 11 Jacobs, 35; Zaccarro, 25–30. work requirements.”21 information into meaningful categories 12 Gregory Foster, Teaching Strategic Thinking So conceptual capacity, or cogni- and to form interconnections among ele- to Strategic Leaders (Washington, DC: National 23 tive horsepower, is the initial component ments.” Through reading and reflecting Defense University, 2005), 2–3. required to be a strategic thinker. But a stra- on assigned readings and contributing to 13 Ibid. tegic thinker must also possess the requisite seminar discussions throughout the year, 14 Mark Grandstaff and Georgia Sorenson, experience of operating and making deci- students learn and develop the concepts Strategic Leadership: The General’s Art (Vienna, sions in a strategic context. George Forsythe that define the strategic environment and VA: Management Concepts, 2009), xxiv. and H.F. Barber reinforce the importance of national security issues. 15 Jacobs, 86. challenging, high-level work experiences in Each of the ICAF courses tasks stu- 16 Ibid., 86–88. 17 developing the leader’s cognitive structures dents via exercises, paper requirements, Ibid., 67. 18 required for action at the strategic level.22 and discussions to develop their conceptual Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New This experience is not typically obtained in a capacity by analyzing, evaluating, and York: Doubleday, 1990), 8, 174–176. person’s first 20 years of leadership, and thus synthesizing the knowledge they acquire. 19 Lewis and Jacobs, 124. most students who graduate from ICAF are And while ICAF pushes them through its 20 Zaccarro, 26. not finished strategic thinkers but only on curriculum, it will be up to each student 21 Lewis and Jacobs, 132. the path toward becoming one. to make sense of these complex global and 22 George B. Forsythe and H.F. Barber, “Mili- While conceptual capacity and stra- national security issues. For those students tary-Strategic Thinking: Expert-Novice Differences tegic leader experience are essential for willing to apply themselves to the readings, in the Structure and Content of Cognitive Repre- becoming a strategic thinker, mastery in papers, and exercises and, more important, sentations,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting the art of strategic thinking is achieved by to reflect upon, discuss, and challenge their of the American Educational Research Association, understanding when and how to exercise the current mental models of the many global San Francisco, California, April 1992. 23 strategic thinking skills listed in the table. and national security issues, then they will Ibid. A proposed description or definition of the see a remarkable growth in their concep- mastery involved in being a strategic thinker tual capacity by graduation. While this is one who possesses the conceptual under- year cannot provide students the requisite standing of the increasing levels of sophisti- experience of a strategic leader, it will serve cation in the breadth and complexity of the as a catalyst to enhance student conceptual variables in the strategic environment. The capacity, which is essential as the founda- strategic thinker is conscious of the limita- tion for becoming a strategic thinker. JFQ

124 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CARPENTER

The Joint Officer

A Professional Specialist General Richard Myers, USAF (Ret.), addresses students and faculty of Joint Advanced Warfighting School By SCOTT A. CARPENTER at Joint Forces Staff College

National Defense University

Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship. —Captain John Paul Jones

n 1986, Congress passed the Goldwa- explores the DOD Joint Officer Development general and flag officers. Few [staff officers] ter-Nichols Department of Defense (JOD) approach and highlights the effects of have had formal training in Joint Staff work (DOD) Reorganization Act to improve career management methodologies on joint and even fewer [have] previous Joint Staff I Service effectiveness in executing joint officers. It recommends that DOD identify experience. Only a small percentage have operations. Title IV of the act called for the and implement a specific career manage- completed joint schooling specific to Joint establishment of a Joint Specialty Officer ment plan for joint professionals, including duty. . . . The average Joint Staff officer, while (JSO) designation to identify those officers designated career paths, which will improve knowledgeable in his Service specialty, has particularly educated and experienced in joint the performance and effectiveness of joint limited breath [sic] of knowledge of his own matters.1 The goal was to increase the quality, organizations. Service, much less a broad understanding of stability, and experience of officers assigned his sister Services.2 to joint organizations, which in turn would Background improve those organizations’ outcomes. Goldwater-Nichols instituted compre- The authors of Goldwater-Nichols Despite overwhelming efforts to hensive changes in the organizational struc- believed DOD needed to develop a joint orga- strengthen joint professional military educa- ture and functional authority of DOD. Prior nization perspective for how military forces tion, little has occurred to exploit the experi- to the act’s passage, a congressional report should operate. ential skills and competencies derived from characterized the overall performance of offi- joint assignments. Because of its failure to cers assigned to joint duty as follows: Commander Scott A. Carpenter, USN, is Deputy of designate career paths and implement a career Maritime Operations in the U.S. National Military management plan for joint officers, DOD is Tour assignments of the Joint Staff officers are Representative Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied losing valuable expert knowledge. This article only about 30 months on average, even less for Powers Europe. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 125 FEATURES | The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist

To ensure the proper career develop- officers who can provide solid military advice, management is vital to the success of the ment of officers assigned to joint organiza- options, details—the results of analysis—to organization.10 tions, Goldwater-Nichols tasked the Secretary the Generals and Admirals.”7 Ultimately, tenure of assignment must of Defense to establish career guidelines, be weighed against the value of its impact on including types of duty assignments, for Job Characteristics and Tenure organizational success. It is in the best inter- officers designated as joint specialists. Clearly, Categorizing jobs as either developing or est of the joint organization to have longer Congress intended for JSOs to serve a unique using jobs is one methodology used to articu- tenured personnel because tenure is more purpose in the joint organization—to provide late the functional description that various relevant to organizational effectiveness than comprehensive, inherently joint strategic positions serve in an organization.8 From a it is to determining who has received a valid advice to senior military commanders and utility perspective, it is desirable for officers joint experience.11 top civilian officials. Likewise, Congress to remain in developing jobs for the minimal also directed the purposeful career develop- time necessary to acquire the intended skill The Joint Officer Development Vision ment of JSOs to serve as the mechanism to set before moving to the next developing job In 2005, the Chairman of the Joint generate and retain joint expertise, thereby or into a using job. However, frequent turn- Chiefs of Staff published his vision for Joint transforming the military into a cohesive joint over is suboptimal from the organization’s Officer Development. The JOD concept is organization. perspective. While it creates a larger pool of based on the guiding principle that joint offi- In 1989, Representative Ike Skelton (D– officers with general experience, it does so cers are derived from Service officers.12 The MO) led a House Armed Services Committee at the expense of maximizing professional stated objective is to produce the largest pool Panel on Professional Military Education to expertise and organizational performance. of fully qualified, inherently joint officers at review DOD implementation of key Gold- These costs manifest themselves in lower the O–6 level for promotion to general or flag water-Nichols’s provisions. In conducting its quality performance, workflow interrup- officer (GO/FO). Additionally, the Chairman review, the Skelton Panel found it essential to tions, and splintering of relationships—all of asserts that “attaining the rank of colonel and fully understand the meaning and purpose of which impact effectiveness and organizational captain signifies that an officer fundamentally a joint specialist: “Parenthetically, the panel outcomes. thinks in a joint context . . . and thereby pos- is convinced that defining the JSO is the crux Using jobs, on the other hand, are ones sesses an unprecedented ability to integrate of the problem posed for DOD by all of the in which the officer, based on accumulated capabilities across the joint force.”13 But does Title IV joint officer personnel policies.”3 In competencies, proficiencies, and/or experi- attaining the rank of colonel or captain, developing its portrait of a JSO, the Skelton ences, is expected to perform key functions or any rank for that matter, signify that an Panel offered a comparative description of a non-JSO. Furthermore, it elaborated on the interplay between JSOs and non-JSOs serving familiarity with joint operations from a Service perspective on the Joint Staff, stating, “In fact, non-JSOs does not transform into joint competency are essential to the proper functioning of the joint system because they bring current Service expertise and credibility to bear in on behalf of the organization. Within the officer is capable of integrating joint forces, considering the solutions to joint problems.”4 organization, using jobs usually demand a especially when there is no requirement for Conversely, JSOs would provide better conti- high degree of accountability and stability the officer to serve in a joint assignment prior nuity, more objectivity, and increased experi- and are often critical to the success of the to being promoted to O–6? ence levels in joint operations beyond the organization.9 Longer tenure in these assign- The JOD concept as outlined by the Service perspective. While both are essential ments builds greater depth of expertise, Chairman is not a complete solution. Famil- in a joint organization, the variance of diver- promotes complementary relationships, and iarity with joint operations from a Service sity of education and professional experience allows the officer to reach a point of sustained perspective does not transform into joint promotes synergy. effectiveness. competency. The results of the Navy’s Fiscal The Skelton Panel also recognized In general terms, individuals pass Year 2012 Major Command Board reflect the need to select theoretical strategists and through developmental assignments as they the haphazard and nonbinding approach to strategic advisors from among those officers rise in an organization. Since developmental joint officer development. The board, which skilled in the application of strategy.5 Identifi- opportunities are often limited, the organiza- convened in November 2010, selected 41 cation is important because the characteristics tion needs an assignment management plan Surface Warfare Officers to serve in O–6 unique to theoretical strategists demand a to move individuals systematically through a command positions. The Surface Warfare more in-depth professional development sequence of positions that develops particular Community considers selectees to be its top scheme.6 Representative Skelton wrote that competencies valuable to the organization and officers, those with potential to serve as flag developing leaders and strategists is a process makes the individual competitive for a using officers. Of the 41 officers selected, just 13 that comes from years of careful study, reflec- job at the higher level. A rational sequence (31.7 percent) have completed Joint Profes- tion, and experience, citing General John of developing jobs can be described as a sional Military Education (JPME) Phase II, Galvin: “We need senior Generals and Admi- professional career path. These identifiable and only 11 (26.8 percent) are joint quali- rals who can provide solid military advice job patterns suggest that accumulated experi- fied. More alarming is the fact that two of to our political leadership . . . and we need ence is not serendipitous; therefore, career the officers selected have not yet completed

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JPME Phase I.14 These results give a much plan is centered on a flexible qualification consisting of developing jobs, advanced different impression of the significance of system that benefits the busy officer and a education opportunities, and using jobs at joint officer qualification to one’s career. Service-oriented officer management system. the upper levels of our national and military From the individual officer’s perspective, According to the Chairman, “Officers and organizations would better support JOD. why serve in a joint assignment when more Services will find it easier to reconcile Service To move forward, DOD should ask specific than three times the officers being selected and joint assignment options; consequently, questions regarding the value and demand for to serve in a flag officer milestone assign- more assignments that deepen an individual joint officers, principally: What is the relative ment have no joint experience?15 officer’s personal occupational competency importance of joint officer experience? How Over the past 20 years, numerous will be easier to link to achieving the common does it relate to joint organizational outcomes? studies have called for DOD to identify career objective of JOD.”18 What career paths and management policies paths consistent with the cumulative building While the JOM plan provides the will sustain its development? of deep knowledge and experience essential mechanism for how officers acquire joint In congressional testimony in 2009, to the most demanding joint billets.16 The qualifications, it lacks a means by which Lieutenant General David Barno, USA objective of JOD should be directly tied to DOD will develop and utilize these officers. (Ret.), observed that our current officer improving the effectiveness and performance Organizations do not exist for the purpose of management system paradoxically identi- of the joint organization. Unfortunately, providing officers joint experience, traditional fies expert tacticians for promotion and the objective of creating the largest pool of or otherwise. On the contrary, the purpose of then expects them to magically recre- joint qualified officers for promotion to GO/ jointness is to develop a highly effective joint ate themselves as strategic leaders. His FO effectively translates into maximizing organization.19 Nonetheless, the failure is the testimony highlighted the fact that the throughput—and thus correspondingly result not of implementation but rather the Services’ management policies are almost shortening tenure in joint assignments. It DOD strategic approach to JOM. The concept exclusively biased toward the tactical level removes the impetus for the Services to assign breaks down at the point of developing the and command, and that those who pursue qualified officers to a second joint assignment proficiency level of joint officers. Relatively specialization, even in areas as vitally because the Services must use every available speaking, current proficiencies never improve important as national security and military opportunity to increase their pool of qualified beyond a baseline level because there is no strategy formulation, risk upward mobility officers. mechanism to retain joint expertise in the because Service policies do not value this joint organization. Without purposeful kind of expertise.20 Nonetheless, if so much Joint Officer Management management and utilization of acquired joint emphasis is given to the importance of tacti- The DOD plan for Joint Officer Man- expertise, there is no net gain in joint organi- cal experience in developing combat arms agement (JOM) is designed to develop officers zational performance. officers, one could conclude that experience progressively in joint matters throughout is the de facto means of developing compe- their careers. It includes alternate ways that Joint Specialty Officer Revisited tencies and professional expertise. are currently being missed to recognize and Goldwater-Nichols sanctioned the joint Joint expertise comes from increasingly award officers with joint experience credit, specialist as a professional of the joint com- challenging and reinforcing joint assignments. as long as the position and/or context of munity. Establishment of joint officer career However, there are no definitive, qualifying work are relevant to joint matters.17 The JOM paths and career management guidelines measures of effectiveness regarding joint officer proficiency or joint expertise. Observa- U.S. Navy (Daniel Viramontes) tions by various joint staff officers and senior leaders indicate that on average, joint staff officers experience a 7- to 12-month learning curve.21 To perform their duties successfully, 75 percent of officers reported that prior joint experience was either required or desired.22 Table 1 summarizes survey results of average effectiveness ratings for prior education, training, and experience in preparing officers for their joint assignment.

Career Management Models The selection of an appropriate career development model largely depends on whose perspective is being considered: the individual officer, the joint organization, or the officer’s Service organization.23 Currently, the Services control officer development. They educate, Coalition liaison officers and U.S. Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn members discuss command and control of assign, promote, and manage personnel operations to repatriate refugees fleeing violence in Libya based on their own need for highly qu­ alified ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 127 FEATURES | The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist

Table 1. Survey Results of Officer Effectiveness Ratings skills career models. Table 5 illustrates the comparison of career model outcomes.27 Institution/experience Number of Average effectiveness Based on table 5, the managing leader succession model appears to be superior. respondents 0 = no help 3 = moderately helpful However, an examination of the assump- 5 = exceptional tions behind each model and the fact that Advanced JPME 19 4.0 the comparisons are made relative to average non-joint combat arms officers are significant Civilian university 1,005 2.15 to interpreting the results. Content specific training/Other 250 3.6 First, it is important to note that when Intermediate-level education/JPME I 959 3.2 considering the managing skills model, Joint Staff, Pentagon 59 4.05 there is no relative difference for promotion JPME II 309 2.7 between those combat arms officers who (10- or 12-week course) have joint experience and those who do not. Previous staff officer billet 595 3.6 This can be attributed to the fact that average Senior PME/JPME II 194 2.8 officers promote and retain equally. Second, (War college equivalent) the analysis of using the managing competen- Service academy 291 2.45 cies model for joint officers, which results in Service command a slightly less than average promotion rate to (Squad, wing, unit, company, or 274 3.0 O–6 compared to average non–joint qualified battalion-level command) combat arms officers, is more indicative of Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff Officer Project: Final Report (Washington, DC: U.S. completing an O–5 command assignment Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2008), 58. (keep in mind those officers who become part of a cadre of joint officers will serve in mul- officers to serve as commanders and on managing the “generalist.”25 The objective of tiple joint assignments instead of command Service-specific headquarters staffs. However, this model was to develop breadth of knowl- assignments, which make them relatively Service-derived career development models edge by exposing officers to various positions, less competitive for promotion to O–6). It is do not necessarily foster the competencies primarily within their specific career field. also important to consider that if DOD only needed to serve in an organization focused on Although it was Service-oriented, its goal was joint matters and strategic issues. The value of to develop leadership competencies applicable experiential development of joint competen- in a range of positions leading to command. joint experience in excess or at cies, and of those who possess this expertise, The RAND study also considered the wrong juncture in a career needs to be recognized as an asset of the joint various career models applicable to managing can be detrimental, even for organization. Unfortunately, the JOD concept a specialized group of officers, such as a cadre officers who are considered does not align development of joint expertise of joint officers. These career models can be higher quality with joint assignment requirements. described as: To create an incentive for officers to become joint specialists, DOD must generate ■■ managing leader succession: joint prescribes a small number of O–6 jobs and no a demand signal for this expert knowledge officers are managed in a manner to identify GO/FO jobs for joint officers managed by the and designate a career path that allows these those qualified to fill the top Service positions competency model, promotion opportuni- officers to flourish. To achieve this, JOM (higher promotion rates, shorter tour lengths) ties beyond O–5 will be extremely limited; policies should focus on managing officers ■■ managing competencies: emphasis is therefore, the majority of joint officers will not whose competencies contribute to joint on developing intensely experienced officers remain in the military beyond that level. organizational outcomes.24 Joint assignments in joint matters through longer and repeated The relatively shorter joint assignment would be linked to form a series of developing joint assignments in the managing leader succession model and using jobs creating career paths for joint ■■ managing skills: used to distribute is consistent with a pattern of developing specialists. These paths would represent viable joint experience throughout the officer corps26 leaders. This model presumes that only higher career tracks leading to senior-level joint ■■ managing by exception: used to fill quality officers would be sent to joint assign- assignments that demand a high degree of available positions from the pool of officers ments but would not remain in those jobs for joint expertise or are suitable for a theoretical scheduled to rotate at the time of availability. long, and only a minimal number would serve strategist. a second joint assignment prior to promotion An Interagency Assignment Officer Tables 2, 3, and 4 capture characteris- to GO/FO.28 Further inspection of this model Career Management study conducted by tics associated with officers and the career also reveals that joint experience in excess RAND in 1999 offers examples for how DOD model. or at the wrong juncture in a career can be could manage a cadre of joint specialists. The In 2009, RAND completed an analysis detrimental, even for officers who are consid- authors described the career model being that compared the managing leader succes- ered higher quality.29 Other inherent aspects used for managing combat arms officers as sion, managing competencies, and managing of the managing leader succession model

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Table 2. Depth and Currency of Joint Expertise at Each Grade include a substantial number of GO/FO billet opportunities associated with combat arms Career Model O–4 O–5 O–6 officers’ career tracks—a contributing factor to promotion and retention rates. Finally, Medium; current through Managing leader succession None Low education only comparing the results of the managing leader Deep; current through succession and managing skills models sug- Managing competencies Low Medium education and experience gests that the increased promotion and reten- Medium; current through tion rates are more indicative of the higher Managing skills None Low education only quality officers portrayed in the managing Low; current through Managing by exception None None leader succession model and not at all related education only to serving in a joint assignment. Source: Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Robert M. Emmerichs, Interagency and Generally speaking, existing military International Assignments and Officer Career Management (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), xvii. officer management practices resemble Table 3. Joint Positions Filled by Officers with Prior Joint Experience those found in the managing leader succes- sion model. However, this model provides Career Model O–4 O–5 O–6 more weight to the individual officer’s and the Services’ perspectives than to the joint Managing leader succession None Few Most perspective.30 Given these assumptions, the Managing competencies Half Most Most/all analysis shows that the managing leader Managing skills None Few Most succession model is capable of producing, promoting, and retaining more officers with Managing by exception None None Few joint experience. 31 Admittedly, this fulfills Source: Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Robert M. Emmerichs, Interagency and the objective outlined in the Chairman’s JOD International Assignments and Officer Career Management (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), xvii. plan. However, it conflicts with the needs and requirements of the joint organization as Table 4. Characteristic Quality of Officers in Each Model demonstrated by the findings of numerous studies, reports, and congressional reviews. Career Model Nature Although joint officers are not currently Managing leader succession Likely future general/flag officer managed as a separate group, the RAND Managing competencies Joint expert/theoretical strategists study found that when the joint organization’s interests are given priority and the contribu- Typical Service experience, but perceived Managing skills lower quality tion of the work performed by joint specialists is considered valuable, the managing compe- Managing by exception Assignment available tencies model is preferred.32 Source: Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Robert M. Emmerichs, Interagency and International Assignments and Officer Career Management (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), xvii.

Table 5. Summary of Differences Between Promotion and Retention in Management Frameworks Relative to Average, Non-Joint Officers

Managing leader Managing competencies Managing skills succession Promotion to O–5 > > = Promotion to O–6 > < = Promotion to O–7 >> << = Retention at O–4 > = =

Retention at O–5 > < =

Retention at O–6 >> >> =

Likelihood of second joint job at or before O–4 <<< > <

Likelihood of second joint job at or before O–5 << >> <

Likelihood of second joint job at or before O–6 < >>> <

Tour length < >> = NOTE: Symbols indicate a comparison with the average and typical outcomes for the overall service. The symbols reflect comparisons based on typical Service outcomes, ranging from slightly more/less likely (>, <) to much more/less likely (>>>, <<<). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 129 FEATURES | The Joint Officer: A Professional Specialist

Recommendations nities, and assigned to key positions in the Career management and assignment DOD must revisit the original idea of national security arena.35 screening for joint officers would be handled the joint specialist, the creation of which was DOD could develop various architec- via the establishment of a DOD Joint Officer intended to improve the performance and tures to create the joint officer community.36 Advisory Board composed of representatives effectiveness of joint organizations. Because One possible construct would ideally from each of the Services. To preserve the the Services are responsible for managing reflect the JSO/non-JSO concept outlined joint perspective, this advisory board would officer assignments, the Service perspective in ­Goldwater-Nichols and expounded on have to reside at the DOD level, perhaps in takes priority over the joint perspective when by the Skelton Panel. For argument’s sake, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense it comes to developing officers. Hence, joint this cadre of joint professionals would for Personnel and Readiness.40 The screening qualification resembles a time-share approach equal half of the total joint duty assignment board would be responsible for approving where officers serve in a joint billet for a brief requirement. Joint officers would possess Service nominations for joint officers, con- interlude before returning to their primary depth of joint knowledge, staff officer stabil- ducting periodic reviews to ascertain an offi- career path.33 Tension exists between satisfy- ity, and internal operational expertise: the cer’s development, and screening each joint ing career advancement on the one hand, and core capabilities necessary to deliver the officer for follow-on assignments or advanced expertise development on the other. A review desired outcomes. They would create and education programs. Using specific language of DOD’s annual Goldwater-Nichols Act preserve a body of knowledge and would to characterize those joint officers with the Implementation Reports from 1995 to 2005 is serve as subject matter experts in joint potential for higher level assignments or spe- evidence that the Services have not shown due matters, available to mentor, guide, and cific education programs, the advisory board’s diligence in developing joint specialists or in teach others.37 Concurrently, their non-JSO results would be included in each officer’s filling critical joint assignments with properly counterparts—ideally, high-quality combat performance report and also coordinated with qualified officers.34 arms officers—would bring the newest the Services’ promotion board proceedings. An effective JOM framework would operational concepts, current insight, and Joint specialists aspiring to the most serve the joint organization better by devel- creativity to the joint organization. This demanding joint billets should know what oping the expertise that it values. It would self-reinforcing tandem would form a highly kind of joint expertise is needed to do the recognize this expert knowledge as an asset effective, agile team enhancing the effective- job.41 Therefore, a major role of the Joint of the joint organization by designing career ness of the joint force. Officer Advisory Board would be to desig- paths to support its development and opti- To organize and staff this cadre of joint nate career patterns for joint professionals. mize its utilization. Joint specialists would professionals, DOD could implement a lateral The objective is to administer the sequenc- build depth of expertise through interrelated entry process similar to that shown below.38 ing of developing jobs leading to top GO/ and reinforcing joint assignments, faculty The career model would target officers at the FO using jobs for joint professionals. The positions at military institutions, and post- 11- to 14-year point of their careers for lateral key is to identify senior-level positions that ings to external agencies where military entry into the joint officer community for the would be filled exclusively by joint special- expertise is in demand or where DOD can remainder of their careers. Additionally, they ists, which would then dictate prerequisite enhance the whole-of-government concept. would complete one of the Services’ advanced assignments to develop the necessary cre- Additionally, strategists and regional spe- operations studies programs and would serve dentials. Possible candidates for top-level cialists would be vetted from this cadre, longer assignments, up to 4 years, to capitalize joint professional positions could be Direc- provided doctorate level education opportu- on their experiences. 39 tor or Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, J5

Lateral Entry Process

O–5 O–6 GO/FO Promotion Promotion Promotion Zone Zone Zone YCS 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32+ O–6 CMD GO/FO CMD Combat I J Branch/XO S J J Arms L M HQ/Staff O–5 CMD Joint Duty Joint Duty Assignment Assignment S M M Officer E E C E E HQ/Staff HQ/Staff Lateral Lateral Entry Entry

Joint Duty (Using) Joint Duty (Using) I J S J J Joint L M Joint Duty S M Joint Assignment Joint Duty M Joint Duty Professional E E (Developing) C E (Developing) Doctorate (Developing) E (Developing) Education Strategists Strategists

YCS: Years of Commissioned Service ILE: Intermediate Level Education JME: Joint Military Education SSC: Senior Service College

130 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CARPENTER or J7 Directors, or President of the National 8 Margaret C. Harrell et al., Aligning the Stars: (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1999), Defense University. Improvements to General and Flag Officer Manage- xxii. 24 Although DOD has achieved significant ment (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Ibid., 51. 2004), xvii. 25 Ibid., 9. improvements in executing joint operations 9 Ibid., 18. 26 Ibid., 10–25. since Goldwater-Nichols, it has come up short 10 Ibid., 16. 27 Harrell, A Strategic Approach to Joint Officer in developing a comprehensive approach for 11 Margaret C. Harrell et al., A Strategic Management, 86. the utilization of joint professionals. The right Approach to Joint Officer Management: Analysis 28 Ibid., 82. approach would include a systematic process and Modeling Results (Santa Monica: The RAND 29 Thie, Harrell, and Emmerichs, 66–93. of reinforcing education and joint assign- Corporation, 2009), xxxii. 30 Ibid., xx, 25, 52. ment experiences to purposefully yield expert 12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Vision for Joint 31 Harrell, A Strategic Approach to Joint Officer knowledge in joint matters. The need for joint Officer Development (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs Management, 102. professionals is already high, and demand is of Staff, November 2005), 1. 32 Thie, Harrell, and Emmerichs, 52. 13 33 increasing. All that remains is for DOD to Ibid., 3, 8; also see Department of Defense, Don M. Snider and Jeffery Peterson, “Oppor- fully recognize the value of joint officers and Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and tunity for the Army: Defense Transformation and Joint Professional Education (Washington, DC: New Joint Military Profession,” in The Future of the significance of their contribution to joint Department of Defense, April 3, 2006), 17–18. the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J. Mathews, 2d ed. operations. JFQ 14 “PERS–41 Quarterly Newsletter,” issue 1, 1st (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), 240–241. quarter fiscal year 2011, 2, available at . 1 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense lyFinal 22DEC10.pdf>. 35 The demand for Army strategists is increas- Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99–433, 15 For an illustration of a similar occurrence ing, within not only the Army but also other th d 99 Cong., 2 sess., October 1, 1986, Title IV, sec. regarding the emphasis placed on joint experience government agencies. Interagency demand is 401, available at . and joint professional military education for those outpacing the supply; Departments of State, Trea- 2 Bill Nichols Department of Defense officers considered to be top performers within the sury, and Homeland Security are actively seeking Reorganization Act of 1986, “Report to the U.S. Army, see Charles D. Allen, “Redress of Profes- strategists to enhance their planning capability. Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 4370,” sional Military Education: The Clarion Call,” Joint See Moore, 6, 9–17. th d 99 Cong., 2 sess., H. Rep. 99–700, 40–42, Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter, 2010), 96–99. 36 Another option advocated by Scales is the available at . a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington, thinkers. He advocates specifically designating key 3 House Committee on Armed Services, Panel DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, strategic billets for these specialists, some of which on Military Education, “Report of the Panel on Mil- 2005), 113–114; Paul Herbert and Stuart Wilson, would be considered prime GO/FO billets. See itary Education of the One Hundredth Congress statement before the Subcommittee on Total Force, Scales, 24. st of the Committee on Armed Services,” 101 Cong., House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House 37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff Officer st 1 sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing of Representatives, March 19, 2003, available at Project: Final Report, 21. Office, April 21, 1989), 52. . Naval Operations Planner Course, U.S. Army’s 6 Being a strategist is, in reality, a specialty. 17 Department of Defense, Joint Officer Man- School of Advanced Military Studies; U.S. Marine In place of commanding, the strategist’s career agement: Joint Qualification System Implementation Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting; U.S. Air experience consists of recurring educational Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; programs and operational assignments. Repeated March 30, 2007), 3. Maritime Advanced Warfighting School; and Joint strategic-level assignments provide the cornerstone 18 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, 8. Advanced Warfighting School. See Scales, 24. of their development, setting them apart from their 19 Harrell, A Strategic Approach to Joint Officer 40 Scales suggests that “experience with the contemporaries. See Charles P. Moore, “What’s the Management, 138. Skelton reforms suggests that such a system would Matter with Being a Strategist (Now)?” Parameters 20 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on require iron-tight oversight at the very top to 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009/2010), 9, 14–16. Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and prevent the Services from suborning the spirit of 7 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Investigation, “Charting the Course for Effective [his proposed] Senior Strategists Program.” See Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Professional Military Education,” H.A.S.C. 111–93, Scales, 25. Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional 111th Cong., 1st sess., September 10, 2009; also see 41 Murdock, 114. Military Education Two Decades After the Gold- Scales, 22–24. water-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Wash- 21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff Officer ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), Project: Final Report (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 11. Notable behind-the-scenes strategic advisors of Staff, April 2008), 25. such as John Nagl, Paul Yingling, H.R. McMaster, 22 Harrell, A Strategic Approach to Joint Officer and Pete Mansoor were known for offering expert Management, 27. advice and insight to their bosses. See Robert H. 23 Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, and Scales, “Return of the Jedi,” Armed Forces Journal Robert M. Emmerichs, Interagency and Interna- 145, no. 3 (October 2009), 22. tional Assignments and Officer Career Management

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 131 FEATURES | Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

By Michael W. Grismer, Jr.

The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced.

— President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010

C−17 Globemaster III aircraft lands at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, during joint field training exercise U.S. Air Force (Donald R. Allen)

132 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRISMER

U.S. Air Force (Michael Longoria)

U.S. Airmen offload cargo from fourth 747 commercial aircraft within a month at Al Asad Airbase, Iraq

he expeditionary nature of U.S. ­evacuation services for U.S. forces.3 AMC pro- forward into the next decade of economic warfare today relies on rapid vides global reach through a mix of organic uncertainty and shrinking defense spending, global reach to defeat irregular aircraft, and through commercial airlines via CRAF brings the most capability at the lowest T threats in the farthest corners of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and other price. Because CRAF represents DOD’s most the Earth, to deter rogue dictators who seek contracts to move Department of Defense flexible and economical capacity for surge to acquire nuclear or biological weapons, and (DOD) passengers and cargo. airlift, this article draws the conclusion that to deliver humanitarian aid to the impov- USTRANSCOM’s timely delivery USTRANSCOM must transform CRAF capa- erished regions of the world. Enter the U.S. of forces and cargo would not be possible bilities to meet the evolving joint deployment Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), without the CRAF. The quid pro quo relation- mission in a fiscally constrained environment. a supporting unified command providing ship between DOD and CRAF commercial joint mobility forces to geographic combat- airline partners provides DOD airlift in time Background ant commanders and also serving as the of national emergency, in exchange for the The CRAF experiment was born out Defense Distribution Process Owner. The opportunity to bid on DOD peacetime busi- of the U.S. experience in World War II when mission of USTRANSCOM is to get the ness. Today, CRAF participation and annual President Franklin D. Roosevelt granted warfighters to the fight, sustain them during DOD payments to CRAF carriers for airlift authority to take possession of any com- the fight, support rapid force maneuver and services are at an all-time high, nearly $3.4 mercial aircraft required by the war effort.7 patient movement, and finally, bring the billion.4 This enormous price tag comes at a Just as today, the early CRAF program pro- warfighters home.1 time when DOD is facing record high budgets vided DOD with planning options to meet Projecting and sustaining joint forces and a doubling of wartime supplemental emergency airlift requirements that exceeded over great distances have always been defense spending since 9/11.5 With DOD fixed capacity of the organic military fleet. The strengths of the U.S. military. The emphasis costs at an all-time high and recapitalization importance of the military and civilian airline and challenge today, however, is the speed of requirements in every direction, the challenge industry partnership was solidified again in force projection, which is critical to campaign to win two wars and reset for the next in a 1987 by President Ronald Reagan’s National success and achievement of U.S. national fiscally constrained environment is nearly Airlift Policy, which states, “It is therefore the security objectives.2 Speed in delivery, espe- untenable. As requirements continue to policy of the U.S. to recognize interdepen- cially for the landlocked environments in exceed funding, DOD must leverage capabili- dence of military and civilian airlift capabili- which the United States currently operates, ties that work and scrutinize spending across ties in meeting wartime airlift requirements, means integrated airlift, both intertheater the board. and to protect those national security interests (strategic) airlift and intratheater (tactical) USTRANSCOM’s current challenge contained within the commercial air carrier airlift. Air Mobility Command (AMC) is is to find innovative ways to leverage CRAF industry.”8 The National Airlift Policy also USTRANSCOM’s component command capability to gain speed, efficiency, and capac- clarifies that during peacetime, the CRAF can responsible for providing strategic and tacti- ity for the warfighter. USTRANSCOM Com- be used to meet passenger and cargo require- cal airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical mander General Duncan J. McNabb recently ments that cannot be met by the DOD organic testified to Congress that “rapid global fleet.9 One key component of CRAF is that it Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Grismer, Jr., USAF, mobility is critical to USTRANSCOM’s quick remains a voluntary program with an incen- is assigned to the J3 East Division U.S. Central reaction capability to meet the needs of the tive to bid on DOD peacetime business. CRAF Command Branch of the U.S. Transportation joint forces and we need to continue recapital- partners receive no compensation unless they Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. izing our air mobility force.”6 As DOD moves are activated to meet DOD surge airlift during ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 133 FEATURES | Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet national emergencies, or they fly peacetime all requirements in advance. Consequently, these restrictions can limit capability and DOD missions. The relationship between USTRANSCOM gains more participation efficiency of CRAF operations when compared CRAF partners and DOD is alive and well from CRAF partners by providing steady- to similar organic DOD missions that are not today, with 32 airlines committing more than state requirements in advance. This was encumbered by FAA restrictions. One example 1,100 aircraft.10 evidenced by increased voluntary participa- of an FAA restriction is Special Federal Avia- The majority of DOD’s organic strategic tion during requirement spikes throughout tion Regulation No. 77, which prohibits opera- airlift capability lies with AMC’s C–17 and OIF and OEF, which avoided further CRAF tions in Iraqi airspace.21 Another more recent C–5 fleets, which, unlike the CRAF fleet, activation during high-ops periods following FAA mandate changes the way commercial have capacity and capability to deliver outsize the 9/11 attacks.18 carriers (including CRAF) schedule their cargo. The complementing CRAF fleet is Shared trust and fair financial incentives crews to ensure compliance with new crew comprised of three main segments: Interna- have sustained CRAF as a model government/ rest and duty day requirements. It is too early tional, National, and Aeromedical Evacuation private industry partnership that meets the to estimate impacts of this regulation on the (AE), with segment assignment predicated on DOD airlift gap and assures CRAF partners CRAF, but it could force international CRAF DOD requirements and aircraft performance guaranteed income with predictable opera- flights to land short of the normal destinations characteristics.11 Additionally, to tailor airlift tions. USTRANSCOM’s goal is to keep the to make a crew change and then continue the for a national emergency, the CRAF is divided CRAF a viable strategic and operational asset, mission.22 Nonetheless, additional takeoffs, into three stages for incremental activation, able to rapidly respond to changing wartime landings, and crew changes result in delivery and carriers are required to respond within requirements. Since commercial airline par- delays and extra costs, which will ultimately be 24 hours of activation. Stage I activation is for ticipation in CRAF is voluntary, USTRANS- paid by the user. expanded peacetime requirements or a minor COM goes to great lengths to reach a modus Another operational limitation to CRAF regional crisis and is comprised of long-range vivendi with both passenger and cargo part- capability is restricting carriers from operat- assets only.12 Stage II is for one major theater ners. The maintenance of a symbiotic rela- ing in designated high threat areas, where war and is comprised of national, interna- tionship between CRAF carriers and DOD is many of USTRANSCOM’s customers require tional, and AE segments.13 Finally, Stage III a success story. Today, DOD planning factors airlift. In several cases, the restriction is due is for periods of national mobilization and rely on the CRAF as the primary means of to CRAF aircraft lacking costly defensive involves a total CRAF airlift recall.14 Over delivering passengers and bulk cargo in the systems designed to counter Man Portable the 60-year history of CRAF, it was activated twice. Both were Stage I activations of the international passenger carriers. The first USTRANSCOM’s goal is to keep the CRAF a viable strategic was from August 18, 1990, through May 24, and operational asset, able to rapidly respond to changing 1991, in support of Operations Desert Shield wartime requirements and Desert Storm, and the second was from February 8, 2003, through June 18, 2003, in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) event of an activation.19 Additionally, accord- Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) threats and Enduring Freedom (OEF).15 In both cases, ing to the Mobility Capability Requirements common to many of the nonpermissive CRAF provided timely and economical surge Study (MCRS), which informs DOD mobility airfields U.S. forces use today. MANPADS airlift. To illustrate, CRAF carriers were paid planning, 57 percent of CRAF cargo capacity are portable shoulder-launched surface-to- $1.5 billion during these activations, a fraction and 55 percent of CRAF passenger capacity air missiles that pose the greatest threat to of the estimated $15 to $50 billion required to are needed to meet activation requirements.20 aircraft during takeoff and landing phases. provide similar DOD organic capability.16 Unfortunately, even with excess CRAF capac- Future threats may also limit CRAF aircraft Events following the 9/11 terrorist ity, there are policy and equipment barriers from operating in a chemical or biological attacks drove DOD airlift requirements to that reduce capability. contamination area. These restrictions typi- all-time highs while many segments of the cally force CRAF aircraft to land short of a commercial airline industry saw business Enhance Current Capabilities destination and transload cargo to an AMC plummet. In the post-9/11 high operations While just over half of current CRAF aircraft with defensive systems. Another tempo environment, CRAF peacetime opera- capacity is required to meet DOD worst-case operational workaround is to schedule CRAF tions, or operations during nonactivation scenarios, the entire CRAF fleet is vulnerable aircraft on strategic missions outside of the stages, are now best described as “steady- to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) threat area, preserving the organic fleet for state operations.” To compare steady-state policy, limiting employment capability. DOD the threat areas. To illustrate, prior to 9/11, operations in 2009, the CRAF flew 5,453 could realize full CRAF capability if partner CRAF flew 24 percent of DOD channel trips for USTRANSCOM, which is nearly airlines received relief from FAA operating cargo missions, the regularly scheduled time- equal to the 5,600 trips made by the CRAF restrictions while flying DOD missions. Since sensitive resupply missions delivered directly during the entire 1991 Gulf War, when the CRAF partners are required to be U.S. flagged to the user at DOD installations with major program was activated.17 CRAF partners carriers, they must operate under FAA Part air cargo hubs.23 Today, CRAF flies 72 percent are best able to employ resources to support 121 or 135 rules (commercial or commuter air- of DOD channel cargo missions, freeing up their primary commercial obligations and lines) that regulate activities even while flying the AMC organic fleet for deliveries to high steady-state DOD business when they can see DOD missions. Depending on the mission, threat areas.24

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Mitigating the MANPADS threat will there are two new multirole tanker/transport recapitalize a portion of the KC–135 fleet with allow the CRAF fleet to operate without aircraft. The Boeing KC–46A and the EADS Boeing KC–46A aircraft, which will come off restriction in more locations and bring more KC–45 are mobility platforms with CRAF the production line requiring no modifica- capability to the warfighter. Regrettably, potential. tions and have flexibility for use as a tanker, aircraft mounted defensive systems like The idea of paying a premium to CRAF cargo, or passenger aircraft. If a similar KC–X Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures carriers for new capability began during the capability was available in the CRAF, it would (LAIRCM) are cost prohibitive to install on 1980s, when the U.S. Air Force paid more easily be the most capable aircraft in the DOD the CRAF. Another cost-effective option to than $600 million to modify 24 commercial commercial fleet and perhaps worthy of a allow access to high threat airfields is to install CRAF airplanes to accommodate outsize premium for the unique capability provided. counter-MANPADS technology to protect equipment.26 To incentivize modifica- The 2010 DOD Mobility Capabilities specific airfields. One such ground-based tions, DOD also paid operating subsidies to and Requirements Study highlights the Air system called the Counter Man-Portable Air these CRAF carriers. Additionally, in the Force tanker shortfall. This 2-year study Defense System (CMAPS) detects multiple mid-1990s, DOD asked AMC to investigate examined three representative scenarios threats, tracks them, and destroys the targets providing incentives to CRAF carriers to pur- that would employ mobility assets. The Air using directed energy, similar to LAIRCM chase the most efficient commercial cargo jet, Force tanker fleet came up 93 aircraft short protocol.25 Portable land-based protection the Boeing 747–400.27 Eight CRAF partners of meeting requirements in the 2 most con- would counter the MANPADS threat, allow- expressed interest, but the aircraft did not fit strained cases.30 To make matters worse, the ing theater direct delivery to maximize CRAF their commercial business strategy and DOD KC–135, which makes up the majority of the capability. CMAPS is just one technology would not subsidize equipment modifications Air Force tanker fleet, is 50 years old, and the that brings more capability to the CRAF. The or higher operating costs.28 KC–46A replacement aircraft will replace commercial airline industry offers additional Adding air-refueling capability to only one-third of the aging KC–135 fleet. Due new technology options to enhance CRAF the CRAF is not a new concept. In 1997, to budget constraints, tanker recapitalization capabilities, which will be reviewed. USTRANSCOM formed a Contract Aerial funding is limited to $3.5 billion annually, Refueling Working Group (CARWG) to allowing for a projected procurement rate of New Commercial Capabilities explore commercial air-refueling options.29 12 to 18 aircraft per year.31 By the time the Because CRAF leverages existing The group examined options, but without an KC–135 fleet is recapitalized, the last aircraft commercial airline capabilities, the DOD established requirement, the fee-for-service will be more than 85 years old. In testimony focus has always been on strategic airlift. model was not pursued. Since then, there to the Senate Armed Services Committee, A new contractor capability to investigate has been significant change in requirements General McNabb stated, “My number one is the civilian air tanker, which is gaining and technology while the KC–135 fleet has recapitalization priority is replacing the fleet momentum as enterprising companies seek aged another 14 years and the Air Force of 415 Eisenhower-era KC–135s with a new to meet expanding military aerial refueling only recently awarded the KC–X contract to platform to preserve a unique asymmetric requirements around the world. Additionally, Boeing in February 2011. This contract will advantage for our nation. The KC–X . . . will

U.S. Air Force

Soldiers board Air Force transport

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 135 FEATURES | Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet address the significant risk we are currently DOD cargo, and USTRANSCOM has lever- Adding foreign carriers to CRAF will carrying in air-refueling capacity.”32 aged them heavily. From September 11, 2001, bring new capabilities, competitive pricing, The business case for a civilian tanker through June 22, 2010, An-124s, and Il-76s and local expertise for niche services like serving military needs has already been augmented the CRAF fleet with more than STOVL and heavy vertical lift. Allowing proven. Omega Air Refueling provides world- 4 million flight hours, earning $1.5 billion in foreign ownership in CRAF may eventu- wide fee-for-service probe-and-drogue aerial CRAF revenue from DOD.39 ally open the door for foreign ownership of refueling to a host of customers including The United Kingdom (UK) is in a ­U.S.-based airlines as well. Foreign investment the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Germany, similar situation to the United States, with an in the U.S. airline industry (including CRAF) Canada, Australia, and the Royal Air Force.33 aging tanker fleet of 19 aircraft, more tanking has been limited for four reasons: increased Omega Air is paid through the Navy Flying requirements than capacity, and no money competition to domestic carriers, possible Hour Program, and offers capability similar to recapitalize. Enter the Future Strategic transfer of U.S. jobs to a foreign workforce, to the AMC KC–135 and KC–10 at a rate of Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) program, a private unfair competition from airlines receiving $7,890 per flying hour for its KC–707 (KC–135 finance initiative with AirTanker Limited, a foreign government subsidies, and DOD equivalent) and $12,500 for its KDC–10 consortium group, to provide a new fleet of concern for negative impacts to CRAF.45 (KC–10 equivalent).34 12 Airbus A330–200 multimission tanker/ Each of these concerns appears dated, and Current joint DOD doctrine includes airlifters.40 The United Kingdom pays a fee many economists believe that more foreign plans for refueling platforms to augment the for service, while AirTanker provides air- investment in U.S. airlines would improve airlift fleet.35 Unfortunately, the KC–135 is refueling and airlift capacity for a contracted the financial health of the airline industry. used primarily as a tanker and is restricted in period of 27 years and pays all capital costs Additionally, the Department of Transporta- the airlift role to carrying 6 lightweight cargo tion (DOT) recently supported legislation pallets and up to 50 passengers. Both com- raising the allowable foreign ownership of mercial KC–X competitors (Boeing KC–46A by the time the KC–135 U.S. airlines to allow easier access to foreign and EADS KC–45) will deliver about 1.1 to 1.3 fleet is recapitalized, the last capital for U.S. airlines.46 As USTRANSCOM times the air-refueling capacity of the KC–135, aircraft will be more than continues leveraging foreign commercial avia- but because they are designed with cargo 85 years old tion capability, future foreign technologies loading floors and doors, they will far exceed should also be investigated. the KC–135 in cargo and passenger capacity. Boeing’s KC–46A (767–200 derivatives) carries to include infrastructure modifications to Partner with Industry 190 passengers and 19 bulk cargo pallets, while the host UK airfield.41 The United Kingdom USTRANSCOM and CRAF partners the EADS North America KC–45 (Airbus will retain permanent access to nine aircraft share many common interests, making future A330–200 derivative) carries 226 passengers and the remainder will be available for com- lift technologies beneficial to both. As DOD and 32 pallets.36 Equipped with defensive mercial use by AirTanker, to include making begins research, development, and testing on systems to allow theater direct delivery, the the aircraft available to other governments.42 the next generation of mobility aircraft, it is KC–X candidates will move easily between Reviewing the FSTA as a business model for beneficial to dialogue with CRAF partners to tanker and transport roles, or a combination a U.S. Tanker–CRAF would be a worthwhile determine if there is a business case for a civil- of the two. Additionally, because the aircraft endeavor, especially if a commercial contrac- ian variant. Future purchases of military air- can deliver and receive fuel, it will have nearly tor offered EADS KC–45 service to the CRAF. craft will be more cost effective in both pro- unlimited range to transport cargo and pas- Exploring options to capture foreign duction and sustainment if they can be tied sengers to the warfighter. With an aging fleet capability for the CRAF should also include to a commercial production line. One such and limited buying power, now is the time options for offering excess CRAF capacity to future technology with mutually beneficial to explore tanker CRAF options, to include international partners at a reasonable reim- opportunity is the heavy lift hybrid airship. taking advantage of foreign capability. bursement rate. The opportunity to strengthen With payload estimates in the 1,000-ton cat- international partnerships and build new egory, advocates believe this future platform Partnerships ones using commercial resources that already will fill voids between sea lift ships and cargo In today’s global economy, innovative operate globally offers efficiency and effective- aircraft.47 A recent study estimated that the options are needed to bring foreign capability ness. Additionally, building these global part- life cycle cost to develop and procure 14 to 16 to the CRAF. USTRANSCOM is required nerships can be beneficial to DOD by taking heavy lift airships is the same as the cost of to first award airlift contracts to U.S. flag advantage of commercial expertise operating 21 C–17 aircraft ($11 billion), but the airship ­carriers that are part of the CRAF. However, outside of the continental United States and would deliver cargo at 3 times the rate.48 when CRAF does not have capability, partners providing competitive bid pricing. By way of Realizing this potential, USTRANSCOM and are allowed to subcontract to approved foreign example, USTRANSCOM recently awarded AMC continue to investigate hybrid airship flag carriers that meet the requirement.37 One 12 contracts worth $2.4 billion for vertical lift concepts for mobility mission areas.49 example is that CRAF carriers lack capability technology and for short takeoff and vertical Advances in vertical lift technologies for outsize cargo. Worldwide, strategic airlift landing (STOVL) capability in Afghanistan.43 will have applications for several sectors of of outsize cargo is limited to the U.S. C–5, These contracts went to both U.S. and foreign the commercial market, making them ideal C–17, and the Russian/Ukrainian An-124 and companies, as will another $5.5 billion for candidates for the CRAF. Today, some 32 Il-76.38 The An-124 and Il-76 both fly outsize similar services in the near future.44 companies worldwide are involved in the

136 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRISMER design or manufacture of commercial airships second, since partners with Boeing 747s discussion forum to gain insight from CRAF and aerostats.50 Another possibility to partner were receiving the majority of the DOD carriers is the newly created CRAF EWG. with the airline industry, multiple services, or peacetime missions, the recommendation After reaching a consensus, USTRANSCOM perhaps a multinational partner is on develop- was to look at employing smaller wide-body can begin a dialogue with the FAA to deter- ment of the Joint Future Theater Lift aircraft. CRAF aircraft.55 USTRANSCOM addressed mine pragmatic solutions that would afford This platform will have similar capabilities these concerns and further strengthened CRAF carriers on DOD missions relief from to a C–130 or a heavy lift helicopter, and be the CRAF business model by creating joint restrictive operating regulations. Another able to operate from naval vessels to ensure venture teams. During nonactivation periods, recommendation to enhance capability by access to remote areas.51 Such an aircraft CRAF partners who find civilian business flying CRAF aircraft into airfields threat- would be of use in landlocked countries like more profitable than DOD have the flexibility ened by MANPADS is to investigate options Afghanistan, requiring extensive vertical lift to fill DOD requirements by selling their to employ CMAPS at selected airfields. resupply, much of which is contracted out to peacetime entitlements to CRAF teammates Adding this capability to the Air Force Con- non-CRAF carriers. Finally, a strategic part- who rely on DOD for the majority of their tingency Response Wing’s airfield opening nership is already in place between manufac- business.56 Moreover, Congress, in recogniz- and sustainment functions is a possible turer Boeing and logistics solutions provider ing the importance of strengthening CRAF employment option. SkyHook International, a Canadian company, participation, granted USTRANSCOM New Commercial Capabilities. Imple- to build a hybrid airship/helicopter for com- authority in the fiscal year 2009 National menting the second recommendation, adding mercial applications.52 Defense Authorization Act to guarantee commercial capability, will take further New lift technologies can offer a tradeoff minimum levels of business and to improve discussions between USTRANSCOM and between speed and lift capacity that will likely predictability of DOD requirements.57 Finally, industry. With the KC–46A still not in pro- find application in the commercial airline industry. As the technology matures and efficiencies are made, the CRAF offers oppor- the immediate future of CRAF appears secure, with partners tunity to bring new capability to DOD, and committing nearly double the number of airplanes required in many cases avoid accompanying research, for DOD’s most demanding war plans development, and testing costs.

Counterargument in May 2010, USTRANSCOM established an duction and the KC–135 fleet approaching With participation and DOD pay- Executive Working Group (EWG) that met 50 years, reestablishment of the CARWG ments to CRAF carriers at the highest level with all CRAF carriers and DOT. The EWG to review options with industry appears to in history, future capacity appears assured. met to strengthen the strategic relationship offer an established venue. A future review by Organic fleet sizes and contingency plan- between all parties and agreed to several pro- the CARWG should also include U.S. allies ning factors have been adjusted to take full posals providing fair incentives for capability, who have already begun taking advantage advantage of CRAF capacity. In 2008, former reliability, efficiency, and activation, to name of KC–X technologies. Japan and Italy pur- USTRANSCOM commander and now Air a few.58 chased the Boeing KC–767 (a similar version Force Chief General Norton Schwartz testi- The immediate future of CRAF appears of the KC–46A), while Australia, Great fied before the Senate Armed Services Com- secure, with partners committing nearly Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab mittee that limiting Air Force C–17 purchases double the number of airplanes required for Emirates bought EADS KC–45s.60 Since there to 205 airplanes was needed because the DOD’s most demanding war plans.59 While is no plan to recapitalize the last KC–135 until DOD organic fleet competes in peacetime surge capacity is not a problem today, the it is 85 years old, a tanker CRAF appears to with the CRAF.53 Boeing will deliver the last long-term focus needs to be on achieving be a viable option to manage aerial refuel- Air Force C–17 in 2013, leaving CRAF as the more CRAF capability. Because CRAF rep- ing effectiveness, thus ensuring capability. only means to absorb future wartime surges. resents DOD’s most flexible and economical Finally, a tanker CRAF appears to offer a Despite the guarantee of DOD business, at source for surge airlift, USTRANSCOM must hedge against risk for the KC–135 fleet that least one area of concern remains. Since the continue to transform CRAF capabilities to continues operating beyond planned life CRAF is an annual contract, partner carriers meet the evolving joint deployment mission in expectancy, forcing AMC to invest more may find that commercial revenues are more a fiscally constrained environment. capital and maintenance manpower, while profitable than DOD business and elect not receiving less capability in return.61 to renew their contract. USTRANSCOM is Recommendations International and Multinational keenly aware of this risk and is fully engaged The previous arguments offer oppor- Partnerships. As USTRANSCOM adds to prevent this possibility.54 tunities for USTRANSCOM to investigate foreign capability to the CRAF, the In 2002, the House Armed Services further each of the four recommendation EWG offers another forum to investigate Committee, concerned about CRAF health, areas summarized below. options for offering excess CRAF capa- commissioned a General Accounting Office Enhance Current Capabilities. bility to our international partners. The (GAO) study that identified two areas for The first recommendation is to develop opportunity to strengthen international improvement. First, stronger financial a c­ omprehensive list of FAA operating partnerships and build new ones using participation incentives were needed, and restrictions that limit the CRAF. A possible commercial resources that already operate ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 137 FEATURES | Transforming the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Boeing globally appears to offer efficiency and KC−46A is to replace Air Force KC−135 Stratotankers fleet to provide air refueling capability effectiveness. The main hurdle to overcome before foreign capability can be added to the CRAF is the Fly American Act, which requires CRAF carriers to be U.S. flagged.62 One option is for foreign carriers desiring to do business with DOD to establish a U.S. affili- ate company. Another option to add foreign investment in CRAF is to amend current legislation to permit foreign ownership. As USTRANSCOM has already learned, foreign carriers bring capital, capability, and efficien- cies not found in the U.S. commercial aviation industry, like outsize airlift. Congress recently provided legislative incentives to preserve CRAF capacity, and with DOD and DOT support, updating legislation to allow foreign ownership of CRAF will bring capability, competition, and efficiency. Requesting leg- islative relief today fits the current climate for DOD fiscal restraint, and the establishment of sustainment, will disproportionately affect to leverage innovation and cost savings from foreign CRAF partnerships could also prove future procurement accounts. Additionally, the commercial aircraft industry. Transform- to be an effective diplomatic tool. with economic uncertainty and the focus ing CRAF capabilities will take leadership at Partner with Industry on Future on debt reduction, Congress will tighten many levels. Innovation is never automatic or Technologies. Partnering with the transpor- supplemental wartime funding, forcing inevitable; it takes deliberate leadership. JFQ tation industry is one of USTRANSCOM’s more capability from the DOD budget. The functions as the deployment and distribution Congressional Budget Office calculated the process owner and architect of future DOD cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Notes transportation systems. As USTRANSCOM to date at $1.1 trillion, and estimates another moves forward in developing the next genera- $1.7 trillion will be spent over the next decade 1 Craig Koontz, “USTRANSCOM,” Pow- tion of mobility capabilities, opportunities to complete these operations.63 Secretary erPoint presentation (Newport, RI: Naval War exist to create a formal mechanism like the Gates affirmed that U.S. strategic strength College, September 13, 2010). CARWG or the EWG that will partner with is linked to the fiscal health of the Nation 2 William G.T. Tuttle, Jr., Defense Science the commercial airline industry to leverage and that “DOD’s track record as a steward of Board Task Force Chairman, memorandum to their innovations and efficiencies. Since taxpayer dollars leaves much to be desired.”64 Defense Science Board (February 20, 2004), 1. CRAF carriers compete for profitability with DOD will make difficult fiscal choices to 3 United States Transportation Command many of the same capabilities as AMC, under- secure the right capabilities needed to win official Web site, “USTRANSCOM’s Transporta- standing the future commercial marketplace current and future conflicts. Admiral Mike tion Component Commands,” accessed at . defines future requirements. Additionally, in congressional testimony, said it best: “This 4 Mark Caslen, telephone interview with since future military production lines will will be hard work and will require difficult author, September 17, 2010. achieve the greatest cost savings when tied to choices . . . choices [that will] be painful, even 5 Tom Vanden Brook, “Defense Secretary a c­ ommercial production line, early dialogue unnatural for the services, for the depart- Gates Targets Jobs,” USA Today, August 9, 2010, 1. with CRAF partners and airline manufactur- ment, and for the Congress.”65 6 Colin R. Baske, “U.S. Air Mobility Forces ers offers opportunities to create sustainability Future operations are sure to be marked Simultaneously Support Force Reductions in Iraq and efficiency and to bring new capabilities in with a need for increased rapid global mobil- and Force Increases in Afghanistan,” Airlift/Tanker a fiscally responsible manner. ity, requiring both airlift and air refueling Quarterly (Summer 2010), 6. to enable joint forces. Without CRAF, DOD 7 Mary E. Chenoweth, The Civil Reserve Air Today more than ever, DOD needs cannot meet mission requirements. Growing Fleet: An Example of the Use of Commercial Assets fiscally sound and pragmatic solutions to capabilities within CRAF by leveraging to Expand Military Capabilities During Contingen- maximize capability, minimize cost, win the commercial aviation strengths brings more cies, RAND Report N–2838–AF (Washington, DC: long war, and recapitalize the force. Former capability at a fraction of the cost. With The RAND Corporation, June 1990), 1–2. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates also constrained DOD budgets and U.S. defense 8 Ronald Reagan, National Security Deci- emphasized that future DOD budget growth industrial base concerns, CRAF offers the best sion Directive 280, “National Airlift Policy,” June must stop. Zero growth, together with the opportunity to meet future global mobility 24, 1987, available at , 2.

138 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRISMER

9 Ibid. ­Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional 50 Bolkcom, Potential Military Use of Airships 10 Dennis R. Lyon, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet Research Service, December 22, 2009), 4. and Aerostats, 1. (CRAF) Capability Summary” (Scott Air Force 32 Duncan J. McNabb, “Statement of General 51 GAO, “Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Base, IL: Department of Defense Commercial Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, Commander, United Addressed, but Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving Airlift Division, Headquarters [HQ] Air Mobility States Transportation Command, Before the as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved,” Report to Command [AMC]/A3BC, July 1, 2010). Senate Armed Services Committee, on the State of the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, House 11 AMC, “U.S. Air Force Civil Reserve Air Fleet the Command,” March 17, 2009, 6–7, available at Committee on Armed Services (Washington, DC: Fact Sheet,” May 2007, accessed at . 52 Lewis Page, “Boeing to Build Combo asp?fsID=173$page=1>. 33 Steve Doragh, interview with author, Sep- Airship-Copter Flying Cranes, Canadians Plan 12 HQ AMC/A3B, Air Mobility Command tember 28, 2010. Worldwide Rental Whirlyblimp Service,” The Reg- Instruction 10–402, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Scott 34 Bud Orr, telephone interview with author, ister, July 11, 2008, available at . 14 Ibid. Mobility Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 53 Norton A. Schwartz, “Hearing to Receive 15 Christopher Bolkcom, Civil Reserve Air Fleet 2009), V–8. Testimony on Strategic Lift Programs in Review of CRAF (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 36 Michael Isherwood, “The Game Changer for the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year Service, October 18, 2006), 3. Mobility,” Air & Space Power Journal (September 2009 and the Future Years Defense Program,” 110th 16 Ibid., 4. 1, 2009), 3, available at . armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2008/03%20 Mobility,” Air Force Magazine (July 2010), 32. 37 Pamela Hall, telephone interview with March/Seapower/08-23%20-%203-12-08.pdf >. 18 Christopher Gourdine, telephone interview author, September 24, 2010. 54 Sowell interview. with author, September 13, 2010. 38 Sergio Coniglio, “Strategic Airlift and Logis- 55 GAO, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond 19 Carl Lude and Jean Mahan, “Executive tic Air Support,” Military Technology (May 2010), as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping,” Summary,” Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 69. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Study 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secre- 39 Sowell, email. Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services tary of Defense, 2010), 6. 40 Defence Management, “You Can’t Kick Ass (Washington, DC: GAO, 2002), 2. 20 Ibid., 5. Without Tanker Gas,” DefenceManagement.com, 56 Sowell interview. 21 Federal Aviation Administration, Depart- September 16, 2010, . 58 USTRANSCOM J5/4, “CRAF Executive tion Regulation No. 77,” available at . Ramp-Up,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 59 Lude and Mahan, 6. 22 Caslen interview. March 8, 2010, available at . (Scott Air Force Base, IL: HQ AMC Directorate, 24 Ibid. 43 Pamela Hall, email to author, September 28, Strategic Plans, Requirements, and Programs, Sep- 25 Rob Doolittle, “General Dynamics to 2010. tember 2009), 6. Demonstrate Ground-Based Counter-MANPADS 44 Ibid., 1. 62 Sowell interview. Aircraft-Protection Technology,” June 25, 2007, 45 General Accounting Office (GAO), “Foreign 63 “CBO: More than $1 Trillion Spent in Iraq available at . 46 Department of Transportation, “Actual 64 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks of Secretary 26 Congressional Budget Office, Participation Control of U.S. Air Carriers,” Federal Register 70, of Defense Robert M. Gates,” Naval War College in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Washington, DC: no. 214 (Washington, DC: Federal Register, Novem- Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), 9–17. Congressional Budget Office, February 1997), 5, ber 7, 2005), 67389, available at . the Fiscal 2012 Department of Defense Budget as =0&sequence=9>. 47 Christopher Bolkcom, Potential Military Use Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 27 Ibid. of Airships and Aerostats (Washington, DC: Con- and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 28 Ibid. gressional Research Service, November 11, 2004), 5. Mike Mullen, Washington, DC, June 15, 2011. 29 USTRANSCOM J–5/4, Concept Develop- 48 Christopher Bolkcom and William Knight, ment Report on Contracted Aerial Refueling (Scott Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C–5 Air Force Base, IL: U.S. Transportation Command, Modernization and C–17 Acquisition Issues 1998), 1. (­Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 30 Lude and Mahan, 6. April 15, 2008), 38. 31 Jeremiah Gertler, Air Force KC–X Tanker 49 AMC, Air Mobility Master Plan 2010 (Scott Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for Air Force Base, IL: HQ AMC A8XPL, 2009), 31. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 139 Operation Enduring Freedom X

CJTF–82 and the Future of COIN

By R.D. HOOKER, JR.

Marines and Afghan Uniform Police conduct security patrol through bazaar in Helmand Province to decrease insurgent activity and gain trust

U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph M. Peterson)

140 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HOOKER

he 82d Airborne Division’s CJTF–82 commander 2009–2010 rotation as the core discusses Afghan national headquarters for Combined army living conditions with T Joint Task Force (CJTF)–82 and ANA commander Regional Command–East (RC[E]) in Afghan- istan marked an innovative break with the past in evolving counterinsurgency (COIN) (Evelyn Chavez) U.S. Air Force doctrine and practice. In four key areas— synchronized communications, unified action, combined action, and joint network targeting—CJTF–82 implemented new approaches at the CJTF level. Both structural and conceptual, these innovations marked a clear departure from past practices, refined existing procedures, and suggested new doctrinal concepts and approaches. Truly interagency as well as joint and combined, CJTF–82 evolved into a hybrid organization that may well describe the future of COIN. At the outset, CJTF–82 was task organized with three U.S. Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), elements of a National Guard division headquarters (led by a one-star), a Polish battle group of two battalions, a French combat battalion (later upgraded to a two-battalion formation commanded by a one-star), a combat aviation brigade with attack, utility, and cargo helicopters, an engineer brigade, a sustainment brigade, and other smaller support and enabling units totaling 24,000 U.S. and 6,000 coalition troops (the CJTF included personnel of 10 different nationalities). Fourteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), including Czech, New Zealand, and Turkish PRTs, also supported the Task Force. Inside RC(E), the Afghan 201st and 203d Corps were positioned as well as large Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police formations, totaling more than 42,000. Like its predecessors, CJTF–82 faced numerous challenges in the course of its year-long rotation. RC(E) was responsible range, a forbidding natural barrier, bisects in the high mountains of Nuristan.1 Eastern for an area the size of Ohio, with 14 prov- RC(E) from east to west. Of great impor- Afghanistan is home to a population that is inces, 159 districts, and approximately 10 tance, more than 70 percent of the RC(E) largely illiterate and has some of the highest million inhabitants, with a 930-kilometer population lives within 100 kilometers of poverty and unemployment levels on Earth. shared border with Pakistan (the distance the Pakistani border, mostly concentrated The tyranny of distance and terrain, a from New York City to Fort Bragg, North along the few major highways leading to long history of conflict and occupation, an Carolina). The Hindu Kush mountain Kabul and through Jalalabad to the Khyber extraordinarily complex tribal mosaic, an Pass. Slightly more than 60 percent of its adaptive and committed enemy, and primi- Colonel R.D. Hooker, Jr., USA (Ret.), served inhabitants are ethnic Pashtuns, historic tive and often corrupt governance all posed from June 2009–June 2010 as Director of the rivals of the Tajik (19 percent) and Hazara extraordinary challenges for soldiers and Communications Action Group, CJTF–82, in Bagram, (10 percent) tribal groupings. A special case diplomats alike. Afghanistan. He currently serves as Dean of the are the famously xenophobic and fiercely Unlike other regional commands in NATO Defense College. A version of this article was independent Nuristanis, about 5 percent of Afghanistan, numerous insurgent groups recently published by the Institute of Land Warfare the RC(E) population, who speak an entirely exist in RC(E). The most significant include (No. 11–1, August 2011). distinct language and live, largely isolated, the Haqqanni Network (HQN), Hezb-e ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 141 RECALL | Operation Enduring Freedom X: CJTF–82 and the Future of COIN

Islami Gulbuddin, and Taliban groups power vacuum with “shadow” governance by operating under the direct control of Mullah establishing local sharia judicial systems and Omar and the Quetta Shura in Pakistan.2 issuing land titles. The CJTF–82 challenge Each group fields different networks and was to empower and enable local governance pursues different agendas, cooperating at from the bottom up. times but sometimes fighting each other. Development. Here, efforts were While all contributed to instability in focused on supporting sustainable devel- RC(E), HQN—an extremely violent group opment through economic growth. Only historically based in Khowst, headquartered an integrated approach partnered with just across the border in Miram Shah, and GIRoA, the international community, and having known ties to al Qaeda—posed the U.S. Government elements in RC(E) across greatest insurgent threat. Well organized all lines of operation can allow Afghanistan and financed, highly resilient, and deeply to prosper in the long run. Vital to this rooted in historic tribal areas on both sides approach was the presence of skilled civil- of the border, HQN in particular absorbed ian development experts in large numbers, tremendous blows from the coalition working as part of the CJTF staff and without collapsing.3 embedded in brigades and their associated While still at home station, the divi- PRTs, District Support Teams, and Agricul- sion staff defined the primary campaign tural Development Teams. objective as follows: “to build and reinforce the Afghan government’s competence, Synchronized Communications capacity, and credibility in a unified effort to To enhance synchronized messaging, DOD protect the population, connect the people CJTF–82 created the Communications to the government, and effect sustain- Action Group (CAG), a small but powerful able development to improve the lives of command and control node chartered to the Afghan population.” Accordingly, the integrate and coordinate the information CJTF–82 campaign concept focused on four line of operations in support of the cam- key lines of operation. paign plan. Headed by an O–6, the mission Information. In the predeployment of the CAG was to “develop, synchronize, planning phase, the commanding general and execute the RC(E) Communications identified information as “the primary line Strategy to gain and maintain the initiative of effort and first planning consideration.” against the enemy and maintain the public The campaign plan stated the problem support necessary to achieve success in clearly: “We will not succeed unless the Afghanistan.” The enemy in Afghanistan Afghan population perceives the Govern- rarely fights to take or hold ground; every ment of Afghanistan as legitimate and operation is conducted with an information enduring. We will fail if we lose the will of objective in mind. Always, the insurgent our supporting populations.” message characterized the coalition as Security. Early experiences in both “infidel occupiers”—a powerful, emotive Iraq and Afghanistan showed a clear bias for theme that was difficult to refute. To counter kinetic operations and coalition-only opera- this approach, RC(E) moved the information tions. Over time, this gave way to a more fight to center stage.

nuanced understanding of the interplay The CJTF–82 Communications DOD between security operations and other lines Strategy was published on a single slide, The MobyGroup multimedia firm in Kabul of operation. Partnering with host nation organized along the four lines of opera- created media campaign to promote Afghan security forces to secure the population tion. It provided basic messaging guidance Security Forces and build stronger ties with was recognized as key not only to building to subordinate units, amplified for specific Afghan people capacity with the army and police, but also operations in the communications annex to connecting with, understanding, and in CJTF orders. Operating within this leveraging the local population. general framework, units tailored broad- supported the campaign concept, while Governance. International, coalition, cast and print products for their local allowing a flexible and rapid approach to and Government of the Islamic Republic of areas and specific requirements. Impor- fast-moving, local situations. Afghanistan (GIRoA) efforts support gover- tantly, all CJTF messaging was firmly CJTF–82 and its subordinate units nance through programs focused from the grounded in the truth—good or bad. The communicated in three primary ways. The top down, but face difficulties connecting at communications strategy proved excep- first and most important was by broadcast. the local level. In areas with limited coali- tionally useful in focusing different orga- Roughly 60 percent of the RC(E) popula- tion presence, the enemy seeks to fill the nizations along simple, broad themes that tion has access to television, but virtually

142 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HOOKER all are avid radio listeners. Accordingly, Web site as well as Facebook and Twitter by Afghans for Afghans, proved strikingly CJTF–82 handed out hundreds of thou- sites, proved extremely successful and successful throughout RC(E). sands of handcranked AM/FM radios, experienced a five-fold growth in subscrib- These principles and concepts drove mostly in rural areas. Building on an exist- ers in the course of the rotation. Perhaps the CJTF–82 information effort—a cam- ing network of 26 radio stations, CJTF–82 most importantly, the RC(E) PA section paign every bit as real and consequential as expanded it to more than 55. These off- built up and leveraged ongoing relation- any kinetic operation. Some operations were the-shelf systems or “Radios in a Box” ships with more than 110 local press orga- phased, long-duration efforts, like Opera- (RIABs) employed locally recruited Afghan nizations in eastern Afghanistan. tion Jaeza (Reward), an integrated, synchro- announcers and script writers and operated Broadcast and print media proved nized campaign to establish community from coalition bases throughout RC(E). to be powerful communications tools, but safety tiplines. Battlespace owners used their Using Afghan programming obtained in an oral, narrative culture like Afghani- RIABs, face-to-face engagements, and print through commercial contracts, they stan’s, nothing can replace traditional, face- products to inform the population about enabled coalition forces to reach into all to-face communications on the ground. the tiplines. As awareness grew, Afghans but the most mountainous areas with local The CJTF Key Leader Engagement (KLE) in increasing numbers began to call in the news, poetry, music, and religious content, cell focused on the Command Group4 as a location of improvised explosive devices and as well as public service announcements key messaging tool, supporting more than weapons caches, often for cash payments crafted in accordance with our communi- 490 engagements with senior Afghan, coali- under the Department of Defense Rewards cations strategy. Units also purchased air time from commercial radio stations where available to augment their broadcasts. broadcast and print media proved to be powerful Whereas higher headquarters conducted communications tools, but nothing can replace traditional, broadcast messaging nationwide, CJTF–82 face-to-face communications on the ground focused on regional and local themes of more immediate interest to the specific local population. tion, international, and U.S. Government Program. Units also handed out cell phones CJTF–82 units supplemented broad- and opinion leaders to tell the CJTF story. to trusted local leaders and personalities to cast messaging with print products such as Subordinate commanders did the same, facilitate call-ins. Over time, actionable calls posters, handbills, billboards, and leaflets supported by International Security Assis- rose exponentially, saving hundreds of lives. designed to communicate messages visually tance Force (ISAF), ISAF Joint Command By integrating all messaging entities coher- to a largely illiterate population. As with (IJC), and CJTF communications guidance. ently, CJTF–82 dominated the information radio and TV spots, local Afghan staff was While KLEs have been used for several fight to a degree not seen in Afghanistan incorporated during preparation of print years in Afghanistan, their conscious use since the conflict began. products to ensure coherent and culturally as a messaging tool in support of a coherent authentic messages, as well as pretesting in communications strategy, synchronized Unified Action the local community. In August 2009, in and in concert with other complementary Civil-military cooperation has long been the weeks preceding the national elections, means, was an innovation that consistently recognized as essential to success in COIN, CJTF–82 disseminated one million “get out produced great results. but execution on the ground has often been the vote” print products per week—more Early on, CJTF–82 recognized that uneven and difficult. While agency cultures than the Afghan government distributed many of the skills associated with successful and doctrinal differences are always present, across the entire country—swamping the synchronized communications lie outside truly integrated civil-military operations are Taliban’s effort. traditional military career fields. Accord- clearly the way ahead. During its Operation While CJTF–82’s Information Opera- ingly, the task force entered into a partner- Enduring Freedom X (OEF X) rotation in tions section supervised RIAB and print ship with The MobyGroup, a large multi- 2009–2010, CJTF–82 broke new ground with operations, the Public Affairs (PA) section media commercial firm based in Kabul, to unified action—the first-ever attempt to fuse handled all interaction with media orga- create a holistic media campaign to promote military and civilian organizations into one nizations as well as traditional command Afghan Security Forces and to build stron- operational headquarters. information programs. Supported by a ger ties between the Afghan people in RC(E) At the transfer of authority from the 26-soldier Mobile PA Detachment and and local and national governance. The 101st Airborne Division to the 82d on June 6-soldier PA Detachment, the PA section result was a print and broadcast campaign 4, 2009, there were three civilians posted supported embedded media throughout that leveraged commercial marketing, to the headquarters. That began to change RC(E), operated a media operations center concept development, and production quickly. In July 2009, the U.S. Embassy in at Bagram airfield, published a monthly capabilities. Tailored with local ethnic dif- Kabul converted the Political Advisor posi- command information magazine, and pro- ferences in mind, the campaign featured tion to that of Senior Civilian Representative vided daily content (both text and photos) posters, billboards, and TV and radio spots (SCR) of the Ambassador. Empowered with on RC(E) to national and international in both Dari and Pashto, with imagery Chief of Mission authority to “coordinate news organizations. CJTF–82’s social mes- geared to Pashtun, Tajik, or Hazara audi- and direct all U.S. Mission-related civilian saging activities, which included a popular ences as appropriate. The campaign, created personnel and programs in RC(E) . . . [to] ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 143 RECALL | Operation Enduring Freedom X: CJTF–82 and the Future of COIN achieve unity of civilian effort and effective brigade, battalion, and Afghan contractor 5 implementation of an integrated civilian- even company level. and USAID military strategy,” the SCR was directed to The platform eventually representative “serve as the U.S. civilian counterpart to grew to more than 175 discuss progress the military commander in the Regional personnel from the State at hospital construction site Command (RC), to senior coalition civilians and Agriculture Depart- and to senior local Afghan officials.” ments and USAID.6 An In this role, the SCR cosigned, with interesting development the commanding general, the CJTF–82 was the Board of Directors campaign plan (Operation Champion concept, used at brigade Sahar) on October 17, 2009. Unified action level to coordinate and aimed to create synergy among related prioritize development functions on the CJTF staff and with projects. The brigade similar organizations at the IJC and ISAF commander chaired levels. It leveraged resident expertise on regular working groups both the civilian and military sides. It with his affiliated State, also enhanced cooperation and coordina- USAID, Agriculture, tion between two different worlds and and PRT leaders to plan, cultures: a military traditionally focused coordinate, and prioritize on conflict and combat, and a civilian funding and support for interagency process focused on diplomacy development projects. (Barry Loo) U.S. Air Force and development. This unique organiza- PRTs continued to play a critical role systems projects that will provide approxi- tion, a true civilian/military hybrid unlike as they have for most of our involvement in mately 339,000 Afghans with access to reli- any seen before, included senior military Afghanistan over the past decade. Manned able power. From April 2009 through April Civil Affairs officers as well as career with both civilian and military experts, they 2010, RC(E) residents reported significant experts from the Departments of State and provided a primary interface and capacity- improvements in education, medical care, Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for Interna- building function with provincial governors roads, and the availability of jobs. Addition- tional Development (USAID), and other and their staffs, serving as an execution ally, an accumulated backlog of more than government agencies up to Senior Execu- arm for development and governance in 1,700 unfinished Commander’s Emergency tive Service rank. Drawing on the assets the provinces. Most were led by U.S. Air Response Program projects dating back to and capabilities of the entire CJTF staff and Force or Navy O–5s with U.S. Government 2006 was reduced to 510 between July 2009 tying in with parallel organizations above civilian deputies, but RC(E) also fielded and April 2010, refocusing the program to and below, it quickly energized develop- Czech, Turkish, and New Zealand PRTs. primarily small-scale, sustainable projects ment and governance efforts and brought Each included development and governance providing immediate results. coherence and focus using resources never professionals and security elements to Unified action also enabled clear before available. enable freedom of movement. All U.S. PRTs progress on rule of law in RC(E), support- The civilian uplift began in earnest were placed under the operational control ing advancements in evidence collection, in early September with the arrival of eight of BCTs to establish a clear link to nearby the identification and removal of corrupt USAID specialists in water, agriculture, gov- supporting headquarters and to ensure close officials, and the establishment of sitting ernance, rule of law, program management, integration with all stability actors across supreme court judges and mobile trial judges. and economics—specialties with applica- the brigade area.7 As one example, five district governors tions for both governance and development. Like everything in Afghanistan, stabil- were removed for corruption in Nangarhar At the outset, the SCR directed the staff to ity operations are a hard and grinding busi- Province in the spring of 2010, and in early organize to support four major objective ness, fraught with setbacks and obstacles. May a judicial commission from the Afghan areas: development in selected commercially Endemic corruption, lack of trained bureau- supreme court charged five district line viable provinces (Nangarhar, Kunar, and crats and officials, widespread illiteracy, an managers with corruption and opened inves- Laghman); support to identified “pilot” dis- active insurgency, and complex coordination tigations on another 13 in Paktika Province. tricts (Khogyani in Nangarhar Province and challenges between U.S., North Atlantic Across RC(E), 12 corrupt Afghan National Sarkani in Kunar Province); provincial tran- Treaty Organization, United Nations, and Security Forces (ANSF) commanders at the sition to lead security responsibility, begin- nongovernmental organization bodies district and provincial levels were removed in ning with the stable provinces of Bamyan defined the operating environment. Still, one 5-month period. Gains on this front will and Panjshir; and stabilization throughout unified action enabled CJTF–82 to achieve be incremental and halting but are essential the rest of RC(E). real and sustained progress. Concrete in combating the corrosive corruption that While the objective teams worked to examples include the completion of 47 threatens progress in Afghanistan. address the challenges described above, schools, 206 kilometers of roads, 39 bridges, In RC(E), unified action strove for the “civilian platform” continued to grow and numerous micro-hydro, generator, and unity of effort by synchronizing, coordi- across RC(E), expanding unified action to solar power projects, as well as electrical nating, and integrating civilian capacities

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U.S., Afghan, and French officials talk during security and development shura in Kapisa Province

French Army (Sylvain Petremand) and expertise with military operations. training teams (ETTs) and police mentor the ratio of coalition to Afghan soldiers or This approach was driven from the top, teams (PMTs), relatively small organizations police was 1:43 in many areas. Through starting with the ISAF commander and the that accompanied ANSF units as trainers combined action, that ratio became 1:4. In U.S. Ambassador. Unified action has been and advisors. In a sharp break with the past, just 90 days, the percentage of Afghan-led considered theoretically for years; its con- CJTF–82 moved to fuse Afghan and U.S. for- operations increased 15 percent, the number ceptual framework in fact is taken directly mations into truly combined units. Combined of joint Afghan/coalition operations jumped from Army Field Manual 3–0, Operations. action refers to the integration of coalition and 20 percent, and ANSF recruiting and reten- But it became an operational reality for the host nation forces into single organizations tion showed strong improvement—a clear first time in RC(E) in 2009. As a new con- to conduct counterinsurgency.9 It involved indication of growing confidence.11 struct, it experienced many of the birthing embedding coalition headquarters and units Executing combined action also placed pains that always accompany new ideas with Afghan counterpart organizations, both heavy demands on logistics and engineer and practices. But the return has been well to increase operational effects and to speed support. Many Afghan troop facilities were worth the investment. Today, a foundation the professionalization and build the capacity in poor condition, which seriously affected has been laid for interagency cooperation of ANSF. morale. Collocating headquarters and forma- in conflict areas that offers exciting oppor- To this end, CJTF–82 replaced ETTs tions provided an opportunity to construct tunities and demonstrated success. and PMTs with coalition maneuver units new facilities and expand others to improve linked directly to Afghan counterparts.10 ANSF quality of life and retention. In some Combined Action Replacing small advisory teams with full- cases, the ANSF moved to coalition sites. In Since 9/11, U.S. and coalition forces have sized combat units introduced a completely others, coalition forces moved to ANSF loca- partnered in various ways with host nation different dynamic. Afghan units and leaders tions, and in still others, collocation required security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, both showed greater willingness to conduct the construction of new facilities. The CJTF formally and informally. For OEF X, CJTF–82 operations, knowing that coalition forces used its staff engineer section to plan and committed to a new and different approach.8 were there in strength and ready to bring in oversee construction, aided by the Regional The previous model featured embedded fire support if needed. With ETTs/PMTs, Support Team, an embedded Combined ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 145 RECALL | Operation Enduring Freedom X: CJTF–82 and the Future of COIN

Security Transition Command–Afghanistan information—to achieve effects against In RC(E), the CJTF found that pro- cell. Most construction was funded through priority targets became apparent. With each longed, focused network targeting, using the Afghan Security Forces Fund. operation, the CJTF adapted its processes, theater- and CJTF-level assets tasked down Given scarce resources, the CJTF learning from both success and failure to to the brigade level, had the largest posi- placed Afghan Army units first in priority improve its effects. tive impact on defeating or disrupting the due to their greater maturity, capability, CJTF–82 employed two basic approaches insurgency across all lines of operations. and leadership and corresponding impact to target anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) networks. Analyzing both casualties and incidents on security. (Afghan National Police and The first called for coalition and Afghan SOF revealed marked differences. Shorter dura- Border Police units were also partnered, but to conduct trigger-based operations against tion operations using only brigade-level assets at somewhat lower levels.) The single most high-value individuals and key AAF leader- showed no significant decrease over time, and dramatic decision was to push out 35-man ship.14 Conventional forces were then staged to resulted in only limited local effects.18 tactical command posts, each led by a U.S. exploit intelligence and interdict the enemy as CJTF–82 network targeting also incor- brigadier general, to live, work, and fight he reacted. If clear indicators and triggers were porated nonlethal targeting, particularly with the Afghan National Army 201st and not available, conventional forces conducted to counter criminals or corrupt officials 203d Corps. Division-level enablers such as disruption operations to provoke trigger events operating in RC(E). Department of Justice artillery fires, close air support, medical and, in effect, flush out targets from hiding by and Intelligence Community assistance was evacuation, intelligence, surveillance, forcing them to move or communicate, thus instrumental in helping RC(E) build action- and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and raising their signature and vulnerability. able legal cases against corrupt officials, logistics could now be incorporated into Both methods relied on painstaking intel- many of whom actively collaborated with the coalition/ANSF operations to a far greater ligence work to establish “pattern of life” and insurgents to target both security forces and degree. In the same way, coalition units to limit and prevent collateral damage during civilians. Nonlethal targeters worked out of benefited from Afghan cultural awareness, the operation. the fusion cell to build target folders with a menu of options, ranging from proposed legal action to requests to remove the official from insurgent networks in Afghanistan are highly adaptive and office to key leader engagements intended to quickly replace leaders and resupply captured materials confront or shame negative influencers. This process has been adopted across the theater as the Joint Prioritized Shaping and Influence tactical experience, and local intelligence Insurgent networks in Afghanistan are List and is currently a top priority for all levels sources as never before. The result was a 71 highly adaptive and quickly replace leaders of command. ISAF now tracks corrupt offi- percent increase in reporting and a striking and resupply captured materials: “Cellular cials and negative influencers in all provinces 60 percent reduction in ANSF casualties networks are by their nature resilient to and has issued guidance specifically aimed at after only 90 days.12 attacks that kill or capture single individu- limiting public engagements that would give als, suggesting a different approach.”15 While the appearance of coalition support to these Joint Network Targeting coalition forces are exceptionally good at individuals. Working in concert with Rule Afghanistan is home to a dangerous deliberately targeting individuals, a focus on of Law staff and stability operations experts, insurgency characterized by highly organized attacking the entire network required new the CJTF Nonlethal Targeting Cell identi- and effective networks made up of command- organizations and techniques.16 JNT looks at fied numerous corrupt officials who were ers, financiers, suppliers, intelligence opera- the problem holistically in order to conduct later removed from government positions in tives, propagandists, and foot soldiers. To operations that degrade enemy effectiveness, RC(E), with several being charged, convicted, confront and defeat them, CJTF–82 refined drive down violence, and foster stability. and sentenced. Members of the population, existing joint doctrine to fit RC(E)’s unique Attacking targets without analyz- to include GIRoA members, are now more operational environment to target insurgent ing network connections often resulted in willing to come forward and report corrup- networks using a full-spectrum approach.13 tactical successes but no lasting operational tion through sworn statements because of Called joint network targeting (JNT), this effects. Expendable low-level leaders were recent success at removing prominent GIRoA process featured both lethal and nonlethal quickly replaced. JNT analyzed the entire members due to their corrupt, criminal, or components designed to attack systems, not network—to include recruitment, training, insurgent activities. Solving corruption will just personalities, to disrupt and collapse logistical support, financing, command and be an arduous process, but efforts like this insurgent cells throughout the battlespace. control systems, leadership, and negative provide a way ahead to attack the problem in The previous rotation, with fewer influencers.17 CJTF–82 learned that “shred- concert with GIRoA. troops and heavier national support element ding” networks was possible by attacking Success in COIN will not come solely responsibilities, had delegated most target- not only key nodes in the enemy network, from kinetic operations; much depends on ing functions to the brigades. With more but also key functions simultaneously. successfully integrating population security assets flowing into Afghanistan as U.S. pri- This often took the form of major CJTF- with stability operations. Still, in Afghani- orities shifted from Iraq, the need to focus level operations that massed ISR and other stan, we face an implacable and deadly enemy resources—Special Operations Forces (SOF) resources for extended periods to maintain who must be confronted when he cannot be and conventional units, ISR, fires, aviation, continuous pressure. reconciled. Joint network targeting provides

146 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HOOKER one way to strike at insurgent networks with key roles but reported to the battlespace-owning NEW proven effect. An intercepted insurgent radio brigades. Three-person District Support Teams from transmission put it succinctly: “They will kill were also fielded in 20 selected districts on a NDU Press trial basis. us. They will kill us all.” for the Institute for 6 Other civilian agencies supporting the National Strategic Studies Command Joint Task Force such as the Department CJTF–82 built upon the accomplish- of Defense, Department of Justice, and intelligence ments and lessons learned of its predeces- activities do not operate under Chief of Mission sors in RC(E) to create new structures and authority. approaches during OEF X. Its success was 7 Coalition (vice U.S.) Provincial Reconstruc- made possible by many actors and agencies, tion Teams reported to national authorities and both in predeployment preparation and coordinated with, but were not task organized on the ground in Afghanistan. The future under CJTF–82. 8 of COIN clearly lies in more effective and The CJTF–82 mission statement read: sophisticated mastery of the information “CJTF–82/RC(E), in partnership with Govern- ment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and domain; in hybrid and synergistic civil- in close coordination with joint, interagency, and military teams; in fused and thoroughly multinational partners, conducts combined action integrated combined formations; and in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to protect precise and holistic network targeting. For the population, increase the competency, capacity, the first time, CJTF–82 innovations and and credibility of Afghan institutions, and defeat adaptations in the areas of synchronized Anti-Afghan Forces.” Strategic Forum 268 communications, unified action, combined 9 See Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency action, and joint network targeting trans- (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the lated these concepts into concrete action in Army, December 2006). Islamic Maghreb 10 an active counterinsurgency, with exciting In some cases, embedded training teams/ and encouraging results. Building on a foun- police mentor teams returned to the units from The terrorist group known as al Qaeda in the dation of rediscovered theory and practice, which they were drawn; in others, they were reas- Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) already poses the signed to RC–South or redeployed without replace- greatest immediate threat of transnational as well as on hard-earned lessons from the ment as their tours expired. terrorism in northwest Africa, and is now post-9/11 era, they represent new thinking 11 Data from CJTF–82 CJ3 Significant Activi- escalating its attacks against regional and and a new counterinsurgency model for suc- ties Reporting. Western interests. The U.S-led Trans-Sahara cessor organizations. JFQ 12 Data from ANA 203d Corps G3. Counterterrorism Partnership has not been 13 Targeting is “the process of selecting and able to prevent further attacks. According prioritizing targets and matching the appropri- to Andre Le Sage, this raises an important NOTES ate response to them, considering commander’s strategic question for the United States: what objectives, operational requirements, capabili- level of activity by AQIM would be a sufficient 1 The Pashtun and Tajiks follow Sunni Islam, ties, and limitations.” See Joint Publication 1–02, threat to U.S. national security to warrant while the Hazaras, who may have descended Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and a more aggressive political, intelligence, from invading Mongol populations, are Shia. The Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, military, and law enforcement response? Nuristanis were forcibly converted to Islam in 1895 April 12, 2001, as amended through October 31, Dr. Le Sage points out a number of specific and believe they descend from the soldiers and fol- 2009), 538. scenarios that would call for a stronger lowers of Alexander, who campaigned there in the 14 A trigger is defined as a reliable intelligence U.S. response. He concludes by laying out 4th century BCE. event confirming the location of a target in space four elements that might constitute such a 2 Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin is led by Gulbed- and time. strategy: increased diplomatic pressure on din Hekmatyar, briefly prime minister in 1996 15 Derek Jones, Understanding the Form, Func- regional states, an increased intelligence effort and a notorious anti-coalition warlord. Al Qaeda tion, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular Networks: to better understand AQIM vulnerabilities, elements in Pakistan provided individual fighters The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Opera- internationally supported military action, and and some training and financial support, as well tions (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced a range of other diplomatic and peacebuilding as ideological inspiration, but did not conduct Military Studies, May 2009), 55. activities in northwest Africa. separate operations in Regional Command–East 16 This approach was not invented in Afghani- (RC[E]) as a tactical entity. stan in Operation Enduring Freedom X, but built 3 The original objective to “defeat the Haqqani upon and refined earlier and evolving practices. network” in RC(E) was later modified to “disrupt” 17 Joint Publication 2–01.3, Joint Intelligence as assets, particularly surveillance platforms, were Preparation of the Operational Environment (Wash- moved to RC–South, the designated main effort. ington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 16, 2009), C–12. 4 Consisting of the commanding general, Negative influencers refers to civilian or security deputy commanding generals for operations, leadership figures who support insurgent or crimi- support, and coalition affairs, the chief of staff, and nal activity for financial or ideological reasons. command sergeant major. 18 Tom Deveans, CJTF–82 CJ3 Assessments, Visit the NDU Press Web site 5 Agricultural Development Teams— email, April 23, 2010. for more information on publications manned by National Guard members with at ndupress.ndu.edu civilian backgrounds in agriculture—also played ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 147 BOOK REVIEWS

conflict pursued for political political” wars. They characterize “Mahan and Corbett Recon- objectives. Their purpose is not Clausewitz’s conception of war sidered” contains absolutely no to challenge On War’s continued as “antiseptic and simplistic” (p. discussion of Corbett or any of his insights and relevance to wars 4), an astounding assertion given ideas. Second, the work contains a between states, but rather to the attention that Clausewitz number of problematic historical provide complementary insights devotes to intangible factors interpretations, from claims that about war in its many other such as passion, fog, friction, and the Confederacy sought to fight forms. morale in books I and III of On a war of attrition (p. 42) to an Willmott and Barrett have War. They assert that Clausewitz assertion that mental rather than grounds for their contention that presents a singular conception material factors caused the stale- Clausewitz does not provide the of war, an incredible misreading mate of World War I (p. 46) to the “answer to all questions” about of a book that seeks to grapple contention that Nazism played a Clausewitz Reconsidered war and that his masterpiece left with the many manifestations of central role in the Wehrmacht’s By H.P. Willmott and important elements untouched. war, from the limited wars of the victories of 1939–1941 (p. 58). Michael B. Barrett Clausewitz pays scant attention ancien régime (book VIII) to the These questionable assertions, Praeger Security International, to finances in On War despite near–total war of the Napoleonic among others, certainly merit 2010 Cicero’s 2,000-year-old admoni- era to the people in arms (book more elaboration and source 236 pp. $22.95 tion that “endless money forms VI, chapter 26). citation than they receive. This ISBN: 978–0–313–36286–6 the sinews of war.” Economics, Willmott and Barrett seek draws attention to the work’s seapower, and particularly the to use Clausewitz as a spring- third shortcoming. The notes and Reviewed by issue of credit are outside the board to examine factors they citations are discursive in nature, DOUGLAS PEIFER framework of his study, despite believe On War failed to address with little effort made to sub- the essential role that British sub- adequately. They aspire to stantiating the facts, figures, and arl von Clausewitz contin- sidies played in funding the coali- provide new perspectives and to details that abound throughout ues to inspire, antagonize, tions that contained Louis XIV challenge conventional wisdom the book. This can be overlooked Cand confuse; at least 5 and defeated Napoleon. More and periodization. Their alterna- in many cases, but when the text books have appeared in the last broadly, Clausewitz consciously tive conceptions of when the remarks that the Taliban partici- 3 years that seek to explain, con- excluded weapons development modern warfare era began, their pated in the 1991 coalition against textualize, or critique On War. and the raising and equipping of use of unusual comparisons (for Saddam (p. 157) and refers to alle- Hew Strachan’s Clausewitz’s On fighting forces from his theory of example, the Civil War and the gations that the 1993 “attack on War (2007), Antulio Echevarria’s war (book II, chapter 1), a choice Pacific campaign of World War the World Trade Center . . . was Clausewitz and Contemporary perhaps justified in the context II), and their emphasis on wars of organized on the basis of C.I.A. War (2007), the Oxford Univer- of the Napoleonic Wars but decolonialization rather than the manuals” (p. 207, n. 4), the reader sity Press conference anthology inadequate to understanding the Cold War examine modern war has a right to know the source of on Clausewitz in the Twenty-first contribution made by technologi- from new angles. Their analysis these dubious insights. Century (2007), and Jon Sumida’s cal developments in the world of conflict since the Cold War Clausewitz Reconsidered Decoding Clausewitz: A New wars and the Cold War. One period embraces nontraditional is neither a theoretical critique Approach to On War (2008) are might justly charge Clausewitz security issues such as resource of On War and its concepts, nor inspired by Clausewitz’s study with ignoring finances, technol- and income disparities, popula- a tightly organized history of and seek to clarify, elaborate on, ogy, and force development in his tion growth, and globalization. modern warfare since Napoleon. or use his concepts to shed light study of war, and had Willmott They write with verve and style It is instead a highly idiosyn- on contemporary war. H.P. Will- and Barrett provided a fuller and provide a wealth of colorful cratic series of essays on modern mott, by way of contrast, con- examination of these factors, details, reflecting the insights warfare by two well-established tends that On War has attained their analysis would have been a gained over decades of writing military historians. It is thought- the status of a sacred text, with welcome complement to Clause- about naval warfare and teaching provoking but contentious, alter- a fawning preeminence border- witz’s On War. military history. nately insightful and wide of the ing on sycophancy accorded to Instead, Willmott and Yet even judged on these mark. JFQ it. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, Barrett revive the worst mischar- merits and ignoring its weak Willmott and Michael Barrett acterizations of Clausewitz and analysis of Clausewitz, the book Dr. Douglas Peifer teaches strategy seek to examine war in the two his work. They charge him with falls short in three areas. First, at the U.S. Air War College. He is a centuries that have passed since conceiving of war as exclusively its organization is scattered and historian by background, with his research focusing on the intersection Clausewitz lived and fought. In the preserve of the state and its uneven. The sections dealing with between military strategy, naval a critique of Clausewitz reminis- agents (p. 153). They resurrect airpower, for example, devote history, politics, and culture. cent of those of John Keegan and the odd notion that Clausewitz’s more time to John Warden, Martin van Creveld, they contend contention that “war is an instru- Desert Storm, and Kosovo than that Clausewitz conceived of ment of policy” ignores civil, to the preceding 80 years of air war solely in terms of interstate ethnic, religious and other “non- warfare. The portion entitled

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He looks at these factors from notes that “intra-civilization” the Chinese, “saving face” was a various perspectives—those of conflict has often invited foreign deeply entrenched cultural imper- the society at large, the military intervention and cites U.S. ative that had significant conse- as a subset of society, and the involvement in the Gulf War quences for the coalition in time individual (that is, military com- (1990–1991) as one such example of war. Chapter five examines manders)—to determine how (p. xiv). As illustrated by the Gulf U.S. and Saudi cooperation in the culture impacts the ability of War, in cases where foreign inter- Persian Gulf War. Cultural issues foreign militaries to live and work vention is involved, mediating such as religion, gender roles, and with one another. The individual cultural differences becomes even tradition complicated coalition level of analysis is particularly more important to the success of relations as well as impacting the relevant, since as the case studies the operation. rights of U.S. Soldiers temporarily demonstrate, commanders can The book offers a variety based on Saudi soil. Beer, Bacon and Bullets: Culture promote or undermine cross-cul- of case studies and perspectives Finally, chapter six exam- in Coalition Warfare from tural cooperation in a coalition from which to consider culture ines the relationship between Gallipoli to Iraq environment. Luft also correctly and coalition warfare. In addition the IDF and the SLA from 1985 By Gal Luft points out that while generaliza- to providing valuable historical to 2000. This chapter differs BookSurge Publishing, 2010 tions are necessary to discussions studies, the chapters highlight from the other cases described 327 pp. $18.99 of culture, there is an inherent individual cultural challenges in the book in that cooperation ISBN: 978–1–43–926096–8 danger in oversimplifying and/ faced by the actors involved in extended over more than 15 or presenting characteristics of the various coalitions. Chapter years, the SLA was comprised Reviewed by one group as superior to another. two describes the relationship of multiple groups—all defined TIFFANY G. PETROS Further, he acknowledges that between Germans and their as Arabs, but with differences in the book focuses heavily on the Ottoman Turkish counterparts religion and ethnicity—and the lthough the threats perceptions of Western militar- during World War I. The author cooperation was between a state facing the international ies toward their counterparts, notes how the two sides commu- and a nonstate actor. The chapter A community in the 21st giving less weight to non-Western nicated in French—ironically, the details successes and missteps century (including terrorism, (Asian and Muslim) perspectives. language of their enemy. He also in the long-term coalition that cyber attacks, and proliferation This is a noticeable drawback of discusses Germany’s support for ultimately ended in 2000. of weapons of mass destruction) the book, but one that is under- Turkish jihad and its unintended Overall, this book is a differ from those of other periods standably difficult to mitigate in consequences. valuable resource for soldiers, in history, what has not changed light of available resources. Chapter three reviews scholars, policymakers, and since antiquity is the building of Although scholars have British-Japanese cooperation in civilians who want to better coalitions by foreign soldiers and long written on aspects of culture the context of their World War I understand the significance of statesmen in an effort to promote and warfare, this book is unique alliance. This chapter focuses on culture in planning and executing and maintain security. Equally in both the cases selected and their joint efforts to win the Battle coalition operations. The lessons longstanding have been misun- the author’s insight derived from of Tsingtau, a frequently ignored offered will become increasingly derstandings and disagreements having served in a coalition yet important battle for control of important as coalition opera- among people of different cultural environment. Luft, currently an a small German colony in China. tions become the norm. Since backgrounds that have threatened executive director of the think Their success marked the first 2001, more than 45 countries coalition cohesiveness and jeopar- tank Analysis of Global Security, defeat of Germany in World War have contributed to the North dized military operations. previously served in the Israel I. Success did not come without Atlantic Treaty Organization–led In this important work, Defense Forces (IDF) where he obstacles, however, in the coali- International Security Assistance Gal Luft examines five historical was deployed for almost 5 years tion relationship. For example, Force in Afghanistan. In such case studies to determine the role in combat assignments in South the two sides had different views coalitions, managing and mitigat- of culture in the planning and Lebanon. He worked daily with on casualties and capitulation. ing cross-cultural tensions are key conduct of coalition operations. Arab soldiers from the South That said, previous cross-cultural to the success of joint operations. He also offers introductory and Lebanon Army (SLA) and details cooperation between Britain and The lessons learned can enhance concluding chapters on culture that history and experience in Japan in part contributed to the not only the U.S. ability to work and war from a broader perspec- chapter six. Dr. Luft’s work also successful engagement. with partners in coalitions, but tive. Fundamental to this effort, differs from that of scholars such Chapter four examines U.S.- also other areas of security the author asks the questions, as the late Samuel P. Huntington, Chinese relations during World cooperation such as building “Does culture matter?” and “If who argued in The Clash of War II. The chapter highlights partner institutional capacity to so, in what ways?” Among the Civilizations (1996) that cultural cultural, strategic, and logistical support and maintain coalition cultural factors he considers fault lines serve as a catalyst incompatibilities that hampered engagement. JFQ are language, religion, customs, for conflict. Luft suggests that productive relations, as well as gender roles, education, ethnicity, cooperation across fault lines is illustrating the consequences of Dr. Tiffany G. Petros is a consultant in values, and overall philosophy. just as likely to occur. The author distrust between leadership. For Washington, DC. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 149 BOOK REVIEWS

and was not wrong—just ahead of among the great powers for 20 immediately to mind. A Europe his time (p. 5). years—a historical period that at peace does not translate to an Fettweis bases his theory coincides with the American Asia, Africa, and Middle East at or vision of the obsolescence “unipolar” moment. This is very peace. of major war on the supposed thin empirical evidence upon In a world in which major linear progress of human nature, which to base a predictive theory wars are obsolete, Fettweis a major tenet of 20th-century of international relations. believes the United States needs liberalism that is rooted in the Fettweis criticizes the realist to adjust its grand strategy from rationalist theories of the Enlight- and neorealist schools of thought, vigorous internationalism to enment. “History,” according to claiming that their adherents strategic restraint. His specific Fettweis, “seems to be unfold- focus too narrowly on the past recommendations include the ing as a line extending into the behavior of states in the interna- removal of all U.S. military Dangerous Times? The future—a halting, incomplete, tional system. In his view, realists forces from Europe; an end to International Politics of Great inconsistent line perhaps, one place too great an emphasis on our bilateral security guarantees Power Peace with frequent temporary rever- power. Ideas and norms instead of to Japan and South Korea; an By Christopher J. Fettweis sals, but a line nonetheless.” The power, he claims, provide struc- end to our alliance with Israel; Georgetown University Press, world is growing “more liberal ture to the international system. an indifference to the balance of 2010 and more reliant upon reason, Classical geopolitical theorists power on the Eurasian landmass; 273 pp. $29.95 logic, and science” (p. 217). such as Halford Mackinder, a law enforcement approach to ISBN: 978–1–58901–710–8 We have heard this all Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas terrorism; a drastic cut in military before. Human nature can be Spykman, and Colin Gray are spending; a much smaller Navy; Reviewed by perfected. Statesmen and leaders dismissed by Fettweis in less than and the abolition of regional com- FRANCIS P. SEMPA will be guided by reason and two pages, despite the fact that batant commands. science. Such thinking influenced their analyses of great power poli- What Fettweis is propos- orget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, the visionaries of the French tics and conflict have long been ing is effectively an end to what and Machiavelli. Put aside Revolution and produced 25 years considered sound and frequently Walter Russell Mead calls “the F Mackinder, Mahan, and of war among the great powers of prescient. maritime world order” that was Spykman. Close the military Europe. Similar ideas influenced Realists and classical established by Great Britain and academies and war colleges. Shut President Woodrow Wilson and geopoliticians have more than maintained first by the British our overseas bases. Bring our his intellectual supporters who 2,000 years of empirical evidence Empire and then by the United troops home. Make dramatic cuts endeavored at Versailles to trans- to support their theories of how States. It is a world order that has in the defense budget. The end form the horrors of World War I states and empires behave and defeated repeated challenges by of major war, and perhaps the into a peace that would make that how the international system potential hegemonic powers and end of war itself, is near, accord- conflict “the war to end all wars.” works. Ideas are important, but resulted in an unprecedented ing to Tulane assistant professor What followed were disarmament power is the governing force in spread of prosperity and freedom. Christopher Fettweis in his recent conferences, an international international politics, and geogra- But all of that, we are assured, is book, Dangerous Times? The agreement to outlaw war, the rise phy is the most permanent factor in the past. China poses no threat. International Politics of Great of expansionist powers, appease- in the analysis of power. The United States can safely with- Power Peace. ment by the democracies, and the Fettweis makes much of the draw from Eurasia. The power Fettweis is not the first most destructive war in human fact that the countries of Western vacuum will remain unfilled. intellectual, nor will he be the last, history. Ideas, which Fettweis and Central Europe, which waged Fettweis needs a dose of to proclaim the onset of perpetual claims will bring about the pro- war against each other repeatedly humility. Sir Halford Mackinder, peace. He is squarely in the tradi- liferation of peace, transformed for nearly 400 years, are at peace, the greatest of all geopoliticians, tion of Immanuel Kant, Herbert Russia, Germany, and Japan and claims that there is little like- was referring to visionaries and Spencer, and Norman Angell, to into expansionist, totalitarian lihood that they will ever again liberal idealists like Fettweis name just three. Indeed, in the powers. Those same ideas led to wage war against each other. Even when he cautioned, “He would be book’s introduction, Fettweis the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the if the latter assertion turns out a sanguine man . . . who would attempts to rehabilitate Angell’s Rape of Nanking. So much for to be true, that does not mean trust the future peace of the world reputation for prophecy, which human progress. that the end of major war is in to a change in the mentality of suffered a devastating blow when Fettweis knows all of this, sight. Throughout history, some any nation.” Most profoundly, the Great War falsified his claim but claims that since the end of peoples and empires that previ- General Douglas MacArthur, in The Great Illusion that eco- the Cold War, the leaders and ously waged war for one reason or who knew a little bit more about nomic interdependence had ren- peoples of the major powers, another became pacific without war and international conflict dered great power war obsolete. except the United States, have producing worldwide perpetual than Fettweis, reminded the Angell, Fettweis writes, was the accepted the idea that major war peace: the Mongols, Saracens, cadets at West Point in 1962 that first “prominent constructivist is unthinkable. His proof is that Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, “only the dead have seen the end thinker of the twentieth century,” there has been no major war and the Spanish Empire come of war.” JFQ

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Francis P. Sempa is the author of is not rare to hear public discus- tant of this book. In it, Libicki diminishing return from com- Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the sions on the efficacy of cyber highlights such important and puter network attacks—that is, 21st Century and America’s Global war, a malicious software exploit “wicked” problems of deterrence that more attacks reduce the Role: Essays and Reviews on National (most recently the Stuxnet), as attribution, proportionality, available pool of vulnerabilities. Security, Geopolitics and War. He is whether U.S. critical infrastruc- escalation, effects, and the role of However, he places too much an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the ture is adequately defended third-party hackers. These chal- confidence in system adminis- Middle District of Pennsylvania, from computer network attack, lenges, specifically in attribution trators (and in the effectiveness an adjunct professor of political or if the notion of cyber war is and damage assessment from of intrusion detection system science at Wilkes University, and over-hyped. Unfortunately, as initiating a cyber attack, are the networks) learning from mis- a contributing editor to American this warfighting domain evolves, reasons why cyber deterrence is takes and computer attacks and Diplomacy. the immaturity at the strategic so hard, since deterrence is about responding correctly to further level of thought is being revealed: sending a signal. Moreover, the strengthen their systems. Fre- contradictory initiatives in the worrisome problem of escalation, quent reports from the Depart- U.S. Air Force (which added where cyber activities cross the ment of Defense (DOD) and the cyberspace to its mission state- line to kinetic attacks leading Federal Government contend that ment in 2005 and planned to to a physical confrontation, is a at least 80 to 90 percent of cyber create a cyber major command, consideration that nuclear strate- attacks are preventable or could but then changed direction and gists did not need to address, have been avoided by proper established a Numbered Air since they did not have to worry configuration, monitoring, Force instead); the length of time about conflict escalation beyond policies, or updating of patches. it took the Obama administra- nuclear exchange. Libicki next Moreover, in many instances the tion to fill its cyber czar position; proceeds to his most unique con- personnel most knowledgeable the discussion of what level of tribution to the discussion about about computer network defense involvement the Federal Govern- warfare within the cyber domain, issues such as vulnerabilities and ment (U.S. Cyber Command and an issue that is also inseparable current threats are not the system the Department of Homeland from deterrence: the motivation administrators and, in many Security) should have in protect- of the originator of cyber attacks. cases, do not talk with those ing civilian resources. Four categories of motivation are administrators. Additionally, In their books, Cyber considered: error, coercion, force, the belief that a finite number of War and Cyberdeterrence and and other (such as feelings of vulnerabilities for information Cyberwar, Richard Clarke (with invulnerability on the part of the systems applications exists is Robert Knake) and Martin attacker, or the desire to create hard to justify, considering the Libicki offer significant contribu- damage for its own sake). Libicki complexity of computer applica- tions in filling this gap in theory thoroughly discusses motivation, tions, the workload of system and policy and bringing the with thoughtful analyses of pos- administrators, the ingenuity of discussion of cyber war to a more sible scenarios. hackers, the fact that updates or Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar developed level of thought. The From these important enhancements to applications can By Martin C. Libicki authors’ achievements are most considerations about deterrence, add their own vulnerabilities, and RAND, 2009 notable in the area of cyber deter- Libicki goes on the offensive, dis- in observing vendor patch release 244 pp. $33 rence, presumably with the intent cussing various ways to respond trends. Anyone using the Internet ISBN: 978–0–8330–4734–2 to get leadership at the strategic within the cyber domain, both Explorer browser can attest to the level to listen to their warnings strategically and operationally. relentless cycles of vulnerabilities Cyber War as organizations are formed, Here there is much room for dis- and patches. By Richard A. Clarke and policies issued, and doctrine agreement as Libicki gets into less Libicki returns to more Robert K. Knake developed. familiar territory, with assertions solid ground as he wraps up Ecco, 2010 Libicki’s portfolio contains that are somewhat less convinc- his book by discussing cyber 304 pp. $25.99 a long list of cyber-oriented writ- ing and do not hold up in prac- defense, which he states is “the ISBN: 978–0–06–196223–3 ings from his work at the RAND tice. In considering conducting a Air Force’s most important Corporation and the National computer network attack, Libicki activity within cyberspace” Review essay by Defense University. Cyberdeter- maintains that several obstacles (p. xx). Here he highlights the BRIAN R. SALMANS rence and Cyberwar is the result reduce the incentives of such defensive goals of robustness, of a RAND study to “help clarify attacks. An example is his belief system integrity, and confi- he concept of war within and focus attention on the opera- that cyber attacks can tip off dentiality. To paraphrase Sun the cyber domain is no tional realities behind the phrase system administrators to further Tzu, with computer network T longer an esoteric topic of ‘fly and fight in cyberspace’” attacks, thus having the effect defense, to know oneself is interest to small groups of people (p. iii). The chapter on cyber of strengthening their defense. essential to adequately defend with unique technical skills. It deterrence is the most impor- Later, Libicki asserts there is a one’s network. The Federally ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 151 BOOK REVIEWS mandated initiative of enter- better and more effective cyber into a cyber war for which we the best offense may be a strong prise architecture (EA) can be defenses (whereas with nuclear are not ready and where we do cyber defense, an important very effective in this regard. deterrence, a defensive capability not fully develop the situation point when leadership considers EA (which Libicki discussed in against a nuclear strike was not to consider all the ramifications resourcing decisions. Libicki and more detail in his 2007 work, an important aspect). These are and potential outcomes. Clarke provide a great service in Conquest in Cyberspace), can two very important points the Belief in the importance of identifying important starting also contribute to the align- authors derive from their experi- public discourse and oversight of points and considerations for a ment of security efforts with the ence and from deterrence theory. governmental cyber war activities discourse on cyber topics, and overall security goals derived Both authors are best here, as leads the authors of these two helping to nudge the discussion from the cyber defense policy they methodically arrive at this books to divergent views about of the cyber domain to another and risk analysis for any given conclusion with examples from the proper level of governmental level of maturity. But the question entity of interest. Enterprise the world of nuclear deterrence involvement in cyber defense. will remain: Is anyone listening? architecture can further address as well as pointing out where Clarke is an advocate of large and JFQ the trend of increasing complex- nuclear deterrence theory falls aggressive Federal involvement in ity in information systems by short within the unique parame- protecting the Nation’s informa- Lieutenant Colonel Brian R. Salmans, facilitating the abstraction of ters of the cyber domain. In other tion systems; Libicki believes that USAF, Ph.D., is on the faculty at the this system complexity. EA— words, the authors warn, the best the Federal Government can only USAF Air Command and Staff College. He is a cyberspace operations officer which, in many cases, is already defense is not offense; indeed, a play an indirect role in protect- whose assignments have included being implemented in DOD strong defense is an enabler of ing private information systems computer network defense positions organizations—may provide an computer network attack. and that a government deter- at the Defense Information Systems organizing discipline in which A stronger cyber defense rence policy could weaken the Agency’s Department of Defense to address cyber defense. would strengthen the viability private sector’s cyber defensive Computer Emergency Response Team Another important addi- of an offensive cyber strategy by posture since it would transfer and at U.S. Transportation Command. tion to the discourse on cyber making the United States more the responsibility for protecting war and deterrence is Richard likely to withstand an ongoing systems from private owners to Clarke and Robert Knake’s Cyber and escalatory cyber war. Clarke the government. As with Libicki’s War. Clarke possesses an impres- speculates that the United States misguided confidence in system sive national security résumé, may be self-deterred because it administrators, his argument is having served in the Reagan, has the most to lose in a cyber weak here as well. The Federal George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and conflict. But he also makes an Government can and does have George W. Bush administrations, important observation. With the much influence over private where he served as the special issue of strategic nuclear war, sector communications infra- advisor on cyber security. As with the military did not maintain structure, and for there to be any Libicki, Clarke’s most important complete and secretive control reasonable level of protection of contribution to the discussion over the entire debate; the aca- our Nation’s critical infrastruc- on cyber war concerns cyber demic research community and ture, the Federal Government deterrence. The authors of both media also put light on nuclear must become heavily engaged books relate their substantial warfighting policies and plans, and involved in securing it. knowledge of nuclear deterrence resulting in rational discourse There are many precedents for a to their consideration of cyber on such matters and leading to more active Federal role in this deterrence, but they make it clear rational controls and nuclear context, such as the National that nuclear deterrence theory warfighting plans. Clarke Communications System and the cannot simply be overlaid on likens our present state of cyber Communications Assistance to the cyber domain. Interestingly, ignorance at the national policy Law Enforcement Act. the difficulties of cyber deter- level to that of the European In the end, both Cyber rence and the lack of experience nations just prior to the outbreak War and Cyberdeterrence and with and inability to determine of World War I; the plans and Cyberwar cast light on important secondary effects of cyber attacks operations of military cyber areas of cyber warfare that must (as well as the fact that the United units may be laying the founda- be contemplated by researchers, States stands to lose the most tion for cyber war with little military staff colleges, and poli- in a cyber war) lead Clarke and public scrutiny or oversight. cymakers at the national level. Libicki to downplay the strategic Clarke stresses the need for Neither Clarke nor Libicki is a value of offensive cyber war public dialogue about cyber cheerleader for offensive cyber (as the value of a first strike or war—a most useful suggestion capabilities, offering considered retaliatory nuclear capability was to avoid a cyber General Curtis analyses on the difficulties a crucial component of nuclear Lemay or “Dr. Strangelove” from inherent in their actual use. deterrence), and to advocate for forcing the Nation’s leadership Instead, both demonstrate why

152 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Command Relationships

By GEORGE E. KATSOS

henever a new inter- command over subordinate forces; should to the President as Commander in Chief. agency working group be exercised through the commanders of During World War II, an American unified convenes within the subordinate organizations; normally exercised high command was proposed to synergize W Capital Beltway, there through subordinate joint force commanders military operations with the Allies. The new is a question that almost always surfaces to and Service and/or functional component Joint Chiefs of Staff had the responsibility some degree: “Could someone please explain commanders; normally provides full authority for the planning and strategy of the U.S. the terms COCOM, OPCON, TACON, assign, to organize commands and forces and employ military war contribution to unilateral and and attach?” What follows are definitions, those forces as the commander in operational multinational operations. During the war, background, and broad analysis under normal control considers necessary to accomplish the Armed Forces were represented by the conditions to better understand the develop- assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, Departments of War (Army and Air Force) ment and usage of this Department of Defense include authoritative direction for logistics or and Navy (Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard (DOD) terminology. matters of administration, discipline, internal during Federal mobilization) to the National organization, or unit training; inherent in Security Council led by the President. Under DOD Definitions COCOM and may be delegated within the this structure, central unified command suf- Combatant command (command command; also called OPCON;4 DOD pub- fered as commanders competed for the same authority): nontransferable command author- lished term since 1950.5 resources and senior leadership attention. ity1 exercised by commanders of unified Tactical control: command authority In 1946, the President approved the combatant commands (CCMDs) unless oth- over assigned or attached forces or com- Outline Command Plan (the first Unified erwise directed by the President or Secretary mands, or military capability or forces made Command Plan) with permanent geographic of Defense; authority to perform functions of available for tasking that is limited to the unified commands under Joint Chiefs of Staff command over assigned and attached forces detailed direction and control of movements control. In 1947, Congress followed with leg- involving organizing and employing com- or maneuvers within the operational area islation12 establishing three military depart- mands and forces, assigning tasks, designating necessary to accomplish missions or tasks ments (Army, Navy, and Air Force, consisting objectives, and giving authoritative direction assigned; inherent in operational control; tac- of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps [and over all aspects of military operations, joint tical control may be delegated to and exercised Coast Guard in time of war], and Air Force, training, and logistics necessary to accom- at any level at or below the level of combatant respectively). Further organizational and plish the missions assigned to the command; command; also called TACON;6 DOD pub- Presidential scrutiny of Service rivalries operational control (OPCON) and tactical lished term since 1989.7 resulted in more civilian oversight. Legislation control (TACON) are inherent in a combatant Assign: To place units or person- and amendments shaped the President’s intent command; cannot be delegated; also called nel permanently in an organization and/ of a unified command structure with more COCOM;2 DOD published term since 1989.3 or where such organization controls and civilian control. In 1958, Congress established Operational control: command author- administers the units or personnel for the a clear line of command through the Secretary ity that may be exercised by commanders at primary function, or greater portion of the of Defense to unified commanders authoriz- any echelon at or below the level of CCMD; functions, of the unit or personnel;8 DOD ing operational command over permanently authority to perform those functions of term since 1949.9 assigned or forces temporarily attached to Attach: The temporary placement of unified commands.13 10 George E. Katsos is a Joint Doctrine Planner in units or personnel in an organization; DOD The following year, the term opera- 11 the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and term since 1949. tional command (OPCOM) was approved Doctrine Division. This article is the first of three with its definition by the Defense Secre- on command relationships. Future articles will History tary as a DOD military term.14 With the include discussions of multinational command The authority of commanding military introduction of OPCOM into the joint relationships and the United Nations. forces flows from the U.S. Constitution force lexicon, the definition’s similarity ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 153 JOINT DOCTRINE | Update with OPCON generated a multidecade Similar to and in support of GCCs, CDRs at any echelon at or below the CCMD terminology debate on interpretation and FCCs may conduct independently assigned level. The establishing CDR is responsible correct usage. However, in 1986, Congress missions with their forces and are usually for ensuring that both the supported and cemented the term combatant command global in nature. As a result, FCC forces can supporting CDRs understand the degree of (command authority) for commanders in move in and out of GCC areas of responsibil- authority that the supported CDR is granted. chief (CINCs) through legislation.15 Known ity. For example, the U.S. Special Operations The four categories of support that a CCDR as the DOD acronym COCOM, it replaced Command (USSOCOM) CCDR exercises may direct over assigned or attached forces OPCOM within DOD terminology and COCOM over all assigned Active Component are general support, mutual support, direct together with TACON joined the already and most mobilized Reserve Component (RC) support, and close support. existing DOD term OPCON in 1989.16 Since special operations forces (SOF). In its role as Administrative control (ADCON) 2002, CINCs have been known as combat- an FCC, USSOCOM provides forces on a tem- provides for the preparation of most military ant commanders (CCDRs) as directed by porary basis to other CCMDs where CCDRs forces and their administration and support. the Secretary of Defense.17 normally exercise OPCON of attached SOF Per U.S. Code (USC), the Services are respon- through a subordinate commander (CDR). sible for the administration and support of Command Authority When directed, the USSOCOM CCDR can their own forces. They fulfill their responsibil- Per the Goldwater-Nichols Department establish and employ a joint SOF task force as ities by exercising ADCON through the CDRs of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the the supported CDR. of the Service component commands assigned Services permanently assign forces to unified Even though GCCs exercise COCOM to CCMDs and through the Services for forces combatant commands. These assigned forces over assigned intratheater airlift forces, the not assigned to the CCMDs.21 are identified in the Global Force Manage- U.S. Transportation Command CCDR, as Most RC forces are assigned by the ment Implementation Guidance signed by an FCC, has COCOM over intertheater Defense Secretary to the CCMDs when mobi- the Defense Secretary and are commanded airlift forces. lized or ordered to Active duty for specific by a CCDR under a COCOM. Attached periods under the authority provided in Title forces are temporarily transferred forces Other Authorities and Relationships 10, USC, sections 162 and 167.22 The Army from one CCDR to another by the President Joint force commander (JFC) is used Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force or Secretary. Besides COCOM, CCDRs as a general term for a CCDR, subunified Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy Reserve, exercise OPCON or TACON over assigned commander, or JTF commander authorized Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard and attached forces through subordinate to exercise COCOM or OPCON over a joint Reserve make up the RC. Prior to activation, commanders to accomplish specific missions. force.18 Considered an area commander, a JFC CCDRs exercise training and readiness over- Subordinate commanders exercise OPCON normally establishes a joint force on a geo- sight (TRO) over assigned Reserve forces when or TACON over the forces under their graphic area instead of a GCC that has an area not on Active duty or Active duty for training. command. Both OPCON and TACON are of responsibility. It is the duty of the JFC to TRO is no longer applicable to RC forces when inherent to COCOM and may be delegated. assist the operations of transient forces to the mobilized or ordered to Active duty. JFQ Two types of CCDRs are geographic extent of existing capabilities and consistent combatant commanders (GCCs) and func- with other assigned missions. Transient forces tional combatant commanders (FCCs). As do not come under the chain of command of a NOTES a CCDR, a GCC exercises COCOM over JFC solely by their movement across boundar- 1 10 U.S. Code (USC) § 164. assigned forces and OPCON or TACON over ies except when a CCDR is exercising TACON 2 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department attached forces. For example, U.S. Central for force protection. Forces may be reassigned of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Command (USCENTCOM) comprises by the Defense Secretary when a transfer Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 30, assigned forces from the Army, Navy, Marine to a joint force will be permanent or for an 2010), 80. Corps, and Air Force. If a contingency breaks indeterminately long period. CCDRs exercise 3 Dictionary of United States Military Terms out and additional non-USCENTCOM forces COCOM and subordinate JFCs exercise for Joint Usage (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, are needed, the Defense Secretary can autho- OPCON over reassigned forces. December 1, 1989), 73. rize forces to be attached to USCENTCOM A JTF commander is designated by the 4 JP 1–02 (June 30, 2010), 339. from U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) for Defense Secretary, a CCDR, a subunified 5 Dictionary of United States Military Terms a specific mission and may attach these forces commander, or an existing JTF commander.19 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1950), 64. 6 under OPCON or TACON. The USCENT- A JTF commander may organize assigned or JP 1–02 (June 30, 2010), 457. 7 JP 1–02 (December 1, 1989), 361. COM CCDR would then have OPCON or attached forces based on the level of command 8 JP 3–0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: TACON over the USPACOM forces that were authorized (OPCON or TACON). A JTF may The Joint Staff, March, 22, 2010), GL7. attached. The USCENTCOM CCDR can orga- be established on a geographical area or func- 9 Dictionary of United States Military Terms 20 nize a joint task force (JTF) and provide forces tional basis. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1949), 10. that the JTF commander may have OPCON A support command authority relation- 10 JP 3–0, GL7. or TACON over as directed by the USCENT- ship is established by a superior CDR between 11 Dictionary of United States Military Terms COM CCDR. The JTF commander will then subordinate CDRs when one organization (1949), 10. have OPCON of his own Service forces and should aid, protect, complement, or sustain 12 Public Law 80–253, National Security Act of OPCON or TACON over attached forces. another force. Support may be exercised by 1947, July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 USC § 401.

154 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu KATSOS

13 Public Law 85–599, Department of Defense 20 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the Reorganization Act of 1958, August 6, 1958, 72 Stat. United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 514, 50 USC § 401. March 20, 2009), V–10. 14 Dictionary of United States Military Terms 21 Ibid., IV–12. NEW (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 1959), 98. 22 Ibid., IV–12. from NDU Press 15 Public Law 99–433, Department of Defense for the Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986, 100 Institute for National Strategic Studies Stat. 992, 10 USC § 111. 16 JP 1–02 (December 1, 1989). 17 Jim Garamone, “CINC Is Sunk,” American Forces Press Service (October 25, 2002), avail- able at . 18 JP 1–02 (June 30, 2010), 247. 19 Ibid., 257.

JPs Under Revision JP 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations INSS Strategic Perspectives 7 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters Korean Futures: Challenges to U.S. JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations Diplomacy of North Korean Regime Collapse JP 1–04, Legal Support to Military Operations JP 3–40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction by Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup JP 1–06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations JP 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Little attention has been paid to the strategic High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management JP 2–0, Joint Intelligence considerations that may shape the responses JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to of the United States, South Korea, Japan, Military Operations JP 3–57, Civil-Military Operations China, and Russia to a North Korean regime JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint JP 3–59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations collapse. This study identifies the interests Operations JP 3–60, Joint Targeting and objectives of these principal state actors with respect to the Korean Peninsula. JP 3–0, Joint Operations JP 3–63, Detainee Operations Although regime collapse is unlikely, such an JP 3–00.1, Strategic Communication JP 3–72, Nuclear Operations event could fundamentally alter the strategic JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats JP 4–0, Joint Logistics landscape in Asia in ways that could diminish JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction JP 4–01, The Defense Transportation System U.S. influence in the region. The study JP 3–04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations JP 4–01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations highlights the complexities and dilemmas JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for that the United States would confront. For Operations Transportation Terminal Operations example, regime collapse does not mean JP 3–07, Stability Operations JP 4–01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) state collapse, at least not in the short run. China will be in the most powerful position JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations JP 4–02, Health Service Support to act because it likely will be the first state JP 3–07.4, Counterdrug Operations JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations to become aware of a crisis. Moreover, in JP 3–11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, JP 4–08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations an environment of clashing interests and and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support competing priorities, there is potential for JP 3–12, Cyberspace Operations JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning serious damage to U.S relations with China, JP 3–13, Information Operations South Korea, and Japan. The authors urge JP 6–01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare (JEMSO) Washington to consider today how best to JP 3–13.2, Military Information Support Operations position the U.S. Government to respond (PSYOPS) JPs Revised (last 6 months) intelligently to what could be the most serious JP 3–13.3, Operations Security challenge America has faced in Asia since the JP 2–01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Vietnam War. JP 3–13.4, Military Deception Support in Joint Operations JP 3–15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device JP 3–05, Special Operations Operations (C–IED) JP 3–08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint JP 3–16, Multinational Operations Operations JP 3–18, Forcible Entry Operations JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations JP 3–27, Homeland Defense JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations JP 3–28, Civil Support JP 3–29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 155 JOINT DOCTRINE | Improving Joint Fires for Special Operations

Air Force B−52 Stratofortress departs Nellis Air Force Base during combat training exercise Red Flag 11–2

U.S. Air Force (Scott Ash) Improving Joint Fires for Special Operations A Mandate for the Joint Force Fires Coordinator

By M ICHAEL WASTILA

hough great strides have been joint fires echoes across military academia; integration, synchronization, and control of made since joint doctrine was however, joint doctrine is lax in addressing joint fires in support of special operations. legislated by the Goldwater- the matter. Nowhere is this need more appar- T Nichols Department of Defense ent than at the Joint Special Operations Task Fundamentals Reorganization Act of 1986, joint fire support Force (JSOTF), where coordination is bifur- Revisiting accepted principles of joint coordination still presents a quandary. The cated at best. At the JSOTF, doctrine relegates fire support, joint fires are weapons systems need for a principal advisor having respon- management of joint fires and air support used during the employment of forces from sibility for the planning and execution of to a component of singular purpose, lacking two or more components in coordinated inclusion of all fire support elements (FSEs) as action to produce desired effects in support Lieutenant Colonel Michael Wastila, USMCR, is a result. Institutionalization of a Joint Force of a common objective. Coordinated action currently serving as Senior Watch Officer for the Fires Coordinator (JFFC) as part of the JSOTF requires the synchronization of joint fires with Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Crisis Action headquarters (HQ) within the Operations the maneuver force, as they are complemen- Center. Directorate (J3) will improve the successful tary functions. The concept of fires describes

156 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WASTILA how the joint force applies lethal and nonle- Organization of a JSOTF HQ is con- tion. The discord stems from governing joint thal fires to achieve desired effects and attain sistent with that of a conventional Joint Task doctrine because responsibility for the JFC’s the objective.1 Lethal fires are categorized by Force (JTF). The J3 forms a Joint Operations concept of fires is unspecified.10 For reasons delivery means such as fixed-wing aircraft, Center (JOC) to serve as the focal point for all more related to airspace management, this attack helicopters, unmanned aircraft, mis- operational matters to include the direction responsibility defaults to the air component siles, rockets, cannon artillery and mortars, of current operations and the planning of commander, whose focus naturally gives and naval surface fire support. Nonlethal fires future ones. A JSOTF may include a Future primacy to aviation fires. Since the JSOTF are broadly delineated as information opera- Plans Directorate (J5). If not, the J3 assumes organizes in a manner similar to a conven- tions (IO), which include electronic attack, all future planning responsibilities; if so, the tional JTF, it takes its lead from joint doctrine computer network attack, and the like. J3 Future Operations Section (J35) receives in this regard.11 The JSOTF’s comparatively Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) approved plans in handover from the J5 for less robust table of organization, lack of opera- commonly view fire support coordination tasking and execution. Doctrine specifies only tional depth, and dependence on nonorganic in relation to four essential tasks. First that joint fire support coordination falls under fire support assets amplify this discord. and foremost, fires must support and be the responsibilities of the J3. The J35 directs Without JFFC oversight, special operations responsive to forces in contact. Second, JSOTF targeting and integrates IO into future planners overlook available fires resources and joint fires must support the JFC’s concept operations.5 tend toward crisis action, ultimately reducing of operations. Third, the concept of fires The J3 is responsible to “plan, synchro- mission effectiveness. must integrate with the scheme of maneuver. nize, and deconflict joint fires and joint air Operation Desert Storm exemplifies the Lastly, fires in support of the joint force support within the JSOTF, [forming] a Joint gap created when the air component drives must be sustainable.2 The coordination of joint fires is crucial to the JSOTF given the need to plan, synchronize, and deconflict the story of Black Hawk Down offers a prolific case where a diverse assets from air, land, and maritime small-scale raid lacking adequate fires resources turned into a components, as well as those from multi- national forces. Practically, unity of effort rescue and spiraled into an epic debacle is only achievable with respect to these essential tasks through the implementation Fires Element (JFE) and a Joint Air Coordina- the SOF concept of fires. During Desert of a JFFC whose authority ensures inclusion tion Element (JACE)”6 as necessary. This is Storm, SOF were relegated to secondary of all FSEs and is dismissive of parochial consistent with global doctrine governing missions within the conventional scheme of component views. joint fire support where the JFE is an optional operations or left isolated altogether, as with staff element comprised of representatives the JSOTF formed for the “great Scud hunt” Doctrine from J3 sections, directorates, and compo- in the western Iraqi desert.12 “No concerted The JFC establishes a JSOTF to nents as necessary.7 When established, the JFE effort was made to coordinate the actions of conduct special operations in hostile, helps manage fires within the Joint Special airpower and SOF to suppress launches.”13 denied, or politically sensitive environments Operations Area (JSOA). Regardless, JSOTF Targeting and fire support coordination were to achieve diplomatic, informational, mili- doctrine effectively defaults the coordination the responsibility of the JFACC whose focus tary, and/or economic objectives, activities and deconfliction of joint fires and airspace was the integration of airspace, not with that “may require low visibility, clandestine, to the J3, JACE, and the Special Operations ground elements.14 History views the mission or covert capabilities.”3 In general, small, Liaison Element (SOLE).8 The JACE specifi- as ineffective given the successful launch specially organized units manned by per- cally focuses on airpower integration and of over 80 Scuds at Israel and Saudi Arabia; sonnel with unique expertise, training, and capabilities; its joint fires expertise is limited no hard evidence exists to support that any equipment make up Special Operations to air attack. The SOLE works directly for coalition air attacks resulted in interdiction.15 Forces (SOF). A JSOTF includes SOF from the JSOTF commander and is located at the JSOTF Scud-hunting operations failed to inte- more than one Service and conducts opera- theater Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). grate SOF activities with aviation fire support. tions with, or augmented by, conventional It provides visibility of JSOTF activities to Unity of effort was impaired by inadequate forces as necessary. SOF are limited in the Joint Force Air Component Commander JSOTF participation in the targeting process numbers so focused efforts are essential to (JFACC) staff for coordination, synchroniza- and development of the fire support plan, preserve the force. Accordingly, joint fire tion, and integration of SOF air, surface, and both key responsibilities of a JFFC. support is a critical capability and force subsurface operations. Notably, the SOLE The story of Black Hawk Down and Task multiplier for the JSOTF. Amazingly, for lacks authority to execute command and Force Ranger in Somalia offers a prolific case such a highly specified organization, coor- control over any SOF element.9 where a small-scale raid lacking adequate fires dination of joint fires is doctrinally defi- resources turned into a rescue and spiraled cient and too often overlooked. To date, “no Anecdotal Evidence into an epic debacle. Formed around staffers theater special operations commands have Whether it is the Gulf War, Somalia, from the Joint Special Operations Command, standing joint fires coordination centers,”4 Afghanistan, or Iraq, the lack of a JFFC to the JSOTF HQ opted for a junior fire support and JSOTF HQs are minimally staffed with advise the JSOTF commander on fire support officer. Arguably, the advice of a senior JFFC joint fires expertise. usage plagues mission planning and execu- would have weighed more significantly in the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 157 JOINT DOCTRINE | Improving Joint Fires for Special Operations

Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams tank conducts live- fire training during interoperability exercise with Moroccan armed forces

U.S. Air Force (Sean M. Worrell)

JFC’s decision to conduct operations without at the tactical and operational levels” from the nent via the JACE and SOLE. Inclusion of a contingency fire planning. The debate rages onset.18 In a repeating theme, the JSOTF HQ JFE bifurcates responsibilities for planning as to the appropriateness of daylight use of staff lacked the resident expertise to “handle and execution. Complicating matters further gunships or whether AC–130s could have the integration—incorporating joint fires in is the fact that doctrine limits targeting and been allocated to the task force.16 However, campaign planning, collating or submitting IO responsibilities to the J35. Implications a JFFC with authorities granted by the JFC subordinate fires requests, and deconflicting with respect to unity of effort are obvious. In surely would have prevailed in securing some operations.”19 Absent institutionalized joint the absence of a bona fide JFFC acting as an alternate means to cover the ill-fated raid of fires planning, SOF applied hastily improvised honest broker, the joint fires process inevita- October 3, 1993. Any number of platforms fire support solutions to unanticipated cir- bly focuses on airpower while inadvertently could have carved out a corridor of fire by cumstances. Ultimately, the JSOTF relied on ignoring surface- and sea-based assets,21 not which to escape;17 in hindsight, collateral the SOLE for deconfliction and integration.20 to mention nonlethal means. A JFFC also damage and loss of life would have been Though resilient, repeated SOF dependence bridges the doctrinal fissure by assuming lessened. Fixation on the gunships likely led on ad hoc fires solutions and surrogate coordi- responsibility for J35 fire planning tasks and to a misperception as to the availability of fire nation borders on dereliction. Crisis response following them through to execution. support—naval surface fires comes to mind. in lieu of a sustainable concept of fires fails to As conceived, the JFE is an ad hoc Regrettably, Task Force Ranger’s willing- evaluate all fire support options. The SOLE organization largely formed from the existing ness to go it alone highlights SOF’s greatest lacks the planning and coordination intimacy table of organization. This burdens already limitations, a lack of operational depth, and a inherent to a resident JFFC. The SOLE’s sepa- overtasked staffs, often creating a void during dependence on nonorganic fires to close such ration in both time and space from the JSOTF deliberate planning.22 The lack of a resident gaps. JOC further degrades mission effectiveness. JFFC responsible for planning, coordinating, The experience of Task Force Dagger, The mandate for a JFFC is readily apparent. and executing the full spectrum of joint fires the lead JSOTF employed early in Afghani- elements leaves the J3 and employed SOF stan, offers a more recent example. This Fallacy vulnerable, having to improvise solutions to JSOTF staff “was built around a Special Forces The lack of a JFE by default leaves JSOTF the integration challenges of fire support and group HQ and faced problems using joint fires fire support coordination to the air compo- maneuver. Though hasty innovation may be

158 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WASTILA

JACE through the Joint Special Operations Air Component to the JAOC, aided by the SOLE. The JFACC is the airspace coordina- tion authority and is responsible for the Air Tasking Order (ATO), which deconflicts airspace and avoids unnecessary redun- dancy in target attack.25 This being the case, it seems valid that the air component should dominate those tasks required to synchro- nize joint fires in support of the JSOTF. Additionally, the JFACC may simply be better equipped to integrate joint fires due to organic attack, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and unmanned aerial systems capabilities. By contrast, JSOTF operations are not air-centric; they typically center on a supported ground maneuver element. SOF requires the concept of fires to be nimble; however, the current requisition process is clumsy and burdensome. Further, one could argue the parochial air component view contributes to a misperception that fire support platforms other than air have limited capability and/or availability. The JFACC is a component commander and is certainly not beholden to the JSOTF commander. Higher USS Sterett launches Tomahawk Land Attack responsibilities may preclude JAOC participa- Missile during system test tion in JSOTF fires deliberation and planning. In addition, the SOLE lacks the proximity, U.S. Navy (Stephen J. Zeller) capacity, and authority to control the joint fire situation throughout an operation and effective for some crisis action, it is reactive of the myriad joint fires platforms available. participate in the planning and coordination and generally contributes to a greater loss of The JFFC also offers a sobering perspective of future operations, often concurrent tasks. initiative, not unlike Black Hawk Down. In when a concept of fires is inadequate. In sum, “the entity responsible for [joint] fires contrast, effective joint fire support coordina- cannot be focused on only one aspect of the tion is proactive where integration is thorough Counterargument fires fight”;26 it leads to an overemphasis of and derived from the inclusion of all com- Aviation proponents seek to employ prosecution by air. ponent fires elements available. JSOTFs have air assets in a centralized manner to maxi- long “recognized need for resident expertise mize their effect. Indisputably, “close air Improvements with their HQ to coordinate and integrate fire support accounts for the vast majority of fire A study prepared by the Joint Warfight- ing Center (JWFC) examined the viability of a JFFC concept from the viewpoint of the JFC. the entity responsible for [joint] fires cannot be focused on It clearly identified the fact that the J3 and only one aspect of the fires fight JFACC worked independently to plan, coor- dinate, deconflict, and synchronize targeting. Although both worked toward common support.”23 support assets provided to Special Forces.”24 objectives, they lacked unity of effort. The Moreover, the absence of a JFFC to for- Advocates attribute this to required cover- 1997 study also documented the resulting mally advise the commander on fire support age distances and the limited availability of disconnect between air operations and all ele- matters arguably contributes to the willing- capable fire support platforms for JSOA such ments of joint fires. The study acknowledged ness to go it alone, a tragic flaw seemingly all as in Afghanistan or Iraq. With the prepon- the J3 as the focal point for synchronization of too common among SOF. A JFFC ensures derance of air assets categorized in terms of joint fires but recognized that in practice, the implementation of fire support plans cogni- fires, relinquishing control of the coordina- JFACC retains the bulk of effort for joint fires zant of the JSOTF’s inherent lack of organic tion process constrains greater employment execution planning through the development fires capabilities. The JFFC creates operational of these assets. Ultimately, requests for of the ATO. Further, it suggested, “the JFACC depth through the procurement and inclusion air support flow from the JSOTF via the has some limitations regarding control of all ndupress.ndu.edu issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 / JFQ 159 JOINT DOCTRINE | Improving Joint Fires for Special Operations joint fires resources and awareness of special continue to control general air operations NOTES operations and nonlethal strategies, thus an and oversee the coordination and execution opportunity may exist to not consider all joint of ensuing air attack means in support of the 1 Joint Publication (JP) 3–09, Joint Fire Support fires aspects during development of the air approved fires plan. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 1–2. plan.”27 The study concluded that the target- 2 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–16, ing process has become an air-driven event, Changes Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat with little consideration for the employment To date, the JWFC study recommenda- Element (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2001), 1–2. of other platforms—a finding of extreme tion for the implementation of a JFFC has only 3 JP 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force consequence for end users such as the JSOTF, been embraced as optional. Doctrine must Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, feeding the fallacy that assets are simply capture the preceding improvements with 2007), xi. unavailable. revisions to Joint Publications 3–09, Doctrine 4 Eric Braganca, “The Evolution of Special The JWFC study recommended, “The for Joint Fire Support, and 3–05.1, Joint Special Operations Joint Fires,” Joint Force Quarterly 35 JFC needed a JFFC to be the impartial arbiter Operations Task Force Operations. However, (2004), 67. for joint fires, manage scarce resources, ensure joint doctrine in and of itself may not be 5 JP 3–05.1, II–11. the commander’s guidance is being followed enough, especially if said doctrine is only 6 Ibid., II–14. and intent accomplished, maintain a focus on viewed as guidance. A mandate for the JFFC 7 JP 3–09, x. 8 what to preserve or destroy, deconflict lethal at the JSOTF may require a Department of JP 3–05.1, III–8. 9 and nonlethal fires, champion JFC fires needs, Defense directive to enforce what is ultimately Lynn P. Peitz, “The Next Joint Challenge: Commanding and Integrating SOF Fires When the and help the JFC maintain situational aware- a change in special operations culture, par- JFACC is the Supported Commander,” research ness.”28 A JFFC offers further value added by ticularly for the air component. JSOTF tables report, Air Command and Staff College, Montgom- assisting the J3 and JFC in synchronizing joint of organization and joint manning docu- ery, AL, 2005, 11. fires with other aspects of the campaign to ments also require changes to reflect this staff 10 Dewey A. Granger, “Coordination of Future include maneuver, communications, IO, and enhancement. It follows that these changes Joint Fires: Do We Need a Joint Fire Support Coor- logistics. These findings for the greater joint must become manifest in training. It is essen- dinator?” paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, force structure multiply for the JSOTF given tial that the JSOTF via the JFFC incorporate 1999, 3. the additional nodes of coordination imposed joint fire support training at the tactical and 11 JP 3–05.1, xii. by the air component above. operational levels to maximize exposure and 12 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Forces in To improve the successful integration, integration through education, exercises, Action (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), synchronization, and application of fires for rehearsals, and the like. Lastly, it is incumbent 234. 13 Peitz, 4. the JSOTF, a JFFC must be institutionalized on U.S. Special Operations Command and/ 14 Granger, 6. as a permanent part of the HQ staff serving as or theater special operations commands to 15 Peitz, iv. a senior subordinate to the J3 with authorities demand qualified individuals/augmentees 16 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down (New York: delegated by the commander. A JFFC, being when staffing JSOTFs; an insouciant approach Penguin Putnam Inc., 2000), 417. the single entity that centralizes communica- to filling JFFC billets invites the specter of 17 Clifford E. Day, “Critical Analysis on the tions and personnel for the coordination of failure into the joint fire planning process. Defeat of Task Force Ranger,” research paper, Air all FSEs, obviates air component awareness Command and Staff College, Montgomery, AL, and control issues. At a minimum, an FSE Implementation of a JFFC within the 1997, 20. comprised of a junior fire support officer, J3 will improve the successful integration, 18 Braganca, 65. 19 air officer, naval surface fires officer, and IO synchronization, and control of joint fires Ibid., 65. 20 officer would support the JFFC, thereby cov- in support of the JSOTF. The mandate for a Ibid. 21 Timothy M. Parker, “Making Joint Fires,” ering the totality of joint fires capabilities. The JFFC is clearly supported given the JSOTF’s paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2002, 5. FSE remains scalable to meet the scope and lack of operational depth and resulting 22 Granger, 12. needs of the JSOTF. The Service components, dependence on nonorganic fire support 23 Jason D. Adams, Deric Holbrook, and Seth having requisite expertise, would source the platforms. The JFFC provides an unbiased Knazovich, “Fire Support for the Special Operations various personnel. expert perspective that avoids the myopic Task Force,” Fires (January–February 2010), 57. The JFFC serves as the principal staff shortcomings of fire planning dependent on 24 Ibid., 59. advisor to the J3 and JSOTF commander the air component for coordination. Prin- 25 Granger, 11. responsible for the coordination, integration, cipal advice and well-conceived concepts of 26 Parker, 11. and synchronization of joint fires.29 Over the fires will preclude the JSOTF commander 27 Joint Forces Fires Coordinator Study (Fort phases of an operation, the JFFC, aided by the from having to go it alone and rely on ad Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997), EX–7. 28 FSE, formulates and disseminates the concept hoc solutions for fire support. Institution- Ibid., EX–4. 29 Ibid., V–1. of fires. They constantly monitor and control alization of the JFFC as the subject matter the joint fires situation throughout the opera- expert having the delegated authority and tion. A key JFFC responsibility is overseeing responsibility for planning, coordination, the joint targeting coordination board and and execution is the required next step balancing the component desires concerning toward improving joint fires for special attack and interdiction. The JFACC would operations. JFQ

160 JFQ / issue 63, 4 th quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu NEW Center for Technology and National Security Policy from NDU Press Institute for National Strategic Studies

New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents by Richard L. Kugler

In 2010, seven major studies were issued that together put forth a comprehen- sive blueprint for major global changes in U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and diplomacy. The seven studies include the National Security Strategy; Quadrennial Defense Review Report; The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century; Nuclear Posture Review Report; Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report; and NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. These studies are brought together in this one book, which por- trays their individual contents and complex interrelationships and evaluates their strengths and shortfalls. It argues that while these studies are well written and co- gent in articulating many valuable innovations for the Departments of Defense and State, and other government agencies, all of them leave lingering issues that require further thinking and analysis as future U.S. national security policy evolves in a changing and dangerous world.

Center for Complex Operations Institute for National Strategic Studies

Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR edited by Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) have emerged in recent years as promising but poorly understood mechanisms for consolidating security and reasserting state sovereignty after con- flict. Despite the considerable experience acquired by the international community, the critical relationship between DDR and SSR, and the ability to use these mecha- nisms with consistent success, remain less than optimally developed. The chapters in this book represent a diversity of field experience and research in DDR and SSR, which suggest that these are complex and interrelated systems with underlying po- litical attributes. The book concludes that successful application of DDR and SSR requires the setting aside of preconceived assumptions or formulas, and should be viewed flexibly to restore the monopoly of force to the state.

CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu NEW from NDU Press The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has moved to the forefront of Chinese military modernization, aided by increased budgets and improved shipbuilding capabilities. The deployments of PLAN ships to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN’s global circumnavigation, and the increased frequency of exercises with foreign navies highlight the PLAN’s growing role as an instrument of national policy. Given these trends, the Institute for National Strategic Studies joined other research organizations in Taipei to discuss the Chinese navy in their 19th annual conference on the PLA. The conference brought together many leading specialists on naval issues to discuss a range of topics related to the PLAN. This volume collects the best papers, most of which have been updated to reflect postconference developments. Topics include the history of other rising major powers in relation to their maritime capabilities, the range of China’s naval modernization, the specifics of PLAN force capabilities, and how the PLAN might use its improved capabilities. As this volume indicates, Chinese naval power continues to develop, expand, and mature despite shortfalls in operational effectiveness. Given regional suspicions about China’s long-term ambitions, the ultimate impact of a stronger PLAN on stability will depend on whether Chinese leaders direct their newfound naval power toward cooperative or coercive ends. PRISM A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM 2, no. 4 (September 2011) offers the following Feature articles: Joseph L’Etoile on transforming the conflict in Afghanistan; Paul Collier on job creation and investment promotion aspects of state-building; Leon Fuerth on “anticipatory governance”; Carlos Ospina Ovalle with an update on the insurgency in Colombia; Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro on the human terrain system; Kimberly Marten on patronage versus professionalism in new security institutions; Laura Varhola and Christopher Varhola on regional engagement in Africa; and Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves de Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, and Michael Miklaucic on NATO countering the hybrid threat. In From the Field, Nadeem Ahmed presents a case study of the 2009 Malakand operation in Afghanistan. Lessons Learned presents an article by Michael Fischerkeller on the debate over the effectiveness of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, followed by an interview with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers. Closing out this issue, John Coffey reviews Joseph Nye’s The Future of Power (PublicAffairs, 2011).

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM CENTER FOR welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military COMPLEX OPERATIONS integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT to [email protected].

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC