Geopolitical Developments in South East Europe: the Political-Geographical Rearrangement of South East Europe Jordan, Peter

www.ssoar.info

Geopolitical developments in South East Europe: the political-geographical rearrangement of South East Europe Jordan, Peter

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Jordan, P. (2007). Geopolitical developments in South East Europe: the political-geographical rearrangement of South East Europe. Europa Regional, 15.2007(2), 87-98. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48104-8

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Geopolitical developments in South East Europe The political-geographical rearrangement of South East Europe

Peter Jordan

Zusammenfassung Geopolitische Entwicklungen in Südosteuropa Die politisch-geographische Neuordnung Südosteuropas Der Beitrag widmet sich den wesentlichen Schritten der politisch-geographischen Neuordnung in Südosteuropa nach der politischen Wende des Jahres 1989. Dabei werden unter Südosteuropa im kulturräumlichen Sinn die byzantinisch geprägten und osmanisch nachhaltig über- prägten Gebiete südlich von Donau und Save einschließlich Bosniens und der Herzegowina verstanden. Die Überlegungen beziehen aber auch Slowenien und Kroatien als Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens sowie Rumänien mit ein. Als Ausgangspunkte pfadabhängiger Transformations prozesse werden die Spielarten des Kommunismus in dieser Region eingehend diskutiert. Das Wiederaufleben der nationalen Frage schon in der Endphase des Kommunismus war entscheidend für den Zerfall Jugoslawiens, aber auch für die Entwicklung der politischen und gesell schaftlichen Situation in den anderen Staaten. Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft reagierte auf die gewaltsamen Konflikte beim Zerfall Jugoslawiens mit einer Eindämmungsstrategie, die sich auch in einem Heranführen Südosteuropas an die europäischen Strukturen äußerte. Immer noch bestehen aber mit dem Kosovo, Makedonien und Bosnien-Herzegowina akute und latente Konfliktherde. Nationale Antagonismen erschweren es Südosteuropa, seiner Stellung als europäische Peripherie zu entkommen und an Eigengewicht zu gewinnen. Seine traditionelle Brückenfunktion zwischen Europa und Vorderasien nimmt es aber wieder ein, wozu seine altansässigen muslimischen Bevölkerungsgruppen einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten.

Südosteuropa, Geopolitik, Kommunismus, Nationalismus, Transformation, EU-Erweiterung, Muslime

Abstract This article is dedicated to the essential phases in the political/geographic restructuring of South East Europe after the political changes in 1989. South East Europe is understood in terms of cultural regions such as those sustainably formed by the Byzantine and Ottoman cultures south of the Danube and Save Rivers including Bosnia and Hercegovina. Our deliberations will also include Slovenia and Croatia as the follow-up states of Yugoslavia and Romania. The different types of communism in this region will be discussed in detail as the point of departure of path-dependent transformation processes. The resurgence of the national issue in the final phases of communism was the key factor for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but also for the emergence of the political and social situation in the other states. The international community of states reacted to the violent conflicts during the disintegration of Yugoslavia with a containment strategy that expressed itself by bringing South East Europe closer to European structures. However, there are still acute and latent flashpoints in the form of Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. National antagonisms make it difficult for South East Europe to escape its position as the European periphery and to gain its own stature. However, it is beginning to regain its traditional function as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East to which its old Muslim population groups make an important contribution.

South East Europe, geopolitics, communism, nationalism, transformation, extension of the European Union, Muslims

Introduction sources of refugee and migration flows. region south of the Danube and Sava, This article shall illuminate important Mediterranean countries like Italy and including Bosnia and Herzegovina. The geopolitical developments and changes Greece have been substantially affected other successor states of Yugoslavia in South East Europe since 1989, because by it. Parts of the Mediterranean region (Slovenia and Croatia), as well as Roma- they are of great importance for the Med- also connect South East Europe with old, nia are included in this article because iterranean region. Some of South East established Muslim population groups – they are closely connected to the devel- Europe can even be considered part of the vestiges of the Ottoman Empire. opments mentioned. Mediterranean region; in any case, it is In a cultural-geographical sense, The impetus for the political-geo- bound by common historical influences South East Europe can be understood as graphical realignment of South East Eu- (particularly the Roman Empire, Eastern consisting of those European countries, rope was the collapse of communism. Rome, Byzantium, Ottoman Empire), as which in addition to the cultural influ- The contrast between the self-governing well as traditional and current economic ences of Byzantium, have also been sig- system of Yugoslavia and the planned and migration relationships. Since the nificantly reshaped by the Ottoman Em- economies of the other communist states political changes of 1989, it has proven pire (as consequence of its particularly meant that the collapse manifested itself to be both the most dangerous European protracted and direct rule there). This in different ways than in the rest of com- crisis region, and also one of the main characterization is certainly true for the munist Europe. The individual states of

87 South East Europe also stood in very unrivalled, and were supported by the ismatic leader Tito – over the economy different relations to the community of western allies. Liberation and commu- through a politically-controlled system communist states and played different nist seizure of power occurred different- of loan issuance, and over political views roles on the international political stage. ly than in most other communist states through reprimand and prosecution. It is important to note these differences without considerable support from the In contrast, the other communist in order to understand the difference in Soviet Union and its Red Army which af- states of South East Europe had actual the transformation processes that fol- forded them a great deal of political lee- planned economies with centrally de- lowed. way with respect to Moscow and greater signed business plans that set production The resurgence of the national ques- self-assuredness in their own activities. goals, allocated roles and set objectives tion, which had already begun in the While Tito’s and Hoxha’s partisan for individual sectors and regions. Agri- final phase of communism, is of crucial movements initially cooperated and even culture was collective with the exception importance not only in the collapse of discussed joining Albania to Yugoslavia, of mountain areas and small personal Yugoslavia. Then, as now, it sets the po- a rift occurred between Tito and Hoxha farms and organized into large govern- litical and social climate to a great extent following Tito’s break with Stalin and ment operations, or into collective farms also in the other countries in the region the withdrawal of communist Yugosla- (depending on the country). All services and therefore deserves appropriate atten- via from the Communist Information (financial, trade, traffic, tourism) were tion. Bureau (1948); Hoxha remained true to operated by the state or associations. Serbia’s attempt to retain dominance Moscow and continued on a Stalinist They were neglected (in stark contrast to over the greater part of the former Yugo- course. Tito’s Yugoslavia in contrast did Yugoslavia), which caused undersupply. slavia is identified as one of the factors not become a member of the Warsaw Pact Also in contrast to Yugoslavia, the other triggered the violent conflicts in former of 1955, but became co-founder of the communist states diverted shipping of Yugoslavia. The international communi- Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and at commercial goods to the railway. Road ty reacted to this conflict with a strategy the same time with its “self-management traffic was in every respect something of of confinement which changed the politi- socialism” struck out on its own socialist an anomaly, which meant that the road cal landscape of South East Europe con- path, which soon would differentiate it network was significantly less developed siderably and initiated the integration of from all other communist states. than in Yugoslavia. this large region into the European struc- Communist Yugoslavia had no cen- Economic transformation in Yugosla- tures. Both of these results are objects of trally controlled planned economy, but via therefore started with a much differ- a detailed analysis. rather had a self-management system ent set of conditions than other commu- Finally, remaining hurdles in the that regulated business and the “public nist states: predominantly non-collective, conflict are discussed and an attempt is sector” [društveni sektor]. Self-manag- small farm based private agriculture, made to assess future roles of South East ing companies acted autonomously, set making privatization of agriculture with Europe in Europe as a whole, with a par- their own business goals and procedures, all the associated upheaval almost unnec- ticular focus on the position of Muslim were not in state ownership but, formally essary; a relatively well-developed retail groups in South East Europe. at least, were employee owned. Along trade system; tourism infrastructure that with the “public sector” there was a pri- was nearly suited to the market; and a Geopolitical changes since 1989 vate sector of the economy, however it road network that was well-developed The collapse of communism was legally limited and primarily served even in rural areas. With the exception of Greece and Cy- a supplementary function. Private farm- We should not overlook that the rela- prus, communist parties seized power ers could own up to 10 ha land. Because tively liberal system and higher standard after the Second World War in all of the the collectivisation of agriculture had of living likely imparted Yugoslavian cit- states of South East Europe. They came been discontinued in the late 1940s, izens with a certain feeling of superior- into power in different ways, not all could they farmed nearly 70 % of all agricul- ity over their communist neighbors. This rely on mass support. They practised dif- tural land until the late 1980s (Taschler has had a lasting effect to this day, such ferent political and economic systems, 1989). Private service sector businesses that Albanians in Kosovo and Macedo- and were incorporated in different ways were permitted to operate, but without nia, for instance, hardly give a thought to into the communist world. The former hired service personnel (as family busi- uniting with Albania. communist states thus offered different nesses), but played a significant role – in In the political-administrative arena, jumping-off points for political and eco- coastal tourism for instance. the Yugoslavian principle of self-man- nomic transformation after the collapse This dual system gave Yugoslavia aged socialism led, in contrast to the oth- of communism. a veneer of “human socialism”. In con- er centrally organized communist states In Yugoslavia and Albania, the com- trast to the planned economies, sufficient of South East Europe, to the development munist movement had a broad basis in consumer goods were available, there of a federal system with six constituent Tito’s and Enver Hoxha’s partisan move- was freedom to travel, itinerant workers republics and two autonomous provinces ments, in contrast to the rest of commu- were permitted to seek employment in (within the constituent republic of Ser- nist South East Europe. Both partisan the West (after 1963), and there was un- bia) which were defined along national/ movements had developed during the hindered tourism allowed from Western ethnic lines and on the local level were resistance against German and Italian countries. Still, the communist party (of- set up in self-governing communes. The occupying forces. They were thus lib- ficially, the Communist League) still ex- 1974 constitution strengthened political- eration movements that were rooted in ercised political control in Yugoslavia – administrative self-government and gave broad sections of the population, if not personified to a great degree in the char- the republics and autonomous provinces

88 Europa Regional 15(2007)2 the status of significant political actors alongside the federal administration. Serbian territories in the broadest sense Their political clout increased following A the death of President Tito in 1980 and H representatives of the republics and au- I tonomous provinces occupied the Cen- SLOVENIA tral Committee with a chairmanship that rotated annually. RO A T I A The great independence and power of O VOJVODINA the republics and autonomous provinc- R A es, in any case since 1974 (Roggemann C 1980), not only helped develop their own d political and administrative structures, r BOSNIA i but also helped develop such structures a AND in all other areas. The individual repub- HERCEGOVINA t SERBIA lics also developed their own raw mate- i c rials industries, energy supply systems and harbor locations. The development S of quasi sovereign state structures also I e MONTE- NEGRO a BG applied to republics and autonomous KOSOVO provinces which, like Slovenia, Macedo- nia, and Kosovo had not been political Serbia proper units prior to communist Yugoslavia; or Autonomous provinces of Serbia like Croatia, which had previously ex- Republics of "Serbian" nations MACEDONIA Republic where the ethnic group of Serbs is dominant isted within other borders. In the case of Communes in Croatia with relative Serbian majority these states at least, state independence AL IfL 2007 would hardly have been possible without Draft: P.Jordan 0 150 km the federal Yugoslav phase. Cartography: F.Partl, P.Mund GR

Fig. 1: Regions which Serbia could see as “Serbian” after the Second World War The resurgence of the national que- Source: own design stion As an internationalist ideology, com- od which was under the hegemony of the tion of Yugoslavia, but which had inte- munism attached only secondary signifi- Serbs, Tito’s Yugoslavia sought a balance grated itself without reservation into Yu- cance to the national question. But it was between the southern Slavic nations. The goslavia and whose majority understood the communist states of South East Eu- non-Slavic Albanians however, were not itself nationally as Serbs, was also estab- rope which developed forms of commu- accorded an equal role. lished as an independent republic with nism with nationalist undertones in the Achieving this balance involved more “Montenegrins” as the titular nation; (5) sense of communist national states fol- than just establishing a federal system. 12 compact communes in Croatia bor- lowing the Stalin period. This was par- Under the pressure of Tito’s partisan dering each other with Serbian majori- ticularly evident under Nicolai Ceauşescu movement which had also achieved vic- ties received no special status. in Romania beginning in the late 1960s, tory over the Serbian nationalist Chet- All these measures were tolerated by and to a lesser extent also in Bulgaria and niks, the Serbs were stripped of their the Serbs. Flare-ups of Serbian nation- Albania. The victims of these forms of territorial claims (see Fig. 1): (1) Regions alism (such as occurred in the first half communism, which saw the state at the referred to in Serbia as southern Serbia of the 1960s when the Serb Aleksander possession of the state nation, were the were upgraded to the Republic of Mac- Ranković was the General Secretary of Hungarian minority in Romania; in Bul- edonia, its majority population was pro- the Communist League) were suppressed garia, the Turks who were pressured up vided with all the trappings of a separate under Tito’s authority. Nationalist dem- until the final phase of communist domi- Orthodox nation (standard language, onstrations by Croats and Slovenes, nance (1984/85) and tried to emigrate in autocephalous Orthodox church); (2) which were grounded in the feeling that large numbers to Turkey. The relatively Serbia was prevented from direct inter- they were disadvantaged within Yugo- large group of Greeks in Albania formed ference with sections of Serbia that con- slavia’s disparity equalization system, the main national opponents of an Alba- tained large national/ethnic minorities for which they as the most economically nian nationalist communism. (Kosovo, Vojvodina) because they were capable always ended up footing the bill, Yugoslavia, which was de facto a autonomous; (3) Bosnia-Hercegovina, were likewise held back by Tito. multinational state, but which in the in- whose population up to the 1961 census What was lacking to go along with the terwar period understood itself also as was predominantly Serbian (The Miro- suppression of national claims and na- nation state – namely, of the Yugoslavian slav Krleža Lexicographical Institute tionalist upsurges through the power of nation consisting of the Serbian, Croat 1993, p. 123), was granted the status of the communist dictatorship and despite and Slovene peoples – also went its own a republic with no special rights for the relatively favorable economic conditions, way in this regard. In a conscious break Serbs; (4) Montenegro, which had been was grappling with the history of the se- with the Yugoslavia of the interwar peri- an independent state prior to the forma- vere conflicts between the Yugoslavian

89 nations (and also with Albanians), es- Montenegro continued to cooperate had underlying causes that ran deeper, pecially during the Second World War. closely with Serbia. and were just waiting to be set off. They had caused severe mutual injury With these divergent aims, so at odds By far the most important was the and continued to fester on as unresolved with one another, the resurgence of the cultural rift within the country. Cen- potential conflicts. national question became the driving tral European and Venetian-influenced Once the economic situation began to force behind the collapse of Yugoslavia. Slovenes and Croats were juxtaposed deteriorate in 1980 (bottlenecks with fuel Nationalism and nationalist thinking against Byzantine and Ottoman- influ- and consumer goods supply at the begin- culminated during the wars following enced Serbs, Bosniaks, Macedonians, ning of the 1980s), following the death Yugoslavia’s collapse, but are still com- and Albanians (Montenegrins belonged of the unanimously popular Tito, the na- mon in the whole of South East Europe to both categories). Competition orient- tional consciousness of all of these resur- today and more deeply rooted than in ed, urbanized, enlightened, to some ex- faced. This is also reflected statistically many other parts of Europe. It is asso- tent early industrialized societies came in the decrease in numbers of those who ciated with the “youth” of these nations, up against cultures for whom close ties thought of themselves as supranational, who first sought to free themselves from between church and state/nation, rigid in a purely civic sense as “Yugoslavi- the dominance of the superpowers and hierarchies and centralism were the rule ans” – that is, who no longer considered then to emancipate themselves from na- and which persisted for a very long time their national/ethnic affiliation essential. tionally different elites. It is associated in a feudal agrarian state. Between the all-Yugoslav census of 1981 with the Orthodox churches who, unlike Consequentially, a second important and that of 1991, this group dropped from the universal Roman Catholic Church, reason for collapse can be attributed to 5.4 % to 3.0 % of the population (Savezni understand themselves to be national a steep northwest-southeast rift in the zavod za statistiku 1981; Savezni zavod churches and after the fall of commu- average educational level, in economic za statistiku 1993). nism regained influence in society. It is performance, and in the standard of liv- The resurgence of a national con- also very much associated with the in- ing within Yugoslavia (see Bertić 1987; sciousness meant for Serbs that they version of the political position between Malaschofsky & Klein 1972). Despite strengthened their claim to primacy in these nations, who as Muslim converts intensive inter-Yugoslavian efforts to the whole state and intended to restrict backed the authority of the Ottoman equalize the disparity it could not be the far-reaching self-government of the Empire, and those other nations, who as reduced, but only continued to grow autonomous Serbian provinces, espe- Christians were discriminated against at (Kiefer 1979). Due to this, the number of cially Kosovo. Early in the 1980s, the that time and later represented the state inter-Yugoslavian immigrants increased idea of Greater Serbia was reawakened nations. The latter accuse the former of in the relatively well to do republics of in the background, which considered betraying the common cause out of op- Slovenia and Croatia in the 1980s. These all of the Orthodox southern Slavs ex- portunism – an accusation that weighs republics viewed the growing number of cept for Bulgarians, and all those who heavily considering the keen historical immigrants as a burden and quickly tired spoke the Štokavian dialect to be Serbs, consciousness in South East Europe. of bankrolling the failed immigrants. and which held the belief, along the This, in fact, was the backdrop to some As a third reason it should be pointed lines of the 1844 published “schemes” extent of all the virulent conflicts in the out that even the Yugoslavia of the in- of Načertanje, that the Serbian people region today between Serbs and Albani- terwar period could scarcely have come would only be capable of successful na- ans, Bosniaks and Serbs/Croats, Mac- about in the form it did without exter- tional development once they succeeded edonians and Albanians. nal pressure, and that Slovenia, Croatia in dominating the rest of the southern The strong national consciousness, and Serbia followed different state goals Slavs. An important representative of based on very different historical views from the beginning. Also, communist the Greater Serbia idea was the Serbian and often antagonistic, makes the rela- Yugoslavia emerged in a macro-political geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927), tionships between neighboring coun- situation that would not have allowed to whom the Serbian nationalists often tries, as well as political and economic another alternative. It was not until this made reference. cooperation in the region difficult. Most situation changed that collapse was pos- Among Croats and Slovenes the re- of these states have oriented themselves, sible. surgence of a national consciousness if at all, to an external reference point A fourth reason was the highly so- strengthened the conviction that they (Brussels, USA) rather than trying to phisticated and far reaching (since 1974 did not have to share the fruits of their seek an intra-regional relationship. That at least) political self-administration. It economic achievements with others. makes it more difficult for South East allowed for largely autonomous politi- They also strove to live out their national Europe to overcome the status of the Eu- cal units, for whom independence was a cultures even more in their respective re- ropean periphery and to gain influence. small step. publics. The collapse of Yugoslavia (so far1) As the majority in Bosnia-Herce- The collapse of Yugoslavia took place exactly along the inter-Yugo- govina, the Bosniaks (at the time called While the collapse of Yugoslavia may slavian borders, although some of these “ethnic Muslims”) strove for political well have been triggered by the resur- are very recent and many are derived dominance in this republic. The Kosovar gence of national consciousness with all from the post WWII period. They are also Albanians demanded the status of a re- of the peoples involved, and especially public in Kosovo. The ethnic Macedoni- by the reemergence of the idea of Greater 1 Further collapse, e.g. as a result of divisions of Bosnia ans increasingly viewed its minority-rich Serbia, and was only made possible by and Hercegovina or of Kosovo or Macedonia, cannot republic as its own nation state. Only the end of the political rift in Europe, it be ruled out.

90 Europa Regional 15(2007)2 undisputed with a few exceptions (the sea This triggered ambitions for independ- These attempts and their failure had far- border between Slovenia and Croatia in ence in Slovenia and Croatia. But the reaching consequences especially for the the bay of Piran [Piranski zaliv/Piran- looming collapse of Yugoslavia was Serbs themselves, but also for the whole ski zaljev], the Serbian majority com- judged quite differently by the inter- region. The former Federal Republic of munes Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrivicë national community. Thus, there were Yugoslavia (it still consisted of Serbia and Leposavić/Leposaviq on the border forces within the European Community and Montenegro) was placed under an of Serbia and Kosovo, Albanian majority (later the European Union) which gave economic blockade by the United Na- communes Medveđa, Bujanovac, Preševo Belgrade assurances that they would ab- tions from 1992 to 1995. That damaged on the border of Serbia and Kosovo). solutely support the unity of Yugoslavia. the Serbian economy and prevented the The collapse of the relatively large The federal army, which had been beginning of a transformation process. Yugoslavia (1991: 256,000 km2, 23 mil- instrumentalized for Serbian interests, The transportation blockade of Yugosla- lion inhabitants) into several small and was first active in the June 1991 “Ten via diverted the West and Central Europe medium-sized states has fundamentally Day War” in order to prevent Slovenia - South East Europe/Middle East route to changed the geopolitical situation in the breaking away. This attempted interven- the east, (through Romania and Bulgaria) Adriatic region. The power of Italy on the tion was half-hearted and failed quickly. and via shipping (between the ports on western Adriatic coast now has no near With substantially greater pressure, the the northern Italian Adriatic and Greece) equivalent on the eastern coast and thus federal army was engaged in 1992 in (Jordan 2006). Because of the interna- has become the dominant in the Adriatic Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in or- tional discrediting of Milošević’s regime, region politically and economically. der to keep the large Serbian minority the lack of security which lasted at least The Adriatic is also no longer a border there in a common state. Belgrade also until the Kosovo ethnic cleansing crisis, between political and economic systems supported these minorities directly and and the instability of the internal politi- or military blocks. encouraged them to form separate states. cal situation, the transformation process With time, this could lead to a reemer- That led to violent conflicts that involved could scarcely take hold between 1995 gence of the former Adriatic cultural unit great loss of life in both republics, and and 2000 and Serbia was set back ten as it existed from Roman times until the did not end until August 2005 in Croatia years. The diverted international trans- Second World War. with the dissolution of the Serbian portation as a result of the crisis years separatist state and the mass exodus of returned only partially to the Serbian Serbia’s attempt to maintain domi- a majority of the Serbs as well as until routes after 2000. nance over large parts of the former December 2005 in Bosnia-Hercegovina Many of these consequences also af- Yugoslavia through US military intervention and the fected other countries in the region, albe- Against the backdrop of a resurgence of Dayton Agreement. it to a lesser extent. Macedonia was par- the idea Greater Serbia, expressed in a Serbia removed the Albanians from ticularly affected and suffered nearly as memorandum of the Serbian Academy of all administrative functions in Kosovo, severely as Serbia under the United Na- Sciences in 19842, the political represent- whose autonomy rights had been sus- tions economic and transportation block- atives of Serbia gave clear signals begin- pended in 1990. The Albanians then ade. Montenegro was also particularly ning in the late 1980s that they wanted to set up a shadow state, initially behav- affected as a republic of the Yugoslavian solve the problem of Yugoslavia through ing mostly peacefully until the conflicts Federation which existed until 2003 and tightened leadership in Belgrade and in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had afterwards was converted to a loose un- in favor of Serbia. In a speech in 1987 ended in hopes of gaining international ion. This co-suffering was one of the es- Slobodan Milošević, chairman of the support. Since the support was not forth- sential reasons for the distancing of Mon- Serbian communists, sided with Serbs coming, even after 1995, they formed tenegro from Serbia beginning in 1998 in Kosovo, who in his view were being radical groups and militant fractions under the leadership of Milo Ðukanović. persecuted. During commemoration of among themselves, which caused corre- Its main industry, tourism, lay dormant the slaughter of Kosovo polje in 1989, sponding Serbian reactions. The violent a decade long and only started to revive Milošević announced plans for energetic conflicts escalated and reached a peak in the early 2000s. Even Croatian tour- action against Albanians in Kosovo. In in 1999 in the expulsion of hundreds of ism was hit hard and did not bounce back 1990, Serbia suspended the autonomous thousands of Albanians, especially into until the end of the 1990s, whereby the rights of both of its autonomous prov- the neighboring countries of Albania year of the Kosovo crisis (1999) was a inces Kosovo and Vojvodina so that the and Macedonia but also into Montene- further setback. Because of their close Yugoslavian state committee, in which gro, which since 1998 had ceased sup- trade relationships with Serbia, Bulgaria the six representatives of the republics porting the Serbian course and gladly and Romania also suffered greatly from and the two representatives of the au- accepted the Albanian refugees. Due to the UN-blockade. tonomous provinces had the same voting this human catastrophe and also because Serbia not only completely failed rights, could no longer vote against Ser- of the threat of destabilization spread- in its attempt to retain dominance over bian interests.3 ing to other regions, NATO launched large parts of the former Yugoslavia, it air strikes on Serbian cities, forcing the also lost something which it otherwise Serbs to relent. would not have: Montenegro. It had al- With the removal of Milošević as the ways been a staunch ally to Serbia and 2 see Milosavlejevíć 1998. leader of Serbia in 2000, Serbia’s attempt had itself actively participated in 1992 3 The representatives of Serbia and Montenegro, and now also those of Vojvodina and Kosovo, always voted to retain dominance over greater parts of in the offensives of the federal army and in the interest of the Serbs. the former Yugoslavia came to an end. Serbia (e.g. at the attack of Croatian Du-

91 brovnik) but increasingly distanced itself after 1998 and broke completely from its South East Europe NATO members 1949-2008 confederation with Serbia in 2006. Ser- CZ UKRAINE GERMANY SLOVAKIA bia had probably already lost Kosovo de M O facto through the events of 1990 (strip- L D ping the Albanian administration of AUSTRIA O CH HUNGARY V power in the autonomous province). The A expulsions in 1999 definitely ruled out any possibility of a peaceful and demo- SLOVENIA ROMANIA cratic re-integration of Kosovo into the A T I A O A R Serbian state federation. Serbian politi- d I C cians of every political stripe still main- T r BOSNIA i SERBIA tain Serbia’s claim to Kosovo and the A AND a L HERCEGOVINA illusion of a possible re-integration even t today; the Serbian Orthodox Church en- Y i c * MONTE- courages this as well. NEGRO KOSOVO BULGARIA

Serbia’s actions in the early 1990s and A Founder member (1949) MACE- L * S its attitude up to 2000 weighed on its Member since 1952-55 B DONIA Member since 1999 e A relationship not only with the other suc- a N Member since 2004 I

A * cessor states of Yugoslavia but also with Member since 2008 the international community as a whole. Deployment of UN-, NATO or EU troops In fact the European Union rushed to the Tyrrhenisches TURKEY MeerHot spot A e g e a n aid of Belgrade following Milošević’s S e a 0* 250 km removal in 2000. With its Stability Pact GREECE IfL 2007 I o n i a n for South East Europe it created an in- Draft: P.Jordan S e a Cartography: F.Partl, P.Mund strument for strengthening Serbia’s connection to the rest of Europe. However, Fig. 2: NATO membership and crisis regions in South East Europe the nationalistic forces that dominate the Source: own design spectrum of political parties in Serbia, the tepid willingness of the country to cooperate with the Hague War Crimes the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Au- 1952). Since January 1, 2007 this region Tribunal, and its rigid attitude in the Ko- gust 1995). The NATO aerial bombard- has also been surrounded by the EU- sovo question have thus far been obsta- ment of Belgrade, Novi Sad and other states. That the relatively less developed cles to rapprochement. The orientation Serbian cities forced Milošević to sur- countries Romania and Bulgaria could toward Russia, which has in fact always render in the Kosovo conflict. join the EU so early in the transforma- supported Belgrade on the Kosovo-ques- The deployment of a relatively small tion process, can also be seen as part of tion, is seen by some political forces as UN-force in Macedonia from 1992 to the containment strategy. a more favorable option, but in the long 1999 probably caused Belgrade to accept With NATO acceptance of Croatia run is not a viable alternative to Euro- the independence of Macedonia with- and Albania, which had already been pean integration. out military resistance. It may also have members of the NATO Partnership for helped to deter the Kosovar underground Peace program at the Bucharest sum- The attempt of the international army UÇK until 2000 from operations in mit (April 2-5, 2008) the circle was once community to stem the conflicts in Albanian areas in Macedonia. again drawn tighter around the conflict South East Europe (Fig. 2) The NATO-expansion of 1999 to Po- regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Ser- In the latter phase of the Bosnia war land, the Czech Republic and Hungary bia/Kosovo. The only thing preventing (1995) and the Kosovo-conflict (1999), supplied the Western military alliance Macedonia from becoming part of this NATO founding member Italy served direct land access to Serbia for the first circle was the name controversy with as a military NATO base. NATO bomb- time and particularly through the mem- Greece. ers flew combat missions from Italian bership of Hungary, another potential NATO expansion from 1999 to 2008 airfields Aviano, Cervia and Gioia del base of operations. However Hungary and beyond, which deployed UN, NATO Colle against targets in Bosnia-Herce- did not tolerate any direct NATO actions and EU troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina, govina and Serbia. These combat mis- in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 from Hun- in Kosovo and also Macedonia ensured sions decided the conflict in both cases. garian territory, out of consideration for the complete containment of the threat Consequently the Bosniaks and Croatian its large ethnic minority in the Serbian of military-led violent conflicts in the groups won the upper hand over the Vojvodina. region, but did not preclude civil vio- Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and recap- The NATO expansion in 2004 to Slov- lence and political instability with all tured western Bosnia. The military turn enia, Romania and Bulgaria (as well as its (also economic and demographical) of the tide in Bosnia was also a condition around Slovakia and the Baltic regions) consequences. It also severely restricted for the successful liberation action in resulted in complete encirclement of the the opportunity for other powers (e.g. Croatia in the Serbian occupied regions Balkan crisis region (Greece and Tur- Russia) to actively intervene in the re- of Western Slavonia (May 1995) and on key have been members of NATO since gion.

92 Europa Regional 15(2007)2 Steps for the integration of South Central and South East Europe East Europe into European struc- N tures E Gross domestic product per capita 2004 South East Europe represents (with the D

E RUSSIAN exception of Eastern Europe, meaning W LATVIA FEDERATION

Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, which S as a constituent of a politically integrat- DENMARK ed Europe does not appear to come into LITHUANIA question as yet) the largest region and belongs to most compact economic periphery of RUSSIA Europe. Most economic and social in- BELARUS dicators reveal a great distance between it and the states of East Central Europe Y (Fig. 3). POLAND N This has been rooted in developments A since the early middle ages, but can be explained mainly by the long rule of the M UKRAINE Ottoman Empire, which hindered inno- R CZECH REPUBLIC vative processes and the subsequent ex- E SLOVAKIA istence of antagonistic nation states that G M O L D found cooperation difficult. O V The long dominance of the Ottoman A Empire also caused South East Europe AUSTRIA HUNGARY to differentiate itself substantially from other parts of Europe up until the present SLOVENIA ROMANIA I A day (particularly from West, North and T A T I O R Central Europe) in its legal systems and A C

L BOSNIA the attitude of citizens towards the state AND SERBIA and national institutions. Through cen- Y HERCEGOVINA BULGARIA turies broad segments of the population MONTENEGRO have considered the state an occupying Gross domestic product A force, avoided cooperation with it, and by purchasing power parity L MACEDONIA in thou./capita B secured advancement through fostering A > 30 N of private networks. I

20 - 30 A The significant lag in socio-economic 12 - 20 TURKEY areas, the differences in legal and politi- 9 - 12 > 9 GREECE cal culture and not the least national an- no information tagonisms, which came to the fore in the 0 250 500 km collapse of Yugoslavia only in the most IfL 2007 spectacular way, make grafting South Draft: P.Jordan Cartography: P.Mund East Europe onto the rest of Europe and its political and economic integration Fig. 3: Gross domestic product according to purchasing power per capita in 2004 in Central particularly difficult. and South East Europe It is nevertheless undisputed in Eu- Source: Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (ed.) (2007) rope that full political and economic integration into the rest of Europe and the Europe itself and helped it to improve to between Serbia and Montenegro, and EU should also be open to South East a certain degree. Serbia and Kosovo; Serbia’s continued Europe. And there is no doubt about the The energetic efforts of the EU how- attitude of defiance toward the independ- European identity of this region, which ever to introduce the states of South East ence of Kosovo; the internal political generates a feeling of community with Europe to the EU since early 2000, have situation in Serbia; the Western patterns the region and the readiness for acts of come up against current obstacles aside often less appropriate democratic po- solidarity with it. The violent conflicts of from those of a more cultural-historical litical practice also in Albania, Bulgaria the 1990s have awakened the awareness character already mentioned: the reluc- and Romania. of the states and citizens of Western Eu- tance of Serbs, and for quite some time Its lack for the most part of such inte- rope to the European responsibility for also the Croatians to cooperate with the gration barriers, also its slight complex- this region. Finally, it was Europe’s fail- Hague War Crimes Tribunal; the disunity ity with respect to the post-Yugoslavian ures in post-Yugoslav crisis management of the nations in Bosnia and Hercegovina problem situation, along with its role as and the sobering experience that such over the common state and their position a pioneering in the economic transfor- violent conflicts could only ultimately on it; the conflicts between Albanians mation process, gave Slovenia – actually be ended through American intervention and ethnic Macedonians in Macedonia; Central European and Mediterranean, not that helped to advance political unity in the longlasting uncertainties in relations in a cultural-spatial sense South East Eu-

93 trolled sovereignty”, also in Kosovo and South East Europe Status of EU Integration 2008 has an administrative military presence. CZ UKRAINE In fact, both states are protectorates of GERMANY SLOVAKIA M the European Union. O L All of the West Balkan states are ac- D AUSTRIA O cession candidates according to the ex- CH HUNGARY V A pressed will of the EU (European Com- mission 2008). The actual time of an EU SLOVENIA accession will depend in all cases not only ROMANIA O A T I A on the progress of respective reforms and R A adaptations, but also on the readiness of C I d BOSNIA the EU to accept them. This readiness SERBIA r AND has dropped considerably since the ac- T HERCEGOVINA i cession waves of 2004 and 2007 and A a t MONTE- their subsequent difficulties. This could NEGRO BULGARIA L i KOSOVO also affect Croatia, but its admission into c

Y A the EU should be easy to cope with, due S L MACE- B DONIA to its extensively transformed economy, e A

a N its considerable economic achievements

A (it lies considerably over that of the EU members Bulgaria and Romania), and its T y r r h e n i a n A e g e a n TURKEY small size among other conditions. S e a S e a Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina offer I o n i a n GREECE the greatest difficulty: Serbia, particu- S e a larly for its domestic instability and its wavering foreign political orientation between a European and Russian option; EU member, Schengen zone, monetary union West Balkan EU member, Schengen zone Bosnia-Hercegovina because it is far EU member from stable as a state and is still bicker- Candidate country, ongoing accession negotiations Candidate country, no accession negotiations yet 0 250 km ing over the goals of its three constituent Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) nations. Negotiations for SAA IfL 2007 Draft: P.Jordan Protective and control functions of the EU Cartography: F.Partl, P.Mund Acute and dormant conflict regions Fig. 4: Status of the European Union Integration 2008 in South East Europe Source: own design Kosovo Rationally considered, the independ- ropean – an integration head start which cially for these regions, which demanded ence of Kosovo in the beginning of 2008 led to EU accession on May 1, 2004 (see economic and also democratic, political means the end of a considerable burden Fig. 4). Already, Slovenia is part of the and legal development measures that are for Serbia. It is rid of the worry of a na- Schengen and the Euro zones. The states intended to lead to more cooperation be- tional minority that both demographi- of Romania and Bulgaria, not directly in- tween the affected states. cally grows disproportionately, and is volved in the post Yugoslavian conflicts The individual states of the West politically less acquiescent; also of an but important as a safety cordon around Balkans have been offered completely economically weak region which was the conflict areas, achieved EU member- different integration schedules. The a sink for development aid even during ship on January 1, 2007. However, they EU signed Stabilizing and Association the time of communist Yugoslavia and are not included in the Schengen area Agreements (SAA) with Macedonia which it would have had to support with and the currency union. (4/1/2004), Croatia (2/1/2005), Albania its own means. With the generous ges- The EU has coined the term “West (6/12/2006), Montenegro (3/15/2007), ture of letting go of Kosovo to obtain its Balkans” to describe the rest of states and Serbia (4/29/2008). Negotiations be- independence, Serbia could also have in South East Europe. This describes gan with Bosnia and Hercegovina for a gained a positive footing in relation to the successor states to Yugoslavia with SAA on 11/25/2005; its conclusion was the new state, the goodwill of the inter- the exception of Slovenia, and Albania. expected by 6/16/2008. In 2005, the EU national community and great attractive- Croatia, though not a part of South East granted Croatia and Macedonia the status ness for investors. Europe in a cultural spatial sense and of a candidate country. However, while The political class of Serbia was ap- also not carrying the historical baggage negotiations are underway with Croatia parently not in the position to make such that the other states do, must nonetheless and have progressed relatively far, they a gesture, because it (like with few ex- arrange itself in these terms. have not even begun with Macedonia. In ceptions the elite of Serbs as a whole, In 1999, following the Kosovo conflict both cases an accession date has not yet particularly also the Serbian Orthodox accompanied by the removal of Milošević been determined. The EU provides the Church) is imprisoned in the history in Belgrade, the EU designed the Stabil- function of protection and monitoring in burdened Serbian nationalism, which ac- ity Pact for South Eastern Europe espe- Bosnia-Hercegovina and, since its “con- cords Kosovo a key position as the “Cra-

94 Europa Regional 15(2007)2 dle of the Serbian Nation”. A change in Macedonia the reasons mentioned already for Kos- this position is not likely in the near fu- The Ohrid Agreement, which was con- ovo. There are, however, close relations ture. cluded under the aegis of the international with the Kosovar Albanians from the That means prolonged strained rela- community in August 2001 and with its time of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and particu- tionships between Serbs and Albanians pressure has since then been implemented larly from the 1990s when Albanians set in the whole region, particularly between to a great extent granted the large Albani- up Kosovo as a shadow state, Albanian the roughly 100,000 Serbs4 remaining in an minority in Macedonia (census 2002: elites retreated from Kosovo to Macedo- Kosovo and the present state nation of 25.2 %)5 the status of a second state nation nia, and thereby cooperated closely with the Albanian Kosovars as well as in the and fulfils many of their demands in the the Macedonian Albanians. Progress in approximate border area between Ser- area of democratic co-determination, ed- the development of Kosovo could also bia and Kosovo. Under these conditions ucation and public administration. Never- awaken the desire among the Macedo- it will also be extremely difficult to in- theless, the desires of some Albanians go nian Albanians to join it. A collapse of tegrate the Serbian majority communes well beyond the provisions of the Ohrid Macedonia would have consequences of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrivice and Agreement, whereby the demand to fed- that are difficult to predict for the rest of Leposavić/Leposaviq from the north of eralize the state, plays an important role. the region. Kosovo into the new state and it is possi- Conversely, many ethnic Macedonians ble that the Albanian majority communes found even the obligations of the Agree- Bosnia-Hercegovina of Medveđa, Bujanovac and Preševo in ment as imposition. The Dayton Accord, which came about southern Serbia may wish to separate In addition, the relationship between under the American and European ae- themselves from their hostile surround- the two groups is strained by the sub- gis in December 1995, did not remove ings and join Kosovo. That could lead to stantially larger demographic dynamics or erase the ethnic segregation caused new crises. of Albanians, which the ethnic Macedo- by war, “ethnic cleansing”, and refugees Continuing strained relations with its nians refer to as an “inner invasion”. Fur- in the once ethnically mixed Bosnia- large neighbor Serbia and between the thermore, the Orthodox ethnic Macedo- Hercegovina, but instead consolidated it. two national groups in Kosovo will also nians believe that the Muslim Albanians, In separating the state along to national- mean that Kosovo itself will be seriously Turks, Roma and Torbeši groups, which ist lines into Serbian and Bosniak-Croat impaired economically because the po- make up 32.5 % (2002) of the population, constituent states (called “entities”) and tential economic relations between the form a “Muslim phalanx”. furthermore by deliniating 10 cantons two countries cannot be exploited and It is undeniable, however, that despite in the Bosniak-Croat constituent state Kosovo will continue to be an insecure a certain political warming between (Fig. 5) according to national criteria, it ground for investors. That could cause Macedonians and Albanians since 2001, divided the whole state in a completely the small state, even with exemplary sup- both groups still exist as parallel socie- nationalist fashion. What was evidently port from the EU, to remain an economi- ties in daily life and hardly come into unavoidable in order to achieve a truce, cally weak zone in the long run with a contact with one another (see also Sironi has proven as the basis for the function- high potential for social conflict and a 2005; Kahl, Maksuti & Ramaj 2006). ing of the state to be a heavy burden. strong tendency toward emigration. This not only concerns language and Since the strongest competencies rest That it would join Albania in the religion, but is based on the reversal of with the constituent states and (in the framework of a “Greater Albania” is not the ruling conditions in the Macedonian Bosniak-Croat constituent state) cantons, likely even under such conditions, since region which took place twice: (1) in a and the whole state can only act, when all the Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedo- country previously dominated by Chris- three constituent nations (Bosniaks, Serbs, nia on one hand, and Albania on the oth- tian Slavs, the Albanians that converted Croats) agree, it is no wonder that Bosnia- er, “grew apart” during the communist to Islam under the rule of the Ottoman Hercegovina has not become cohesive – period. The Albanians in Kosovo and Empire were accorded a portion of state neither politically nor economically. Macedonia were socialized in the rela- power; (2) after the withdrawal of the Aside from the international commu- tively liberal and prosperous Yugoslavia Ottoman Empire (1912/1913) they were nity, which has served as protector and and look down on the Albanians in the reduced to a discriminated minority in a monitor since 1995, only the Bosniak mother country who grew up under a Slavic state (Serbia). Ethnic Macedonians majority population (2004/05): 50 %)6 is rigid and poor communist dictatorship. still perpetuate the image of the apostate interested in keeping the state whole. The international community and Albanian and look down on them with a The Serbian constituent republic particularly the EU can probably counter certain feeling of superiority. gives the impression of being relatively this development best by continuing in- It is still not likely that the Albanian content with its present condition as a de tensive talks with Serbia, offer it concrete Macedonians will blast the state with facto independent state under the mantle support and perspectives for EU acces- unreasonable demands or that they will of the powerless Bosnian-Hercegovian sion. This is the only way a new political align themselves with one of both of the total state. The Bosnian-Serbian elites elite can develop in Serbia, which places Albanian neighbouring states (Albania, have set themselves up in this constitu- less importance on nationalist feelings Kosovo), as long as their economic situa- ent state and could not expect any bet- and may also be able to redefine Serbian tion in Macedonia is much better than in national ideas. Albania or in Kosovo. The desire for af- 6 Personal calculation according to estimated dates of filiation to Albania is also improbable for the Federalni zavod za statistiku (2004) for the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and according to the estimation 4 According to estimates by UNHCR (www.unhcr.ch) , of the Slovenian demographer Josipovič (2005) for the KFOR (www.nato.int/kfor), and OSCE 5 Statistical Office of Republic of Macedonia Serbian Republic.

95 European standard of living, and gain Bosnia and Hercegovina its own clout as a region in Europe once Administrative division 2008 its states stop thinking only of their own respective development, and instead

Posavski k. (F BiH) overcome their own contradictory na- tionalisms and begin to work together on

R A neighborly, intra-regional cooperation. e p a I In a small mosaic of small states like u b s k l i k a S r p Brèko that of South East Europe there has to Unsko-sanski k. B

C be a special type of acceptance of one’s R neighbors and cooperation with them. Zenièko- Tuzlanski k. E The shortcoming of this respect is also dobojski e R n S evident in foreign trade, which is marginal k. i B O S N I A a n d v o between the states of South East Europe. HERCEGOVINA g a O e But several sub-regions do have closer c k r Srednjo- e ties: especially Slovenia, Croatia and Hercegbosanski bosanski H s k. k. I Bosnia-Hercegovina; Serbia is economi- e p A n o s cally strongly connected to Montenegro, a B r F e d e r a c i j Sara- Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina jevski k. Bosansko- S T podrinjski (Wiener Institut für Internationale k. Hercego- a irtschaftsvergleiche vaèko- W 2007). Far more I Zapadno- k herze- neret- intensive external trading integration ex- vanski i govaèki l A k. k. ists between the whole of South East Eu- b u rope and Italy, to which most exports from p many countries go (Bulgaria, Romania, A e O R R Croatia, Albania). Far behind Italy, but d G r E still prominent trading partners, are the i N a E Mediterranean countries Greece and Tur- t T i c N key. However, in terms of foreign invest- O S e ment, Italy is far behind Central and West a M European countries and is scarcely more strongly represented in South East Europe International border Neutralized zone 0 50 km Boundary of a federative unit than Greece or Cyprus (Wiener Institut IfL 2007 Canton boundary Draft: P.Jordan für Internationale Wirtschaftsver- Cartography: F.Partl, P.Mund gleiche 2006). Overall, the current economic inte- Fig. 5: Administrative division of Bosnia and Hercegovina Source: Jordan, P. & K. Kocsis et al. 2007 gration of South East Europe with the Mediterranean is strong. This is under- ter position from an affiliation with the educated people are still emigrating. The scored by active legal and illegal worker mother country Serbia. Certain features international community is still holding migration from South East Europe espe- of Bosnian-Serbian identity like the use strong to the total state. But it must re- cially to Italy, but also to Spain, Portugal, of the Serbian language in its ijekavian main weak under the Dayton framework Greece and Turkey. If one considers for- variant (in contrast to the Serbian-used despite some progress (establishment of eign trade, foreign investments and work ekavian variant) may support this self- a common police force) and is powerless migration in the same way, South East sufficiency. Its future attitude will cer- to oppose the diverging interests of the Europe is oriented in about the same de- tainly depend on the situation in Serbia. three nations. gree (admittedly different according to The Croatians of Bosnia and Herze- Once the neighboring states are politi- country) to both Central Europe and the govina make up the majority in three of the cally stable and securely embedded in the Mediterranean. cantons of the Federation but are neither European structures, there will have to By its very nature, South East Europe the majority in the state as a whole, nor in be a political realignment of the present is in the role of a bridgehead to South- any one of the entities. Despite their formal region of Bosnia and Hercegovina which west Asia and the Middle East (see also equal status as one of the three constitutive could be connected to crises. Zeune 1833, vol. 2, p. 242). Historically nation states, they find themselvesde facto it fulfilled this role, particularly when it in a double minority position. They partici- Conclusion and future prospects: was part of the territory of great empires pate in political, cultural and economic life Current and possible roles of that stretched over both continents. This in Bosnia-Hercegovina only in a restrict- South East Europe in Europe was the case in the Eastern Roman, the ed way and orient themselves mainly to (with special consideration to its Byzantine and the Ottoman empires. Croatia (Skočibušić 2005). Mediterranean components) The central regions of these three em- Under these complicated circum- South East Europe will be able to quit its pires connecting South East Europe with stances, the economic development of the present role as Europe’s periphery and a Southwest Asia, lay also partly in South country has suffered. Many young and crisis region, close its gap between the East Europe.

96 Europa Regional 15(2007)2 However, while Eastern Rome and By- cording to numbers, the largest (about however less receptive to fundamen- zantium, centered in the Bosporous, until 2.1 million), followed by Bosniaks in talist influences. Thus, fundamentalist the 12th century extended culturally and Bosnia-Hercegovina (1.688 million), the movements have not been able to gain a politically in both directions, radiated in Muslim Albanians in Serbia, Kosovo foothold in the long run, even during the the far corners of Europe, influenced Eu- and Montenegro (about 1.5 million), the the Bosnian War, when the Muslim Bos- ropean culture considerably, and in turn Turks in Bulgaria (747,000), the Muslim niaks were dependent on financial help received impulse from the rest of Eu- Albanians in Macedonia (509,000), the and arms supplies from Islamic coun- rope, this function was to a great extent Roma in Bulgaria (371,000), the Bos- tries – the best conditions for exercising lost in the later Byzantine Empire. The niaks, “Muslims” and Gorans in Serbia, influence. Ottoman Empire established itself in Eu- Kosovo and Montenegro (about 280,000) Muslim groups are especially aware rope from the beginning as a culturally and the Pomakhs in Bulgaria (about of the geopolitical bridgehead function and politically antagonistic power. South 250,000). All other groups have less than of South East Europe to Southwest Asia East Europe moved from a bridgehead of 78,000 members. in both directions and are currently sub- exchange in both directions to a South- All Muslims in South East Europe stantially strengthening it. west Asian occupation in Europe – a have been settled since the 16th century “Turkish” or “Turkish-Greek” peninsula at the latest and are an inheritance of the (Daniel 1875, S. 26) in Europe, which Ottoman Empire, which was a Muslim scarcely maintained ties with the rest of state, under whose dominance previous Europe. Christian autochthonic groups (Albani- Literature and sources The retreat of the Ottoman Empire ans, Slavic Bosniaks, Pomakhs, Torbeši Bertić, I. (ed.) (1987): Veliki geografski from the greater part of South East Eu- and Gorans) converted to Islam and to atlas Jugoslavije. Zagreb. rope (with exception of eastern Thrace, a lesser degree to which Muslim groups Bougarel, X., E. Helms & G. Duijz- the “European Turkey”) and the creation also immigrated (Turks, Tatars, also ings (2007): The New Bosnian Mo- of the Turkish state stripped it of this Roma). saic: Identities, Memories and Moral function as well. The nation states in the However, the close connection be- Claims in a Post-War Society. Burling- territory of the former Ottoman Empire tween religion and state, which is char- ton, VT. were mostly hostile to Turkey, the home- acteristic for the Muslim states and Bufon, M. et al. (ed.) (2006): The West- land of the former occupier. This attitude which uses Islam in order to assert its ern Balkans – A European Challenge. intensified during the communist era, religious rule with help of the state was On the Decennial of the Dayton Agree- since South East Europe and Turkey be- lost in South East Europe with the retreat ment. Koper. longed to different political systems and of the Ottoman realm. The upshot was a Büschenfeld, H. (1981): Jugoslawien. military blocs. The bridgehead function secularization of Muslim groups. Today Stuttgart. of South East Europe reduced itself to religion hardly figures in the daily life of Daniel, H. A. (41875): Die europäischen a minimum of economic relations and the Muslims – in some cases, even less Länder außer Deutschland. Leipzig. = transit traffic in this time. so than it does for Christians. This secu- Handbuch der Geographie, Bd. 2. Following the political changes in larized “European” Islam differentiates Daxner, M. et al. (ed.) (2005) : Bilanz Eastern Europe, it was revived compre- itself clearly from that of the recent im- Balkan. Wien, München. = Schrif hensively. This was not only due to eco- migration groups from Turkey or other tenreihe des Österreichischen Ost- und nomic and transportation relationships, countries in the cities of western Europe. Südosteuropa-Instituts, Bd. 30. but also as a consequence of the very In the streets of Sarajevo one sees fewer European Commission: http://ec.europa. active role that Turkey played politically, women with a head scarf than in many eu/enlargement/countries/index_ economically and culturally, particular- parts of Berlin or Vienna. en.htm (abgefragt 24.4.2008) ly in the Black Sea region and in other It is true that many Muslim groups in Federalni zavod za statistiku (ed.) parts of South East Europe; it was also a South East Europe like Bosnians or Po- (2004): Procjena ukupnog broja pri consequence of the Turkey’s application makhs draw their specific identity from sutnog stanovništva po starosti, spolu to become a member of the EU (acces- religion, but religion forms only the cul- i kantonima, 30.6.2004. godine. Sara- sion attempt 1987, accession candidate tural background of their identity. It is in jevo. since 1999, accession negotiations since no case practiced by all members of the Garašanin, I. (1844): Načertanje. Beo 2005). group. In no case does it imply a Muslim grad. For Turkey and other states with Mus- culture in the sense of value or code of Goehrke, C. & S. Gilly (eds.) (2000): lim majorities, the Muslim groups of conduct shaped by Islam in its substan- Transformation und historisches Erbe South East Europe are a special pivot. tial elements. For Albanians, Islam does in den Staaten des europäischen Os- Altogether about 7,650,000 Muslims even not have the character of a feature tens. Bern. lived in the former communist South of national identity since many Albani- Hatschikjan, M. & St. Troebst (eds.) East Europe (without Turkey, Greece and ans are also Orthodox or Catholics – so (1999): Südosteuropa. Ein Handbuch. Cyprus) at the beginning of the 2000s; religion for Albanians is not binding but Gesellschaft, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kul- a figure arrived at partly with census separating. tur. München. data, and partly according to estimation The Muslim groups of South East Henkel, R. (ed.) (2006): South East- (Jordan & Kocsis et al. 2007). Among Europe maintain nevertheless special ern European Countries on their Way the Muslim groups of South East Europe relationships to Muslim countries and to Europe. Geographical Aspects. are the Muslim Albanians in Albania ac- receive support from them. They are Leipzig. = forum ifl Vol. 5.

97 Jordan, P. & W. Lukan, W. (eds.) (1998): te – Sprache und Literatur – Kultur – ty in Southeastern Europe. Lanham, Makedonien. Geographie - Ethnische Politik – Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft – Boulder, New York, Oxford. Struktur - Geschichte - Sprache und Recht. Wien, Zürich. Wiener Institut für Internationale Kultur - Politik - Wirtschaft - Recht. Malaschofsky, A. & S. Klein (1972): Wirtschaftsvergleiche (ed.) (2006): Wien et al. = Österreichische Osthefte, Analphabetismus. In: Breu, J. (ed.): WIIW Database on Foreign Direct In- Sonderband 14. Atlas der Donauländer. Wien, Bl. 242. vestment in Central, East and South- Jordan, P. et al. (eds.) (2003) : Albania Meier, V. (2001): Jugoslawiens Erben. east Europe. Wien. Geographie – Historische Anthropol- Die neuen Staaten und die Politik des Wiener Institut für Internationale ogie – Geschichte –Kultur – Postkom- Westens. München. Wirtschaftsvergleiche (ed.) (2007): munistische Transformation. Wien et Milosavljević, O. (1998): Der Miss- WIIW Handbook of Statistics 2007. al. = Österreichische Osthefte, Son- brauch der Autorität der Wissenschaft. Wien. derband 16. In: Bremer, Th. et al. (Hrsg.): Serbi- Zeune, A. (1833): Allgemeine Jordan, P. (2006): Serbia-Montenegro’s ens Weg in den Krieg. Berlin, pp. naturgemäße Erdkunde. Leipzig, Ber- position in the transportation network 159-182. lin. of Southeast Europe. In: Heuberger, Roggemann, H. (1980): Die Verfassung Žuljić, St. (1991): A critical assessment V. & E. Vyslonzil (eds.): Serbia in Eu- der SFR Jugoslawien. Berlin. of certain of J. Cvijić’s conclusions and rope. Neighbourhood Relations and Savezni zavod za statistiku (ed.) (1981): messages in his anthropogeographic European Integration. Wien, Berlin. = Popis stanovništva, domaćinstva i research. In: Bognar, A. et al. (eds.): Wiener Osteuropastudien, Bd. 22, pp. stanova u 1981. godini: Nacionalni Geopolitical and demographical issues 109-123. sastav stanovnštva po opštinama. Be- of Croatia. Zagreb. = Geographical Pa- Jordan, P. & K. Kocsis et al. (2007): ograd. pers, Bd. 8, pp. 345-392. Ethnisches Bewusstsein in Mittel- und Savezni zavod za statistiku (ed.) (1993): Südosteuropa [1: 3,000.000]. In: Atlas Popis stanovništva, domaćinstva, Ost- und Südosteuropa, hrsg. v. Ös- stanova i poljoprivrednih gazdinstva u terreichischen Ost- u. Südosteuropa- 1991. godini. Stanovništvo, Bd. 3: Na- Institut, red. v. P. Jordan, Wien, Nr. cionalna pripadnost, detaljna klassi- 2.9-G9. fikacija. Beograd. Josipovič, D. (2005): Suitability of the Sironi, H. (2005): Empowerment von Dayton Territorial Division for the Frauen in Makedonien. Wien. = Wie Process of Integration of Bosnia-Her- ner Osteuropastudien, Bd. 19. cegovina. Vortrag bei der internatio Skočibušić, N. (2005): Identitätsmerk- nalen Konferenz “Dayton -10 Years male der Kroaten in der Herzegowi- After: Conflict Resolution and Coop- na. Diplomarbeit, Humboldt-Univer- eration Perspectives”, Sarajevo, 28.-30. sität zu Berlin. November 2005. Statistical Office of republic of Mac- Kahl, Th., M. Metzeltin & M.-R. Ungu- edonia, Census: www.stat.gov.mk (ab- reanu (eds.) (2006): Rumänien. Raum gefragt 20.3.2008) und Bevölkerung, Geschichte und Ge- Sundhaussen, H. (1999): Kosovo: schichtsbilder, Kultur, Gesellschaft “Himmliches Reich” und irdischer und Politik heute, Wirtschaft, Recht Kriegsschauplatz. Kontroversen über und Verfassung, Historische Regio- Recht, Unrecht und Gerechtigkeit. In: nen. Wien, Berlin. Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift für Gegen- Kahl, Th., I. Maksuti & A. Ramaj (eds.) wartsforschung 48, pp. 237-257. (2006): Die Albaner in der Republik Sundhaussen, H. (1993): Experiment Ju- Makedonien. Fakten, Analysen, Mei- goslawien. Von der Staatsgründung nungen zur interethnischen Koexis bis zum Staatszerfall. Mannheim. tenz. Wien, Berlin. = Wiener Osteu Taschler, B. (1989): Agrarstruktur [1: ropastudien, Bd. 23. 6,000.000]. In: Breu, J. (ed.): Atlas der Kiefer, D. (1979): Entwicklungspolitik Donauländer. Wien. Bl. 322. in Jugoslawien. München. The Miroslav Krleža Lexicographical Klemenčić, M. (1997): Atlas Europe. Za- Institute (ed.) (1993): A Concise Atlas greb. of the republic of Croatia & of the re- Kocsis, K. (Hrsg.) (22007): South Eastern public of Bosnia and Hercegovina, red.

Europe in Maps. Budapest. v. Mladen Klemenčić, Zagreb. Prof. h.c. Univ.-Doz. Dr. Peter Jordan Lienau, C. (Hrsg.) (2001): Raumstruk- Todorova, M. (1997): Imagining the Bal- Österreichische Akademie der Wissen- turen und Grenzen in Südosteuropa. kans. New York. schaften München = Südosteuropa-Jahrbuch, Vasović, M. (1980): Jovan Cvijić Institut für Stadt- und Regionalfor- Bd. 32.. 1865-1927. Geographers. Biobiblio- schung Lukan, W., Lj. Trgovčević & D. Vukčević graphical Studies, Bd. 4, pp. 25-32. Postgasse 7/4/2 A-1010 Wien (eds.) (2005): Serbien und Montenegro. White, G.W. (2000): Nationalism and [email protected] Raum und Bevölkerung – Geschich- Territory. Constructing Group Identi-

98 Europa Regional 15(2007)2