MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS

CLUSTER REPORT

SECOND QUARTERLY FEBRUARY 2008 – APRIL 2008

CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CLUSTER Page Number SYNTHESIS OF OVER-ARCHING TRENDS ...... 3 PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER …………………………………. 7 MILITARY BALANCE CLUSTER ...... 9 HUMAN SECURITY CLUSTER ...... 14 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER ...... 20 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER ...... 28 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER ...... 34 ECONOMIC CLUSTER ...... 39 PUBLIC OPINION CLUSTER ...... 44 MEDIA ...... 49 ENDNOTES……………………………………………………………………………….56

METHODOLOGY

The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace process. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the eighth of such reports.

It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of February - April 2008.

Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened.

2

SYNTHESIS OF OVERARCHING TRENDS

In the period of protracted conflict under review, a favourable balance of power clearly emerges as the priority on both sides, albeit with no specific timeline for its attainment. The balance of power favoured by each can be characterized in the following terms – for the government it is akin to that which obtained before the 1987 Indo- Accord, in that it is one which does not provide a space for the accommodation of key Tamil nationalist political demands – merger and a constitutional settlement outside of the existing parameters of an unitary state. In effect, the government is fighting a war to defend the status quo of a Sinhala majoritarian and unitary state. Furthermore, it should be noted that in 1987, the GOSL believed that through the Vadamarachchi operation it had the military upper hand and that Indian intervention was designed to salvage space for the accommodation of Tamil political demands. In this period too, there were serious allegations of human rights violations against members of the security forces.

The balance of power favoured by the LTTE is one akin to the 2002 period and is characterized by military gain and control of territory plus, and most importantly, the opportunity and space to institutionalize this through political arrangements agreed upon with the GOSL. In this respect, the LTTE seeks a balance of power, underpinned in tangible terms, of its self - perception and definition as the hegemon of Tamil politics or at the very least, primus inter pares amongst all Tamil political actors. Its long term objective remains the creation of an autonomous unit at least or separate state at best – a goal which is sees as being sustained by international recognition of an independent Kosovo. The underlying rationale of the LTTE remains that of staying in contention militarily and politically on the grounds that the costs of war to the Sri Lankan state will mount to prohibitive proportions and the tide of international opinion too, will eventually turn in their favour.

What emerges at present, is the relative success of the Rajapakse government in defining the terms of the conflict as one against terrorism rather than an ethnic conflict, and its relative success in setting the agenda accordingly. The abrogation of the CFA noted in the last quarter, the focus on the Thirteenth Amendment and provincial councils, the preparation for local and provincial elections to set up separate and distinct political institutions for the East and thereby institutionalize the de- merger, the refusal of permission to the Norwegian facilitators to visit the Vanni and engage the LTTE, are all elements of a strategy to marginalize the LTTE and settle the conflict within the confines of the existing status quo. The overarching political goal of regime consolidation is also furthered by ensuring that through local and provincial elections in the East, multi –ethnic and Tamil support for the regime, in particular, can be secured at electoral contests in the future.

With regard to the latter, what also emerges is that the overarching political project of regime consolidation has been commenced in the East. What is likely to follow is a series of provincial electoral contests culminating in the next Presidential and General Elections – the President can call the next Presidential election after mid November 2009 and Parliament has to be dissolved by April 2010. The objective is likely to be the exhaustion and demoralization of the opposition through a series of provincial defeats which in turn will deflect attention from the rising cost of living and failure to deliver on the promise of certain and imminent victory on the military front. In this context, the key question that emerges is the respective ability of each side to bear the costs of conflict in pursuit of their overarching goals.

Bearing the Costs of Conflict

Government: On the government side there are a number of factors that need to be monitored from this perspective, namely the economic costs of the war coupled with the rising cost of living,

3 the frequency of explosions outside of the north and east targeting civilians and the relationship with the West in which the human rights record of the government is a central focus.

As the Peace Confidence Index Survey (PCI) reveals, the president’s ratings with the public are very comfortably high, except on the question of the management of the economy where they are uncomfortably low in comparison. This suggests that whilst the public accepts the argument of international factors affecting the cost of living and the necessity of economic sacrifice in the fight against terrorism, they also believe that the economy can be much better managed under these trying circumstances. The poll reveals a simple truth – governments, fairly or unfairly, are invariably held responsible for the rising cost of living. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that a protracted stalemate on the war front, which seriously undermines the government’s claim that victory is both imminent and certain, will erode its support base. This is evident in the urban areas, which bear the brunt of rising prices. However a sustained period of this will impact on the rural economy and the current cushioning effect of military pay and pension as well as remittances from abroad, may be insufficient a buffer against economic hardship translating into public disaffection with the regime.

In this respect, attention has to be diverted from the simple fact of victory not turning out to be imminent, even if the argument could be sustained that it is certain in the long run. What happened at Muhamalai is a sharp reminder to the regime of what the shape of things to come could be, when hostilities further intensify. Consequently, the political management of protracted conflict will be deemed to necessitate tighter control over reportage of the war and the situation in the war zone, along with continued emphasis on anti- terrorist vigilance in the rest of the country and the traitor/patriot discourse. Electoral contests too, will be intended to both consolidate the regime in power as well as divert attention from the protracted nature of the conflict. The electoral rhetoric could be expected to stress past achievements and future possibilities, rather than current challenges, other than the constant reference to the work of unpatriotic elements. Electoral prospects will be advanced by lack of unity and cohesion within opposition parties and between them, as well as continued stalling on the reconstitution of the Constitutional Council and the appointment of independent commissions including for the police, human rights, public service and elections.

What this does mean is that the government will not only continue to face criticism of its human rights and governance record, but that it will also continue to fuel such criticism through its management of protracted conflict. Its clamping down on the media and its attitude towards the Commission of Inquiry (COI) and the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), resulting in the departure of the latter, attest to this and indicate that Sri Lanka’s appraisal in the Universal Peer Review process of the UN Human Rights Council and its re-election bid to the Council, did not have any deterrent or inhibiting effect in this regard. The GSP + issue further ensures that the government’s relationship with Western states will continue to have a human rights focus and accordingly evince strain. Reflecting the government’s ability to set the agenda, albeit perversely in this case, it is worth noting that recent Western pronouncements on Sri Lanka, focus on human rights and the earlier emphasis on a political settlement of the conflict is less pronounced.

LTTE: Muhamalai and the advent of a independent Kosovo notwithstanding, the LTTE faces a serious challenge in effecting a balance of power akin to that which obtained in 2002. Clearly its resource base is shrinking and the regular air attacks against it demonstrate the government’s determination to keep up the pressure on its military resources and the civilian population. Any long term projection on this basis will lead to the conclusion that LTTE military resistance must yield diminishing returns. Consequently, in order to be able to achieve its long term goal it has to act decisively in the short term to raise the costs of war to the government in political, military and economic terms. Hence the strategy of widening the theatre of hostilities to encompass the south of the country and of bringing home the horrors of war to civilians in the south.

4 There is however a dilemma for the LTTE – one indeed of their own making. The political imperative of being able to demonstrate to their constituency the ability to “strike back” and raise the costs of war to the government, results in civilian targeting and fatalities in the south. Internationally, this serves as a grim reminder of the nature of the organization and its modus operandi and leads to the hardening of international opinion – the very same international opinion that the LTTE aims to convince of the government’s programme of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” against the Tamil people. The LTTE’s inability to be able to move beyond the tactic of “bombing itself” onto the agenda, vitiates its efforts to turn international opinion in its favour, even at a time when international opinion is far from enamoured with the actions of the government. Furthermore, it lends credence to the government’s argument that it is fighting a war against terrorism.

The strategy of widening the theatre of hostilities probably results from an inability to take the military offensive and an unwillingness to do so at this point. Defensive action is a different matter and it is highly likely that the LTTE will mount fierce resistance if and when the battle approaches its core territory.

In summary, there is an element of the LTTE carrying on doing what it knows and feels it does best, until such time as the government finds it too costly to maintain pressure at current levels and is ready to consider talking yet again. For the LTTE, it is a holding operation with proactive escalation of the costs of war to the government, whenever possible, on the one hand and of drawing international attention to human rights violations and humanitarian crisis on the on the other, in the hope of turning opinion in its favour.

The Emerging Political Challenge in the East For all actors including the donor community, the immediate political challenge will come in the form of the newly elected political bodies in the East – this quarter has registered the TMVP sweep of Tamil local authorities and the next can be expected to see a TMVP victory in provincial polls. This is all that is happening on the political front and it is what constitutes the government’s policy of “conflict transformation”. Put another way, it is a further stage in the systematic dismantling of the Tamil nationalist political project and as such points to “hurting stalemate” as the only circumstances of a return to the negotiating table.

The challenge presented by developments in the East is posed by the following questions: 1) What will the government’s relationship be with a legitimized TMVP at the helm of local authorities and of a provincial council? 2) Will the experience of provincial councils in the rest of the country over the last two decades repeat itself in the East? More pertinently will there be a repeat of the experience of the Northeast Provincial Council under Varatharajah Perumal ? 3) Will the government devolve police powers to that council and what happens to armed TMVP cadre? 4) What impact will this have on Tamil/Muslim relations? 5) How does the LTTE respond to the institutionalization of separate political arrangements for the East under the stewardship of the TMVP? 6) Does the donor community deal with these new political bodies or continue to deal with the central government? 7) What does the donor community do in the event the new bodies do not have the capacity to deal with them? 8) Do development partners in particular, have a role to play in strengthening devolution, even if this is at the expense of slowing development?

5 Conclusion Having put the APRC in limbo and having shifted the focus of conflict transformation to the East, the government has gained the upper hand in this quarter, except on the human rights front. All other actors have to respond to an agenda set by the government. Yet at the same time, the success of its political management of protracted conflict is not assured. Embedded in the questions above are potential pitfalls, indicating as always that a defence of the status quo can never guarantee that status quo as long as it is at the root of conflict.

6 I. PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS

1.1 Context The abrogation of the six-year old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in the last quarter made clear that the undeclared war between the Government and LTTE had become official. Although the government continued to claim that it would be willing to engage in peace talks, the intensification of the war resulted in the Government’s strategy shifting from negotiating to defeating the LTTE militarily. The LTTE also sustained its rhetoric of calling for peace talks, even though it seemed that there was little space for talks. Reports indicated that Norway and would take up new initiatives to facilitate peace talks, but it proved to be only media hype.

1.2 Rapidly diminishing space for peace talks The lack of any progress in initiating peace talks was made apparent by the fact that the most positive development was the convening of Sri Lankan political leaders, and the Norwegian facilitators, on the sidelines of a conference held in Oslo, Norway. This Conference on Peace and Reconciliation in South Asia was organized by the International Association for Human Values (IAHV), from April 10-11.1 This conference was attended by the renowned spiritual leader Sri Ravi Shanker, Prof., head of SCOPP, Erika Mann, a member of the European Parliament, Minister , leader of the CMC, opposition UNP MP Jayalath Jayawardene, Venerable Brahmanawatte Seevali Nayaka Thero, Jon Hanssen Bauer, Eric Solhiem and MDMK leader Vaiko among others. Prominent actors who took part in this conference encouraged the government to return to the negotiation table. Among them were Norway’s peace envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer, Spiritual Guru Sri Ravi and prominent leaders of Tamil Nadu.2 Indian Spritual Guru Sri Ravi Shankar in his speech stated that he was seeking spiritual healing for the conflict in Sri Lanka.3

There seemed to be little indication that the Norwegian facilitators would step out of hibernation. Norway’s peace envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer, ruled out the possibility of an externally designed solution to end Sri Lanka’s prolonged ethnic conflict, stating that Oslo would be more than happy to assist any solution endorsed by the Sri Lankan people.4

Norway’s peace envoy Bauer requested that India play a more proactive role in the Sri Lankan conflict: “It will turn out to be vital if India can mediate and get both the government and the LTTE back to the peace table. Norway has never abandoned the Sri Lankan Government and if India mediates, we will fully support them.” 5 The Government Spokesmen Minister Keheliya Rabukwella said, “We do not need to offer any special invitation to India. The moment we get our friends involved in the Sri Lankan conflict, it turns out to be volatile as the LTTE does not want peace in this country.”6 There was no public response by the Indian Government and there was substantive evidence to suggest that India would re- enter to mediate between the two parties, especially at this juncture.7

The LTTE continued to appeal to the Norwegians on specific issues relating to the war suggesting that from the LTTE’s perspective, Norway played a pivotal role outside of peace talks on humanitarian issues had an important role to play outside of peace talks, which is on humanitarian issues. The political head P. Nadesan wrote to , the former special peace envoy on April 8, “We would like to place a request through you, who is looked upon by the Tamil people as a peace envoy, to the Royal Norwegian government to take steps to immediately end the military assault of the holy Madhu shrine.8”

1.3 Projection The abrogation of the CFA has a direct impact on the status of the conflict so it is no longer an ‘undeclared’ war. It is to be expected that this development will usher in a bloodier phase of war. As noted in the last quarter, the lack of a hurting stalemate or even the lack of a severe set back in the military operations has

7 meant that peace talks are highly unlikely. Given that the SLMM and CFA have been dismantled, all the other pillars of the ‘no war, no peace’ situation, including Norwegian facilitation, and even the Co-Chairs have become inactive.

8 II. MILITARY BALANCE

2.1 Context9 Since the beginning of 2008 military operations have intensified in the North, and the Government has clearly expressed confidence in that the LTTE can be defeated. Over this current quarter the Government has continued with its three-pronged military strategy to rout the LTTE. The focus of the military appears to be to breach LTTE defenses; they cut off supply lines forcing them to withdraw while killing as many LTTE cadres as possible along the Southern and Northern FDLs. The Security Forces were able to make some headway especially in LTTE-controlled Mannar, but movement has been slow, forcing the Government to push back its self-imposed deadline of June and then August 2008. There has also been some movement by the military in Weli Oya where they have been able to advance slowly, northwards. The LTTE has maintained a stiff resistance and has also tried to keep the Security Forces stretched by continuing attacks in the South, mainly on civilian targets, thereby expanding the theatre of war. The debacle at Muhamalai, in April which led to a significant number of casualties, especially of security force personnel, makes clear that the war will be slow measured and bloody. The last quarter also saw a number of attacks on civilians in government- and LTTE-controlled areas, which are violations of international humanitarian law, and the humanitarian and human rights ; which highlighted the consequences of the conflict.

2.2 Military balance remaining in favour of Security Forces despite set backs During this quarter it is clear that it is the Security Forces who are on the offensive, while the LTTE is fighting more of a defensive military campaign. The Security Forces are carrying out a three-pincer movement against Wanni from Mannar, Welioya and Jaffna. The military appears to be using large- scale military operations to carry out an onslaught on LTTE positions in addition to using small- troop formations both on the forward defense line and in enemy territory in order to weaken the LTTE.

The situation in Mannar provides some sense of the overall military balance. The Security Forces who had moved towards Madhu were finally able to capture the Madhu Church area. Other areas such as Adampan are expected to fall to the military and the LTTE will have to fortify a new forward defence line unless it wants to strategically withdraw towards the Wanni heartland. While the military has offered a number of reasons why the operations have taken so long including fears of attacking civilian targets, especially the Madhu Shrine, it is clear that the LTTE is offering a strong defense.

The Security Forces began their military operations in Mannar in July last year with the 57 division focusing on Madhu and 58 division on Adampan. It is yet unclear how exactly the Security Forces will proceed. For instance it is not clear whether the military is determined to immediately seize control of the A32 between Mannar and Pooneryn which would open up an alternate land route to Jaffna, as opposed to moving eastwards towards the A9 or the A34 (that links Mankulam and Vellankulam). The LTTE’s reliance on the North West coast to bring in supplies from India and for maintaining another front, especially for the who allegedly have bases in Vidathithivu and Nachchikuda, indicates that it is an important target for the Security Forces. Pooneryn is also a strategic point for the LTTE’s military operations against Government forces in the Peninsula, as it can launch artillery attacks against security force positions and use it as a launching pad for offensives.

The Security Forces faced a number of critical challenges that slowed down movement in Mannar. The LTTE is continuing to wage a fierce defensive war against the armed forces and has reportedly mined and booby trapped strategic areas through which the army is attempting to advance. Explosions were reported from Keerisuddan, Koayilmoaddai, Pandivirichchaan, Vilaaththikkulam, Valaiyankaddu and in the area near Adampan10. The LTTE also launched counter-offensives. On

9 March 10, the day went to polls the Tigers launched a surprise attack on troops manning forward defences in the Puliyankulam area.11 The on-set of heavy rains has been another critical issue making movement in the terrain more difficult and dangerous. Areas including Manthai West and Madhu, which is where the fighting is concentrated, have experienced flash floods in mid-March flooding bunkers and making movement by vehicle virtually impossible and slowing down ground troops.12 The rains and flooding also resulted in the dislodging of mines, which has made it difficult for both sides to move about even in areas they control. Both sides continued to launch attacks in spite of the rain, including artillery exchanges and combatants launching ground attacks in Mannar especially.13 The bad weather, particularly low hanging clouds made it difficult for helicopter gun ships to launch attacks.14 The heavy rains also resulted in an increase in cases of dengue and chikungunya.15 In a freak incident lighting hit a training field in Katukaliyawa, Minneriya which resulted in the death of 4 army men and injured a further 65.16

A significant controversy related to the military operations was the issue of the Madhu Shrine. There was mutual recrimination by both sides alleging that the no war zone was being violated with the military insisting that the LTTE was launching artillery from the church compound precincts, and the LTTE claiming that the military had fired shells which damaged the church. On April 3 the Statue of Mary and baby Jesus was moved to St Xaviers Church, Thevanpitty, in LTTE-controlled areas. Reportedly the LTTE refused to allow the sacred statue to be moved to St Sebastians Cathedral in government-controlled areas, although the Bishop of Mannar, Ryappu Joseph insisted that he had not been pressured by either side.17 The Bishop called for the area to be declared a no war zone through a gazette notification so that the statue could be returned, but the Government refused.18 The Madhu Shrine area seemingly offers little strategic advantage although it has the infrastructure to support a military base.19 “The political and symbolical value is great,”20 however, without the Statue the Government has not been able to fully utilize the propaganda value of securing control over Madhu Church. As commentator D.B.S. Jeyaraj noted, the Statue is in danger of joining the ranks of the disappeared.21

Despite the heavy fighting there have been no large-scale battles during this quarter, apart from the clash at Muhamalai on April 23 which led to heavy casualties on both sides,; particularly for the Security Forces. It is still unclear as to what exactly took place as the official versions of both sides do not match, and both sides insist losses were heavy on the opposing side. It appears that during the fighting the Security Forces were able to advance to the LTTE’s second FDL, but found themselves under heavy shelling by the LTTE. Initially the military claimed that it had advanced 500m into LTTE-controlled areas, and that over 52 LTTE cadres had been killed. The military initially claimed only 38 soldiers were killed and 84 injured. The LTTE claimed 150 soldiers and 25 LTTE cadres had been killed, and also two T-55 tanks were destroyed.22 There was a steady stream of ambulances from Rathamalana Airport to Colombo hospitals while the A9 was reportedly shut off for civilian traffic. The ICRC handed over 28 bodies of soldiers to the Government, and 9 bodies to the LTTE cadres. According to the LTTE controlled radio, National Radio, 143 bodies were taken to Colombo in body bags by the authorities. These bodies were embalmed and placed in coffins in three places namely Borella, Battaramulla and Madampe where 75, 38 and 30 bodies were respectively.23 The Government responded to the debacle with contradictory claims of what happened and tried to play down the figures, while trying to thwart any news getting out, especially regarding military casualties. A circular was issued barring former Army Chief of Staff, Major General, Janaka Perera from visiting army camps or army officers and barred them from having links with him, reportedly for criticizing the conduct of the war24 Some reports indicated that the military had launched an offensive and found themselves in a similar scenario as in October 2006 and November 2007 when the LTTE pulled back, allowing the troops to advance and trapping them in heavy firing. 25 Military analysts raised questions as to why the military sought to replicate these past debacles, especially when there were intelligence reports that the LTTE was reinforcing its FDL, and why there was no support from either the Sri Lankan Air Force or Navy this time around. Some claim that it was a

10 surprise attack in response to intercepted LTTE messages that their defenses were weak on the Muhamalai line.26 Ultimately, the battle at Muhamalai made clear that the LTTE was still a force to be reckoned with, and that the on-going military operations would result in heavy losses on both sides,; not just for the LTTE. In a recent interview with state television Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse admitted that they had suffered a big loss in Muhamalai. He claimed that over one hundred troops were killed and injured,; it was a loss the military experienced after a long period of time.27It should be expected that the situation in the Northern FDL will most probably return to a comparable situation like in March where there were almost daily exchanges of gun fire across Kilali, Muhamalai, Nagar Kovil, and small operations.28

Military operations and set backs: The military continued its full-4 scale offensive against the Wanni. The armed forces continued to attack the LTTE north of the Welioya FDL, and there are reports that the military made slow advances into Janakapura North despite heavy mines and booby traps.29 The air force conducted a number of aerial attacks; including attacks on suspected heavy gun points such as Pooneryn, and strategic centres such as the administrative and operations coordination centre near Puthukudirippu, and the communications base in Karadiyabokku.30 The military is conducting long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs) in the Wanni, Mannar and Vavuniya31. While Security Forces denied that they targeted any civilians, accusations that deep penetration teams were responsible for the deaths of TNA M.P Sivanesan and Rev. Father M.X Karunaratnam persist.32 During this quarter personnel from the (STF) – the police commando unit which is based in Ampara and Southern Batticaloa – were re-deployed in Welioya and Kebithigollewa. This move was seen as controversial, as the Opposition UNP claimed that the move was a response to a TMVP request who apparently felt that the STF would be an obstacle during the Provincial Council Election campaign.33 The Government denied this claim and pointed out that no STF camps had been closed, and that it was just re-deploying personnel in order to strengthen the FDL.34

While the LTTE is fighting a defensive war, it has been able to strike out and attack. While this may have not significantly off set the security force momentum or even slowed down the advance,; the attacks outside the North and East have increased pressure on the Security Forces and have meant that personnel are required outside the operational areas. The Sea Tigers were able to sink a naval Dvora fast attack craft off Nayaru, , on March 22. Six navy personnel were rescued but the fate of ten others remains unknown.35 The Defence Ministry speculated that the blast was either due to a sea mine or under water weapon developed by the Tigers.36 The LTTE reported that the explosion was a result of a by three cadres, Niranjani, Kaninila and Anupumaran.37 After 12 months the launched another aerial attack, this time on the Weli Oya defence lines. The impact of the attack itself was minor, causing no deaths. One soldier was injured from this attack. Given that the Air Tigers have been able to launch such an attack and return back to its secret base has raised serious questions regarding recently developed aerial detection and defence response capacity.38

During this quarter there were bombs, explosions, and intelligence reports of further attacks to destabilize the south and effectively bring the war to the rest of the country by the LTTE During this quarter the LTTE was held responsible for bombs and explosions; and intelligence reports of further attacks to destabilize the South and effectively bring war to the rest of the country have been reported. .Minister was killed in a suicide attack on April 6. The LTTE had been able to gain easy access to him despite repeated intelligence reports that Fernandopulle was a high profile target. This demonstrated a security lax on the part of the authorities rather and not just the perseverance of the .39 On April 25 a bomb blast occurred inside a passenger bus in Piliyandala killing 26 passengers and injuring 73, which was reported to have been carried out by the LTTE. An improvised explosive device exploded in Welawatte, killing one man and injuring three school children on March 10.40 There was a claymore attack near Galge on the Kataragama-Buttala Road on March 2 that killed one soldier and wounded another.41

11

There have been highly publicized claims that the Security Forces and Police have been able to crack down on suspected LTTE cells operating in the South, apprehend suspects, and seize explosive material including in Modara, Puttalam and Kandy.42 Reports indicate a high level of activity in the Central Province including a spate of attacks on power transformers in April.43 One suspected LTTE operative blew himself up in Modera on February 29.44 There continued to be claims that the LTTE was using civilian covers and underworld contacts.45 According to reports attributed to the police intelligence and other official sources, a third group was involved in the bombs and attacks in the South which has added to the confusion and fear.46 There were also reports that the LTTE is carrying out small scale attacks to destabilize the East. A claymore explosion targeting a bus on February 4 in Ethawetunuwewa on the Anurdhapura - Janakapura Road killed 4 SLA soldiers and 10 civilians; and a claymore killed two police officers in Kanchirankuda areas, Koralaipaththu Division on March 26.47

Casualties: The Army Commander, in December 2007 claimed that the LTTE had only 3,000 cadres and that by June 2008 they would all be killed. By the end of April more than 3360 had been killed, this clearly showed that the official estimates of casualties or fighting cadres, or even both, are inaccurate. 48 As in the past, the official casualty figures are generally inflated and the total force of the LTTE is undervalued. By February 10 the figure of remaining LTTE cadres had been revised to 5,000.49 Other sources claim that the LTTE has 10,000-15,000 cadres.50 Nonetheless, if the total fighting force of the LTTE is taken as 15,000 and the casualties as 3,000, then 20% of the LTTE’s cadres have been killed.51 Leaving the arithmetic aside it is clear that the LTTE is going to find it increasingly difficult to man such a wide FDL, so it will have to review its strategy especially on its Western flank. Among its casualties the LTTE has also lost some of its more senior leaders, including one time second-in-command of the Sea Tigers, Mangalesh allegedly due an internal rift; and also LTTE lost another senior stalwart Lt.Col.Thavam the official photographer of Prabakaran due to battles in the war front52. Rumours that LTTE ‘Supremo’ Prabhakaran was killed or injured were squashed when he appeared at the funeral of TNA MP K. Sivanesan. Rumours relating to his ill health continue to circulate.53

The military has insisted that the LTTE was relying on its less seasoned fighters on the Mannar Front and had called in its female fighting units and civilian militias. The military also claimed that they found baby items such as milk bottles, toys, infant clothing, and three female bodies inside a LTTE bunker in Pallaikuli, Mannar. The army accused LTTE of using pregnant mothers and breast feeding mothers to engage in sentry duties, pickets, and road clearances.54 Nevertheless, the LTTE has not employed tactics such as throwing waves of cadres against the advancing army in Mannar . Some analysts speculate that this may be due to the LTTE not wanting to loose too many cadres at this stage of the war and would rather cede territory. There are other reports, however that top Tiger Leaders such as Bhanu, Jeyam, Sornam and Ramesh and units such as Anthony, Jeyanthan infantry divisions, Sothiya Woman’s Brigade, artillery corps and Ponnamman mining unit are involved in the current operations, hence it is not just the fresh recruits who are manning the FDL.55

While the pressure is building up against the LTTE, it is clear that it is able to maintain a heavy resistance in the short-term. Manpower is a critical problem that the LTTE faces. There are reports that even with the one child per family policy, and civilian militias that include women and elders; the LTTE is still short of cadres. The LTTE’s efforts to recruit more youth into its forces have reportedly led to more families seeking to flee Wanni, which weakens LTTE’s position. In addition to the political repercussions and the loss of manpower, having civilians in Wanni makes it more difficult for the Security Forces to carry out operations. The LTTE is trying to prevent mass flight and has imposed strict regulations for individuals to leave Wanni, and even threatening to keep family members hostage There continue to be reports that the LTTE is finding it increasingly difficult to bring in arms and armaments. The Sri Lankan authorities for instance claimed to have

12 developed an underwater defence system to prevent large scale sea movement of LTTE across the international maritime boundary.56 However, the LTTE’s extensive use of mortars in defence, especially in Muhamalai and Welioya has intensified rumours that the LTTE has received fresh stocks of mortar shells from South India and Kerala in particular.57 There were also reports that the LTTE was manufacturing shells locally.58

The military by comparison finds itself in a positive position as enlistment to the forces remains high.59 The army claimed that 30,000 persons have joined the military within the first two months, and another 15,000 will join.60 The Government has purchased new MiG-29 interceptor jets from Russia61, and also plans to buy mobile radars, utility helicopters, attack crafts for , and transport vehicles and combat equipment, and arms from Slovakia and China for the Sri Lankan Army.62 However, the Government is trying to ensure that morale remains high, especially after the Muhamalai debacle. The figures of military casualties’ remains under reported. Minister stated that 104 security force personnel and policemen had been killed and 686 injured in February,; while the Prime Minister Rathnasiri Wickremanayake told parliament that 93 security force personnel had been killed and 686 injured in the fighting in Wanni in March.63 This leaves a total 197 killed 1519 injured if the official figure for April is also included.

2.3 Projection It seems that the military operations will intensify over the coming months with the Security Forces continuing their multi-pronged offensive. It can be assumed that most of the movement will continue to be in Mannar, and the military may make some headway there and even in other areas such as Weli Oya. Aerial bombardment is likely to increase and the Security Forces will also use long- range reconnaissance patrol/deep penetration units in order to de-stabilize the LTTE. The LTTE may try to launch counter-offensives and targeted attacks in the East, and is likely to carry out incidents of violence in the South to target key actors and/or ordinary civilians, but it does not seem that it will be able to prevent the military’s on-going operations. The military will however have to extend its deadline for its defeat of the LTTE, especially as the LTTE is still entrenched, particularly on the Muhamalai line. The Army commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka stated “I don’t conduct the war looking at deadlines and timeframes… But we must realize that the offensive is going to take time.”64 Thus, it is clear that the Government will continue to intensify its military campaign in Wanni. It can be assumed that the death toll from both sides will steadily mount. With the LTTE clearly facing severe constraints in terms of man power and arms shipments, the question is whether LTTE is able to launch sustained counter-offensives, or will it continue fighting foremost a defensive war.65

13 III Human Security Chapter

3.1 Context As witnessed in previous quarters, the present quarter witnessed a continued deterioration of the human security situation, with persistent violations against civilians, internally displaced persons (IDPs), media personnel, human rights defenders, and humanitarian actors. This quarter also witnessed the rising human rights and humanitarian crisis in the North, including areas in the LTTE controlled Wanni, raising questions of security of non-combatants, accessing areas to provide urgent humanitarian assistance, and the plight civilians and communities in the affected areas. With all signs showing an escalation of hostilities in the North, it is yet to be seen how the relevant actors will substantively address the deepening human security crisis in the area. The continuation of violations in East, despite the liberation, development and holding of local government elections in March 2008 have demonstrated the insecurity faced by civilians and the inability of State agencies to hold perpetrators accountable and deter the occurrence of violations.

The culture of impunity that has prevailed in Sri Lanka in the recent past has been exacerbated with the lack of progress in investigations and inquiries, including issues of politicisation of institutions, lack of independence, delays, interferences by state actors, resulting in the international independent group of eminent persons (IIGEP) to make an early exit from their observing role citing ‘an absence of political and institutional will’ to address the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. This development is only one in many that demonstrates the spiraling violations and the lack of concrete steps taken to address the crisis that is prevalent in Sri Lanka, calling to question the frameworks in place to deal with human security, and questions whether there can be any measures taken to end the culture of impunity.

3.2 Continuing human rights and humanitarian crisis intensifying in the North

Continued Human Rights Violations: Trends that have been observed in the last few months persisted this quarter including the continued attacks on and threats to civilians. Killings, abductions and disappearances seem to have increased in all parts of Sri Lanka resulting in the ICRC to making the statement that "Extra-judicial killings and disappearances are part of a terrible pattern of abuse in Sri Lanka, which must be stopped."66 In addition to individual acts such as shootings, stabbings, and other direct forms of violence, civilians have been targeted through other means such as bombs, claymore attacks, and aerial bombardment. Comparing the two quarters it seems that attacks targeting civilians had intensified over this quarter. There were a high number of claymore attacks and bombs during the previous quarter, both preceding the abrogation of the CFA and after. During this quarter the number of bombs including suicide bombs concentrated in and around Colombo and its suburb have increased in number, with high casualties, especially in the months of February (especially in the lead up to Independence Day) and April. In LTTE-controlled areas the number of civilian casualties as a result of aerial bombardment was lower than in the last quarter, but there were a number of casualties from claymore attacks.

14 35 32

30 Bomb Explosions 25 24 Claymore Attacks 20

15 15 Aerial Bombardment 10 888 Artillery Attacks 6 5 2 222 111 1 11 0 123412341234 February March April

Disappearances continued to be a critical problem during this quarter, within Colombo, Jaffna and Batticaloa districts in particular, recording significantly high number of violations. Although the (HRW) in their most recent report on disappearances67 focused on older cases dating from 2006 and 2007; it spoke about the overall context in which disappearances took places and how they took place. The report stated that a majority of cases documented by them implicate the Government, and in some cases the relatives of the ‘disappeared’ having identified specific military units and camps as having either detained on taken their family members. These statements highlight the human rights crisis facing the country in which state sponsored terror is rampant and no independent process is in place to hold perpetrators accountable.

The LTTE and TMVP have also been accused of continued violations. The LTTE continues with egregious violations including suicide bombings, political assassinations, forced child recruitment, and the systematic repression of basic civil and political rights in areas under their control. The LTTE is reportedly continuing with compulsory weapon training for school children, and the policy of one child per family. The conscription by the LTTE is not limited to children. There have also been reports of fishermen being abducted by LTTE and forcibly conscripted recruited. In March 3 brothers were arrested along with another fisherman abducted by the LTTEfrom Mannar Island.. Although there has been a slight increase in child recruitment in this quarter, compared to the previous quarter, the LTTE recruited 12 children while re-recruiting 1 other. At present the LTTE has 1,410 cases of underage recruitment, and out of that 146 are presently under the age of 18. 68 According to UNICEF the TMVP has 144 cases of underage recruitment, and of these 76 are under 18, and 68 were recruited while under 18 but have passed that age.69 The TMVP released 44 children and youth during this quarter, which seemed to signal a process of transformation. The fact that the TMVP continued to abduct children over the quarter, 7 recruitment cases and 2 re-recruitment cases has meant that the TMVP is in danger of replicating the ‘revolving door’ policy of the LTTE with regards to child recruitment, where one lot of children are released and another lot are abducted.

Continuing Insecurity in East: Although the holding of Local Government Elections in parts of on March 10 were portrayed as a positive step in returning normalcy and democracy in the East insecurity, fear and tension prevailed. While the election period witnessed few incidents of reported killings reports indicated an “overwhelming culture of fear and intimidation.”

15 There were also reports of several individuals being coerced into contesting in the elections and others being forced to vote. The climate of fear and insecurity that prevailed in the run up to the elections and the election day malpractices documented begs the question whether these elections were merely held by the Government to demonstrate to the international community that there is ‘normalcy’ in the East, and to provide a space for the TMVP to enter the democratic process.

Although the elections and the development in the liberated east are flagged as successes, the continuation of human rights violations undermine these claims. Prior to the election there were various claims of rights violations. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) in Batticaloa stated there were 63 and 37 complaints reported in January and February respectively. Out of the violations in February, there were six complaints of arrests, six complaints of disappearances, five complaints of abductions, and eight complaints of intimidation in February. Based on killings reported in the trilingual media it seems that a number of cases were reported in Batticaloa each month with an increase in April (February 4, March 3 cases and April 6). Abductions and disappearances which tend to be under–reported were somewhat higher in March (7 cases) and no cases reported in April. There were also several reported cases of violence against women including abductions and rape; including the abduction of two school girls from the Kalkudaa Naamakal Viththiyaalayam by a white van on March 4th. Though police complaints were made with many of the violations, none of the perpetrators have been held accountable,- a further indicator to the culture of impunity prevalent in the liberated areas.

Other parts of the east also witnessed continued violations. In it was reported that there were 24 disappearances, and 25 abductions in the first three months of 2008.70 While these are reported figures, many civilians fear reprisals in reporting violations. There are also those who lack confidence in steps being taken to investigate, and hold violators accountable due to the prevailing culture of impunity. One positive sign with the elections was that election monitors and media were allowed in to areas in Batticaloa, including the newly resettled areas which were restricted previously.71

Lack of improvement in the human security situation in Jaffna: Threats to human security were witnessed in the Jaffna peninsula, with issues of human rights violations, displacement, restrictions on livelihoods and on movement continuing from the previous quarter. The killings, abductions, disappearances, and threats to civilian life continued, with several incidents being reported during curfew hours and in high security areas. According to HRC Jaffna reports, there were 740 persons who had disappeared in the area from December 2005-March 2008 with as many as nine media personnel killed. It has also been reported that more than 27 civilians were abducted in the first three months of 2008. While these are disturbing figures, similar to other parts of Sri Lanka many violations go unreported due to fear of reprisals and therefore the reported figures are merely an indicator of the true nature of the problem.

The increased fear and insecurity faced by civilians is an indicator of the rising number of surrendees72 in the Jaffna prison. The plight of the surrendees, opting to go into prison and remain with convicts and criminals, aptly sums up the fear they face and the knowledge that they will be targeted if they remain free. From January 1- February 20, 2008 (in less than 8 weeks) there were 12 new surrendees in the Jaffna prison, there are over 376 surrendees presently in the prison the conditions being poor, cramped and unhygienic.73 The residences of the surrendees indicate the areas in which human rights violations are most rampant, including areas in Chavakachcheri, Meesalai, Koddikamam. Though increasing numbers resort to protective custody and remain in jail, those who can afford to escape the peninsula do so which is an emerging trend in the North.

While the killings, disappearances, abductions and threats to civilians continue in Jaffna, other forms of violations are also present including restrictions in movement and livelihoods, rising cost of living

16 and numerous humanitarian difficulties. As with other parts in the North and East, Jaffna peninsula remains increasingly militarised, with military approval necessary for most activities and having in many respects replaced the civilian administration.74

The rule of law under siege: Arrests and detentions continued in this quarter in all parts of the country. A high profile arrest was that of journalist Tissanayagam on March 7 along with .3 others, who are associated with the media. Though no formal charges have been brought against any of them, these cases demonstrate a growing trend where individuals are detained for no apparent reasons or on substantial evidence, with complete and utter disregard to the rule of law and due process. While the Government has been able to claim that arrests and detentions have resulted in Security Forces and Police being able to capture. LTTE cadres and prevent attacks of terrorism there are also indications that the suspects include civilians, whose main reason for being arrested is that they are Tamils from the North and East. It also appears that the Government is willing to use arrests and other modes of intimidation in order to target anyone who is critical unfavourable or a threat. With limited redress available at a time when emergency law prevail and detention orders are not provided to the detainees or their counsel, the courts have become increasingly reluctant to question the decisions of the government and thereby becoming complicit in the abuse and collapse of the rule of law.

Inherent flaws with investigations and inquiries: ingredients for a cycle of impunity The above is one of the few occasions where justice has been delivered and some redress provided to the victims and affected families. A persistent trend in Sri Lanka is the culture of impunity, with no progress in investigations and inquiries into human rights violations, limited numbers of indictments and no convictions of human rights violators in the recent past. This quarter witnessed several developments with the Commission of Inquiry (COI) investigating and inquiring into the 16 human rights cases. The video conferencing that took place in March demonstrated the inherent problems of the system, including the lack of effective witness and victim protection, and delaying tactics by the state and other actors. These and other problems have resulted in the IIGEP making an early exit as observers in the investigations and inquiries where they cited various obstacles and restrictions in independent investigations and inquiries including the following: There seems to the IIGEP to be an absence of political and institutional will on the part of the Government to pursue with vigour the cases under review with the intention of identifying the perpetrators, or at least uncovering the systemic failures and obstructions to justice that rendered the original investigations ineffective.

There have been inherent flaws with the victim and witness protection mechanisms which are presently available in Sri Lanka, with several reports of persons coming forward either being targeted or threatened, this has instilled a fear in many to come forward with crucial information and evidence. Such flaws have further exacerbated the culture of impunity, which provides for human rights perpetrators to roam free as there is insufficient evidence to hold them accountable in a court of law. Recent developments have demonstrated that this is not limited to Sri Lanka. Victims and witnesses who have fled Sri Lanka and presently living overseas have also been threatened, resulting in one victim refusing to provide testimony in the video conferencing that was held in March. Further, the release of , leader of the TMVP, from the British Prison and the inability to bring charges against him on human rights violations including child conscription, , and abductions is related to the fear felt by many of providing evidence with the prospect of reprisals.

A deepening humanitarian crisis in the North: What is notable in this quarter is that many of the broad trends witnessed in the last two years in relation to humanitarian issues persisted with little or no initiative by any of the parties to address them. Issues such as restrictions in movement, security of IDPs and the general lack of humanitarian space were all witnessed this quarter.

17 The continuation of hostilities has resulted in 183,758 IDPs presently in Sri Lanka.75 The increased military operations including aerial bombardments, insecurity and various threats has caused significant numbers of IDPs especially in Killinochchi and Mannar. There are also reports of civilians being caught in the cross fire, and hostilities particularly in areas of Mannar district. For example, the LTTE claimed that the military had turned Madhu into a “war zone” and that it had forced the flight of civilians who had sought security in Madhu.76 In March 2007 the LTTE claimed that it had to evacuate over 10,000 displaced persons out of Madhu area due to the ongoing hostilities77. There are also reports of people escaping LTTE controlled areas and entering government controlled areas. Many of these people are fleeing the high level of insecurity within Wanni and also the LTTE’s forcible recruitment. The LTTE has imposed severe restrictions on civilians leaving Wanni, and if civilians are given permission other some family members may be held hostage. If youth attempt to flee Wanni, other family members may be detained by the LTTE, hence entire families have to find a way of escaping. Those who are lucky and able to flee Wanni mainly arrive in Mannar, some in Trincomalee either by boat or by foot.

Having fled to government-controlled areas however, the majority of IDPs are not free to move into normal welfare centres, or with host families instead, they are either detained and arrested by government forces or put into special welfare centres such as Kalimoddai, Mannar. In this centre IDPs are not allowed to move about freely but have limited opportunity for livelihood opportunities or to seek medical assistance. The majority of Kalimoddai’s residents reportedly want to leave the camp and move in with relatives in Mannar Island, but so far the Security Forces have not given them approval. It has been reported that there is limited preparation by the Government to address the needs of the IDPs fleeing the Vanni, and that the situation in camps such as Kalimoddai are not ideal either in terms of the location, or the services available, in terms of proper shelter, water and sanitation. Security threats continued this quarter. Fleeing civilians from the Vanni are in most occasions treated as criminals and detained for long periods. Many of the civilians in the Vanni have had to experience forced training by the LTTE, and regardless of the fact that they had limited choice in the matter,; when entering Government controlled areas they are treated with suspicion by the government forces. Threats against IDPs in welfare camps still persist as seen with the abduction of an IDP in a white van from a camp in Chavukkadi in Batticaloa.78

Freedom of movement has been an issue in the North, with the many exit and entry points to the Vanni facing various restrictions and thereby impacting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With recent suicide attacks in the south, there have been further restrictions in the North including stringent travel restrictions at Medawachchiya following Dambulla attacks.79 This has severely impacted the transport of essential goods to Mannar and Vavuniya, and impacted the movement of civilians and humanitarian actors. Humanitarian actors have also continued to face difficulties in their operations including security considerations including questioning and being detained for long periods. For example, six female employees of the Social Welfare Organization of Ampaa'rai District (SWOAD) were detained in Veeramunai by the Police for many hours with no charges being brought against them.

3.3 Projection The significant factor in the present quarter is that it has seen the continuation of serious human rights and humanitarian violations, with no prospect of immediate redress or rectification. With the war moving to the North, all indicators are that we will witness a similar crisis to that experienced in the east in 2006/7. Though liberated, the east still experiences numerous challenges, many of which will remain unless and until a genuine democratic process takes shape. Unfortunately, there are no signs of democracy, rule of law, pluralism and justice prevailing in most parts of Sri Lanka. Taking into consideration the hawkish attitude of the Government, the military strategies, the role of armed actors, collapse of the rule of law, increased authoritarianism, and the complete disregard for

18 international norms, the next quarter has all signs of a deeper crisis with intense human suffering, violations, and a flourishing culture of impunity.

19 IV POLITICAL

4.1 Context Despite the lack of a clear Parliamentary majority and its reliance on a loosely held alliance, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has been able to further consolidate its position during this quarter with a resounding victory for its ally the TMVP in the Local Government Elections in Batticaloa. The Government’s decision to go ahead with the Eastern Provincial Council Elections was met with a high level of interest by the main political parties who invested significant energy into the election campaign. The election results will have significant repercussions both for local actors in the East and for national politics. In national politics the sudden split within the JVP added to the political instability, and demonstrated once again the Government’s ability to maneuver and dominate political parties. The violent death of three members of parliament made clear that instability and turbulence within Sri Lankan politics is set to continue.

4.2 Government further consolidating power in a unstable context Batticaloa local government elections: A key development in this quarter was the Batticaloa Local Government Election which was held on March 10.80 It was a test of both the Government’s claim that the East had been ‘liberated’ and the position of the TMVP within the Eastern Tamil Community. The Government was able to claim the election as a double success: that it was able to hold the elections and thus prove that normalcy and democracy had returned to the East and that its ally the TMVP won a resounding victory. The Government’s claims of success were, however undercut by the non-participation of key political parties and reports of intimidation that challenged the claims that it was a free and fair election.

The Batticaloa L.G Elections was a significant attempt at rehabilitating democratic politics in the East and were used as such by the Government to demonstrate the success of ‘liberation.’ A few of the local authorities in Batticaloa had already been to the polls in 2006 but due to the security situation elections had been postponed in nine bodies, mainly in Tamil areas under government- control and LTTE-controlled areas including Batticaloa Municipal Council, Eravurpatthu Pradeshiya Saba, Koralepatthu Pradeshiya Saba, Koralepatthu North Pradeshiya Saba, Manmunai South, Eravilpatthu Pradeshiya Saba, Manmunai Pradeshiya Saba, Manmunai West Pradeshiya Saba, Manmunai South West Pradeshiya Saba, and Porativupatthu Pradeshiya Saba.81 For these ten bodies elections were held after a lapse of 14 years.

The statistics gathered from the election make it difficult to dismiss the outcome: a total of 270, 473 eligible voters, including 11,000 IDPs for whom special arrangements were made to vote; they had the opportunity to cast their ballot in 285 polling stations for six political parties and twenty two independent groups who had put forward 831 candidates. 161,749 or 59.8% of eligible voters exercised their franchise, returning 101 councilors.82 The Government took a number of measures such as bringing in 6000 policemen for Election Day while also providing two policemen for each candidate. The statistics of recorded election related violence was low, which indicated, at least for official purposes that the election was ‘free’ and ‘fair.’83

The claim that the LG elections were free and fair was challenged from the outset. The refusal of the (TNA) and the (UNP) to participate in the local polls questioned the legitimacy of the polls. Both parties stated that security concerns were the main reason for not contesting the election. The L.G polls recorded a low level of election related violence. PAFFREL noted that “elections were held peacefully except for few incidents reported in Vakarai.”84 This view was backed by an ‘unnamed’ civil society group. Reports by other civil society organizations including CPA and a nine-member coalition verified that there were a number of incidents of violence and that the overall culture of fear and insecurity questions as to whether this is a free and fair election.85 “While the East faces many difficulties, the upcoming elections are

20 especially troubled by forced participation in all levels of the election, the persistence of violence in the region and the apparent manipulation of the usual indicators of free and fair elections.”86 There were reports that individual candidates had been forced to contest by the TMVP, and at least one instance where an individual who refused was shot dead.87 Efforts by groups to post pone the poll through the intervention of the Election Commissioner failed, including the TNA's bid to get the Supreme Court to postpone the elections until normalcy was restored; it failed.88 The issue of legitimacy was challenged. The UNP which was not a party to the elections alleged “that the elections to nine local bodies including the Batticaloa Municipal council, held after the government entered into a pact with the armed Group or TMVP was an extension of the manner in which President Mahinda Rajapakse had won the November 2005 presidential election.”89 For the most part the election was heralded by political actors in the South. The JHU said “that the holding of elections to the Batticaloa Municipality and eight other local bodies was a fine reply to LTTE leader V Prabhakaran and his henchmen in Colombo.”90 The JVP however claimed that “though the local government elections in the east could not be a 100% democratic exercise, it was at least the first step towards reviving democracy in the Eastern province.”91

For the Government and the TMVP the LG elections offered significant benefits. Through it the Government is able to demonstrate the fruits of liberation including the return of normalcy and democracy. The victory of the UPFA and TMVP also allows it to retain control and demonstrate the legitimacy of its allies. Furthermore, the LG Elections offered a dry run in preparation for the Eastern Provincial Council Election which is obviously a more significant election. The elections also made clear to the Government that it had a new strategic vote base not just in terms of potential votes but also in terms of demographics. During the Presidential elections Mahinda Rajapakse won the majority of Sinhalese votes, while the UNP carried the majority of minority votes. The emergence of the TMVP promised to bring about a dramatic change.

The TMVP’s resounding victory in the polls put it in a significant position to secure and consolidate its position in the East, and also strengthened the Government’s hand. The TMVP led by Sivanesathurai Chanthirakanthan, alias Pillayan, emerged victorious in all bar one of the nine local government bodies, winning 61 of the seats and 35% of the total votes cast.92 In Batticaloa MC the TMVP contested under the UPFA symbol and won. Other Tamil political groups and independents also did well.93 The key question was whether its victory would initiate the transformation in the behaviour of the TMVP from an armed group to a political one. While S. Pillayan cast his vote for the first time in his life and claimed that the election “would mark the beginning of the Eastern province being demilitarized and re-democratized”; this is yet to be seen. 94 The TMVP had resisted calls to disarm stating that it needed arms for self defence, but given reports of its involvement in a variety of human rights abuses, including looting of IDP camps and child recruitment, it has a responsibility to demonstrate a transformation rather than continue a path of political consolidation and militarization. That the TMVP was elected into office could make it more accountable to the public.

The elections effectively made public the complicity between the Government and the TMVP, and made clear that Government officials had been misleading the public and the international community regarding the relationship between the two. That the TMVP had curtailed the movement of its armed cadres was as much an indicator of its transformation as proof that the Government was in a position to prevent the TMVP carrying guns in public and committing crimes. The Government’s refusal to disarm the TMVP makes it responsible for preventing violence and violations by the group.

Given the demographics it was expected that the SLMC would not win any of the councils, but it did win a number of seats. The SLMC was able to claim that it won 82% of the Muslims vote, and thereby defeat former SLMC parliamentarians who had joined the Government and contested for

21 the UPFA. It is noteworthy that there had been a high level of violence in Muslim areas leading up to the poll with the SLMC in particular being at the receiving end.95

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: Immediately after the LG elections the Government declared through a gazette declaration May 10 as the date of the first event Provincial Council Elections for the East. 96 The EPC elections are to be held in the three districts of the Eastern Province - Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara, which will return 11, 10 and 14 members respectively. When nominations closed on April 3, 1,342 candidates from more than thirty political parties and fourteen independent groups had submitted their nomination papers. 97

The elections are significant for various reasons. In October 2006 the East was de-merged from the North in the wake of a Supreme Court ruling. The joint administration was divided between the de- merged North and East with the Government making a number of appointments.98 The establishment of an Eastern Provincial Council will further legitimize the de-merger. The issue of legitimacy is a key for the Government which also wants to drive forward the process of normalization in the East. While most political parties decided to compete for various reasons the UNP’s decision to contest added credibility of the process. The TNA’s decision not to compete could be due to a number of factors including the fear of legitimizing the de-merger and the EPC,; opposition from the LTTE and India regarding the TNA competing or even due to the fact that it cannot guarantee winning many seats. In the statement on April 2 the TNA declared that it would not contest, it said, “this is an election at which through the visible or invisible fire and muscle power of the TMVP and Government armed forces, President Rajapakse hopes to implement his insidious political agenda.”99 The specter of violence and intimidation which had raised questions as to whether the LG elections were free and fair cast a shadow on the EPC elections. The issue of the TMVP continuing to carry arms continued to be an issue, as a number of political parties called for the TMVP to be disarmed, but the Government refused to actively engage in such a process. For the TMVP the EPC will be a key step in their efforts to consolidate political power. The EPC election is also a communal battle as it is clear that the main struggle is whether the chief minister will be a Tamil or a Muslim. There were even reports that international actors were playing a prominent role in the elections with allegations that the US, Norway and India are backing the UNP-SLMC alliance.100

For the TMVP securing control of the EPC has become a raison d’etat, if they fail they will face serious issues regarding their long-term survival. The importance for the TMVP of securing control of the EPC cannot be emphasized enough, and was made clear by both Pillayan and Karuna before him . The TMVP has championed the issue of Eastern Tamil identity, and if they fail to carry the majority of Tamils and secure the Chief Minister position then they could face a serious crisis. The group’s apparent efforts to transform from an armed group to a political movement working within a democratic system could be seriously set back, which would also have implications for Eastern stability. Similarly for the SLMC, control over the EPC is critical as the first election that the party ever faced was for the North East Provincial Council Election when it secured the second highest number of seats in the PC. This time round the SLMC realized that the Muslim Community has a significant chance of securing control of the PC which would however further fuel tensions with the TMVP. There was an initial proposal for all the Muslim political parties to contest as independents, and thereby ensure that a Muslim would win the position of chief minister, but the inherent rivalry and suspicion in Muslim politics proved to be an impossible hurdle. Instead, as expected, the SLMC joined the UNP and agreed to contest under the elephant symbol and the other remaining political groups coalesced in an uncomfortable alliance with the UPFA and the TMVP. Furthermore, given that the East is the base of the SLMC and that the party has suffered so many defections including most recently that of M. L. M. Hisbullah who was touted as SLMC’s candidate for Chief Minister, crossing over to the Government; the party and the current leadership have to prove that they have retained its mass support. The UNP and Ranil Wickremasinghe have faced a string of defeats and

22 need a victory to give them a boost. Hence this may be merely a provincial council election, but like the Southern Provincial Council elections of 1993 and the Wayamba Provincial Council elections of 1999, this election will be a real test for the Government and the opposition causing significant national repercussions. If the Government does well, they would be in an advantageous position to contest other elections within the year, even parliamentary elections.101

Given the importance of the election most of the parties are contesting with as equal enthusiasm as in a general election and throwing all their weight behind the election campaign. Even the JVP which objects to the principle of the EPC, but is contesting nonetheless, is claiming that this would allow it to “use the election as a platform to raise awareness among the people that the provincial council system will ultimately pave the way to separate the country.102 The three most senior SLMC leaders including leader Rauf Hakeem, General Secretary Hassan Ali and Chairman Basheer Segudawood all resigned their parliamentary seats in order to contest the EPC demonstrating how critical the election is for the SLMC.103 This move was announced after Hizbullah crossed over. The Government for its part threw in all its political heavyweights: Three committees were appointed for each of the three districts: Minister Nimal Siripala De Silva and AHM Fowzie in Digamadulla, Minister Susil Premajayanth in Batticaloa, and Minister Jeyaraj Fernandopulle in Trincomalee.104 During the campaign for the EPC elections various parties accused the government of the misusing of state properties, including state buildings, schools, vehicles, radio and television stations, and government servants to promote their propaganda campaigns.105 A proposed alliance aimed at building confidence between the old Left parties (Lanka Samasamaja Party, Sri Lanka Communist Party, Sri Lanka Mahajana Party, Democratic Left Front and Desha Vimukthi Janatha Party) and the Tamil National Democratic Alliance (constituted of alternate Tamil political parties including EPRLF (Pathmanabha Wing), PLOTE and Tamil United Liberation Front) ,who shared similar views on the ethnic conflict, was called off following pressure from Temple Trees. Nonetheless, it was saying that a number of Government allies including the old Left parties and the EPDP preferred to contest as independents, which indicated their disapproval of the Government’s campaign.106 The JVP decided to campaign in all constituencies in the East as an independent group. While it has fielded candidates from the three main ethnic communities its chief ministerial candidate is a Sinhalese, Katukitulagedera Wimal Piyatissa.107 The elections have arguably intensified communal tensions with almost all groups warning of the threats posed by opposing political groups. It is likely that the communal card could prove the most decisive factor rather than the ideological position of the party on critical questions. Hence Tamil voters in Trincomalee could prove apprehensive of voting for the UNP-SLMC alliance’s chief minister candidate despite their fears of the Pillayan Group.

While there was some horse trading on the Government side to ensure victory it is not clear in which way direction the elections will progress. Senior Presidential advisor Basil Rajapakse played a key role in the campaign, ensuring that all the alliance partners were out in the district. He also made a number of key deals including the cross over of Hisbullah.108 Reportedly, the Government has unofficially promised both Pillayan and Hisbullah the chief minister-ship position.109 Since then the President announced that out of his partners the one that wins the most votes will secure the Chief Minister position.110 It seems unlikely that Hizbullah will be able to secure the position from within the Governing alliance as the Muslim vote is likely to split and the TMVP is in a more powerful position to claim the post. It is ironic that Hizbullah is contesting in an alliance with the TMVP given his stated position that the TMVP is the main threat that the Muslim Community faces. “The Tamil dominant areas are under a cloud due to the TMVP's activities, aided by the government,.” Hizbullah stated during the LGE.111 The Government has tried to win over particular local leaders and communities through a range of measures. Basil Rajapakse visited Mutur on April 20 and promised to remove the fishing restrictions, which included a ban on night fishing and mechanized boats and a limit of 2 km from the shore.112 The Mutur Community able to get a critical grievance addressed is significant, but it is yet to be seen whether the promise will hold.

23 While the TMVP has announced that Pillayan will be the UPFA’s Chief Ministerial candidate, the Government has proved more reticent in echoing this call thereby putting more pressure on TMVP.113 While the TMVP is likely to secure the bulk of the Batticaloa seats it will prove more difficult in the Tamil areas of Trincomalee. There were rumours that the LTTE had decided to contest through the Peoples Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT) in Ampara,; however it is unclear if this is the case and which side it is more likely to support.114 The TMVP has suffered a number of attacks but it is indefinite whether these are attacks by the LTTE or by other armed groups. There was some speculation that the removal of some units of the STF was at the behest of the TMVP and demonstrated its power with regard to the Government.115 The UNP’s claim that it will introduce legislation to ensure that the TMVP is disarmed, obviously poses a threat as the group has refused to disarm and has instead restricted the movement of armed cadres. The TMVP has stated that it would disarm when terrorism is totally wiped out of the country.116 It is speculated that the TNA “would carry out a silent campaign for the UNP in the East.”117

Security has been a critical issue for candidates during these elections. Intimidation and fear during the pre-election period has reportedly led certain individuals, particularly Tamils from coming forward. The UNP noted that prominent Tamils whom they approached to contest the elections came forward and backed out due to security reasons.118 As noted in the box below election candidates, party offices and party supporters have been at the receiving end of the violence119 • April 20 UPFA candidate Mr. Abdul Raheem was assaulted in Kalkuda, Batticaloa. • April 21 PLOT supporters were assaulted by TMVP supporters in Kattankudi • April 22 UNP propaganda office in Damana, Ampara was damaged by JVP supporters. • April 25 UNP supporters were assaulted by UPFA supporters in Valaichchenei • April 25 Mr. Anthunan, a candidate of EPDP was not allowed by TMVP to conduct his election campaign in Valachchenai. • April 28 a candidate of EDF Mr. .A. Mariyadas’s house came under a bomb attack in Punnachcholai, Batticaloa • April 30, while UNP candidates K.Velayudan and Keethi Fernando were at their election campaign a TMVP supporter who came with weapons in a van of HN 2480 threatened them.

Campaigning has also been extremely difficult due to security reasons. Opposition Leader, Ranil Wickremasinghe on April 29 took a ferry from Trincomalee to Kinniya to address an election rally, as the government refused to provide a helicopter for him for the journey.120 Within a few hours of Hakeem’s resignation as an M.P., Attorney General CR De Silva filed an application before the Supreme Court seeking to slash the former Ministers security.121

Setback to APRC process: In the lead up to independent celebrations there was a flurry of activity around the APRC. On January 22 APRC Chairman handed over to President Rajapakse a set of proposals titled “action to be taken by the President to fully implement relevant provisions of the present constitution as a prelude to the APRC proposals.” The Government had reportedly handed these same proposals to Minister Vitharana a few days earlier and with his presentation of these proposals back to the Government, the latter announced that it would look at ways of implementing the APRC proposals. In essence the proposals called for the implementation of key aspects of the 13th amendment of the Constitution, and for the establishment of a provincial council in the East and an interim advisory council for the North. 122 These developments created significant confusion regarding the status of the APRC proposals that had been under discussion over 2006 and 2007,; and raised questions regarding the very purpose of the APRC. The Government made a number of public statements that it was going to fully implement the 13th amendment to the constitution. The Government announced that they will implement the 13th amendment at the submission of the APRC report on January 28, President Rajapakse promised to

24 implement the 13th amendment when the government officials met with a delegation from the main opposition UNP at Temple Trees on February 26, and also Pilliyan and Hizbullah two candidates running for the Chief Minister post from UPFA at eastern provincial council election too promised to implement the 13th amendment at their separate propaganda campaigns.123

This confusion continued into this current quarter. Neither the APRC nor the Government have yet announced when they will hand over the full proposals. In the first week of April the APRC Committee members visited Northern Ireland and Wales for a week long tour following an invitation extended to the Committee by the British Government where they also met with diaspora groups. Senior LSSP member and Constitutional Affairs specialist Dr. Jayampathy Wickremaratne resigned from his position as the senior adviser to the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs.”124 He cited the non- submission to the Government of a preliminary report setting out the progress made in APRC deliberations over the months on issues at the heart of the proposed power sharing exercise.125 Tensions among political parties over the APRC intensified over this quarter. The TMVP requested of the President that sessions be suspended until May 2008 when the TMVP would gain power at the EPC as resulted.126 The JHU and the MEP walked out of the APRC deliberations protesting the non- inclusion of the TMVP group in the deliberations.127 In February the JVP threatened that it would challenge the proposed interim council for the North if the Government attempted to establish it, as the party claimed that there was no legal provision for such a council. 128 The delays and the recent threats by Sinhalese nationalist parties had only increased fears among the minority parties and the moderate Sinhalese groups that the Government is not interested in pushing forward a far-reaching proposal, and is using the threats of Sinhalese nationalists groups to do nothing. A meeting between President Rajapakse and opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe took place on February 26 at Temple Trees, to discuss the recommendations of the APRC and how to implement the 13th amendment to the constitution.”129 The first meeting between the two leaders since the failed MOU talks of October 2006 did not result in the UNP acceding to a Government request to re-join the APRC.130 As one commentator, Tisaranee Gunasekara noted “the APRC may be kept in existence for a little while more on life support as a sop to the Tamils and the international community but will deliver nothing.”131 It is also clear that the APRC has not brought about a Southern consensus; at best it has confirmed the deep rooted divisions and suspicions within the Southern political groups regarding the ethnic question.

The JVP split: Political instability resulting from the break up of parties and the cross over of MP’s has been a dominant feature of politics in Sri Lanka, especially over the last two years. Most of the major political parties have succumbed to this phenomenon. In this quarter, the JVP suffered a significant crisis when the Polit bureau decided to suspend the party membership of Parliamentary Group Leader and Propaganda Secretary on 21 March. The decision was set off by a contestation by Weerawansa at a Patriotic National Movement (PNM) meeting of the JVP’s line that the TMVP should be disarmed before the elections.132 This resulted in a confrontational and very public exchange of words between JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe and Weerawansa. “In fact we will not show any mercy,” Somawansa avowed at a commemorative meeting for JVP members killed in the 1971 insurgency held at Vihara Mahadevi, Weerawansa was not present.133 Weerawansa “near to tears,” made a special statement in Parliament on April 9 stating that “there had been a conflict within the JVP for sometime and he believed it had been organized by certain alien forces that wanted to divide the country.”134 Weerawansa was joined by 10 other JVP MPs who pledged to defeat the conspiracy against him. Both sides maintained that there was space for reconciliation, even though it seemed that the divide could not be papered over.

From the JVP point of view this is probably the biggest crisis they have faced since they re-entered democratic politics. It is a party that prides itself in high levels of party discipline and opaqueness that makes public scrutiny of the inner working extremely difficult. In this crisis the dirty laundry and problems within the party between the various leaders was publicly aired. With the split, the JVP was

25 forced to face the reality- it had become just another political party that was susceptible to the same problems as other political parties including personal ambitions of senior leaders and machinations by influential political actors. This was not the first time, as M.P. Nandanan Gunathileke had left the JVP in September 2006, however, his departure was handled by both sides very discreetly. The scale of the current crisis cannot be over-emphasized: for one the poster boy and public face of the JVP – Weerawansa is taking on the party machine, and he is joined by ten other JVP MPs who are willing to back him and take on the party.135 It is yet to be seen what implications this could have for the party machine, as to whether the split will also be replicated throughout the party, down to its cadres and supporters. It is yet to be anticipated if the Weerawansa faction either joins the Government or creates an independent wing. The Patriotic National Movement which is a pro-JVP Sinhalese nationalist movement is experiencing a serious problem as Weerawansa was Co-Chairperson and was heavily involved in the group. The crisis became a farce which involved a press conference which nearly resulted in a brawl as a dissident re-joined the party, another dissident re-appeared in the party ranks a day later, three vehicles of the dissident was stolen from the parliamentary complex, and a JVP M.P was arrested for the crime. The JVP revealed its violent side as the dissidents and their supporters faced a number of attacks.136 It is unclear how the crisis will be resolved or whether it will be. While the Government still relies on the JVP for its support, it seems unlikely that it would welcome the dissident JVP into the cabinet thereby putting the Weerawansa faction in a difficult position. They will probably get state patronage of some kind. The party itself can do little, it will not risk voting against the Government at this juncture both in terms of the war and the political context that favours the Government. However it is likely that the JVP will become more vocal and strident in its advocacy of workers’ rights, corruption in the Government, and even launch a strike when necessary to flex its muscles.

Deaths of Parliamentarians: Over this quarter three Parliamentarians died violently. While one lost his life in a road accident and another in a claymore attack that may not have been intended for that particular M.P, it made very evident the dangers faced by M.Ps in Sri Lanka since the previous quarter saw the killing of another two M.Ps. Chief Government whip- Highways and Road Development Minister Jeyaraj Fernandopulle was killed by a suicide bomber on April 6 at Weliweriya, Gampaha as he flagged off a marathon at 7.45 a.m.137 Fernandopulle was a very vocal advocate of the Government and given his ethnicity, Colombo Chetty, he was strategically positioned as member of a minority community to defend the Government. As one commentator put it “With the assassination of Minister Fernandopulle, President Mahinda Rajapakse has lost one of his close political buddies who would not hesitate to stick his neck out to defend the regime… Minister Fernandopulle was very effective as the Chief Government whip and would sometimes single handedly face the opposition to take the government out of a difficult situation in Parliament.”138 Fernandopulle had been recently appointed to lead the UPFA campaign in the Trincomalee District. It became apparent that there had been serious security lapses, despite intelligence reports that the Minister was a top target of the LTTE and the prior attack that killed Minister D.M. Dayaratne that was allegedly targeting Fernandopulle.

Jaffna District MP K Sivenesan was killed along with his driver in a claymore attack targeting his vehicle in LTTE controlled Kanagarayankulam area on March 6.139 Sivanesan is now the fourth Tamil M.P to have been killed since November 2005. 140 While the TNA blamed the army’s Deep Penetration Unit the army rejected the charge and blamed the LTTE.141 Sripathi Sooriyaarachchi, M.P from Gampaha District and Coordinator of the SLFP (M) died in a road accident. He’s two body guards were killed when the jeep they were traveling in skidded off the Kurunegala- Anuradhapura road (at Madagama) which had become slippery due to monsoon rains, and crashed headlong into a tree on February 9.142 He died exactly a year to the day that he was sacked from his Ministerial portfolio after highlighting various abuses of the Government, including an alleged deal between the UPFA and the LTTE prior to the 2005 Presidential election in a bid to defeat UNP candidate Ranil Wickremasinghe. 143 The UNP and Sooriarachchi? expressed skepticism that it was

26 just an accident and called on the IGP to conduct a full probe. 144 With his death the SLFP(M) was seriously weakened as Sooriyarachchi was a committed street fighter and following his demise the Government was able to appoint a party loyal Governor of the , Reggie Ranatunga as MP.145 During this quarter, another prominent parliamentarian, died on March 16. He had resigned from the Government during the last budget vote and had stepped out of politics during the last few months due to ill health.

Rise in cost of living: The Government’s biggest challenge was probably the rising cost of living that threatened to increase dissatisfaction in the South. The rising cost of living provided a shortcoming for the opposition, be it the UNP or the JVP to challenge the Government and feed on popular discontent. The high rate of inflation is a result of a number of differing issues including the cost of the conflict, rising public expenditure including defence, and the increase in prices of basic commodities globally. Over this quarter, it became apparent that there was a global food crisis of which Sri Lanka also fell victim. Coupled with this crisis Sri Lanka also faced heavy rains in Rajarata, popularly known as the rice bowl of the country. In the face of this looming food crisis the Government tried to pin the blame on the external situation and the war. Minister of Agriculture Development & Agrarian Services stated, “There is no food crisis in Sri Lanka and the country is currently facing the effects of the global food crisis.146” The government in a move to resolve the escalating price of rice imposed maximum wholesale and retail prices on rice. According to Minister of Trade and Consumer Affairs, Bandula Gunawardana, this was the first time in the country’s history that price control had been imposed on rice147. The Opposition was able to make various accusations claiming that the high costs were a result of economic mismanagement. UNP parliamentarian critiqued the measures such as the fixing of the price of rice, stating that “this cosmetic exercise will ridicule the government” and that it would lead to rice hoarding148

4.3 Projection Over this quarter the Government has been able to consolidate its power. In the East, the victory of the TMVP and the Government has given it new confidence to push ahead with the Eastern Provincial Council elections. Victory is not assured but the Government has been able to put forward a broad coalition. If it does win, elections in other provincial councils or even snap parliamentary elections are possible. The split within the JVP during this quarter indicated that no party was safe from factionalism and cross over politics that has intensified during the last two years. The Government is thus confident of retaining power and can set the political agenda over the coming months. The main challenge will be to manage the increases in the cost of living and the popular discontent that could increase, especially if the Opposition parties intensify their campaign.

27 V. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CLUSTER 5.1 Context The Government continues to wage an aggressive foreign policy to strengthen its economic and military safety net. During this quarter there were a number of high profile visits which demonstrated Sri Lanka’s alliance with key states including China and Iran. These visits seemed to deliver significant dividends in terms of economic aid, and also promised to strengthen Sri Lanka’s international safety net. These new alliances have redoubled the Sri Lankan Government’s confidence to take on any major international actors and to take unilateral measures. It is yet unclear whether these alliances will have any serious repercussions from countries such as the US, or even whether this will increase pressure on states such as India, the US, and Israel to provide military and intelligence assistance in order to draw Sri Lanka from relying on these ‘new’ favourite allies. The Sri Lankan Government, however continued to face problems relating to its human rights record, including Sri Lanka facing scrutiny at the UN Human Rights Council, its eligibility for the EU’s ‘GSP plus’ trade deal, criticism by the US State Department and the withdrawal of the Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP).

5.2 Continuing criticism of the Government by the Western international community, while the Government becomes increasingly adept in managing diplomatic relations High Powered Visits to China and from Iran: With mounting economic pressures and the increasing reluctance of Western donors, the Government has attempted to ensure that it is able to access economic assistance from Asian donors. These allies also provide the Government other potential strategic advantages including arms, supplies, and diplomatic support. The Government has a dual aim in reaching out to countries such as China and Iran as they are willing to overlook its human rights records, as Sri Lanka is able to strengthen its international position in addition to securing economic aid. This will mean that there will be a dramatic change in Sri Lanka’s donors as the traditional main providers of aid – Japan and the World Bank will be demoted by China and Iran.

President Rajapakse and a high level government delegation including the Export Development and International Trade Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, President's Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary Dr. Palitha Kohona visited China from April 7- 11. The President’s official reason for visiting China was to attend the BOAO Forum Annual Conference which was held in Hainan. The BOAO was established in 2001 to enable leaders of the Asian Region to engage in a regional level dialogue and build an integrated economic plan for the region. On the sidelines of the Conference, President Rajapaksa was able to hold bilateral discussions with the Chinese President Hu Jintao which reportedly focused “on a wide range of issues pertaining to development of Sri Lanka.” This was President Rajapakse’s second state visit to China this year, the first being February 2007. China has already pledged more than US $ 1 billion in assistance to Sri Lanka in 2007 for projects that include the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, the Hambantota Port Development Project, the supply of 100 railway carriages, and Multiple Diesel Units to the Sri Lanka Railway and the construction of a performing arts theatre.149 This visit not only strengthened ties between the two countries but promised to bring new aid to Sri Lanka, reducing its dependency on other donors, and offered another market for arms and military equipment.

In a significant diplomatic move, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid an official visit to Sri Lanka from April 28-29 as a part of his South Asia tour. The Government was able to claim that it was a significant success as he had reportedly come on the special request from President Rajapaksa. To celebrate his visit the city was decorated with cut outs of the two presidents.150 The visit served as a symbolic ‘high-point’ of the new role that Iran was taking in Sri Lanka, as a donor. During the visit Iranian President Ahamedinejad inaugurated the Uma Oya Hydro Power project, on April 29 at Wellawaya. Iran granted $450 million to finance the project which is estimated “to produce 100 MW electricity and supply water to irrigate the agricultural and industrial sectors in Hambantota and Moneragala districts.”151 The two leaders inaugurated the Sapugaskanda oil refinery

28 enhancing project to which Iran has granted US$ 700 million as an interest free loan.152 Iran has also provided Sri Lanka with a US$ 1.6 billion line of credit to help Sri Lanka buy Iranian oil.153 In addition to promising to enhance ties, the two countries issued a joint statement confirming “the full and non-discriminatory implementation of Article 1V of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty on peaceful nuclear cooperation.”154 This promised benefits for both sides as it gave Iran, Sri Lanka’s diplomatic support when there is significant international pressure regarding Iran’s nuclear capability while it provides Sri Lanka the possibility of exploring nuclear technology.155 There were unconfirmed reports that the Sri Lanka-Iranian defence cooperation was also discussed, including Iranian secret service training, according to prominent Indian observer, B Raman.156

As to whether there were any negative repercussions as a result of the visit is yet to be seen. The US did express its displeasure. On a discordant note, a day after the visit of President Ahamedinejad to Sri Lanka, the US State Department released its terrorism report 2007(released on 30 April). “The report said that Iran-Sri Lanka’s latest ally remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism with elements of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directly involved in the planning and supporting of terrorist acts.”157 The Government denied the accuracy of this report.158

Prime Ministerial visit to Israel and Palestine: Sri Lanka demonstrated its diplomatic skills of ‘running with the hare and hunting with the hound’ in Prime Minister Rathnasiri Wickremanayake’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories from March 24 –29. In the first ever visit of a Sri Lankan Prime Minister to Israel he signed an agreement establishing cooperative relations between Israel and Sri Lanka in the areas of culture, science and education. The Prime Minister also exchanged views with the Israeli leadership on the common threat of terrorism. He went on record stating that certain reports referred to Tamil youths receiving training in Palestinian camps in Syria and Lebanon, thereby trying to firm up Sri Lanka’s membership in the international war against terror.159

The Prime Minister next visited the West Bank where he met Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and Prime Minister of the caretaker government Salam Fayyad.160 He was greeted by the Mayor of Ramallah at ‘ Mawatha’ which demonstrated President Rajapakse’s credentials as a friend of the Palestinian people and an ally of the Organisation of Islamic Countries.161 While managing the diplomatic fine balancing, the visits were not a complete success as the Prime Minister failed to get Israel to accede to a request for arms sales. 162 The subsequent visit to Sri Lanka by the Iranian President and the nuclear understanding between Iran and Sri Lanka is unlikely to soften the Israeli stance. PM Wickremanayake also visited Jordan where he focused on the possibility of securing more employment opportunities for Lankans.163

Military cooperation with India, Pakistan and Slovakia: A key focus of the Rajapakse administration has been to strengthen bi-lateral ties with both India and Pakistan. This has proved particularly challenging as Sri Lanka relies on Pakistan for military assistance and procurement, but risks antagonizing India, which is wary of selling arms to Sri Lanka but wants to maintain its hegemonic position in South Asia. India’s Security Advisor Narayan Swamy for instance stated, “We have to ensure that India's pre-eminent position in the region is not compromised by Sri Lanka seeking arms from elsewhere.”164 India officially stopped providing ‘weapons with offensive capabilities’ even though it continues to train Sri Lankan military personnel and provide what it terms as ‘defensive military equipment.’ Indo-Lanka defence ties however remain strong as a top level six member military delegation headed by Army Commander Sarath Fonseka visited New Delhi in March to discuss the exchange of information, training, and the current military operations in the North.165 In April, the Government also sought “US$ 25 million worth of 81 mm, 120mm and 130mm mortar ammunition” for the military within one month from Pakistan.166 Unconfirmed reports also suggested that the also had sought 150, 000 rounds of 60 mm mortar ammunition and as many hand grenades for immediate delivery from Pakistan.167 It is highly probable that Sri Lanka will secure the arms as the Pakistani military has apparently agreed to supply

29 the ammunition on an emergency basis from its War Wastage Reserve maintained in various army depots.168 Sri Lanka buying arms from Pakistan and China puts increasing pressure on India, and makes it more difficult for the Indian administration to refuse requests by the Sri Lankan Government.

The Sri Lankan Government demonstrated its ability to diversify its arms suppliers when it secured a shipment of 10,000 military missiles from the Slovak Economy Ministry. The missiles are designed to be dispatched from multiple rocket launchers. The three-metre missiles were due to be shipped to Colombo on Thursday (17 April), the BBC said in a news report.169 Given that Slovakia is an EU member there were questions raised as to whether the deal met EU policy. Sri Lanka is not on the list of countries subject to the embargo on arms exports, but the deal constitutes a violation of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.170

Response to Kosovo’s Independence: This quarter also saw critical international developments - Kosovo’s declaration of independence. This posed a critical challenge for the international community as to whether they should recognize this unilateral actor, to delay recognition or to condemn it. The two parties to the conflict took divergent positions, with the Government condemning the move and the LTTE welcoming this step. Even though the two contexts are so different the Government saw Kosovo independence as an international endorsement of separatism. The official response was; “The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Kosovo could set an unmanageable precedent in the conduct of international relations, the established global order of sovereign States and could thus pose a grave threat to international peace and security.”171 The LTTE responded by stating that the developments in Kosovo as a precedent for a Tamil Ealam.172 For a beleaguered rebel group, Kosovo was a re-affirmation of the struggle for an independent state.

UN Human Rights Council: Sri Lanka, along with a number of other UN HRC member states came under scrutiny in part of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This was an inbuilt-mechanism in the HRC to examine the human rights records of all states where the Government, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and NGOs would all make submissions. Developments within the HRC worked in the Government’s favour. The polarization within the Council between the West and the rest essentially meant that the Southern states would resist measures that would embarrass or criticize any of the developing nations. As the first round of UPR unfolded in April it became evident that the process had been effectively watered down. While the OHCHR submission included issues that NGOs had formally submitted to the office, it raised several rights violations. The Sri Lankan Government attempted a positive spin on the UPR; it highlighted positive developments and in the domestic media it even tried to claim that it had volunteered for the review.173

The IIGEP decides to terminate its mission: In November 2007 the IIGEP had already communicated to the GOSL that it would relinquish its mandate at the end of March 2008. 174 In its final report to the Government the IIGEP cited “lack of political will” on the part of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government to investigate issues relating to human rights violations as the chief reason for its exit. The IIGEP also asserted that there were obstacles to its work from its inception due to interferences from the Attorney General's Department to the work of the Committee of Investigation. The IIGEP, which was mandated to monitor if the investigation was conducted in accordance with international standards and transparency, objected to the role of the Attorney General's Department since it impeded the process of investigation. Lack of procedure to protect the victims and witnesses, slow pace and lack of transparency in investigations, non-corporation of the state institutions, and the lack of financial independence to the Commission of Investigation/Inquiry, were cited as the reasons behind the resignation of the IIGEP.

30 The exit of the IIGEP was a categorical vote of no-confidence in the Government’s attempts in response to the human rights situation. A key reason for the Government appointing the IIGEP had been to divert international scrutiny and to demonstrate that it was taking action against human rights violations. With the IIGEP pulling out, and the end of the discussions between the Government and the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lousie Arbour; the Government had lost some of its delaying tactics. The IIGEP’s report card effectively failed the Government as its charge of a lack of political will went to the very heart of the culture of impunity and the commitment of the Government to address the human rights situation in the country. Even while the Government had critiqued the IIGEP on various charges, the line up of 11 eminent persons gave the IIGEP significant credibility which made it difficult for the Government to dismiss the issues raised by IIGEP. The IIGEP was headed by Justice P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India, and 10 other prominent citizens from various parts of the world appointed either by particular countries or international organizations.175

Relations between the Government and the IIGEP had been acrimonious, and even on its departure there was a fierce of exchange of statements. Responding to the allegations made by IIGEP at their press conference on April 23, the Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights, said that “the IIGEP has acted irresponsibly by making public statements and in other ways overstepping their mandate.”176 In a curious twist to the drama the Government claimed that it received a letter from IIGEP Chairman Justice Bagwati in a letter dated April 26 and delivered to President Mahinda Rajapakse which reportedly stated that “the IIGEP has never alleged that there was an absence of “political will” on the part of the Government of Sri Lanka. It was merely an apprehension which was voiced by IIGEP in view of the facts before them.” Disaster Management and Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe stated that “the IIGEP had completely changed its stance on the issue of the government’s lack of political will to find the truth.”177 Beyond the acrimonious exchange between the two sides, this development provided a moment for the international community to draw attention to the situation in Sri Lanka.

GSP plus concessions issue: The Government’s human rights and governance record was also highlighted as a result of Sri Lanka trying to secure an extension to the EU’s GSP plus. In late 2005 the Generalized System of Preferences Plus(GSP plus) concession was extended to Sri Lanka for a period of 3 years, it entitles the country to duty free imports of some 7000 items to Europe.178 Sri Lanka is only one of 15 countries worldwide and the only country in the South Asian region that enjoys the benefits of the GSP plus facility. It is estimated in Sri Lanka the apparel industry employs 100,000, and supports another million who depend on these wage earners for survival, not forgetting the US$ 2 billion in export earnings.179 The EU extended this facility to Sri Lanka due to three key reasons; the 2002-2004 Ceasefire period, the phasing out of the multi- fibre agreement, and the December 2004 tsunami tragedy. The point about the extension of the GSP plus facility is that it is to be based on the ratification and full implementation of 27 human rights instruments of which the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) is one albeit a key one.180

The Government is trying to demonstrate that it was in accordance with key human rights instruments including ICCPR, but it is likely that Sri Lanka will not be found to be in compliance of all. For instance with regards to ICCPR the Government passed a law in 2007, but “the UN has indicated that [the] law is insufficient to assure compliance with the ICCPR,” and that it requires either a constitutional amendment, or a reversal of the Supreme Court decision that ruled in 2006 that “the rights under the ICCPR are not rights under the Constitution of Sri Lanka.” 181 Even though the UNP promised to support the amendment the Government has yet to propose the bill and instead sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court whether and how individuals in Sri Lanka would derive benefits from rights contained in the ICCPR.182 The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and the Supreme Court rulings give “adequate recognition to the provisions contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”183 It is not, however clear that

31 this meets with international standards, and it also raises questions as to whether the Government is seriously committed to ensuring that ICCPR is implemented.

The Government well aware that there was a strong possibility that the EU would not extend the GSP Plus facility to Sri Lanka due to the deteriorating human rights and governance situation in the country attempted to take steps to convince the EU. President Rajapakse set up a committee of three Ministers G.L. Peiris, Rohitha Bogollagama and Saratha Amunugama to study the issue and lobby for it. Peiris was sent off to the EU in March to campaign for the continuance of the GSP plus facility, which was not successful and the Government has realized that it is not a political negotiation.184 There was much media speculation that G L “Peiris was making a feeble attempt to cover up a dismal and unsuccessful visit to Brussels which ended in EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson and External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner pulling up the Minister over the government’s atrocious human rights and good governance record.”185 The Government is already trying to off-set domestic criticism for failing to secure the GSP plus by claiming that the UNP and the LTTE are responsible for giving Sri Lanka a bad name. 186 An EU fact finding team which arrived in Colombo in late April “warned that the lukewarm attitude adopted by the government can result in a severe impact on Sri Lanka with the country losing the GSP+ benefit.” 187 The EU team was of the opinion that “they had not seen any encouraging step on the part of the government so far towards addressing human rights violations.”188

US State Department Criticism of Sri Lanka’s Human Rights: In its 2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices released by the State Department in Washington D.C, on March 11 the United States in its report on Sri Lanka condemned its human rights and governance record. The report charged that the Government of Sri Lanka was responsible for the deterioration of human rights and conveys that the ethnic Tamil minority are the worst affected. Clearly aggravated by the report, Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama summoned US Ambassador Robert O’ Blake to express Sri Lanka’s “serious concerns” about the report. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement where it claimed that the report “presents a distorted view of the actual situation in Sri Lanka” and is “unfortunately a litany of unsubstantiated allegations, innuendo and vituperative exaggerations.”189 However, within minutes of this statement being issued, the US Embassy said in a press release that “the US Government stands by the report.”190 The exchange of letters continued.191 In sum, the report once more put pressure on the Government to at least defend its human rights record.

India involvement in Sri Lankan politics: India continued its overt and covert diplomatic efforts to encourage the Government to bring about a political settlement. Responding a day after the APRC handed over its interim report to President Mahinda Rajapakse on 23rd January, the Indian External Affairs Ministry issued a statement, that the proposals were a “welcome first step provided they paved the way for a final settlement of the ethnic conflict.”192 The language used in the statement was cautious but positive suggesting that India did not want to be seen as overtly encouraging, especially when it is unclear whether the Government will implement its promise and to what degree. Sri Lanka suffered a diplomatic set back when the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh turned down the invitation to attend Sri Lanka’s Independence Day ceremony.193 It was speculated that the President’s proposal was timed in order to entice the Indian PM to visit Sri Lanka.194

India continued to cast a long shadow on Sri Lankan politics. Social Services Minister and EPDP Leader visited India in March to attend a regional conference of Social Development Ministers, during which he met National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan and External Affairs Ministry Secretary Shivshankar Mennon. A press release issued by Minister Devananda’s office quoted M.K. Narayanan as saying that he expected devolution of power to the people of the North and the East would materialize very soon, consequent to which they would play a major role in Sri Lanka’s efforts to solve the problems it is up against.195 Furthermore, there were

32 also rumours that India was supporting the UNP-SLMC alliance. Newspapers claimed that the Indian High Commissioner Alok Prasad had a string of meetings with opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and SLMC leader before the alliance was formed. Ranil Wickremasinghe is also reported to have conferred with Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon when Mr. Wickremasinghe attended a wedding in New Delhi.196 The JVP took a very public position vis-à-vis India, claiming that it was attempting to meddle in our “internal affairs.”197 The JVP Parliamentary Group leader Wimal Weerawansa also insisted that the talks between the President and the Opposition leader took place as a result of the insistence by the Indian High Commission.198

Prominent leaders of Tamil Nadu urged the Indian government to take steps to initiate negotiations between the SL government and LTTE. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi insisted that “To bring peace in Sri Lanka, the Union government should come forward to organize useful negotiations so that a proper political solution is thrashed out.”199 The Leader of MDMK Vaiko met with the Indian Prime Minster after attending the Peace and Reconciliation Conference in South Asia in Oslo in April and requested the Indian government to mount diplomatic pressure on the Sri Lankan government to stop its military offensive and initiate peace talks for a workable solution to fulfill the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils.200 Joining the hands of Vaiko and Karunanidhi, BJP president Ranjith Singh too requested the Indian government to play a major role to bring both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government to the negotiating table.201 In a follow up to the statements from Tamil Nadu, The Tamil Nadu state assembly passed a resolution to call upon the centre to take steps to bring peace to Sri Lanka on April 23, 2008.202 This resolution said that “India should arrange for talks between the two parties and help arrive at a political solution.”203 Sri Lankan government spokesmen, Minister Keheliya Rabukwella in response to this development stated that the government is not worried about this resolution which was passed in Tamil Nadu assembly.204 Nonetheless, this has been one of the more significant steps taken by Tamil Nadu actors to voice their position and to exert pressure on the Central Government of India.

5.3 Projection

Many of the issues highlighted in this quarter will have significant ramifications for Sri Lanka in months to come. Sri Lanka will attempt to ensure that its ties with its ‘new’ allies are strengthened. especially as the economic situation becomes more difficult,; western donors continue to place various conditions and the military campaign grinds on. The Government will continue to face significant international scrutiny over its human rights and good governance records, particularly at the UN with Sri Lanka facing re-election for membership at the HRC and the UPR process. While domestically the Government is well placed to withstand and even take advantage of international criticism, at the international level it will have to rely on its global allies to ensure that Sri Lanka’s image and prestige is not radically shaken up.

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VI LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 6.1 Context: Most of the developments witnessed during this quarter which in fact are timely political necessities and urgently required to temper the countries abysmal human rights record has ironically stemmed from a mix of catastrophic early supreme court decisions and the political developments and had received prominence unfortunately though, for the obtuse reason of setting the stage for an appearance of eligibility for GSP plus status rather than any honest effort towards strengthening governance and the process of rule of law. The Supreme Court decision on the ICCPR and whether the citizens are able to derive its benefits through the necessary enabling legislation, recent developments on the witness protection legislation, are developments which appear to be mostly orchestrated to bolster the country’s human rights image in the international arena. These developments in turn have led to the Supreme Court being called upon to cater to the current political exigencies and help ward off international pressure which in turn has shed light on the hereto existent albeit not so apparent hostile reaction of the Sri Lankan judiciary and specifically the Chief Justice towards the intense International pressure currently directed at the Sri Lankan State as well as the judiciary.

6.2 Constitutional Crisis continuing, despite efforts to demonstrate Sri Lanka’s compliance with international and national standards

Supreme Court opinion on ICCPR Act and implications on GSP Plus Status: During this quarter President Rajapaksha sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court in terms of article 129(1) of the Constitution on whether and how individuals in Sri Lanka would derive benefits from rights contained in the ICCPR. This issue arose in the back drop of the GSP Plus facility, being a facility which entitles the country to duty free imports of some 7000 items to Europe, which Sri Lanka currently enjoys, and coming up for renewal later this year. However the facility is dependent on good governance criteria and the acceptance of UN conventions of human, labour and political rights. The controversy over the GSP Plus facility arose after the Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that ‘the rights under the ICCPR are not rights under the Constitution of Sri Lanka. In view of this Judgment the EU has informed Sri Lanka that to qualify for GSP Plus facility the government would have to introduce a constitutional amendment to ensure the rights under the ICCPR are rights recognized by the Constitution, or alternatively that the said supreme court ruling be reversed.205 On March 24 the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka decreed that the ICCPR Act which was passed in Parliament last year and provisions of the Constitution and other law including decisions of the Superior Courts of Sri Lanka allows adequate recognition to the civil and political rights contained in the ICCPR and that the rights recognized in the Covenant are justifiable through the medium of the legal and constitutional process prevailing in the country.206 Given the prevailing trend of the Sri Lankan Judiciary to temper its opinions on the current political expediencies rather than the strict rule of law this particular decree was a predictable response to the Presidents application which sought an advisory opinion from the SC on the adequacy of the ICCPR Act. Although Sri Lanka ratified the ICCPR in 1980 the citizens were unable to reap its benefits until recently for the want of enabling legislation. As a result of international reaction to Supreme Court decisions such as the Nallarathnam Singarasa Case,207 the government in late 2007 was compelled to introduce a law titled the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, No. 56 of 2007, however, experts in the field consider this legislation woefully inadequate and appears to be a part of government strategy to gloss over its short-comings issues at hand.208 The title of the Act it self is a misnomer and gives the mistaken impression that it enacts the ICCPR into domestic law. This impression however is far

34 from correct as the ICCPR Act contains only four main substantive rights-covering a limited area. Analysts reject the view that rights recognized by the chapter on fundamental rights of the Constitution substantially gives effect to the other rights in the ICCPR. 209

The EU continues to maintain that an advisory opinion alone from the Supreme Court will not suffice. In order to ensure full compliance with the international covenant it is necessary to study the restriction clauses of the constitution, and other provisions because the cumulative effect might not protect those rights as strongly as the ICCPR requires them. A constitutional amendment is clearly required in order to ensure compliance with the ICCPR., yet again a tremendous opportunity to improve the Bill of Rights had been squandered and the Supreme Court opinion comes across as a feeble and inept attempt to eye wash the International Community regarding the states compliance with its international obligations.

In a further show of aggression, and in reaction towards the International pressure directed at the judiciary, the Chief Justice during a recent court hearing reportedly declared that he was neither afraid of, nor prepared to act according to the whims of the international law. This remark was made during an open court hearing of a fundamental rights application by a lawyer from Vavuniya who had challenged a Police action to turn him back as he was motoring from Vavuniya via Medavachiya to visit a client at Anuradhapura prison. The CJ apparently commented that the FR petition appeared to have been filed with the intention of taking the matter to the international court, and in a further unwarranted show of aggression when rejecting the said petition stated that his comment about the international court could be quoted if necessary.210

Eviction Case: A positive development that was witnessed this quarter was the direction by the Supreme Court in February to appoint a committee to look into issues arising from arrests and detentions that came about in the Fundamental Rights violation petition211 filed by the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) in view of the mass arrests and detentions of Tamils in Colombo and suburbs in December 2007.212 Although Sri Lanka is notorious for appointing committees and commissions for most issues, such a committee has the ability to frame policy and respond to ensure the protection of rights in relation to arrests and detentions.

A trend in 2007 was the harassment and victimisation of minorities, namely Tamils which were evident with the evictions of Tamils in June 2007, and the mass arrests and detentions in December 2007. These developments have been in many instances reported in the media and sometimes taken to courts as seen with both cases of evictions and arrests. Although the judiciary has been accused for its politicisation and lack of independence, there are rare moments where it has stepped up to protect and uphold fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.

These developments also come in the wake of the indictment issued by the IIGEP which terminated its observations of proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry, alleging in its final statement issued on April 15 that investigations into serious violations of human rights have not been transparent and had failed to satisfy basic international norms and standards. The IIGEP in its concluding statement commented on the lack of effective victim and witness protection, and stated that there is an absence of a functioning and effective victim and witness protection programme under the laws of Sri Lanka. Commenting on the witness protection unit set up within the Commission of Inquiry the IIGEP comments that this unit enjoys no statutory basis; it lacks fully trained staff, and does not have sufficient funds to offer adequate assistance to those in need of protection from possible retaliation for appearing before the Commission.

Witness Protection Bill: During this quarter a Bill titled “Assistance and protection to victims of crime and witnesses” was submitted by the Attorney General to the Supreme Court for approval. This Bill was apparently brought out in the national interest in terms of Article 122(1) of the

35 Constitution, and ideally set out the rights and entitlements of victims of crime and witnesses, and provided for a mechanism to promote, protect, enforce and exercise such rights and entitlement. The Bill was also expected to provide for the payment of compensation to victims of crime and enabled victims of crime to obtain compensation from persons convicted of having committed offences against them. The Bill also provides for obtaining redress by victims of crime including restitution, reparation, and rehabilitation of such victims, and that they are treated with equality, fairness and with respect for their dignity and privacy.213 The haste in which this Bill was presented in Parliament clearly stands out as yet another effort in a string of similar efforts exhibited during this quarter by the government to clean up or at least be seen to clear its human rights record in answer to the negative international opinion which mounted pressure on the government, spotlighted on the human rights abuse, impunity, lack of respect for the rule of law, and good governance.

Although there is no clear indication as to the exact nature of the latest Bill which has been presented in Parliament, critics who have been privy to the draft Bill which was in circulation during the last year comment that the proposed legislation is replete with extensive fundamental flaws which goes to make the Bill a farce.214 “Having a piece of legislation that puts in place a weak, ineffective protection programme may in fact be worse than having no protection programme at all,” says Rosalind Sipos, a legal analyst. “Witnesses may falsely place their trust in a system that cannot protect them while at the same time allowing politicians to trumpet their promotion of human rights when they have, in fact, fallen short of the mark.”215 This Bill suffers for a want of clearly laid out division of responsibility. As pointed out by Rohan Edrisinhe, of CPA, both the Authority and the Police Protection Division are given the responsibility of developing the protection programme and implementing it. Analysts point out the importance of clearly establishing a responsible authority not only to build confidence in the system, but also to prevent the corruption of it. This aspect of the Bill is considered almost farcical as it leaves the granting of protection to the very body from whose members protection will often be sought. Critics note the Bill to be riddled with deficiencies including such as the definition of “witness”, which does not include the family of witnesses despite the fact that family members are often targets of intimidation. Additionally, it only comprises those who have already provided information and no prospective inclusion of those who might reasonably be expected to provide information. The legislation is also incompetent in areas such as lack of provision for witnesses to establish a new identity, to relocate or to find protection in safe houses. Nor does it provide for the transport of property belonging to the witness or the payment of reasonable financial assistance to the witness. There is no provision for court proceedings to be filmed and for all records of proceedings to be sealed and protected. Experts suggest that ideally the witness protection legislation bill should be completely revamped, and that before it is passed and the 17th Amendment to the Constitution is implemented the independence of the Police is assured. Despite the negative views expressed by many this quarter witnessed the government’s attempt to rush the Bill through Parliament to satisfy the International Community on its state of readiness in its rights protection front.

Constitutional Council: This quarter continues to witness the constitutional fiasco brought about by the non implementation of a Constitutional Council in flagrant violation of the 17th amendment. Even though during the previous quarter there were encouraging signs of steps towards its reactivation this drive too appears to have lost momentum. The distinct lack of political will to depoliticise public institutions led to the paralysis of the CC to date, and could be largely attributed to behaviour of all the political actors with the minority parties and the opposition playing petty party politics,; the Speaker showing little skill in being a consensus builder, and the President determined to use the crisis to strengthen his power. Instead of attempting to appoint a nominee agreeable to all, the President ignored the CC and made unilateral appointments to the independent commissions for public service, Judiciary, Elections, Police and Human Rights created under the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. In doing so he has called into question the legitimacy of the independent commissions which have no mandate as they seek efficacy through the CC. This deadlock seemingly

36 ended with the JVP, in agreement with the other minority parties such as the TNA and SLMC, proposing the former Auditor General S.E. Mayadunne as nominee representing the minority political parties in Parliament, based on a proposal put forward by the Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA).129; Mayadunne’s nomination was formally 26 communicated to the Speaker W.J.M. Lokubandara by the Opposition Leader Ranil Wickramasinghe on the January 10 2008. However, to date no tangible moves have been made to reconstitute the CC incorporating the new nomination. The government is continuing to delay the process because the longer the 17th Amendment remains unimplemented the more opportunities exist for the President to continue to make unilateral politically partisan appointments. The situation is serious because several appointments that should be made in a non partisan manner under the 17th amendment are due in the next few months i.e. the Secretary General of parliament, vacancies on the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. There is speculation about the appointment to the office of AG and the Inspector General of Police. Therefore this matter must be resolved as a matter of urgency.

Appointment of Secretary General of Parliament: This quarter sees a new development in this continuing constitutional fiasco when on March 31 President Mahinda Rajapakse went ahead and appointed Dammika Kitulgoda as the new acting Secretary General of Parliament despite strong opposition from political groups and the civil society in the Country. This appointment again brought in to question the bona fide of the government and the President while the government justified the Presidents action saying that in the absence of the CC, the President had no option other than to make the appointment in this way. The President’s action is construed as a measure to salvage a crisis situation; it is not in keeping with the true spirit of democracy. 216Opinion varies on this temporary appointment that a temporary appointment made by the President is lawful for two weeks, following which the President did not have the jurisdiction to make any further appointments to the position. However, this opinion is challenged on a charge of ambiguity between the Sinhala and English readings of the Constitution. In case of ambiguity according to the Supreme Court it is the Sinhala text that takes precedence. According to the Sinhala text the President clearly has no authority to make this temporary appointment. The Sinhala text states that the President shall appoint an acting SG only in the absence of the existing SG, and the appointment would be valid for only 14 days. A clear interpretation of this text would be that the President shall appoint a temporary SG if the existing SG was not able to perform his/her duties due to sickness, or being overseas for an appointment, or for other personal reasons. In this light the opposition argues that the appointment of the temporary SG by the President on retirement of the previous SG is in total violation of the Constitution and shows contempt of the Rule of Law. At the time of writing the temporary appointment continues.

Select Committee - The President now states that he is awaiting reports from the special Select Committee that has been appointed by him under the Chairmanship of the Constitutional Affairs Minister D.E.W. Gunasekera. According to the Minister the Select Committee is still in the process of looking into the legality of the 17th Amendment. The President states until the Select Committee completes its task he will not appoint the CC. This clearly is not a valid excuse because the 17th Amendment is part of the Constitution and is already law. This excuse would be applicable in an instance where the select committee wants to improve on the 17th amendment,; however, it is mandatory to implement the law as it is and then if necessary improve the latter. The lesson learnt from the 17th amendment fiasco, and the unwillingness of the President to implement it, demonstrates a dangerous populist attitude towards politics which believes that a person who is elected by a majority of the people has democratic legitimacy which entitles him to do virtually do anything. This kind of populism is very dangerous for constitutionalism and the rule of law.

The state of Emergency: The Emergency Regulations continued to be in operation during this quarter as a majority of Parliamentarians either voting in favour of its extension or abstaining from voting.217

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6.3 Projection: 2008 began with the possibility of a break in the impasse in the Constitutional Council Crisis, but over the last few months it has become clear that this is unlikely, that the CC will be re-constituted in the immediate future. Recent moves by the Government indicate that it will continue with unilateral appointments and measures to sustain the discussion on solving the crisis, rather than actually resolving it. The Government has demonstrated a true desire to demonstrate its compliance with international standards on key issues such as the ICCPR and Victim and Witness Protection. It is unlikely that over the coming months the national and international scrutiny and criticism of the Government’s commitment to constitutionality and human rights standards will let up. The Supreme Court is likely to hear a number of Fundamental Rights cases but it is difficult to predict which direction the Court will take.

38 VII. ECONOMIC

7.1 Increasing signs of slow down in economic growth Signs of slowing growth rate: Indications so far are that the annual rate of GDP growth in 2008 is expected to slow down due to both domestic and external factors. Not all data pertaining to the first quarter of 2008 is available yet. Some are available and others we have only up to February. Compared to the first quarter of 2007, certain economic indicators of the first quarter 2008 appear to be below par. For example, in the agriculture sector, while paddy (-25%) and coconut (-22%) outputs have dropped sharply, tea (+30%) and rubber (+14%) outputs have increased significantly in the first quarter 2008 compared to the corresponding period last year. In the industrial sector, during the first two months of this year, private sector industrial output has increased marginally (+6%) while the public sector industrial output has dropped dramatically (-91%) and industrial exports have increased marginally in value (+4%) in comparison to the corresponding period last year. Further, the weighted average prime lending rate and the Treasury bill rates have increased significantly during the first quarter 2008 compared to the same period last year, which could reduce the GDP growth rate by way of lowering investments. In addition, inflation has increased by 6 - 9% in the first quarter 2008 compared to the first quarter last year, which could also reduce the real rate of growth of GDP.

In the external sector of the economy, while imports in dollar value have increased by 40%, exports have increased by only 12% during the first two months of this year compared to the same period last year. Therefore, the trade deficit during the first two months of this year has more than doubled (+110%) in comparison to the first two months of 2007. Nevertheless, gross official reserves during the first two months of 2008 increased by 33% compared to the corresponding period last year due to the issue of sovereign bonds worth USD 500 million in October 2007,; syndicated loan of USD 300 million obtained in February 2008 from international capital markets and 14% increase in net private remittances received in the first two months of 2008 (compared to the same period last year).

The foregoing data reveal that, both in the domestic and external sectors, the economy has done as well as during the first quarter last year. The immediate future seems bleak, primarily due to external shocks. The world price of crude oil is surging at an unprecedented level. International prices of rice, wheat, and milk powder are also rapidly escalating. The US economy is on a recession, which is the destination of around 60% of Sri Lanka's apparel exports. Meltdown in the US economy and the upcoming Presidential elections there in November 2008 would negatively affect Sri Lanka's exports to the US due to sluggish consumer demand. In the domestic front, unprecedented rain and floods have slashed the Maha 2007/2008 seasonal paddy harvest and other food crops. The foregoing external and domestic factors are likely to increase the cost of living further during the rest of the year as well.

The only positive development one could expect on the economic front during the rest of this year is spin off from the political and economic stabilisation of the Eastern Province in the aftermath of the Provincial Council elections held on May 10, 2008. Besides, further gains in the northern battlefront during the course of the year could also give a psychological boost to the economy by way of a 'feel good factor'.

Sources of Growth: The Sri Lankan economy grew by 6.8% in 2007 after recording 7.7% growth in 2006 (second highest annual rate of growth since independence, after 8.2% recorded in 1978) and 6.2% in 2005. In the past three years (2005-2007) the average annual growth rate of the economy exceeded 6%. That is, the economy has achieved a sustainable growth rate of over 6% in the past three years, which is unprecedented.

39 However, it is imperative to discern the sources of the remarkable economic growth rate amidst a high intensity civil war, which is what Table 1 attempts to do. Table 1 depicts the shares of sectors and sub-sectors in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices from 2003 to 2007. During the past five-year period (2003-2007), while the share of agriculture sector had declined consistently (barring in 2007) and the share of industrial sector had increased consistently (barring in 2007) year- on-year in the GDP the share of services sector had increased in 2004, declined in 2005 and then increased consecutively in 2006 and 2007 (see Table 1).

In the agricultural sector, agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries sub-sectors have both experienced declining shares in the GDP over the period 2003 to 2007 (see Table 1). In the industrial sector, while mining, quarrying and construction sub-sectors have increased their shares in the GDP consistently during 2003-2007,; share of the utilities sub-sector had dropped marginally in 2004 but increased marginally since then and share of the manufacturing sub-sector had increased consecutively in 2004 and 2005 but declined consecutively in 2006 and 2007 (see Table 1). In the services sector, while wholesale and retail trade (except in 2004), ownership of dwellings (except 2007) and private services (except 2007) sub-sectors have consistently contributed lesser to the GDP during the period under review, transport, communication, banking, insurance, real estate (except 2005) and government services (except 2004) have consistently contributed increasing shares to the GDP.

The agriculture sector is entirely owned and operated by the private sector. In the industrial sector, while mining and quarrying and manufacturing sub-sectors are almost entirely owned and operated by the private sector, utilities sub-sector is almost entirely owned and operated by the government (except gas), and the construction sub-sector has both private and government ownership and operation. Services sector has a mixture of both private and government ownership and operations.

Particularly noteworthy is the phenomenal growth in the government services sub-sector since 2005. Government services include public administration, defence, education, health and other government services. While in 2003 and 2004 the growth of GDP in current prices (nominal GDP) has been greater than the growth of government services in current prices, it has been the reverse since 2005 onwards. In fact, the gap between the growth of nominal GDP and government services has been highest in 2005 (9.01%), followed by in 2007 (7.90%) and 2006 (5.05%) (see Table 2 in Endnotes).218 In 2003, while there was hardly any growth in the government services in monetary terms the GDP at current prices grew by 11.36%. Therefore, it is inferred that one of the primary sources of economic growth in the past three years (2005-2007) is the growth in government services. Wanton recruitment to the public sector has been the hallmark of the new government that came to power in April 2004. In 2006 and 2007 increasing recruitment to the armed forces (including to home guard and civil defence force services) has bolstered the public sector.

Growth in government services is purely in terms of personnel and not in terms of productivity. That is, increased number of personnel has increased expenditure for government services and not necessarily enhancement in productivity of personnel. Growth in the private sector, where mostly growth is productive, has been on a sliding path. Therefore, economic growth experienced in the past three years is mostly unproductive growth. Due to the sustainability of this form of economic growth there are serious questions as to whether this is real or phantom growth.

40

Table 1: GDP Shares in percentage terms (based on GDP at current prices) by Sector and Sub- Sector 2003–2007 Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

AGRICULTURE 13.23 12.54 11.82 11.34 11.69

1. Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry 11.58 10.94 11.04 10.14 10.15 1.1 Tea 1.44 1.46 1.34 1.19 1.38 1.2 Rubber 0.30 0.35 0.42 0.62 0.60 1.3 Coconut 1.55 1.30 1.25 1.02 1.11 1.4 Minor Export Crops 0.43 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.32 1.5 Paddy 1.71 1.50 1.64 1.33 1.24 1.6 Livestock 0.94 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.14 1.7 Other Food Crops 3.87 3.64 3.56 3.27 3.01 1.8 Tobacco 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.9 Betel and Areca nuts 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 1.10 Plantation Development 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.22 1.11 Other Agricultural Products 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.29 0.30 1.12 Firewood and Forestry 0.59 0.56 0.66 0.70 0.74 2. Fishing 1.65 1.60 0.78 1.20 1.54

INDUSTRY 28.43 28.62 30.19 30.64 29.93

3. Mining and Quarrying 1.40 1.44 1.46 1.57 1.58 4. Manufacturing 18.59 18.72 19.51 19.23 18.50 4.1 Processing (Tea, Rubber and Coconut) 0.78 0.76 0.66 0.60 0.60 4.2 Factory Industry 16.65 16.81 17.73 17.57 16.93 4.3 Cottage Industry 1.16 1.15 1.12 1.05 0.97 5. Utilities 2.39 2.35 2.36 2.46 2.46 5.1 Electricity 2.00 1.96 1.91 2.00 1.98 5.2 Gas 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.36 5.3 Water 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 6. Construction 6.04 6.11 6.85 7.38 7.38

SERVICES 58.34 58.84 57.99 58.02 58.38

7. Wholesale and Retail Trade 24.25 24.56 23.21 22.45 22.07 7.1 Import Trade 8.78 9.18 8.43 7.88 7.87 7.2 Export Trade 4.88 4.85 4.34 4.04 3.97 7.3 Domestic Trade 10.59 10.53 10.44 10.53 10.23 8. Hotels and Restaurants 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.51 9. Transport and Communication 11.01 11.49 11.72 11.74 11.82 9.1 Transport 9.62 10.03 9.95 9.84 9.88 9.2 Cargo Handling – Ports and Civil Aviation 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.52 9.3 Post and Telecommunication 0.79 0.89 1.18 1.33 1.42 10. Banking, Insurance and Real Estate, etc 8.44 8.52 8.37 9.08 9.17 11. Ownership of Dwellings 4.01 3.72 3.62 3.51 3.53 12. Government Services 7.83 7.82 8.42 8.77 9.34 13. Private Services 2.29 2.17 2.07 1.90 1.93

Gross Domestic Product 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: Derived from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2007, Statistical Appendix Table 1. Note: 2007 data are provisional.

41

Per Capita Income: Per capita income is derived by dividing the Gross National Product (GNP) of a country by the total population of a country. There are different income brackets used for the foregoing categorisation of countries by different international organisations over time. According to the latest categorisation of the World Bank, countries with USD 905 or less per capita income per year are defined as low income countries, between USD 906 and USD 3,595 are defined as lower middle income countries, between USD 3,596 and USD 11,115 are defined as upper middle income countries and over USD 11,116 are defined as high income countries. In 2007, Sri Lanka had a per capita income of USD 1,608 per year, which means it is a lower middle income country. . The per capita income used by the government is misleading, because it is worked out at current market prices. That is, the Gross National Product (GNP) at current prices (3,538,630 million) in 2007, which is called the nominal GNP, is divided by the total population (20 million) in 2007. This gives an annual per capita income of Rs.176, 932 (USD 1,608) and monthly per capita income of Rs.14, 744 (i.e. average income per person per month in Sri Lanka) in 2007 (see Table 3 in Endnotes).

If we use the GNP at constant (2002) prices (2,208,137 million), which is called the real GNP, the annual per capita income in 2007 was Rs.110,407 (USD 1,004) and monthly per capita income was Rs.9,201 (i.e. average income per person per month in Sri Lanka) (see Table 3 in Endnotes). This is the realistic measure of per capita income because it takes into account the rise in prices, i.e. inflation.

Furthermore, according to the latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) undertaken by the Department of Census and Statistics (DCS) during 2006/2007 the mean per capita income per month was only Rs.6,463 (i.e. the average income per person per month) and the median per capita income was only Rs.4,043 (i.e. 50% of the population in Sri Lanka received less than Rs.4,043 per person per month) (see Table 3 in Endnotes).

All the foregoing figures pertain to the country as a whole. There are, of course, district-wise variations in the above figures. The HIES was conducted among a representative sample of households in 19 out of 25 districts in the country. All the five districts in the North and Trincomalee district in the East were not covered by this survey. Therefore, it does not cover the entire country. Sri Lanka's national income accounts also do not fully cover the LTTE controlled areas in the North.

There are disadvantages and advantages of HIES over the national income accounts. Since HIES is a representative sample survey it does not cover each and every household in the country, which is a disadvantage vis-à-vis the national income accounts. The advantage of HIES is that it covers the informal economy as well in addition to the formal economy. In the case of national income accounts it covers only the formal economy, the informal economy is not captured. Therefore, we could argue that the national income account is an underestimation of the actual income of the country.

The per capita income worked out from the national income accounts is deceptive because it includes income of institutions as well (government, non-government, private, etc), which may not necessarily filter down to the household incomes. In contrast, the HIES captures solely the income and expenditure of households, which is the real disposable income of households and by extension individuals. Thus, significant part of the per capita income derived from national income accounts is ghost income as far as individuals are concerned, which is reflected in the significant discrepancy between per capita income derived from the two sources, viz. HIES and national income accounts (see Table 3 in Endnotes).

42

The latest HIES 2006/7 reveal that only 15.2% of the Sri Lankan population is poor (see Table 4), a dramatic drop from 23.0% in the last HIES 2002/3, which is a striking statistic given the galloping inflation since mid-2006. The regional headcount poverty indices are also questionable because accordingly Eastern Province (10.8%) has the second lowest incidence of poverty after the Western Province (8.2%) (see Table 4). That is, while 15.2% of the Sri Lankan population was deemed poor in 2006/7, in the Western Province only 8.2% and in the Eastern Province only 10.8% of the population was deemed poor. Besides, according to the HIES 2006/7, Ampara (10.9%) and Batticaloa (10.7%) districts had the lowest incidence of poverty after Colombo (5.4%) and Gampaha (8.7%) districts (see Table 4), which is again questionable. If indeed we take the latest poverty data emanating from the HIES for granted, then why is that nearly 50% of the Sri Lankan population is receiving the poor relief payment of the Samurdhi poverty alleviation programme whilst only 15.2% of the population is deemed poor?

The Eastern Province poverty incidence data is very misleading because the HIES was not undertaken in one of the three districts in the province, i.e. Trincomalee. Besides, HIES does not cover the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in welfare camps who are the most poverty stricken people. Furthermore, it needs to be clarified how the provincial or district poverty lines in the East was worked out, since for the past 17 years the DCS has not collected consumer prices in the Eastern and Northern Provinces which is essential for determining the district and provincial poverty lines.

Until mid last year (2007) both the Central Bank (CB) and the DCS used to prepare the national income accounts, and most of the times it has been the case that DCS growth figures were higher than that of the CB. Presumably due to this fact the CB has entrusted sole responsibility for compilation of national income accounts to the DCS. Due to the above noted surprises in the poverty figures derived from the HIES it is high time to make the collection of socio economic data independent of the government departments and ministries which are susceptible to political interference. The Central Bank, which is statutorily supposed to be independent of the government, has become highly politicized under the present Governor.

Moreover, the GDP growth figures for the fourth quarter 2007 7.6% is questionable. This doubt is compounded by the negative net remittance received (USD –63 million) during December 2007, according to CB data, which is unusual because usually remittances are high during December due to the festive season. Tampering of economic data appears to have become part and parcel of the development strategy of the present government. Inflation data is another key suspect in the phantom growth figures churned out by the DCS and the CB. For example, compilation and dissemination of the Sri Lanka Consumer Price Index (SLCPI) was discontinued after November 2007, because in November 2007 the point-to-point rate of change in inflation in terms of the SLCPI hit a record 26.2%, and was replaced by the new Colombo Consumer Price Index CCPI (N) (2002=100). Moreover, there was no official announcement of inflation data in terms of the Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI 1952=100) for the month of April 2008, reportedly because it hit almost 30%. DCS being a government department is even more susceptible to political manipulation. Therefore, it is time to entrust the collection and dissemination of socio economic data to an independent authority like the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) in India and Great Britain.

43

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION

8.1 Context The continuing high level of support for the Government’s military campaign among the Sinhala Community is a significant feature of the public opinion survey. Similarly, confidence in the President on all most all fronts apart from economic remains pronounced. Among the minority communities there is continuing support for peace talks and in general lack of support for the military operations. However, all four communities agree that a political solution of some kind is needed. Across the board, one can see fair levels of ignorance on constitutional issues, especially on the All Party Representative Committee.219

8.2 Continuing high level of support for military campaign and Rajapakse Presidency among Sinhala Community

Solution to the Conflict: The results of the March survey show a decrease in the Sinhala support of nine percentage points for peace talks from 25.7% in November 2007, while support for the government’s defeat of the LTTE remains constant. A majority within the Sinhala community continue to demonstrate a majority support of 48.1% for the government’s defeat of the LTTE. For a clear majority of the Tamil (83%), and Up Country Tamil (77.3%) communities the way to end the conflict and attain peace in Sri Lanka is by stopping the war and conducting political negotiations. As for the Muslim Community 83.8% prefer an end to the war and the commencement of political negotiations.

There is recognition amongst individuals in all four communities that a political solution is essential to the resolution of the conflict, a view shared by 31.6% of the Sinhala community and 30.1% of the Up Country Is a political settlement necessary? Tamil 3.2 community. A 1 further 30% of 1.613.6 14.3 17.6 Don't know/ Not sure the Sinhalese 27 1.2 24.2 indicate that 1 11.1 they feel that a 15.8 43.7 18.1 3.8 political solution Not required would be useful, 1 with 18.1% of 34.4 28.9 30.0 1.1 this say that a % political solution 0 11.5 71 71.2 Useful is not required. 43.7% of the Up Country Tamil 0 40.3 35.6 31.6 30.1 community do Essential not know or are 0 not certain of Nov March Nov March Nov March the necessity of '07 '08 '07 '08 '07 '08 a political solution. In Sinhala Up Country Muslim comparison with Tamil results from November ’07,

44 there is no great change in opinion, although the percentage of Up Country Tamils who feel that a solution is ‘essential’ has reduced by 10 percentage points.

Sinhala opinion that the country is ‘close’ to reaching a permanent solution to the conflict has increased by 12 percentage points. The percentage point drop in opinion of the Muslim community in response to the question on the proximity to a permanent solution from 23.6% to 19.7% is within the margin of error. The Tamil and Up Country Tamil communities agree with the Muslims that the country has not moved closer to a permanent solution.

In contrast majorities within the Sinhala and Muslim communities agree that the government is committed to finding peace through talks, the other two communities tend to disagree220. When the same question is asked regarding the LTTE, majorities in three communities (Sinhala – 70.3%, Tamil – 42.3% and Muslim – 41.8%) state that the LTTE is not committed to finding peace through talks. Agreement regarding the LTTE’s commitment is expressed by 29.9% of the Tamils, 26.5% of the Up Country Tamils and 25.8% of the Muslim community.

Opinion on how to describe the conflict situation remains polarised. While majorities in the Tamil (56.7%) and Up Country Tamil (43.2%) communities describe the current situation as an ethnic conflict, the majority of Sinhalese (71.2%) and Muslims (40.2%) state that it is a war against terrorism. 40.4% of the Up Country Tamil community state that they do not know or are not sure how to describe the situation. Sinhala opinion that this is a ‘war against terrorism’ has risen from 62.8% in Nov ’07 to 71.2%., while Muslim opinion that the situation is an ethnic conflict has reduced by ten percentage points since the November report.

Capacity and Security: While 70.1% of the Sinhalese and 32.8% of the Muslims feel that the LTTE is weak militarily, How would you assess the government's military 54.2% of the capacity? Tamil community and 34.4% of the 100 Muslim 3.6 1.5 community disagree, stating 80 7.1 Weak that they feel 5.7 that the LTTE’s capacity is 60 Strong strong. While 26.4% of the Up 92.2 Country Tamil % 88.1 15.7 40 76.9 community agree 70.2 12.0 with this, a majority of 45.6% state that 20 37.7 they do not 26.1 know or are not sure. When 0 rating the Nov March Nov March Nov March military capacity '07 '08 '07 '08 '07 '08 of the Sinhala Up Country Muslim Government, Tamil majorities in the Sinhala, and

45 Muslim communities feel that the Government is strong.221 While 26.1% of the Up Country Tamil community agrees, a majority (45.1%) states that they do not know or are not sure. In comparison with the November ’07 results, the Muslim community continues to feel that the LTTE are strong militarily, while Sinhala and Up Country Tamil perception of the strength of the LTTE has decreased. In the case of the Government,; while there are those that agree that the Government is militarily strong in the Muslim Community, it has reduced slightly by 6 points, the Sinhala community’s impression of the government’s strength has increased by 4 percentage points.

A majority of 62.9% of the Sinhala community feel that the security situation in the country has improved, as do 33.2% of the Muslim community. This sentiment is shared by only 13.4% of the Tamil community where a significant proportion (36.1%) feel that the situation has worsened. 24.1% of the Up Country Tamil community agree that the situation has worsened while 53% of the same community and 41% of the Muslim community do not know or are not sure. These results do not show any variance from those reported in November ’07 with the exception of the Muslim community where the opinion that the security situation has improved has reduced by 11 percentage points.

The President’s popularity: Sixty percent of the Sinhala community are still willing to bear a high cost of living for the sake of the Government’s war with the LTTE, the other ethnic groups refuse to do so. Majorities within the three minority communities (79.4% of the Tamils, 72.7% of the Muslims and 69.4% of the Up Country Tamils) state that they will not shoulder the economic burden of the war. They are joined in this opinion by 31.3% of the Sinhala community.

However, while the Sinhala community expresses a high level of satisfaction with the president’s handling of social values (81%), management of own party (68.8%), international relations (77.1%), the war (91.4%) and solving the conflict (73.5%),; a majority of the Sinhalese are dissatisfied with his management of the economy (63.6%). They are joined in this by their counterparts in the other three communities. With Are you satisfied with Mahinda Rajapakse's performance regards to the other with regards to managing the cost of living? aspects of the 7.8 President’s Muslim 78.3 administration, the 13.9 Up Country Tamil No response and Tamil communities express 24.2 a strong sense of Up Country 72.0 dissatisfaction,222 Tamil 3.8 while the Muslim community’s Dissatisfied opinions are split 4.1 between satisfaction Tamil* 88.7 and dissatisfaction.223 7.2 The Constitutional Satisfied Debate: Across the 3.6 board, there is a Sinhala 63.6 general level of 32.9 ignorance with regards to the All 0 20406080100 Party Representative % Committee and developments

46 regarding the same.224 Of those who do express awareness of the APRC, only 2.9% of the Sinhala community, 2.7% of the Up Country Tamil community and 7.0% of the Muslim community feel very confident in the ability of the APRC to bring about a southern consensus. Further, of the same group of persons who are aware of the APRC, most express dissatisfaction with the level of inclusion practiced by the committee. The inclusion of the TMVP in the committee, however, is met with disapproval by most of the Tamil community, while the other three communities have no definitive stance on this issue.

When the subject of the implementation of the 13th Amendment is broached, the responses elicited show that approval for putting this into practice is low, except in the case of the Muslim community where 31.1% approve. Disapproval is highest amongst the Tamil community (41.2%) while most sections of the Sinhala (39.3%) and Up Country Tamil (33.3%) state that they do not know or are not sure. With regards to the establishing of an interim provincial council for the North, a majority of 55.6% of the Sinhalese state that they do not know or are not sure. At the same time, 55.6% of the Muslim community approve while 59.4% of the Tamil community disapproves. A majority (40%) of the Up Country Tamil community neither approve nor disapprove.

Questions on specific constitutional changes elicit mixed responses. In general, the most support for constitutional change comes from the Tamil and Muslim communities while the Up Country Tamil community consistently indicates that they are unsure. While the level of support varies on most issues, apart from change under a federal constitution more Sinhalese support than oppose structural changes. The Tamil and Muslim communities are most Structural changes supportive of a merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces while the Sinhalese t Muslim 1.2 a 90.2 Agree h s and the Up Country Tamils are t s u ty 0.6 e re o li Up Country Tamil 61.3 g u i a less so. Change that retains a n s ig u a n l q Tamil* 84.2 3.2 h e re e unitary system, as opposed to C Sinhala 61.5 13.2 Disagree within a federal system wins r e m Muslim 49.6 13.6 the support of the Sinhalese d te n s 2.8 and the Muslims. Change u y Up Country Tamil 27.4 e s g l under a federal system is met n ra Tamil* 61.1 9.5 a e h d with favour by the Tamil C fe Sinhala 11.1 24.2 community. On these matters, r e m Muslim 60.2 13.1 d te the Up Country Tamil n s u y Up Country Tamil 15.7 12.4 Community mostly maintains e s g y n r Tamil* 21.3 41.5 that they do not know or are a ita h n not sure. Constitutional C u Sinhala 40.2 7.7 change that ensures religious t Muslim 50.4 25.0 s r equality receives support from a e Up Country Tamil 36.5 5.5 E g h r all four communities, with the rt e o M Tamil* 69.5 10.5 highest level of support N Sinhala 30 28.4 coming from the Muslim and Tamil communities. (see 020406080100 graph) % The concept of devolving powers225 to the provinces is met with little resistance, although 29.1% of the Sinhalese indicate that they would not be willing to give police powers to the provinces. It is the Tamil and Muslim communities who are most in favour of sharing these particular powers. These two communities are also the most willing to devolve

47 powers of land to the provinces (Tamil- 74%, Muslim – 65.6%), as well as matters of health and education (Tamil- 76%, Muslim- 66.1%). While the Sinhalese are not as yielding as the two aforementioned communities, their levels of agreement for allowing certain powers to be shared to provinces does not fall below the 30% mark.

With regards to procedural changes such a as provincial council elections every five years, establishing Sinhala and Tamil as official languages and establishing high courts for provinces, we see that the trend created when asking about power sharing continues. When asked if they would agree to high courts for provinces, with the lowest level of agreement amongst the Sinhala community (39.6%) and the highest from the Tamil community (62.7%). The Tamil community (75%) and the Muslim community (73.8%) are most agreeable to the idea of provincial council elections every five years while the Up Country Tamil community is the least willing (47.5%). As for the establishment of Sinhala and Tamil as official languages and English as a link language, all communities are agreeable to the idea, with the most consent coming from the Muslim community (81.5%) followed by 77.9% of the Tamils and 60% of the Sinhalese and the least support from the Up Country Tamil community (58.3%)226.

48 IX. MEDIA

9.1 Context: The insecurity and threats faced by the media has continued into the last quarter. While there were a number of violent incidents the media also faced verbal attacks and threats. Coupled with the culture of impunity where even identified perpetrators remain at large, the media in Sri Lanka remains cautious and fearful. Direct government involvement in curtailing the freedom of information and press freedom was manifested through a number of arbitrary removals and appointments of high officials of state media institutions and censorship in the form of government orders. While the situation of the media was highlighted by national and international media organization, it has not resulted in an improvement in the situation or the Government taking corrective measures.

9.2 Increasingly hostile and dangerous environment for the media: Within the past three months, around 11 incidents of physical attacks against the journalists and other media professionals have been publicly reported in the media.227 It is important to note that Minister Mervin Silva was reported to have been directly or indirectly involved in 3 of the 11 incidents. Most of the victims of these attacks were the employees of SLRC who protested the Minister's infamous intrusion of the SLRC premises in December 2007. Journalist Arunasiri Hettige, Assistant Director (Supplies) of SLRC was attacked with a club affixed to a sharp object on March 14, when he was on his way to work.228 The President had to summon a meeting with the trade union leaders of the SLRC, after they threatened to block the transmission if the government failed to take any action against Minister Mervin Silva. It was reported that the accused minister was also present at the meeting. The minister had denied that he was behind any of these attacks and the President had assured the employees of the SLRC, of their safety.229 Despite massive protests launched against his hostile behavior against media personnel, on March 20, the MTV journalists who were covering the opening of a fly-over bridge in Kelaniya were threatened and prevented from carrying out their work by the minister230. Media persons have also been attacked by other actors. In one incident, a journalist attached to ITN, was assaulted by a Buddhist Chief Monk in front of a large public gathering. This journalist had covered the news of a sexual abuse story which this particular monk was charged as the culprit. 231

The public identification of certain media institutions and journalists as ‘anti-patriotic,’ ‘traitors,’ ‘pro- Tiger’ by key figures in the Government has intensified fear in the media. In a public meeting held in Rathnapura, President Mahinda Rajapakse, stated that “some media institutions have become the mouth piece of the LTTE. They unjustifiably allege there is no media freedom, despite the freedom available in abundance, as simply illustrated when one reads the weekend newspapers"232 The Government has also increasingly taken steps to control the media. The President arbitrarily intervened in removing some high officials in state controlled media institutions and making new appointments. Without prior notice, the Chairman of the SLBC, Mr. Sunil Sarath Perera was removed by the President on the February 27.233 The Chairman of the Public performance Board, Prof. Somarathna Balasuriya was also abruptly removed on February 18. A retired Army Major General was appointed to SLRC, as the Additional Director General (Administration). This has been marked as the first attempt of militarization of state media institutions.

A number of journalists have been arrested within the past three months. On March 7, the editor of the www.outreachsl.com, .J.S Tissainayagam was arrested by the ‘Terrorist Investigation Department’ along with some four other media professionals attached to the same news website.234 Tissanayagam was held by the TID since March 7, along with eight others. They are being detained under the Emergency Regulations (2005) Act. Despite filing a Fundamental Rights case to the Supreme Court on March 19, on the grounds of his medical condition and denial of legal rights, Tissainayagam is still in remand along with the owner of the printing press, Mr Jesiharan and his wife, Walarmathi. Four individuals who were arrested including Kithsiri Wijeysinghe, Ranga Lasanthe (photographer),

49 Udayanan (visual editor) and Mr. Kumara (a relative of the owner) were released on the same day that he filed a fundamental rights case in the Supreme Court. Tissainayagam has been granted limited access to family, legal representation and information pertaining to his case.235

The Government's has also attempted to obstruct the flow of information through various means over the past three months. In early February, the Presidential Secretariat issued a circular pertaining to the release of official information to mass media or the public by public officers. Accordingly no public officers are authorized to publish articles, provide information or make statements to the media except, in accordance with the official policy of the government.236 In another move, the Media Centre for National Security warned that any rumors including SMS text messaging regarding the war situation would be dealt with severely. This proclamation was viewed by media groups as an instrument to censor news related to war in the coming months. On the February 4, text messaging on mobile phones was blocked as a part of the security measures for the Independence Day celebrations.

For the past three months, there has been a number of important global and local campaigns against media suppression in Sri Lanka. In the early January, Sri Lanka was listed as one of the six most unsafe places for journalists in the annual survey conducted by the International Federation of Journalists. In a joint letter the representatives of journalist's unions and associations across the Asia Pacific region, appealed to the President and the Government of Sri Lanka to protect the safety of journalists and uphold the rights of the media to report freely. On February 14, a massive protest march organized by the Movement Against Media Suppression, was held in Colombo with the joint participation of journalists, trade union activists and civil society activists.

Case Study I: UNICEF BP 100 High nutrition biscuit Issue

Facts of the Incident: A lorry which was carrying a load of high-nutrition biscuits (BP 100) was seized by the police at Medawahchiya checkpoint on the 26th January. The driver and the cleaner of the lorry were arrested due to their failure to produce the required clearance documents. The UNICEF office in Colombo claimed that these biscuits were imported by them on a request of the Health ministry, to be distributed among malnourished children in the Vanni and Killinochchi, and that they had obtained all the required clearance documents from the Defense Ministry and Commissioner General of Essential Services to transport them to the North, but that, when the truck was checked it did not have the full documentation on the vehicle. UNICEF claimed that this was an inadvertent mistake. After the police investigations, the lorry, the arrested driver and the cleaner were released.

The way the controversial high nutrition biscuit issue was reported by the Sinhalese, Tamil and English newspapers in Sri Lanka clearly depicts the polarization of the print media, in terms of language and state/private ownership. The reportage of this incident in each newspaper also reveals the politics of each newspaper in relation to the on-going conflict, parties to the conflict and the international community's involvement in humanitarian issues in Sri Lanka. This story was irresponsibly covered by most of the print media to confirm suspicions and prejudices held by these newspapers.

There are several aspects in the coverage which need to be noted including: • The importance given to the incident by each newspaper in terms of the number of articles, news items, cartoons etc. • Partiality in the way the incident was reported. • Space given to the different parties attached to the incident to voice their explanations. • Efforts to correct false news or to apologies to the parties affected by misleading stories.

50 Coverage as an indicator of the newspapers’ interest: The table below shows the number of news items and articles and the cartoons published in each newspaper covering this incident. From all the Sinhalese, Tamil and English newspapers, ‘Dinamina’ has given the most extensive coverage to this incident. It is the only newspaper which published a leading news story and an editorial on this issue. It also has the highest number of the articles and cartoons on this story.

Compared to the Sinhalese and Tamil newspapers, English newspapers paid little attention to this incident. For instance, whereas the story was carried widely in ‘Dinamina’, which is the Sinhalese newspaper that is published by the State owned, Lake House, its English and Tamil counterparts, (‘Daily News’ and ‘Thinakaran’), gave limited coverage to this issue. ‘Thinakaran’, only published a small front page news aricle on the January 28 (the day on which the story was broken by the print media), while the ‘Daily News’ did not carry any news on this story until three days later. On January31, this issue was mentioned as a part of another story in a small front page news piece which appeared in the ‘Daily News’ on another similar incident where a lorry with explosives, had been seized at Thekkawatte checkpoint. This was the only reference ‘Daily News’ gave to the biscuit issue. No photographs of the lorry in question were published by any Tamil newspapers. Among the Sinhalese newspapers, ‘Lakbima’ and ‘Lanka’ published photogrphs of the lorry.

Partiality in coverage: The newspaper coverage varied, particularly with regard to how the nutritional biscuits were described as food for combatants and how the biscuits were linked to the LTTE. On January 28, all the daily Sinhalese newspapers except ‘Lankadeepa’, directly reported that the concerned lorry was carrying the high nutrition biscuits to be handed over to the LTTE. Every news item that appeared in the Sinhalese papers stated the World Food Organisation (WFO), sent the biscuit load to Kilinochchi. The headline of the ‘Dinamina’ lead, news story in big letters said, “WHO sends energy biscuits to the Tigers.” Every newspaper used the words "Tigers/Vanni tigers" when referring to LTTE. The news item appeared in ‘Lankadeepa’ on the 28th, mentioned that the police suspected that this load of biscuits were being carried to Kilinochchi to be handed over to the LTTE. Wimal Weerawansa was quoted in ‘Dinamina’ on the 30th saying that the “nudity” of the international community was revealed by this incident which proved that WHO sent high protein biscuits to the Tigers. On the same day ‘Dinamina’ in another news item, quoted the Spokesman of the JHU, Nishantha Sri Warnasinge who criticizes the UN agencies severely, using this incident, and directly accusing it that they sent a load of high protein biscuits to tigers.

The fact that this kind of high nutrition biscuits are normally used by the military deep penetration teams was highlighted in every Sinhalese newspaper. This has been emphasized in the coverage to prove that they were intended for the LTTE guerilla cadres who are hiding in the deep jungles in Killinochchi. Only the police and military sources had been quoted in all the news items that appeared on the 28th.

Compared to the Sinhala newspapers, English newspapers tried to present the news in a more balanced manner. Not one English newspaper explicitly stated that the biscuits were intended for the LTTE but they all stated that the lorry was heading towards Killinochchi. The newspapers ran the line put forward by the military that these biscuits are usually used by the fighters hiding in the jungles. The ‘Daily Mirror’ gave two possible reasons for the nutritional biscuits being sent to the Wanni: Military sources said that biscuits of this type are normally used by military Deep Penetration Units. The website of the Norwegian manufacturers of this product say that "BP-100 is a compressed food product for use in the rehabilitation phase of severely malnourished children and adults"- (Daily Mirror, January29, page 03) Tamil newspapers except ‘Thinakaran’, (State Media) reported the incident just as additional news saying that a truck, which was carrying high protein biscuits, had been taken into custody at the

51 Medawachchiya checkpoint. Only ‘Thinakaran’, quoted the Military spokesman's statement saying that they suspected that these biscuits were for the LTTE.

Space for Response: On January 31, UNICEF released a press statement regarding the ‘BP 100’ biscuit issue. In the statement UNICEF clearly stated that they had obtained the required clearance documents for this shipment from the Ministry of Defense and the Commissioner General for Essential Services, but the lorry had inadvertently left without the full documentation. Except for ‘Lakbima’, no other Sinhala Newspapers published this press statement. All the daily english newspapers excluding the ‘Daily News’, provided space for this statement. The ‘Sunday Times’ published a long feature article which included this press statement and a comprehensive description of the ‘BP 100’ biscuits which are used to feed malnourished children. Among the Tamil newspapers, ‘Thinakkural’ and ‘Virakesari’ published this.

On February 14, ‘Thinakkural’ published an article quoting a speech delivered by Fillin Fameli of UNICEF at a function held in Galle, with reference to this biscuit incident, denying the allegations that they are sympathizers of the LTTE. Sinhalese and English newspapers had not published this.

Most of the Sinhalese newspapers used this issue to attack NGO's and international agencies working in Sri Lanka. The targets of such attacks included UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies such as Oxfam and ZOA who have on various occasions been accused of providing supplies to the LTTE. ‘Lanka’, ‘Dinamina’, ‘Divaina’, and ‘Lakbima’ have previously published lengthy feature articles severely criticizing the NGOs and INGO’s saying that they support the Tigers and are trying their best to undermine the efforts of the Sri Lanka forces to liberate the North from the Tigers. All four cartoons published in ‘Dinamina’ had portrayed NGOs in a very humiliating manner.237 Both ‘Dinamina’ and ’Lakbima’ had published the statements issued by the JVP and JHU in relation to this incident. They were harsh comments against NGO's. The titles of the articles alone gave a clear indication of the content: “The nature of the International Community is exposed by their act of sending high protein biscuits for Tigers;”238 “We should launch a collective Campaign against Tiger friendly NGOs,”239 and “Let us campaign until traitor NGOs leave this country.”240 A significant fact was that English newspapers, even those perceived to be more Sinhalese nationalists, showed little interest in using this incident to accuse the NGOs.

Correction of the false news: The initial news appeared in all Sinhalese, Tamil and English newspapers who claimed that the biscuit load belonged to the WFP. This information had been extracted from the statement issued by the Media Centre for National Security. When WFP clarified its position only ‘Virakesari’ and ‘Daily Mirror’ carried the WFP statement on January 29, where the country director of WFP, Mohamaed Saleheen denied their involvement in this incident. No Sinhalese Newspapers published this. On February 06, ‘Dinamina’ published a small news article on page 5 of the paper, quoting a letter, Mr. Mohamaed Saleheen had sent to ‘Dinamina’ Newspaper, expressing his deep concern about the damage caused to the good name of their organization by the false news, the paper carried, which claimed that the alleged biscuit lorry belongs to the WFP.

Although all the Sinhalese newspapers except for ‘Lankadeepa’ published a news piece which turned out to be false, none of them issued a correction regarding the WFP involvement. None of those newspapers apologized to the offended parties. Even after it was revealed that the load of biscuits had been transported to Killinochchi on a request of the government authorities, and all the required clearance documents had been obtained for the shipment, but ‘Dinamina’, ‘Divaina’ and ‘Lanka’ kept publishing articles and news items which complained that these biscuits were meant to be handed over to the LTTE, and that UNICEF and other INGOs were LTTE supporters.

Follow up news: No Sinhalese or English newspapers reported the news that the arrested lorry was released after the police investigations. ‘Thinakkural’ reported this news on February 04. ‘Lanka’,

52 mentioned the release of the lorry in a feature article which appeared on February 10. However, the manner in which the article had been written implied that the decision to release the lorry was very unwise.

Following the release of the lorry, two police officers of the Medawachchiya checkpoint, who were on duty on the day this lorry was seized, were interdicted. The exact reason for the interdiction has not been given, but it seemed that it had something to with this biscuit incident. However, this news did not appear in any Sinhalese, Tamil or English newspaper. ‘Divaina’ on February 13, published a cartoon on this. ‘Rivira’ had mentioned this in a long feature article written about the Medawachchiya checkpoint.

Conclusions

• The polarization in the ethnic communities was reflected in the newspaper coverage. In general, the Sinhala media tended to be the most aggressive in its coverage. Among the Sinhalese newspapers, ‘Lankadeepa’ was the most neutral in its coverage.‘Dinamina’, ‘Lakbima’, ‘Divaina’ and ‘Lankadeepa’ have portrayed the incident in a very prejudice way. The same newspaper house, which gave a large space for this incident in their Sinhalese newspapers, did not, gave prominence to it in its English counterpart. While the Sinhalese papers have taken a very extreme nationalist approach in reporting the incident, the English paper of the same agency portrayed the news in a more neutral manner. Therefore it can be said that the presentation of the same piece of news varied according to the assumed interests of the target audience of each newspaper and not necessarily the politics of the publishing house at least in the case of the private media. • A significant aspect of the coverage was that very few of the newspapers attempted to verify the story from the international agencies concerned and relied purely on the military sources. Even when the agencies concerned put out a statement clarifying their position it is noteworthy that not all the newspapers were willing to give it space. When the real facts were revealed that the highest government authorities had given their approval for the concerned shipment, all the Sinhalese newspapers seemed to drop the issue, even without giving any explanation for the false news they published in their newspaper in big letters. • This incident took place in a context where the national and international NGOs work in the fields of human rights and humanitarian issues were being severely criticized by nationalist media. This incident was picked up by ultra-nationalist Sinhalese media, to sustain their claims that UNO, UNICEF and other related international organizations are secretly supporting the LTTE. • The UNICEF office in Colombo did not release a statement promptly explaining its position. They issued a press release only on the January 31, three days after the news appeared in newspapers. This delay only added to the public confusion regarding the issue. It needs to be noted, however that there is no guarantee that such a statement would be covered. The country director of the World Food Programme, responded promptly to the media, releasing a statement on the 29th denying their involvement in the incident, however as shown, this did not get carried widely in the Sinhalese media. • A government agency, the MCNS made the charge of smuggling goods to the LTTE but the relevant Ministry responsible for granting approval did not seek to issue a clarification at any point. • A significant impact of this story was that the nutritional biscuit supplies to civilians in the Wanni was suspended as a result of this story.

Case Study II: Print media response to the release of the Results of the Local Government Election in the Eastern Province

53 Local Government elections in the Eastern province were held on the 10th of March 2008, and the results appeared in the media on the 12th. It is important to analyze the reporting of the Sinhalese, Tamil and English print media subsequent to the release of the results of the election as it clearly manifests the partialities and the prejudices of each media channel with regard to the TMVP and the Government, and to the claims by the Election Commissioner and the Government that it was a free and fair election.

Coverage: All the Sinhalese Tamil and English newspapers gave prominence to the news and articles related to the election results on the 12th. It was the lead news of all the four main Sinhalese newspapers (‘Lankadeepa’, ‘Dinamina’, ‘Divaina’ and ‘Lakbima’). The ‘Island’ and ‘Daily News’ carried lead news on the election results while the ‘Daily Mirror’ gave considerable space in its front page with a photograph. Except ‘Sudaroli’, all the other main Tamil papers including ‘Thinakaran’, ‘Thinakural’ and ‘Virakesari’ carried a lead story which related to the election. Similarly, almost all newspaper editorials of the 12 that were focused on the outcome of the election results, apart from the Tamil papers. Among the Sinhalese papers, the editorials of ‘Divaina’, ‘Dinamina’ and ‘Lakbima’ on the 12th discussed the outcome of the election results. The ‘Island’ and ‘Daily News’ editorials on the 12th too were on the election results, while Daily Mirror devoted its editorial to discuss the results of the election on the 13th. It is interesting to note that no other Tamil newspaper except for ‘Thinakaran’, which is published by the state owned Lake House, ran an editorial on the implications of the election results on the 12th and 13th. Thus, it seemed that the Tamil papers were more wary of covering the election results than their Sinhalese and English counterparts.

It can be said that all the Sinhalese and English newspapers except for the ‘Morning Leader’ portrayed the results of the election in a positive approach. This difference was well demonstrated in the editorials in each newspaper. The editorial of the ‘Daily News’ on the 12 carried the heading "Dashed Spirits Revived" 241 It hailed the election results and commended the government highly for restoring the democracy in the eastern province and pointed out that the district has been suffering as a result of terror and politics for more than two decades. The editorial of the ‘Island’ on the 12th had been titled as "A Triumph for Democracy"242 It too depicted the election as a constructive step taken by the government to restore democratic rights of the people of the Eastern province. The UNP was severely criticized for boycotting the election and being negative about the Government's effort to get the armed groups back to the democratic politics. The ‘Daily Mirror’ editorial on the 13th suggested that the outcome of the election had to be welcomed. It further said, The international community that eternally keeps pricking our country for its failure to follow democratic ideals will now be able to appreciate the extent of the country's commitment to the democracy.243 The headings of the ‘Dinamina’ and ‘Lakbima’ on March 12 were "Batticaloa Revolution" and "The good side of the eastern province election" respectively.244 In contrast to this, the presentation of the outcome of the election in the Tamil papers other than ‘Thinakaran’, was rather critical, focusing on election violence and malpractices.

Space for Differing Political Views: The coverage given by the each newspaper to the statements issued by the various parties varied significantly. ‘Dinamina’ and its English counterpart ‘Daily News’ did not publish statements issued by the UNP which stated that the election was rigged. They did however run the press release issued by the Democratic Group of the UNP, which is currently allied with the government and which criticized the main stream UNP for not contesting. ‘Lakbima’ and ‘Divaina’ published the statements issued by the main UNP party. The protest held by the UNP in front of the Election Secretariat on the 12th against the election had been reported with photographs in ‘Lakbima’, ‘Lankadeepa’ and ‘Divaina’. The ‘Island’ and the ‘Daily Mirror’ who had also given space in the front page, for the news and photos of this protest. All the Tamil newspapers except ‘Thinakaran’, had published news items and photos of the UNP protest in the front page. The lead story of the ‘Virakesari’ on the 13th was on the UNP protest and its heading was a statement extracted from Ranil

54 Wickramasingha's speech: "What is the difference between the government and the tigers"245 Only ‘Thinakaran’ gave space to the statements issued by the TMVP.

The statements issued by the LTTE and TNA with regard to the election did not appear in any of the Sinhalese newspapers. Among the English newspapers only ‘Daily Mirror’ published a small section of the LTTE statement in the front page. All the Tamil newspapers except for ‘Thinakaran’, published the TNA statement. The lead story of the ‘Sudaroli’ on the 14th, was the TNA statement issued by MP Mawei Senadhiraja. The heading of it was " Can you call this election full of fraud a victory of democracy?"246

The Tamil papers seemed to show a disinterest in the elections. For instance none of the papers carried feature articles on the outcome of the election during this time. Among the English papers ‘Daily Mirror’ ran several analytical articles on the election results from March 12-14. Shakunthala Perera's half-page article titled "Who really were the Winners of the East" which appeared in the ‘Daily Mirror’ on the 13th emphasized the fact that the real victor of this whole election process was not the Tamil People in the East but the Government. The ‘Morning Leader’ carried several analytical articles, including the weekly column by Dr. P Saravanamuttu with the heading "Sunrise or Sunset for the East." Lanka, the weekly newspaper of the JVP, published a full-page article on March 16 under the heading “LTTE and UNP dreams were shattered by the mini polls in Batti".

It can be concluded that the reportage of the outcome of the eastern province election in the print media in Sri Lanka adds one more example of the polarization and the partialities of the newspaper organizations in Sri Lanka, based on the political preferences and the ethnical prejudice. While almost all Tamil papers, apart from the state owned paper, restricted their coverage as if they were fearful of legitimizing the election, the Sinhalese papers seemed to take the opposing position. In the English paper it was the Morning Leader which took the most critical stance to the election results. The paper is perceived to have a bias to the UNP, which may also explain its position.

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ENDNOTES

PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS 1 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmuddin “Oslo seeks India’s mediation to end Sri Lankan conflict” April 15 2008 2 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmuddin “Oslo seeks India’s mediation to end Sri Lankan conflict” April 15 2008 3 Daily Mirror, “Spiritual Guru seeks healing for Sri Lanka” April 15 2008 4 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmuddin “Oslo seeks India’s mediation to end Sri Lankan conflict” April 15 2008 5 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmuddin “Oslo seeks India’s mediation to end Sri Lankan conflict” April 15 2008

MILITARY SITUATION 6 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmudeen “No invitation for India to mediate – Govt” April 16 2008 7 Daily Mirror, by Jamila Najmudeen, “To mediate or not: India not yet decided” April 22 2008 8 Daily Mirror, “LTTE seeks Norway’s help to stop govt. offensive” April 09 2008 9 This chapter is based solely on information available in the public realm including newspapers, news websites and the Official websites of the Sri Lankan Military, the Government Peace Secretariat and the LTTE Peace Secretariat 10 TamilNet, “30 booby traps explode in 5 days in Mannar” April 06 2007 11 The Suday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Lull in battlefront as focus shifts to east” March 16 2008 12 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008; Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Rain and Thunder in the battle front,” March 23 2008; Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “President reviews progress of war,” March 30 2008 13 The LTTE reported launching an attack on the Thiruketheswaran area into the Thalladi HSZ while the military claimed clashes from the Palaikuli and Kallaikulam areas. (Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Rain and Thunder in the battle front,” March 23 2008) 14 Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Rain and Thunder in the battle front,” March 23 2008 15 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008 16 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri and Kassapa Ellepola “Lightning strikes soldiers Kills four soldiers; injures 65”, April 02 2008 17 “We are not under pressure of the LTTE… We never yield to the LTTE or the Sri Lankan Army. Of course we will listen to both parties but make our own decisions.” (The Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Bishop defends shifting og statue as Madhu war hots up,” April 6 2008; Transcurrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Madhu Church: Tragic casualty of Politico-Military Crossfire,” April5 2008) 18 The Nation, Senapathi, “Sylvan shrine sullied”, April 06 2007 19 Nation Newspaper, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Displaced Our Lady of Madhu statue in danger of disappearance,” April 13 2008 20 Transcurrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Madhu Church: Tragic casualty of Politico-Military Crossfire,” April5 2008 21 Nation Newspaper, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Displaced Our Lady of Madhu statue in danger of disappearance,” April 13 2008 22 TamilNet, “150 SLA killed, Tigers locate 30 SLA bodies in Northern Front” April 24 2008 23 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj, “Tigers demonstrate military prowess at Muhamalai,” April 27 2008 24 The Sunday Leader, “Janaka throws down the gauntlet” February 24 2008 25 Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Rain and Thunder in the battle front,” March 23 2008 26 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj, “Tigers demonstrate military prowess at Muhamalai,” April 27 2008 27 In a recent interview with state television Defence secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse admitted that they suffered a big loss in Muhamalai. He claimed the losses suffered at Muhamalai were over hundred troops killed and injured was one experience by the military after a long period of time (Daily Mirror, “Gota admits ‘big loss’ at Muhamalai” May 05 2008)

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28 Transucrrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Tigers get ready to face the Mechanized Infantry of the Army in the North,” March 25 2008; Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Prabha reappears, seemingly very much in command,” March 8 2008 29 The Nation, Military Matters, Senapathi “Govt.LTTE strategize anew” April 13 2008 30 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Fall of most LTTE defence lines imminent,” February 8 2008 31 D.B.S Jeyaraj, “LRRP infiltration demolishes impregnable Tiger terrain myth” March 11 2008 32 TamilNet, “Jaffna TNA MP Sivanesan killed in DPU claymore attack”March 06 2008, “NESoHR Chairman Fr. Karunaratnam killed in DPU attack” April 20 2008 33 Daily News, “No political hand in STF re-deployment” March 22 2008 34 Sunday Observer, “STF removed from East to reinforce Wanni battlefronts” March 23 2008 35 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008 36 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008 37 TamilNet, “Black Sea Tigers sink SLN Dvora, 14 SLN killed – LTTE” March 21 2008 38 Yahoo news, Amal Jayasinghe , “Tiger rebels launch air strike in Sri Lanka: security sources” April 27 2008 39 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Jeyaraj: Probe on who failed and what next,” April 13 2008 40 On April 25 bomb blast occurred inside a passenger bus in Piliyandala killing 26 passengers and injuring 73 (TamilNet, “A bus bomb in Piliyandala, 25 killed , 73 wounded”, April 25 2008), An improvised explosive device exploded in Welawatte, killed one man and injuring three school children on March 10 (TamilNet, “Civilian killed, 4 wounded, bomb blast in Colombo” March 10 2008 ) Prior to these two incidents 20 civilians were killed from a bomb blast inside a bus in Dambulla on February 2nd (TamilNet, “20 civilians killed, bomb attack on bus in Dambulla” February 02 2008) and also 14 civilians were killed and 103 persons wounded from a LTTE suicide attack at the fort railway station on February 3rd a day prior to the 60th independents day celebrations. (TamilNet, “14 killed ,103 wounded in Colombo train blast” February 03 2008) 41 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Trooper make progress in north, but major battles ahead,” March 9 2008 42 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Nayaru fireball: Sea mine or human torpedo?,” March 23 2008 43 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “War assumes new dimension in view of poll” April 20 2008 44 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Modera bomb house: The explosive truth,” March 2 2008 45 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Trooper make progress in north, but major battles ahead,” March 9 2008 46 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Fall of most LTTE defence lines imminent,” February 8 2008 47 Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Batti’s calm busted,” March 30 2008 48 Sunday Leader, Ranjith Jayasundera, “Lies, damn lies and statistics” April 27 2008 49 Sunday Observor????, The Sunday Leader, Ranjith Jayasundera, “Russian roulette with the troops,” April 6 2008 50 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj” Tigers fight fierce defensive war on north western front,”Febrary 24 2008 51 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj” Tigers fight fierce defensive war on north western front,”Febrary 24 2008 52 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj” Tigers fight fierce defensive war on north western front,”Febrary 24 2008 53 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Trooper make progress in north, but major battles ahead,” March 9 2008 54 Official website of Ministry of Defense, Public security and Law and order, “Toys found in terrorist bunker; evidence for LTTE's blatant disregard for civilian lives”, March 06 2008 55 Transucrrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “So near and yet so far in Mannar War Theatre so far,” February 26 2008; The Nation, D.B.S.Jeyaraj “Tigers fight fierce defensive war on north western front,” February 24 2008 56 Daily Mirror, Commodore R.S. Vasan IN (Retd), “Lanka’s underwater defence system:killing two birds with one stone?” February 02 2008 57 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Has LTTE resumed arms smuggling,” February 8 2008

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58 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Has LTTE resumed arms smuggling,” February 8 2008 59 The Nation, D.B.S Jeyaraj” Tigers fight fierce defensive war on north western front,”Febrary 24 2008 60 Sunday Observer, “Security Forces on a realistic path to achieve the set target” December 30 2007, Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Fall of most LTTE defence lines imminent,” February 8 2008 61The Sunday Leader, Ranjith Jayasundera, “Russian roulette with the troops,” April 6 2008 62 Sunday Times, Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, “Bishop defends shifting of statue as Madhu war hots up”April 06 2008 63 Daily News, “Military drive to wipe out Tiger terror will continue – PM” April 10 2008 64 The Sunday Leader, by Ranjith Jayasundara “Playing Russian Roulette with the troops” April 06 2008 65 Transucrrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Tigers get ready to face the Mechanized Infantry of the Army in the North,” March 25 2008 66 ICRC statement, “Sri Lanka: ICRC deplores misleading public use of its confidential findings on disappearances ,” March 19 2008 67 HRW , “Recurring Nightmare – State responsibility for disappearances and abductions in Sri Lanka,” March 2008 68 UNICEF, “Monitoring and Reporting” April 69 UNICEF, “Monitoring and Reporting” April 70 According to the HRC figures, there were 11 persons who were arrested, 11 persons who disappeared and 12 abduction in February. In March the violations continued with 4 arrests, 8 disappearances and five abductions. 71 Sunday Leader, Amantha Perera, “Batti’s calm busted,” March 30 2008 72 The process of placing someone in protective custody is discussed in the CPA/INFORM Report February 2008. 73 CPA/INFORM REPORT FEBRUARY 2008. Prisoners remain cramped into several small rooms in the house converted to a prison by the authorities. There are over 40 men in one room, a room that was meant for around 10 persons. Recently a different facility was opened to house 25 women and 9 children. 74 CPA, INFORM “Fact Finding Visit to Jaffna” March 2008 75 UNHCR Statistical summary on IDP movements from April 2006 – May 31 2008 76 LTTE Political Commissioner, , (Transcurrents, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, “Madhu Church: Tragic casualty of Politico-Military Crossfire,” April5 2008) 77 D.B.S Jeyaraj, “So near and yet so far in Mannar War Theatre so far” February 26 2008 78 TamilNet 14th February 2008 79 Inter Agency Standing Committee, Press Release, March 15 2008 POLITICAL CLUSTER 80 The Batticaloa District has and area of 2633.1 square kilometers which represent 4% of the entire land area of Sri Lanka. The total population in the District according to statistics available for the year 2001 is 486,447 consisting of 1798 Sinhalese, (0.67%), Muslims 29,339 (10.85%) and the Tamils constituting the largest single community with 237, 477 or 87.80% of the total population. 81 www.nationalsecurity.lk “Election for nine Local Authorities in Batticaloa District to be held on 10th March 2008”, 82 The contesting Political Parties consisted of the Eelavar Democratic Front(EDF) (former EROS) (Plough), UPFA(Betel Leaf), Jathika Sangwardena Peramuna(JSP)(Coconut), National Congress (Horse), TMVP(Boat), SLMC(Tree), and Independent (Apple). Of those eligible 161, 749 voters exercised their franchise of which 19, 772 votes were rejected. (Daily News, Rasika Somaratne, Polls campaign ends today, 7th March 2008, page 1; Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara in Batticaloa, “ TMVP boats roar in Batticaloa, 12th March 2008, page 1) 83 Daily News, Rasika Somaratne, “Polls end on successful note” March 11 2008 84 Daily Mirror, “Polls peaceful but isolated rigging” March 11 2008 85 CPA Fact Finding Visit – Batticaloa February 2008 86 CPA Fact Finding Visit – Batticaloa February 2008 87On January 10, 2008: Marimuththu Arumugam (58) from Commathurai, Eravur was a retired laboratory technician was shot dead because he refused to contest the election as a TMVP candidate. (The Sunday Leader, Abductions and killings in the northeast - June '07 to February '08”, February 24 2008 88 Efforts by groups to post pone the poll through the intervention of the Election Commissioner and the Supreme Court failed The TNA's bid to get the Supreme Court to postpone the elections until normalcy was

58 restored failed, because the supreme court ruled that it was not in a position to block the democratic process of holding local government elections in Batticaloa district. (Daily Mirror, “SC says it can’t stop Batti polls” January 22 2008) 89 The Island, Zacki Jabbar, “UNP rejects Batti polls”, 12th March 2008, page 1 90 The Island, “Mini polls a slap in Prabhakaran’s face-JHU, 12th March 2008, page 1 91 The Island, Lakshmi de Silva, “Polls not totally free, but a step towards democracy in the East- JVP”, 11th March 2008, page 3 92 The Sunday Leader, Comment/Economy, “ The Right Stuff”, 6thApril 2008, page 10 93 The EPDP led alliance- Independent Group 1 (EPDP, PLOTE, EPRLF (Nabha) which won 6 seats became the main opposition party in the Batticaloa Municipal Council, the Eelavar Democratic Front (former EROS) and SLMC each won one seat. 94 The Island, Franklin R Satyapalan, Harischandra Gunaratna and Norman Palihawadena, “Democracy rekindled in Batticaloa”, 11th March 2008, page 1 95 Paffrel, “Interim PAFFREL Report on the Batticaloa Local Government Elections” March 10 2008 96 www.priu.gov.lk, Presidential Information Unit, Newsline, “Eastern PC polls in May”, Tuesday 18th March 2008, 97 Sixteen political parties and 14 independent groups had submitted nomination papers in the Trincomalee district while nominations by the EPDP, the Muslim Liberation Front, The Tamil Democratic Party and the United National Alliance were rejected. In the Batticaloa District 30 political parties and independent Groups submitted nominations while nomination papers of two political parties and an independent group were rejected. Nominations of the Ruhunu Janatha Party and the United National Alliance were rejected. In the Ampara District 14 political parties and 26 independent groups filed nominations while papers of the National Progressive Front, the Sri Lanka Jathika Sandanaya and the Akila Illangei Tamil United Front were rejected (Daily Mirror, Yohan Perera and Amadoru Amarajeewa, “Parties ready for May 10th poll in East”, 4th April 2008, page 1) 98 The JVP submitted a petition against the merger of the North and East Provinces following the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement and the Xth amendment to the Constitution in 1987 by the then Government under former president J R Jayewardene (Daily Mirror, Ajantha Kumara Agalakada, “PC elections: President directs full strength to east”, 3rd April 2008, page 1) 99 The Sunday Times, Editorial, “UNP-SLMC alliance holds edge in east”, 6 April 2008, page 4 100 The Nation, This is my Nation,” A stirring contest”, 6thApril 2008, page 4 101 The Morning Leader, “Elections and the Muslim Factor” March 19 2008 102 Sunday Observer, Shanika Sriyananda, “Sunday Meeting” an interview with JVP Propaganda Secretary Wimal Weerawansa “UNP will never come to power” March 30 2008 103 Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri and Yohan perera, “ SLMC stalwarts quit Parliament”, April 3 2008, page 1 104 Daily Mirror, Ajantha Kumara Agalakada, “PC elections: President directs full strength to east”, 3rd April 2008, page 1 105 Paffrel, “Pre-election violence (27/3/2008 – 5/5/2008)” 106 Daily Mirror, Sandun A Jayasekera, “Eastern PC polls: EPDP chooses to fight it alone”, 1st April 2008, page 2 107 The JVP has decided to field eight Sinhalese, one Tamil and four Muslims for the Trincomalee district. Prominence has been given to Muslims in the Batticaloa District with 10 Muslims two Sinhalese and two Tamils coming forward. In the Digamadulla District the party the party will field 12 Sinhalese, one Tamil and four Muslim candidates (Daily Mirror, “JVP chooses its candidates”, 3rd April 2008, page 1; The Island, “ JVP’s Piyatissa as Chief Ministerial candidate”, 3rd April 2008, page 4) 108 The Sunday Times, Editorial, “UNP-SLMC alliance holds edge in east”, 6th April 2008, page 4 109 Basil Rajapakse reportedly told Pillaiyan that once the election is over and TMVP returns the largest number of members to the 37 member Provincial Council, he can stake a claim for the chief ministership. He also reportedly told Hizbullah that if the SLMC would be able to return the largest number of members from the three districts if they contested on the UPFA ticket, this would qualify him for the chief minister's post.(Sunday Leader online, Suranimala column, “Panic over provincial election amidst global hostility on the rights front” March 23 2008) 110 The Sunday Times, “UPFA-TMVP alliance to pick CM after polls — if elected” March 23 2008

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111 The Tamil dominant areas are under a cloud due to the TMVP's activities, aided by the government. The TMVP does not operate in isolation and why the situation remains volatile is because that's the way the government wants to have it. People are scared to participate in the election process. They don't discuss politics and are forced to stand in as candidates. That's the level of public acceptance they have. (The Sunday Leader, “'State aided terror for polls', March 02 2008) 112 Daily News, “Eastern fishing restrictions eased” April 22 2008 113 The Morning Leader, “Pillayan UPFA’s Chief Ministerial candidate at Eastern PC election”, 10 April 2008, page 1 114 Lakbimanews, Ranga Jayasuriya, “Enter LTTE in East- A diabolical plan ?”, 6th April 2008, page 1 115 The Sunday Leader, Comment/Economy, “The Right Stuff”, 6thApril 2008, page 10 116 The Morning Leader, Arthur Wamanan, “Dayananda vetoes bearing of arms at eastern polls”, 9 April 2008, page 1 117 The Nation, Political Affairs by Ravana, “ elephants do topple trees or fodder”, 6th April 2008, page 5 118 Daily Mirror, “Hakeem sees sunset in East for ruling UPFA”April 08 2008 119 Paffrel, “Pre-Election Violence (27/3/2008 – 5/5/2008 120 www.infolanka.com, “Ranil takes ferry to Kinniya rally” April 30 2008 121 The Sunday leader, Comment/Economy, “The Right Stuff”, 6thApril 2008, page 10 122 Daily News, Rohan Mathes, “Cabinet committee to study APRC proposals”, 1st February 2008, page 1 123 Bottom Line, “Eastern election – to bestow wider devolution of powers to provinces”, May 07 2008, The Hindu, “Sri Lanka: full implementation of 13th Amendment recommended” January 24 2008, Daily Mirror, “President, Ranil meeting ends on a positive note” February 27 2008 124 The initial understanding was that the preliminary report would also be submitted to the Government by Professor Tissa Vitharana. Since this did not happen the differences of opinion within the LSSP seem to have led to the resignation of Dr. Wickremaratne. (The Island, Lyn Ockersz, “Rift within left on APRC outcome”, 1st March 2008 page 1 ) 125 The Island, Lyn Ockersz, “Rift within left on APRC outcome”, 1st March 2008 page 1 126 The Sunday Leader, State of the Nation, Editorial/Politics, Sonali Samarasinghe, “From the light of democracy to the dimness of reality”, 27th February 2008, page 8 127 The Island, Tisaranee Gunesekara, The 17th Amendment and its Enemies, 9th March 2008, page 10 128 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “JVP to take interim council to court”, 12th February 2008, page 1 129 The Bottom Line, Munza Mushtaq, Rathindra Kuruwita and Sarashi Samarasinghe, “Nations hopes rise as Mahinda-Ranil meet”, 27th February 2008, page 1 130 The UNP withdrew from the APRC process in September 2007 after accusing both the government and the APRC of lethargy in its efforts to end the war and find a political solution to the ethnic conflict. (The Bottom Line, Munza Mushtaq, Rathindra Kuruwita and Sarashi Samarasinghe, “Nations hopes rise as Mahinda-Ranil meet”, 27th February 2008, page 1; Daily Mirror, Kesara Abeywardene, “President turns to UNP on 13th amendment”, 27th February 2008, page 8) 131 The Sunday Island, Tissaranee Gunasekara, “Unintelligent Governance”, 10th February 2008, page 10

132 Sunday Times, Political Editor, “Axe falls on JVP strongman”, 6th April 2008, page 1 133 Sunday Island, Shamindra Ferdinando, “Weerawansa facing disciplinary inquiry confirms Somawansa”, 6th April 2008, page 1 134 The Island, Wijitha Nakkawita and lakshmi De Silva, “Wimal accuses anti-national forces for his ouster”, 9 April 2008, page 1 135 The dissident group members are:- , M Musammil, S Herath, Mrs A Alahakoon, P U Shantha, A Jagodage, J Samaraweera, , Premawansha Jayasinghe, and D Gunesekera 136 On April 9th official vehicles of two JVP Mps, Mr.Piyasiri Wijenayake and Achala Jagoda were taken away forcibly by an unidentified gang when they were parked in the parliamentary car park. (Daily Mirror, Sunil Jayasiri, “Dissident JVPers’ vehicles robbed” April 10 2008) On April 10th a house of a dissident JVP MP, Sumanasiri Herath was attacked and his vehicle was robbed. (Daily Mirror, “Alarm bells as JVP crisis heads for crash” April 11 2008) JVP crisis spread into its allied organizations when the Kalutara district organizer of the Patriotic National movement an organization allied to JVP was assaulted in Bandaragama on April 17.(Daily Mirror, Yohan Perera, “JVP rift spreads to allied organizations” April 18 2008) This was followed by the assault of another member of PNM, Dr. Sumith Vanniarachchi in his

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Kandy residence on April 21. (Daily Mirror, “PNM charges JVP of assault on Vanniarachchi”) April 22 2008 137 The Island, Shamindra Ferdinando, Asoka Gunathilleke and Norman Palihawardena, “Tigers break promise, attack sports event”, 7th April 2008, page 1 138 138 Daily Mirror, Mirror Politics, Kesara Abeywardena, “LTTE targets political leader”, 8th, April 2008, page 5 139 Daily Mirror, Crime, “TNA MP killed in claymore attack”, 7th March 2008, page 1 140 (TNA National List) December 205, Nadaraja Raviraj TNA Jaffna District) MONTH 2006, T Maheswaran(TNA Colombo District) January 2008 (The Island, Norman Palihawadana, “Blast in LTTE area kills TNA MP”, 7th March 2008, page 1) 141 Daily Mirror, Crime, “TNA MP killed in claymore attack”, 7th March 2008, page 1 142 The Nation, Darisha Bastians, Jayashika Padmasiri and Ayesha Wijeratne, “Sri no more”, 10th February 2008, page 1 143 The Morning Leader, “Sripathi’s wife to asks for impartial probe”, 13th February 2008, page 1 144 The Nation, “UNP smells a rat in Sripathi crash”, 10th February 2008, page 9; The Morning Leader, “Sripathi’s wife to asks for impartial probe”, 13th February 2008, page 1 145 Daily Mirror, Crime, “TNA MP killed in claymore attack”, 7th March 2008, page 1 146 Montage, by Mandana Ismail Abeywickrema, “Sri Lanka: A victim of the global food crisis” May 15 – June 15 147 Daily Mirror, “Price control on rice from mid night” April 17 2008 148 Daily Mirror, “Price control on rice from mid night” April 17 2008 INTERNATIONAL 149 Asian Tribune, Sri Lanka President in China to participate in the BOAO Conference, 10.4.2008 150 Daily Mirror, My Serendib by Upul Joseph Fernando, “How would Prabhakaran read Ahmadinejad’s visit to Sri Lanka?”, 30 April 2008, page 9 151 ColomboPage News Desk, Sri Lanka. “Iranian President to visit Sri Lanka,” Friday, April 18, 2008, 152 Sunday Observer, Dhaneshi Yatawara, “Towards a powerful and bright future” 27 April 2008, page 8) 153 Lakbimanews, Namini Wijedasa, “Welcoming Pariah status ?”, 27 April 2008, page 7) 154 The Island, “ Lanka for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy”, 30 April 2008, page 1 155 The Island, “ Lanka for Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy”, 30 April 2008, page 1 156 Daily Mirror, My Serendib by Upul Joseph Fernando, “How would Prabhakaran read Ahmadinejad’s visit to Sri Lanka ?”, 30 April 2008, page 9 157 Daily Mirror, “US slams LTTE”, 2 May 2008, page 1 158 The Government responded to the allegations on (5 May) by saying that “the report was not accurate and was an effort to divert attention from the issue at hand.” (Daily Mirror, Dilrukshi Fernando, “Lanka rejects US charges”, 6 May 2008, page 1) 159 www.colombopage.com, “Israel says Sri Lanka should fight terrorism and not capitulate to it”, 26 March 2008 160 International Middle East Media Center (www.imemc.org), “Sri Lankan PM visits West Bank and meets with Abbas”, 25 March 2008 161 www.news.lk, The Official Government news portal of Sri Lanka, “Prime Minister completes successful visit to Israel, Palestine and Jordan” 29th March 2008 162 IPS, Faizal Samath “Sri Lanka:turning to China, Iran for funds”, 22 April, Colombo 163 www.news.lk, The Official Government news portal of Sri Lanka, “Prime Minister completes successful visit to Israel, Palestine and Jordan” 29th March 2008 164 Daily Mirror, “India warns Lanka against deals with Pakistan”, March 28 2008 165 www.satp.org, South Asia Intelligence Review, “Reluctant Hegemon AjaiSahni, Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management Vol 5 No. 48 June 2007 166 www.aol.in, Indo Asian news service, “Sri Lanka’s SOS to Pakistan for urgent arms,” 2ndApril 2008 167 www.aol.in, Indo Asian news service, “Sri Lanka’s SOS to Pakistan for urgent arms,” 2ndApril 2008 168 Islamic Republic News Agency, New Delhi, “Sri Lanka orders emergency military supplies from Pakistan”, 3 April 2008, www2.irna.ir. 169 nosint.blogspot.com, “Sri Lanka gets 10,000 missiles from Slovakia”, April 2008 170 lankkanewspapers.com, “Slovakia sells missiles to Sri Lanka in breach of EU export rules – paper, 7 April 2008

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171 Daily Mirror, “Sri Lanka rejects Kosovo’s secession” February 18 2008 172Sunday Observer, “Kosovo no precedent to Ealam” February 24 2008 173 SCOPP, Prof.R.Wijesinha “The State of Human Rights in Sri Lanka” March 26 2008 174 Faced with international condemnation of grave abuses of human rights during the brief period that he had been in power, President Rajapakse announced on September 4, 2006, that he would "invite an international independent commission to probe abductions, disappearances and extra-judicial killings. The IIGEP was constituted in February 2007 by the President and was mandated with the task of monitoring the work, particularly to “comment on the transparency of the COI’s investigations and their conformity with international norms and standards.” of the Commission of Inquiry (COI), appointed by the President in November 2006, to investigate and inquire into 16 incidents of alleged serious violations of human rights that came up since August 1, 2005 (Sunday Leader, Editorial, “The silence of the lambs”, 27th April 2008, page 4, Frontline March 29-11 April 2008, B. Muralidhar Reddy in Colombo, “Sri Lanka Mission Failure”) 175 Other members of the group are Judge Jean-Pierre Cot (France), Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia), Arthur E. “Gene” Dewey (United States), Prof. Cees Fasseur (the Netherlands), Dr. Kamal Hossain (Bangladesh), Prof. Bruce Matthews (Canada), Andreas Mavrommatis (Cyprus), Sir Nigel Rodley (United Kingdom), Prof. Ivan Shearer (Australia) and Prof. Yozo Yokota (Japan) (Frontline, B. Muralidhar Reddy in Colombo, “Sri Lanka Mission Failure,” March 29-11 April 2008) 176 www.colombopage.com, “IIGEP says repeated calls to improve Sri Lanka’s HR record failed”, 23 April 2008

177 www.daily mirror.lk, Poornima Weerasekera, “IIGEP clarifies position to settle row with Government”, 29 April 2008

178 Sunday Leader online, “SC advisory opinion will not satisfy EU criteria” 16th March 2008.

179 www.asiantribune.com, Sunil C Perera, “EU to renew GSP plus scheme for Sri Lanka's exports for another three years” 5 March 2008 180 The Morning Leader, Insight Column, Paikiasorthy Saravanamuttu, “Will the Pope get a visa to visit Sri Lanka”, 23rd April 2008, page 9

181 Sunday Leader online, “SC advisory opinion will not satisfy EU criteria” 16th March 2008. 182 Sunday Leader online, “SC advisory opinion will not satisfy EU criteria” 16th March 2008. 183 srilankawebnews.blogspot.com, “A clear message on rights says Colombo”, 31st March 2008 184 The Sunday Times, Thoughts from London by Neville De Silva, “ The Cabraal tapes and fuss about GSP plus”, 27 April 2008, page 13 185 Morning Leader online, State of the Nation, Sonali Samarasinghe, “Government battling on all fronts” 2ndApril 2008 186 Morning Leader online, State of the Nation, Sonali Samarasinghe, “Government battling on all fronts” 2ndApril 2008 187 The Nation, Munza Mushtaq, “ Clandestine EU mission in Colombo”, 27 April 2008, page 1 188 The Nation, Munza Mushtaq, “ Clandestine EU mission in Colombo”, 27 April 2008, page 1 189 Official Government website, “US report distorted view to denigrate Sri Lanka - Foreign Minister,” March 15 2008 www.priu.gov.lk 190 Sunday Times, Chandani Kirinde, Human rights battle with US to be pursued”, 16 March 2008, www.sundaytimes.lk) 191 On 31 March, Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama forwarded a letter to the US Ambassador Robert Blake as a response of the government of Sri Lanka to the country reports on Human Rights Practices-2007 released by the US Department of State relating to Sri Lanka on 11 March. In this letter the Foreign Minister regretted that none of the positive steps taken by the Government of Sri Lanka to address the concerns on human rights had been reflected in the US State Department Report on Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the letter stated that the US report carried several serious and baseless allegations against various officials of the Sri Lankan government and that the report was critical and judgmental and that such

62 a slant undermined the objectivity and impartiality of the report. In a further development during the course of a meeting between the State Department’s South Asian region officials and representatives from the Consortium of Sri Lanka Expatriates in Washington DC, high-ranking State Department officials clearly indicated that they could not accept the Sri Lankan Government’s official response to their Annual Report. (Asiantribune.com, “Sri Lanka’s response to the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2007”, 1 April 2008; www.tamilstar.com, US to cold shoulder Colombo response, 6 April 2008) 192 www.thenation.lk, Political Affairs By Ravana, “APRC proposes Mahinda disposes”,27 January 2008 193 Sunday Leader, “Manmohan won't come for Feb 4 celebrations” January 06 2008 194 Sunday Leader, “Manmohan won't come for Feb 4 celebrations” January 06 2008 195 Daily Mirror, Opinion, Mirror Politics Kesara Abeywardena, “Eastern litmus test”, 19 March 2008 196 www.srilankaguardian.org, “Is Hakeem walking on a sharp knife”, April 2008) 197 Mr. Weerawansa said that India stands in line with the western forces today given its move to secure a slot in the UN Security Council and on nuclear related issues. “These western elements who meddled in our affairs got their fingers burnt. So, they are now using India to carry out the same mission here. We have to be cautious about it,” (Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “Mahinda-Ranil talks: JVP sees India’s hand”, 28th February 2008, page 1) 198 Daily Mirror, Kelum Bandara, “Mahinda-Ranil talks: JVP sees India’s hand”, 28th February 2008, page 1 199 Daily Mirror, “India should organize peace talks: Karunanidhi “ April 19 2008 200 Daily Mirror, “India should pressurise Lanka to declare ceasefire: MDMK leader” April 23 2008 201 Daily Mirror, “BJP asks India to mediate between Sri Lanka and LTTE” April 30 2008 202 Daily Mirror, “TN assembly wants Lanka’s crisis solved” April 24 2008 203 Daily Mirror, “TN assembly wants Lanka’s crisis solved” April 24 2008 204 Daily Mirror, “Sri Lanka not worried about possible Indian intervention” April 25 2008

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 205 ‘SC advisory opinion will not satisfy EU criteria’ The Sunday Leader, 16/03/2008. pg 1. 206 S.C.Ref: No. 01/2008. 207 Singarasa vs Attorney General (2006) 208 ‘Civil Society to intervene on court ruling on ICCPR’ Lakbima News, 04/03/2008 pg 3. 209 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act, No. 56 of 2007. (the ICCPR Act) 210 http://esoorya.blogspot.com/2008/05/cj-dares-international-court.html. 211 Fundamental rights application filed by the Ceylon Workers Congress against alleged illegal arrest and detention of thousands of Tamil Citizens without valid reason and reasonable suspicion carried out in Colombo and its suburbs by the law enforcement authorities. The petitioners complained that Tamils had been arbitrarily arrested in and around Colombo after the bomb blast in Nugegoda and no reasons given for the arrest. ‘Court allows inquiry into CWC’ FR petition against mass arrests’ TamilNet 7/12/2007. www..com/art.html?catid=13&artid=23951 212 The Supreme Court directed the Attorney General to see that such a committee has representatives of Justice Ministry, Police Department, Attorney General Department and others. http://srilankainfocus.blogspot.com/2008/02/sri-lanka-court-flays-indiscriminate.html

213 http://www.sundaytimes.lk/080504/News/news0012.html. Sunday Times online, 04/05/2008

214 ‘Winesses have hope now?’Lakbimanews www.lakbimanet.com/lakbimanews_07_09_09/special/spe6.htm 215 http://www.lakbimanet.com/lakbimanews/lakbimanews_07_09_09/special/spe6.htm 216 .Wilson Gnanadas ‘Opposition tasks govt. over new appointment’ The Nation, 6/4/2008. pg 6. 217 Daily Mirror, 06/05/2008.

ECONOMIC

Table 2: Annual Growth of Government Services vis-à-vis GDP

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2004-2007 Current prices 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Gross Domestic Product (%) 11.36% 14.73 17.31 19.81 21.74 Government Services (%) 00.03% 14.48 26.32 24.86 29.64 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2007, Statistical Appendix Table 1. Note: 2003 data are worked out from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2006, Statistical Appendix Table 1. Further, 2007 data are provisional.

Table 3: Per Capita Income 2007 Per Capita Income per Per Capita Income per month Mean Per Capita Median Per capita month at current prices at constant (2002) prices Income based on Income based on HIES based on GNP of 2007 based on GNP of 2007 HIES 2006/2007 2006/2007 Rs.14,744 Rs.9,201 Rs.6,463 Rs.4,043 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2007, Statistical Appendix Tables 1& 2. Department of Census and Statistics, Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2006/7 Summary Findings, Colombo. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/HIES/SummaryFfindingsHIES2006_07.pdf

Table 4: Share of Poor

Poverty Headcount Index (%) 15.2% Sri Lanka Province 1. Central 22.3 2. Eastern 10.8 3. North Central 14.2 4. Northern N.A 5. North West 14.6 6. Sabaragamuwa 24.2 7. Southern 13.8 8. Uva 27.0 9. Western 8.2

District 1. Ampara 10.9 2. Anuradhapura 14.9 3. Badulla 23.7 4. Batticaloa 10.7 5. Colombo 5.4 6. Galle 13.7 7. Gampaha 8.7 8. Hambantota 12.7 9. Jaffna N.A 10. Kalutara 13.0 11. Kandy 17.0 12. Kegalle 21.1 13. Kilinochchi N.A 14. Kurunegala 15.4 15. Mannar N.A 16. Matale 18.9

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17. Matara 14.7 18. Monaragala 33.2 19. Mullaitivu N.A 20. Nuwara Eliya 33.8 21. Polannaruwa 12.7 22. Puttalam 13.1 23. Ratnapura 26.6 24. Trincomalee N.A 25. Vavuniya N.A Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Poverty Indicators based on HIES 2006/7, Colombo. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/poverty/PovertyIndicators.pdf 218

PUBLIC OPINION 219 The results of the March 2008 PCI reflect the opinion of Sri Lankans from eight provinces on issues such as war, peace, security, the economy, human rights, media freedom, corruption, balances of military power and other issues pertaining to the state of war and peace in Sri Lanka. The survey was conducted amongst a sample of 1644 persons randomly selected individuals during a period covering March 19th through April 5h. It should be noted here that due to the security conditions in the country, the Tamil sample was chosen using a non-random sampling technique. The results of the Sinhala, Muslim and Up Country Tamil communities are subject to a three percent error margin. 220 Agree: Sinhala -52.3%, Tamil- 5.2%, UCT- 11.5%, M- 40.4% 221 Sinhala- 92.2%, Muslim – 70.2%

223 Management of own party, Satisfaction – 48% while Dissatisfaction- 31.6%; International Relations – Satisfaction – 49.2%, Dissatisfaction – 33.6%; Conducting the War- Satisfaction – 45.5%, Dissatisfaction – 41.8% 224 Percentages of those who indicated that they are not aware of the APRC- Sinhala – 45.6%, Muslim- 62.4%, Tamil- 42.3% and UCT- 43.2%. 225 Respondents were asked if they were willing to devolve powers of land, health, education, law and order, culture and heritage to the provinces. 226 The bulk of Up Country Tamil opinion however falls to the Don’t know/ Not Sure category

MEDIA 227 FMM E Bulletins, February 2008,; FMM News March, April 2008 228 FMM E Bulletin, March 2008 229 Daily Mirror, 18th March 2008, "President Summons Mervyn" 230 FMM E Bulletin, March 2008 231 FMM E Bulletin, February 2008 232 This came in the wake of a comment by Major General Sarath Fonseka who in an interview published in the state controlled Sinhala daily Dinamina accused some media of being traitors: " …I am not blaming all journalists. I know 99% of media journalists are patriotic and doing their jobs properly. But unfortunately, we have a small number of traitors among the journalists. They are the biggest obstacle. All other obstacles we can surmount." Dinamina, 02nd January 2008 "Issara Koti Apata Gehuwa, Den Api Kotinta Gahanawa") 233 FMM E Bulletin, February, 2008 234 FMM E Bulletin, March 2008 235 FMM Press Release, June 11 2008 236 Lakbima English, March 16 2008 237 On January 29, January 30, February 06 and February 13 238 Dinamina, January 30, page 07

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239 Dinamina February 05, Page 05, 240 Lakbima February 02, page 09, 241 Daily News, Editorial, 12th March 2008 242 The Island, Editorial, 12th March 2008 243 Daily Mirror, Editorial, 13th March 2008 244 Dinamina and Lakbima, 12th March 2008 245 Virakesari Lead News, 13th March 2008 246 Sudaroli Lead News, 14th March 2008

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