MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT SECOND QUARTERLY FEBRUARY 2008 – APRIL 2008 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number SYNTHESIS OF OVER-ARCHING TRENDS ..........................................................................3 PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER …………………………………. 7 MILITARY BALANCE CLUSTER ................................................................................................9 HUMAN SECURITY CLUSTER ..................................................................................................14 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER .............................................................................20 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER ....................................................................................................28 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER ..............................................................................34 ECONOMIC CLUSTER ..................................................................................................................39 PUBLIC OPINION CLUSTER .....................................................................................................44 MEDIA ..................................................................................................................................................49 ENDNOTES……………………………………………………………………………….56 METHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace process. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the eighth of such reports. It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of February - April 2008. Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened. 2 SYNTHESIS OF OVERARCHING TRENDS In the period of protracted conflict under review, a favourable balance of power clearly emerges as the priority on both sides, albeit with no specific timeline for its attainment. The balance of power favoured by each can be characterized in the following terms – for the government it is akin to that which obtained before the 1987 Indo- Sri Lanka Accord, in that it is one which does not provide a space for the accommodation of key Tamil nationalist political demands – merger and a constitutional settlement outside of the existing parameters of an unitary state. In effect, the government is fighting a war to defend the status quo of a Sinhala majoritarian and unitary state. Furthermore, it should be noted that in 1987, the GOSL believed that through the Vadamarachchi operation it had the military upper hand and that Indian intervention was designed to salvage space for the accommodation of Tamil political demands. In this period too, there were serious allegations of human rights violations against members of the security forces. The balance of power favoured by the LTTE is one akin to the 2002 period and is characterized by military gain and control of territory plus, and most importantly, the opportunity and space to institutionalize this through political arrangements agreed upon with the GOSL. In this respect, the LTTE seeks a balance of power, underpinned in tangible terms, of its self - perception and definition as the hegemon of Tamil politics or at the very least, primus inter pares amongst all Tamil political actors. Its long term objective remains the creation of an autonomous unit at least or separate state at best – a goal which is sees as being sustained by international recognition of an independent Kosovo. The underlying rationale of the LTTE remains that of staying in contention militarily and politically on the grounds that the costs of war to the Sri Lankan state will mount to prohibitive proportions and the tide of international opinion too, will eventually turn in their favour. What emerges at present, is the relative success of the Rajapakse government in defining the terms of the conflict as one against terrorism rather than an ethnic conflict, and its relative success in setting the agenda accordingly. The abrogation of the CFA noted in the last quarter, the focus on the Thirteenth Amendment and provincial councils, the preparation for local and provincial elections to set up separate and distinct political institutions for the East and thereby institutionalize the de- merger, the refusal of permission to the Norwegian facilitators to visit the Vanni and engage the LTTE, are all elements of a strategy to marginalize the LTTE and settle the conflict within the confines of the existing status quo. The overarching political goal of regime consolidation is also furthered by ensuring that through local and provincial elections in the East, multi –ethnic and Tamil support for the regime, in particular, can be secured at electoral contests in the future. With regard to the latter, what also emerges is that the overarching political project of regime consolidation has been commenced in the East. What is likely to follow is a series of provincial electoral contests culminating in the next Presidential and General Elections – the President can call the next Presidential election after mid November 2009 and Parliament has to be dissolved by April 2010. The objective is likely to be the exhaustion and demoralization of the opposition through a series of provincial defeats which in turn will deflect attention from the rising cost of living and failure to deliver on the promise of certain and imminent victory on the military front. In this context, the key question that emerges is the respective ability of each side to bear the costs of conflict in pursuit of their overarching goals. Bearing the Costs of Conflict Government: On the government side there are a number of factors that need to be monitored from this perspective, namely the economic costs of the war coupled with the rising cost of living, 3 the frequency of explosions outside of the north and east targeting civilians and the relationship with the West in which the human rights record of the government is a central focus. As the Peace Confidence Index Survey (PCI) reveals, the president’s ratings with the public are very comfortably high, except on the question of the management of the economy where they are uncomfortably low in comparison. This suggests that whilst the public accepts the argument of international factors affecting the cost of living and the necessity of economic sacrifice in the fight against terrorism, they also believe that the economy can be much better managed under these trying circumstances. The poll reveals a simple truth – governments, fairly or unfairly, are invariably held responsible for the rising cost of living. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that a protracted stalemate on the war front, which seriously undermines the government’s claim that victory is both imminent and certain, will erode its support base. This is evident in the urban areas, which bear the brunt of rising prices. However a sustained period of this will impact on the rural economy and the current cushioning effect of military pay and pension as well as remittances from abroad, may be insufficient a buffer against economic hardship translating into public disaffection with the regime. In this respect, attention has to be diverted from the simple fact of victory not turning out to be imminent, even if the argument could be sustained that it is certain in the long run. What happened at Muhamalai is a sharp reminder to the regime of what the shape of things to come could be, when hostilities further intensify. Consequently, the political management of protracted conflict will be deemed to necessitate tighter control over reportage of the war and the situation in the war zone, along with continued emphasis on anti- terrorist vigilance in the rest of the country and the traitor/patriot discourse. Electoral contests too, will be intended to both consolidate the regime in power as well as divert attention from the protracted nature of the conflict. The electoral rhetoric could be expected to stress past achievements and future possibilities, rather than current challenges, other than the constant reference to the work of unpatriotic elements. Electoral prospects will be advanced by lack of unity and cohesion within opposition parties and between them, as well as continued stalling on the reconstitution of the Constitutional Council and the appointment of independent commissions including for the police, human rights, public service and elections. What this does mean is that the government will not only continue to face criticism of its human rights and governance record, but that it will also continue to fuel such criticism through its management of protracted conflict. Its clamping down on the media and its attitude towards the Commission of Inquiry (COI) and the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), resulting in the departure of the latter, attest to this and indicate that Sri Lanka’s appraisal in the Universal Peer Review process of the UN Human Rights Council