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Piercing the Fog of Peace Developing Innovative Operational Concepts for a New Era

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Piercing the Fog of Peace Developing Innovative Operational Concepts for a New Era PIERCING THE FOG OF PEACE DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR A NEW ERA THOMAS G. MAHNKEN GRACE B. KIM ADAM LEMON PIERCING THE FOG OF PEACE DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR A NEW ERA THOMAS G. MAHNKEN GRACE B. KIM ADAM LEMON 2019 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Thomas G. Mahnken is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He is a Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has served for over 20 years as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, to include tours in Iraq and Kosovo. He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. His previous government career includes service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from 2006–2009, where he helped craft the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2008 National Defense Strategy. He served on the staff of the 2014 National Defense Panel, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. He served in the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment and as a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. In 2009 he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2016 the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal. Grace B. Kim is an Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. At CSBA, she focuses on trends in future warfare, long-term military competition, and U.S. security policy in East Asia and the Middle East. Prior to CSBA, Grace worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and the Treasury Department’s East Asia Office. She also served as a Turkish Linguist on the Syria Team for the Institute for the Study of War and Research Assistant focusing on the Middle East and European security policy at the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies in Istanbul, Turkey. From 2013 to 2014, she was a Fulbright research fellow at Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Adam Lemon is a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. At CSBA, his work focuses on nuclear weapons, missiles and missile defense, naval warfare, and long-term geopolitical competitions. Prior to joining CSBA, Adam was a student at Duke University, graduating in 2017 and focusing on grand strategy, civil-military relations, and Eurasian geopoli- tics. He has also served as a research intern in the Center for National Defense at the Heritage Foundation and as an intern in the office of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris-Rodgers (WA-05). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank Ross Babbage, Hal Brands, Bryan Clark, Eric Edelman, David Fahrenkrug, Evan Montgomery, and several reviewers who wish to remain anonymous for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this monograph, and Kamilla Gunzinger for her editing and publication support. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of contributors, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover: The U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and USS Lexington off Diamond Head on February 2, 1933 while both ships were awaiting the official beginning of exercise Fleet Problem XIV. U.S. Navy Photo. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................. i U.S. Great Power Competition with Imperial Japan ................................i Emerging Chinese Threat Trends. ii Questionable Strategic and Operational Assumptions ............................. iv The Need for Innovative Operational Concepts to Meet Emerging Challenges .............v INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1 PLANNING FOR GREAT POWER COMPETITION: THE INTERWAR PERIOD .......................... 3 EMERGING THREAT TRENDS ........................................................... 13 Strategic Geography and the Tyranny of Distance ............................... 14 Chinese Economic Growth and Defense Spending .............................. 16 Military Modernization .................................................. 17 Informationized Warfare ................................................. 19 A2/AD Capabilities .................................................... 20 Medium-Range Ballistic and Cruise Missiles .................................. 20 Wide-Area Surveillance and Targeting . 23 Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) ....................................... 23 5th Generation Fighters .................................................. 25 Advanced Bombers and Fighter-Bombers .................................... 25 Submarines ......................................................... 27 Modern Surface Combatants ............................................. 28 Underground Facilities (UGF) .............................................. 30 Nuclear Forces ....................................................... 31 Space Capabilities ..................................................... 34 Cyber Capabilities ..................................................... 36 QUESTIONABLE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS ............................... 39 Questionable Strategic Assumptions ........................................ 41 THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS TO MEET EMERGING CHALLENGES ......... 49 Conclusion .......................................................... 55 LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................. 57 FIGURES FIGURE 1: THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC ...................... 4 FIGURE 2: WAR PLAN ORANGE, 1924 ........................................... 6 FIGURE 3: WAR PLAN ORANGE, POST-1935 REVISION ................................ 8 FIGURE 4: MAP OF THE FIRST AND SECOND ISLAND CHAINS. 15 FIGURE 5: CHINA’S OFFICIAL DEFENSE BUDGET (2007–2018) ......................... 17 FIGURE 6: DF-26 IRBM DURING PLA PARADE ..................................... 22 FIGURE 7: PAYLOAD DELIVERABLE BY CHINESE MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT ................ 26 FIGURE 8: SIZE OF PLAN SUBMARINE FORCE (1990–2018) .......................... 27 FIGURE 9: LAUNCHING OF CHINA’S SECOND AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 2017 .................. 29 FIGURE 10: CUMULATIVE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHINESE SATELLITE LAUNCHES ............. 34 FIGURE 11: PAST ASSUMPTIONS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES TO U.S. AIR POWER ......... 47 FIGURE 12: X-47B UAS LAUNCHING FROM DECK OF USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH ............. 52 FIGURE 13: U.S. ARMY VEHICLE FIRES NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE AT RIMPAC 2018 ........... 54 TABLES TABLE 1: PLARF GROUND-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE INVENTORY .......... 20 TABLE 2: WORLD NUCLEAR FORCES, JANUARY 2018 ............................... 32 www.csbaonline.org i Executive Summary The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Congressionally-mandated 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission refocused U.S. defense planning on the reality of competi- tion and the possibility of conflict with China and Russia and highlighted the urgent need to address eroding military balances and growing operational challenges through the develop- ment of innovative operational concepts.1 Although additional resources are clearly required to meet near-term challenges and modernize for competition and conflict in the 21st century, bigger budgets will likely prove insufficient to support the national defense strategy without innovative operational concepts that can bridge the gap between our ends and our means. This paper is meant to stimulate discussion of, and ultimately spur action to develop, the concepts and capabilities the United States will need to prevail in a more dangerous world. U.S. Great Power Competition with Imperial Japan For the United States to prepare for great power competition, it is useful to examine a previous period during which the United States dealt with a great power rival: Imperial Japan during the first four decades of the 20th century. Then, as now, the United States faced an ambitious rising power in East Asia during a period of rapid technological and doctrinal change.2 The U.S. solution to this problem was War Plan ORANGE, a plan for a single-theater war in the Western Pacific between the United States and Japan initially based upon a rapid U.S. trans- Pacific naval lunge to defend U.S. possessions, primarily the Philippines, against Japanese 1 DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington,
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