THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCF AND INTIMIDATION
In Re : BOIPATONG MASSACRE OF 17 JUNE 19 9 2
MEMORANDA SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF ANC (PWV) , ANC (VAAL) AND VAAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
Nicholls, Camhani*, Koopasammy & Pillay Attorneys al Law 23rd Floor Kine Contra 141 Commissioner Street Johannesburg 2001 P.O. Box 8694 Jchar,n»sbu'g 2000 Tel: 331-6913/10 331-6927/8/9/0 I H — TILE___C O M M I S S I O N ___QH___THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE RND IMTIMID&TIQN / / N^j/ IN RE : BOIPATONG MASSACRE / ' / / ------k______
MEMORANDUM ON THE ONGOING VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE BY THE SECURITY FORCES TO PREVENT THE VIOLENCE, PROTECT RESIDENTS AND BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THE VIOLENCE TO JUSTICE
1. The massacre at Boipatong and Slovo Park on the night
of 17 June 1992 is not an isolated incident, but is
part of a pattern of violence which has been
experienced in various parts of South Africa during the
p a s t 2 y e a r s .
2. The pattern of violence is a matter of common knowledge
I in South Africa and has been referred to in innumerable
media reports dealing with particular incidents and
accounts of violence, and is acknowledged by the
Government, its security forces, and all political
movements in South Africa. It was because of this
pattern of violence that the Goldstone Commission was
established. Various aspects of the violence have
already been investigated by the Goldstone Commission
and the nature and extent of the violence is known to
members of the Commission from their own
investigations.
3. Although press reports of events concerned with the
violence may not always be accurate, and are often subj ect to disputes concerning the details of particular incidents and responsibility for them, these press reports provide convincing evidence of the nature and extent of the ongoing violence. In many instances allegations have been made and reported in the press
(but denied by the security forces) that the security forces are either actively involved in the execution of the violence, or passively stood by and allowed it to h a p p e n .
In this Memorandum 10 incidents have been chosen from a survey of press reports to illustrate a pattern of organised and premeditated attacks which occurred prior to the Boipatong Massacre, and which, in each instance resulted in multiple deaths, injuries and damage to property. Other incidents which occurred in the Vaal
Triangle are referred to in the Memorandum dealing with the Vaal History. The description of the incidents has deliberately been kept brief, and certain disputed matters have been omitted. The descriptions provide sufficient information to identify the time, place and nature of the attack, as well as the allegations made concerning the groups responsible for the various a t t a c k s . - 3 -
5. The 10 incidents are as follows : -
5.1 ON THE 15TH AUGUST 1990, 24 people were killed in a
pre-dawn attack at the Crossroads informal settlement
in Katlehong. Residents reported that armed men
arrived at the settlement and raided shacks, killing
men and looting valuable items.
(Ref : Sowetan 16/8/90; Citizen 16/8/90).
5 . 2 Q M ___T H E ___8 T H SEPTEMBER 1990. the Tladi informal
settlement near Merafe Station in Soweto was attacked
by a group of men during the night. It was reported
that the group approached the settlement from the side
of the railway line which borders the settlement and
separates it from the nearby hostel. The attackers
v'oreNred headbands and were armed with firearms and
dangerous weapons, including pangas. Some deaths
resulted from gunshot injuries, while others had been
stabbed and hacked to death.
Allegations were made that the attackers had numbered
approximately 100, and were from the Inkatha controlled
J - 4 -
Meraf- Hostel. The official police reports stated chat
9 people died in this attack.
(Ref : Press Reports : Citizen 10/9/90; Business Day
10/9/90; Sowetan 10/9/90).
ON THE 12TH SEPTEMBER 1990, '25 workers were hacked to death at the Vusumuzi Hostel in Tembisa, during the early hours of the morning. They were attacked by a group of men who arrived at approximately OlhOO.
Fifteen people were killed in the attack.
(Ref : The Star 13/9/90; Business Day 13/9/90).
QN THE 18TH NOVEMBER 1990 r 19 people were killed in an atack on the Zonkezizwe informal settlement on the East
R a n d .
Witnesses and victims of the attack allege that the uttackers were from the Kwesini Hostel in Katlehong.
(Ref : Press Reports : Sunday Star 25/11/90; Sowetan
2 3 / 1 1 / 9 0 ) . - 5 -
5.5 ON THE 2CJH NOVEMBER 199Q, 11 people were killed ai.J
10 were injured at Mandela View informal settlement on
the East Rand. The attack occurred at approximately
10:50p.m, when a group of approximately 150 men armed
with pangas, knifes and firearms rampaged through the
informal settlement.
VN Prior to the attack, r<_ ~idents had received a tip off that an attack was imminent.
(Ref : Citizen 28/11/90, Sowetan 28/11/90) .
5 . 6 ON THE 27TH MARCH 1991 f at approximately 4a.m
approximately 20 armed men arrived at an all-night
vigil in Alexandra for a violence victim, Mrs. Jane
Ramakgola, and killed 15 people and injured 16. The
<- assailants shot first with AK 47 rifles and then hacked
people with pangas.
Prior to the attack, the police had been asked to
protect the house from attack during the vigil, and had
given assurances that they would do so. 6
On the 4th Apiil 1991, Witwatersrand Police ^iason
Officer, Col. Frans Malherbe, reported that 7 of the
assailants had been arrested and would be charged.
(Ref : Sowetan 5/4/91)
Ultimately, five persons appeared in the Witwatersrand
Supreme Court on the 14th October 1991, on charges of
murder, attempted murder, house breaking, possession of
firearms and ammunition.
(Ref : City Press 14/10/91).
On the 7th January 1992, one of the accused was
acquitted. The case against the remaining four
accused has been postponed to 10 August for judgement.
(Ref : Citizen 17/1/92. )
0 .8 i' ON THE 2STH APRIL 1991. 22 people were killed and
several others were injured, when heavily armed Inkatha
members, who had attended a funeral attacked residents at random after le_i\ing t h e Meadowlands Stadium, w h e r e services for Moses Khumalo were held. The men were carrying pangas, spears, axes, sharpened fence p o l e s , butcher knifes and guns. Prior to this event, the local civic association had approached the SAP to request protection and to request that they disarm the
Inkatha members as they feared an attack by them. The
SAP did not confis'-i.te a single weapon before, during or after the funeral and did nothing to prevent the
Inkatha supporters rampaging through Soweto. No arrests were made in relation to this attack.
(Ref : CASE report March 1992).
Q N T S E ___1 2 T H M A Y ___1991, 27 people were killed and at least 3 0 injured and 112 shacks were burnt to the ground in a dawn attack by about 1 000 men at the informal settlement known as Swanieville, near Kagiso.
Allegations were made that the attack lasted for about
2 hours and that the attackers all wore red headbands.^
The police are reported to have claimed that the reason - 8 -
why they did not respond immediately to the attack was
that the local riot squad members were changing shifts
j-jgtween 5 1 15 and 5:30 am and that the first warning of
violence was issued to them at 6 : 3 0 a . m .
Almost 24 hours passed before the hostel was searched
for weapons.
(Ref : Document compiled by LHR, IBIIR and CALS).
Maj. Ray Harrold of the South African Police is
reported to have said : "to prevent the group of Zulus
moving through Kagiso and thereby causing further
possible incidents, the police escorted the group of
Zulus via a detour back to the hostels. Meanwhile, it
was found that 27 people had been killed and that 82
squatter huts had been burned at the squatter camp".
(Ref : Citizen 13/5/91).
Law and Order spokesman, Brig. Leon Mellet, when asked
how the Swanieville Massacre could occur in a declared
unrest area stated "We cannot stop the violence. We
) - 9 -
cannot stop the killings. We can only control it". He
further stated thct Swanieville and neighbouring Kagiso
had been declared unrest areas after information was
received that people were preparing for a "big fight".
(Ref : Business Day 13/5/91).
On the 9th February 1992, 12 men appeared in court on
29 counts of murder and were granted bail of R500,00
e a c h .
(Ref : City Press 9/2/92).
5 . 1 0 O N the 13TH october 1991r 10 people were killed and 4
injured, when about 2 0 gunmen entered the Twelepele Bar
Lounge and opened fire with AK 47's. The gunmen then
•also opened fire on people in the street outside the
tavern. Witnesses to the attack reported that the
attack lasted about 45 minutes and after the attack the
gunmen disappeared in 2 minibuses. SAP spokemen Lt.
Col. Tienie Halgryn, sai- that the police had
information that the killers had come from Merafe Hostel.
(Ref : Sunday Times 14/10/91). Leaving aside the disputed allegations concerning
police participation in the violence, or their standing
by and allowing it to happen, there is overwhelming
evidence that the security forces have, over a long
period, persistently failed to protect communities in
Black residential areas against violence, and in most
instances, have failed to bring the perpetrators of the
violence to justice. The inability or unwillingness of
the police to provide protection to residents and to
bring the perpetrators of violence to justice is
important for an appreciation of the attitude of
residents in black townships to the police and to the
outrage, anger and resentment which followed at the
Boipatong Massacre.
It is submitted that the abject failure by the security
forces to protect the citizens and to carry out the
duties expected of them, calls for an explanation by
the persons in command of the security forces, and for
the making of appropriate recommendations by the
Goldstone Commission. IN THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION
in re : BOIPATONG MASSACRE OF 17 JUNE 1992
MEMORANDUM ON VAAL TRIANGLE BACKGROUND
Submitted on behalf of the ANC (PWV Region) and the Vaal Council
of Churches.
1. INTRODUCTION
1*1 Among the matters dealt with in his report, Dr.
Waddington identified "community relations" as an area
of concern. He did so primarily within the context of
difficulties encountered by the police in relation to
their investigation of the massacre. At the same time,
he pointed to the "danger of creating a self-fulfilling
and vicious spiral" - an observation of more general
i m p o r t .
I • 2 It is our submission t h a t t h e "spiral" is in fact
already present and that its elements have already
gathered a very serious and destructive momentum.
There is an acute crisis in the Vaal Triangle,
reflected inter ___aJJLa, in the breakdown of essential
services, the inability of the local authorities to enter affected areas in order to effect repairs and the continuing loss of life on a virtually daily basis.
There are several factors in this crisis. One of them is ineffective policing, in turn a function of deep and widespread mistrust by the community of the security f o r c e s .
This memorandum has been compiled in order to assist the Commission by furnishing some indication of the origins and nature of that mistrust and, in so doing, to complement the observations of Dr. Waddington. It consists of a brief description of aspects of certain events in the Vaal Triangle over the past two years.
It does not in any way purport to amount to a complete catalogue of relevant incidents.
It has been sought in this memorandum to traverse the material in as neutral a fashion as possible. It has similarly been attempted to avoid the generation of disputes of fact. (For instance, repeated allegations of direct involvement by policemen in numerous incidents of violence will not be advanced in this memorandum). The Commission is in no sense being invited to undertake a series of collateral - 3 -
investigacions. The purpose is not to embark o n a
fault-finding exercise. Rather, it is to contribute to
an understanding of why it is that profoundly n e g a t i v e
perceptions of the police force have become de facto
entrenched, in order that constructive possibilities-^
for the immediate future may be identified and pursued.
INKATHA RALLY OF 22 JUL. 199_Q
2.1 A key event in the history of the violence which has
wracked the Vaal Triangle for the past two years was
the Inkatha rally held on 22 July 1990. This was the
first public meeting of Inkatha in the Vaal Triangle.
2.2 The rally had been advertised as a peace rally, to be
held at the Evaton Stadium. The Evaton branch of the
Vaal Civic Association had arranged a rent protest
meeting at the same venue for 22 July 1990. (The j Inkatha rally was originally scheduled for 21 July
1 9 9 0 ) .
-> 2.3 Approximately a week before the rally date, COSATU X officials received word that there had been an Inkatha
meeting at the Denver Hostel on 10 July 1990 at which
) there had been discussion of planned attacks upon
COSATU and ANC members in Sebokeng on the day of the rally. Other reports in similar vein were also r e c e i v e d .
Attorneys Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom were instructed to take the matter up. Letters setting out the reports which had been received and calling for pre-emptiv_ measures were faxed on 18 July 1992 to the Minister of
Law & Order, the Commissioner of Police and the
Divisional Commissioner of Police for the West Rand. A copy of such letter is annexed, marked "A". A similar letter of concern was faxed to the General-Secretary of
I n k a t h a .
On 20 July 1990 a reply was received from Inkatha's attorneys, being annexure "B". The Head of the
Security Branch of the South African Police communicated on the same day, a copy of which is annexed marked "C".
Also on 20 July 1990, General Erasmus, (the Divisional
Commissioner of Police) telephoned the attorney acting for COSATU, Mr. Harris, in response to the fax m e n t i o n e d - 5 -
above. Mr. Harris inter alia conveyed to General
Erasmus a report that Inkatha members from various Reef
hostels had hired a train to Sebokeng, that they would
b e armed and it was agreed that s t e p s s h o u l d b e t a k e n
t o disarm them. G e n e r a l E r a s m u s a l s o g a v e t he
assurance that there would be a sufficient police
presence in Sebokeng on the d a y to monitor the
situation. A cop^ of a memorandum prepared by Mr.
Harris shortly after 22 July 1990, setting out these
matters, is annexed marked "CC".
2.7 In Vereeniging, certain police officers, including
Colonel Mazibuko, officer commanding the Sebokeng
Police Station, called on the COSATU regional office to
discuss the fact that two meetings were scheduled for
the same day at the Evaton Stadium. Agreement was
reached between the police officers and Mr. Vavi and
others, of COSATU, that steps would be taken to
postpone the VCA meeting. Colonel Mazibuko undertook
to prevent Inkatha members bringing in arms and said,
inter alia, that roadblocks would be set up for this
purpose as from 21 July 1990. - 6 -
After this meeting, Mr. Vavi, the Regional Secretary of
COSATU, issued a press statement, a copy of which is
annexed, marked "D". The purpose of this statement was
i n t e r to prevent panic amongst residents, such as
had swept through Sebokeng in April 1990 when rumours
spread that the Zulus w e r e coming to kill people.
2 . 9 In the event, no roadblocks were set up and the large
number of Inkatha members who attended the rally had
not been disarmed. A group of Inkatha members from the
Sebokeng Hostel went to the rally. Before they left,
they ordered that everyone in Block F, Hostel 4 had to
move out, because Inkatha members were going to move in
and take over that Block. The residents did not accept
t h i s .
2.10 At the stadium, violence broke out. The ANC blamed
Inkatha and vice versa. For present purposes, it does
not matter which is correct. The pertinent fact is
that the police did not prevent or bring to an end such
violence. Large scale damage to houses in Zone 7A,
J near the stadium, followed. At least one resident died
at that stage. V
- 7 -
2.11 Thereafter, a group of several hundred armed Inkatha'
members marched to the Sebokeng Hostel. They were
^ escorted by police.
2.12 At the hostel, there was gathered a large group of
residents, also armed, and clearly intent on preventing
access into the hostel by the Inkatha members. The
^ police did not avert the confrontation which followed.
There was prolonged fighting, leaving some 21 dead,
including a policeman who died after being struck by an
assegai, allegedly thrown by a hostel resident. There
was also a great deal of looting from hostel tenants.
2 . 1 3 After this, the Inkatha members who had resided in the
.hostel and had participated in the rally and ensuing
events were^denied re-entry to the hostel. Those
Inkatha members formed the nucleus of people who some
months later, took occupation of the Kwa-Madala Hostel,
which at that time had been standing emptv.
2 . 1 4 After the events of 22 July 1990, incidents of violence j in and around the Sebokeng Hostel occurred on an almost
daily basis for some weeks. In the course of this,
) - 8 -
several hostel residents died, including a number who
were shot dead through the windows of uheir hostel
r o o m s .
2 . 1 5 In response to these events, on 9 A u g u s t 199 0 s o m e 33
church leaders participated in a march in order to hand
in a Memorandum to the District Commissioner in
Vereeniging. A copy of the Memorandum which was
submitted is annexed hereto -arked "E". The Memorandum
was handed to Col, Fourie, the District Commissioner.
No proper response was forthcoming from the police,
whose main interest appeared to be to ask why church
leaders were siding with COSATU and not with Inkatha.
Seemingly, no attention was given by the police to the
matters raised in the Memorandum. Only 2 days later on
11 August 1990, there was another attack on the
Sebokeng Hostel by an unidentified gunman or gunmen, in
which 9 people were shot dead and 10 badly injured.
i 3. 4 SEPTEMBER 199 0
3.1 In the early hours of the morning of 4 September 1990,
there was a further major attack on the residents of
the Sebokeng Hostel. In the course of the previous
day, hostel residents had received a tip-off that
> - 9 -
Inkatha members were going to attack during the night
of 3 September. Guards were posted but retired at
02h00 on 4 September, in the belief that it had been a
false alarm.
3 . 2 The attack was launched at about 03h00. The attackers
moved from block to block, meeting with increasing
resistance as residents woke and defended themselves.
3 . 3 Boon after the attack began, Mr. Sello Morake, who was I the Co-ordinator of the Hostel Central Committee ran to
Zone 14 from where he telephoned the emergency number
of the SAP in Vereeniging. At about 04h40, he reported
the attack to Const. Henning. About half-an-hour
later, Mr. Morake could still hear shots from the
direction of the hostel; he then again telephoned
Const. Henning who informed him that there were no police
available to be sent to Sebokeng.
3 . 4 At about 06h00 the attackers became trapped in Block E,
Hostel 3. A large number of residents gathered outside
it. Many of them wanted to launch their own attack.
Police then formed a blockade to prevent access to or
exit from the block. This was the first action by the
police to contain the situation.
j Later, a detachment of Cape Corps troops formed a line
confronting the residents. In the result, these troops
opened fire and deaths and injuries resulted.
137 people were arrested, being the people trapped in
the block as well as Mr. Themba Khoza, Inkatha Youth
Brigade leader. His car had been parked inside the hostel and was found to contain firearms and an explosive device. He was subsequently acquitted on charges of possession. Of the others, 36 were prosecuted on a variety of charges of theft, possession of arms and ammunition and malicious injury to p r o p e r t y .
A judicial inquest found that the SADF action had accounted for 4 deaths. The internal inquiry by the
SADF into that action was found to be a "whitewash”.
3 8 others died in the course of the attack on the h o s t e l .
One of the results of attacks of the sort recounted above and the absence of effective policing intervention, was deepening mistrust of security -1 1 -
forces, particularly those consisting of White members
or under the command of White officers. This concern
led to an approach in early December 1990 to Col.
appointment of an exclusively Black
punue pciuxux around the Sebokeng Hostel. Incidents of
violence and a fear of further major attacks continued
to be a source of anxiety for the hostel residents and
surrounding community. Col. Mazibuko agreed to the
request and Black members of the police force under his
command were appointed to such a patrol. It proved to
be entirely successful. One of the results of this
\ arrangement which gave the community confidence, was
\ the arrest by the patrol of 15 men who were approaching
J the Sebokeng hostel with firearms and explosives. They
were said to be Inkatha members. They were granted
bail of R200,00. Thirteen gave their address as the
Kwa-Madala Hostel. The Black police members were
V^reported to be unhappy that bail had been granted.
Letters of appreciation from the VCC and the Hostel
Residents' Committee, dated 10 December 1990, were
addressed to Col. Mazibuko. Copies are annexed hereto
) marked "FI" and "F2".
)
1 The role of Whi^e security forces has become a matter
of particular and grave concern to residents. This
presents a particular policing issue which requires
/ urgently to be addressed. Illustrative of this is the
difference in community perceptions of the Black
uniformed branch under Col. Mazibuko and the mainly
White CID branch under Col. Coetzee, operating from the
same police complex in Sebokeng. The former are by and
large trusted; the latter are by and large profoundly
distrusted.
It is widely believed to be a general pattern that
complaints relating to, for instance, killings,
abductions and assaults concerning Kwa-Madala
residents, which are lodged with the Black police in
Sebokeng are taken over by the White controlled CID in
Sebokeng or Vereeniging and that they are then not
effectively investigated.
It would similarly happen that the Black police would
be informed ex post facto by the police from
Vereeniging that the latter had carried out a raid of
Kwa-Madala Hostel, without any prior notification.
There would therefore be no participation by the local -13-
police, who woula also remain unclear about the resultsl
of such a raid. An allied perception is that the local
police have no say concerning the presence and conduct
of outside security force units, such as the ISU and
SADF. This perception remains as strong today as it
was at the time of the shootings near Sondela Brewery
on 26 March 1990, in respect of which the Commission of
Inquiry found Captain uu Plooy of the Reaction
Unit had not informed Colonel Mazibuko of his presence
in Sebokeng, even when that was in the vicinity of
Colonel Mazibuko's own police station.
3. 12 In short, the local Black police are seen as having no
authority and as lacking the power to act properly as a
police force.
3 . 13 By December 1990, the ongoing pattern of violence in
the Vaal and the role of residents of Kwa-Madala Hostel
therein, led to a decision by the VCC that an approach
should be made to Iscor concerning this matter, since
Iscor owned the hostel. A meeting took place on 11
December 1990 and on 12 December 1990, the management
of Iscor recorded its position in a fax to the VCC. A
copy of the fax and a typed transcript thereof is
j i
-14-
annexed hereto marxed "Gl" and "G2" respectively. O n
the sane day, pursuant to a request from I s c o r
management, that proof be furnished of involvement of
Kwa-Madala residents in acts of violence, the V C C
forwarded the names of some persons arrested by the
police in Sebokeng, for cross-checking against Iscor
records. A copy of the said letter is annexed hereto
m a r k e d " G 3 " .
4- MANGALEMBE NIGHT VIGIL
4*1 0n about 5 January 1991, a youth, Nangalembe, was
abducted and killed. A night vigil was arranged for 11
January 1991. On the days preceding that date, members
of the family saw that the house was under surveillance
and feared an attack. Several meetings with police
officers were held. On 11 January 1991, the family was
still fearful and asked Rev. Moerane of the VCC to take
the matter further with the police to arrange
protection. Rev. Moerane did so, telephonically and
through a personal visit to the Sebokeng Police
Station. An assurance of a police patrol was provided.
A copy of a memorandum drawn up by Rev. Moerane on 17
January 1991 is annexed marked "H".
j It is a matter of dispute whether there were any police
patrols, with police spokesmen saying afterwards that
there had been a patrol but that the marshalls had
asked them to withdraw. The fact is that in the early
hours of the morning, gunmen attacked the night vigil;
some 38 people were killed.
Eleven people were charged. In the course of a bail
application (which was refused) , Inkatha leader, Beulah
Kubheka testified and requested that the accused be released into the care of the Kwa-Madala Hostel.
Ultimately, seven stood trial on murder charges. They were acquitted. In the course of his judgement, Mr.
Justice Schutz criticized the investigation by the police, stating that they should have tried harder to
find incriminating evidence. He also noted the
evidence of the police that they had been prevented by
t h e A N C from speaking to certain witnesses.
On 25 January 1991, the ./CC addressed an urgent personal plea to the Minister of Law & Order. This
Memorandum detailed a number of complaints and mentioned inter alia, that there was dissatisfaction with the response of Col. Fourie to the earlier approach by church leaders, referred to above.
Reference was made also to the use of Kwa-Madala Hostel as a springboard for attacks on residents. A copy of this letter is annexed hereto marked "I".
The Minister's response was in essense to refer the matter for the attention of the police officers having local jurisdiction. Pursuant to the letter to the
Minister, Col. Pourie (the very officer about whom unhappiness had been expressed), telephoned the offices of the VCC. In the result, no advance in respect of the crisis of violence was achieved.
In the months thereafter, there were regular incidents of assaults, kidnappings and killings. By far the greater number of such reports included allegations of involvement on the part of Kwa-Madala residents. Rev.
Moerane and others attended a further meeting with the
District Commissioner of Police, in order to convey the extreme concern of the VCC and Vaal residents concerning this ongoing violence and to request action on the Kwa-Madala Hostel. It was found to be difficult to convince the police of the dangers posed for the community by the residents of the Kwa-Madala Hostel. The meeting concluded with an oral undertaking from the
police that they would investiciate and take whatever
action they considered necessary.
At the end of May 1991, the Lekoa City Council decided
to switch off electricity to the townships in its area
with effect from 3 June 1991. In the belief that the
cutting of electricity would further destabilize the
area, the VCC directed an appeal to the State President
for his intervention. A copy of the letter is annexed
hereto marked "J". On 3 June 1991 church leaders
inarched to the Lekoa City Council offices, from which
offices the letter to the State President was again
faxed. The VCC's appeal was transferred from the State
President's office to that of the Minister concerned.
In the result, the decision to cut off the electricity
stood. The church leaders then staged a sit-in at the
Lekoa Council offices and were arrested and
subseguently convicted for trespassing.
On or about 6 June 1991, a group of residents from
Kwa-Madala went to the house of Mr. Ernest Sotsu, a prominent ANC member living in Boipatong. Amongst this group was a Mr. Kheswa, a leading Inkatha member. Mr. -18-
\ Sotsu ^as not a: home and his family was informed that
Sotsu was to report to them at the Kwa-Madala Hostel,
failing which drastic action would be taken against
him. Similar visits were made on a number of occasions
thereafter. They were reported to the police and
Kheswa and others were arrested on charges of
intimidation. They were released on bail.
4 . 9 On 3 July 1991, while Sotsu was in Durban at the ANC
National Conference, his home was attacked and his
wife, daughter and grandson were killed. Two other
grandchildren who were also shot, survived and were
able to identify one of the attackers as Kheswa. He
was arrested on charges of murder, but subsequently
released from custody.
4 . 1 0 Kheswa is a notorious figure in the Vaal. Rev.
Moerane, at a meeting with senior officers of the
police, sought clarity from them on the number of
instances that Kheswa had been arrested on serious
charges, but released on bail. The information was
J promised for a further meeting which, however, never
materialized.
J -19-
On or about 8 July 1991, a tavern in Zone 7, S e b o k e n g ,
was attacked and 5 people killed, with some 14 i n j u r e d .
Immediately after this, a search was carried out of the
Kwa-Madala Hostel and 3 A K - 47 rifles and ammunition
seized. Rev. Moerane circulated these matters in a
letter of 12 July 1991 to churches, in vhich there was
again reference to the need for an urgent meeting with
Iscor management. A copy of this circular is annexed
hereto marked "K".
4 . 1 1 Pursuant to these matters, Dr. Fanaroff of NUMSA wrote
to Iscor on 22 July 1991, proposing, inter alia, that
Kwa-Madala be demolished. A copy of the fax is annexed
hereto marked ML". The reply from Iscor dated 24 July
is annexed hereto marked "MM. The management of Iscor
were of the view that there was no reason to treat
Kwa-Madala differently from Kwa-Masiza.
4 . 1 2 Mounting dissatisfaction with, inter alia, the
continued escalation of violence led to the launch of a
consumer boycott of White businesses in the Vaal area. .) A copy of a press release from ANC Vaal relating to
this boycott is annexed hereto marked "N".
J -20-
J.ULY 19 91 - BOIPATONG
The vulnerability of the residents of Boipatong to attacks by groups of men from the Kwa-Madala Hostel had become clear by the middle of last year. In June and
J u l y 1991, there were three incidents. Each of them further inculcated in the residents the sense that the police were not willing to take effective action against the transgressor/ or to prevent a recurrence.
The second and third incidents took place at a time when the police had promised intensified patrols in
Boipatong, following the deaths of members of the Sotsu family on 3 July 1991.
In one incident, on Saturday 29 June 1991, a large group of armed men from the hostel marched through the
Boipatong township, firing shots in the air and shouting in a provocative and abusive manner at residents. After a while, police arrived and shepherded the group back to the hostel. In response to a specific complaint about the firing of guns, a police officer stated that they had made enquiries and that all the guns were properly licensed and they have no jurisdiction over the traditional weapons. No further action was taken. -21-
In the evening of 15 J u l y 1991, there was an a t t a c k by
a group of men, evidently from the hostel. S e v e r a l
h o u s e s were damaged. One resident was killed. When
the police arrived, they escorted the group in the
direction of the hostel. No further action was taken.
A NT^/SA report of 17 J u l y 1991, containing a short
eye-witness account is annexed, marked "0".
The night of 29 July 1991 saw another attack. Almost
100 dwellings were damaged and two residents died.
Again, the only police action was to escort the
attackers back to the hostel. Despair at this stage of
affairs led to residents drawing up a memorandum inter
a l i a . * , calling for the "riot unit police" to be
withdrawn immediately. The memorandum was presented by
members of the civic association to Capt. Roos on 30
July 1991. He undertook that the police would go into
the matters raised and to "come back" to the community
on them. This did not happen. Copies of a NUMSA
statement of 30 July 1991, the memorandum and a NUMSA pamphlet are annexed marked "Pi", "P2", and "P3".
On 8 August 1991, NUMSA addressed an appeal to Col. Williams, int£r alia, expressing apprehension about an
influx of people _nto Kwa-Madala Hostel and requesting
that precautions be taken. A copy thereof is annexed,
marked "Q".
In August 1991, the issue of Kwa-Madala was again taken
up by the VCC with Iscor management. On 15 August
1991, Rev. Moerane accompanied a group of women from
the VCC Women's Lxnisteries to Iscor, where a letter
concerning Kwa-Madala was handed to Mr. Viljoen. A
copy of the letter is annexed hereto marked "Rl".
Iscor replied on 19 August 1991, enclosing a copy of
their policy on Kwa-Madala. Copies of these documents
are annexed hereto marked "R2" and "R3", respectively.
On 24 September 1991 conflict arose between residents
of the Kwa-Madala Hostel and the police, resulting in 5
residents being killed. Pursuant thereto, a meeting was
held between the VCC and Iscor. A memorandum was
prepared for this meeting, a copy of which is annexed
hereto marked "R4".
On or about 17 November 1991, an Inkatha member was attacked and killed in Sharpeville by a group of youths -23-
allegedly supporting the ANC. There were fears
concerning security for the day of the funeral, fixed
for 24 November 1991. In order to address this, Rev.
Moerane and others attended a meeting with the Station
Commander of the Sharpeville Police. He was persuaded
by the community representatives that mourners at the
funeral should not carry arms. He telephoned a White
senior officer, who overrode that request, on the basis
that disarming Inkatha members would result in
violence. On the day of the funeral, the police
presence which had been promised was absent and the
Inkatha members were armed. Violence broke out and one
Sharpeville resident was stabbed to death. A report on
these events prepared at the time by Rev. Moerane is
annexed hereto marked "S".
5-9 During the second half of 1991, several meetings were
held with the Divisional Commissioner of Police in
Vereeniging. At each of these meetings, the VCC raised j its concern about attacks against the residents of
Sebokeng, Sharpeville u.id Boipatong, which were
emanating from the Kwa-Madala Hostel. At each of these
meetings, the response of the police was in essence
that there was insufficient evidence for them to take
a c t i o n .
j -24-
5 . 1 0 On 8 January 1992, Rev. Moerane and others attended a
meeting with Col. Steyn and Capt. De Klerk in
Vereeniging, concerning the abduction of Johannes
Mthimkulu, allegedly int:> the Kwa-Madala Hostel.
Initially, these police officers agreed that a raid of
the hostel would be carried out. On the following day,
however, at a meeting with the Divisional Commissioner,
it was said by Capt. Roos that the police needed to be
on "the right side of the law" before they could
conduct a raid. After further discussion, the meeting ) reached a deadlock, with the police holding the view
that there was no basis upon which a raid could be
conducted. Subsequently, the late Saul Tsotsetsi (then
a VCC fieldworker), was informed by the police that
they had conducted a raid on or about 16 January 1992,
but had not discovered any weapons, nor found anyone
being held against his or her will at the Kwa-Madala
H o s t e l .
j 5 . 1 1 Incidents of the sort already described continued to
take place. Certain of these have been set out in
Memoranda already placed before this Commission. -25-
The tardiness on the part of the police authorities to respond to complaints about police misconduct has produced extreme levels of anger and frustration in the community. A recent instance concerns the shooting by
Const. Skuta Marumo on 1 M a r c h 1992 of A M Molebatsi.
Documentation relating thereto has already been placed before a Committee of this Commission. For convenience, a copy thereof is annexed hereto marked
"T". As is evident from this documentation, repeated requests that Const. Marumo be suspended, arrested or transferred went unheeded. Subsequently, Const. Marumo was killed by unidentified members of the community.
An indicator of their rage was that his body was chopped into pieces and distributed at various places, in respect of which allegations had been made of unlawful conduct at those places by the late constable.
The Boipatong Massacre and the ongoing violence in the
Vaal Triangle led to a decision of t ^ Broad Forum (a coalition of various bodies) to call for indefinite stay-away and consumer boycott action. A copy of a press statement released on 1 July 1992 is annexed, marked "U". The statement concludes by appealing for more community involvement in defence mechanisms. " / J' f \
S’^i Fcor oc :e~nuys Telephone. (0*11) 403-2*55 Pietermaritzburg Office 1st Floor. 14 Timber Street 22 Jo^isser S ’.'ee! P.O.Box 2'97 -- - r.r- h c ;- C • rc.&• 423-1764 Pie:e'.rri£r::zt'jrc 3200 2 ~ ^ ~ ,1 ,!. * / r **. '■*■ C Q '
I S July 1990
The Commissioner of Police PER TELEFAX: (012) 323-2456
D e a r Sir
re: THREATS OF VIOLENCE : INKATHA
We refer to the above and advise that we represent the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). We have been Instructed by our client that they have received information that an Inkatha meeting was held on the evening of the 10th of July 1990 at the Denver Hostel, Johannesburg. This meeting was apparently attended by two persons from the head office of Inkatha. We are advised that at the above meeting it was decided that an attack would be made on Saturday 21st July 1990 in certain areas in Sebokeng particularly upcn persons allegedly affiliated to COSATU and the African National Congress.
We are instructed that on the 11th July 1990 members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa were asked to attend the aforesaid Inkatha meeting where they confirmed that it_ was decided that areas of Sebokeng should be attacked by all "Zulus". They were further informed that on Saturday the 21st December 1990 there would be an Inkatha rally at Zone 7 Stadium in Sebokeng and that they should resign from COSATU unions and the ANv and join Inkatha.
On the 13th July 1990 the Regional office of COSATU for the Southern Transvaal received a telephone call from an anonymous person living in Sebokeng informing COSATU that he had heard about the Denver Hostel meeting and that an attack by Inkatha upon certain areas in Sebokeng would take place on the 21st July 1990.
In view of the above, we feel compelled to bring these facts to your attention in order that the necessary pre-emptive measures can be taken to ensure that no unlawful conduct takes place as a result of the Inkatha meeting held on the 10th July 1990 at the
m • I a Ownr I I I fcj D i l-f «w A A IM fV M I I R N u BA LLB M U S.KX B» UB LLU f J »* U.B 1.U* PS BA LIB UM Denver Hostel. The allegations detailed above are of a sufficiently serious nature as to arouse deep concern in our clients as to whether they and their families and/or property m a y be the subject of attack by persons aligned to Inkatha or. the 21st July 1990. We would therefore be rest grateful if these invest is;-icr.s ecu 2c he investigated or. ar. urgent ta. is :: ascertain as t c whether there is any s u b s t a n c e t o t h e m . 'We wculc re crateful if ycu cculc ccr r u r.; cat e t: us the result ::
c. ZC Z T Z L'T.'Z -l V •
Yours faithfully CHEACLI THOMPSON & KAY SOM
PETER HARRIS
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*07 I»' M r ? . H A F - K 1 5 C*-r h ? ;s j . 7 ?>:zhy.a n / b s / 0 2 /: 0 :: 2 / c c For Urgent Attention: Mr Peter Harrls/Shlrley PER F W NO (Oil) 403-1764 DATE FAXZD 2 o / - 7 / q o TIME FAXED 0 < R h l % Dear Sirs YOUR LETTER TO THE GENERAL-SECHETARY, INKATHA DATED 1 8 T H J U L Y 1990 We act for Inkatha. We refer to your letter addressed to Inkatha dated the 16th July 1990, but sent by fax or. the 19th July 1990. Our client has no kncwledze of th« a.llecati nr.R contained In your nfnrftRalri letter ar.d denies that such threats were ever made. < ■ C\ ( Inkatha ie an organisation which is committed to peaceful and denocratic principles, which includes respect for different political outlooks. Furthermore, our client assures you that is has no intention, and never has had any intention, of carrying out any unlawful activities, which may affect Ccsatu, its members or any of its property, or anyone else or their property, at any Btage, including on the 21st July 1990. J We hereby reserve ail our clients rights herein. Yours Faithfully KRS J. FRIEDMAN FRIEDHAN 4 FRIEDMAN FROM: The Head, Security Branch South Af r icar. Police Private Bag X302 PRETORIA TO: Messrs Cheadle Thompson and Haysom Attorneys TELEFAX: (Oil) 403-1764 (For attention: Peter Harris) OUR REFERENCE: S6/32/14 (0.5) Mr Appelgryn SUBJECT: RE: THREATS OF VIOLENCE: INKATHA MESSAGE: 1 Further to t h i s office's telex dated 20 J u l y 1990, y o u a r e advised t h a t a police investigation into the matters you have mentioned could not confirm t h e allegations of your clients. 2 it was however revealed that Inkatha had gained the necessary permission to h o l d a meeting at Evaton on Sunday 22 J u l y 1990. i The police in the area was however informed of the 6ituation and they will monitor the proceedings ir their normal line of duty. 4 . should your clients have any further ' £hej are advised to feel themselves free to lay charge, at their nearest police station. R M U L D E R 1 1 5 1 / 1 0 7 MEMORANDUM i TO: C O K C R E S S O F SOOTH AFRICA* TRADE UNIONS re: TXT.ATHA RALLY or SEBOKEJiC: 1. On th. 16th Of July 1990 I racaivad a tal.fax fro. Mr Zv.linzl.. vavi, th. COSATU V.at.rn Tranavaal Regional s.cratary, inf^. 1*, that ^ forBatlon had C O M to h u attention that a . . . t i n g had b..n h.ld at D.nv.r Hoatal on th. 10th of July 1 9 ,0 « whlch an announc.nt had b . . n .ad. about an Inkatha rally. At t h . abova , „ t l n g tho«. attending war. I n c i t e to attack / c . r t a l n ar.a. of s.bokang, .or. • Pacifically p.r.on. and prop.rty belonging to COSATU and ANC .a.bera. 2 . Shortly after that tel«fax vaa received I V “ c o n t a c ^» that *ore inforuation had cone to his attention concerning the Inkatha rally and the fact that Inkatha aeabers intended to coa.it acta of violence after the rally. Various discussions were held with COSATU and on their instructions I : ‘-.4 despatched a letter to Inkatha, srttJnn ■>- - 2 - their attention and particularly the concern of COSATU tha*" they would be the subject of attack on the 21st of July 1990. A copy of that '’et t e r is a t t a c h e d hereto marked "A*. Letters were then also sent to the Commissioner of Police, the Minister of Law and Order and the Divisional Commissioner of Police fcr the West Rand. Copies of these letters are attached hereto narked "B", "C" and "D". * In essence, the letters to the South African Police gave the* the details of when the Inkatha aeetings had been held, where the meetings had been held and the substance of COSATU's concern that they would be attacked on Saturd? the 21st of July 1990 after the Inkatha rally which would be held at Zone 7 Stadium in Sebokeng. I quote the final paragraph of the letters to the South African Police and the Hinister of Law and Order: - 3 - 4*1 "In view of the above, we feel compelled to bring these facts tc your attention in order that the necessary pre-emptive measures can be taken to ens u r e that no unlawful conduct takes place as a result of the Inkatha meeting held on the 10th of July 1990 at the Denver Hostel. T h e allegations detailed above are of a sufficiently serious nature as to arouse d e e p c o n c e r n in our clients as to whether they and their families and/or property nay be the subject of attack by persons aligned to Inkatha on the 21st of July 1990. We would therefore be most grateful* if these allegations could be investigated on an urgent basis to ascertain as to whether there is any s u b s t a n c e to them. We would be grateful if you could communicate to us the result of your investigation in order that we may inform our client accordingly". 5. By late on the 19th of July 1990, as we had received no reply from Inkatha to our telefax, I phoned Mrs J Friedman, the attorney for Inkatha. She stated that she would investigate the matter and cone back to a e as soon as possible. I was phoned by Mrs Friedman later that night, the 19th of July 1990, and told by her that Inkatha would be prepared to give an assurance confirming that no unlawful acts would be committed by Inkatha or its members on the 21st of July 1990. she said that a letter confirming this would be sent to us early the following morning. On the 20th of July 1990 a letter was received from the attorneys for Inkatha, which letter is attached hereto marked "E". At 15 h 35 on Friday the 20th of July 1990 a telefax was received from the head of the security branch, South African Police, saying that they receive ’ our telefax and that the police had investigated our allegations and were not able to confirm them. The telefax from the security police also stated that the police had been informed of the Inkatha rally and that they will "monitor the proceedings in the normal line of duty". - 5 - During the course of Friday the 20th of July 1990 I received a telephone call froc the Divisions] Conalssioner of Police for the Witwatersrand area, General G Erasmus. He wanted to taLk to me in connection with the fax that we had sent to the police. I told hia that further information had come to our attention. This was that the eeeting had been changed from Saturday to Sunday, t hat is the 22nd July 1990. on instructions from my client I told General Erasmus that the residents of the . . George Goch, Nancefield and D e n v e r Hostels intended to leave Johannesburg for Sebokeng at 8 o'clock on a train which had been hired for then fro* the station near the George Goch Hostel. ), 7* 1 further told General Erasmus that we had information that the Inkatha j supporters catching this train would be j armed and that he should take all steps to disarra them at the station before they J':i 9°t to Sebokeng in order to prevent the • h A \ - 6 - viole ce. General Erasmus said t h a t t h e Police would take the appropriate steps would monitor the George Goch station and if people were armed would disarm them. He also assured me that there would be a sufficient poiioe prese..oe in Sebokeng on the day to monitor the situation. 8* CONCLUsrnfi It is a natter of the gravest concern that in spite of the above violence did in fact occur on Sunday 22nd July 1990 In S e b o k e n g . 8.2 The police were warned that there would Possibly be violence, were told where and -hen and by who. It would allegedly be perpetrated and yet it still took piace. The situation demands a tull investigation a. to why, in spite of repeated warninge, violence occurred and lives were lost and property damaged. i 'N a rw Kfcu Ck La* | mt row *> m * ► i a CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS IKH? L: A 5 £ 3 TATEKENT r nV / - '/ 0 _ \ --IlT-AIf}A_JajDER7AyES_NOT TO ATTACK VAAL RESIDENTS ^'side^the d“ell6ra «both in Sebokeng Hostel and hostel. ; t I‘ an r*P?rted U0 that Ink»tha leaders have c „ . , t o T?- an attempt to orchestrate an attack on Vaal residents thi* ®'eqedlv took"ol» 3uPP°sedly be in retaliation against attacks which stayaway on July Jnd. members in Evaton during the national « ' tandd“oiiSInkIthaCortuat Wete t0ld to resi9" f r °m COSATU and the Irr„fh„'i Inkatha or Uwusa . They were also told to pay R 4 0 . 0 0 to attend ‘ t r I ' " ? ; " 1" Ulundi They -ere told to attend'an Inkatha r^ " ‘L t I I ^ y) l n Sebokenc-'- The rally has subsequently b e e n a't-’ac k on v R ? V ' J * ° U l y ' The imPre3aion th«y «ere given was that the frcm the rally.r6S1 •'ould b e planned in Ulundi and would be launched t£“shwavelTh»elier3 'ere extremely unhappy with attempts to use them in in he Vaal Nor do eh ln^ ntlon of attacking their brothers and eistera n -ne Vaal. Nor do they have any intention of resigninq from their rcaniaations and joining Inkatha. " r ^ ; 1*88 WQ ;re Gxtremely concerned by this attempt by certain ^°n f l l c t amon93t residents in the Vaal. We had reason ^believe that such an attack was in fact being planned. We therefore w o C T n o ? 1 k t h r °Ug h their lawyers to seek an assurance that they fa" now h an attack on Vaal residents. Such an assurance has in fac. now been given by Inkatha, through their lawyers. We have also received an assurance from the commander of the police in a l l o w e d ^ °l0nel Mazibuk°> that those attending the meeting will not be lowed tp carry weapons. We have informed the Commissioner of Police and ensure^hat't-h^ ^ h"" ° f d«™»«>P— * • . and -e expect th el to * ® ^ the3e undertakings are honoured. The onus is on the police and 7 o U lice c e ° aand n d tnkatha^ Inkatha responsible ^ if there “ 3 PeaC6fUl is any violence. ^ We M throuoh “pprooc*ed the to take the matter up with the government situatinn monltorln9 »>ecl.aniaia. He will also be monitoring the situation on Sunday, together with our lawyers. d? *PP?al ^township residents and hostel dwellers to remain calm and isciplined this weekend. Do not allow yourself to be provoked by rumours, peace is^eDt^ *■ f We are doin9 everything we can to ensure that .. . u n 6 3 area. Ultimately it is the residents of the Vaal fail Cfln en3uro that thes« attempts to create conflict will VAAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES E - * 3£3D t M G l S : - Po-C'T 311'?, Tft,;ir Bull£ - - r,, c . <3 Voci'dlr Svr;: / / “ v''~ • • „ Vetf,,: I?*-: 2 2 -3: ' r- / t > : 2 i - t £ >f. 0 9 AUG JS7 1990 ’f > rric i c 7nr. DISTRICT COM MI Sf I ONE? SOUTH AFRICAN P0 1 ICE VEREENIGING Peer Sir V . . 1 c.uaeai of ’ • ^hfo«01tdhesh; “^ " , c| F 2v 202^ / 5S?cernE of Co“ tu w-™ 2 - Jo!o^rA :^tu^r^oSi“fr:h:r^ “ e:a^ ^ r i ^ i tithrt>u81’ ■ carrying veepons into the Zone ™ L b o k ° ™ !t^.™ ^ ‘“?P°rt" S Stadlum).for the'peece rail,' on the 22/07/1990? (Evaton 3 " J hu b? SEel) enlf partisan Intervention of Police (uri,, Inkatha attack on residents and thejr proper^. E 4‘ llv "nulJU n 6neEE on the part of the police to protect 5- the Seboken* 6. The cbmmentB of Senior Police 2 2 / 0 7 / 9 0 end 01/08/90 events. PreBs/aedle over the railway Btetlon? \'\ B e ,ro"£*VHouthauwel 8. The entegonlstlc presence of Police in veMelii* u h » , - •registration number pletes et the -t t h p u t ..... • the HuBky BlnibueeB. hostel-complex, especially 9' hones^alnce^the V M °* >° "e s » f ,‘h e l r 10* L h! » ! P! ^ C and deaths sustained by hoBtel r*«4rf*nt* e n d t v i r t \ i n 1 1; r i e s . T h e ( £ 1: c ; i j e C 5 V- O F 1 r f s 1 d1 r. t 5 ' c therefore f ‘ ~ ~ r.A dr t 1 c r * - : r f iu r t * c £ , : c r : c t. r d » f i . ♦i. < f . t c •^ ^w i ■ 'ii C r ' *■ ' i' »•' , ■ .♦ 1. \:hy t '• f t : r e e r. :• r. t 1 e t wf r r. f c- £ ft I •- 1 r - t *• c ; : ] j c c vt. r c or. t r t ve r.ed l-j t h e letter? 2 . The explEr.etion of the Police conduct including rer.erV:e m e d e tince the 22/07/90. 3. The irnediete withdrawal of white police force members from the Vep.l Bloch, residentiel n r e e e . 4. The Icnedietc withdrewei of ell hied: end white police force members frora the hostel co^pl ex , ^ s e rc^iV’^* LottU KJUt . S' ’ I j 5. The setting up of the dntc for o meeting of e delegation of the Veel Council of Churchcs with the District Commissioner of Police. 6. The establishment of n/conmi scion of inquiry into the Police conduct and events sinte the 22/07/90 by the Stete President, Hr f V dc Klerk. It Is our hope that the natters mentioned in this memorandum will be given immediate attention. V'e desire a Vaal Tringle which is radiant vlth justice, peace, stability and reconciliation. SICKED: : ■ ('■ ^ \ ^ ... /.: . * . . . • • ■ '• •- : - . v' -• / : • v . i.i ^■v-; ' vr- v : or . r.u.'--..-;; j. i . W .i«i, >;o~ t t ‘>- V- • -Ui-i • i.yuy c » h ' ...... ••• - • •• : ;• piy.ftfefa. ■ ' ' ■■■" •'••■VMi.orint if. - r/ — t- • ‘ fw>‘, I.-Jf- jV . . - V ' m :-.r ■. .< v- ; .... VAAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES F o B; > 363'’ Vt = ’ 9 s: Roorr 30'. Tti-.s- B j ,c '• 22 Voori'tf ».*■• 5"fi- V’f : near Colonel hu]:o r'crer.t ve °Ur 1 0rd Rnd FEviou‘ Jesus Christ. At this T hp ':p.i Council of Churches ( '• ^ r \ . anc- than!-fulnoss to you a n ^ Pnr verf-‘ cf re y JxpressOE its ?,ra t i t. ur^e especially so in t h e i ^ t of'ro r’tf f ?ol;ce force, -his is 3nr' res^ents of the cv-Oyr-C i:0 «:?n r . n - s of our conrrenati ons ^ w r o c o j v i n ^ n o q c; ^ r p c r> r P H p h t and concerns‘to';o;Lo ^ ‘t ;e^ tl0n for h ^ i n r, taken tSeir n 3 V j t ’ where you na situation together. 1 e tlnG we can review the °f the^ronent^we say " ’ee p ^ t ^ ^ ^ IeSults t l n l u l l * ; t0 keeP Prayi^ « » » « . of JoSJ fiSM ' Thanking you in anticipation. Yours in His Service l e v M I V.n'i organising SECRETARY Collection Number: AK2672 Goldstone Commission BOIPATONG ENQUIRY Records 1990-1999 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012 LEGAL NOTICES: Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only. People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of the collection records and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website. This document is part of a private collection deposited with Historical Papers at The University of the Witwatersrand.