Humanism Book

A ROUGH GUIDE TO BELIEF IN THE 21st CENTURY

JACK GRASSBY P O S T M O D E R N HUMANISM

A ROUGH GUIDE TO BELIEF IN THE 21S T C E N T U R Y First published in Great Britain in July 2005 by Jack Grassby.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means be it recorded or photocopied without prior permission from the author.

Jack Grassby is identified as author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

©Jack Grassby 2005 ISBN: 1 901237 33

Also by Jack Grassby:

The Unfinished Revolution A Socialist’s Guide to the 21s t C e n t u r y Revolution in the 21s t C e n t u r y

Designed & typeset by Lee Foster @ Lusion

Printed and Published by TUPS Books, Unit 38, Hutton Close, Crowther Industrial Estate, Washington, NE38 0AH T: 0191 4190446 This book is dedicated to all those who have ever asked ‘Can we believe anything?’ Contents

Map of Principal Ideas ...... i

Glossary of Principal Te r m s ...... ii

I n t r o d u c t i o n ...... v i i

Part I

Humanism - What Is It? ...... 1

The Origin of the Species ...... 9 R a t i o n a l i t y ...... 1 2 A g e n c y ...... 1 4

The End of Utopia ...... 2 1

S c i e n c e ...... 2 7 P o s i t i v i s m ...... 2 8

Idealism versus Realism ...... 4 1

Social Reality ...... 4 8 P h e n o m e n o l o g y ...... 4 8 E x i s t e n t i a l i s m ...... 4 9 A u t o n o m y ...... 5 2

Part II

Po s t m o d e r n i s m ...... 5 6 D e c o n s t r u c t i o n ...... 5 8 Reason and Logic ...... 6 3 B e l i e f ...... 6 5 Belief and Social Theory ...... 7 1 Structuralism versus Social Action ...... 7 1 Conflict and Cooperation ...... 7 5

Belief Systems ...... 8 0

A Humanist Belief System ...... 9 7

Part III

Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s ...... 1 0 7 Humanist Ethics ...... 1 1 3

Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing ...... 1 1 9

Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s ...... 1 3 3 Humanist Political Policies ...... 1 3 5 Humanist Organisational Structures ...... 1 4 2

C o n c l u s i o n s ...... 1 4 7

A p p e n d i x ...... 1 5 2 B i b l i o g r a p h y ...... 1 5 2 Other References ...... 1 5 4

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s ...... 1 7 4 Map of Principal Ideas

Plato; Socrates; Aristotle CARTESIANISM (Descartes)

IDEALISM REALISM (Berkeley; Hegel; Kant) (Devitt; Dummett)

RELIGION MODERNISM Religious Structuralism Ideology (Aquinas) Utopianism (More)

Political Ideology Structural Marxism (Althusser)

PHENOMENOLOGY POSITIVISM (Husserl) (Ayre; Quine)

Existentialism Deconstructionism Evolution Logic (Sartre) (Derrida; Foucault) (Darwin; Mendel) (Russell)

Humanist Ethnomethodolgy Sociobiology Relativity Marxism (Garfinkel) (Wilson; Blackmore) (Einstein) (Gramsci) Quantum Mech. (Bohr; Feyman)

POSTMODERNISM/RELATIVISM Belief Systems: Rationality Autonomy Subjectivity

A Humanist Belief System Humanist Values Humanist Ethics Grand Narratives Humanist Politics

Postmodern Humanism i Glossary of Principal Te r m s

A p r i o r i - a necessary premise; a required given.

Analytical philosophy - the systematic analysis of ideas using logic.

A n t h ro p o c e n t r i s m - a human-centred view. The human species is the source and the focus of all concepts, beliefs and values.

Autonomous agents - free, responsible, intentional individuals.

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m - the application of a relativist perspective to meaning, particularly where applied to written texts.

D e i s m - a belief that God created the universe and left us alone to get on with i t .

E p i p h e n o m e n o n - a superstructure derived from, and expressing the character of, its base.

E p i s t e m o l o g y - theories of the method or grounds of knowledge.

E t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y - according to this theory an objective social order is i l l u s o r y. Subjective ideas of social order are constructed by individuals as they struggle to organise impressions and experiences into a coherent p a t t e r n .

E v o l u t i o n - the theory that all species emerged from a single primeval source by a process of natural selection.

ii Postmodern Humanism E x i s t e n t i a l i s m - according to this theory human nature is not fixed. T h e essence of humanity lies in our free choice of actions. The human species will become what we choose to do.

F a l l i b i l i s m - the belief that our scientific knowledge is pragmatic, provisional and vulnerable. Experimentation and observation can never prove a theory to be universally true. Scientific theories must be open to be proved false.

Fuzzy logic - the process which identifies the probability of a conclusion arising from a premise or an effect following a cause. Degrees of certainty.

Grand narrative/meta-narrative - an overarching description, explanation or purpose.

H u m a n i t a r i a n - charitable; concerned with human welfare.

Idealism - by this theory all our ‘reality’ is a human construct and, for us, there can be no other. Our sense of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ is dependent upon the mind as a function of our brain. Our reality is mind-dependent.

I d e o l o g y - an all-embracing theory generally emerging from a realist p e r s p e c t i v e .

L o g i c - the process which links inevitably a certain conclusion with a given p r e m i s e .

M a t e r i a l i s m / m o n i s m - a belief that the material, the physical, which is accessible to the senses, is all there is.

M e m e s - units of cultural evolution.

M o d e r n i s m - the belief that an objective reality, or Truth, can be identified in formulaic science, religion, or social theory. Utopian.

M y s t i c i s m - a belief in a deep experience of consciousness, of existence, of being one with the universe. An expression of the ‘vision thing’.

Postmodern Humanism iii N i h i l i s m - a denial of all aspects of rational thought - particularly values and ethics.

O b j e c t i v e - independent of human perception i.e. Pertaining to universal Tr u t h s .

O n t o l o g y - the philosophy of the meaning and nature of ‘existence’or ‘being’.

P h e n o m e n o l o g y - a view of of the essence of consciousness. Things are simply as the individual perceives them to be, with emphasis on action or b e h a v i o u r.

P o s i t i v i s m - in philosophy it is generally recognised as anti-realism. In science, logical positivism is an acceptance of the application of logic to our sense observations to produce a model of the observed - rather than a knowledge of ‘truth’or ‘reality’.

P o s t m o d e r n i s m / re l a t i v i s m - the theory that all human concepts including values and belief systems are human constructs. There is no absolute objective Tr u t h .

P r a g m a t i c - without a predetermined view.

Quantum physics - the science of the sub-atomic where laws of relativity (and natural reason) break down. The certainties of mechanistic laws are replaced by laws of probability.

R a t i o n a l i t y - the use of reason: formal logic (including ‘fuzzy logic’) and i n t u i t i o n .

R e a l i s m - a belief that there is a ‘real’reality out there, which is accessible to us. Our concepts are a true expression of that reality. ‘Reality’ and ‘Tr u t h ’ are independent of mind, independent of the function of our brains.

R e l a t i v i s m - derived from ideas of idealism. The view that concepts of meaning, purpose, truth and value are human constructs. There is no transcendent universal Truth, no meaningful ‘real’ r e a l i t y. All our concepts are, therefore, relative.

iv Postmodern Humanism R e l a t i v i t y - the scientific theory that there is no natural ‘centre’ for the universe, which can be said to be ‘at rest’. There is no ‘natural’ r e f e r e n c e framework for our observations. All our observations and calculations are observer dependent. Velocity and hence space and time (space-time) are relative to the observer’s reference frame.

S c e p t i c i s m - continual doubting.

S e c u l a r - non-religious.

Social action - the theory that our view of society is the result of the i n d i v i d u a l ’s experience of it. Individuals construct the concept of the ‘real- i t y ’ of society as they act and react in what they see as socially meaningful w a y s .

S o c i o b i o l o g y / e v o l u t i o n a ry psychology - according to these schools of thought biological evolution and cultural evolution proceed together in a mutually dependent manner. Behaviour is predisposed by evolved genes and environment - cultural and physical acting together in a mutually reactive manner.

St r u c t u r a l i s m - the theory that social ‘reality’for the individual is shaped by objectively existing social structures (e.g. by the economic social relations). The objective structure of society determines ‘reality’ for the individual - rather than the individual constructing the ‘reality’of society.

S u b j e c t i v e - dependent upon human perception.

T h e i s m - a belief that God created the universe, is accessible to our prayers and concerned with our fate.

Tr a n s c e n d e n t - beyond the material; beyond sense experience; supernatural.

U t o p i a n - the idea that societies can be organised beneficially according to some master plan, idea, or blueprint.

Postmodern Humanism v ‘It is nowhere written that “the good” exists...since we are now on the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote, “if God did not exist everything would be permitted” and that, for the existentialist, is the starting point.’ J e a n - Paul Sartre Existentialism and Humanism Int r o d u c t i o n

With the collapse in religious and political conviction on one hand and the horrors delivered by religious fundamentalists and political ideologies on the other, there is a crisis of confidence at the heart of Western liberal society. The sense of crisis has been focused and deepened by the expression of postmodernism and relativism. To paraphrase Dostoevsky’s words, can we, without a God, believe and do anything? Contemporary ideas in philosophy, science and politics have undermined confidence in all belief systems and led to confusion regarding ethics and moral values - and a collapse of confidence in the ‘ Truth’. It would seem that we can, in a sense, believe anything - or, what amounts to the same thing, believe nothing. The ensuing confusion has led to a debilitating uncertainty in the liberal communities of the Left and, paradoxically, to a suicidal certainty in the political and religious communities of the Right. It is argued in this book that Humanism has a central role in confronting this confusion. The terms ‘postmodernism’ and ‘relativism’ are used here to mean the recognition of the subjective nature of all our concepts; the denial of an objective universal Truth; a rejection of all transcendent beliefs and ideologies. For the purpose of this book the terms ‘ p o s t m o d e r n i s m ’ and ‘relativism’ are regarded as synonymous. T h i s book seeks to identify a distinctive Humanist position from this per- s p e c t i v e . There have been repeated declarations of crisis in human history. For the merchants of doom the end is always nigh. But the current omens of catastrophe are unsettling and our prophets sound a disturbingly convincing tone. The current crisis is exceptional in that it arises from a confluence of perspectives - the geographic (global

Postmodern Humanism vii I n t r o d u c t i o n

warming and population explosion); the biological (genetic engineering, which threatens to change and even destroy our species); the scientific (we reduce our view of reality to mathematical equations of quantum probability); the political (the 20t h century was the most bloody in human history and the story of human self-destruction continues in the 21s t); the philosophical (postmodernism and relativism threaten our grasp of meaning, truth and social values). These factors have been instrumental in producing the end of the Utopian ideal both as a religious and as a political vision. We are stuck in a neo-liberal, social democracy at the mercy of the markets - it is n o w, we are told, ‘the end of history’.( 1 ) Philosophers and scientists, sociologists and politicians, while destroying the certainties of our superstitious past have proved to be incompetent in producing an alternative narrative for the human species. With the growing realisation of our human subjectivity we have become adept at deconstructing values and have failed to resolve the problem of constructing values. Postmodernism and relativism have dumped us in an intellectual and moral vacuum. Does it matter? Could we not just continue in a state of blissful relativist uncertainty - a sort of nihilist dream Utopia? A l i v e - a n d - l e t - live liberalism? Regrettably not. The human species abhors an intellectual vacuum. We are predisposed to seek ‘grand narratives’ individually and collectively and without a compelling alternative we could return to religious fundamentalism and/or political ideology. We have seen that both can produce their own form of horror - but we must be cautious of any alternative we seek to deliver. Our genetic inheritance predisposes us to behaviour which can be destructive - to power, greed and selfishness (as well as to selflessness and altruism), to tribalism and racism. In a cultural and intellectual vacuum, religious and political delusions would arise and devour us. Human history, and particularly the history of the 20th century (and the start of the 21s t), shows that the human species cannot be trusted to be just left alone to get on with it. To understand where we, the human species, might choose to go, it is necessary to look at where we are and where we have been. A l a rge minority of people (perhaps in some cases a majority) if asked about their basic beliefs, would say they are ‘humanists’(with a small ‘h’). If asked further what this humanism means they might

viii Postmodern Humanism I n t r o d u c t i o n venture the view that it is a ‘secular humanitarianism’, or a belief in ‘the good life without religion’. Other attempts at describing humanism have produced a sort of liberal Christian/Judaic ethic expressed in a secular context. Is that it? Can humanists, in the 21s t c e n t u r y, be described adequately in these terms of the Enlightenment? The central thesis of this book is to argue that Humanism is all that, but it has to be more than that if it is to confront the challenges, intellectual and practical, of the 21s t c e n t u r y. The objective here is to see what the ‘more than that’ factor might be. It is argued that this e ffort is central to a modern Humanism if it is to confront the confusion and crisis of belief in contemporary society. It is further arg u e d that this ‘more than that’ factor is indeed the essence of what contemporary Humanism is. The first real attempts to describe Humanism as a system of beliefs followed the formation of the British Humanist Association (BHA) in 1963. Several attempts have been made since then to provide a philosophical foundation for those beliefs together with a coherent statement of what those beliefs are. These attempts have generally sought to establish that the perspective identified as postmodernism or relativism is the enemy of Humanism. It will be argued here that postmodernism and relativism are not incompatible with Humanism. They are, rather, a necessary part of it. Rather than rebuff relativism as a problem, Humanism must embrace it as a necessary part of the solution. An attempt is made to show that it is possible, necessary even, to identify a philosophical framework from a postmodern perspective upon which a Humanist belief systems can be constructed. A range of distinctive Humanist beliefs and values can then be identified within this unifying framework. This is more a book ON philosophy than a book OF philosophy. Where it hopes to provide interest and originality is in drawing on many contemporary ideas at a popular level, in an attempt to outline the shape of a system of postmodern Humanism. The book generally follows traditional philosophical arguments but in a contemporary context. Our search will lead us into the dark heart of philosophy where many have perished. Be courageous! In an attempt to demystify classical philosophical ideas, without dumbing down or descending to the simplistic, the book is written in the most robust and direct language the author can muster.

Postmodern Humanism ix I n t r o d u c t i o n

H o w e v e r, when addressing philosophical issues, it is often necessary to use technical terms where they carry a weight of meaning, or a historical significance, difficult otherwise to express. It should be noted that philosophical terms are used in different ways by diff e r e n t writers and this adds to the traditional difficulty in accessing philosophical ideas. Philosophers, in their A l i c e - I n - Wo n d e r l a n d world, use words to mean just what they want them to mean. A n attempt is made to explain philosophical terms, as they are used here, as they occur.

To aid the reader whose reading enthusiasm outstrips their memory, a glossary of the principal terms, as they are used here, is provided on page (ii) This does not seek to provide a technical definition of philosophical terms (it would be impossible to do justice to their complexity), but, rather, to provide a reference, a reminder, of how they are used in the context of this book. A ‘road map’ showing something of the relationship between the principal ideas as they relate to the book’s narrative is given on page (i) The appendix provides a bibliography and further texts and r e f e r e n c e s . Where things get too difficult (for this author), or too subtle or complex, a further explanation is attempted in footnotes at the end of the chapter. If you don’t get it first time, don’t despair! The principal ideas are repeated several times, in different ways, throughout the book - and sometimes, with philosophy, you find you knew it all along.

The book is organised in three parts:

Part I - sets out some relevant contemporary ideas from science, philosophy and sociology to illustrate the postmodern perspective.

Part II - considers the nature and status of belief systems from a postmodern perspective and identifies the structure of a postmodern Humanist belief system.

Part III - addresses the possible content of a postmodern Humanist belief system and identifies the distinctive values, principles and ethics arising from it.

x Postmodern Humanism I n t r o d u c t i o n

While the book does have a linear narrative and should be viewed as a whole, each chapter is designed to stand fairly independently and the reader can, should he/she choose, read only the parts that look interesting or useful. This explains some repetition necessary for clarity. Humanists have done much good work on humanitarian grounds - significantly in alleviating the consequences of religious superstition. This practical contribution to human welfare must not be overlooked in our search for an intellectual grounding. The intention here is that a clearer exposition of what Humanism is will lead to a greater expression of Humanist action. Indeed, action is seen here as an essential component of the postmodern Humanist ideal.

Postmodern Humanism xi

PART I

Humanism - What Is It?

The current support in the UK for a secular approach to society is evident. The demand for secular ceremonies (marriage, funerals, baby-naming) is increasing exponentially. However, membership of the British Humanist Association and allied organisations is tiny and almost static - their formal influence on social policy is significant but small. Humanism is fighting below its weight. Currently many (most?) people in the UK would claim to be ‘non- religious’. In a recent BBC poll 73% of respondents said they did not believe in God (YouGov Poll October 2004). In a poll of 16-year- o l d s , asked the question ‘Do you believe in God?’ 35% said yes; 45% said no; 20% said don’t know (G u a rd i a n, 27t h November 2004). According to Young People in Britain, a 2004 research report for the DfES, some 65% of young people are ‘not religious’. Further statis- tics and references can be found on www.humanism.org.uk. However we might judge these results it is clear that a large, and often unrecognised, proportion of people in the UK no longer describe themselves as ‘religious’ - and some would identify themselves as ‘humanists’. While few self-acclaimed ‘humanists’would be able to give a definitive description of what their humanism is, as commonly held, three broad overlapping categories of the humanist position might be identified. They are generally grouped around ideas of humanitarianism.

1. Secular (i.e. non-religious) humanitarianism. This secular humanitarian view is not specific to humanists. It covers many neo-liberal groups who would not particularly identify themselves as Humanist: Amnesty; Liberty; Greenpeace, etc. (And the Humanist slogan ‘we believe in life before death’has been purloined by Christian A i d . )

Postmodern Humanism 1 Humanism - What Is It?

2. Mystical humanitarianism. This position invests the human species with a special value outside of, and over, the physical, material world and other animals - a sort of god substitute. It replaces a transcendent God with transcendent Man. This position can only be described as confused and dangerous. It leads inexorably to religion, and/or political ideology. This is the ground for the most common attack on humanism as a ‘pseudo-religion’. The Te l e g r a p h newspaper has identified Humanism as ‘one of the new gods of Religious Education’ (April 2004). John Gray can say:

‘…liberal humanism is itself very obviously a religion - a shoddy replica of Christian faith markedly more irrational than the original article, and in recent times more harmful.’ Heresies ( 2 )

3. Anti-religious humanitarianism. This group is motivated chiefly by an anti-religious sentiment (and in some cases only by this). T h e i r view is usually conditioned by their personal experience of religion or by their reading of religious history. This position does approach a sort of philosophical base in so far as it recognises the necessary rejection of the transcendent but few, it seems, are then prepared to think through the logical consequences of this rejection in philosophical t e r m s .

It is becoming increasingly clear that this humanitarian humanism is not enough to excite a popular response. It does not distinguish humanism from the many competing (and often confused) humanitarian organisations. It does not excite passion. To carry influence in public affairs Humanism needs be more than a secular h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m . This uncertainty as to the precise nature of humanism contributes to its failure to find an effective voice in contemporary society. T h e purpose of this book is to seek to identify and to clarify what it is that sets humanists apart from humanitarians. And, now that humanism is included for the first time in the national framework for Religious Education in schools, it is a belief system that will come under increased scrutiny. To attempt this clarification of a distinctive humanist perspective,

2 Postmodern Humanism Humanism - What Is It? reference is made here to ideas related to the contemporary view of philosophy which can roughly be identified around the terms ‘ r e a l i s m ’ and ‘idealism’. These terms, as they are used here, and the postmodern perspective from which they are viewed, will be described as we go along. So, what is humanism? Most would agree that humanism is a life stance which denies (or at least discounts) the existence of an accessible God, or gods. It is materialist, it rejects supernatural or non- material explanations. It denies the existence of a supernatural interventionist being as the source of knowledge or Truth. H o w e v e r, humanism is not simply atheism. Indeed it is possible for a humanist to hold a ‘deist’view - that is to hold that there is a God who created the universe and then left us to get on with it. Humanists do, however, deny the existence of any accessible supernatural entity to instruct, inform, or guide us. All supernatural explanations of the universe and ourselves are rejected. We must examine more closely what this rejection of an interventionist God and the supernatural m e a n s .

Jean-Paul Sartre expressed the view of the existentialist philosophers:

‘The existentialist…finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven… There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it.’ Existentialism and Humanism ( 3 )

That position, for the existentialists, is the starting point. And it must be also our starting point. How can a distinctive Humanist philosophy and morality be constructed from this relativist perspective and what would be its content? In this postmodern/relativist context, Humanism (with a capital H) is used to distinguish it from humanism - its earlier, more general, humanitarian form. In seeking to define Humanism it is useful to see where we have been before we try to move forward. A brief outline of humanist thought might be summarised as follows: Sociobiologists, and evolutionary psychologists, now recognise that a human predisposition to seek ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, to find ‘reasons’

Postmodern Humanism 3 Humanism - What Is It?

and ‘purpose’gave the early human species an evolutionary advantage. In the absence of physical, material explanations, Homo sapiens invented gods and religions - concepts reinforced by their appropria- tion and assimilation into the power structures of the societies from which they sprang. Accompanying these religious beliefs there seems frequently to have been a reaction, a counter-belief in the secular, the rational, the non-religious. These early expressions of doubt might be seen as the stirrings of humanism. They often had a rebellious, anti-establishment, radical edge. Early Greek thought first described the material world by allusion to immortal gods - and then turned to ideas of logic and metaphysics (Plato; Socrates; Aristotle). This first attempt at a systematic humanist perspective can be thought to have arisen in the 5t h century BC when Socrates ‘called philosophy down from heaven to earth’. The further development of humanism is usually associated with the Renaissance. Around the 15t h- 1 6 t h century AD, attention again moved away from God to man as the centre of interest. Notably, Francis Bacon expressed a view showing that interest was moving away from the transcendent to the material. Recognition was granted and respect was paid to human reason, intellect and creativity - but still acknowledged as a gift from God. The so-called ‘Enlightenment’of the 18t h century saw further movement to reject God and the transcendent, and secular ideas were expressed by writers such as Hume, Kant, Voltaire, Gibson, Paine and Robert Owen. Physical manifestation of their ideas was expressed in events such as the French revolution of 1789 and the earlier A m e r i c a n Declaration of Independence of 1776. L a t e r, in the late 18th and 19t h c e n t u r y, these secular ideas were to be developed further in the views of the utilitarians (‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’); in the writings of John Stuart Mill, Thomas Huxley, the novelists George Eliot and Thomas Hardy and many others whom we would now claim to be ‘humanists’. The first use of the word ‘humanism’as a philosophy of life appears to have been in 1808 by the Bavarian educationist F.I. Nielhammer. Since then, ideas of what have been called humanism have occurred in many contexts, in many cultures, with many associations. R e c e n t l y, for example, the proposed European Constitution

4 Postmodern Humanism Humanism - What Is It? declared a shared heritage of ‘humanism, equality of persons, freedom and respect for reason’. It does not explain what its ‘ h u m a n i s m ’ is, but the use of the words ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ a n d ‘ r e a s o n ’ must give a clue - and, at the same time, revive visions of a Europe in a more revolutionary mood. Recent attempts have been made to define and express the distinctive features of Humanism (with a capital H) as a coherent, systematic belief system. The first such attempt occurred in the 1960s with the formation of the British Humanist Association (BHA). A statement of their beliefs is given in Appendix ( 5 0 ) . Their sisterly (or brotherly) partner is the National Secular Society (NSS) and their cousins are the Ethical Societies and the Rationalist Press A s s o c i a t i o n - independent bodies, though allied on most issues. Various collabora- tive groups exist at national and international level and the International Humanist Ethical Union (IHEU) acts as an informal international umbrella grouping for Humanist org a n i s a t i o n s . Appendix (51) gives details of current org a n i s a t i o n s . An international attempt to describe Humanism was made at the 2002 International Humanist Conference and their agreed statement, the Amsterdam Declaration 2002, is shown in Appendix ( 4 8 ). The 2005 report of a North East Humanists working party on Humanist values is printed in Appendix ( 4 9 ). A notable recent attempt to describe Humanism was made by Jim Herrick of the BHA, editor of the New Humanist. He recognises but does not seriously address the central issue of relativism. He says:

‘Scepticism - the continual doubting of all we are told or all that we see - is fundamental to the humanist outlook. This is not a know- nothing stance which leads to paralysis, but an alert attention to what we see and think… Scepticism is one of the foundations of humanism but it is not sufficient in itself. Complete scepticism could lead to a nihilistic belief in nothing or a cynical belief that nothing is of value. Humanism goes beyond this to put forward positive aspects of being alive and living with others…’ Humanism: an Introduction ( 4 )

Herrick goes on to argue that a majority would agree on what the ‘good life’ is and accept the values that go with that. That is his ‘posi-

Postmodern Humanism 5 Humanism - What Is It?

tive aspect’. Most Humanists would agree with what Herrick says. We must agree, these ARE Humanist values, but this is the benign, liberal, humanitarian approach which does not identify a distinctive Humanist p o s i t i o n . Herrick does not explain why or in what way Humanism is ‘sceptical’. Or what exactly the logical consequences of this scepticism are. He does not explain why we should accept ‘what most agree’. As we have noted, in history, humanism was often a challenge to the majority mandate. He does not explain on what grounds we can put forward ‘positive aspects of being alive’. In some ways Herrick’s Humanism represents that ‘ replica of Christian faith’ described by John Gray ( 2 ) . Most serious of all, Herrick does not recognise the seriousness of the relativist challenge or the force of argument it carries. Herrick’s Humanism, while valuable in many of its ethical conclusions, fails to achieve the dynamic of a coherent philosophical perspective necessary to galvanise commitment and action. Because of this uncertainty of identity, many continue to confuse Humanism with humanitarianism, some with hedonism - and some even with naturism, imagining humanists dancing naked in the forest at midnight. The Amsterdam Declaration 2002 is a useful document in so far as it identifies an international consensus on Humanist values at this particular time. However, it too fails to identify what are the unique, distinctive Humanist values, or the philosophic basis of those values. C r i t i c a l l y, it is uncertain as to how Humanist moral values arise, whether these values are considered to be asserted or deduced. ‘Humanists believe that morality is an intrinsic part of human nature… [an assertion?], needing no external sanction… [a deduc- t i o n ? ] . ’ ( 4 8 )

The British Humanist Association Philosophers Group do recognise this problem of finding a philosophical grounding for Humanist ethics and their pamphlet What is Humanism? concludes:

‘No resolution of this debate [between realists and idealists] is in sight …there is no humanist orthodoxy on these difficult questions’. ( 5 )

6 Postmodern Humanism Humanism - What Is It?

This question of ‘realism’ (the belief that there IS an objective Tr u t h , an accessible ‘real’ reality) versus ‘idealism’ (the belief that our ideas of reality can be only subjective human constructs) is at the heart of postmodernism. This, it is argued here, is the major issue in defining Humanism in philosophical terms and this question is addressed in the c h a p t e r, ‘Idealism versus Realism’. Before we proceed further to define what a modern Humanism is, let us sum up what Humanism is not. First, Humanism is not simply humanitarianism - although most Humanists would correctly claim to be humanitarian (so would the Pope!). Humanitarianism is a necessary but no longer suff i c i e n t definition of Humanism, in the same way that anti-capitalism is a necessary but no longer sufficient idea to define socialism. Second, Humanism is not simply secularist (so was Stalin!). Neither is it simply crude atheism. It is possible that Humanists could accept the existence of a God in the form of ‘deism’ - a belief that God created the universe and then abandoned it to its physical laws. It is also possible for Humanists to be agnostic - if that concept embraces the view that any possible God is not accessible to us and does not intervene in the physical universe. It is not necessary for a Humanist to be an atheist - but it helps. Third, Humanism is not a substitute for religion. It should not seek to recognise man (and woman) as something above the material thing he/she is. Humanism should not seek to substitute a transcendent Man for a transcendent God. It is not, or should not be, the ‘shoddy replica of Christian faith’described by John Gray. F i n a l l y, as we shall see, Humanism is not simply rationalism - although most Humanists would claim to be rational. The construction of a belief system does require reason, but it also requires the assertion of an assumed (and therefore relativist) value. This question is the main concern of the chapter, ‘Belief Systems’. To help us understand what we think Humanism is, it will be necessary to look first at the contemporary view of human nature (or, more accurately, human behaviour) to see what we now conceive the human species to be. If, according to a materialist perspective, it is all just us (our genes) and the environment (physical and cultural) it is necessary to consider what the ‘us’ i s .

Postmodern Humanism 7

The Origin of the Species

The universe is generally thought to have commenced with the Big Bang some 15,000 million years ago. Science now attributes this event to quantum fluctuations which can arise, without cause, out of nothing. Our current universe is a kind of solidified end product of this event. What that ‘nothing’is, or was (if we can say ‘is’or ‘was’i n this context), is a question addressed by writers such as Stephen Hawking in A Brief History of Ti m e ( 6 ) . Fortunately (for this author) the field of cosmological physics is outside the scope of this book - although we will have to consider some of the philosophical issues it raises. First, it is necessary to consider what it is ‘we’ a r e . The earth is thought to have formed some 10,000 million years ago. Life is believed to have begun on earth some 4,000 million years ago, and the Neanderthals, from which the modern human species, H o m o s a p i e n s , e m e rged, some 3 million years ago. In 10,000 million years, inert matter had developed on earth the ability to reproduce and produced … us … the currently dominant species on an evolving planet in an evolving universe. The crucial feature of life is the ability to reproduce - an entity called, in biology, a ‘replicator’. This simple fact was overlooked by early thinkers (perhaps blinkered by ideas of gods and the transcendental) until revealed by Charles Darwin in 1859 in his theory of evolution. The theory for the evolution of different species is generally described as ‘natural selection arising from random variation’a n d was described by Darwin in his work The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection ( 7 ). The theory is now often expressed in a phrase attributed to Thomas Huxley:

‘natural selection by the survival of the fittest.’ Evolution and Ethics ( 8 )

Postmodern Humanism 9 The Origin of the Species

This single phrase transformed our view of ourselves and our place in the universe. It continues to influence thinking in philosophy, science, s o c i o l o g y, and politics. Some attention to current thinking in this field is necessary to understand what we now believe the human species to b e .

First it is necessary to be clear what it is, exactly, that Darwin proposed. Because of the force of its impact on the religious and social status quo, Darwin’s concept of natural selection by the survival of the fittest has been much abused, misrepresented and misunderstood. Properly understood, evolution is without an aim - the dynamic of change (survival of the fittest) is expressed without a plan, or objective. Species and individuals survive not because they are ‘ b e t t e r ’, ‘stronger’ or ‘superior’ in some intrinsic way, but because their physiological and behavioural characteristics are best suited to survival in the circumstances they encounter. Evolution is uncaring, and motiveless. Nature is indifferent to the s u ffering of humans and other sentient beings. The fittest will survive only because they are the best fitted to survive in the circumstances they face at a particular time. Evolution does not care about past circumstances, nor anticipate future circumstances, or future evolutionary developments. Evolution does not mean that species are getting ‘better’. It is best understood as a process without a purpose. As we shall see, this understanding of evolution is fully consistent with, and has indeed contributed to, the postmodern perspective. Archaeologists and anthropologists have now identified most of the previous ‘missing links’ in the evolutionary chain from simple life forms to us - a species with a brain of 100 billion nerve cells making 100 trillion connections, the most complex thing in the universe. We can now understand how that process happened. The mechanics of evolution and the evolutionary steps that have occurred have become c l e a r e r. The work of Charles Darwin and his near-contemporary Gregor Mendel have been combined in what is generally known as neo- Darwinism. This shows that inheritance works by an individual passing on units of information, which determine physical characteristics in what we now know as ‘genes’. The genes are randomly recombined by the machinations of sex (and the even more

10 Postmodern Humanism The Origin of the Species mysterious machinations of ‘love’) to produce offspring, encapsulat- ing the characteristics of both parents. This produces random change and what are called ‘mutations’. Genes are continually exchanged and swapped in a sexually breeding population to form a ‘gene pool’ and ‘natural selection’ works continually on this pool, generally favouring those genes which are helpful to survival and eliminating those which are less so. In this way those individuals with genes favouring survival and reproduction spread through the pool - the ‘survival of the fittest’. Currently there is discussion on the finer details of the mechanics of natural selection and questions as to what is the evolutionary entity upon which natural selection operates. Is it the gene or groups of genes, the individual or the species? (See footnote (a).) However, at the level discussed here, that distinction is not important. While our genetic inheritance carries the characteristics of behaviour which, in the past, has served a survival advantage, it would seem that there has been no significant change in the human genome in at least the last 40,000 years (with the development of genetic engineering that might be about to change). Since then ‘social evolution’, but not genetic evolution, has continued with cultural evolutionary units identified by Richard Dawkins as ‘memes’ - cultural units (of concepts and beliefs) that follow evolutionary processes. Susan Blackmore develops this concept of a non-biological replicator in her idea of ‘the selfish meme’ and says:

‘The pace of mimetic [cultural] revolution is now so fast, relative to human genetic evolution, that we can safely ignore the latter for most purposes.’ The Meme Machine ( 9 )

That is not to say we can ignore our genetic inheritance in the ongoing cultural evolutionary process. Our evolving culture was generated by the predisposed behaviour produced by our genes and the evolution of our genes was affected in turn by the effects of the evolving cultural environment. Genes and memes evolved together in a co-reactive m a n n e r. Thus, this ‘co-evolution’ of genes and culture continues to be a ffected by genetically predisposed behaviour arising from our evolutionary past.

Postmodern Humanism 11 The Origin of the Species

The message from sociobiology, then, is that human behaviour is more genetically determined than we might have thought. Patterns of human behaviour are impressed more strongly by our genes than socialists and other Utopians have allowed (or hoped) when constructing their ideological narratives.The idea of human nature as a blank sheet, the tabula rasa, upon which the environment can write its own story, is no longer tenable - much less the idea that human nature is naturally ‘good’, repressed only by a malevolent environment created by our socio-economic systems. As Noam Chomsky puts it:

‘ Within the Marxist left - not including Marx - there’s a strong tendency to insist there is no human nature; that people are just constructed by their historical circumstances and environment. T h i s makes no sense, but these ideas are very convenient for those who aspire to managerial politics; they remove moral barriers to manip- ulation and coercion.’ Language and Freedom ( 1 0 )

Several writers (such as Matt Ridley and Gerald Edelman) have identified consciousness and, by extension, the sense of agency, reason and free will, as part of the evolutionary process. Their concept is that consciousness emerged progressively in a species as it ‘recognised’i t s environment. The view of Edelman is that an individual goes through a similar process from birth as the brain evolves neural states that are meaningful representations of the environment from moment to moment (see footnote (b)).

R a t i o n a l i t y

It will be argued, in this book, that rationality (as the term is used here) is part of our human genetic inheritance. The need for the human mind to operate in terms of ‘cause’and ‘effect’, to search for ‘reasons’ (and to identify ‘purpose’), to think logically, is a cognitive feature of the human species which has served an evolutionary advantage. We are now hard-wired for this epistemology (the way we identify and view our ‘knowledge’). Rationality, reason and logic, and ideas of

12 Postmodern Humanism The Origin of the Species

‘ t r u t h ’ are now part of the human condition. This issue is discussed further in the chapter, ‘Postmodernism’. This cognitive predisposition to use reason, to seek cause and eff e c t , culminated in many cultures with the search for the ultimate reason or meaning and, in the absence of obvious material explanations, H o m o s a p i e n s invented God, or more often gods. These concepts were then reinforced and embedded in social structures as they were appropriated in the form of establishment religions by whatever ruling class ruled. As we shall see, this idea of relating meaning to the exercise of power has been the basis for some ‘deconstructionist’ p h i l o s o p h e r s notably Jacques Derrida ( 2 7 ) and Michel Foucault ( 2 8 ) . This search for reasons is often expressed in social terms as a ‘meta- n a r r a t i v e ’ or ‘grand narrative’- an overarching concept for individual and human purpose and meaning. This genetic condition is recognised by some sociobiologists as a universal predisposition which explains the commonality of many traditions and myths in many different cultures and religions.This idea is considered further in the chapter ‘Grand Narratives - The Vision T h i n g ’ . F u r t h e r, all cultures would seem to accept the same principles of formal logic. We seem to be genetically programmed for logic as well as for language. The question regarding the use of reason is therefore not simply one of usefulness, but rather a question of locating where in a belief system it can/should be used. This position can be summarised by saying that reason is necessary in establishing what we regard as the ‘facts’(the truth if you insist, but with a small ‘t’), but first, as we shall see, the value system upon which we base our facts must be grounded on an unprovable assertion. Ultimately, all human meaning and all human values rest on unprovable assertions. This asserted value cannot be identified by reason alone but it can be tempered and constrained by reason.This point is considered in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’.

Regardless of the pleas of the Utopians (and the rejected romantics) we are dumped in this bleak state of meaninglessless by the human condition. We are alone (as far as we know) in an uncaring universe i n d i fferent to human happiness and suffering and the fate of the human species. If there is any meaning or value to human existence it is self-generated and self-regarding. Karl Popper expresses this view:

Postmodern Humanism 13 The Origin of the Species

‘History has no meaning, I contend. But this contention does not imply that all we can do about it is to look aghast at the history of political power or that we must look on it as a cruel joke… A l t h o u g h history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and though history has no meaning, we can give it meaning.’ The Open Society and its Enemies ( 1 1 )

Sartre expresses this concept:

‘There is no universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjectivity’. Existentialism and Humanism ( 3 )

We are (as far as we know) the only species to have developed a consciousness of our consciousness, but this only makes us diff e r e n t , more complicated, more dangerous certainly - but not ‘superior’ i n any objective way. There is no way that the human species can be said to be ‘better’ in the universal scheme of things except on our own egocentric evaluation. An alternative view of the universe could be constructed, for example, from the perspective of entropy (energ y flowing from a higher to a lower level) which would place the human species low on the valuation scale. The universe is indifferent to our self-generated beliefs and our dreams of superiority.

Agency Underlying the recognition of the human species as a social animal, and indeed underlying the concept of all societies we describe as ‘civilised’, is the assumption of ‘self’ and ‘agency’, that we are autonomous agents with the sense of freedom of action and a sense of responsibility for our actions that goes with that freedom. Some philosophers link our sense of agency to our sense of causality. We can choose reasons and attribute purpose. However we view it, underlying the assumption of agency is the concept of ‘free will’. We can see that the idea of agency and free will can be attributed to our evolutionary development. Daniel Dennett argues in his book F reedom Evolves that our sense of free will is a consequence of the

14 Postmodern Humanism The Origin of the Species co-evolution of genes and culture ( 1 2 ) . Dennett argues that genes and memes (cultural units of evolution) evolved together to create the conditions which allow us to act as if we are free to make moral choices. This account demythologises the mind/consciousness debate and provides a materialist basis for free with - a position which will be adopted in this book. There remains a question as to what degree our actions can be said to be ‘free’. Most sociologists now accept a genetic factor in behaviour but few go on to deny some influence of the environment, physical and cultural. Research in the gene-led behaviour field (so-called sociobiology) continues to be controversial. This is partly because of the difficulty in disentangling the effects of the two factors, genes and environment - particularly as they are mutually reactive - but also because the concept of gene-determined behaviour challenges the conceptual basis of most political ideology and social theory. It challenges the basic premise of the Left by questioning the effectiveness of environmental intervention for social change - and, at the same time, challenges the political Right by questioning the reality, the degree, of individual responsibility. A further challenge is to the concept of equality of race and gender. See footnote (c). F u r t h e r, the view of genetic influence on behaviour challenges the concept of agency, of autonomy, and this presents a threat to the whole concept of personal responsibility on which our societies are based. Problems of an ethical nature will arise with increasing u rgency as we learn to manipulate behavioural characteristics by genetic engineering and the question of the desirability of engineered conformative behaviour will need to be addressed.

The apparently simple concept of evolution by natural selection has opened up a Pandora’s box (or a can of worms). There are many interests vested in the outcome of the gene-behaviour debate and it is not surprising that it raises hackles. For our present purpose, we can note that the genetic effect on behaviour is greater than many thought (or hoped) but that we can, with the existentialists, hold a belief in the sense of self and autonomy. If we wish to construct what we recognise as a civilised society we must hold a belief that we ARE free to choose our actions, to a greater

Postmodern Humanism 15 The Origin of the Species

or lesser degree, and be judged responsible for our behaviour - or think we can, which amounts to the same thing.

F u r t h e r, it is argued here that our genetic inheritance includes the predisposition, the necessity, to use reason and that this, together with subjectivity and a sense of autonomy, forms the essence of the human condition. Consideration of the implications of this view is given in the chapters ‘Social Reality’ and ‘Belief Systems’.

F o o t n o t e s

(a) The question of what entity carries the evolutionary advantage, the gene or groups of genes, the individual or the species, is discussed by several geneticists including Stephen Jay Gould in his book T h e S t ru c t u re of Evolutionary Theory. H o w e v e r, at the level considered here it is only necessary to observe that genetic advantage must be made manifest in bodies - although, surprisingly, not necessarily in the body that the gene itself is found in. It has for example been shown by Richard Dawkins in his book The Extended Phenotype t h a t the plant genes that determine the colour of flowers and make them attractive to bees are selected because of the effect of the genes of bees which determine how their eyes work. On this understanding, evolution must be considered as a process in a holistic context. The genetic elements of the gene pool change over time and the character of the individuals, the species, with them.This natural selection is opportunist and and concerned only with the present. Evolution does not, and cannot, concern itself with any possible future or the characteristics that might then favour survival. We now understand more fully the potency of Charles Darwin’s thesis, and recognise, as Dawkins says, that ‘evolution is blind’ - or was until genetic engineering. C u r r e n t l y, consciousness and intelligence (and an awareness of the evolutionary process) provide a dominant evolutionary advantage - at least for us for the moment in our bit of the universe. This might not always be the case, and the human species itself, as currently formed, might not always serve the blind interests of survival.

16 Postmodern Humanism The Origin of the Species

( b ) The genetic basis, and the evolutionary relevance, of the predisposition of the human species to selfishness and aggression on one hand, and altruism and co-operation on the other, is the subject of ongoing scientific debate. It can be seen as a continuation of the conflict between the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes (the natural state of mankind is a struggle for survival by the individual - ‘nature red in tooth and claw’) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (man is the ‘noble sav- a g e ’ whose nature is to live in a state of harmony with others). Matt Ridley views Hobbes’ position as leading to the need for an authoritarian state, and fascism, and sees the following connection: Thomas Hobbes (1651) - David Hume (1739) - Adam Smith (1776) - Charles Darwin (1859). He goes on: ‘the Hobbesian search for a perfect society ended, therefore, in the gas-chambers of A u s c h w i t z . ’ R i d l e y, then, comes down on the side of Rousseau with an anarchis- tic conclusion and goes on to argue:

‘If we are to recover social harmony and virtue, if we are to build back into society the virtues that made it work for us, it is vital that we reduce the power and scope of the state.’ The Origins of Virtue ( 1 3 )

He could have argued the opposite thesis - we need a stronger state to mitigate and deflect the conflicts arising from the expression of the genetically inherited tendency to struggle for survival - many do so a rgue in the debate on the role of the state.

Whatever might be the dominant genetic behavioural characteristic, conflict or cooperation, that cannot be a source of our ethics. In ethics an ‘is’ is not an ‘ought’. Our social philosophers must look to other sources for their ethics. We can take note of our predispositions but we must choose what behaviour we wish to adopt and what values we thus wish to assert. We must then be prepared to construct the society necessary to deliver these values.

(c) Although the genetic differences between races and genders is currently thought to be insignificant (and the Marxist evolutionary Darwinist, Stephen Jay Gould, claims to have proved it!) this might not always be the case. It is possible that, as we further unravel the

Postmodern Humanism 17 The Origin of the Species

human genome, significant genetic differences, and associated b e h a v i o u r, will be discovered, between races and between genders. This will place the assertion of human equality at risk if equality is a rgued from the premise of sameness. It is important to realise that any claim of an inherent human equality must find its source in some other location. It does not lie simply with the argument of genetic congruence.

18 Postmodern Humanism Postmodern Humanism 19

The End of Utopia

The human species, along with other species, have developed a genetic predisposition for collective action ever since co-operation presented an evolutionary advantage. These systems were, and for some species continue to be, concerned with the primary objective of the production of the means of survival. According to Marx, it was the conflicts arising from the social relations produced by the ownership of the means of production which has been the dynamic of history. Whether or not we wish to go down that path, it is clear that while other species retain relatively unchanging forms of social relationships we, the human species, have been prolific in dreaming up different forms - and worse, of seeking to implement them. G e n e r a l l y, early human societies exploited ideas of Godly power, magnanimously delegated to the earthly power holders (and conveniently accompanied by suitable wealth), to buttress the authority of the ruling class. Some modern rulers still receive this Godly power and we pray that the gracious he or she be ‘saved’a n d granted glorious longevity. Alongside these religious myths there is a long tradition for social and political philosophers to challenge the transcendental beliefs and to seek a rational, secular basis for ethics and morals. From A r i s t o t l e onwards, and probably backwards, philosophers have sought to identify the rules by which a society could attain the ‘good life’ w i t h- out reference to some transcendent authority. The Enlightenment was a period in Western history around the 17t h and 18t h century when notable attempts were made to identify an ideal ethical system on the basis of a secular rationality. An underlying theme was utilitarianism, based on the idea of ‘the greatest good for

Postmodern Humanism 21 The End of Utopia

the greatest number’. John Stuart Mill proposed a utilitarianism based on ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ ( 1 4 ) . These proposals foundered, chiefly because there is no rational approach to deciding what the ‘good’is. ‘Good’for some is ‘bad’ f o r others. Further it is impossible to arbitrate rationally between a small good for many versus a larger good for a few. Or a certain short-term happiness versus a possible long-term happiness - or what, indeed, ‘ h a p p i n e s s ’ i s . Another proposition was the Golden Rule, ‘do unto others as you would be done by’. This foundered under the criticism of the social theorists and under the alternative proposition, do not do unto others as you would be done by - they might not like it. Some turned, in something like emotional panic, to an even more ephemeral basis for ethics - ‘love’. Other notable attempts to construct a Utopian system based on a view of universal ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’ sank under similar intellectual difficulties - and, as we can witness from history, failed in actual attempts at their implementation. The lands of the free and the homes of the brave are not necessarily the countries of the h a p p y. All proposals for a universal overarching Utopian system have been discredited by the evidence of history - even before their intellectual collapse under the postmodern assault. In all cases it was recognised that, in the final analysis, they fell back on pragmatic, subjective (and fallible) human judgment. And, in realisation, they didn’t work. Nevertheless, underlying all these attempts has been a belief in some sort of social Utopia. Life for everyone would continue to ‘improve’. People would become content, if not actually happy. Things would get better and better. At some material level that has happened - for some. But in a wider context that belief is no longer tenable. Utopia never happened, and our understanding of the human condition now tells us it never will. The end of the Utopian dream can be seen to be the result of the dynamic of three powerful influences. First, the lessons from ideology. The experiences of the 20t h c e n t u r y (and before) have revealed the horrors that are delivered by attempts at the implementation of ideological social theories - of so-called universal ‘deep structures’. Religious dogmas have long delivered

22 Postmodern Humanism The End of Utopia persecution and wars. They continue to do so. And attempts to implement political structures based on race or class have produced their own horrors. Few would now seek to defend ideological lais- sez-faire capitalism, or ideological Marxism. Fewer still to justify f a s c i s m . Immanuel Wallerstein, one of our most influential social critics, w r i t e s :

‘Utopias are breeders of illusions and therefore, inevitably of disillu- sions. They can be used, and have been used for terrible wrongs. The last thing we really need is still more Utopian visions.’ Utopistics ( 1 5 )

Second, from science. Our knowledge of the influence of genes has destroyed ideas of the perfectibility of human behaviour by environmental change. The view of the blank slate, upon which the environment can write its own story, is no longer tenable. The idea of a genetic evolutionary process producing an ‘improvement’ in the human species, of directing nature to some more perfect goal, has been long rejected. Socialist ideas of continually ‘improving’ a n innate human nature by social intervention have been discredited by experience and by science. John Gray can use this view to attack what he sees as Humanism:

‘Humanists angrily deny harbouring the vast hopes of Marx or Comte, but still insist that the growth of scientific knowledge enables mankind to construct a better future than anything in the past.There is not the slightest scientific warrant for this belief. It is faith, pure and simple.’ Heresies ( 2 )

The question of changing human behaviour by genetic engineering has yet to be seriously addressed. Current ideas of the genetic influence in social behaviour, the nature/nurture debate, are discussed further in footnote (a). Third, from philosophy. Relativist postmodernism has directed attention to the subjective nature of our ideas and our social values. This, together with the understanding of the dynamics of evolution,

Postmodern Humanism 23 The End of Utopia

has led to the position that there can no longer be a tenable view of a universal ‘purpose’ for the human species. All ideas of a transcendent ideological belief, religious, political or scientific, have been jettisoned. All attempts to identify and implement a universal ‘deep structure’ for society, secular, rational or religious, have failed. This is the end of the human dream of Utopia. Francis Fukuyama proclaims this is ‘the end of history’ ( 1 ) .

In these circumstances of uncertainty, to avoid a descent into nihilism, it is useful, necessary even, to examine what exactly it is we are trying to do when we seek to identify an ethical system. It is now generally accepted that it is not possible to construct a practical ethical system for human behaviour based on reason alone. Ultimately, all human values have a subjective origin (or a Godly one). Rationality can only deliver an ethical ‘must’ after an earlier premise has identified the asserted ‘ought’. This question is considered further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’. One conclusion from this perspective is that we, the human species, are stuck with our different views of value, purpose, ethics and social systems. And, if we cannot reason our way out of conflicts then we must find ways of negotiating our differences. Science negotiates its d i fferences through experimentation - the social equivalent would be the study of human behaviour through history. It can be seen that the question of what factors influence choice in human behaviour is crucial in considering ethical systems. While, in ethics, an ‘is’is not an ‘ought’, the ‘is’ (what we physiologically and psychologically are) will help determine what social structures we need to help deliver the ‘ought’. In social theory terms this issue is sometimes discussed under the banners of ‘structuralism’ versus ‘social action’ - is society responsible for constructing the individual’s view of social ‘reality’ o r is the individual responsible for constructing the ‘reality’ of society? These concepts are discussed briefly in the chapter ‘Belief and Social Theory’. As we shall see, the position adopted here is that our genetic inheritance predisposes us to see certain patterns in social (and physical) phenomena - structures and processes, causes and eff e c t s . Our cultural environment predisposes us to see certain values, meaning and purpose. Our ultimate ‘belief’, our actual behaviour, is a

24 Postmodern Humanism The End of Utopia result of a reaction of these two predispositions presided over by the mysterious ‘self’. A map of the principal ideas in social theory relevant to this question is given in Appendix ( 5 3 ).

F o o t n o t e s

(a) While the sociologists and biologists (and increasingly the physicists) continue the debate on the relative effect of nature versus nurture on human behaviour, it is now obvious that both genes and environment, nature AND nurture, do both play a role - a view recognised in sociobiology. Matt Ridley recognised this joint effect in his work The Origins of Vi rt u e ( 1 3 ) where he envisaged a direct role for the environment as a facilitator in switching the behavioural genes on or off. E.O. Wi l s o n , in Consilience ( 3 4 ), claims that culture can have a feedback effect on the gene pool in the form of gene-culture evolution resulting in the e m e rgence of universal ‘epigenic rules’ for behaviour. Susan Blackmore echoes this concept in her idea of a non-biological replicator (The Meme Machine ( 9 )). These ideas were discussed in the chapter ‘The Origin of the Species’ and we will see further reference to their relevance in the chapter ‘A Humanist Belief System’. We can conclude that, together with genes, the cultural environment in the form of ideas of ethical values, belief systems, traditions and myths, plays a role, albeit a complex one, in social behaviour. And, as we shall see, the choice of values is essentially subjective and we must accept that conflict of views at this level is part of the human condition. In these circumstances, it is crucial that we recognise clearly what the nature and status of our belief system is. As relativists, Humanists would have first to recognise the subjective choices we make to establish human values and purpose. We must then recognise the need to construct the social structures to deliver these values and to resolve, or accommodate, the inevitable conflict of values and interests that will arise. C u r r e n t l y, the resolution of conflict of values is addressed at a collective level by democratic structures, by economic competition, by politics - or by war. Most would agree that our current democratic

Postmodern Humanism 25 The End of Utopia

forms are defective - a feature commonly identified by the political cognoscenti as the ‘democratic deficiency’. We need to take note of studies in the exercise of democratic action and in the management of conflict. The following chapters address these issues further.

26 Postmodern Humanism Mathematical Reality - A Mandelbrot Set S c i e n c e

Many humanists would claim to believe in the ‘scientific’. By this some mean a belief that science, by the use of reason and observation, is gradually and progressively revealing the Truth about the nature of the physical universe. Few scientists now believe this - the universal Truth is no longer the holy grail of science. Up to and including Newton, it was assumed that a mechanistic universe, a ‘real’ r e a l i t y, was out there waiting for us to discover it. Currently our scientists adopt a rather different stance and generally agree that we are simply inventing analogues (usually mathematical), which match our observations. Objective ‘Truth’, ‘real’ r e a l i t y, is no longer seen to be within our grasp - or of concern. Albert Einstein broke the chains of objectivity of Newton’s mechanistic universe and echoed the relativist perspective with his general and special theories of relativity. The concept of relativity has something in common with the ‘idealism’ of relativist philosophy - the idea of an observer-centred reality. Niels Bohr destroyed the view of certainty, of a deterministic universe, with his ideas of quantum mechanics. From quantum mechanics it is necessary to view reality from complementary subjective perspectives rather than from a single objective frame and to view the universe in terms of probability rather than certainty.

Postmodern Humanism 27 S c i e n c e

Positivism

Stephen Hawking expresses the view of the positivist scientist when discussing the existence of ‘extra dimensions’to explain the universe:

‘…as I am a positivist, the question “Do extra dimensions exist?” has no meaning. All one can ask is whether mathematical models with extra dimensions provide a good description of the universe.’ The Universe in a Nutshell (16)

In taking this view, by deciding to reject (or at least ignore) the question of the nature of ‘reality’, science can be seen to be adopting a materialist position - what some philosophers (notably T h o m a s Hobbes) have identified as ‘monism’. Materialism, together with reason, is ‘a priori’, a necessary given, for the scientific belief system. By definition the scientist chooses to deny, or at least ignore, the possibility of non-material, spiritual, entities; to confine attention only to observations open to the senses; to construct models, analogues, of how they might work.

Gerry Gilmore, professor of experimental philosophy at the Institute of A s t r o n o m y, Cambridge University, recognises the deep subjectivity of the human condition. Gilmore writes:

‘…we should not expect to be too special: our eyes are adapted to detect predators (cave bears) and potential food, and not necessarily to allow an unbiased view of the nature of existence and e n e rgy…Quantitative astrophysics soon discovered that what we see is not what we get: most matter does not shine in any wave- band, light, heat, X-rays or radio…everything which shines, and everything which is studied by scientists on Earth is almost an irrelevant perturbation of reality. ’ (17)

Roger Penrose sees that our view of reality is determined by the restraints imposed by the question - and the questioner. He says:

‘…modern physicists invariably describe things in terms of mathematical models… It is thought they seek to find “reality” within the

28 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e

Platonic world of mathematical ideals. Such a view would seem to be a consequence of any proposed “theory of everything”, for physical reality would appear merely as a reflection of purely mathematical laws.’ The Road to Reality ( 1 8 )

In Penrose’s view, our idea of a mathematical ‘reality’ is a consequence of the tendency of the brain to ask mathematical questions. In taking this view, modern science might be seen as echoing an earlier Kant:

‘Thus the order and regularity in the appearance, which we entitle “ n a t u r e ’’, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had we, or the nature of our mind, not originally set them there.’ Critique of Pure Reason ( 1 9 )

Thus, the theories of science are recognised by the scientists, and the philosophers, as subjective, as human constructs. Instead of seeing science as the progressive revealing of objective ‘Tr u t h ’ we can, r a t h e r, recognise scientific ideas as the more complete modelling of observed phenomena as dictated by the nature of human senses and the character of human thought. This view of science is recognised by some as ‘positivist’, or ‘instrumentalist’. As used here that view can be described as accepting that concepts arising from sense observation and reason provide the simplest unifying description of phenomena and provide accurate predictions of future observations. The view is ‘positivist’ in that science is recognised as providing an authentic methodology for conceiving structures, mental models, with which we can relate to the physical world without commitment to their ‘reality’. This is not to say that the physical and social worlds H AVE an objective structure that we can ‘reveal’ or ‘discover’, but rather that, from the perspective of the human condition, we can (must) think in these terms. We shall see that this view is recognised here as ‘structural idealism’- as opposed to ‘structural realism’, which a rgues that physical and social structures do have an objective reality, which is accessible to us.

Postmodern Humanism 29 S c i e n c e

For some, human society cannot be subjected to the same structural analysis as the non-human physical world. From the postmodern perspective, however we approach the question, subjectivism is at the core of both the physical and social sciences - unless we assume a transcendent God who knows better. This question is considered briefly in footnote (a) and in the chapter ‘Belief and Social T h e o r y ’ . This subjectivity of science is not unconstrained. As an individual, a scientist can invent any theory, ‘believe’anything - but only within the constraints of reason and sense observation. However, as profession- als, scientist accept a further collective agreed limit to this autonomous freedom. Their ‘facts’ must be supported by repeatable experimentation and observation by others. And a scientific theory must be open to falsification, to modification and change. There is no ultimate scientific Truth out there waiting to be discovered. Science is concerned only with ideas that are seen to work for now. The belief system of science is discussed further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’. The principal model for science is one that allows for the most rigorous yet creative use of logic - mathematics. An instructive example of the use of mathematical equations to model ‘extra’ dimensions is given in footnote (b). An example of how well- established scientific theories (Einstein’s relativity) can be challenged is given in footnote (c). Quantum physics, which deals with the behaviour of sub-atomic particles, further undermines our concepts of a ‘real’ objective reality and shows that our view of reality itself is empirical and uncertain. The best-known example concerns the nature of light, which can be observed experimentally both as a wave of electromagnetic energy or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y, as a particle, a photon. A similar problem exists regarding our concepts concerning the ‘ p o s i t i o n ’ and ‘velocity’ of a particle in space. This is expressed in H e i s e n b e rg ’s ‘uncertainty principle’, which states, roughly, that we can observe the position of a particle, or its velocity, but not both s i m u l t a n e o u s l y. This is not simply a technical problem of the effect of the observation instruments on the observed (although that is also a problem), it is a more fundamental problem of concept. If there is no ‘ s t a t i o n a r y ’ point in the universe, no objective reference frame, no ‘zero’, then any ‘velocity’we identify must be relative to some arbi- trarily chosen frame of reference. If we declare that an object has a

30 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e particular ‘velocity’then this carries with it the consequence of the use of a particular reference frame of ‘position’ to which our velocity refers. Position and velocity (and time and space) are mutually dependent entities. As we use up, as it were, our freedom in specify- ing velocity, our freedom of observing, of choosing position declines. In this way we can talk only about the ‘probability’ of a particle being at a given point, at a given velocity, at a given time.

Penrose addresses the quantum scientists’ view of reality:

‘Most of them are distinctly uncomfortable about addressing the issue of “reality” at all. They may claim to take what they would call a “positivist” stand, and refuse to consider what “reality” is supposed to mean…All that we should ask of our formalism, they might claim, would be to give an answer that we may pose of a system, and that those answers agree with observational facts.’ The Road to Reality ( 1 8 )

Theoretical physicists are currently working to unite the theories of quantum physics and relativity in a ‘theory of everything’. Then, says Hawking with largely misunderstood irony, ‘we would know the mind of God’ ( 1 6 ) . These problems concerning our view of the reality of our universe are probably due to the limitations of our conceptual apparatus - our brain - and to the restrictions of our best available analogue - mathematics. We do not yet seem able to form the concepts necessary to resolve these apparent contradictions. Perhaps we never will be. Some scientists believe that philosophers will need to come up with a fundamentally different ontology.

For some social philosophers the methodology for the study of the natural sciences can provide an analogue for the study of human b e h a v i o u r. This means the development of more comprehensive and accurate models based on the interaction of theory and observation. From this perspective we need to view knowledge not as an objective Truth but as a continuous process of analysis. We must continually observe, test and reassess our values and our concepts - and the consequences of holding them. Scientists can accept that they got it

Postmodern Humanism 31 S c i e n c e

wrong. This view is expressed clearly by Umberto Eco when discussing Stephen Hawking’s recent acknowledgement that his earlier account of the nature of black holes was in error:

‘For those involved in the sciences there is nothing exceptional about this…but I feel that the episode should be brought to the attention of young people in every non-fundamentalist or non-confessional school so that they may reflect upon the principles of modern s c i e n c e … Modern science does not hold that what is new is always right. On the contrary, it is based on the principle of “fallibilism” (enunciated by the American philosopher Charles Pierce, elaborated upon by Popper and many other theorists, and put into practice by scientists themselves) according to which science progresses by continually correcting itself, falsifying its hypotheses by trial and error, admitting its own mistakes…’ The Guardian ( 2 0 )

It is this aspect of the scientific method which allows the claim of Humanists to be ‘scientific’ - not in the sense of revealing some eternal objective Truth.

So, does all this matter to the hard-pressed would-be Humanist confronted by the problems of postmodern philosophy, and much else? Well yes it does, actually. Science matters because it illustrates a methodology in the use of reason and observation for assessing our ‘facts’. Our facts are what we can choose to think of as our ‘truth’for now. Our views, our ‘truths’, are open to disproof. Science also matters because it demonstrates the irrelevance of the human species in the universal scheme of things. We inhabit a universe, possibly one of many parallel universes; a vulnerable human species, on a fragile planet, revolving around a very ordinary star. A n d there are billions of stars in our very ordinary galaxy; and there are billions of similar galaxies in our universe. Any significance, any value or importance, attached to the human species in the cosmos is self-attributed - what will be referred to here as ‘anthropocentrism’. Also, modern physics tells us more about the nature of our own

32 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e nature. We can now identify chemo-electrical patterns of brain - activity with particular emotional states and behaviour. We can now relate specific genes to physiological and psychological characteristics. Our behaviour and beliefs must be viewed in this context. And, for some, the ‘uncertainty’ of quantum physics gives an opening for a discussion of the nature of what we see as the autonomous ‘self’, of the ‘choice’ f a c t o r, in human behaviour. We are no longer restricted by the mechanistic rules of Newtonian physics. ‘Free will’ comes back into the human equation and existential choice remains on the scientific agenda. This question is considered further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’.

To summarise: since the early 20t h c e n t u r y, scientific theories of nature have conflicted with our everyday perception of reality. Our ‘reality’ is not as objectively ‘real’ as we might have thought. The theories of relativity and quantum mechanics tell us that space and time are not universal objective absolutes. The theories of quantum physics appear to show that not only is our view of the physical universe grounded in our observations, our ‘reality’ is, in some sense, actually created by our observations. By our observations we actually seem to determine the nature of the physical world. Our scientific view of physical r- eality is at odds with our philosophical understanding of it. In this way, the theories of cosmological physics, relativity and quantum mechanics, reinforce the relativist paradigm. All our concepts are subjective and pragmatic. In a sense we create our own structures of physical reality. And, if our concepts of physical reality are subjective, how much more tentative (and subjective) must be our theories of society and human behaviour. The scientific method reinforces the postmodern perspective in that it provides an example of a relativist belief system. As relativist, as positivist, science demonstrates what it is we do when we adopt a belief. We can see that many models can be constructed and, in so far as they are rational and explain our observations, all are equally ‘true’. Their evaluation is based, not on a universal Truth, but on whether they are useful.

The idea of producing a mathematical model as an analogue of observed behaviour has been extended, controversially, from science

Postmodern Humanism 33 S c i e n c e

to social theory. One such model rises from consideration of dynamic feedback systems in so-called chaos/complexity theory ( 3 3 ) . A t t e m p t s have been made to apply this theory to social systems and to show how patterns of behaviour arise naturally from the structure of the system. Thus we can identify social ‘normality’ and ‘deviancy’ as a property of the system. This analogue for social behaviour cannot help us to produce our values, but it might help us to design a society to deliver them. The idea has relevance to the sociologists’ theories of ‘ s t r u c t u r a l i s m ’ and ‘social action’ and these will be discussed later in the chapter, ‘Belief and Social Theory’.

Science (and relativist Humanism) can be said to deal in observed ‘facts’, but there is no need to elevate our ‘facts’ to some mystical transcendent ‘Truth’. Truth becomes a redundant concept in this context. We observe our ‘facts’and construct our own belief system - and the epistemology to go with it. Or, perhaps we choose our belief system and then observe our ‘facts’. Either way, the idea of objective Tr u t h , what philosophers recognise as ‘realism’, has received a final blow from science and postmodernism. Truth has becomes something that seems useful at the time. Certainly we can act as if the material world has a ‘real’ e x i s t e n c e beyond our concepts i.e. we can act as quasi-realists - the human psyche seems to need that assurance. But to assert an objective, universal, ‘real’ reality is to approach the transcendental. The ‘real’ r e a l i t y, as Hawking affirms, would be known only by a God. Relativists agree with Wittgenstein and Hawking: the idea of a ‘real’ reality is not only unknown and unknowable, not simply without meaning, but rather beyond meaning. Modern science, then, endorses the view that the concepts reality, truth, value and meaning are human constructs and have no validity (one is tempted to say no meaning) in any absolute sense - only a u t i l i t y. Wittgenstein came to this view in his philosophy declaring that the meaning of language lies in its use. Existentialists adopt a similar view when they declare that the human essence, our meaning, lies in our freely exercised choice of action. For relativists, as for the positivist scientist, ‘truth’ is something that works for us for now. These considerations bring us to the heart of

34 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e relativist Humanism and take us to some central issues of classical philosophy - considered in the chapter, ‘Idealism versus Realism’. First, we must acknowledge that science, as it is commonly perceived, does not (yet) purport to explain human behaviour. For most, sociology is not (yet) a science in the sense discussed above and we need to recognise a different sort of belief model from that used by science. It is not easy to see how ideas of consciousness and freedom will emerge from mathematical equations. One socio-philosophical perspective which is important to our discussion here is known as ‘ e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ’ and that subject is discussed in the chapter, ‘Social R e a l i t y ’ .

Footnotes

(a) The structuralist view is opposed by one faction of social theorists, the ‘social actionists’, who deny that human behaviour can be described by reduction to formulaic structures. This faction holds that we must view society as the result of individual actions and reactions and that the ‘reality’ of society is simply how the individual views it. The view adopted in this book is identified by some by the term ‘ethnomethodology’. It might be seen that this view embraces both the social action and the structuralist position. According to this view of ethnomethodology, society is a flux but our human condition predisposes us to construct reality in a certain way (the species’ subjectivity), and our cultural environment predisposes us to identify certain values and purposes (the individual’s subjectivity). Individual action is then the result of the interaction of these two predispositions mediated by the autonomous ‘self’ . This position is discussed further in the chapter ‘Belief and Social Theory’.

(b) Much of quantum physics and cosmological physics is based on a concept of dimensions in addition to those four dimensions of our everyday world (three of space and one of time). This involves the concept of extra ‘imaginary’ dimensions which can be conceived, imagined, but are not observed directly in our everyday experience. Whether these imaginary dimensions ‘exist’ is a matter for the

Postmodern Humanism 35 S c i e n c e

philosophers of science - in a way, all the concepts of physics, g r a v i t y, magnetism etc., are ‘imaginary’. It is useful for the understanding of the status of scientific theory to have a feel of what the modern physicist is saying. It is not diff i c u l t to get some understanding of the concept of imaginary quantities which underlies much of modern physics. A simple approach, familiar to ‘O’level GCSE students, might be presented as follows:

‘ O r d i n a ry ’ d i m e n s i o n s

In much of everyday life we need think only in terms of ‘ordinary’ numbers, quantities or dimensions. For example we would say that 4 metres plus 3 metres is 7 metres and would write it: 4 + 3 = 7. We can express this in pictorial or graphical form (Fig.1).

F i g . 1

0 4 3

4 + 3 = 7

‘ I m a g i n a ry ’ dimensions

We are also used to thinking in terms of other dimensions. We might, for example, say 4 units along, and 3 units up. That would mean (if we measured it - or remembered our Pythagoras) that we had moved 5 units from the starting point, or origin, measured as the crow flies. If we wanted to express this by an equation we would have to - identify that the 3 units are at right angles to the 4 units and we could write something like 4 + i3 where ‘i’ indicates that we have brought in another dimension for the 3 q u a n t i t y. We can show this in graphical form thus (Fig. 2).

36 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e

Fig. 2 5! i3

0 4

4 + i3 = 5!

The ‘i’ term is the mathematical equivalent of the square root of - 1. But - 1 has no square root, it is an ‘imaginary’ number (there is no number that multiplied by itself gives us - 1). Numbers identified by the ‘i’ term are described as ‘imaginary’ numbers. The ! symbol indicates that the quantity 5 is composed of quantities in more than one dimension. We can, if we choose, consider the ‘ordinary’ numbers to include all our four ‘ordinary’ dimensions and the i term to identify other ‘imaginary’ dimensions. We could, then, include terms j, k, l … for other ‘imaginary’ dimensions. Although these are described as ‘imaginary’ this does not mean that these dimensions do not ‘exist’ - simply that we cannot observe them directly in our ‘ordinary’ space-time universe. T h e i r concept woul be validated if, and when, they are observed to interact with our ‘ordinary’d i m e n s i o n s . Our mathematical analogy provides us with an informative exercise. ‘Imaginary’ numbers are just as valid as ‘ordinary’ n u m- bers. We can carry out mathematical calculations involving these ‘ i m a g i n a r y ’numbers, using the appropriate rules, but we would only be able to observe their effect when they broke through, as it were, to a ffect our ‘ordinary’n u m b e r s . For example, if we were to carry out the mathematical calculation:

(4 + i3)x(4 - i3)

we can calculate

(4 + i3)x(4 - i3) = 16 + 12i - 12i - ixi9

Postmodern Humanism 37 S c i e n c e

remembering that i squared is - 1 we get

(4 + i3)x(4 - i3) = 16 + 9 = 25

The ‘imaginary’ terms have disappeared and we are left only with their effect in giving us the ‘real’ quantity 2 5. Hawking says:

‘One might think… that imaginary numbers are just a mathematical game having nothing to do with the real world. From the viewpoint of positivist philosophy, however, one cannot determine what is real. All one can do is find which mathematical model describes the universe we live in. It turns out that a mathematical model involving imaginary time predicts not only e ffects we have already observed but also effects we have have not been able to measure yet nevertheless believe in for other r e a s o n s . ’ The Universe in a Nutshell ( 1 6 )

C u r r e n t l y, to explain the behaviour of atomic particles and the cosmos in a unified grand ‘Theory of Everything’, Hawking claims it to be necessary to postulate the existence of eleven dimensions. A current cosmological theory postulates the existence of a multi- universe comprised of ‘membranes’ upon which the dimensions of each universe are located. These membranes are envisaged to penetrate each other but not to interact. If the dimensions of the other universes do not interact with our own, and cannot therefore be subjected to our sense observations, it is difficult to see how these theories can be seen to meet the scientific test of disprovability. In this sense the theory cannot (yet) be said to be ‘scientific’. See the - chapter ‘Belief Systems’. A further interesting experiment is to put a complex number to represent X in a simple equation such as Xn = R.X(1 - X) and to perform repeated calculations using the calculated Xn as the new X. The plotted results show fractals of amazing beauty and complexity such as the Mandelbrot set shown at the beginning of this chapter.

38 Postmodern Humanism S c i e n c e

(c) Einstein’s theories of relativity are postulated on the premise that the speed of light is constant (300 million metres/second), independent of the observer. This contradicts our ‘common sense’ v i e w. If the observer is approaching the source of light, the light waves should, one would think, be seen to be approaching faster than if the observer is travelling away from the source of light - as experienced with sound waves when a moving vehicle passes us. The ‘price’Einstein has to pay for this assumption that the speed of light is constant is that our measures of time (seconds) and distance (metres), known as ‘space-time’, are not constant. Under the rules of r e l a t i v i t y, time and/or length are shortened as we move faster. A metre rod shortens and a clock speeds up. Einstein could have proposed a system where time and length remain constant and the speed of light varies. This is the proposition now considered by some scientists - the variable speed of light theory (known as VSL), postulated by Joao Magueijo in his book, F a s t e r Than the Speed of Light ( 2 1 ) . It is claimed that the V S L theory gives an explanation of some of the observed phenomena of cosmological physics not resolved by the theories of relativity. From a scientific (and relativist) perspective, it is not that one theory is ‘true’ and the other ‘false’, but rather that one might be more useful than the other in explaining what we observe in the universe.

Postmodern Humanism 39

Idealism versus Realism

The connection between the realms of philosophical ideas and everyday matters is not always obvious. But increasingly, in a global world, the effect of intellectual thought on events, particularly when expressed as an ideology, is obvious. This effect is all too evident now in the extreme expression of ideology - fundamentalism. It is a paradox that the growing impact of postmodernism, which seeks to deny the absolute, is giving birth to growing expressions of it. T h e moral panic induced by relativism is driving some into the embrace of moral certainty. It is now impossible for those concerned with society and the future of the human species to ignore the conflicting belief systems which are thrust at us - sometimes in a physical manner. Hitherto, this has not been so serious, or so urgent, a matter. The ‘non-believer’ in many countries of the West has been able to pursue a relatively disengaged life untroubled by their moderately engaged ‘believer’ neighbours. It is now possible to recognise that the major conflict of the 21s t c e n t u r y will not be between the different religious beliefs (for, indeed, they have much in common) but rather between the religious (and political) ‘believers’ and the non-religious ‘non-believers’. A c o n f l i c t between those who think that there is not an objective Truth and those who believe there is an objective Truth - theirs. Philosophy is concerned, at one level, with the nature of ‘reality’ and our relationship to it. It is concerned with ideas of existence, ‘truth’, ‘meaning’ and the ‘real’. This analytical philosophy is a turn- o ff for many. We are not all interested in ideas, but there are some who are and the ideas they ‘discover’ a ffect everyone. Christianity, Buddhism, Marxism, evolution and relativity, are ideas that changed the world. Ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity (and sisterhood)

Postmodern Humanism 41 Idealism versus Realism

still do - as well as ideas of racism, fascism, market capitalism and nationalism. There seems to be no limit to what we, the human species, are prepared to believe. Those of us who reject the idea of a transcendental belief have the responsibility of examining what the alternative is. Hitherto, it has been possible for the ‘non-believer’ to take refuge in humanitarian works as a distraction to thinking out what an alternative belief system would be. With postmodernism, the luxury of that evasion is no longer open to us. Postmodernism is an expression of the ‘non-believer’ p e r s p e c t i v e and it is now necessary, if we are not to surrender to nihilism, to examine what sort of alternative belief system that perspective would produce - and how that belief system differs in any fundamental way from a religious or a scientific one. Philosophy, as well as humanitarianism, must now be the concern of all of us. When first considering the philosophical landscape that prospect does not seem inviting. John Dewey addressed the question of the range of philosophies, commenting:

‘They [philosophies] range from spiritualism to materialism, from transcendentalism to positivism, from rationalism to sensationalism, from idealism to realism, from subjectivism to bold objectivism, from Platonic realism to nominalism. The array of contradictions is so imposing as to suggest to sceptics that the mind of man has tackled an impossible job…or that philosophers have abandoned themselves to vagary. ’ Experience and Nature ( 2 2 )

That ‘abandonment to vagary’ might be thought to have been arrested since then, by the converging of science and philosophy in the understanding of human subjectivity. It is, of course, not possible here to even attempt to address these particular convolutions of philosophical discourse - and the many - others that confront us. However, the issue of truth, meaning and r e a l i t y, ideas central to philosophy, are also central to the understanding of a relativist perspective and we must try to find an e v e r y m a n ’s (or everyperson’s) approach - a ‘rough guide’ to belief. In this we will not DO philosophy, but rather see what philosophers have

42 Postmodern Humanism Idealism versus Realism to tell us in non-professional language - as far as that is possible. Plato and Aristotle set the scene for two millennia of philosophical discussion of ideas of knowledge and reality. Descartes and Kant, amongst others, took up the cudgels in the 17t h and 18t h centuries and their ideas have tormented us ever since. The existentialist philosophers, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, continued the debate, with Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault and Althusser as some of the more recent protagonists.Their deliberations are often obscure and their writing dense - in the best possible sense. At the heart of their debate there was a central issue. The issue was, and remains, the relationship between our concepts, and what we recognise as an external ‘reality’- the Cartesian duality, the mind/matter debate. This is recognised in this book as concerned principally with the conflict between the ideas of a subjective ‘idealism’ and an objective ‘realism’. Much of the debate has been addressed in the domain of analytical philosophy - the systematic study of ideas using logic. It is important to note that, when used in this philosophical sense, the meaning of the term ‘idealism’ is not the same as that commonly used meaning an attitude to life, the pursuit of a social ideal. In philosophy ‘idealism’refers to the view that our ‘reality’is determined (or at least conditioned) by our perceptual apparatus - the brain. For the idealist it makes no sense to talk about a ‘real reality’ - there can be only ‘our reality’ - reality is mind dependent. This view leads to the idea that our concept of what ‘is’ cannot be judged against some external objective ‘Is’, some universal Truth - all our concepts (particularly our values) are relative - a view recognised in this book as ‘subjectivism’ or ‘relativism’. S i m i l a r l y, the use of the term ‘realism’ in the philosophical sense is not the same as the common meaning of the term ‘realistic’. In philosophy realism identifies a belief that there is a ‘real’ reality out there which can somehow be known by us. Reality, for the realist, is mind independent - a view sometimes identified as ‘anti-idealist’and recognised in this book as ‘objective’. The view of the realist, it is arg u e d here, leads to a belief in some universal, objective, transcendent Tr u t h - the position of the religious and political fundamentalist. For millennia, philosophy has moved uneasily between these two positions, idealism and realism. For some it still does. T h e

Postmodern Humanism 43 Idealism versus Realism

Philosophers Group of the British Humanist Association struggled with this problem and declared:

‘No resolution of this debate [between idealism and realism] is in sight …there is no humanist orthodoxy on these difficult questions.’ ( 5 )

There might be no orthodoxy for these philosophers but, it is arg u e d here, philosophy and science together are moving inexorably towards the idealist, the subjective relativist position - and that view can (should) become the Humanist orthodoxy. Immanuel Kant addressed these two views, the subjective and the objective view of reality:

‘Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid.’ Critique of Pure Reason ( 1 9 )

Kant seems to be saying that subjectivism (idealism) is the only objective reality - and that, it will be argued here, is the essence of the postmodern position. I n t e r e s t i n g l y, this interpretation of Kant is similar to some views of Buddhism. The literary critic Andrew Brown describes one view of the Buddha’s teaching:

‘The world is an illusion in the sense that what we can understand is bounded by our consciousness, which is by definition inadequate and partial. To the extent that we mistake our consciousness for r e a l i t y, we are falling victim to an illusion. At the same time the

44 Postmodern Humanism Idealism versus Realism

content of our consciousness is real. It does change the world and is changed by it.’ The Guardian ( 2 3 )

Positivist scientists continue to be concerned about the question of mind-body duality, but they are often more concerned with the nature of consciousness and how it can arise from a physical source. Few now dispute that consciousness, the mind, has a material source - the brain. That the mind, consciousness, is an epiphenomenon of material. Most recently, Paul Bloom has written:

‘Modern science tells us that the conscious self arises from a purely physical brain. We do not have immaterial souls.’ Descartes’ Baby ( 2 4 )

In this same vein, our scientists dispute the necessity of thinking in terms of a ‘real’ r e a l i t y, an objective Truth. What concepts work are good enough. There is no need to think in terms of a reality behind the mathematical equations of science. We can believe the external universe ‘exists’ but to ask what exactly it ‘is’ is simply to seek to impose a human construct upon it. We are the ‘is’. Stephen Hawking says:

‘as I am a positivist, the question “do extra dimensions really exist?” has no meaning.’ The Universe in a Nutshell (16)

From the scientific and relativist perspective, we can know only OUR subjective reality. Other sentient beings (if there are any) would know only THEIR subjective reality. To conceive the possibility of a ‘real’ reality would require us to be able to step outside the human condition - it would require a God to know it. This position takes us to the central, residual question - what, if anything, can we ‘know’ with certainty? And what indeed, does ‘ k n o w i n g ’ mean? This question has challenged philosophers for millennia. What can we take a priori to be the case? Descartes answered this question with his famous proposition ‘I think therefore I am’ (considered further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’). That was-

Postmodern Humanism 45 Idealism versus Realism

n ’t good enough for some - and in any case it doesn’t take us very far in developing a social belief system. Karl Popper addressed the question of scientific knowledge and defined a ‘scientific’ truth as something which could be disproved (but never proved). This ‘principle of falsification’, he argued, ruled out all so-called pseudo sciences (he meant the social sciences) because they were not open to disproof. Wittgenstein effectively finished the debate with a declaration that all these questions were simply problems of language, inventions of our subjective mind. He recognised that all concepts are human inventions, human constructs, useful, but ultimately, in the absolute sense, meaningless. Not only can we not know what ‘truth’, what r e a l i t y, ‘means’, we cannot objectively ask the question - for the idea of meaning itself is a human construct. Wittgenstein was at one time (briefly) a resident of Newcastle upon Tyne and is reputed to have been impressed by the philosophical astuteness of the local Geordies. An apocryphal story tells of a conversation with his Geordie landlady, Mrs T h o m a s :

W: ‘I want to go to Wallsend. How far is it?’

Mrs T: ‘Oh, it’s a canny walk.’

Several hours later Wittgenstein returns:

W: ‘That was a long way. I thought you said it was an easy walk. D o e s n ’t canny mean “easy”- as in “go canny”?’

Mrs T: ‘Oh, Mr Wigdenstine, you might be a canny philosopher but you can be canny thick. A“canny walk” means a canny long walk.’

That conversation is reputed to have finally persuaded Wi t t g e n s t e i n that the meaning of language lay, not in metaphysical Truth, but in its use - and he gave up analytical philosophy. To some extent the debate has moved on and most scientists, and many philosophers, are happy to recognise that they deal only in models of what they perceive reality to be - what works for now. The idea of an absolute Truth, for them, is of no interest or concern and indeed, meaningless. This is the

46 Postmodern Humanism Idealism versus Realism view of the relativist postmodernists and that is the perspective arg u e d in this book. The philosophical (and scientific) birds have finally come home to roost and we are faced with a cultural crisis. We are told by some that, within relativist postmodernism, if we cannot say anything is objectively ‘True’, then we cannot believe anything - or what amounts to the same thing, we can believe anything. Relativism has been represented in this simplistic way to mean not only that that there is no objective Truth but that, consequently, there can no objective ‘facts’. Thus we have the idea of a crude relativism that asserts that ‘we can believe anything’ - as dangerous a belief as that of the religious fundamentalists that theirs IS an objective Truth . Postmodernism (and relativism) is more subtle than this crude representation and a deeper understanding needs to be addressed. T h i s is attempted in the chapter ‘Postmodernism’.

Postmodern Humanism 47 Social Reality

We can address the same questions of human behaviour as we do of the behaviour of the inanimate universe. What is the status of our concepts of the observed phenomena? Can we talk about the structural reality of collective and individual social activities? In p a r t i c u l a r, can we talk about the reality of their meaning and purpose? Karl Popper addresses this issue in his statement:

‘Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and though history has no meaning, we can give it m e a n i n g . ’ (11)

Other social philosophers, as we might guess, have given this issue some thought.

Phenomenology

The term ‘phenomenology’ might sound formidable to some not familiar with its use - it is daunting to some who are. Its origin is generally attributed to Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). It has now several meanings, some of them profound and some of them obscure. F o r t u n a t e l y, the several tendencies within phenomenology need not concern us here. We need to observe only that at one level it enjoins us to study the objects of our cognitive acts precisely as they appear and irrespective of any view regarding their underlying ‘reality’ - or indeed their ‘existence’. The parallel here with the view of the positivist scientist is obvious. According to this theory we form mental constructs of the ‘essence’

48 Postmodern Humanism Social Reality of things from our perception of the particular sense properties of the thing observed. Some phenomenologists then go on to apply this view to the observation of consciousness itself and hence claim to deal with the essence of consciousness. Thus, in an echo of Descartes, our consciousness is special because it is the only thing we can directly experience. The phenomenological view is of interest here in so far as it offers a concept of social reality in an idealist, non-transcendental manner i.e. it rejects the assumption of an objective accessible ‘reality’ underlying, as it were, the observed properties. Social reality is what the individual perceives it to be. This phenomenological position is recognised here as ‘idealist’ and is considered further in the chapter ‘Belief and Social T h e o r y ’ . The tendency which is most relevant to us here is that expression of phenomenology which identifies consciousness of an autonomous self as the crucial aspect of human existence within the world - existentialism. This existential phenomenology was deeply influenced by the early work of Martin Heidegger and more recent interpreta- tions were developed by Gabriel Marcel (who coined the term existentialism) and by Jean-Paul Sartre. It is the latter’s perspective that is useful here in that it most directly and dramatically addresses the issue of individual human behaviour in a social context.

Existentialism

We can note that the existentialist approach has something in common with that of the positivist scientist. Both direct attention to our experience of the behaviour of things as representing, for us, the ‘ e s s e n c e ’ of their existence. Things are what we perceive they do and people are as we perceive they choose to behave. The subject matter for the scientists is the deterministic behaviour of the material universe. The subject matter for the existentialist is the ‘free choice’ behaviour of the human species. This existentialist perspective poses a question concerning human b e h a v i o u r. If there is no external transcendent source for our values, if, indeed, there is no such thing as objective reality, how do we go about identifying human values? If there is no external arbiter, no God

Postmodern Humanism 49 Social Reality

to advise or command, how do we identify the values upon which we choose to act? Sartre addresses this question when he says:

‘The existentialist…finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think i t . ’ ( 3 )

And Gloria Gaynor, in her immortal contribution to existential p h i l o s o p h y, sang:

‘I am what I am, I am my own special creation.’ La Cage aux Folles

The existentialists say that we create our values by our conscious, free choice of action, by our chosen behaviour. The idea of creating human values by our choice of action seems fairly straightforward - until the professional philosophers (and the sociologists) get a hold of it. Many descriptions of existentialism are obscure and some obscurantist - but some aspects do clearly speak to profound depths of the human psyche. A simple (some might say simplistic) description of Sartre’s existentialism can be expressed as follows: We all have some degree of free will - or think we have - for practical purposes it doesn’t matter which. The essentially human part of human nature is our consciousness of our freedom to choose (or think we choose) at least some of our actions. The dilemma, as we have seen, is that there are no objective references, no ‘ideal’o b j e c t i v e values to validate our choice. The ‘value’ of our action might not be seen by others as we view it. And, there can be no certainties about the consequences of our actions. The final evaluation of the ‘meaning’ o r ‘ v a l u e ’ of our action is not ours to make. But to be human we must consciously choose to act. In more technical terms, Sartre says that for the human species ‘existence precedes essence’(we become what we consciously choose to do), whereas for other animals ‘essence precedes existence’ ( t h e y become what they are born to be). We, the human species, have to

50 Postmodern Humanism Social Reality choose and to act to become human. We are what we do, and we can only judge if it is ‘authentic’ for us. For Sartre, choice is ontological - we create ourselves, we exist by our conscious choice of action. ‘ A u t h e n t i c ’ action comes through the consciousness of available alternative choices in whatever circumstances obtain. Existentialists do not find this freedom comfortable. It is not a chosen condition - it is just how we, the human species, are. We are, in Sartre’s famous phrase, ‘condemned to be free’.

The sociobiologists tell us that the actions we choose, and thus the values we create, will be conditioned (but not determined) by our genes, our environment and our experience. Our actions are conditioned by our evolutionary inheritance - physiological and cultural. Crucially, as we have seen, this genetic inheritance involves the use of reason. If our values can be said to have a basis, a grounding, it is in r a t i o n a l i t y. We must recognise reason as a necessary component of the human condition. Not in the use of reason to make our choice (reason does not provide a basis for that), but rather in insisting on the necessary rational coherence of our choices and in the acceptance of the logical outcome of our choices - to behave in a manner rationally consistent with those choices. Our choices of action are authentic only if we are conscious of choice and work through and act out the logic of those choices. T h u s , for example, if we were to assert an innate human equality we could not go on to identify a superior race or class. Our actions, and the values manifested by them, can be judged only in a social context. This matter is considered further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’. For the existentialist, then, the pattern of our freely chosen actions defines our values - our principles, if that is what we like to call them. This existential phenomenological perspective has had a profound e ffect on modern culture and has informed much of 20t h-century art, literature and philosophy. It serves the postmodern relativist well - it validates the right to choose, freely, values that are ‘authentic’ for us - but, crucially, it conditions the way in which we hold our beliefs, and how we regard the beliefs of others. We CAN choose to embrace a value system, an ideology even (that is at least to act as though we did), but only if we acknowledge that that choice is grounded in our

Postmodern Humanism 51 Social Reality

material self. We cannot, and we do not need to, elevate our beliefs to the status of universal transcendent Tr u t h s . From a Humanist’s perspective much depends on Sartre’s view, which ‘authenticates’ only those actions that are recognised as ‘free c h o i c e s ’ exercised in a social context. From this we can conclude, with Sartre, that authentic choice can exist best within a community that exercises mutual respect. We cannot, from an existential perspective, embrace a social value system which denies others equality in the right to choose.

Autonomy

The existential view is premised on the concept of autonomous, free individuals. The question of how ‘free’ our actions are has received recent attention from our sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists (e.g. Edward O. Wi l s o n ( 3 4 ), Matt Ridley( 1 3 ) , Susan Blackmore( 9 ) ) . They claim to have identified universal characteristics of behaviour, which have an evolutionary source. This view, together with the work of the neuroscientists (who claim to have identified a chemical basis for human behaviour), has cast doubt about the extent to which our actions can be said to be ‘free’. See footnote (a). It would seem clear that some of our actions are at least influenced by our genetic inheritance. At least some of our behaviour would seem to be genetically predisposed. Certain aspects of the sociobiolo- g i s t ’s case seem undeniable from the anthropological evidence. T h e global human species seems to be genetically predisposed to behave in certain similar ways. Included in these universal patterns of human b e h a v i o u r, what E.O. Wilson calls ‘epigenic rules’ ( 3 4 ) , are the use of reason and language and the creation of ‘grand narratives’to identify a personal and collective destiny - the ‘vision thing’. The relative influence of genes versus environment (particularly the cultural environment) continues to be a source for debate. These predispositions are not, as Matt Ridley would have us believe, an adequate basis for an ethical system. In ethics an ‘is’ is not an ‘ought’. Human value is created only when we choose between our predispositions - to accept or reject them. However, these predispositions do give a clue that some of our traditional social ‘values’ are not

52 Postmodern Humanism Social Reality as freely chosen as we might think and are therefore not authentic ‘ v a l u e s ’ in the existential sense. To create an authentic human value it is necessary to recognise alternatives and make a conscious choice. To create an authentic human value in existential terms it is necessary that the actions be seen to be freely chosen. There is also the question of how this ‘free’ choice can arise in a material entity - the brain. It is argued by some that freedom has no place in a mechanistic material universe and it is not easy to understand how free will can be described by a mathematical equation. A current view is that our ‘freedom’ is connected with the concept of consciousness and that this is an evolved characteristic, a property, of the material brain in the same way that ‘green’is the property of grass. The existential position is that we are at least in some degree ‘free’ - or act as if we think we are, which amounts to the same thing. We must be free to choose and this carries the idea of rights and responsibilities - the foundation upon which all our so-called civilised societies are based.

Past efforts to construct an ethical system in the search for a social Utopia have been grounded in attempts to reconcile rationalism with a romantic idealism (as with Mill and Marx). These attempts have been based on absolutes - ‘reason’, ‘happiness’, and ‘equality’. T h e y sought to impose an absolute where there can be no certainty, an objectivity where there can only be human subjectivity. The socio- philosophical problems of the past have been generated by the attempt to find an absolute certainty, a transcendent ‘real’ r e a l i t y, beyond the subjective human concept. Relativists, idealists and existentialists, recognise that there is no ultimate Truth for the human species. T h e r e is no objective universal Truth or Meaning out there to be discovered, revealed or worked towards. The human condition can deliver only a pragmatic human subjectivity and we have learned that all value systems, including ethics, must be grounded on unprovable premises. The answer for Humanists, then, is not in avoiding the uncertainties of postmodernism and existentialism (or worse, in seeking to deny them) but in embracing them. Humanists must seek to construct an ethical system which faces up to the necessary uncertainties of the human condition. Existentialism confronts this question and authenticates our attempts to construct answers by our actions.

Postmodern Humanism 53 Social Reality

Can we, then, construct a system of human ethics, a Humanism, on the foundations of existentialism postmodernism and relativism? We must surely have a shot at it. The alternative is to abandon the field to the absolutists - the racists, the nationalists, the religious fundamentalists, the political extremists and the assortment of New Age cranks waiting in the wings. Or, alternatively, descend into nihilism and c h a o s .

Footnotes

(a) It is obvious that whatever human ‘freedom’ is, it cannot be absolute. It is constrained and conditioned: First, freedom of action is restricted by the psychic limitations of our species arising from the structure of the human brain, by the nature of our human senses and by our genetic predispositions. Our concepts must reflect the character of the sort of thoughts, the cognitive abilities, our material brain can deliver. Second, our freedom is restricted by the social structures we e n c o u n t e r. This includes our political and economic systems, our his- t o r y, which Hegel and others since have identified as conditioning our choice. Third, we are restricted in our freedom by the natural material limitations of space and time - or our perception of it. As John Gray remarks in his critique of Mill’s On Liberty and Other Essays ( 1 4 ), we are restricted in our search for happiness as we cannot experience all the possible forms of happiness and therefore we cannot make a totally informed decision of what will make us most happy. Our choices are necessarily limited and temporal. F i n a l l y, our freedom is restricted by those components of thought which our culture imposes upon us - including that of language and symbols. Recent writers addressing this issue are notably Noam Chomsky in Knowledge and Fre e d o m ( 2 5 ), Guy Debord in The Society of the Spectacle( 2 6 ), and Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilisation ( 2 8 ). We must leave further discussion of what exactly our human freedom is, and how it can be expressed, to another writer. It should be noted however that the idea of freedom is a matter of crucial concern to the Humanist perspective.

54 Postmodern Humanism Social Reality

For our purpose here it must suffice to say that we have (some) freedom - or, what amounts to the same thing, we think and act as if we have. It is the conscious exercise of this freedom that makes us h u m a n .

Postmodern Humanism 55 Part II

P o s t m o d e r n i s m

A common charge against postmodernism is that it is relativist - all concepts, all values, are of equal status and so, the argument goes, relativists can believe anything. Or, viewed from the other side of the coin - relativists can believe nothing. This view is a misrepresentation of the postmodernist position - postmodernism and relativism are more subtle and more complex than that. First, it is necessary to recognise that postmodernism, as the term is currently used, is an attitude, an approach, rather than a single p h i l o s o p h y. It appears in a range of contexts from art and architecture to politics and physics. It has its roots in the thinking which explores the logic of a strict materialism and in the recognition of the subjective nature of human concepts. Postmodernism can be identified as being in the tradition of classical philosophy (generally identified with ‘idealism’) and of modern philosophy. Postmodernism can be identified with both ‘ p o s i t i v i s m ’ and ‘phenomenology’. It can be seen to have its genesis in the thinking of Plato and Socrates (‘man is the measure of all things’), as developed by Descartes (‘I think therefore I am’), as expressed by Kant (subjectivity is the only objective reality). Postmodern thought has been encouraged by converging ideas in diverse fields blurring the distinction between the observer and the observed; in science, where physics shifts our view from absolute reality to subjective measurement (relativity and quantum physics); in the arts, which have moved from realism to abstraction and subjectivism (conceptualism); in literature (deconstructionism); in politics (which denies Utopian solutions and affirms ‘the end of history’). Postmodernism is ‘post’ modern in that it follows a realist ‘ m o d e r n i s m ’ which believed in the existence of accessible Truths and

56 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m hegemonic theories expressed in terms of an objective reality. T h e essence of postmodernism is expressed in philosophical terms as ‘ i d e a l i s m ’ - the recognition that our ‘reality’is a human construct. For the postmodern idealist there can be no reality other than that we ourselves create. We ourselves create ‘reality’ in the sense that we create the only ‘reality’ we can know. This position follows as a logical consequence of the rejection of the transcendent. There can be no sense in a belief in a universal objective reality over and above, as it were, the human, because there is no God, no entity above the material us, to perceive it. We ourselves are the only possible source of reality, value, meaning, and purpose. This is not to deny the existence of a universe outside, as it were, ourselves (the human psyche seems to need the assurance of that grounding), but it is to deny knowledge of it other than as a human construct. This is not only to recognise the limits of discovering what that other ‘is’is (our science produces only developing models of how we observe it to behave), but also to deny the possibility of knowing the ‘other’ in terms of a universal objective Truth. We would need a God to do that and, by denying God, we must recognise that we construct for ourselves the only ‘is’there is. Or, as Kant might have it, to recognise that our subjectivity is the only objective reality. The postmodernist asserts that there are no transcendent absolutes, no objective value systems, and no ultimate epistemology (the method or ground for obtaining knowledge). If there are no gods, no external ‘Tr u t h s ’to inform us, then all our ideas, all our values, must be expressions of our material selves - there is nothing else. All concepts must be subjective and pragmatic - all ideas are therefore relative. Postmodern relativism denies the possibility of a truly neutral or objective view of reality. Postmodernism, then, involves the denial of all religious and political dogma, the rejection of all Utopian visions and social ‘deep s t r u c t u r e ’ o r t h o d o x y. It is clear why postmodernism has attracted enemies from a wide spectrum of those with vested interests in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t ’s status quo. In taking this position, postmodernists can be seen to be following the path of the many classical philosophers (and scientists) who have struggled with the implications of the necessary subjectivity of human concepts. Plato and Socrates have been identified here as early

Postmodern Humanism 57 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

sceptics. Descartes is recognised as producing a systematic approach to the mind/matter debate. Later, Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Sartre addressed the issue in a social context. Friedrich Nietzsche rejected not only the God-hypothesis but also any transcendental concepts of r e a l i t y. He sought to move beyond the nihilism to which this position might be thought to lead, and conceived a world in terms of an interplay of social forces without structure or final end, ceaselessly o rganising and reorganising themselves in a ‘will to power’. He saw a need to invent new myths and grand narratives and the emergence of a new kind of human being, ‘superman’ - a concept appropriated by fascism that led to Auschwitz and a global war. Few philosophers would want to go down that road, but Nietzsche did recognise the necessity of working out the logical consequences of declaring God, and all transcendent concepts, dead. It is clear that ideas of ‘reality’, ‘truth’and ‘meaning’are concepts complicit in the debate. It not surprising that analytical philosophers have discussed meaning, and the meaning of meaning, and the meaning of the meaning of meaning - that is what analytical philosophers get paid to do. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard V. O. Quine are well-known modern exponents of this dark art. Edmund Husserl developed the idea of phenomenology which (amongst other things) assumes that things ‘are’ simply as they are perceived by the individual to be.

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n

More recently, Jacques Derrida and the deconstructionists have applied the phenomenological perspective to the concept of meaning particularly when applied to words and texts. For them there is no single, universal, objective meaning of anything. It is us, the individual human species, that creates meaning. The only meaning we can have is our individual human meaning (other sentient beings presumably have their own). But humans can (could) choose from several meanings - although, conveniently (and sadly), they generally look only to the most conventional within their cultural environment. According to the deconstructionists, everything we offer as meaningful (and particularly texts) can have many meanings.

58 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m

Literature cannot have a single objective universal meaning - not even the meaning the author intended - for there is no objective agency to arbitrate. This is not to say that a text can mean anything (reason exercises its constraints) but rather that more than one interpretation is possible - often revealing a meaning which contradicts the interpretation intended by the author. In this way Derrida challenged classical philosophy and literature and sought to go beyond meaning - hence his interest in Freud and the psychoanalysts (L’ E c r i t u re et la Differe n c e ( 2 7 )). Michel Foucault in his seminal work Madness and Civilisation ( 2 8 ) is recognised as one of the more radical, and provocative, exponents of deconstructionism where he seeks to identify the exercise of power as the determinant of meaning. For our present purposes it will come as a relief to the reader (it certainly does to the author) that we can simply observe that, whatever view we take of ‘meaning’, as relativists we can simply assert it is a human concept. For relativists, for idealists, there can be no absolute Meaning out there in some kind of spiritual dictionary. For our purposes we can assume that ‘meaning’ is human information, an instruction or advice, of how something (or an event) will behave towards us - and how we should choose to behave towards it. The deconstructionists argue that when related to texts this ‘ m e a n i n g ’ might be the opposite to that intended by the author. For example, by the sign ‘keep out’ the writer probably means ‘don’t come in’. However, for the curious, or the thief, the sign ‘keep out’ can mean ‘come in’. Relativism is not challenged by the deconstructionists’ p e r s p e c t i v e . Indeed it is the relativist perspective that gave rise to deconstructionism. Relativist Humanists can agree with the deconstructionists - there can be no ultimate meaning but we, the human species, can choose a meaning - that is what it is to be human. In the field of social philosophy, postmodernism can be seen as a reaction to the opposing philosophy of ‘realism’, or ‘realist structuralism’, which holds that there IS an accessible objective ‘reality’ o u t there; that there ARE absolute Truths in religion or political ideology. In the 20t h century (and now in the 21s t) this view was expressed by fundamentalists; in religion, leading to bigotry, persecution and terrorism; in politics, by ruthless totalitarianism leading to tyranny,

Postmodern Humanism 59 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

genocide and war. It is not surprising that some have sought an alternative view to this ‘realism’ and it is this imperative that gives postmodernism its contemporary relevance. The implications of relativist postmodernism to social theory will be considered further in the chapter ‘Belief and Social Theory’.

The basic stance of postmodern philosophy, then, is that all concepts, all ideas, are subjective human constructs and none can be said to be more true than another. We are prisoners of our genes, our synapses and our environment. ‘Tr u t h ’ is meaningless other than as a self-refer- ential exercise within a chosen belief system. We choose our own values, and construct our own ‘truth’, our own narrative and e p i s t e m o l o g y. All our philosophical problems (and all their solutions), all our ideas and ideologies, are just examples of the human species talking to itself. We invent the questions, and we invent the answers. Postmodernism does not tell us what, or what not, to believe; it advises how we should hold our beliefs; it informs us of the status of our belief system. Ludwig Wittgenstein came to the same conclusion from another direction. He explored the linguistic aspects of ‘truth’ and ‘meaning’ and finally came to the conclusion that all propositions are tautologies or value-less relativities. We can (truthfully) compare things, but the thing we compare, the basis of comparison, the ‘value’, is an invented human construct. Having chosen and asserted our value we can rationally construct our subjective truths (with a small ‘t’), better referred to as ‘facts’. This is what Wittgenstein meant when he said:

‘The world is all there is that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not of things…’ Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ( 2 9 )

For the relativist postmodernist, and the positivist scientist, the ‘ Tr u t h ’ becomes a redundant concept and is replaced by what we choose to think of as observed ‘facts’. For example, it is a ‘fact’ t h a t the earth rotates around the sun, but there is no need to elevate this ‘ f a c t ’ to a universal transcendental ‘Tr u t h ’ - there is no objective - centre of the universe and we only use the sun as a reference because it is convenient for some of our observations.

60 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m

In the same vein, relativist postmodern philosophy argues that there is no objective history, only the subjective history that we choose to construct. As Karl Popper puts it:

‘History has no [objective] meaning, I contend. But this contention does not imply that all we can do about it is to look aghast at the history of political power, or that we must look on it as a cruel joke…Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and though history has no meaning, we can give it m e a n i n g . ’ The Open Society and its Enemies ( 1 1 )

Willard V.O. Quine expresses this position most clearly and d r a m a t i c a l l y :

‘The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. A n y statement can be true if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system [of our beliefs].’ Word and Object (30)

Postmodernism is thus concerned, at one level, with ideas of classical philosophy concerning ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and ‘value’. As such it occupies a central position in modern philosophy and in social and cultural theory. Its relevance to theories of value (and consequently to ethics) indicates that it is of particular importance for Humanists. From a postmodern perspective, and to annoy the fundamentalists, we can say that truth is something that seems a good idea at the time, o r, more seriously, something that, like scientific theory, is ‘true’ if it is a useful instrument in our chosen narrative. Truth is something we are prepared to behave as if. This view has been attacked eagerly by some on the religious Right (and some on the ideological Left). Currently this attack is expressed, at one level, in the UK, in an unholy alliance between the revolutionary Socialist Workers Party and the Muslim Association of Britain. In practice, postmodernism sits ill with all dogmatists - the

Postmodern Humanism 61 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

religious fundamentalists, the fascists, the racists - and the structuralist Marxists. Postmodernism poses a threat to all realist ideologies. The religious evangelists and the political fundamentalists make strange bed-fellows in their attack on postmodernism. Postmodernism also poses a central problem for all contemporary social theorists. Modern thinkers have become adept only in deconstructing value systems not constructing them. The problem of identifying an authentic narrative for human affairs without recourse to a transcendent source - a God, or a dogma - is a central difficulty for all of us in the 21s t c e n t u r y. The Philosophers Group of the British Humanist Association have struggled with the problem of finding a basis, a grounding, for their secular ethics:

‘The “realists” would say that though values do not exist in some sort of Platonic heaven, the facts that certain actions are right or wrong, cruel or kind, just or unjust, are real moral facts. “Anti- realists” [idealists] would maintain that there is an important distinction to be made between “facts” and “values”, and whereas facts about the world are there to be discovered, values are things we choose or create or invent, or project onto the world as a reflection of our feelings and desires.’

Having set out, somewhat uncertainly, what they see as the alternatives (what is identified here as ‘idealism’ versus ‘realism’), these Humanist philosophers disarmingly admit they cannot choose:

‘No resolution of this debate is in sight… There is no humanist orthodoxy on these difficult questions.’ What is Humanism? (5)

This question of the nature of ‘truth’, value’and ‘reality’ identifies a central problem for classical (and modern) philosophy and is central to the Humanist narrative. Is there a ‘real’ r e a l i t y, an objective Tr u t h , out there, independent of human concepts and, if so, what is it and what can we say about it? The theist says, yes there is - and the ‘real’ reality is known by God. Hawking is expressing this view when he says, disingenuously, that if we could find the ‘theory of everything’

62 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m we would know ‘the mind of god’ ( 6 ) . The relativist postmodernist, with the positivist scientist, says that to ask the question ‘what is really real, what is truly Tr u e ? ’ is meaningless. It is tantamount to asking what can be perceived without a perceptionist. Relativist idealists accept that the universe, including ourselves, is essentially meaningless - but we can create meaning and value. The relativist recognises all ‘meaning’as human meaning, all ‘truth’ as human truth, all ‘value’ as human value. There is no other One out there to whom meaning, value or truth can refer. That is the essential perspective of postmodern relativism, and, it is argued here, that is the essence of postmodern Humanism. So where do we go from here? How do we go about constructing our relativist Humanist beliefs? Can we just believe anything?

Reason and logic

To answer the question ‘can we believe anything?’ we must first look more closely at ideas of reason, rationality and logic. The question regarding the use of reason and logic and its status in philosophical debate, poses a problem for some. It is the source of excitement in the attacks on the relativists from the political fundamentalists and source of moral panic in the ranks of the religious. If there is no Truth, they s a y, what about the Truths of logic, of mathematics? What about rationality? What about morality? Most Humanists would claim to be rational (and some to be rationalists), and most would want to claim to use reason in the construction of an ethical system. Yet, ethical values, in origin, can have no rational objective source. They are simply subjective human assertions. Humanists, at first view, seem to be denied the grounds upon which a rational ethical system can be constructed. We will need to see how this problem can be resolved from a relativist’s perspective. The relativist Humanist does not need to reject rationality - indeed he/she cannot for, as we have seen, it is a feature of the human condition. Reason, as we shall see, must play a part in the construction of a relativist belief system. We must first consider the status of rationality in philosophical

Postmodern Humanism 63 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

discourse. Reason is an essential aspect of our ability to form concepts and to think. We could not even form ideas, much less defend them, if we could not identify what we see as rational connections between things, between causes and effects. Reason has emerged as a cognitive characteristic of the human species. We are hard-wired for reason as well as for language (see the chapter ‘The Origin of the Species’). The idea of logic is an attempt to express reason in a systematic context. Aristotle was the first to construct a logical system from the definition formulated by Socrates - the ‘reductio ad absurdum’. Russell and Wittgenstein saw that all our concepts can be analysed in propositions symbolised by the logical terms ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’a n d ‘all’. These logical states are now commonly expressed in digital terms by electronic ‘gates’such as:

AND…both A and B OR …either A or B NOR… neither A nor B

The concept of rationality, as it is used here, is identified in the broad sense of:

(a) logic - including fuzzy logic and ideas of ‘truth’

a n d (b) intuition - relating to ideas of purpose, cause and eff e c t

It can be readily seen how each form served an evolutionary advantage in facilitating the creation of concepts which would grant power and control over the physical world. Logic is useful in that we cannot think that something ‘is’ and ‘is not’ the case. And, our brains are hard-wired to ask the ‘why’ questions - and to provide the ‘ b e c a u s e ’ answers. Rationality underlies our concept of reality and for some philosophers such as Hegel, reason and reality are identical. Reason demands that any belief system must be coherent and consistent - we cannot both believe and not believe simultaneously - politicians excluded, of course. An authentic belief system cannot contain propositions that conflict. Reason demands some self-evident c o n s i s t e n c y. We cannot assert just anything - that would be nihilistic,

64 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m and language and rationality, the human condition, requires order. We cannot just choose to believe anything to be a ‘fact’. For some philosophers (notably Bertrand Russell) formal logic, reason in its deductive form, was the essence of philosophical discourse. But logic (as in mathematics) deals only with the relationship between things. It does not seek to identify, or evaluate, those things in themselves. On its own terms logic is ‘true’but it cannot lead to meaning or value. To construct a belief system the human condition requires us to break out of the cycle of formal logic to assert and inject a human construct - a relativist value. Reason then takes us on to other contingent ‘truths’, better recognised in this book as ‘facts’ in our belief system. Similarly with science, it is not so much a case of logic gradually ‘ r e v e a l i n g ’ the Truth, but rather ‘constructing’ more comprehensive models of what we choose to observe. Our belief in our sense observations is the added component to logic. It is important therefore to see a belief system as asserting a human value - and then, by reason, identifying the ‘facts’ that flow from it. Reason is involved in this process in so far as it conditions and restricts our choice, our assertion, of primary values, for we cannot accept a value system that is inconsistent or would lead us to some irrational conclusion. We shall see that our use of rationality in everyday life incurs more than the use of formal logic - it includes ideas of probability and intuition. This broad use of the idea of reason in human affairs is referred to here as ‘rationality’ or ‘reasonableness’ and is discussed further in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’.

Belief

So, to return to our question, can we believe anything? At one level it is clear that the human species, individually and c o l l e c t i v e l y, CAN assert, can believe anything. We have only to look at the New Age cranks, the newspaper columns of astrology, the religious sects believing in celestial space ships and cats from Mars. Individually and collectively the human species can be seriously bonkers. At a more serious level we can, obviously (for some do), believe in

Postmodern Humanism 65 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

religious dogma, or political ideology, in racism, in the authoritarian state, in various Utopias, in The Truth, in God, and the ‘really’ real. It is this group which deserves, and needs, attention and which is the focus of this book. Is it the case that, at this deep level, we can believe anything? The analytical philosopher who accuses the relativist of ‘not believing anything’ o r, alternatively, of ‘believing anything’, has a problem - well, several actually. According to analytical logic the statement ‘we can believe anything’ is a truism, a tautology - it describes itself. On the other hand, the statement ‘we cannot believe a n y t h i n g ’ is a contradiction - if we cannot believe anything we cannot believe that statement. Put analytically, the problem is can a class include/exclude itself? Can we actually say ‘this statement is not true’ or ‘all statements are true’- if so what do they mean? Wittgenstein recognised that, from the perspective of formal logic, all propositions are either tautologies or meaningless. The analytical philosopher who charges the relativist of not believing anything is unable to explain what their charge means. Nevertheless, the phrase ‘you cannot believe anything’does have meaning for the long-suff e r i n g traveller on the No. 6 bus. Certainly the use of the phrase ‘doubt is our only certainty’is not uncommon - and it was good enough for Kant. However the charge about belief does raise questions which need answers - and not just for the relativist. It is clear we need to address the question of what exactly we mean when we say we ‘believe’ something. We need to explain what ‘belief’i s . First, we need to be clear, relativists do NOT say you cannot believe anything is ‘true’ - where that ‘truth’ is understood as a human construct - a ‘fact’ in our belief system - a ‘truth for now’. Relativists can have their ‘truths’ and their ‘facts’ - the human psyche seems to need to think in these terms. But, as we shall see, this freedom to believe is not unconstrained. It is conditioned, conditional and carries c o n s e q u e n c e s . This is a central issue for relativist Humanists and the focus of this book, and it is necessary to illustrate this point further before we proceed. As we have seen, if we were to say ‘you cannot believe anything’ this carries the implication in logic that you cannot believe this statement either … and you cannot believe this statement about this

66 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m statement … and so on ad infinitum. The charge made against the relativists in this context is not that they are wrong but that, under formal logic, their position is meaningless. Relativists (with Wittgenstein) can accept this charge. All such analytical expressions of formal logic ARE in a sense meaningless, or more specifically value-less. Relativists assert that it is only by human intervention that we can insert value and create meaning. Relativists recognise that to break out of the circle of analytical logical meaninglessness they must do the breaking with a subjective concept - an assertion of human ‘value’. After this point we can use (must use) our rationality to assess the consequences of our choice on our other asserted values and examine the actual consequences of our choice especially where it concerns our ethics and behaviour. We can note that value statements have a different status of proof to that of the analytical philosopher. This discussion is continued in the chapter ‘Belief Systems’. Relativist Humanism recognises the necessity to assert a primary ‘ t r u t h ’ which is partial, provisional, pragmatic, and temporal - a truth for now. Rather than this concept presenting a problem for Humanism, it is argued here that this relativism presents an opportunity to affirm the primacy of human agency as the source of truth and value. In essence, the Humanism described here is a necessary recognition of the human condition of subjectivity. From this perspective, Humanism IS relativism. For these Humanists, the ‘truth’ is something we behave as if. We make the ‘truth’ by the choice of our values, by our behaviour. For these Humanists, the ‘truth’ is existential action. So, to return to our question - can we believe anything? The answer to this question must be, yes - and no. Some truths are truer than others. Put another way: can we believe anything? Yes - within reason. Relativists (and the positivist scientists) recognise that the ‘truth’ i s simply our view of the match between our concepts, our synaptic patterns, and our sense perceptions. All our models explain our perceptions to a greater or lesser degree - all are ‘true’ to some extent (if rationally coherent) but some are more comprehensive, more useful, than others. There is no absolute universal Truth - for that model would need to be an exact replica of the thing itself - what Hawking calls ‘the mind of God’.

Postmodern Humanism 67 Po s t m o d e r n i s m

Ideas of an external, objective universal ‘Tr u t h ’ cannot be embraced by relativists (or positivist scientists) and, as we have seen from our h i s t o r y, they can be dangerous and destructive. However, an asserted subjective ‘truth’ is essential if we are to construct a belief system. This is the paradox at the heart of relativist Humanism and can be summarised as follows: The relativist Humanist starts with the assertion that the human species is itself the source of all concepts, beliefs and values. The ‘I’i s our consciousness, limited by the physical properties of our brain, shaped by our genes and modified by our physical and cultural environment. A relativist might rephrase Descartes and say:

‘ We are what we think we are, and everything is what we think it is.’

There is no other ‘real’ reality out there in the universe waiting to be discovered. The ‘truth’ is our ‘truth’. We, the human species are the source and the focus of our reality - and there is no other (God) out there to know it. We can use (must use) our rationality, our logic and ideas of ‘truth’, after we have introduced an asserted value - a value which Humanists accept as relativist, pragmatic, provisional, and temporal - a truth for n o w. But we are not free to introduce any asserted value, we cannot just decide to ‘believe anything’in a nihilistic sense. Our rationality constrains and conditions our choice. We cannot, while retaining our view of rationality (and sanity), introduce values which are self-contradic- t o r y, inconsistent, incoherent, or which would lead us logically to other inconsistencies. It would, for example, be illogical to believe in unconditional human freedom at the same time as universal justice, or a ‘master race’at the same time as universal human equality. Humanists recognise that we ourselves are the centre of the debate. It is us, the human species, asking the questions - and us providing the answers. We are the entity that thinks we are, and thinks what ‘is’. We are the source that posits the ‘real’ … we are the ‘is’ … and there are no other beings (other than possible sentient beings yet to be discovered) out there to think it. Thus, we are the source of the only reality that means anything. It is our meaning and our reality. All our concepts are our concepts, all our

68 Postmodern Humanism Po s t m o d e r n i s m values are human values - provisional, pragmatic, temporal - and at origin subjective and relative. Our ‘truth’ is how we choose things to be judged, our ‘facts’explain to ourselves what it is we think we observe.

Having identified the status of our beliefs we must then address the question of what values do we, as relativist Humanists, choose to assert. Most would agree this should include the basic humanitarian values: altruism, affection, empathy, etc. The question addressed in this book is whether it is possible to identify additional values which are distinctively Humanist; to question whether it is possible to identify values which emerge rationally, or can at least be asserted r e a s o n a b l y, from the relativist perspective itself. Other disciplines (the arts, literature, science) are useful in addressing the question of what we, as Humanists, might choose as our values and are discussed in later chapters. The methodology and other influences affecting our choice of primary assertions are the concern of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists - and increasingly of the artists. The nature of the process of making the choice of social value has been addressed by thinkers over the years from Plato and Aristotle, Nietzsche and Sartre, to Freud and the advertising wonks. Currently they are joined by the evolutionary psychologists, the neuroscientists and the physicists. Some would recognise this process of choice of human value as ‘ e x i s t e n t i a l ’ - and many Humanists would be happy to identify themselves as existential Humanists - we create our values by an ‘ a u t h e n t i c ’ choice of action. This idea was discussed in the chapter ‘Social Reality’. In all this, postmodernists can be seen to be taking a ‘situationist’ position in that they recognise the subjective nature of their chosen values, which they are prepared to accept as the ‘truth for now’. T h e y are prepared to accept this ‘truth’ as provisional and empiric and are open to adjusting the ‘truth’ in the light of experience and as the evidence is observed more closely - much like modern positivist scientists. What is really ‘real’, truly True, is not a question they consider possible to address. So, if the relativist Humanist CAN believe something to be true in that provisional sense, what is that ‘something’, and how is it to be identified? That is the question addressed in the following chapters.

Postmodern Humanism 69

Belief and Social Theory

The failure of Humanism to capture more overt public support and influence must be, in part, due to the failure to produce a convincing statement of what Humanism is. Some of the difficulties causing this failure have been discussed earlier in this book. Humanists are not solely to blame for the crisis in belief. Postmodernism confronts all intellectual positions in the 21s t c e n t u r y. In this intellectual vacuum, belief conviction has declined in all disciplines, even the scientific. The compelling social visions, the convincing grand narratives, are currently manifest in religious and national fundamentalism. To compete with these narratives of religious and political conviction it is necessary to clarify what the basis of Humanist philosophy is, and what distinctive social narrative might emerge from it. The question for the postmodern Humanist is ‘can we identify a distinctively Humanist philosophy from a postmodern perspective? Can we construct a social morality out of relativeness, an ethical system out of subjectivity?’ It is argued here that we can. Indeed, relativism is seen as the essential vehicle for the Humanist project. Humanism, it is argued here, is not simply affected by the postmodern perspective, Humanism is, in a sense, an expression of it. We need to look at some current ideas of social theory from the idealist, postmodern perspective.

Structuralism versus social action

A current debate concerning the nature of society lies within the field of social theory dealing with the issue of ‘structuralism’ versus ‘social

Postmodern Humanism 71 Belief and Social Theory

action’. For some, it is the objective structure of society that determines our social values. For others there is no such thing as society - society is a mental construct. This issue hinges on the question of whether knowledge is to be understood at a micro or macro level, individualistically (structuralism) or socially (social action). The two positions might be summarised as follows.

1. ‘Structuralism’ a rgues that our individual views of social reality arise from and are shaped by the inherent structure of the society in which they are formed. Society shapes the individual. This view can be recognised, for example, in the structuralist Marxist view, developed by Louis A l t h u s s e r, where social values are seen as the ‘ s u p e r s t r u c t u r e ’ of a capitalist society. This perspective is generally viewed as ‘realist’ i.e. it assumes the objective ‘reality’ of the social structure which does the shaping.

2. ‘Social action’ a rgues that the concepts of a society, its culture and its values, are the constructs of the mind. Individuals create social values as they act and react in socially meaningful ways. Social values are created by the individual as they act out their values in ‘social action’. This view can be recognised in the humanitarian Marxism of Antonio Gramsci and this perspective is generally viewed as ‘idealist’ i.e. it does not recognise universal social structures as an objective universal reality. It becomes necessary to describe human behaviour in terms of the action of individuals.

From a postmodern perspective there can be no universal social ‘deep structure’ theory which is universally and objectively valid. It is not possible to identify an objective ‘real’ social structure which shapes our individual view of social reality. Every interpretation is equally true and, according to some, simply serves a quest for power. Postmodernism might be seen to follow Popper’s view that, ‘Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and though history has no meaning we can give it meaning.’( 1 1 ) The following view, posited here, can be seen as some reconcilia- tion of these two positions, structuralism and social action. In adopting this view we might be seen to approach the perspective of the ethnomethodologists.

72 Postmodern Humanism Belief and Social Theory

Ethnomethodology assumes that society is a flux and social order is i l l u s o r y. From this perspective social order is simply constructed in the minds of individuals as they struggle to organise impressions and experiences into a coherent pattern (Harold Garfinkel, Studies in E t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y). It is possible to go on from this position to argue that, after identifying a certain order, certain values, the individual proceeds to act in a manner which reinforces that interpretation. This in turn strengthens the identification of that perceived value in the manner of a dynamic feedback system. It is thus that ideas of social ‘norms’ and ‘deviancy’ might be seen to be formed according to the principles of complex dynamic systems ( 3 3 ) . The view taken here is that we are predisposed by our genes to recognise certain universal patterns of behaviour - the subjectivity of our species. We are also predisposed by our cultural environment to recognise certain values, meaning and purpose - the subjectivity of the individual. Our ultimate actual behaviour is the result of the reaction of these two predispositions mediated by the mysterious autonomous ‘ s e l f ’. In taking this view it might be seen that here we are thinking as idealist but acting as a quasi-realist - a position akin to that of the positivist scientist. None of the current views of social theory (other than the outright ‘realist structuralist’ view) directly challenge the relativist perspective - they do indeed endorse it. Certainly the ethnomethodological view expressed here can be seen to endorse the idea of creating social values by existential action. Important as these arguments are (sociologists have to make a living) it is not possible to pursue the ideas further here. Sociologists will be familiar with the arguments, others will find them well documented ( 5 3 ).

An attempt at a description of Humanist philosophy, social values and ethics, from a postmodern perspective now seems possible. T h e following will discuss some of the factors which would allow us to identify that Humanism. First, we have seen that the answer to the question ‘can we believe a n y t h i n g ? ’ is ‘yes… and no’ - or ‘yes… within reason’. A p o s t m o d- ernist can hold a belief only if it is consistent with their other beliefs,

Postmodern Humanism 73 Belief and Social Theory

and leads to consistent conclusions. In other words if it is part of a rationally coherent and consistent value system. As we have seen, Willard V.O. Quine asserts ‘any statement can be true if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system [of our beliefs]’ ( 3 0 ). The critical phrase here is ‘if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system’. Our belief system must be rationally coherent. We have seen that rationality is a necessary ‘a priori’ for any meaningful belief system. ‘Rationality’ is understood here to mean recognition of the necessity for the use of reason - logic and intuition. On the grounds of rationality we could not accept both the ‘master r a c e ’ of fascism and a universal human ‘equality’ because they are c o n t r a d i c t o r y. And, postmodernism denies racism an ideological basis as an objective Truth. Fascism emerged under a realist banner, not an idealist one. Under relativist postmodernism there can be no godly ‘chosen people’, no objective ‘master race’. Postmodernism would not make Auschwitz impossible - but it would make it less likely. The relativist position leads us to identify an innate human equality - not as some god-given right, but as a human recognition of the human condition. We give others rights because we demand them for ourselves. These human rights must be equally bestowed for there is no external rule, no objective value, against which we can measure s u p e r i o r i t y / i n f e r i o r i t y. All men and women are equal because there is no external arbitrator to judge otherwise. A unilateral declaration of superiority is irrational and an innate equality becomes a reasonable evaluation under postmodernism - and the alternative view is condemned by history. The existential view, that we create the essence of the human species by our freely chosen actions, requires that we encourage the freedom to exercise such a choice. Both the positive freedom - the freedom to - and the negative freedom - the freedom from. The right to the freedom to choose, and the acceptance of variety in social values and lifestyles, is a rational consequence of a relativist perspective. This freedom means that there will be inevitable conflicts of values. Less conflict, one would hope, than currently experienced in a realist culture, and certainly at a different level - intellectual rather than physical. Nevertheless the recognition of conflict as part of the human condition is something that relativist Humanists would have to confront.

74 Postmodern Humanism Belief and Social Theory

Conflict and cooperation

It is evident from this analysis, from sociobiology and from human h i s t o r y, that conflict in human affairs will arise - conflicts in values, ethics and purpose. It is necessary to address the matter of conflict as a crucial issue for relativists. D i fference is endemic in the human species, it is part of the human condition. Physiological differences certainly, but also differences in behaviour arising from the choice of different values, meaning and purpose - generally arising between different physical and cultural environments, but clearly also differences arising within cultures. It is clear that, at one time, physiological variety served an evolutionary advantage. When one physiological characteristic failed to favour survival another was there to succeed. We can see that the evolutionary dynamic was sometimes served by conflict resulting in the survival of the fittest to obtain the means of survival. Early men, and presumably women, engaged first in personal conflict for survival and then ‘progressed’ to tribal, and then national, conflict. Later, with the advent of plenty, the species seemed unable to kick the habit and engaged in conflict for greed and for power. This was often disguised as religious, and then political, righteousness, sometimes aided by nationalist or racist fervour. Currently we enjoy, if that is the word, the luxury of conflict on all fronts. Some sociobiologists, such as Susan Blackmore in The Meme Machine ( 9 ) and E.O. Wilson in C o n s i l i e n c e ( 3 4 ) a rgue that culture itself has shared the evolutionary process in the form of cultural ‘memes’. Wilson argues that gene and cultural evolution followed an inter- related path - so-called ‘co-evolution’. On this analysis our cultural institutions are constructed for conflict, as well as cooperation. T h e nation state can be seen as an example of such an institution engaging in both cooperation in trade and conflict in wars. Certainly the emergence of different human cultures, for whatever reason, seems to provide a basis for a level of conflict not evident in other species. Whatever we might think is the cause, conflict in human society is ubiquitous and (seemingly) eternal - and will sometimes be expressed in violence. Built into the human genome there is a predisposition for conflict - as well as for cooperation. The concept of conflict has been used by some philosophers

Postmodern Humanism 75 Belief and Social Theory

(notably Hegel with his ‘dialectics’) to argue that conflict is the genesis of progress. This has found expression in many forms, notably the class conflict of Marx. Conflict has been fertile ground for social psychologists (Freud and Jung) and as a dynamic of human behaviour it has inspired writers, artists and prophets. From one perspective, conflict is how we define ourselves as an individual and as a tribe. In some human conflicts the basis for disagreement cannot always be rationally dispelled. Where reason is disregarded (or judged to be inapplicable) we have a conflict of assertions not susceptible to reason. From the relativist perspective, underlying this type of conflict there is often a misunderstanding of the nature of belief, a misunderstanding of the status of human values. Currently, underlying this type of conflict there is often an unacknowledged belief in ‘realism’ - the idea that there are absolute Truths - theirs. How we deal with conflict will be conditioned by how we view our beliefs, how we view the status of our values. This presents a particular problem, and a particular opportunity, for Humanists. From the relativist perspective all values have the same status as human constructs (provided they are rational, consistent and freely chosen). Conflict does not arise from relativism, nor does relativism resolve it. R a t h e r, relativism downgrades conflict to the human level. It denies conflict the support of a transcendental Truth. H o w e v e r, relativism, by legitimising, as it were, conflict in this way, by placing conflict on a human level, imposes on Humanists a particular responsibility to consider the means of addressing it. Apart from the humanitarian desire to resolve conflict amicably (or at least direct it to non-violent forms), a relativist Humanist approach to conflict is, of necessity, open, tolerant, respectful and, in consideration of its consequences, rational - as far as that might be possible. Physical expressions of conflict are not ruled out by a relativist perspective per se. There remains the classical dilemma of deciding when violence is justified to protect freedom - or as currently arg u e d in military interventionist terms, to reduce the prospect of greater violence. Relativism cannot resolve that question except to identify our beliefs as self-generated and thus downgrade the status of the conflict. Humanists may, of course, be pacifists, accepting that non-violence is the most effective way of resisting an attack on freedom. That is

76 Postmodern Humanism Belief and Social Theory their choice and their interpretation of history and human nature. For the rest, a postmodernist world would not make war impossible (that is an emotional choice and beyond reason), but it would make war less likely. From this analysis, relativists are logically directed to seek a coherence in society that will allow for difference without recourse to its expression in destructive terms. Relativist Humanists would give consideration to the organisational structures necessary to negotiate and deliver freedom and diversity with social stability. Paradoxically, as some social liberals would see it, relativism is sometimes on the side of ‘law and order’and the regulatory state. The answer, as with so many human problems, arises from that which is denied to the immature - experience and balance. Hitherto human conflict has been focussed by religious and political difference. But the religious and the political fundamentalists have much in common (currently the UK’s revolutionary Left seeks an alliance with the Muslim Association of Britain) and we should prepare for the possibility that future conflicts will focus on the ‘ b e l i e v e r s ’ versus the ‘non-believers’. Another book awaits delivery - The Humanist Approach to Conflict and Cooperation.

So, what would be the practical effect of adopting a postmodern Humanist perspective on everyday social values? It would not be, as the libertine hopes and the Cole Porter song once provocatively proclaimed, ‘anything goes’. At the everyday level of social behaviour we would be likely to adopt many of the liberal humanitarian values identified and arg u e d for by the many Enlightenment writers. But critically, from a relativist perspective we would be conscious of the status of these values as assertions - as a subjective human choice. We would, consequently, be more considered and constrained in our choice by rationality, by the internal logic of our chosen values - and the likely rational consequences of their application. The recognition of the role of reason in conditioning (but not determining) our assertions makes the expression of conflicting assertions more susceptible to resolution by negotiation and debate. P a r a d o x i c a l l y, having dismissed reason as the grounds for our

Postmodern Humanism 77 Belief and Social Theory

beliefs, we would be more sensitive to the need to use reason to defend them. If we were all to recognise the subjective status of our values, and if these were to be examined rationally, we might find that there is a large degree of agreement as to what our basic values, what our objectives, are. H o w e v e r, where there are residual, ‘authentic’ disagreements at a serious level we would have to decide to a) accept the difference, or b) continue to negotiate, or c) go to war. This conclusion is unexceptional. It is what we do now. We tolerate, negotiate or fight. As Humanists we would hope to take the latter course less readily (and with universally agreed safeguards) - but we would need to address the issue of the defence of our basic relativist perspective. A s Kant might have said, we would need to be prepared to defend the objective right of our subjective choice. As relativists we would, then: First, be prepared to examine the nature and status of our belief system in a rational manner before we assert our values. Second, we would be more inclined to use rationality in our debates and seek to identify common underlying values. Third, with the acknowledgement of the status of our values as assertions we would negotiate authentic differences more readily and openly; be prepared to adjust our values in the light of knowledge and experience; construct social systems to address differences. Fourth, we would seek to maximise freedom in both its positive and negative expressions.

To sum up. Postmodern Humanism would not necessarily change many of the basic social values of a liberal democracy. It would, h o w e v e r, emphasise some values distinctive to the postmodern perspective. Crucially, it would affect the way those values are reached; how we view the status of those values; how we continually assess those values; how we would confront conflict. It would invalidate all dogmatic ideologies, religious and political. Fascism, for example, would not become impossible under relativism, human nature would see to that - but it would be seen to be deprived of an intellectual base. It would be seen as non-rational and indeed, with the evidence of history, as irrational. From a relativist Humanist’s perspective it would be irrational to

78 Postmodern Humanism Belief and Social Theory seek to impose beliefs, social values and lifestyles by force - except to defend the relativist perspective of universal freedom and equality itself. The practical challenge to Humanists is to identify the processes with which the human species can express its asserted values and unite around its differences. This, it is argued here, is only possible from a relativist postmodern perspective which rejects ideas of absolute transcendent Truths and recognises the subjective, pragmatic nature of our most cherished beliefs. Postmodernism and relativism deny the comfort of ideological certainty but allow the excitement and satisfaction of recognising that it is by our choice that we create the essence of what the human species is to become. With this approach we can see that it is essential that we have a clear understanding of the nature, status and content of our belief systems.

Postmodern Humanism 79 Belief Systems

The question of what we can know, what we can believe with c e r t a i n t y, has concerned philosophers for millennia. The status of reason, and the use of logic, has formed an essential part of that epistemological debate. It would be logical (but not reasonable) at this point to discuss the various theories of reason and logic as expressed by philosophers from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to Russell and Godel and Chomsky. Because of the restrictions of space and time (and the limitations of the author - and the patience of the reader) that is not possible. Nevertheless, some consideration of this core aspect of belief is n e e d e d . For our purpose we can describe logic as the process which allows us to identify a necessary conclusion from a given premise and to insist on the principle of non-contradiction. We can simplify the concept of rationality to the proposition that it is not possible to accept that something ‘is’ and ‘is not’ at the same time. This proposition, for the metaphysical philosophers, is not as straight forward as it might first seem for it depends, as President Clinton said, in an entirely d i fferent context, what we think the meaning of ‘is’ is. The curious and the courageous can turn to footnotes (a) and (b). And, we can note that the theories of quantum physics would seem to contradict even this simple concept of the rational (notably with the story of Schrodinger’s cat which simultaneously ‘is’ dead and ‘is not’ dead). Scientists have recognised this challenge to conventional thought and called for a radical review of how we express what we think of as ‘reality’ - a review of the fundamentals of ontological p h i l o s o p h y. Whatever our view of this complex and puzzling situation we can

80 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems note that the debate can be seen to endorse the relativist subjective perspective - we are the source of all concepts (including ‘reason’ a n d ‘logic’) - we are the source of the ‘is’. We can observe, in passing, that there is a difference between the hardness of formal logic and the softness of ‘fuzzy’logic - a diff e r e n c e between logical certainty and logical probability - and between induction and deduction. These different aspects are addressed in philosophy in the theory sometimes known as ‘expected utility’ a n d are discussed further later. For our purpose here they can be lumped together in the term ‘rationality’. After much debate by the analytical philosophers (famously by Bertrand Russell in his Principia Mathematica( 3 1 ) and Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus( 2 9 ) ) it is now generally recognised that the rules of formal logic themselves cannot lead us to values, or indeed to meaning. Logic is a self-contained system which identifies and measures the relativity of things as entities within a value system, but logic is unable to lead to the value itself. Reason can reveal the ‘true’relationships within a value system, but it cannot lead to an external objective Truth, meaning or value. H o w e v e r, we must note that rationality is not rejected by relativists per se. Reason is only rejected by relativists when it is conceived as a path to a universal objective Tr u t h . It is clear that rationality in its several forms has served to provide the human species with an evolutionary advantage. We are now hard- wired to think rationally. Rationality is part of the human condition.To reject rationality would be to reject totally the possibility of meaning and value and would lead to a crude nihilism … and madness. Rationality is the basis, the ‘a priori’, of all our concepts. Wi t h o u t reason we would be denied the concept ‘meaning’. It would be impossible, even, to produce coherent concepts much less draw conclusions from them. Rationalism is assumed ‘a priori’ in human thought - otherwise we could not discuss anything. The human brain delivers reason together with consciousness. Both Descartes and Wittgenstein invoke reason as ‘a priori’, a necessary given, in their belief systems. D e s c a r t e s ’ dictum:

‘I think therefore I am.’

Postmodern Humanism 81 Belief Systems

invokes reason in its ‘therefore’. And Wittgenstein in his a d m o n i s h m e n t :

‘That of which we cannot speak we must pass over in silence.’

invokes reason in its ‘must’.

Rationality is an essential ingredient in any belief system - and even the religious do not ignore it. This point is considered further in footnotes (a) and (b). Whether or not reason is considered to be an objective reality or a subjective human construct takes us back to Descartes and Kant and the realist/idealist debate. For Hegel, and for others, reason is identified with reality. Fortunately for this writer, as it is presented here, that debate does not threaten the relativist position - indeed it endorses it. The relativists accept, insist, that all concepts are subjective constructs but they would be happy to recognise ‘reason’i n either an objective or subjective category. Thus, a belief system involves rationality (it must respect the principles of logic and non-contradiction, ideas of cause and eff e c t ) but it must be something more than the application of reason. T h e identification of human ‘value’, ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ i n v o k e s something other than the rational. We can only assert value. It is this act of choosing, of adding as it were a value to reason, that makes us h u m a n . So, where does that take us in our consideration of belief systems? It is clear that we must break out of the cycle of formal logic, of reason, to create a human value. We can have our ‘truth’, better identified as a ‘fact’, but we must not lose sight of its status as the rational consequence of an assertion - of what we have recognised as an ‘existential’choice (see the chapter ‘Social Reality’). Formal logic, then, is a closed system dealing only with relationships and does not, cannot, produce values. We can use logic, r a t i o n a l i t y, after the assertion of rationally consistent values and this allows us to develop what we can then recognise as our ‘facts’. We can present this concept in diagrammatic form as in Fig. 3.

82 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems

Fig. 3

Formal logic A belief system. Logic plus value.

b a c A ) B) Logic A’ B’ C’ … C) Logic d e

Logic is assumed ‘a priori’. The arrows represent logical steps.

a, b, c, d , e… are logically deduced value-less ‘facts’. A, B, C … are logically consistent asserted values. A’, B’, C’ … are logically deduced value-laden ‘facts’.

The cycle of logic is ‘true’ but without value. Logic can produce its ‘ f a c t s ’ (its ‘truths’ if you like), but these are value-less facts.Yo u cannot get out of the system more than you put in. The value-laden system also is subject to this limitation. We cannot get a NEW value out of the system by the use of logic. In logic, as in life, you only get out what you put in - and sometimes not even that. As Wittgenstein recognised, it is in this sense, from the perspective of analytical philosophy, that all propositions are simply relativities - meaningless tautologies. In this context pure mathematics can be seen simply as an exercise in formal logic. Positivist science can be seen as a belief system where the ‘a priori’, the given, is logic plus what we observe is the ‘real’. What is understood as ‘real’ is only that accessible to our senses. A n y other possible ‘reality’ (the supernatural) is of no interest or concern - a view that will be recognised here as ‘materialism’, and what some philosophers identify as ‘monism’. We can have our ‘facts’ (that is how the human brain is constructed to work) but we must recognise that the ‘facts’ of science are ‘true’ only in the scientific belief system - i.e. what our senses confirm by

Postmodern Humanism 83 Belief Systems

experiment and observation to be the case. We cannot claim the scientific facts are universally and objectively True in any transcendent sense - and, as we have seen, relativists would not want to - and the scientific world now generally agrees with this subjectivist p o s i t i o n . Thus, to the ‘a priori’of logic and materialism most scientists would now be prepared to add ‘subjectivity’ in recognition of our inevitable anthropological (human-centred) view of reality. Science no longer believes its mission is to reveal universal objective Truths but rather to describe what we, from a human sensory perspective, can think we observe. The ‘a priori’ for a scientific belief system is thus logic, materialism and human species subjectivity. The use of logic then allows us to develop the various scientific sub-systems, physics, c h e m i s t r y, etc. The belief systems of mathematics and of science can be thus represented in diagrammatic form as Fig. 6.

Fig. 4

Pure mathematics Positivist science

b a ‘A Priori’D e d u c e d c Logic ) Materialism ) Physics Chem B i o l o g y Logic S u b j e c t i v i t y ) d e

a, b, c … are mathematical ‘truths’ or facts. The arrows represent logical steps, as before.

We must note that the ‘subjectivity’ of science is not totally unconstrained. Scientific subjectivity is the subjectivity of the species (how the human brain is constructed to function to interpret sense signals) - and this includes the hard-wiring of the brain to use reason. Scientists cannot just postulate anything. One theory is not viewed to be just as

84 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems good as another. The scientific community accepts the restrictions of the scientific method. This requires that every scientific proposition must be subjected to tests of its possible falsification (no scientific theory can be proved to be universally True) by repeated experimentation and sense observation - and a test of its rational coherence with other established theories. Nevertheless, as Quine and Popper remark, every scientific theory must be of equal status if it meets the scientific tests. There is no ultimate scientific Truth out there waiting to be discovered. Scientific theories have often been found to be ‘wrong’. Certainly all scientific theories are open to challenge. The ultimate judge of a scientific theory is its acceptance by peers - does it stand up to observation, does it work? This possibility of challenge and of change is a crucial aspect of scientific belief. An example of a current scientific challenge to what was thought to be the well-established theory of relativity is given in footnote (b) of the chapter ‘Science’. The constraints on the freedom of the scientist to construct theories is echoed in the constraints on the freedom of the relativist to choose values. It is not possible, under postmodernism, to construct a belief system which contradicts the relativist perspective. Thus, all dogmatic ideologies, religious and secular, are invalid under postmodernism. And, the asserted values must be rational and consistent - and stand up in the face of observation and experience. We must note that the concept of adding, as it were, an asserted ‘ v a l u e ’ to the logic cycle causes problems for materialists. Where does this added bit come from? How does the brain, a material computer, produce something that is not the result of a computation? How does the computer brain produce the non-computable? This question takes us back to questions of choice and free will - and back again to the mind/matter debate. It is a central question for the analytical philosophers, the neuroscientists, the computer design- ers, the searchers for artificial intelligence - and for Humanists. T h e question is considered further in footnote (d).

To demonstrate the relativists’ position in practical terms, a relativist would say ‘that the earth rotates around the sun is “true” (a subjective human construct). A relativist cannot say ‘that the earth rotates around the sun is Tr u e ’ (an objective universality). Nor can a relativist say

Postmodern Humanism 85 Belief Systems

‘that the earth rotates around the sun is NOT true’. Relativists and positivist scientists recognise that we only use the sun as a reference when it suits our convenience. On such occasions, to avoid the linguistic confusion between ‘Tr u e ’ (an objective universality) and ‘true’ (a subjective human construct), the term ‘fact’ for the latter concept is used in this book. Relativists are accused by the anti-relativists of not being able to say ‘that the earth rotates around the sun is True’. Both camps might be satisfied if we say ‘that the sun rotates around the earth is a “fact”. It is here that we must recognise that we have come up against the limits of the usefulness of the concept ‘truth’. Wittgenstein likened this situation to climbing a ladder…and then throwing the ladder a w a y. Others have likened the situation to flying without wings. For most everyday purposes this distinction between Truth and truth is unnecessary - and indeed confusing. For philosophers and logical positive scientists, and for relativist Humanists, the distinction is essential. Indeed, for them, that is the essence of what Humanism is about. In everyday life this debate is academic - it does not relate to our everyday behaviour. We feel the need to be able to say that it is ‘true’ that the number 6 bus goes into town. Clearly there is a difference in the analytical philosophers’ notion of ‘truth’ and our everyday ‘facts’ and it is necessary to say something of the difference between ‘ l o g i c a l ’ and ‘reasonable’b e h a v i o u r. If questioned by an analytical philosopher, I would say that you must take the number 6 bus to get into town.That is what I have done many times before, and that is what the bus schedule shows. T h a t , h o w e v e r, is not a decision made on the basis of formal logic. On this particular day the number 6 bus might not go into town. It is a ‘ r e a s o n a b l e ’ decision, on the basis of probability - but it cannot be shown to be strictly in accord with formal logic. From the relativist’s perspective it is a reasonable ‘fact’ that the number 6 bus will take me to town. But it is a reasonable ‘truth’, not a universal ‘Truth’. Our everyday decisions are made not on the basis of the certainty of formal logic but on the probability of asserted reasonableness - logic plus intuition. We must leave some room in our belief system for flexibility in our use of rationality based on intuition, on experience. This distinction between Truth and facts might seem pedantic to the

86 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems person in the street (or on the number 6 bus). They might change their view if they were confronted by a fundamentalist armed with more than their Truth. For the relativist Humanists (and all in the belief business), the distinction is crucial. Relativists are not so hungup on the rigidity of reason as some of their anti-idealist philosopher critics - relativists do not have the pressure to deliver immutable universal Truths. As a human construct, as a feature of the human condition, reason can be viewed by relativists with more flexibility than that allowed to the analytical p h i l o s o p h e r. As we have seen, relativists can (must) view reason as operating in a range from the certainty of formal logic to the probability of fuzzy logic and intuition (see footnote (c)). The formal logic of the analytical philosopher is mechanistic in concept. With a given premise the conclusions are inevitable. Formal logic, like a computer, is deterministic. Human rationality deals with reasonableness (logic plus intuition). We calculate (mostly subconsciously) that it is a high probability that the number 6 bus will take us to town. A high probability becomes a reasonable risk to take. Some might say reasonableness becomes logical. The person in the street (or on the number 6 bus) has more in common with the rationality of the relativist than the logic of the analytical philosopher.

So, how does all this relate to our human understanding in a social context - to the construction of a social belief system? This requires us to look again at the most basic of these belief systems - Descartes’ p r o p o s i t i o n :

‘I think, therefore I am.’

On further analysis (deconstruction, if you like) we can see that:

The ‘therefore’evokes rationality and meaning, as we have seen. The ‘I’ invokes an autonomous intentional self to do the thinking. The ‘am’invokes an objective reality based on the subjective ‘I think’.

It is this latter concept which is the source of the philosophical dilemma. Are we being objectively subjective or subjectively objective? Are we realist idealists or idealist realists? As we have seen,

Postmodern Humanism 87 Belief Systems

Kant (and the Buddha) can be read as affirming that subjectivity is the ultimate objectivity. It must suffice here to note that any claim to objectivity in Descartes’ statement must be confined to the concept of the consciousness of the self, the ‘I am’; in phenomenological terms objectivity is confined to the consciousness of consciousness. All that this consciousness constructs is constrained by the subjective ‘I think’. Subjectivity remains at the heart of the human condition. T h i s question is considered further in footnotes (a) and (b).

The ‘a priori’ for any social belief system is, then, rationality, autonomy and subjectivity. To complete a social belief system we would need to add, to assert, human values. These must be in the form of logically coherent asserted values upon which we can rationally construct our ethics. A diagrammatic representation of a social belief system might be then as shown in Fig. 5.

Fig. 5 A Social Belief System

Asserted Va l u e s Accepted ‘A priori’ Deduced Ethics A R a t i o n a l i t y ) B) A u t o n o m y ) A’ B’ C’ … C) S u b j e c t i v i t y )

A, B, C … are asserted, freely chosen, social values (e.g freedom, equal- i t y … ) . A’, B’, C’ … are deduced ethics (e.g. tolerance, democracy…). The arrows, as before, represent logical steps.

It can be noted that this description of a relativist social belief system d i ffers from our scientific belief system in so far as the social system identifies the autonomous self as ‘a priori’. This is what makes it ‘social’. Not only are we faced with the sense subjectivity of the species we have also to accept the psychic subjectivity of the individual. Subjectivity, as it is used here, is thus the subjectivity of the human brain and human sense apparatus together with the subjectivity of the autonomous individual which does the asserting. Scientists now generally accept the idea of human species subjectiv-

88 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems i t y, but some hesitate over the idea of the ‘self’ as an autonomous factor in the equation. For our purpose here we can see that the concept of an autonomous and responsible self is the necessary ‘a priori’ f o r any social belief system that we could recognise as delivering what we would recognise as a coherent ‘society’. A further difference between the science and social belief systems is that the latter does not insist on ‘materialism’ as a priori - although, as we shall see later, a Humanist’s belief system, for example, might. Most religious belief systems would differ from these descriptions of both the social and the scientific systems in that, for the religious, ‘ s u b j e c t i v i t y ’ is denied (faith demands an objective certainty - a Tr u t h known and delivered by God) and the asserted values are replaced by ‘revelations’. On the basis of this analysis a religious belief system might be shown as Fig. 6.

Fig. 6 A Religious Belief System

Revealed Va l u e s / B e l i e f s Accepted ‘A priori’ Revealed/Deduced Ethics A ) R a t i o n a l i t y ) B) A u t o n o m y ) A’ B’ C’ … C) Objectivity (God) )

A, B, and C are values revealed by the Deity (e.g. love, truth, charity…). A’ B’ and C’ are ethics revealed by God (e.g. the Ten Commandments) o r, less convincingly, deduced by his representatives.

Religion, by denying the subjectivity of its Truths, is not open to a rgument, disproof or change - although many religious would claim to be ‘rational’ (Thomas Aquinas claimed a logical approach to theology).The current split by the Anglican community over women and gay clergy shows where the path leads when they seek to deny the revelatory status of their values. Postmodern relativists can (must) modify their values, adjust their ‘facts’ in a manner akin to that of the ‘ p o s i t i v i s t ’ scientist. As understood here, a religious belief is not compatible with a relativist belief system, social or scientific.

Postmodern Humanism 89 Belief Systems

It can be observed that, in the real world, our asserted values will be shaped with or against the traditions and the values of the society in which they occur. We will tend, as individuals, to define our values for or against the prevailing cultural status quo. However, it is a source of debate as to what extent man creates the ‘reality’ of society, or society as an objective reality is responsible for the concept of society in man (and women of course). For some, the structural Marxists, society is the ‘superstructure of the economic base’. For some others ‘there is no such thing as society’. This issue was discussed in previous chapters and involves ideas of ‘ s t r u c t u r a l i s m ’and ‘social action’. A source for the of relevant social theory is given in Appendix ( 5 3 ) . The view taken here is of a mutual reaction between mental constructs (the idea of what society is) and the behaviour of the individual in society. The individual forms a mental construct of society and this affects behaviour which, in turn, a ffects his/her mental construct. This is recognised by some as invoking the properties of a classical dynamic feedback system. Such a system is susceptible to analysis as described in chaos/complexity t h e o r y. This theory purports to show how the concepts of human values (of ‘conformity’ and ‘deviancy’) can be seen to arise naturally from the dynamic of the system. This theory of social behaviour has yet to be much explored by sociologists generally - but the basis of such an approach has been identified by T. S . Young in her paper Chaos Theory and Social Dynamics ( 3 3 ). It may be found to have relevance to the Humanist’s cause.

There remains the question as to what degree the individual is free to shape his/her idea of what the essence of society is, or is to become. This has echoes of the nature versus nurture debate and remains l a rgely unresolved. The ideas from sociobiology would seem to indicate that we are more in the control of nature in the form of our genes than we thought (and many hoped). The position taken here is that we do have some degree of autonomy, we can exercise our existential free choice (or think we do which amounts to the same thing) for to deny that would be to reduce the human species to automatons and destroy the idea of responsibility upon which the structure of a civilised society is based. The position taken here is that human thought is first restricted by

90 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems the ‘a priori’ of the human condition - rationality, autonomy and s u b j e c t i v i t y. We are then genetically predisposed to recognise certain patterns or structures in the physical and social worlds to organise and make sense of our observations. We are further predisposed to recognise values, meaning and purpose in society. Our ultimate belief and behaviour is a consequence of the dynamic reaction of these two predispositions mediated by our autonomous ‘self’. This view is recognised here as ‘ethnomethodological’.

To sum up. This chapter has sought to identify the necessary framework, the basis, for a belief system. We have seen that what we think of as ‘reason’and ‘truth’(better identified as facts) are the results of the function of the human brain and are necessary for the construction of any belief system. We must accept the constraints imposed by these hard-wired concepts if we are to address any form of belief system; scientific, social or religious. The alternative is not nihilism - it is the annihilation of thought. We have seen that the human condition requires an ‘a priori’, a given, for the construction of any belief system. We have seen that the ‘a priori’ for a relativist social belief system are rationality, autonomy and subjectivity. It is with the recognition of subjectivity as ‘a priori’ that the relativist position is fundamentally different from that of the religious. The religious are called upon to accept the existence of an objective Truth (conveniently delivered by their prophets) as ‘a priori’.They are called upon to accept by ‘faith’ a Truth external to the human condition; to deny their subjective humanity. The question of the status and meaning of these concepts continues to bug the analytical philosophers. The postmodern relativist perspective allows us simply to note these questions, to recognise the concepts of rationality, truth and purpose as the necessary vehicles, the components of human thought. These considerations add to the problems, and the earnings, of the analytical philosophers. But they do not (except for the religious perspective) attack the validity of the relativist perspective. The anti- relativist analytical philosophers and the religious struggle to escape from human subjectivity. The relativist Humanist does not want to - he/she embraces it.

Postmodern Humanism 91 Belief Systems

The basic structure of a belief system identified in this chapter will be used to describe a distinctive Humanist belief system in the chapter ‘ A Humanist Belief System’.

Footnotes

(a) Whether or not Descartes would accept that his statement, ‘I think therefore I am’, invokes rationality, autonomy and subjectivity, modern analytical philosophers, the relativists and the deconstructionists would not find this interpretation to be controversial. H o w e v e r, the term ‘am’ remains problematic for philosophers, and scientists, because of difficulty in the concept of what ‘existence’ i s . There is a problem in defining exactly what the meaning of ‘is’is. The difficulty is not the scientific one of explaining why anything at all ‘exists’(the theories of quantum physics that allow ‘something’ to emerge out of ‘nothing’ go some way to describe this), but rather the difficulty in explaining exactly what existence means in a metaphysical sense - that field of philosophy known as ‘ontology’. Philosophers from Aristotle on (and probably before) have had a shot at this. More recently philosophers such as Hegel, Sartre and D e w e y, and many others, have addressed the issue of existence as it relates to the human condition. It must suffice here to note that, from the relativist, idealist perspective, however the concepts of existence are expressed, they are, of necessity, human constructs. Our ideas of existence are of an existence as perceived and experienced by us. We are the source of the ‘is’. For the idealist philosopher, the phenomenologist and the positivist scientist, no concept of existence is meaningful or useful other than the one we experience. This debate continues to engage the minds of our metaphysical philosophers - and our physical scientists. As a result of observations in atomic physics, the theoretical physicists have developed theories apparently contradicting our conventional concept of reality. A s remarked in the once-popular song, some time, somewhere, ‘something has to give’.

(b) Whether the ‘I am’ in Descartes’ dictum is subjective or objective is

92 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems

at the heart of philosophical debate. The paradox is that even taken in an objective sense the ‘I am’ is grounded in the subjective ‘I think’. This takes us back to the field of concern of the phenomenologists and their idea of ‘consciousness of consciousness’ and perhaps they would want to claim Descartes as their own. However, the phenomenological position is essentially idealist and subjective and if Descartes had intended to resolve the issue in essentially subjective terms he would surely have written:

I think, therefore I think I am.

This debate concerning the nature of reality (what is the status of our perception of it) continues to entertain our metaphysical philosophers - and our physical scientists. The latter have claimed it will be necessary for our philosophers to rewrite their ontological theory to achieve a confluence with quantum theory. Whatever the outcome of that debate it is clear that any objectivity in Descartes’ declaration can be applied only to the concept of consciousness. Only the ‘I think’ can be claimed to be objective. Everything the ‘I’ thinks is, by definition, subjective; every concept of what we think of as reality is conditioned by human subjectivity. The ‘I think’ might be objective but what the ‘I’ thinks is, by definition, subjective. And some philosophers (notably in the Buddhist tradition) deny even the objectivity of the self. For them the ‘self’ i s also a human construct. Kant can be read as saying that human subjectivity is the ultimate o b j e c t i v i t y :

‘if these subjective conditions…were not at the same time objectively valid.’ ( 1 9 )

From a relativist’s perspective, this debate is of interest but of limited value. We might claim to be absolutely certain of the consciousness of our own existence - we must be uncertain about everything else. Whatever our view of ‘self’ our view of the ‘non-self’ universe must be subjective. The fundamental relativist’s position of subjectivity is not challenged by this debate, it is endorsed by it.

Postmodern Humanism 93 Belief Systems

(c) Formal logic is constructed on the premise of absolutes which seem to reflect, to underlie, the function of the brain. We cannot (usually) think that something simultaneously ‘is’ and ‘is not’. T h i s corresponds to the digital systems we use in our technology - a device is ‘on’ or ‘off’, represented by the states ‘1’ or ‘0’. Yet things are not what they seem (are they ever?). Paradoxically, much of our science and even our mathematics is based not on specific certainties but on approximations and probabilities. In physics, our measurements can be only as accurate as the measuring device and, when we add in the human factor, not even as accurate as that. Certainly, human behaviour is not based on the logic we sometimes like to imagine inspires our actions. This distinction is not trivial. It underlies the conflict in the theories of relativity and quantum physics. Relativity has as its basis the assumption of the possibility of smooth continuous variations of time and position. Quantum physics requires that we think in terms of discrete units of space and time. Further, quantum physics requires that we deal in terms of probability concerning the position and the velocity of atomic particles. We can talk only of the possibility of a particle being at a certain position with a certain velocity. S c h r o d i n g e r’s cat is, famously and with Dracula-like sensibility, simultaneously ‘dead’ and ‘not dead’. These atomic micro uncertainties are mysterious in that they manifest themselves as certainties only when they enter the macro world of our senses. We do not usually encounter the ‘undead’. Human behaviour is frequently the consequence of several overlapping probabilities, often subconscious and generally uncalculated. Our decision to catch the No. 6 bus is based on probabilities which experience has taught us do not always pay off . Nevertheless, surprisingly, these probabilities concerning human behaviour can be seen as the results of the on/off digital synaptic events in our brain. The ideas of ‘fuzzy logic’ are intended to take some of these uncertainties and probabilities into account in a systematic way. T h e term has come to be applied to any analysis that is not binary. It is not possible to pursue these ideas further here and it must suffice to note that our belief systems must leave space for ideas not subject to the certainties of formal logic.

94 Postmodern Humanism Belief Systems

(d) Roger Penrose addresses the question of ‘freedom’ in the material brain. Penrose recognises the problem regarding the diff e r e n c e between the output of a computable machine and the output of a brain. There is, he insists, a difference not accountable for in terms of our present knowledge:

‘If thinking is just carrying out computation of some kind, then it might seem that we ought to be able to see this most clearly in our mathematical thinking. Yet, remarkably, the very reverse turns out to be the case. It is within mathematics that we find the clear- est evidence that there must be something in our conscious thought processes that eludes computation.’

Penrose sees the possibility of the explanation of the ‘something that eludes computation’ (and therefore logic) in the concepts of quantum mechanics:

‘If Einstein’s general relativity has shown how our very notions of the nature of space and time have had to shift, and become more mysterious and mathematical, then it is quantum mechanics that has shown, to an even greater extent, how our concept of matter has suffered a similar fate. Not just matter, but our very notions of actuality have become profoundly disturbed. How is it that the mere counterfactual POSSIBILITY of something happening - a thing which does NOT actually happen - can have a decisive influence upon what actually DOES happen? There is something in the mystery of the way that quantum mechanics operates that at least SEEMS much closer than is classical physics, to the mystery needed to accommodate mentality within the world of physical reality. …For physics to be able to accommodate something that is foreign to our current physical picture as is the phenomenon of consciousness, we must expect a profound change - one that alters the very underpinning of our philosophical viewpoint as to the nature of reality. ’ Shadows of the Mind ( 3 2 )

Postmodern Humanism 95 Belief Systems

Penrose is, in a sense, addressing the difference between a determinist reality and non-determinist created value - although he expresses it in more complex (and more lengthy) terms appropriate to a professional philosopher. However, Penrose recognises that the source of the ‘non-computable’ IS the material brain. To obtain a value from a source OTHER than the material brain we would have had to invent a transcendent entity - a God, or a ‘spirit’ - to do this. It is the essence of postmodern relativism that it refuses to do this. Relativists and the positivist scientists insist that it is the material ‘us’that is the source of the non-computable. Sociobiologists seek to explain mentality by identifying what we recognise as human consciousness as an evolved characteristic, an epiphenomenon, of the human brain.

96 Postmodern Humanism A Humanist Belief System

Many efforts have been made to describe a Humanist ethical system - generally from a secular humanitarian perspective. And yet … there is often an underlying assumption that Humanism could be, should be, more than a simple free-wheeling humanitarianism. Most attempts to develop a distinctive and convincing Humanist ethic have failed because most have failed to identify a distinctive Humanist philosophy upon which it could be based. Jim Herrick, in his book Humanism: an Intro d u c t i o n ( 4 ) , seeks to identify an ethical and moral structure arising from our being social animals. Herrick’s premise is, essentially, that the human species is naturally ‘good’ and that we can all agree what that good is when we see it. History would seem to disagree. Herrick’s ‘good’ is not good e n o u g h . Another argument Herrick uses is based on the idea of ‘wide a g r e e m e n t ’ - the democratic approach. But this approach is based on a (generally unrecognised) relativist view. Fundamentalists finding their Truth do not easily accept the blasphemy of others. History has taught us that the members of the human species are all too disposed to fight to the death (usually someone else’s) for their Truth. Tolerance, and d e m o c r a c y, are best grounded in a relativist perspective. Further, in history the majority have often been shown to be in error. Social advances are often achieved by a rebellious minority - and often that minority have been humanists. In another example of worthy optimism Matt Ridley in The Origins of Vi rtue ( 1 3 ) purports to show that altruism, for example, has an evolutionary genetic origin. This idea of ethics as simply genetically predisposed behaviour fails to stand up. It ignores the fact that the essence of ethical values is human choice. If altruism is indeed simply

Postmodern Humanism 97 A Humanist Belief System

a genetically determined response, then it is not a human ethic, it has no moral standing per se. Also, Herrick and Ridley must deal with the a rgument that self-interest is also a legitimate ethical value for we are also predisposed to that. Altruism only becomes an ethical value when (if) we freely choose that predisposition as an alternative to predisposed self-interest. In ethics an ‘is’ is not an ‘ought’. Other writers have sought a rational basis for ethics, such as Mill’s utilitarianism - the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Or the G r e e k s ’ Golden Rule - do unto others as you would be done by. T h e s e homilies have their value but, under scrutiny, they have failed to provide a rigorous basis for a practical system of ethics. It is generally perceived that much of our everyday behaviour does reflect the traditions and the values of the society in which we are conditioned (however we might consider those to be conceived). These cultural influences, together with our genetic predispositions, are an essential background to the individual’s values. From an existential perspective, it is our reaction to this, our conscious choice, our acceptance or rejection of these predispositions, that define our personal values. It is these chosen values which ultimately define a society and which, by our actions, are made ‘authentic’. It is from this v i e w, within a postmodern perspective, that we must seek to develop the basis of Humanist ethics. This book has sought to identify a distinctive philosophical basis for Humanist belief in postmodern relativism. Humanism, from this perspective, can be defined as accepting fully the consequences of a secular non-transcendent reality - a view that is recognised here as idealism. As accepting that we ourselves, the human species, are the source of all our concepts and values. Our view of reality is by us and for us. Our values can be only OUR values. Our truth can be only OUR truth - subjective, pragmatic, provisional and relative. Postmodern Humanism is therefore a process of: recognising the ‘a p r i o r i ’ of our belief system and the status of our values; asserting our values with attention to their rational consistency and coherence; actualising these values by our action. It is argued here that this recognition of the pragmatic, relativist nature of our values, and the necessity to realise these values by existential action, is the essence of H u m a n i s m .

98 Postmodern Humanism A Humanist Belief System

The role of rationality in a relativist context has provoked much a rgument - and much misunderstanding. It has been discussed in some detail in earlier chapters, but as the concept is central to the postmodern perspective of Humanism (and this book) the basic idea is repeated here. We cannot defend our choice of our values by reason only. We cannot find a compelling logic, in the analytical sense, for the value system upon which our ethics are to be based or the values we choose to adopt. Rationality cannot be the source of value per se. This is not to say that rationality has nothing to do with our assertion of value. Our choice of value is conditioned and constrained by reason. It is necessary for our basic assertions to be rationally consistent and coherent. We cannot (unless we are a quantum physicist) believe something ‘is’and simultaneously ‘is not’. F u r t h e r, we cannot choose values which can be expected to produce contradictory consequences. It is not rational, for example, to choose racism if, at the same time, we wish simultaneously to achieve racial h a r m o n y. Or to choose equality together with unrestricted freedom. Here, our grounds of reasoning do not follow the strict formal logic of the analytical philosophers, but they would be accepted intuitively as ‘reasonable’. They hang together, they are consistent - and they have been judged by observation, by history. Postmodern Humanism can, then, claim to be both relativist A N D rationalist. A value assertion is ‘authentic’ only if it is rationally consistent with our ‘a priori’ and our other asserted values - and, for the existentialist, if we are prepared to act upon it in a social context. Relativist Humanism can be seen as using reason to help to identify (but not determine) our primary assertions of value by reducing these assertions to their consistent essentials, limiting the chance of conflicting ‘facts’ arising from them, and being prepared to change these values in the light of observations of their eff e c t . This acknowledgement closes down the arguments of the you-can- believe-anything opponents of relativism. Relativists’ views are conditioned but not determined by reason. They are rational once the basic assertions, and their status, have been coherently identified. Thus, while we cannot, as Humanists, identify some transcendental source, a God or an objective universal Truth, as the basis of our ethics, we can defend our values on the grounds that reason, and

Postmodern Humanism 99 A Humanist Belief System

h i s t o r y, shows they are most likely to produce the social (and personal) behaviour we existentially choose to achieve.

To sum up, it is argued here that Humanist basic values must be recognised as relativist assertions; subjective idealist constructs; a pragmatic existential choice. They must be internally coherent and consistent with our a priori. While they do not emerge inevitably from the epistemology of analytical logic, they must be consistent with, and must emerge rationally from their relativist origin. In keeping with the principle of non-contradiction they must be consistent with our other concepts - particularly the construct of our social experience. They are reasonable assertions emerging from our acknowledgement of their genesis - but they ARE assertions, human constructs - and in this recognition lies the essence of relativist Humanism. Leaving further consideration of these issues to the professional philosophers we can consider how we can go about constructing a postmodern Humanist belief system from a relativist perspective. We can then go on to consider what ethical values might emerge rationally from it. We have seen that for any belief system we must first identify our ‘a priori’, what we must take as given. Even the most simple such as D e s c a r t e s ’ ‘I think therefore I am’e v o k e s :

Rationality (and meaning) - evoked by the ‘therefore’. Autonomy - the ‘I’- the idea of ourselves as free autonomous agents. Subjectivity - the objectivity of the ‘I am’ is grounded in the subjective ‘I think’. (see the chapter ‘Belief Systems’).

Having identified the necessary basis for our system, our ‘a priori’, we can seek to identify a coherent and consistent body of value assertions with which to express our Humanism. We recognise these values as subjective, idealist, constructs rather than an expression of an objective social reality. In existential terms we assert our values and create the essence of our humanity by choosing to act upon them. In keeping with the principle of Ockham’s razor (the most simple explanation is the most desirable) we will seek to keep our asserted values to a minimum. At this point, to help us in our endeavours, we

100 Postmodern Humanism A Humanist Belief System can turn to the humanist tradition, to science, to the arts and to h i s t o r y. First, we must deal with the issue of ‘materialism’. We have seen that materialism (the rejection of the supernatural) is a scientific ‘a priori’. It could be argued that materialism is for Humanists also a ‘given’. Many Humanists (most?) would agree that we are concerned o n l y, and necessarily, with the material universe - for most Humanists, there is no other. Humanists deny the interventionist God hypothesis. Many Humanists would go on to deny the supernatural, the non-material - a view akin to that of the scientific reductionists. Nevertheless, there are some Humanists who would want to allow for the suspension of disbelief - to recognise an ambivalence in human c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Some Humanists might wish to keep open the possibility of a non- interventionist God. Some Humanists profess not to be atheists. Some Humanists seem to be balanced dangerously between the singing angels and the sinning scientists. This would seem to be the position of David Boulton in his book The Trouble With God ( 3 5 ) . It is this aspect of the human condition which is addressed in the chapter ‘Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing’. The question here is whether, for the Humanist community, materialism is a given, an element of our ‘a priori’, a necessary part of any Humanist belief system, or an optional ‘value added’ assertion. With generosity, and in the interests of the ecumenical, let us place materialism with our asserted values rather than with our ‘a priori’. This does not place our Humanism in the category of John Gray’s ‘degenerate religion’ - a Humanist belief system is not a ‘faith’, it is acknowledged as a human construct. This position does not affect the thrust of the relativist argument presented here. It does, rather, confirm the relativist, subjective perspective. On the issue of materialism, relativist Humanists would be happy to be seen in either the idealist or the realist camp. Asserted values/beliefs which might be considered to be ‘ H u m a n i s t ’ and which are rationally coherent and consistent with our a priori could, then, include:

Materialism. A denial, or at least a disregard, of the supernatural - but not necessarily to the extent of scientific reductionism.

Postmodern Humanism 101 A Humanist Belief System

E q u a l i t y. If there is no transcendent universal standard and no objective arbiter of value, then it is rational to assert that all humans have an intrinsic equality - we cannot, with reason, assert otherwise.

Freedom. We are free autonomous agents (or can act as if we think we are). We can choose reasons and attribute purposes and recognise that by our freely chosen actions we define the essence of the human s p e c i e s .

Positivism. We can conceive patterns or structures in human behaviour which we can choose as authentic expressions of human value, meaning and purpose. We must think as idealists but we can act as quasi-realists.

Anthropocentrism. If we wish to identify a particular status for the human species in the universe we must recognise this as self- acclaimed - an assertion for us and by us.

Having identified our a priori and our asserted values we can use rationality (logic and reason) to deduce our ethics. These could include:

Tolerance. It seems reasonable, coherent, to conclude that if we are free and equal autonomous agents responsible for creating human values, then we must tolerate the right of others to act according to their chosen values.

Pragmatism. If we embrace relativism then Humanist beliefs, values and purposes must be provisional and pragmatic and will continue to evolve. For some, this is recognised as a ‘situationist’ rather than a ‘ p o s i t i o n i s t ’ perspective. See footnote (b).

Universalism. What used to be called ‘the brotherhood of man’. If we are all equal, and if we are, as it were, all in the same boat, we can recognise the need for a global view of human aff a i r s .

D e m o c r a c y. Where this is recognised as a device for allowing the maximum exercise of expression of human potential individually and c o l l e c t i v e l y, and for negotiating differences (see footnote (a)).

102 Postmodern Humanism A Humanist Belief System

On the basis of the foregoing arguments, the outline of a basic relativist Humanist belief system might then be constructed as in Fig. 7.

Fig. 7 A Relativist Humanist Belief System

Asserted Va l u e s Assumed Deduced Ethics A Priori

M a t e r i a l i s m ) E q u a l i t y ) R a t i o n a l i t y ) Fr e e d o m ) Autonomy ) Tolerance Pragmatism U n i v e r s a l i s m … Po s i t i v i s m ) S u b j e c t i v i t y ) A n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m )

Humanist readers can identify their own preferred asserted values and beliefs as an expression of their own priorities, their own vision of Humanism - but remember to keep to the rules of coherence and rationality! From the postmodern perspective the ‘a priori’ c o n c e p t s are not optional. This diagram is not intended to be viewed as a definitive description of a Humanist belief system. That would be too complex to express in diagrammatic form (and beyond the ambition of this author). Rather, it seeks to identify the a priori and the kind of logical steps necessary to establish a unifying philosophical framework upon which a diversity of Humanist values can be accommodated. An actual postmodern Humanist belief system, identifying Humanist values, would need to be described in the more conventional method of prose. The diagram is intended to be useful in providing a conceptual framework upon which those prose can be l o c a t e d . It is on this basis that a statement of postmodern Humanist principles and values might now be expressed in more conventional terms - recognising that these must be seen as pragmatic and provisional - as ‘situationist’rather than ‘positionist’ (footnote (b)).

Postmodern Humanism 103 A Humanist Belief System

F o o t n o t e s

(a) Because postmodernism sets much store by the relativist status of values there is a responsibility to address the question of how these values are to be expressed, and how the inevitable diff e r e n c e s between values will be negotiated. This negotiation of diff e r e n c e would need to be addressed as a process at both a theoretical and practical level. Here we can turn to studies in the field of conflict - to psychology and sociology; to philosophy and to theories of complex dynamic systems; to theories of management. At a practical level it might be thought that the conflicts of values under relativism would not be great. There would be, one can imagine, a universal agreement on most human moral values. T h e s e values would, it seems, be amenable to rational debate within traditional structures. The UN Bill of Human Rights is an example of universal agreement on values at international level. T h e International Court of Human Rights is an example of an international (if, at the moment, toothless) arbitrator. At the macro level, the level of the grand narrative, greater d i fficulties can be foreseen. This is evident today in Christian versus Muslim religious conflicts and the political conflicts of individualism versus collectivism (or capitalism versus socialism if you prefer). These conflicts are not amenable to rational debate (except in so far as the historical consequences of these ideas can be identified and discussed) as they are founded on subjective choice. But the recognition of the status of these beliefs as relativist would downgrade the conflict to that of pragmatic choice and a common underlying value might sometimes be identified. It would be necessary, from a relativist perspective, to construct democratic structures designed to allow the pursuit of individual and collective visions - and which would allow for the play of emotional as well as rational factors. These conclusions are not exceptional. Similar conclusions have been arrived at by other writers from other directions. The importance of their expression here lies in the philosophical basis which identifies the status of values as relative - and consequently the way in which they will be presented, used and defended. Crucially, under relativism, the reaction to conflicts of views will be mollified by a

104 Postmodern Humanism A Humanist Belief System

recognition of the status of the grand narrative as a subjective existential choice. In this aspect, postmodern Humanism can be seen as a process of relativism in action.

(b) A ‘ p o s i t i o n i s t ’ is conceived as taking up a fixed position with regards to a projected social target and pursuing that objective without deviation. This stance can be identified with ‘realist’philosophy - the idea that there is a fixed universal Truth which we need to pursue. A ‘ s i t u a t i o n i s t ’ is conceived as regarding a social project as a targ e t for now, of being prepared to adjust the objective and the means of pursuing it as circumstances are observed to change - to change, perhaps, as a consequence of the action taken. It is recognised that there is a reactive relationship between the project target and the means of pursuing it. This stance can be identified with an ‘idealist’ philosophy - the idea that there is no fixed universal Truth.

Postmodern Humanism 105

Part III

Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

It has been argued here that the identification of Humanist beliefs, principles and values must be an evolving (or, indeed, an evolutionary) process. In recognition of their subjective nature as human constructs it cannot be otherwise. It is only possible therefore to seek to identify here, as a contribution to the debate, the possible content of a relativist Humanist belief system as an ongoing project. We have seen that any social belief system must be based, a priori, on rationality, autonomy, and subjectivity. We have seen that Humanist asserted values must be rationally coherent but are otherwise open to how we choose to express the Humanist narrative. On this basis, we can now consider how relativist Humanist beliefs, principles and values, and their associated ethics, might be expressed in a more discursive manner. a) Materialist

Humanists start from the premise that there are no accessible gods, spirits or non-material ‘souls’. There are no supernatural beings to instruct or inform us. The physical, material universe, including ourselves, is all there is. There is no transcendent entity, religious or ideological, that we can turn to for comfort, validation or support. The universe has no meaning and life has no purpose other than that we choose to give it. Some Humanists might prefer to allow the possibility of a transcendent being as an unknowable (the agnostics), a detached God (the

Postmodern Humanism 107 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

deists), a pre big-bang ‘first cause’, a God as a human construct (the historical God). These views are not inconsistent with the ‘material- i s m ’ described here - although many would think them unnecessary.

b) Relativist/Postmodern

All our ideas, concepts and values are human constructs (including the concepts of ‘truth’and ‘meaning’). The concept of ‘truth’b e c o m e s useful only after the choice, the assertion, of subjective values. The idea of a universal objective Truth invokes the transcendental and leads inevitably to ideas of religion and ideology. Only the gods would know ‘The Tr u t h ’ - if there were any. What we ordinarily think of as ‘truth’ concerns the match between the synaptic models we form in our brain (manifested as concepts) and our observations of what we think of as ‘reality’. No match can be said to be perfect but we can use reason and experience to think that some matches are better than others. Our concepts are conditioned by the material structure of our brains. These behave in a manner which has developed through the evolutionary process i.e. evolved to conceptualise our ‘reality’ in certain ways. Our view of ‘reality’ is a result of the interaction of the genetic predisposition of our brain and our senses with our physical and cultural environment. We cannot say a concept is objectively, universally and eternally True, we can say only that a concept fits our observations, that it is a ‘fact’, within our chosen value framework. Our choice of reference frame (our chosen belief system and our asserted values) decides what our ‘facts’ will be. Thus, while there is no absolute eternal Truth there are truths for us for now; facts, within a particular belief system. This means that Humanist beliefs are what some call ‘relativist’or ‘postmodern’and it is from this perspective that Humanists arrive at and hold their views. Human action is the result of the interaction of our individual genome with our environment, physical and cultural - not in a deterministic manner, for the operation of the brain delivers, in ways we do not yet fully understand, the ‘non-computable’ freedom of the autonomous ‘self’ .

108 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

Human society is what we recognise as patterns or structures in the interaction of individuals. This has found expression, by the coevolution of ideas and behaviour, to produce concepts of rights and responsibilities, values and morality, rules and traditions. Many of these inherited social values and traditions have been observed to underpin a tolerant, and tolerable, civilised society. In this way, Humanists accept many of the traditional liberal social values - compassion, tolerance, and the pursuit of happiness etc. Nevertheless, there is no objective underlying ‘deep structure’meaning or purpose to society other than that we choose to attribute to it. Any goal for the human species is self-generated. c) Rationalist

Humanists believe that the human species is genetically programmed to be rational. This has led to the ability, to the necessity, to form concepts of purpose, of cause and effect - ideas which have proved to be important as agents of evolutionary advantage. Reason, logic and intuition underlie our ability to form concepts - to think even. We think therefore we reason. Humanist beliefs are rational - NOT in determining their values (which must be an existential choice) but in examining the internal logic of their belief system and the rational consequences of their asserted values. Rationality conditions and constrains our assertion of our values - but rationality cannot determine them. Paradoxically, having rejected rationality as the source of values, rationality then becomes more significant in the act of defending them. Rationality can be applied as a useful tool in a form ranging from strict analytical logic (including ‘fuzzy logic’) to intuition or reasonableness. In all cases Humanists judge ‘truth’, our ‘facts’, on the basis of observed consequences - does it work to deliver our chosen values? d) Po s i t i v i s t

We can construct concepts of social reality in terms of objectives and purpose but must be prepared to check continually our actions against

Postmodern Humanism 109 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

our objectives, and our ‘facts’ against our observations and experience. Concepts which can never be tested by action, by cause and effect, are of no value. This is a position analogous to that of the positivist scientist. This means that while we can, in a sense, choose to believe anything, our beliefs are constrained, conditioned and conditional. We can form and believe any concept we choose to describe the universe and ourselves but these concepts must be consistent with our other beliefs. Our beliefs and our epistemology must be adjusted to be logically consistent within our chosen belief system. Our ‘facts’ m u s t be rationally consistent with each other, consistent with reasonable expectations of their consequences and must be adjusted in the light of knowledge and experience.

(e) Pragmatist/Situationist

Humanists hold their views in a contingent manner, open to change, challenge and development, in a manner incompatible with all religions, fixed ideologies and dogmatic political beliefs. T h i s perspective is recognised by some as ‘situationist’. Humanists recognise that our concepts of purpose and value aff e c t our actions and that the consequences of our actions affect our concepts in a mutually reactive manner. Humanist objectives are thus open to development and change in the light of the consequences of the actions taken to pursue them. Humanists are prepared to change their views, their values and their objectives in the light of knowledge and experience in a manner similar to that of the positivist scientist. We must continue to question and to judge whether our inherited predispositions and social traditions continue to be valid; useful in our chosen narrative; conducive to our chosen values. There can be no Humanist Utopia, only a cautious recognition of d i fferent ways of organising society according to their degree of rationality and sustainability. In popular social science parlance, Humanists are opposed to the idea of objective ‘deep structure’ theories of society.

110 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

(f) Autonomist/Existentialist

Humanists believe that we are free autonomous agents (or can think we are), free to choose values and purpose. This freedom is expressed in a belief in our ability to choose at least some of our actions - or, what amounts to the same thing, to act as if we choose. Human society is founded on this belief of individual autonomy and on the consequential acceptance of ‘responsibility’. Humanists assert that consciousness and ‘free will’, our ability to choose, is the result of the evolution of our material brain. It is the exercise of this function of our choice of values and purpose that makes us human. Humanists accept that it is by our individual and collective choices that we ourselves determine the essence of the human species. We choose, and by our actions are responsible for, what it is to be human. Human value and purpose are created by action which is ‘authentic’, i.e. action which is consciously and freely taken with an awareness of the possible alternative choices. This means that the Humanist ontology is what some call ‘existential’. Humanists believe they are responsible for creating the values in society by their existential choice. Humanists are ethical and approach questions of morality as responsible agents. They seek to identify ethics, as patterns or guides for behaviour, to express and deliver their chosen objectives.

(g) Equality

The concept of autonomy, of agency, together with the relativist perspective, carries the implication of equality in the right to create values and the right to construct social structures to deliver these values; to allow us all to direct our lives on an equal basis. We are all of equal worth for there is no external agency, no objective standard, to judge otherwise. To allow one individual or group to assert superiority would allow all - a logical contradiction. A u n i v e r s a l human equality becomes a rational evaluation under postmodernism. Human equality is not based on genetic, on physical or mental, congruence. We are manifestly physically (and intellectually)

Postmodern Humanism 111 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

d i fferent, but we can choose to declare ourselves equal. We bestow rights on each other. We grant equality to each other. This is an asserted equality over race and gender, over social, physiological and psychological diff e r e n c e s . The idea of equality carries with it the responsibility for tolerance (provided this is reciprocated) and to construct the necessary social structures to negotiate diff e r e n c e s .

(h) Fr e e d o m

The view that all human values, if rationally held, are equal in status, leads us to consider ideas of liberty - the right to exercise our choice of value - subject to the right of others to do likewise. Further, as existentialists, Humanists would wish to increase human liberty of action - freedom to, and freedom from - to express their humanity. The idea of freedom is difficult in concept and in realisation. We can easily recognise freedom ‘from’ (negative freedom), but it is more d i fficult to identify freedom ‘to’ (positive freedom). Rules and regulations are the reins of freedom - the balance is hard to identify. The problem is that ‘freedom’ cannot be considered as an absolute. We do not act in a social vacuum. It is not easy to define ‘maximum freedom’. Mill’s maxim is often quoted in this regard:

‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not s u fficient warrant.’ ( 1 4 )

Mill did not address the question of how to decide who is harming who. ‘No man (or woman) is an island’. A smoker hurts us all when he bungs up the health service. There are few human activities which do not affect someone else. Our approach to liberty has to be considered, calculated and collective. Liberty is social as well as personal.

112 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

(i) Evolutionary

Humanists accept that the human species is the consequence of some 4,000 million years of evolution, not to a design or a plan, not towards some ‘higher’ state, but by the chance operation of natural selection. We can, if we choose, think of this as a ‘process’, and we can seek to identify a structure to this process through the agency of reason, knowledge and experience. It would be a fundamental error to think of this process as having an objective structure or a purpose. Any structure or purpose we ascribe to ourselves or the universe is a human c o n s t r u c t . The evolutionary process has delivered the human genome hard- wired for language, reason and our ideas of ourselves as autonomous free agents. Human genes and our environment (physical and cultural) are all there is. Our behaviour affects our environment, physical and cultural, and our environment affects how we behave. It is not nature OR nurture - it is nature AND nurture, reacting in the manner of a dynamic feedback system.

(j) Anthropocentric

The human species is the natural focus of human attention. This is not, as Gray would have it, that we are replacing the Christian myth with a humanist myth. Our anthropocentrism is strictly idealist, and existential. We can have only a human subjective perspective - and our sense of the human species as ‘special’is recognised as entirely self-credited. From this view we can identify an internationalist, communitarian and ecological perspective.

Humanist ethics

Humanists are charged by some with lacking values or ethics - lacking morals even. This latter charge is made with particular relish - for who does not seek their own moral worth in the depravity of others? Nevertheless, in a sense, this charge by the anti-relativists is valid - if

Postmodern Humanism 113 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

ethics are viewed as commandments or instructions. As materialists, Humanists would be unable to identify a universal, objective system of rules from whatever source they might be thought to arise. Humanist ethics must be seen simply as human constructs, an evolving guide for human behaviour based upon a freely chosen, but rationally coherent value system, conditioned but not determined by reason, moderated by history and experience. We have seen that, from a relativist existential perspective, there are no human values other than those we choose to create by our actions. Postmodern Humanism acknowledges no values ‘a priori’, as given. There can be no Humanist ‘Golden Rule’, no Humanist ‘Te n Commandments’, no Humanist ‘Utopia’. If Humanist values can be thought to carry their own distinctive characteristic it is in recognition of their origin as human constructs. The status of relativist Humanist ethics is, therefore, simply a considered view of how, at this moment of time, we might choose and encourage the human species to act. This view is currently delivered by individual Humanist writers or, exceptionally, in collective pronouncements such as the Amsterdam Declaration 2002 ( 4 8 ) . T h e Humanist community is not yet able to deliver a collective view of Humanist values in an systematic, evolving and democratic manner. The Humanist view on many moral values and ethics is often not very different from that of most humanitarian liberal-minded people. Those humanitarian ethics are taken for granted here. The diff e r e n c e lies in how Humanists arrive at, hold and apply their values and it is upon this difference that a distinctive Humanist ethical system might be sought. C o n s e q u e n t l y, the term ‘ethics’ is used here to mean simply an evolving statement of preferred behaviour, based on a system of rationally coherent asserted values, arising from a relativist, materialist, philosophy. On this basis we could venture the view that a distinctive Humanist ethical system could include:

A C T I O N . Act rationally, consistently and being conscious of our freedom to choose. To act in conformity with our chosen values, without recourse to some transcendent guide. We must choose and we must act to create what the human species is to become.

114 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

P R A G M AT I S M . Be open minded and prepared to change values in accord with reason, knowledge, observation and experience. For practical purposes to act as if there is ‘a truth’ which we can work towards (i.e. as quasi-realists), but to approach this ‘truth’in a flexible, open and tolerant manner (i.e. as quasi-idealists). Be prepared to continually check, and if necessary challenge, traditional values - including our own.

E V O LU T I O N . Recognise that both genetic and environmental factors, physical and cultural, are conditioners of human behaviour. Acknowledge that our genes, in reaction with the cultural and social environment, predispose (but do not determine) human behaviour, the ‘ g o o d ’ and the ‘bad’. Accept that human beliefs are part of the evolutionary process. Construct social organisations to deliver our values, with due regard to our genetically inherited predisposition and the cultural traditions the human species has evolved - recognise both the genes and the m e m e s .

F R E E D O M . Promote and encourage individual and collective freedom of speech, thought and action - freedom from and freedom to. Open up choice of values and objectives, lifestyle and culture in order to maximise and keep open the possibilities of what the human species is to become. Support and encourage political, economic and social systems designed to deliver personal and collective expressions of the human p o t e n t i a l .

C R E AT I V I T Y. Encourage and engage in human creativity, mental, physical and aesthetic and the search for knowledge and understanding of ourselves and the universe. Pursue individual and collective happiness in a creative, fulfilling and meaningful life - subject to the same right for others.

R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y. Recognise a responsibility to identify a system of coherent social and personal values. Act in accord with these values. Recognise responsibility for the consequence of our actions; for creating, by our choice, the essence of what the human species is to

Postmodern Humanism 115 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

b e c o m e . Recognise an internationalist, communitarian and ecological p e r s p e c t i v e .

E Q UA L I T Y. Assert an equality of individual human value, rights and responsibilities over and above genetic difference, above concepts of n a t i o n a l i t y, ethnicity, gender, class, economic values and the law. Support the equal right of all to choose and create their individual and collective destiny and to pursue their own idea of happiness - consistent with the recognition of the same right for others.

R E S P E C T / T O L E R A N C E . Respect members of our own species and other species and the material world with whom we share our moment of conscious existence. Tolerate the views of others but actively oppose intolerance, bigotry and prejudice.

D I V E R S I T Y. Encourage and support diversity (genetic and cultural), within a unifying social structure, recognising, at the same time, the unity of the human species.

V I S I O N A R Y. Recognise that the human species is predisposed to identify and strive towards an overarching vision, a wider destiny. Allow and encourage a free choice of purpose, a ‘grand narrative’, individually and collectively, free from the spiritual constraints of religion, the intellectual constraints of ideology and, as far as it is possible, from the constraints of the politico-economic system.

E M PAT H Y. A characteristic of the human species is the tendency to empathise with other members of the species to the extent that total i n d i fference to the feelings of others is regarded as pathology. Clearly, feelings of empathy arise from the ability to imagine one's self in the situation of others and it is this degree of imagination which would explain what seems to be its prominence in the human, as compared to other species.

It seems likely that the human predisposition to empathetic feelings and behaviour has an evolutionary origin. The tendency to identify

116 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s preferentially with other members of the tribe presents a gene survival advantage. For some writers, empathy constitutes part of the arche- typal pattern of cognition and behaviour common throughout the human species - a universal condition identified by Carl Gustav Jung as an inherited 'collective unconscious'. It has its religious expression in the commandment 'love they neighbour'. Whatever its source, empathy would seem now to be subject to both a genetic and a cultural influence. Empathetic behaviour is seen to vary between individuals of the same tribe but also, if we are to believe anthropologists, to differ significantly between cultures. E m p a t h y, it would seem, can be learned as well as inherited. It is on this premise that we can identify the exercise of empathy as an authentic existential choice and it is with this choice that Humanists can seek to express their universalism. We can choose to recognise our tribe to be the whole human species. The consequences of the identification of empathy as a desirable social value are considerable and perhaps decisive to the human project. Empathy leads naturally to concerned action. This is often expressed in humanitarian terms but can be seen to have wider implications. It is not possible to discuss the psychology and many of the manifestations of empathetic action here but we can see the dangers of the ideologically committed seeking to impose their religious or political narrative on the grounds of the others ultimate betterment - seeking to 'save' the reluctant others in spite of themselves. Humanists can be expected to practice and encourage empathetic behaviour - but it would seem that the practice of empathy is safe only when exercised from a relativist perspective.

It is not possible for a single author to identify a substantive view of Humanist principles, values and ethics. That will require the con- certed efforts of the Humanist community, its writers and its p h i l o s o p h e r s . The A m s t e rdam Declaration 2002 (48) can be seen as a recognition of the need for such a project. A more recent contribution has been made by the North East Humanists’Working Party 2005 ( 4 9 ). The Humanist values and ethics identified above owe much to both these projects, particularly the latter, which discussed many of the issues raised in this book. Nevertheless, it is evident that the Humanist community is not, as a whole, currently organised in a manner to

Postmodern Humanism 117 Humanist Beliefs, Principles and Va l u e s

allow an authoritative statement to be delivered as a collective, evolving project.

118 Postmodern Humanism

G r a n d N a r r a t i v es - T he Vision Thing

In addition to the need for a materialist reductionist system of beliefs many Humanists would recognise the need to identify a ‘human factor’ , an emotional factor - ‘the heart has its reasons’. This ‘knowledge beyond reason’ is identified here as ‘the vision thing’ - that part of the human condition that seeks an overarching explanation of existence, or simply an experience of existence that transcends the everyday. The human condition, our genetic inheritance, requires that we seek to identify ‘grand narratives’ (or ‘meta-narratives’) to explain our existence, to guide our actions and to inspire our lives. Hitherto this need has been met chiefly by our religious and secular myths. For some, a declining number, this need is still met by their spiritual or political vision. Others identify their grand narrative in less exalted forms. This human need can be viewed as arising from an evolutionary dynamic. The identification of the concepts ‘cause’and ‘eff e c t ’ led us to adopt the ideas of ‘reason’and ‘purpose’. Asking ourselves the question ‘ w h y ? ’ and creating answers, gave us an evolutionary advantage. It is this predisposition that found expression in the many religious narratives of gods, benign or threatening, who must be worshipped, obeyed or mollified. We can see that it played a survival role in the struggle of the human species for existence by providing a motive to fight against adversity; by constructing a vision of progress when circumstances were bountiful; by encouraging a struggle for life when conditions were bleak. For some writers, such as David Boulton and Bryan Appleyard, this human predisposition is an expression of an ambivalence in human consciousness: a sense of being at once in and out of the world. For these writers a belief in gods, spirits or space aliens is an expression of the mysteriousness of consciousness which cannot be explained by

Postmodern Humanism 120 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

scientific reductionism. We can, they say, by leaving these anomalous experiences unexplained, look at consciousness in a new light. A s relativist materialists we can, if we choose, suspend our disbelief. Whether or not we agree with these views it seems clear that, one way or another, the human species is predisposed to seek to transcend the ordinary, material self in dreams, visions and imaginings. This need to express ourselves in grand narratives, in transcendent visions, has been embedded in human traditions by the social structures erected to exercise power. It has been exploited throughout the ages to bolster the power of whatever rulers ruled. In this way, societies were conditioned and controlled and the rebellious subdued. The grand narratives of religion have been appropriated by the establishment to justify their power and deflect attention from the injustices of their rule. They continue to do so. Two great visions of the first and second millennia in the We s t e r n world were Christianity and Judaism. The historic visions of the 20t h century were fascism, capitalism and what some called communism- its expression now identified by the revolutionary comrades as ‘state capitalism’. Marx called the religious narratives ‘the opium of the p e o p l e ’ but failed to recognise that his own vision would be grotesquely abused. Currently, the hegemonic view of the West is neo-liberal, free-market capitalism. The market is called upon to deliver the dreams of the future for the human species. The failures of these past grand narratives can be seen to have arisen, in part, from their failure to recognise their status as human constructs, as expressions of the mysteriousness of human consciousness, and their consequent transformation into dogma - a fate seemingly destined for all visionaries. Freud said ‘I am not a Freudian’, and Marx said famously (but too late) ‘I am not a Marxist’. Humanists have no access to the religious spiritual myths and are presented with a paradox - we need the ‘vision thing’ and yet are denied the transcendental grounds upon which one can be founded. The question is, can Humanists express an account of a secular vision in materialist terms? At one level the answer lies in the many expressions of humanism which, in our culture, already exist. Expressions of what can be identified as humanism permeate our arts - and even our science. David Hume asserted that passion and desires are the well-spring of

121 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing human behaviour, while, more recently, Peter Jay recognised a secular narrative, in The Road to Riches ( 3 6 ), when he asserted that ‘after sex, wealth is the greatest human passion’. Jay didn’t question why we want wealth, but he did recognise it as a non-rational secular passion. Thus, it is commonly recognised, rationality is not the only human dynamic. This combination of reason and passion in human affairs defines a tension in the views of postmodern contemporary society. T h e rejection of the transcendent creates a problem for the secular materialists when seeking to identify their grand narrative. As Sartre says, ‘The existentialist … finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven’ ( 3 ). We have abandoned all ideas of a religious heaven or a secular Utopia. We must deal with the problem which Russell asserts: ‘the extent to which beliefs are based on evidence [and reason] is very much less than believers suppose’. A n d this recognition is as destructive of the beliefs of the rationalist as it is of the superstitions of the religious. Whatever its source, and whatever its failings, it is clear that this human predisposition to invent an overarching purpose, to identify a personal and collective destiny, to express our experience of existence, has served a social purpose. It continues to do so, it is the human condition. Any practical social/political belief system must take this human predisposition into account both to deconstruct the old myths and to construct new ones. Some account of the ‘vision thing’ must be part of any attempt to construct a distinctive Humanist narrative. For convenience, these ‘visions’ can be seen to have two aspects: the historical (views of the past and the future) and the mystical (views of the now). The historical addresses the issue of how things might become, the mystical deals with the experience of the reality of how things are. They might be described as follows:

1. HISTO R I C A L - a collective vision which can inform and inspire and act as a source of social rules, traditions and ambitions. Most religions fall into this category, but also political ideologies such as fascism and dogmatic communism. The religious expression of these visions often originated with, or identified with, a person, often deified, or claiming some special

Postmodern Humanism 122 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

relationship with a God. Thus we get a Moses, Christ or Mohammed. Expression of these human narratives in their secular form can be identified in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, in Marx and Engels’ C o m m u n i s t M a n i f e s t o . From a philosophic perspective they are expressed in, for example, N i e t z s c h e ’s ‘Super Man’. Plato’s Republic, More’s Utopia, Mill’s L i b e r t y, and many others, present a vision of a secular grand narrative in more moderate terms. Meanwhile, here in the 21s t c e n t u r y, some of us, in the land of hope and glory, ask the God who made us mighty to make us mightier yet.

2. MYSTICAL - a personal emotional experience which cannot be described easily in narrative form - what can, perhaps, be identified as the human ‘spirit’o r, if we can reclaim the term, the human ‘soul’. This experience has been identified by many writers - the religious mystics certainly, but also by secular writers and artists and particularly the poets - although many would reject the terms ‘mysticism’, ‘spirit’and ‘soul’.

It is frequently the case that these aspects, the historical and the mystical, are combined and reflect each other. It is common, for example, for the visions of the religious mystics to reflect their religious narrative - to experience what is sometimes described as ‘ G o d ’s love’. And the ecstasy of a Newcastle winning goal reflects the narrative of United’s glorious football past - and even more glorious future. The religious (and sometimes the football fan) often experience their mystical vision as ‘the hand of god’. The historical form of the secular vision in art is well documented. William Faulkner expresses the optimistic view of the human condition. When collecting his Nobel Prize for Literature he said:

‘I believe that man will not merely endure, he will prevail. He is immortal, he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. The poet’s, the writer’s duty is to write about these things. It is his privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honour and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past.’

123 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

Samuel Beckett expresses the bleaker side of the human condition and the human capacity for endurance:

‘They give birth astride a grave, The light gleams an instance, Then it’s night once more.’ Waiting For Godot ( 3 7 )

Art, we can see, can be the expression of our predisposition to seek meaning and reach for a ‘grand narrative’ at a historical level - but it can be also an expression of the mystical, of our wonder at our experience of existence. Writers who might be identified as addressing a secular mysticism include: Tom Paine, George Eliot, E.M. Forster, Thomas Hardy, William Wordsworth and Albert Camus, and particularly the play- wrights such as Arthur Miller, Samuel Beckett and Tony Kushner. Thomas Mann writes:

‘Being was not Well-Being; it was joy and labour, and all Being in space-time, all matter, partook if only in deepest sleep in this joy and l a b o u r, this perception that disposed Man, possessor of the most awakened consciousness, to universal sympathy. ’ The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man ( 3 8 )

We will all have our own favourite poems and on inspection many poems will reveal a secular perspective. Wilfred Owen expresses a secular view in describing a dying soldier:

‘Move him into the sun - Gently its touch awoke him once, At home, whispering of fields unsown. Always it awoke him, even in France, Until this morning and this snow. If anything might rouse him now The kind old sun will know.

Think how it wakes the seeds - Woke, once, the clays of a cold star.

Postmodern Humanism 124 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

Are limbs, so dear achieved, are sides, full-nerved - still warm - too hard to stir? Was it for this the clay grew tall? - O what fatuous sunbeams toil To break earth’s sleep at all?’ War Poems ( 3 9 )

This identification of a secular vision is not confined to We s t e r n culture. It has its expression in many, perhaps all, cultures. T h e Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam reads:

X X V I

‘Oh, come with old Khayyam, and leave the wise to talk; one thing is certain, that life flies; one thing is certain and the rest lies; the flower that once has blown for ever dies.

X X I X

Into this universe, and witty, not knowing, nor whence, like water willy-nilly flowing; and out of it, as wind along the wast, I know not whither, willy-nilly blowing.

X LV I I

F o r, in any out, above, about, below, tis nothing but a magic shadow show, play’d in a box whose candle is the sun, round which we phantom figures come and go.

X LV I I I

And if the wine you drink, the lips you press, end in the nothing all things end in - yes - then fancy while thou art but what thou shall be - nothing - thou shalt not be less.’ ( 4 0 )

125 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

Literature, then, can give us access to ‘the vision thing’ at both the historical and the mystical level. It can help us invent our meanings and grand narratives to inspire us when things go well and console us when things are difficult. And, underlying much literature there is an unspoken secular morality, and some, such as A e s o p ’s Fables, present explicit secular ethical values in metaphorical form. Music and the visual arts can be seen as contributing equally to the expression of the human vision. In the visual arts, for example, cubism is now recognised as an exploration of human perception. Conceptual art continues the investigation of the human subjective experience, an experiment in value and meaning. Perhaps it is not so much the case that we need Humanist writers and artists but rather that we should identify the Humanism in what art and literature there is. Much of our art and literature is permeated with a secular perspective - with what some Humanists have sought to identify as the secular ‘divine’, or even the secular ‘sacred’. This terminology upsets some Humanists - but we can see where these writers are coming from. It is clearly the case that Humanists need to discover, reclaim or invent, the necessary secular terminology to describe what is recognised as a vital expression of the human condition.

One further aspect of the mystical form of the human vision needs to be considered. The mystical experience is now recognised by neuroscientists as having a material basis in the form of the activity of certain areas of the brain. This action is produced by activities such as meditation, the contemplation of nature, the universe, football - and by drugs. This latter cause, a chemical basis for altered/heightened perception, has been experienced by many (as evidenced by the popularity of drug use over cultures and over history). It has been studied at a systematic level by writers such as Aldous Huxley, in Doors of Perc e p t i o n ( 4 7 ), and Sidney Cohen, in D rugs of Hallucination ( 4 1 ) , and less systematically by writers such as William Burroughs, Timothy Leary and more recently Irvine Welsh. Some forms of hallucinogens have been used from the earliest recorded history - often to accompany religious ceremonies. Hashish (cannabis indica) has been consumed in India and Egypt since time immemorial. It is currently the most common recreational drug in the UK - after alcohol. The psilocybe mushroom of southern Mexico was

Postmodern Humanism 126 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

used as a hallucinogen long before Aztec civilisation. The peyote cactus is revered by Indians of the Native American Church and is used in their religion in communion. We all know that the misuse of drugs can lead to disease, destitution and death - but alcohol and tobacco are not the only drugs! Chemically induced mental states are now commonplace in our society and its psychiatric use has earned the name psychochemistry. Prozac, Ritalin etc. are the harbingers of expanding new generations of psychochemicals. Many writers have described experiences under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. Indeed, if research is to be believed, many people have now ‘experimented’ with hallucinogenic drugs, principally LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) and so called ‘magic mushrooms’. Many describe an altered state of perception and/or a transcendental experience of enlightenment, of ‘oneness’with God, or H u m a n i t y, or the Universe. Many claim an experience of knowing THE answer - and some even of knowing THE question. Regrettably, few can carry this experience back to their unaltered state to be able to present a coherent description of what that experience was. Some try. C u r r e n t l y, Ecstasy is the most popular drug of choice for dancing or ‘clubbing’, and a description of its effect is given by Johann Hari as f o l l o w s :

‘ Within 20 to 40 minutes I’d start to “come up” - the drug sends rushes to the brain, which can be, quite literally, an ecstatic experience. The effect is known as being “loved up” and I find it simultaneously blissfully happy and hectic. My heart beats faster, and I feel a lot of energy and excitement. I feel an irresistible urge to do things, especially dance… The drug makes me feel extraordinarily “at one” - almost a ffectionate - with the people around me, even large crowds. It’s very easy to bond with people when “loved up”.’ The Observer, 26 May, 2002

The altered states of perception experienced under LSD and its derivatives, have been well documented by psychologists and sociologists, and by writers such as De Quincey and Aldous Huxley. T h e s e describe dramatic changes in the perception of everyday objects and

127 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing the experience of unusual emotional states, sometimes beautiful, sometimes frightening. A recent account is given by Sidney Cohen and the following extracts describe LSD-induced experiences, by several subjects, in laboratory conditions, focused on those aspects of the experience which would seem to relate to the ‘mystical’. Cohen relates several of their comments:

‘The first change was one of pleasant relaxation. As the morning wore on, this sense of tranquillity increased to an indescribable mood of great calm and peace … I seemed to have arrived finally at the contemplation of the eternal truth, all else was long since gone. The solitude of this place did not disturb me, I would have preferred to remain forever in this “Nirvana without the ecstasy”… The great problem I had was one of communication. It was impossible for me to describe what I felt, first because words were inadequate, second, because the languor and reticence to interrupt the experience was so great.’

‘I return to the changing pictures, the colours swimming, retreating, changing; these colours to an artist are in reality a picture frame. T h e hard core, the soul, the God, the Be of the artist is the picture. His genius is as great as his ability to put his Be or Is or Oneness on the c a n v a s . ’

‘Suddenly the light coming through the window began to attract me…By this time it seemed as if several hours or possibly days or even a year had gone by. I looked at my watch and realised that it had only been fifteen minutes since I had gone down to the hall b a t h r o o m . In spite of the fact that I could not see quite clearly, everything seemed somehow wonderful to me. The grass outside was the greenest I had ever seen…The sun and the day felt warm and wonderful. The light sparkling from the cars was as beautiful as anything I had ever seen… I had the feeling that I knew what the purpose and the reason for life was. The feelings that I had at the time could not be very well described in psychiatric terms but best described in either religious or poetic ones.

Postmodern Humanism 128 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

I had a very strong feeling that everyone was basically good, and that once the defences and the garbage, so to speak, that we pick up throughout our lives were stripped off, there really was such a thing as the brotherhood of man…’

‘The distinctions between “I” and “it” and the divisions into “this and that” have ceased. Dimension and quantity have gone…Far from a sense of loss, bewilderment, or dimming, there is the most vivid recognition of a wholeness that is absolute, timeless, instant. The comprehension is entire…This state is basic and omnipenetrat- ing . One does not “appreciate” it. Every object and every self are aspects, scintillate and constructs made by the separate consciousness in their effort to objectivize and manipulate that timeless continuum…Coming down from it, joy is felt, and unstinted loving- kindness. But in itself it would seem to be nearer to a knowledge that is at last pure Truth - a Truth which is Reality and therefore transcending feeling, as we know it, and action as we strive to manifest it.’

Cohen comments on these experiences:

‘It is unnecessary to pass final judgment upon these states now. T h e i r value to the individual may be open to question, but the importance of investigating the condition itself is obvious. These are unusual manifestations of human mental function, ordinarily inaccessible. The ability to produce them chemically clarifies similar obscure and puzzling experiences found in the religious, historical, and mystical l i t e r a t u r e . ’ Drugs of Hallucination ( 4 1 )

The similarity between these drug-induced descriptions and what is often identified as a religious experience is indeed strikingly obvious. What is clear is that each individual carries back from their ‘trip’ d i fferent, but similar, accounts of what the experience was. For some the experience was ‘good’ - one of wonder and delight - for others the experience was ‘bad’- unpleasant and terrifying. Many have diff e r e n t experiences on different occasions. And some have diff e r e n t experiences on the same occasion.

129 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

At the University of Pennsylvania radiologists have constructed brain maps that show how different religious experiences accompany certain neural processes. They report that in experiences of ‘oneness’ with the universe, blood flow drops in the parietal lobe, a brain structure that gives us a sense of self. Some research seeks to develop devices to stimulate that part of the brain to enhance ‘spiritual’ experiences. However the mystical experience might be induced it would seem to offer an alternative approach to the experience of existence, radically different from the approach of the metaphysical philosophers. Who can say that, as an experience of consciousness, it is less valid? Wittgenstein, after abandoning metaphysic philosophy, turned to mysticism. Some writers, particularly in the tradition of Indian metaphysics, have sought to use the relativist perspective to argue that their - mystical vision presents a view of reality equally valid to that of Western science. Some, as a consequence, have sought to attack Western science as reductionist. Some, on the basis of relativism, have sought a holistic view embracing both the mystical and scientific perspectives. However, the mystical experience does not meet the demands of a relativist belief as described here. It is not subject to rationality (much less to the requirement of repeatable sense observation and openness to disproof) and, hitherto, mysticism does not seem to have contributed to the scientific project in any significant w a y. For our purpose here, we can see that while the mystical experience might give an insight into the nature of human perception and the human condition it does not lead to valid mental constructs pertaining to our ‘ordinary’ world. It might be thought rather to tell us about the function of the human brain and the nature of consciousness than to describe the ‘reality’ of the universe. The identification of a chemical source for the mystical experience causes problems for the religious (not to mention their social approba- tion) but a material source is easily accommodated in a Humanist perspective. Relativist Humanists, as materialists, would accept that consciousness is a phenomenon of material - and the mystical experience, whatever its source, is as valid as any other human experience or perception of existence. This view endorses the

Postmodern Humanism 130 Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

postmodern perspective - all experiences of existence are from a human perspective, all our concepts of reality are a human construct - however they might be caused. Few attempts seems to have been made, as far as this writer is aware, to identify a distinctive Humanist vision from either the historical or the mystical perspective. There is no definitive description of a distinctive Humanist grand narrative, a Humanist mystical vision. Is it the case that it is not possible to identify a distinctive Humanist vision? Must Humanists share their historical narratives and their mystical visions with the religious, the politicos - and the drug takers? The questions for Humanists, and the questions addressed here are - what would be the distinctive Humanist grand narratives, what would be their ‘vision thing’, where would their passion lie? How can we replace the religious myths with secular visions? It is argued in this book that the identification of a distinctive Humanist vision, historical and mystical, should be possible from a materialist perspective. That vision would be grounded in the Humanist relativist narrative of a universe chillingly grand, beautiful in its variety and complexity, but indifferent to the fate of the human species. A human species excited and awed by the chance circumstance of existence. Ahuman species without value or meaning - but engaged in the creation of value and meaning.

The postmodern perspective does not prohibit the holding of grand narratives, mystical or historical. Postmodernism identifies the status of these narratives, and describes how we must hold and act upon them. We ourselves are the source of any concept we might identify as a ‘vision’of what it means to be human. But this is a vision only by us and only for us. In the words of Popper, ‘though history has no meaning, we can give it meaning’. In doing this we are repeating what the human species has done since it became s a p i e n s . We are telling ourselves stories to encourage us in the dark, to comfort us in our sorrows, to give us hope to face the future. It has been argued in this book that Humanists must learn to construct their grand narrative, their vision, on a foundation of relativism. In doing this they will need to recognise that the ultimate basis of their vision is not wholly accessible to reason. In this way

131 Postmodern Humanism Grand Narratives - The Vision Thing

Humanism is open to creativity and the arts. Relativist Humanism authenticates the role of the arts as an expression of the human vision. I r o n i c a l l y, postmodernism and relativism have been blamed by some for the current violent expression of religious fundamentalism. By the postmodern declaration of the end of ideology, it is argued that the religious have been pushed to defend their vision by violence. Whether or not we agree that relativism has provoked fundamentalism as well as undermined it, we must surely take account of any factor that might explain the violent expression of the ‘vision thing’. If the secular Humanist world does not produce its own compelling grand narrative, its own vision, then many will look to a religious alternative - and some will seek its expression in fundamentalist violence. The alternative to postmodernism is not modernism, it is superstitious pre-modernism. Any proposal for the construction of a Humanist system of ethics must accommodate this genetic predisposition for the vision thing - but for Humanists to replace a transcendent God with the vision of a transcendent Man would be to deny the essence of Humanism. With the denial of absolute truth, and an understanding of the limitations of our rationality, relativist Humanists can turn naturally to the non-rational creative talents. In this we could look to the deconstructionists such as Derrida and Foucault who seek to go beyond language. More conventionally, we can look to our artists, writers, poets and politicians - after our philosophers have delivered their verdict on what Humanism is. Can we construct a distinctive Humanists narrative for our historical vision? Can we find a Humanist expression for the mystical experience? This book cannot address those aspects further - other than to invite the attention of other writers. We await an exposition of the ‘Humanist Vi s i o n ’ - viewed not simply as a convenient fabricated myth but rather as an authentic expression of an exciting and challenging choice for the destiny of the human species.

Postmodern Humanism 132 An image from the Trade Justice Movement Humanist Policies and Politics

By politics we generally mean the ways in which society organises (or d o e s n ’t organise) itself, formally and informally, to deliver its values. The question addressed here is what might be the Humanists’ s t a n c e in this regard and how might they seek to have it delivered. There are Humanists who believe that their Humanism is shared by those with a broad range of political beliefs and that to identify a Humanist political ‘manifesto’ would limit the Humanist appeal. C e r t a i n l y, as the political spectrum is currently manifest, it seems clear that we cannot recognise a distinctive Humanist position in party political terms. Indeed, from a postmodern perspective we cannot recognise any political position if that is intended as a universal blueprint for society. In this situation, some Humanists might choose simply to do their own thing as individuals and live their life according to their Humanist principles as best they can. Currently, it seems, many who think of themselves as Humanist would (if we are to believe the polls) be prepared to do just that. Possibly that is because because they do not see any overt political expression of organised Humanism which attracts their commitment. Nevertheless, while we might engage in social action as individuals, we also tend to seek collective action with the like-minded. For most, this will be a political question and requires a political answer. If we wish to exercise social influence it will be necessary to identify a collective stance on political issues. F u r t h e r, there is an argument to be made for the view that a series of distinctive political imperatives can be seen to flow from the rejection of transcendent assumptions. Certainly, we can identify certain political positions which follow from the distinctive postmodern

Postmodern Humanism 134 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

Humanist perspective as described in this book. The challenge is how to identify a political vision without constructing an ideological s t r a i t j a c k e t . There have been several attempts to describe Humanist politics, notably The Humanist Manifesto 2000 by Paul Kurtz ( 4 2 ) and, more r e c e n t l y, To w a rds a New Political Humanism, edited by Barry F. Seidman & Neil J. Murray ( 4 3 ) . These are valuable contributions to Humanist thought but they focus chiefly on the humanitarian aspects of Humanism and do little to identify a distinctive Humanist political position. The politics they identify is shared with most liberal humanitarians. This general conflation of humanist and humanitarian ideals and values is a consequence of the failure to identify a distinctive Humanist philosophy. The question then is can, should, Humanists seek to act as a distinctive political force? Is it possible, or desirable, to identify a collective Humanist political stance? Paul Kurtz answers this question:

‘If we are to influence the future of mankind, we will need to work increasingly with and through the new centres of power and influence to improve equity and stability, alleviate poverty, reduce conflict, and safeguard the environment.’ The Humanist Manifesto 2000 ( 4 2 )

Yes, we will need to do that. But Kurtz’ objectives are simply those of the enlightened liberal humanitarian. Is that it? Or can org a n i s e d Humanism make a more distinctive contribution? If Humanists seek to contribute to the collective choices by which the human species will be defined then the identification of distinctive political policies would seem to be necessary. We can approach the question as follows:

1. What is the philosophical basis for our values? 2. What values emerge from that philosophy? 3. What political policies can be identified from these values? 4. How can these policies best be delivered?

This book has sought to identify some answers to the first two questions from a postmodern relativist perspective. The answer we give to

135 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s the other two questions will depend on our individual prejudices and predilections. It is not possible to make a rational decision on these matters - and the structures for Humanists to arrive at ongoing, collective, democratic views do not exist. Nevertheless, having set out the challenge, as it were, it would be cowardly not to attempt a personal view.

Humanist political policies

The intellectual milieu affects and (hopefully) inspires the activists and the activists (hopefully) inspire and inform the theorists. T h i s book has addressed chiefly the theoretical aspects of Humanism but it has been a theme of the book that action is necessary for the delivery of Humanist values. It is useful (if risky) therefore to consider briefly what Humanist political policies might be from a relativist p e r s p e c t i v e . The following clearly reflects the author’s own political views. T h e reader must provide his/her own prejudices. It is necessary, first, to get some sort of handle on the contemporary political scene as it is currently expressed. We must first seek to identify a political compass - but in doing this we must recognise that it is we who ‘box’ the compass. We decide its alignment. From a postmodern perspective we cannot make a realist ‘deep s t r u c t u r e ’ diagnosis of society - much less a definitive prognosis. We cannot think in terms of a universal master plan, a Utopian blueprint. We cannot adopt a political transcendence while, at the same time, denying a theological one. In terms of social theory we cannot adopt an outright ‘realist structuralist’ v i e w. We cannot accept that objective social structures are alone responsible for the constructs of the indi- v i d u a l ’s social reality. As idealists, we deny that social structures exist as some objective universal reality imposing values on the blank slate of human consciousness. The view we must take is therefore one of caution, action by trial and error, pragmatic rather than dogmatic - a view identified earlier as ‘ s i t u a t i o n i s t ’ rather than ‘positionalist’. Certainly we can adopt a political direction to give a rational coherence to our action, a rough guide to how we are to approach and judge political issues. T h e

Postmodern Humanism 136 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

human condition seems to require that. We can adopt a political stance as a kind of quasi-realism, a sort of working hypothesis. But that must be done under postmodern terms. On this basis we would reject A l t h u s s e r ’s structuralist Marxism. Similarly we would reject the ideological capitalism of Adam Smith. Relativist Humanists would reject both on theoretical grounds but would also reject them on pragmatic grounds - both have been tried and found wanting. We can look at the world and see that while one half suffers from p o v e r t y, hunger and disease the other half is driven by conspicuous o v e r-consumption. We can see foreign policy driven by liberal economic imperialism. We can see a media driven by scandal and trivia and worse, by racism and prejudice. We can see our education system distorted to meet what it sees as the needs of the ‘vocational’. We can decide that the system we have is not the one to deliver the values we wish to assert. We can seek to change what we perceive to be the the basis on which that society operates. It is still possible, under postmodernism, for our revolutionary comrades to hold on to their Marxism - but on relativist terms. Marx never claimed to ‘give a recipe for the cook-shops of the future’. We can decide that while capitalism delivers the goods (for some) it does not deliver the human potential. It is on this basis that an anti-capitalist stance can be adopted as a working hypothesis - a non-structuralist stance which some might identify as Gramsci’s ‘Humanist Marxism’. The following, then, is based on a concept of political action around a neo-Marxist analysis of a capitalist-socialist axis - with the understanding that by ‘capitalism’it is meant economic-sourced endeavours directed chiefly at commercial gain (any social benefit is incidental) and by ‘socialism’ it is meant endeavours directed chiefly to social ends (any commercial gain is secondary). This is not to fail to recognise that real life is more complicated than that simple description. We are all now workers, consumers and capital owners (well, most of us in the West). Nevertheless, while we must reject ideas of the individual capitalist, capitalism as a systemcan be seen to have its own dynamic in its search for profit. It is easy to recognise that there is a difference between the objectives of capitalism and the objectives of social values. As the capitalist guru George Soros says:

137 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

‘The problem is not in establishing that there is a difference between the two, it is in deciding when we should be guided by one and when the other. ’ The Open Society ( 4 6 )

It is this ‘diff e r e n c e ’ which, it is argued here, we need to address.

In this analysis it is tempting, but simplistic, to dismiss the market as not a fair nor effective system of distribution. However, we must recognise that the market is ubiquitous in some form in all cultures and it does provide a mechanism to take account of the vagaries of individual choice without the necessity of trying to predict demand. According to Marx, and a view endorsed by contemporary economists, the market is an integral part of the price-wage-profit cycle - ‘you cannot buck the market’. On this analysis it is market capitalism - or revolution. Revolution as a short political singularity (of the revolutionary comrades) or as a gradual evolution (of the democratic reformists). Few seem prepared to go down the former road (for now) and we struggle to keep the market but to direct it to social ends - the ‘social m a r k e t ’ of the social democrats. The political debate at the moment revolves around the ways of achieving this ‘social dimension’ in a capitalist market by taxation, public services and regulations. Or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y, in the case of the extreme Right, of abandoning eff o r t s to introduce a social dimension in the economic equation. New Labour, the Clinton/Blair ‘Third Way’, can be seen, by those so disposed, as a continuation of the experiment in directing capital to social ends, with its genesis in the Co-operative movement and mutual societies of the 19th and 20t h centuries. State intervention now is direct in the case of the health service, education and the police and indirect in the case of the Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and Private Public Initiatives (PPIs). Other initiatives with this same aim include not-for-profit companies and a new form of company, the ‘Community Interest Company’ (CIC). The CICs are designed to engage in social projects but to exploit the risk-taking features of a company by raising shares - although dividend payments will be capped. The CICs will be required to produce an annual ‘community interest report’.

Postmodern Humanism 138 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

In this way, so the theory goes, the dynamic of capital and the market will be utilised for public ends. One problem is that the economic laws of risk capital conflict with the need to guarantee delivery of the public services. The state will always need to bail out the failing private company. Another problem is that private capital will only go along with this game where (and if) it delivers dividends in dividends. A further problem is that the ethos of public service is damaged or lost in the profit motive of private capital. The public service unions’drums beat and the natives are restless. We have seen the end of the belief in socio-economic Utopias - and for some ‘the end of history’ ( 1 ) . In the ensuing uncertainty we have seen the emergence of variations of social democracy where attempts have been made, with various degrees of success, to manipulate, direct or regulate the market for its (and our) own good. The motive might be worthy but capital works with competition at a global level and our politics have ended up dominated by systems of economic management. Our sociopolitical structures are now congruent with our economic system. Our ideals of democracy and freedom are expressed in a structural concept of capitalism and the market. But few now believe that the Western model of market capitalism is destined for universal permanence. The resolution of the conflict between social objectives and commercial gain is far from over. For many, the jury is still out. From a relativist postmodern perspective there is no justification for t e l e o l o g y, whether Marxist or non-Marxist. Meanwhile, capitalism and the market form the hegemonic politics of the 21s t c e n t u r y. This is the political battlefield on which Humanists must engage. While individual Humanists will make their choice between reform, revolution and the status quo, we can surely agree that there is an imperative to articulate a recognition of social objectives, of public values, in any political manifesto - and to recognise the priority of these social values in any socio-economic system. Thus, while it is difficult to identify a distinctive Humanist position from this analysis we can surely welcome any attention to the social aspects of political policy. The question here is whether we can identify and describe a distinctive political narrative based on a relativist Humanist perspective. Several writers might be thought to have approached this view without identifying it overtly as

139 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

‘Humanist’. One notable example of this is Karl Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies ( 1 1 ) . From a relativist perspective, another issue is crucial. With the recognition of the subjective status of human values, it will be necessary to address the question of how we should deal with human d i fferences - and particularly with the ideological differences - that will inevitably arise. Different social values are currently (supposedly) negotiated within our democratic processes and any Humanist politics will need to address the nature and function of our democratic structures. It might be noted that parliamentary democracy, as currently expressed in the West, is the means of the dictatorship of the majority - and sometimes the dictatorship of the minority. Studies in democratic methods, such as co-operativism, syndicalism and anarchism might provide a useful source for ideas whereby democracy is understood not as the dictatorship of the arithmetic m a j o r i t y, but rather the means by which all can find expression of their wishes in the context of a stable society. Some groups and organisations did experiment with such forms of open democracy in the 1960s and 70s. This is evident from the various student and community groups which bloomed (and mostly faded) at that time. For most, their existence was brief - but their eff e c t persists in the more open, more egalitarian, less deferential society of t o d a y. Some such organisations do continue to function in attenuated form, such as The Claimants Union and Newcastle-based T h i n k Globally - Act Locally. References for these organisations are given in the Appendix ( 5 2 ). On the above analysis, the following might be identified as some possible distinctive sociopolitical policies for 21s t-century postmodern Humanists - now there’s a challenge!

* The separation of church and state and the secularisation of all public bodies, public institutions and ceremonies. The promotion of a secular ‘mono-cultural’ state to go alongside the acceptance of a ‘multi-cultural’s o c i e t y. * A universal system of secular mono-cultural state schools, with no state support or financial incentives for schools outside the state s e c t o r. Religious Education in schools to be replaced by studies in

Postmodern Humanism 140 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

Citizenship and Belief Systems. *The promotion of new forms of democratic structures at local, national and international level. Support for the devolution of power to the lowest effective democratic level. A written constitution for the UK identifying rights as ‘citizens’r a t h e r than as ‘subjects’. A democratically elected parliamentary second c h a m b e r. Experiments with different forms of democratic structures including referenda and proportional representation.

* Support for international and global structures emphasising the unity of the human species. Support for the European Union and the proposed European Constitution. Support for all agencies of the United Nations. The restructuring of the Security Council of the UN on the basis of population blocks rather than nation states.

*The regulation of the pay, work conditions and work-life balance of all workers at a global level. A global minimum wage and work c o n d i t i o n s . Economic and social support for developing nations. An international monetary system.

* Local and global action to bring economic institutions under democratic control for social ends. The identification and promotion of ‘public value’ over economic gain. A declaration of the ultimate aim of the ownership/control of capital for social ends. A ‘public value assessment’ to accompany all financial audits. Democratic structures for the allocation of capital.

* Global expressions of, and collective action for, the protection of human rights and social objectives. Support for organisations which express a global humanist perspective such as the various o rganisations of the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights.

Watch, the World Court of Justice. Support for international and multi-national action on human rights and values - involving the use of human rights-driven military intervention.

141 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

* The development of social and economic structures which maximise the totality of freedom, ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, individually and c o l l e c t i v e l y. Independent bodies at national and international level to carry out regular ‘freedom audits’ to assess existing and prospective legislation regarding the balance between freedom and the needs of a secure society. Freedom to confront all beliefs and to challenge all belief systems.

* The study and development of social structures for dealing with conflict at all levels. The current democratic processes are clearly defective - particularly where ethnic divisions are concerned. If we are genetically predisposed to conflict and tribalism we must find non-confrontational ways of expressing a tribal identity.

* Support for expressions of human equality, value and dignity; the right to life - and the right to death. Legalisation of euthanasia; abortion for health and social reasons only - not ‘on demand’; global agreements on population regulation.

* The democratic control and regulation of key areas of human development: the genetic sciences and technologies; the exploration and exploitation of the earth and other planets; the use of global capital resources.

* The global regulation of: genetically modified crops; biotechnology; genetic engineering and allied genetic projects. A global project on the exploration of space; a global agency to advise on the future of all species including our own. The identification and creation of a sustainable global ecological system.

* Support for projects in the creative arts and the identification of a Humanist perspective in them. Support for secular projects experimenting with alternative lifestyles.

*Public and practical support for asylum seekers and refugees and other minority groups likely to be neglected by religious and other

Postmodern Humanism 142 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

humanitarian groups. * An international declaration of animal rights.

These can be only a personal view. In many ways it can be only a personal wish list. All Humanists will disagree with some of it and, in the sceptic tradition, some might disagree with all of it - and in this lies the problem for organised Humanism. At UK national level Humanist policies are generated by national committees in what is largely an ad-hoc manner. Policies, or more accurately ‘views’, are pursued largely by the lobbying of national politicians and the media. Some individual Humanists and local groups seek action through political parties and MPs, others by individual and collective direct action. All of this is important and valuable.There have been some notable successes on single issues but the wider politics have been largely unmoved. The action has been l a rgely uncoordinated and, while clearly, all this is necessary, we must ask, is it enough? Do organised Humanists make the impact they deserve and might expect in a largely secular society? We might conclude that, internationally, nationally and locally Humanists must find ways of engaging with others to identify and to realise their vision. This raises questions concerning joint action with others, particularly the question of cooperation with religious groups on humanitarian projects. Most humanists would seem to accept this action - but some recognise the need to do this under a Humanist banner with a clear Humanist focus. The question of a real debate with religious groups at a philosophical level is more problematical. First, o rganised Humanism needs to get its own house in order; to identify and articulate their distinctive philosophy, values and ethics; to clarify their objectives as a collective project and to organise themselves accordingly; to develop their policies, strategy and tactics.

Humanist organisational structures

The creation of formal democratic structures carries problems as well as advantages. The chief advantages of a formal democratic structure would be to facilitate the identification of policy on contemporary issues which could attract public attention and support and which

143 Postmodern Humanism Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s could form the basis of proselytising, recruitment and lobbying pro- grammes. A democratic structure can also create a sense of participation and shared identity. The chief disadvantage of a formal democratic structure is that it could be divisive. Policy decisions could upset the minority. Also, as with any form of organisational structure, it could attract the power- seekers and the demagogues - although it is to be hoped that the Humanist community would not be their natural home. A f o r m a l democratic structure requires mass membership and participation, otherwise control tends to lie with a handful of activists. On the other hand too loose a structure risks the possibility of what Mary Parker Follett describes as the ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ (D y n a m i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( 4 4 ) ) . Several views around these positions have been expressed. One is the idea of Humanism organised as an informal loosely structured entity serving chiefly as a sort of intellectual leaven. Others would like to see an organisation structured for direct political intervention. There are, of course, positions in between. C u r r e n t l y, it might be thought that the British Humanist A s s o c i a t i o n (BHA) and the Rationalist Press Association (RPA) take predominately the former view (raising intellectual issues) while the National Secular Society (NSS) takes predominately the latter (seeking political action). This might be the position which best matches the current membership and commitment - but it would be wrong to think of these as separate factions, not involving and reacting to each other. The Fabian structure has sometimes been identified as appropriate for a Humanist organisation. The Fabian model does not have a strict democratic structure (it operates, as does the BHA, on the basis of l a rgely unaccountable regional ‘representatives’) and it does not seek to make public policy pronouncements - indeed public policy positions are specifically prohibited by the Fabians’ rules. Intervention in the political arena is achieved by the Fabians by their sponsoring and publication of regular policy documents which, while representing some faction of Fabian thought, do not amount to formal Fabian policy. While this Fabian model might seem appropriate to the current membership of organised Humanism it must be remembered that the Fabians are able to make a significant and direct contribution to the political debate by their affiliation (and largely shared membership)

Postmodern Humanism 144 Humanist Policies and Po l i t i c s

with the Labour Party. It would seem inappropriate, at this stage, for the Humanist o rganisations to seek political affiliation - even if we could agree on the appropriate party! A significant influential role at national level would be unlikely (compared, say, to the Fabians, the CBI or the TUC), and local political parties are simply vehicles for the election of MPs and local councillors. H o w e v e r, as currently based, it might seem useful if the BHA w e r e to recognise itself as a Fabian equivalent, with the National Secular Society as their political arm. This would require the BHA to address seriously the promotion of academic publications and research on current philosophical, political and social issues which, while not representing formal Humanist policy, would carry a recognisable Humanist message. It would then be necessary for the BHA to engage in public debate on these publications with the political parties and to support the NSS in their more overtly political actions.

145 Postmodern Humanism Postmodern Humanism 146

C o n c l u s i o n s

Hitherto, Humanists have faced the charge that they are without ethics - without morals even. Others have charged that Humanism is a Christian heresy - that Humanists have appropriated the morality and optimism of religious redemption. In answering these charges some Humanists have sought to deny the ‘evil’ of the human genetic inheritance. Man, they say, is inherently ‘good’- a view of Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’, corrupted and depraved only by society. In an attempt to identify a secular salvation these Humanists have sought to deny the human condition and have endeavoured to replace a transcendental God with transcendental Man. That view, it is argued here, is a betrayal of the Humanist position. Experience has taught us that the human condition is, in an ethical sense, ‘flawed’. We carry the propensity for ‘evil’ - as well as for ‘ g o o d ’ . The Humanists’ message must be to recognise fully the human condition, its subjectivity and its genetic inheritance, and seek to make the best of it. The challenge to Humanists is not to deny the human condition but to engage with it with stoicism - to see that that is how we are. While we do not have the solace of the certainty of religious redemption we have the excitement and the satisfaction of existential c h o i c e . Other Humanists, recognising their inability to ground their liberal values in rational certainty, have attempted to portray their uncertainty as a virtue - we are, they proclaim cheerfully, ‘without an ideology’. This view is understandable. In some ways it is admirable. But it does not carry conviction and it does not inspire passion. There is an often unspoken recognition that Humanism should be about more than a free-wheeling liberal humanitarianism.

Postmodern Humanism 148 C o n c l u s i o n s

As a consequence of this uncertainty Humanism has failed to make the impact it deserves, and could be expected to have, in a largely non- religious society. Chiefly, this is because Humanists have failed to clarify their philosophy, failed to achieve a clear understanding of their intellectual stance, and consequently have failed to express themselves attractively, compellingly - and honestly. Hitherto, ideas of Humanism have been constructed chiefly on the unsupported premise of a secular humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is necessary - but it is no longer sufficient. Humanism needs a defining account:

‘ A substantial academic work that draws together and integrates traditional philosophical work with these more recent approaches.’ Colin Gallagher C h a i r, North East Humanists, 2004

The arguments presented here in this book seek to identify in relativist postmodernism a unifying philosophical framework upon which a range of Humanist beliefs can be located. A Humanist philosophy which recognises and rejoices in the fact that we, the human species, are the source, the creators and the focus of our values and beliefs. Rather than rejecting relativism, Humanists must construct their ideals upon it. The human species confronts a brief spell of material made conscious, in a meaningless, indifferent universe. The challenge for Humanists is to identify the manner in which we can give this experience value, meaning and purpose. Postmodern Humanism, then, recognises the total subjectivity of the human condition - a rational consequence of the rejection of gods and the transcendent - and recognises the identification of values and meanings as a creative existential act. Humanism in action can be seen as the process of clarifying those human declarations of human value by intellect and by action and by reviewing those values in the light of reason, knowledge and experience. The Humanist message is that we must be free to do that as an evolving project. The Western idea of ‘freedom’is currently expressed in the freedom of the market. That is certainly one powerful expression of the idea of freedom but to believe it is the only and final expression would be to underestimate the human potential.

149 Postmodern Humanism C o n c l u s i o n s

The collective human species has the possibility, and can assign to itself the right, to choose its future evolution and destiny, free from the constraints of religious belief and economic dogma. For the first time in history, the human species can take control of its material and biological future. That is where the evolutionary process has delivered us - and that is the process that we, as Humanists, are invited to carry f o r w a r d . As described here, action is an essential component of the Humanist ideal. Action is seen as necessary in the creation of Humanist values. Freedom of action, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, in a truly open society is thus an essential element of the Humanist vision. It is in the exercise of this freedom that we choose what the human species is to b e . Humanist ideals already permeate much of our social and cultural life. But this is often unrecognised and undeveloped. Humanism has become the ideal that is unable to speak its name. To meet the challenges of fundamentalism on one hand and ideological scepticism on the other, Humanism needs to find its distinctive voice. This book can be only a sketch of what a relativist Humanism would look like. Much work needs to be done by the Humanist community if they are to make the contribution that this perspective demands. This would include:

A professional account (‘a substantial academic work’) of Humanist philosophy from a relativist perspective.

An exposition of the Humanist vision - ‘historical’and ‘mystical’.

O rganisational structures to deliver an evolving statement of Humanist values and ethics.

The development of Humanist sociopolitical policies and the means to pursue them.

Currently the Humanist community, national and global, is not org a n- ised in a manner able to deliver these objectives. We await a Humanist leadership to deliver that organisation. We await the Humanist professional philosophers and sociologists, scientists, politicians,

Postmodern Humanism 150 C o n c l u s i o n s

writers and artists, to deliver that ‘substantial body of work’. We await the next Darwin or Mill. Otherwise we are likely to get the next Hitler or Stalin (or the next fundamentalist Christ or Mohammed). As Karl Popper puts it:

‘…we may become the masters of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its prophets.’ The Open Society and its Enemies (11)

Human values are tentative, pragmatic and provisional. In this they are fragile and vulnerable and will need to be defended. We are learn- ing to confront religious and political terror at military level. Postmodern Humanism provides the possibility to address it an intellectual level. Much depends on how, and if, we do that. For Humanists it is not ‘the end of history’. For Humanists, it might be thought that the history of the human species has hardly yet begun. The human species has survived many crises of existence and is now experiencing a crisis of identity. The historic role for Humanism could be to encourage us to explore our common humanity and to help us understand what that humanity is - and could become.

151 Postmodern Humanism Postmodern Humanism 152 A p p e n d i x

B i b l i o g r a p h y

1: Howard Williams; Francis Fukuyama and the End of History, University of Wales Press, 1997. 2: John Gray; H e re s i e s , Granta Books, 2004. 3: Jean-Paul Sartre; Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen, 1948. 4: Jim Herrick; Humanism: an Intro d u c t i o n , Rational Press Association, 2003. 5: British Humanist Association Philosophers Group; What is Humanism?, 2 0 0 3 . 6: Stephen Hawking; A Brief History of Ti m e , Bantam, 1995. 7: Charles Darwin; On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, 1859. 8: Thomas Henry Huxley; Evolution and Ethics, 1 8 6 3 . 9: Susan Blackmore; The Meme Machine, Oxford University Press, 2000. 10: Noam Chomsky; Language and Fre e d o m , Fontana, 2000. 11: Karl Popper; The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge, 1945. 12: Daniel C. Dennett; F reedom Evolves, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2004. 13: Matt Ridley; The Origins of Vi rt u e , Penguin Books, 1997. 14: John Stuart Mill; On Liberty and Other Essays, 1 8 5 9 . 15: Immanuel Wallerstein; U t o p i s t i c s , The New Press, 1998. 16: Stephen Hawking; The Universe in a Nutshell, Bantam Press, 2001. 17: Gerry Gilmore; The Guard i a n , 3 0 t h Oct. 2004. 18: Roger Penrose; The Road to Reality, unpublished, 2005. 19: Immanuel Kant; Critique of Pure Reason, 1 7 8 1 .

153 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

20: Umberto Eco; The Guard i a n , 4t h Sept. 2004. 21: Joao Magueijo; Faster Than the Speed of Light, A r r o w, 2004. 22: John Dewey; Experience and Nature , Open Court Pub. Co., 1925. 23: Andrew Brown; The Guard i a n , 6t h . N o v. 2004. 24: Paul Bloom; D e s c a rt e s ’ B a b y, William Heinemann, 2004. 25: Noam Chomsky; Knowledge and Fre e d o m , Fontana, 1972. 26: Guy Debord; The Society of the Spectacle, Zone Books, 1995. 27: Jacques Derrida; L’ E c r i t u re et la Difference, Routledge, 2001. 28: Michel Foucault; Madness and Civilisation, Routledge, 2001. 29: Ludwig Wittgenstein; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan, 1961. 30: Willard V.O. Quine; Wo rd and Object, The MIT Press, 1960. 31: Bertrand Russell; Principia Mathematica, 1927. 32: Roger Penrose; Shadows of the Mind, Vintage, 1995. 33: T.S. Young; Chaos Theory and Social Dynamics, Texas Wo m e n ’s University and Vi rginia Polytechnic and State University, 1991-1994. 34: Edward O. Wilson; C o n s i l i e n c e , Little, Brown and Co., 1998. 35: David Boulton; The Trouble with God, O Books, 2002. 36: Peter Jay; The Road to Riches, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2000. 37: Samuel Beckett; Waiting for Godot, Faber and Faber Ltd, 1998. 38: Thomas Mann; The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man, 1 9 4 5 . 39: Wilfred Owen; War Poems of Wi l f red Owen, Chatto & Windus, 1994. 40: The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Ward Lock, 1950. 41: Sidney Cohen; D rugs of Hallucination, Paladin, 1970. 42: Paul Kurtz; The Humanist Manifesto 2000, Prometheus Books, 2000. 43: Barry F. Seidman & Neil J. Murray; To w a rds a New Political Humanism, Prometheus Books, 2004. 44: Mary Parker Follett; Dynamic A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Pitman, 1982. 45: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; The Communist Manifesto, 1848. 46: George Soros; The Open Society, Little, Brown & Co., 2000. 47: Aldous Huxley; Doors of Perc e p t i o n , Vintage, 1954.

Postmodern Humanism 154 A p p e n d i x

Other References

48: The Amsterdam Declaration 2002 See page 156

49: Draft Report of North East Humanists Working Party on Humanist Beliefs and Values and Actions, 2005 See page 158

50: BHA and North East Humanists’Statement of Beliefs , 2000 See page 170

51: Humanist Organisations

British Humanist A s s o c i a t i o n 1 Gower Street London WC1E 6HD w w w . h u m a n i s m . o r g . u k

N o rth East Humanists 43 Fern Av e n u e Newcastle upon Tyne NE2 2QU w w w . N o r t h E a s t . H u m a n i s t s . n e t

National Secular S o c i e t y 25 Red Lion Square L o n d o n WC1R 4RL

Rationalist Press A s s o c i a t i o n 1 Gower Street L o n d o n WC1E 6HD www.rationalist.org.uk

155 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

International Humanist and Ethical Union w w w . i h e u . o r g

52: Direct Action/Human Rights Organisations

Think Globally - Act Locally (TGAL) PO Box 1TA Newcastle upon Tyne NE99 1TA

Amnesty International w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g

Claimants Union u k . g e o c i t i e s . c o m / j a n n e r b o y u k / p l y m o u t h c l a i m a n t s u n i o n / p c u l . h t m w w w . u n f i n i s h e d r e v o l u t i o n . c o . u k

Human Rights w w w . l e d . g o v . u k / h r a c t / h r a m e n u . h t m

D i re c t o ry of direct action websites w w w . s c h n e w s . o r g . u k / d a t a b a s e

53: Social T h e o ry

Structuralism and Social A c t i o n See page 173

Postmodern Humanism 156 A p p e n d i x

48: The Amsterdam Declaration 2002

AMSTERDAM DECLARATION 2002

Humanism is the outcome of a long tradition of free thought that has inspired many of the world’s great thinkers and creative artists and gave rise to science itself.

The fundamentals of modem Humanism are as follows:

1 Humanism is ethical. It affirms the worth, dignity and autonomy of the individual and the right of every human being to the greatest possible freedom compatible with the rights of others. Humanists have a duty of care to all of humanity including future generations. Humanists believe that morality is an intrinsic part of human nature based on understanding and a concern for others, needing no external sanction.

2 Humanism is rational. It seeks to use science creatively, not destruc- t i v e l y. Humanists believe that the solutions to the world’s problems lie in human thought and action rather than divine intervention. Humanism advocates the application of the methods of science and free inquiry to the problems of human welfare. But Humanists also believe that the application of science and technology must be tempered by human values. Science gives us the means but human values must propose the ends.

3 Humanism supports democracy and human rights. Humanism aims at the fullest possible development of every human being. It holds that democracy and human development are matters of right. The principles of democracy and human rights can be applied to many human relationships and are not restricted to methods of government.

4 Humanism insists that personal liberty must be combined with social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. Humanism ventures to build a world on the idea of the free person responsible to society, and recognises our dependence on and responsibility for the natural world. Humanism is undogmatic, imposing no creed upon its adherents. It is thus committed to education free from indoctrination.

157 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

5 Humanism is a response to the widespread demand for an alternative to dogmatic religion. The world’s major religions claim to be based on revelations fixed for all time, and many seek to impose their world- views on all of humanity. Humanism recognizes that reliable knowledge of the world and ourselves arises through a continuing process of observation, evaluation and revision.

6 Humanism values artistic creativity and imagination and recognises the transforming power of art. Humanism affirms the importance of literature, music and the visual and performing arts for personal development and fulfilment.

7 Humanism is a lifestance aiming at the maximum possible fulfilment through the cultivation of ethical and creative living and offers an ethical and rational means of addressing the challenges of our times. Humanism can be a way of life for everyone everywhere.

Our primary task is to make human beings aware in the simplest terms of what Humanism can mean to them and what it commits them to. By utilising free inquiry, the power of science and creative imagination for the furtherance of peace and in the service of compassion, we have confidence that we have the means to solve the problems that confront us all. We call upon all who share this conviction to associate themselves with us in this endeavour.

IHEU Congress 2002

Postmodern Humanism 158 A p p e n d i x

49: Draft Report of North East Humanists Working Party on Humanist Beliefs and Values and Actions, 2005

North East Humanists’ Statement of Beliefs, Values, and Actions

Fo r e w o r d

Stimulated by the ambitious attempt to encapsulate the essence of Humanist beliefs and values in the Amsterdam Declaration of 2002, and dissatisfied with much of the discussion on values in the Humanist literature, eight members of North East Humanists (and, later a ninth) formed a working party in 2004 to draw up a statement of beliefs and values which the North East Humanists membership might find helpful and broadly acceptable.

Among the difficulties with much of the discussions on values in the Humanist literature is that:

• Discussion is often only of moral/ethical values; • A value may be stated at such a level of abstraction that it may cover many different ways of behaving; • Philosophical approaches are over-represented with an under- representation of findings from the social sciences; • Some approaches can seem elitist, parochial, and patronising as in the • BHA’s Thinking About Ethics (‘decent people’, ‘good people’, ‘bad people’); • The attribution of the development of morality/altruism to the need for co-operation often ignores the social regulatory function of m o r a l s ; • In the light of today’s world events an emphasis on happiness as the goal in life can feel misplaced; and • Many of the values claimed for Humanism may be held equally by tolerant Believers with a social conscience.

We are not suggesting that we have discovered fresh values; most of the values we have identified will be familiar to humanists. What we have tried to do is to link the values to the beliefs behind them.

159 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Also, we recognise that while the beliefs set out below are thought likely to be held by many humanists, not all humanists will agree with them. Is there a difference between many of these beliefs and those of many Believers? Probably very little. They are basically the beliefs of someone who values the democratic ideal. The difference for a humanist is that the actions which follow from his or her beliefs and values are untrammelled by the constraints of religious ideology, by the need to pray for guidance, by considerations of punishment and reward in the next life, by reference to ancient manuscripts, or by supposed divine revelation.

This work is by no means complete but we have arrived at a stage where we should like to open up this project to the thinking of others. We see this as an evolving project in which the content may be added to and modified from time to time. Therefore, we welcome feedback and we invite contributions of additional beliefs, values, and, if possible, accompanying actions. Communications may be by e-mail to j o h n h o d g e @ b l u e y o n d e r . c o . u k or by letter to me at:

43 Fern Av e n u e , Jesmond, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 2QU.

All contributions will be acknowledged and contributors whose suggestions lead to a significant modification of the text in the next version, or to the inclusion of fresh beliefs, will be credited.

John Hodge C o n v e n o r North East Humanists’Working Party on Beliefs and Va l u e s

Members of the working party: Jack Grassby; Grace Hodge; John Hodge; Gordon Houlsby; Neil Jenkins; Roger McAdam; Jack Sibson; Peter Warburton; Geraldine Wi l k e s .

Postmodern Humanism 160 A p p e n d i x

Basic assumptions

The beliefs and values that we are concerned with here have to do with human nature, the nature of society, and the meaning of life. The position taken by the working party is that, where there is a choice of how to behave, the actions of an individual are in large part dictated by his or her values, that these values arise out of his or her beliefs, which, in turn, arise out of life experience.

The following statements are generalisations, nearly all of which require more space to validate them than is appropriate here. Our aim is to paint a broad picture of where we are coming from in compiling our suggested lists of Humanist beliefs, values, and actions.

In its simplest form the sequence is:

Common human needs + experience beliefs values actions ( n a t u r e ) ( n u r t u r e )

Human needs, experience, and beliefs

Humans are born with the genetic potential for the unfolding of a range of needs. Many needs, such as for food and comfort, are manifested at birth; other needs, such as for autonomy and achievement, e m e rge a little later in childhood. Inborn needs stay with the individual throughout life but evolve in their form during each life-stage through to old age. The manner in which these needs come to be satisfied, or not, is dependent on the physical and social environment and the degree to which it facilitates or inhibits personal growth (e.g. with regard to the kind, quantity, and quality of the food received, the kind of care given, whether living is harsh or easy, the opportunities for self- expression and self-fulfilment). Beginning in early childhood, according to how his or her needs are met, alongside beliefs implanted in him or her by carers, the individual develops beliefs to do with what people and life are about, all of which beliefs are gradually org a n i s e d into a coherent whole.

161 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Va l u e s

Values are preferences for particular forms of behaviour and are the principles by which we conduct our lives. By the time adulthood is reached we have acquired a hierarchy of values from the mundane or not very important to the high or deep and to which some individuals might give up their life to preserving, such as freedom of speech. Within this hierarchy we will have political, economic, social, aesthetic, religious, and other values, which develop out of our beliefs. If, for example, we believe that human beings are basically self-centred and untrustworthy, our values are likely to include protecting ourselves from exploitation and, perhaps, ‘doing the other fellow before he does me’. As with beliefs, values do not exist in isolation from each other but form a values system, that is, we each hold clusters of values, which are integrated, together with our system of beliefs.

Values are an integral part of personality; they are rooted in the needs system of the individual and are embedded in the belief systems that give meaning and coherence to his or her life and which sustain his or her sense of identity. Beliefs/values systems are dynamic, that is, a change in one area has a knock-on effect on other areas. Hence, the tenacity with which people may hold on to certain of their beliefs for fear that a change in one sphere may invalidate all of the beliefs which give them a sense of identity. Thus, statements of value in themselves may have little meaning without knowledge of the beliefs and attitudes of those who are propounding the value.

A c t i o n s

As noted, above, values may be seen as statements of policy, i.e. the principles governing action across a variety of situations. Actual ‘right b e h a v i o u r ’depends on the totality of the circumstances applying at the time. Therefore, the statements in the ‘Actions’column are intended to be indicative only and are just a few of the actions that could be identified as having a Humanist base.

Postmodern Humanism 162 A p p e n d i x

163 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Postmodern Humanism 164 A p p e n d i x

165 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Postmodern Humanism 166 A p p e n d i x

167 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Postmodern Humanism 168 A p p e n d i x

169 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

Postmodern Humanism 170 A p p e n d i x

50: BHA and North East Humanists’ Statement of Beliefs, 2000

What is Humanism?

The essential ideas of Humanism and secularism go back at least 2500 years to the time when Greek thinkers challenged traditions and beliefs based on the gods. These ideas were further significantly developed by philosophers of the renaissance in the 14t h century and subsequently.

North East Humanists North East Humanists are concerned with moral issues from a non- religious viewpoint and with the achievement of a more open, just and caring society. There is a long tradition of organised secularism in the North East reaching back to the 1860s.

B e l i e f s North East Humanists (with the British Humanist Association) hold that:

• morality is developed from experience, reason and knowledge, not derived from supernatural sources.

• human beings can lead happy, creative, fulfilling and meaningful lives whilst in this world.

• as far as we can know, our life here is the only one we will ever have.

• men and women must take responsibility for their conduct and for the welfare of others.

• in common with other life forms, human beings have evolved naturally over millions of years and will continue to do so.

A i m s North East Humanists was founded in order to:

• promote an awareness and knowledge of Humanism in this area.

• be a Humanist presence in matters of social concern.

• provide an opportunity for like-minded people to meet each other and exchange ideas.

171 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

A c t i v i t i e s Monthly meetings

Meetings on Tyneside take place on the third Thursday of each month at the Literary and Philosophical Society, 23 Westgate Road, Newcastle; just a few minutes walk from the Central Station Metro.

Te a / c o ffee is available from 6.45 p.m.

Talks and discussions on ethical and social issues with visiting speaker commence at 7.15p.m.

Visitors are very welcome.

The Teesside Group is also developing its own programme of activities.

N e w s l e t t e r A quarterly newsletter is sent to members including articles, the programme of events and matters of current interest.

Discussion groups Two groups of up to 10 members each meet, respectively, on the second Wednesday and second Saturday in each month to discuss any matters of common interest to Humanists.

Visitors are very welcome.

Fu n d - r a i s i n g A fund-raising group researches charitable causes compatible with Humanist beliefs and organises events to raise money for such purposes.

C o n f e r e n c e s One-day regional conferences on Humanist subjects are held from time to t i m e .

Social events There are opportunities for members to meet each other at a variety of social gatherings.

Postmodern Humanism 172 A p p e n d i x

NEH We b s i t e Up-to-date information on the group’s activities can be seen on our w e b s i t e : h t t p : / / N o r t h E a s t . H u m a n i s t s . n e t

Humanist Ceremonies

For people seeking a meaningful alternative to conventional religious ceremonies, North East Humanists can advise on and provide officiants for weddings, affirmations, namings and funerals.

In the case of weddings, baby-namings and affirmations, the celebration may be anywhere - in a private house or hotel, in a garden or even on a c l i fftop. It can be very personal, with poetry, readings, music and commit- ments chosen by the couple themselves, with help from the off i c i a n t .

Under the present law, a couple who choose a Humanist wedding ceremony must register their marriage with the Registrar, as a legal formality.

There are no special requirements for naming ceremonies, although the birth must be officially registered, as must a death.

A Humanist funeral provides a dignified opportunity for people to celebrate a life as well as to share their grief. It can take place at a crematorium, a cemetery or at a woodland burial ground. Music, readings, and tributes to the person who has died can all be included.

The British Humanist Association (BHA)

The NEH is affiliated to the BHA, a registered charity, and we encourage our members to support the BHA d i r e c t l y. Information on the BHA can be accessed by phone on 0207 079 3580 or from their website: w w w . h u m a n i s m . o r g . u k

Other affiliations are with the National Secular Society, the European Humanist Federation, the International Humanist and Ethical Union and the Gay and Lesbian Humanist A s s o c i a t i o n .

173 Postmodern Humanism A p p e n d i x

53: Social Theory Structuralism and Social Action

Diagram from the website: w w w . h e w e t t . n o r f o l k . s c h . u k / c u r r i c / s o c / t h e o r y . h t m

Postmodern Humanism 174 A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

It is, of course, not possible to identify all the sources which inspire a book - much less to give adequate credit. In one’s life there are some long-time friends who seem to have always been around and whose influence and ideas have permeated one’s own beliefs by a sort of osmosis. It is not possible to distinguish their ideas from one’s own. There are also more recent friends and acquaintances who suddenly, and often surprisingly, by a phrase or a question, open up an avenue of thought previously unexplored. These revelations have been interesting and often exciting and it is, perhaps, chiefly these which give the necessary incentive, the passion, for a writer to actually sit down and write.

I wish also to acknowledge the inspiration given me by the North East Humanists Working Party on Humanist Beliefs and Values whose earnest discussions, for me, set the hare running.

It is, therefore, to the following I wish to acknowledge my debt and my thanks. In many different ways they are co-authors of this book.

The old suspects

Gordon Houlsby Bill Gray Ab and Pru Hamed Malcolm Campbell Bernard Gounel

175 Postmodern Humanism The more recent suspects

Pete T h o m p s o n Don Pritchard Alex Brown Stuart Gardner David Mulholland Members of North East Humanists Working Party:

John Hodge; Gordon Houlsby; Neil Jenkins; Roger McAdam; Jack Sibson; Peter Warburton; Geraldine Wilkes.

Paul Gray edited the book and his corrections and suggestions were more helpful than any writer deserves. Lee Foster designed the book and his work, as evident here, is more attractive than any writer can expect.

All images are from the grass-root community publication Muther Grumble except where identified otherwise.

Postmodern Humanism 176 P O S T M O D ERN HUMANISM

CAN WE BELIEVE ANYTHING? Expressions of relativism, with their dismissal of gods, and the transcendent, have dumped us in an intellectual and moral vacuum. We no longer know who we are or what to believe - if, indeed, we can believe anything. This book considers, in a systematic way, the construction of a belief system for the 21st century from the perspective of what has become known as postmodernism.

To address this problem it is necessary to go back to first principles - to examine what ‘belief’ is. An attempt is made here to show how it is possible, necessary even, to do this from a postmodern perspective and to go on to identify a philosophical framework upon which we can construct our social values.

The book addresses at a popular level (but without dumbing down) some fundamental ideas in philosophy. These ideas are presented in the context of contemporary thought in philosophy, sociology, science, politics and the arts. The basis of a possible Humanist belief system which emerges from such an analysis is identified and the distinctive social values, and ethics (and politics) such a system might deliver are explored.

The North East Humanists welcome this book as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the meaning of Humanism and its relevance in the 21s t C e n t u r y.

Preview this book online @ www.jackgrassby.co.uk

Also by Jack Grassby:

The Unfinished Revolution

Revolution in the 2 1 s t C e n t u r y

Information on all three books can be found at www.jackgrassby.co.uk

£9.95