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No. 186 Israel’s principal sponsor and protector—and the number of Americans living in the Kingdom have developed over 10 years of U.S. military says must be better coordinated and better through -language media, specifically openness to such a process more clearly than it November 2001 as the starver of Iraqi children—it is easy for remains substantial; what has changed is the presence in . These run from how controlled than it has been in the recent past. including the increasingly influential satellite has done in the past. Strategic Forum opponents of American policies to portray the nature and depth of person-to-person contact. America prices military training courses and 4. Get better organized. On the diplo- television networks like Al Jazeera. Moreover, Institute for National Strategic Studies Saudi regime as accomplices in an anti-Arab, The same is true militarily. Restrictions on spare parts to the details of how the host nation matic side, this means avoiding prolonged gaps they need to hear it both from senior American The United States must recognize that National Defense University anti-Muslim conspiracy. accompanied tours for military personnel, support program is utilized. Serious attention in ambassadorial representation, such as the officials talking directly to them and from it cannot take Saudi Arabia for granted. Any Ten years ago, fears about the attitudes of imposed in the wake of the 1996 Khobar Tow- to addressing these grievances would help in one that was just closed by the arrival of Am- Arab-Americans and American Muslims who coalition to build security in the Gulf, let alone the Saudi “street” could reasonably be dispar- ers bombing, have shortened tour lengths and daily dealings with the Saudi military. It will bassador Robert Jordan. Equally pressing is the have found success and fulfillment in the one aimed at defeating global terrorism aged. That is no longer the case. The informa- hampered the development of personal rela- have little effect on Saudi public opinion, need to overhaul the way the United States United States. rooted in a radical interpretation of , tion revolution has hit Saudi Arabia and the tions between Saudi officers and American however, or on the ability or disposition of the organizes its defense presence in the Kingdom. The most difficult part, of course, is how cannot succeed without the full involvement U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding rest of the Arab world with a vengeance. In the advisory personnel. The consolidation of air Saudi government to support the American For historic and bureaucratic reasons, the U.S. to treat the question of political reform. Virtu- of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. America needs 1980s, the regime could exert almost total operations in the interest of force protection policy agenda. For that, the United States needs military now has at least three general officers ally every outside observer of the region recog- to address the problems in the relationship control over information entering the country. has meant the loss of day-to-day contact be- to take serious action in six areas: in Saudi Arabia on a continuing basis. None of nizes that a way must be found to carry out starting now. the Strategic Consensus Foreign newspapers were carefully censored, tween fighter pilots and ground crews of the 1. Prioritize what the United States the three works for either of the others. The political changes corresponding to the social and the only television news available was the two air forces. Because of the oil price slump of wants. It may well be that Riyadh’s most Department of Defense should elevate the changes that have been under way within Notes by Joseph McMillan 1 At his 1945 meeting with President Roosevelt aboard the dry recitation of the day’s royal appointments. the 1990s, there have been no major Saudi important contributions to a war on terrorism commander of Joint Task Force Southwest Asia Saudi Arabia and all the other Gulf states. USS Quincy, Abdul Aziz said, “You and I want freedom and In 2001, Saudis get news of the world from 24- will be providing clear public condemnation of to three-star rank—equal to the senior naval Squaring a tangible and immediate national prosperity for our people and their neighbors after the war. How hour satellite news channels, such as Qatar’s Al Islamic extremism and quiet private intelli- officer in —and consolidate defense interest in stability with a less tangible interest and by whose hand freedom and prosperity arrive concerns us but because of the oil price The preponderance of Saudi citizens Defense Donald Rumsfeld later denied that Jazeera. They read online editions of Arabic gence on Islamic extremists. On the other activities in the Kingdom under his operational in democracy is difficult everywhere, but little. The English also work and sacrifice to bring freedom and slump of the 1990s, there Key Points among the September 11 terrorists and Presi- Saudi Arabia had refused the use of its newspapers from London, Cairo, and Baghdad hand, the Bush administration may judge that control. At least the U.S. military would then be prosperity to the world, but on the condition that it be brought by them and marked ‘Made in Britain.’” Department of State, dent George Bush’s ensuing announcement of bases—on the grounds that the United States and exchange political views by fax, cell phone, have been no major Saudi it is more important to have access to Saudi air able to speak with a single voice. reform must grow he United States inevitably will look to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 8, Near East and Saudi Arabia to play a critical role in a war against global terrorism have again had not asked to use them—the fact that the and e-mail. When an Arab child is shot in weapons procurements bases to fly offensive operations against the 5. Give renewed attention to the Israeli- Africa (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 8. organically out of the any effective campaign against global placed the spotlight on the U.S. relationship issue arose at all highlights the need to keep Nablus or suffers malnutrition in Basrah, the Taliban or to have stable oil prices throughout Palestinian dispute. It will be argued that 2 Koran, Sura 3:103, trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The T from the United States with Saudi Arabia. Even before September 11, three key points in mind: images are instantly and repeatedly beamed to a crisis period. Nothing says that America taking on this challenge now would be reward- history and culture of the Islamic Computing Centre, London, available at terrorism. For Saudi Arabia to fulfill expecta- U.S.-Saudi relations were approaching a cross- the Kingdom and throughout the Arab world. for several years cannot seek help in all these areas, but the U.S. ing terrorism. Nothing could be further from people if the process is http://info.uah.edu/ tions, the United States must revitalize a Military cooperation with the United States msa/quranYusufali.html. strategic relationship that was under serious roads. Despite long odds, America forged a has always had the potential for damaging Saudi The flood of news has been matched by must have a government-wide understanding the truth. Osama bin Laden did not attack the 3 th to be peaceful and its Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10 ed. (London: strain before the attacks on September 11. successful military and political coalition with sovereignty and political and religious legitimacy in an equal flood of political discourse. The power weapons procurements from the United States of what it is prepared to give up if necessary to World Trade Center because the United States Macmillan, 1970), 738. Managing this relationship has always the Saudis during the Gulf war, but over the ways that have no parallel in most other countries, of radical religious scholars is felt in the publi- for several years, further limiting opportunities get the things needed most. was not working on the peace process. He does outcome successful 4 The Wahhabis destroyed the Shi’a shrines at Karbala, last several years bilateral ties have been including the other Gulf states. cation of manifestos and the preaching of for interaction and familiarization. 2. Undertake a genuine strategic dia- not want movement toward a peaceful Israeli- , in 1801, then captured Mecca and Medina in 1803–1804, presented unusual challenges. In particular, seriously strained. Both sides have been in- Getting Saudi cooperation in the war against inflammatory sermons in mosques. Since the The drift in ties has also been visible at logue. Ten years after the defeat of Iraq, there Palestinian solution. The Palestinian issue is nowhere more than in the Arab Middle East. where they cleansed the holy places of all traces of what they the Saudi Kingdom’s unique history and considered idolatry. They then invaded Iraq and Syria and were status in the Islamic world create risks that clined—and for the most part able—to keep Iraq and the continuing operations to secure Bagh- outbreak of the Al Aqsa intifadah, the King- the policy level. Other than Secretary of Defense is no shared understanding with the Saudi not the root cause of radical Islamic terrorism Yet it is now clear that orderly change toward dad’s compliance with the postwar ceasefire was a only driven out by a prolonged campaign led by Egyptian forces close military cooperation with the United these strains hidden from public view, but in dom’s cities have even witnessed street demon- William Cohen’s regular visits, cabinet level leadership on the strategic underpinnings of or the source of the Iraqi threat to the Gulf, but greater political participation and finding a at Istanbul’s behest (Hitti 740–41). In the early 20th century, the diplomatic feat of considerable complexity and skill. States could damage the House of Saud’s the process the United States seems to have lost strations, something unheard of in the past. officials in the Clinton administration visited the bilateral relationship and the future of the it is much easier for the Saudis and other Gulf way to reconcile deeply traditional social struc- British-brokered 1922 Treaty of Uqair, which defined the bound- Changes that have taken place since the sight of the unique problems the Saudis face in Meanwhile political reforms, such as national Saudi Arabia only when the United States had region. American and Saudi officials have Arabs to support America on terrorism and Iraq tures with the realities of the modern global aries of Iraq and , was aimed primarily at containing political and religious legitimacy. deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia for working with America. charters and democratic elections in neighbor- demands to levy, whether lower oil prices or conflicting rationales for the presence of U.S. when they see the United States working for a system are the only way to forestall serious Saudi expansion into territories ruled by Britain’s protegés, a fact These challenges were met in 1990 by a Operation Desert Shield make such cooperation that is now often forgotten. As the United States comes to grips with ing Kuwait, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, , and pressure on the Palestinians. Even Cohen’s forces in the Kingdom, conflicting understand- just settlement in the Occupied Territories and instability in the long run. Supporting the common understanding of the threat, shared even more delicate than it was before 1990. the aftermath of September 11, it is no longer Jordan emphasize for Saudi citizens their lack visits, designed as routine consultations, were ings of the threat, and undoubtedly conflicting when they are seriously consulted on the direc- necessary political evolution without triggering strategic objectives, and careful accommo- possible to sweep these issues under the rug, as of a voice in the future of the country. often dominated by the need to enlist support conceptions over how to move forward. These tion of that process. an even greater anti-American backlash will be dation of each other’s sensitivities. However, Saudi Insularity has been illustrated by the very public contro- Against the background of this rapidly for particular actions against Iraq. consultations need to be frank, strictly private, 6. Articulate a positive vision for the a narrow path to walk, but one that cannot be the factors that made the Desert Storm coali- versy over use of Prince Sultan Air Base by U.S. In structuring joint military action with evolving political landscape, U.S.-Saudi interac- regular, and inclusive of all aspects of the U.S.- region. The United States cannot expect the avoided. Obviously, it would be hazardous for tion work have deteriorated, while the politi- forces for operations against the Al Qaeda Saudi Arabia, American diplomacy must recog- tion at the personal, grassroots level seems to be Saudi relationship, from security and oil to Saudi government to make a public case on its the United States to try to script the reform cal environment has evolved to make military Rescuing the Relationship terrorist network. nize that the basic underpinnings of the Saudi withering. Although the number of Saudi agriculture and education. behalf, not least because the American process or provide the model for its outcome. As cooperation more difficult. At one level, the contretemps over polity create serious stresses in the system when students in American universities is still sub- For many reasons, Saudi Arabia must play 3. Do not make cooperation harder vision—a world open to pluralism, freedom, in any country, reform must grow organically Restoring the relationship will require: the reported Saudi refusal to allow the United Saudi leaders try to work closely with non-Arab, stantial, it is considerably smaller as a propor- an important role if an international campaign than it has to be. It will not always be possible and participatory government—is not the out of the history and culture of the people if addressing grievances that have grown over States to operate out of Saudi Arabia arose non-Muslim powers. Saudis are acutely con- tion of the university-age population than was against global terrorism is to succeed. Its politi- to avoid forcing the Saudis to choose between Saudi vision. Arabs in Saudi Arabia and else- the process is to be peaceful and its outcome a decade of American presence in Saudi from a front-page story in The New York scious of the uniqueness of that system. The the case before the Kingdom’s own higher- cal stature in the Islamic world, the fact that its the United States and the Arab and Islamic where need to start hearing not only what the successful. America, however, can indicate Arabia; prioritizing what Washington needs Times, which stated that a senior Air Force Nejdi heartland of Saudi Arabia, the region education system was up and running. Further- regime is the ultimate target for many of the causes that contend for their support, but United States is against (Iraq and Al Qaeda), from Riyadh; reaching an understanding on general had been dispatched to run the air war around which the modern Kingdom was built, more, because of the narrow, Islamically ori- terrorists, and indeed that the ideological, America often pushes them into these choices but what it is for, what kind of life it wants for the strategic basis of the bilateral relation- financial, and personal roots of Al Qaeda may ship and the future of the region; structuring from Prince Sultan Air Base. To judge from has an almost uninterrupted history of inde- ented curriculum in the Saudi education needlessly. Moreover, U.S. public characteriza- them. In précis form, this vision would call for The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by subsequent reports, the steps reported in The pendence dating back centuries. It was never system, a progressively larger share of young be found within Saudi Arabia give the Kingdom tions of what the Saudis have agreed to do, and a region free from war, terrorism, and tyranny books, monographs, and reports on national security members of the National Defense University as well as decisions to avoid forcing the Saudi regime a special role to play. For it to play that role strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. other scholars and specialists in national security affairs to take sides against America; overhauling New York Times were taken without top-level colonized or taken under protection by Saudis are reaching adulthood with only lim- of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with that where people are allowed to live their lives, For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, well, the two countries must find a way to U.S. military presence in the Kingdom to consultation with the Saudi government. No European powers; in fact, not even the ited exposure to Western ideas, let alone to the support, often have unpredictable and unpro- raise their children, and develop their political, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are government likes to learn from the press that Ottoman writ ran in the steppes and West itself. Meanwhile, the nationalization of revitalize their strategic relationship. ductive consequences. Maintaining the kind of social, and economic institutions as they see fit. produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect ensure improved coordination; renewing Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: the views of the Department of Defense or any other its territory is to be used by a foreign power deserts of Nejd. As a consequence, Aramco has meant fewer Americans living and American military officers and defense secrecy that the Saudis would prefer is neither The people of the Middle East need to diplomatic efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm. agency of the Federal Government. to conduct offensive military operations the Saudi political, social, and working with Saudis in the oil industry. Again, officials who have spent time with their Saudi practical nor appropriate, but what America hear this message not second-hand but straight front; and articulating a positive American INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE against a third country. Although Secretary of legal institutions evolved counterparts have heard the litany of griev- Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode vision for the region—one that is open to ances—some petty, some significant—that Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor political and economic change. in virtual isolation

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1924 –1927 circa 1745 1891 1912 Abdul Aziz conquers Hashemite 1993 Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and 1836–1838 Al Rashid rulers of Hail (now in Abdul Aziz begins establishing Kingdom of Hijaz, including holy Radical Islamic opposition group, Muhammad ibn Saud form religious- Ottoman-Egyptian force northern Saudi Arabia) conquer settlements of Ikhwan (“brother- cities of Mecca and Medina; 1962 Committee for Defense of 1995 political alliance and establish 1811–1818 invades and occupies Nejd, Riyadh, drive Al Saud into exile hood”) of Wahhabi tribesmen in drives Hashemite family off 1932 1938 1947–1962 U.S. deploys small force of 1979 1990–1991 Legitimate Rights, is formed; U.S. Army Saudi Arabian Wahhabi state in central Arabia Ottoman-Egyptian offensive installs collateral branch of in Kuwait, and recognize an effort to harness religious and becomes Abdul Aziz proclaims Kingdom Oil discovered in commercial U.S. builds and uses F–100s to Saudi Arabia in Radical Wahhabis seize and Coalition forces invited to use later succeeded by Movement National Guard program office (Nejd). destroys Wahhabi state. Al Saud as rulers. Ottoman suzerainty. zeal on behalf of Saudi state. King of Nejd and Hijaz. of Saudi Arabia. quantities near Dhahran. Air Base. reaction to Yemeni civil war. occupy Grand Mosque in Mecca. Saudi bases during Gulf war. for Islamic Reform in Arabia. in Riyadh destroyed by bomb.

1801–1804 1820–1834 1843 1902 1921–1922 1928–1929 1933 1945 1951 1979–1989 1989 1991 1994 1996 Nejdi-Wahhabi forces sack Shi’a Al Saud family begins reconsti- Imam Faisal ibn Saud returns Abdul Aziz ibn Saud (later first British repeatedly repel Ikhwan Abdul Aziz puts down rebellion Oil concession granted to President Roosevelt and King U.S. Military Training Mission U.S. deploys small force of Governor of Asir arrests Fundamentalist clerics issue Saudi security services arrest U.S. Air Force apartment shrines in Iraq; capture Mecca tuting Wahhabi power in Nejd; from exile, resumes throne, and ) retakes threats to Kuwait, Transjordan, of Ikhwan. Standard Oil of California. Abdul Aziz meet aboard USS established. F–15s to Saudi Arabia in conservative preacher on morals “Letter of Demands” to leading radical cleric, provoking building in Khobar destroyed and Medina, invade Syria. By by 1834 the revived Nejdi- rebuilds domains. Riyadh and founds modern Saudi and Iraq, leading to Treaty of Quincy in Great Bitter Lake, reaction to Iranian revolution, charges, provokes large increase role of religion in protests and calls for violent by bomb. 1804, the Nejdi-Wahhabi state Wahhabi state includes most of state as Sultan of Nejd. Uqayr defining Nejd’s northern Egypt. then deploys AWACS during demonstrations. decisionmaking. action against government and embraces most of Arabian modern Saudi Arabia minus Red borders. Ikhwan raids continue Iran-Iraq war. foreign forces. Osama bin Laden Peninsula. Sea coast. as late as 1927. calls for holy war and is stripped of Saudi citizenship.

from the more cosmopolitan influences that Overshadowing this background of isola- [and] a unique place in the hearts and minds Expansion of the Modern Saudi Kingdom petroleum reserves. The wealth that flowed from structure, the United States counted on per- assumption of a de facto regency, the modalities What Abdullah undoubtedly hears shaped the countries around it. tion is the pervasiveness of an especially strict of believers throughout the world.”3 Most West- those resources in the 1970s and 1980s surely sonal relations between Schwarzkopf and of U.S.-Saudi relations became significantly through his contacts with the Saudi people is The House of Saud, which has ruled for version of Islam as the framework within erners living in a post-Enlightenment world reinforced the strength of Riyadh’s voice, but Khalid to ensure effective coordination. more complicated. This is not because Abdullah discontent with the fact that Western forces are most of the last 200 years, has sought with which all of Saudi life and politics takes place. find it hard to understand the profound emo- neither oil nor money alone could buy the The agreement on command structure is anti-American, but because, as regent instead still in the Kingdom 10 years after the defeat of TRANS An Nafud diminishing success to preserve this isolation. An often quoted passage from the Koran likens tional attachment of Muslims to these places, IRAQ Saudis the stature that they enjoy in Arab and illustrates how far the U.S. administration went of king, his freedom of action is constrained by Iraq. To the United States, the reason to remain JORDAN One of the principal reasons King Adbul Aziz, the Islamic faith to a rope: above all to Mecca, and the uneasiness with Al Jawf Islamic councils; credibility in managing and to ensure that the Saudis could stay on board the requirement that he work within a collective in Saudi Arabia is clear: Iraq has not imple-

father of the current ruling generation, sought And hold fast, all together, by the rope which they hear reports (however untrue) that Captured from Rashidis, 1911 protecting the holy places does. However, close in the common struggle. This careful approach leadership. This constraint is magnified by mented its ceasefire obligations, Saddam Hus- American rather than British oil companies to infidel troops are occupying this sacred soil. military association with the United States, the was visible in countless other ways as well, Abdullah’s lack of full brothers as natural allies sein remains in power, and Iraqi forces still which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not Hejaz Ha'il IRAN SHAMMAR develop the oil resources of the Eastern divided among yourselves; and remember with The Legacy of Abdul Wahhab and Al Captured from AL-HASA country that, more than any other, embodies from American efforts to keep Israel out of the within family councils and his concomitant threaten neighbors. Nevertheless, the Saudi Hashemites, Province was his perception that U.S. involve- Saud. Secondly, the House of Saud came to 1924–1925 NAJD the modern globalist challenge to traditional fight to Schwarzkopf’s prohibition of the con- royal family is under steadily growing pressure gratitude Allah’s favour on you; for ye were th Al Hufuf ment came with no political strings attached. enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so power in the 18 century through an alliance Medina Islam, undermines that credibility. sumption of alcohol by American troops and the myth of American to explain how it can claim to defend the Holy American companies were in it for the money, that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye with the most puritanical movement yet to Riyadh Gulf of Oman restrictions on public disclosure about Ameri- Places if it cannot even defend itself without Captured from omnipotence leads many Kingdom of House not for strategic influence, and therefore would were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He arise within orthodox Islam. Founded by the Ottomans, 1911 can use of Saudi bases. In return, the Saudis the aid of unbelievers. Its critics demand to of Saud Building a Coalition Arabs to conclude that, if be less likely to present challenges to the Saudi saved you from it.2 Nejdi teacher Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab agreed to a range of activities by U.S. forces know how the leaders of Islam can allow the political system.1 Until the 1970s, broad areas (d. 1792), the Wahhabis, as their opponents For both religious and historical reasons, that would have been anathema a few weeks Saddam is still in power, sacred lands of Mecca and Medina to be used of the country, including the capital, Riyadh, called them, were viewed throughout the Mus- Mecca Saudi protectorate, allowing non-Arab (especially non-Muslim) earlier, such as non-Islamic religious services as a military base by those who are making unlike the mercantile 1920 to 1933 troops into the land of the Two Holy Mosques it must be because were off-limits to Westerners. Foreign embassies lim world as the quintessence of radicalism Annexed in 1933 Annexed in 1925 and allowing American servicewomen to drive war in Iraq and Afghanistan against believers. were restricted to Jiddah, a port city already elites of the smaller Gulf and fanaticism for the first 200 years of their was a momentous decision for Fahd to take in on Saudi roads. It was this combination of America wants him to be These criticisms, which go to the fundamental Rub al-Khali OMAN tainted by contact with the outside world. Even states, the dominant history.4 Under Wahhabi political philosophy, Al ASIR August 1990. Secretary of Defense Richard American sensitivity and Saudi flexibility that legitimacy of the regime, are the source of Cheney and the team he took to Jeddah to today, all foreign embassies are corralled political groups in Saudi Saud rule is ideologically justifiable only to the enabled the coalition to work. need to reach out to other allies through com- Saudi refusals to allow offensive operations within a secure, purpose-built diplomatic extent that the ruling family upholds the faith Jizan Arabian Sea secure agreement on U.S. deployments may not promise and negotiation. Abdullah is not in a against Iraq from its bases and of its anger Arabia rarely had to deal have fully appreciated the historical basis of quarter on the outskirts of Riyadh, where in all its purity. Unlike King Abdullah of Jordan YEMEN HADRAMAUT Postwar Changes position to take risks or make bold decisions as when the United States allows operations con- interaction between foreigners and Saudis can with foreigners, especially or King Muhammad VI of Morocco, King Fahd these sensitivities, but the circumspection with Fahd was in 1990. ducted from Saudi Arabia to be publicized. be controlled. Unlike the mercantile elites of and his brothers do not rule by hereditary which they approached the task reflected a In contrast to the U.S. experience in Eu- Abdullah’s views, interests, and manage- In addition, the myth of American om- non-Muslim foreigners clear recognition of how unprecedented and rope, where long-practiced habits of coopera- the smaller Gulf states, the dominant political descent from the Prophet but as part of a social ADEN rial style are also significantly different from nipotence (reinforced by its own frequent 0 250 Miles difficult their proposal was. tion make joint action easier, operational mili- groups in Saudi Arabia rarely had to deal with This rope is made up of countless fibers contract with the community of believers. Gulf of Aden Fahd’s. Where the former focused on the strate- pronouncements of its stature as the sole super- foreigners, especially non-Muslim foreigners. Osama bin Laden’s message derives much Once King Fahd agreed to the deploy- tary cooperation in Saudi Arabia has grown gic picture, the latter focuses on details. Where power) leads many Arabs to conclude that, if woven and intertwined—religious, legal, 0 250 KM ments, General Norman Schwarzkopf and staffs more difficult since the victory over Iraq. There One result of this history is an insularity that social, cultural, economic, educational—and of its appeal in Saudi Arabia from its reliance Fahd’s attention was oriented toward the Gulf Saddam is still in power, it must be because sometimes borders on xenophobic arrogance. on the very same Islamic teachers who pro- in Washington, Tampa, and Riyadh began are many reasons. Some problems stem from and the West, family connections on his America wants him to be. The seductive expla- disentangling them is almost impossible. But devising a structure for coalition forces that the inevitable cross-cultural frictions, some Paradoxically, a second result is an uneasy two strands are of particular importance in vided the theoretical justification for the Saudi mother’s side orient Abdullah’s attention more nation is that the United States is obviously sense of fragility, a suspicion that institutions state. Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taimiyah threw aside the traditional U.S. insistence on from the decade-long slump in oil prices that to the Arab north—and the Israeli-Palestinian plotting to dominate the Middle East and its constraining the Saudi political system: dynasty, first came to power in the 18th century. designation, which traditionally conveys to the indispensability of unity of command. The altered the financial terms of both the security that have not had to withstand the winds of Mecca and Medina. First, geographically (1263–1328), perhaps the most important So when bin Laden preaches a duty to over- whoever holds sovereignty over the cities of dispute. Moreover, Abdullah is reputedly more resources, particularly as the effectiveness of foreign influence may not be as sturdy as many seminal influence on Wahhabi doctrine, taught coalition had no single supreme commander assistance and host-nation support components pious, which makes the Islamic dimension the U.S. deterrent makes the Iraqi threat seem and historically, Saudi Arabia holds the two throw and kill rulers who permit innovations Mecca and Medina, crystallizes the claim of the but three separate chains: a NATO-style of the relationship. More fundamentally, how- Saudis would have them. holiest sites of Islam. It is, as the definitive that subjects are not bound to obey a ruler who and foreign influence, the Saudi royal family is House of Saud to a position of leadership within even more germane to understanding his misleadingly remote. Public receptivity to these fails to enforce the holy law, or Shariah. Ibn arrangement by which Schwarzkopf exercised ever, U.S.-Saudi military ties have been affected decisionmaking. Finally, the crown prince is in messages did not originate in dissatisfaction history of the Arab peoples puts it, “the cradle of hard pressed to dispute the point. the Arab and broader Islamic worlds. From a command over U.S. forces and operational by transformations in three major areas that Islam,” with “a halo of sacredness around it Abdul Wahhab himself held that subjects have Islam is not only the basis of the internal Western perspective, Saudi Arabian interna- much closer touch with ordinary Saudis than with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but a positive duty to disobey, depose, and, if need control over British forces; a second chain in overlap with and reinforce each other: the Saudi Fahd was, still conducting a weekly majlis, the attitudes toward the United States and the legitimacy of the House of Saud but also the tional standing may come from its possession of which Saudi Arabian Lieutenant General leadership, the political consciousness of the be, kill a ruler who falls away from enforcing source of much of its international standing. It more than a quarter of the world’s proven public council at which any subject can present governments that work with it have been sub- the faith. That was the appeal on which Prince Khalid bin Sultan Al Saud commanded Arabs of the Gulf, and the American role and requests and grievances directly to the regent stantially hardened by the collapse of that This Strategic Forum was prepared by Joseph McMillan, a distinguished research fellow in the Institute for is significant that King Fahd’s official title is not all Arab and Islamic forces; and a third, sepa- image in the region and the world. Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the “His Majesty” or “King of Saudi Arabia” but for quick action. process and the onset of the Al Aqsa intifadah. National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to rate French chain of command. Instead of With King Fahd’s debilitating stroke in late To the extent that the United States is seen as Dr. McMillan at (202) 685–3610 or forward them by e-mail to [email protected]. “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” This insisting on a formal combined command 1995 and Crown Prince Abdullah’s subsequent

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