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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ______

The attached transcript, while an accurate recording of evidence given in the course of the hearing day, is not proofread prior to circulation and thus may contain minor errors.

2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION

MELBOURNE

TUESDAY 6 APRIL 2010 (129th day of hearing)

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE B. TEAGUE AO - Chairman MR R. MCLEOD AM - Commissioner MS S. PASCOE AM - Commissioner

______CRS WORDWAVE PTY LTD - A MERRILL COMPANY. 4/190 Queen Street, Melbourne. Telephone: 9602 1799 Facsimile: 9642 5185

17295 1 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, I call the first witness this 2 morning, Ms Christine Nixon. 3 Victoria Police for eight years?---Yes, I did. 10 You held that role between April 2001 and March 2009?---That's 11 correct. 12 With the assistance of Victorian Government Solicitors, have 13 you prepared a statement dated 22 January 2009?---Sorry, 14 I'm just checking the date. 15 That's the date on the version I have been given. I think it 16 was actually supplied much later in 2009?---And this 17 is - just so I'm clear, this is the statement relating to 18 my responsibilities as the Chief Commissioner. 19 That's right?---Yes, I did. 20 It has obviously got an incorrect date on the top of it, but if 21 you have got a copy of that statement, it has now been 22 identified for you. It is (WIT.3010.009.0377)?---Yes. 23 That is the statement that deals with your duties as Chief 24 Commissioner of Police, the events of 7 February and 25 related matters?---Correct. 26 Are the contents of that statement true and correct?---Actually 27 I would like to make one alteration, if I could. 28 Yes, if you can direct our attention to where things should be 29 altered?---To paragraph 44. 30 Yes?---And I have, since this statement was prepared, caused 31 some other inquiries to be made and I would like to alter

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17296 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 it, if I could, to the point that I actually asked 2 Assistant Commissioner Fontana to brief Minister Cameron 3 by phone at approximately 5.40 pm. 4 So as corrected it should read, "I asked Assistant Commissioner 5 Fontana to brief Minister Cameron by phone"?---"At 5.40 6 pm." 7 The sentence now reads, "I asked Assistant Commissioner Fontana 8 to brief Minister Cameron at 5.40 pm"?---That's correct. 9 With that correction, Ms Nixon, are the contents of that 10 statement true and correct?---Yes, they are. 11 I tender that statement. 12 #EXHIBIT 836 - Witness statement of Christine Nixon 13 (WIT.3010.009.0377). Log of Assistant Commissioner 14 Fontana (VPO.001.081.0166). Delegations and position 15 descriptions (INDX.820.001.0001). Victoria Police manual 16 extracts (INDX.821.001.0001). Letter from VGSO 17 (CORR.1003.0165_R). Emergency Management Act as at 18 February 2009 (TEN.254.001.0001). Kilmore prediction map 19 (TEN.020.002.0001). 20 MS DOYLE: I will take you to the other report which deals with 21 recovery matters later in the morning?---Thank you. 22 I want first to ask you a number of matters that arise from 23 this document which is now exhibit 836. As you note in 24 the statement, prior to your appointment as the Chief 25 Commissioner of Police in Victoria you were a member of 26 the New South Wales police force for 29 years?---I was. 27 And you say in paragraphs 4 through to 6 of your statement that 28 you were involved in a number of roles and functions in 29 New South Wales?---Correct. 30 Including some in which you gained emergency management 31 experience. I just want to ask you about the emergency

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17297 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 responses in which you have been involved. Focusing on 2 paragraph 5 of the statement, you give the example of in 3 1997 being emergency management controller as part of your 4 role as regional commander, assistant commissioner within 5 the Greater Hume region. Was it in that role that you 6 were then involved in some of the emergencies you mention 7 in the following sentence, major fires and an outbreak of 8 Newcastle disease in chickens?---No, sorry. I had a 9 number of roles as region commander and I first went as an 10 operational region commander in what was called the 11 Greater Hume region, which is the western suburbs of 12 Sydney and down into the area around Bowral, so that was 13 my first operational experience as a region commander and 14 I was involved in chairing and meeting with people in that 15 area around emergency management. The 1998 statement that 16 I made is in regard to while I was actually the region 17 commander in a region called - I can't think what it was 18 called. I guess it was the region around Gosford area 19 when in fact there was an outbreak of Newcastle disease 20 and some fires in the central coast of New South Wales. 21 What role did you play with respect to the fires on the central 22 coast?---New South Wales has a structure that means that 23 the assistant commissioner is the operational coordinator, 24 for want of a better description. So I was responsible to 25 have met and prepared and worked with a range of the 26 agencies involved in fire and other emergency situations 27 and to put in place procedures to be able to deal with 28 with whatever the incident might be. So in this 29 particular case I was there in support of the combat 30 agency, for want of a better description, fire services. 31 During those fires, did any part of your responsibilities

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17298 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 involve responsibilities for warnings or evacuations with 2 respect to those fires?---In some cases there were 3 instances where clearly warnings were given to the 4 community, but I think they were given by the fire 5 agencies. We also had an emergency management officer who 6 was a full-time officer within my office in that region 7 and he also would have been involved in giving some of 8 those as well. 9 But were you personally responsible for any aspect of warnings 10 or evacuation pertaining to those fires?---Just a slight 11 change from the fires, but certainly - I can't remember in 12 detail the fires, but I do remember in detail the 13 Newcastle disease. Newcastle disease is a disease in 14 chickens and certainly I was involved in briefings to the 15 community about that disease and to the broader community 16 around the central coast and Newcastle and also around the 17 broader, I suppose, state itself around the problems of 18 Newcastle disease. 19 Over what period of time, was it a matter of days, weeks or 20 months that this outbreak of Newcastle disease required 21 that level of attention from you?---I obviously was 22 involved in that as well as doing my normal 23 responsibilities as a region commander, but it would have 24 been intermittent over - I think it was about over a month 25 or two. 26 You then refer in paragraph 6 to having had the post of senior 27 police officer managing the search for a snowboarder who 28 had gone missing in Mount Perisher. What was your 29 responsibility there? Were you coordinating the 30 search?---No, I was the overall controller. Again I was 31 the senior emergency management person, but we certainly

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17299 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 had inspectors and others, search and rescue people, who 2 were responsible for directly coordinating that search, 3 that response. I had a role in that which was really to 4 gain additional resources and so we brought search and 5 rescue people from Victoria who came to assist us. I had 6 a role obviously to brief my senior management and to keep 7 the families informed. I had quite a lot in that instance 8 to do with the families who had lost their children. 9 You then say at the end of that paragraph 6 that as regional 10 commander for the south-eastern region you were 11 responsible for police operations during two major fires. 12 Those fires, did you have any responsibilities pertaining 13 to warnings or evacuations?---Certainly the two fires, one 14 was in Kosciuszko National Park and that would have had 15 less, it was really more about people not being able to go 16 into those areas, but again it would have been the local 17 police commanders who would have done that. My role 18 really was to ensure they were given appropriate support. 19 In terms of the other fire, it was in an area called Moss 20 Vale, Wingello, which is just out of Wollongong. It was 21 again a responsibility with the fire agencies, who would 22 have done that along with the local police commander who 23 was an inspector at that time as well. So, my role again 24 was one of coordination. 25 Paragraph 7, and I will come back to the position of other 26 members of the force, but in paragraph 7 about halfway 27 through you refer to some of your Victorian 28 experience?---Yes. 29 Including you say, "I was involved in responding to the 2002/03 30 Victorian bushfires as well as the 2006 fires." You held 31 the position as Chief Commissioner during both those

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17300 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 fires. I'm just wondering can you briefly tell us, first 2 of all the 2002/03 fires, what your duties entailed? For 3 example, were you located at the SERCC during the 4 fire?---No, I wasn't. My role as the Chief Commissioner 5 obviously encompasses a great range of responsibilities 6 and I have found that having appropriately qualified and 7 well supported people to carry out roles is the best and 8 only way really I can operate. So in my case my 9 responsibility usually was to ensure that they were well 10 supported, that they did have sufficient resources. 11 I often visited and I think in that instance I would have 12 visited the fire centres. I think it was NRE at the time, 13 where they had a fire response being conducted, and it is 14 a matter that I would have then gone to the CFA, to their 15 operating area and spoken and asked about resources. 16 I would have obviously been in contact with the SERCC and 17 with the then deputy commissioner, who I think was Bill 18 Kelly at the time, who would have had overall 19 responsibility for that area. So mine again was a 20 coordination and oversight role. 21 Did a similar situation apply during the 2006 fires?---That 22 fire again it would have been. I did go into the fire 23 areas and meet with local communities. That was really a 24 matter of just to see how they were, to go and support 25 fire services, to go afterwards to a thankyou concert to 26 be able to thank people because it was a very long fire, 27 that one. That's generally the sort of role I've taken. 28 Before we leave your previous experience, just touching on New 29 South Wales again for a moment before we leave that, in 30 any of those incidents to which we have referred or others 31 have you been involved in organising or advising in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17301 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 relation to an evacuation under the New South Wales State 2 Emergency and Rescue Management Act?---I think in some of 3 those cases I know an evacuation has occurred. I have a 4 personal experience of being involved in a fire but not 5 one as a - I was a police officer, but I wasn't the police 6 officer responsible for it at the time. But I can't 7 recall. 8 Again sticking with New South Wales for a moment, have you ever 9 been involved in advising in relation to either a 10 declaration of a state of emergency or a declaration of a 11 natural disaster?---No, I haven't. 12 Now moving to the Victorian structure. At the beginning of 13 paragraph 7 of your statement you refer to a matter you 14 have just touched on in one of the answers you gave. It 15 says, "During my time as the Chief Commissioner of 16 Victoria Police, while the management of emergency 17 activities had been delegated to Deputy Commissioner 18 Kieran Walshe and Assistant Commissioner Steve Fontana in 19 accordance with" and then you refer to the Police 20 Regulation Act and the Emergency Management Act and then 21 you go on and recount your experience?---Yes. 22 Can we just pause there and make sure that that structure is 23 clear. So if we go to the position in February 2009, you 24 were sitting in the role of Chief Commissioner. You had 25 two deputy commissioners, Mr Walshe and 26 Mr Overland?---Yes. 27 Below them you had a number of assistant 28 commissioners?---That's correct. 29 Some of whom were responsible for particular regions, others of 30 whom had what we might call portfolios, subject matter 31 portfolios?---I think we call them functional

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17302 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 responsibility, so one of those functional 2 responsibilities that relates to today's matters was 3 counter-terrorism and emergency management. 4 That was a position that Assistant Commissioner Fontana filled 5 at that time?---That's correct. 6 There would have also been obviously an assistant commissioner 7 responsible for each of the then five police 8 regions?---That's correct. 9 Under the Emergency Management Act obviously you had a number 10 of responsibilities that we will go to in a moment?---Yes. 11 And you also had responsibilities conferred by that Act but 12 responsibilities in relation to the state's Displan which 13 has for some time has been known as the state emergency 14 response plan?---Correct. 15 Perhaps we can just refresh our memories in terms of the way 16 the responsibilities under the Emergency Management Act 17 work. Under section 5 of that Act, the coordinator in 18 chief is the minister, who was then Minister 19 Cameron?---Yes. 20 And your title under that Act was deputy coordinator-in-chief 21 under section 5.2 of the Act?---Correct. 22 Under section 6 of the Act, and we may now just pull up the 23 text of section 6 so that it can be seen. I think we have 24 a version of that available. It is at (TEN.254.001.0001). 25 If we can go to the page where sections 5 and 6 appear. 26 Section 5 I have just touched on. Section 6, the role of 27 the coordinator-in-chief, who was obviously the minister, 28 is to "ensure that adequate emergency management measures 29 are taken by government agencies and, (b), to coordinate 30 the activities of government agencies carrying out their 31 statutory functions, powers, duties and responsibilities

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17303 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 in taking such measures." When you were wearing the hat 2 of deputy coordinator-in-chief, would you and did you 3 regard your role as involving identical responsibilities 4 to those in section 6?---Certainly under this particular 5 piece of legislation, yes. 6 There is then, as I mentioned, Displan, but commonly referred 7 to as SERP, which obviously applied for the state. Under 8 the SERP your title was state coordinator of Displan or we 9 might call it state coordinator of SERP?---Correct. 10 In relation to that obligation, once the SERP came into 11 operation the state coordinator of the SERP is the Chief 12 Commissioner of Police who under section 11 of this Act, 13 as it says there, is to be responsible for the 14 coordination of the activities of agencies, having roles 15 or responsibilities in response to the emergency. Now, 16 you had appointed a deputy, a deputy state coordinator of 17 SERP and that was Deputy Commissioner Walshe?---Correct. 18 Under each of the Emergency Management Act and the Police 19 Regulation Act you had a power to delegate most of your 20 powers to an identified member of Victoria 21 Police?---That's true. 22 Under that power you had delegated to Deputy Commissioner 23 Walshe all of the powers that you were able to exercise as 24 state coordinator of Displan?---Yes. 25 That is the only delegation that had been given to any police 26 officer of either your powers under the Emergency 27 Management Act as deputy coordinator-in-chief or your 28 powers under the same Act as state coordinator of 29 Displan?---In a formal sense, that's correct to say. But 30 informally and because of the construction of the role of 31 the assistant commissioner emergency management and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17304 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 counter-terrorism, he too would have been given similar 2 responsibilities. 3 The distinction between formally and informally may be one that 4 you adhered to when you were Chief Commissioner, but it is 5 the case, isn't it, that both the Emergency Management Act 6 and the Police Regulation Act make it clear any delegation 7 is to be by instrument, so, in short, in 8 writing?---I understand that view. 9 There is such a delegation for Deputy Commissioner Walshe, if 10 we can go to that. That is at (VPO.001.081.0095). The 11 two instruments seem to work together. First there was an 12 instrument of appointment. If we can just see all of that 13 page at once, it was an appointment by you under section 14 11 of anyone holding the position of deputy commissioner 15 to be the deputy state coordinator. The next page in the 16 bundle is 0096, and it is the delegation to which I have 17 just referred, if we can go to page 0096, instrument of 18 delegation. Again, if we can see all of the page at once 19 so Ms Nixon can see this has a handwritten date of 20 1 August 2005, and it indicates next to the word 21 "Appointment" that you, pursuant to section 12 of the Act, 22 delegated to the deputy state coordinator of Displan "all 23 the powers and functions vested in me as state 24 coordinator." In short, this instrument delegates to 25 Deputy Commissioner Walshe all the powers that you had at 26 that time as state coordinator of Displan?---Yes, it does. 27 Now, when you referred to informal delegations, I think you 28 referred to the position of assistant commissioner for 29 counter-terrorism and emergency management?---Correct. 30 That was a post held in 2009 by Assistant Commissioner 31 Fontana?---That's right.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17305 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Obviously that entailed a number of responsibilities in 2 relation to emergencies, but he did not have delegated to 3 him either any of your powers under the stream that we 4 might call deputy coordinator or any of your powers under 5 the stream of state coordinator of Displan?---In a formal 6 sense, but in a role and responsibility I think both he 7 and I were of the view that he did in fact have those 8 delegations. 9 He had a position description?---Yes, he did. 10 Or a role description. Perhaps if we can look at that. The 11 assistant commissioner's role description is at 12 (VPO.001.081.0097), the next page in the suite of 13 documents that are already on the screen. Do you 14 recognise this as the position or role description that 15 applied to Assistant Commissioner Fontana as at 2009 but 16 in any event when he held this position?---Yes. 17 It notes there his immediate manager is obviously you. He has 18 a number of direct reports. Interestingly, under his role 19 purpose he was required to always give 110 per cent, it 20 would seem, adding that up. Was he a high performer?---He 21 was. 22 The purpose of your role is then set out there. He is a member 23 of a corporate committee which ensures Victoria Police 24 delivers its targets, he leads and manages Victoria 25 Police's anti-terrorism response, he provides a central 26 focus for internal and external liaison, planning and 27 coordination et cetera, and he leads and develops an 28 effective team. Under "Organisation context" there is a 29 reference to a strategic focus on what appears to be 30 delivering "a safer Victoria by providing intelligent and 31 confident policing focused on the development of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17306 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 partnerships and a community capacity" et cetera. 2 On the next page at page 0098 there is also 3 reference to what he must do in leading and developing his 4 team, enhancing the capability of his direct reports, 5 developing his skills. Over on page 99 it indicates he 6 must contribute effectively as a member of the corporate 7 committee to his collegiate work, ensuring strategy and 8 business plans are implemented. Move down a couple of 9 points, ensuring the management of key business risks, 10 setting performance targets. None of this seems to be 11 very directly engaged with either counter-terrorism or 12 managing emergencies. Is there some other document that 13 would give life to or content to the assistant 14 commissioner's responsibilities in terms of the very 15 difficult policing tasks of counter-terrorism and managing 16 emergencies?---There are probably numerous documents 17 within Victoria Police that have set out the kinds of 18 tasks that he undertook. There was a performance 19 agreement that would have similarly covered this kind of a 20 process, but I think more importantly there would have 21 been briefings by deputy commissioners, there would have 22 been meetings that he attended on my behalf or a deputy 23 commissioner might have attended with him, so that he 24 understood his responsibilities. 25 There's nothing in that role description either which refers to 26 the Emergency Management Act or to Displan or SERP. 27 Again, would we need to look elsewhere to find out what 28 his state of knowledge might have been about those 29 obligations?---You might want to ask him about what his 30 knowledge was and I think also the SERO, the role held by 31 Superintendent Collins, probably had more of a day-to-day

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17307 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 focus on those pieces of legislation or that particular 2 plan so that it was to be updated when necessary. 3 You have said, Ms Nixon, that really the only way you could 4 operate when you were Chief Commissioner was ensuring that 5 you had delegated certain responsibilities to good people, 6 and that you could feel confident in them. Presumably as 7 at February 2009 you were not lacking confidence in 8 Assistant Commissioner Fontana. You felt that he knew 9 what his responsibilities were?---Actually I had a great 10 deal of confidence in the senior management team of 11 Victoria Police and I had no reason to doubt their 12 capacities. 13 You also say in your statement at paragraphs 14 and 15 that 14 although Deputy Commissioner Walshe had in essence moved 15 on, he was now a deputy commissioner, he had previously 16 had responsibility for emergency management and 17 counter-terrorism. I think what you seem to be saying 18 there is that, although Mr Walshe no longer had formal 19 responsibility for that portfolio, you regarded him as 20 doing what you call maintaining oversight of that 21 department on his promotion?---Because of his background 22 and his experience and relationships he often would 23 participate in senior government meetings, central 24 government response committee or the Victorian Emergency 25 Management Council, and so he wanted to maintain his 26 oversight of that responsibility and because of his skill 27 and knowledge he had continued to do that and often 28 delegated for me in those particular forums. 29 You mentioned a moment ago the role of the SERO and as at 30 February 2009 that was held by Superintendent Rod 31 Collins?---That's right.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17308 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 The role SERO is not mentioned anywhere in the Emergency 2 Management Act or emergency management manual, is 3 it?---Not that I'm aware of. I'm happy to take your view 4 on that. I don't know. 5 I think also, although you refer to Superintendent Collins by 6 name a number of times in your statement, you don't refer 7 in your statement to the role or functions of the SERO, so 8 I might just explore with you what that involved as at 9 February 2009. We also have a role description for SERO. 10 If we can bring that up, (VPO.001.081.0144). 11 Superintendent, state emergency response office. His 12 immediate manager was Assistant Commissioner Fontana, if 13 I'm reading this correctly?---Yes. 14 And his manager one removed was the deputy commissioner. Would 15 that have been Deputy Commissioner Walshe?---I think so. 16 I'm not sure of the date of this, but that certainly was 17 the practice, yes. 18 The document then adopts a similar format to that we just 19 looked at. There is a reference to the purpose of his 20 role and a number of duties. They start off as reasonably 21 generic, but towards the back of the document we have been 22 supplied with an appendix which is at (VPO.001.081.0150). 23 Here in relation to the role of the SERO, at last during 24 shift 1, it says the function is to manage the operation 25 of the SERCC for the state emergency response coordinator, 26 ensure the SERCC is established and functioning and assist 27 the emergency response coordinator as required. There is 28 then a list of duties. I will direct your attention to at 29 least number 9, respond to queries directed from outside; 30 10, ensuring the state coordinator is informed of all 31 significant developments; 13, ensure the ongoing and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17309 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 efficient operation of the SERCC. Those, as far as you 2 are aware, were among the duties of Mr Collins as at 3 February 2009?---Yes, they were. 4 What role did Inspector Hocking play in this scheme? We have 5 heard him referred to as essentially having been delegated 6 some duties in respect of the SERCC on 7 February, but was 7 his formal title state emergency response officer 8 inspector? Is that a title that was used in the 9 force?---I think that's a reasonable way to describe his 10 responsibilities, yes. 11 So when we go into 7 February, if we can describe the senior 12 positions perhaps by reference to a tree or a chain of 13 authority. You went into the day obviously with your 14 responsibilities as deputy coordinator under the Emergency 15 Management Act, state coordinator of Displan but also 16 obviously wearing your Chief Commissioner's hat in terms 17 of the control of the force?---That's right. 18 We had Deputy Commissioner Walshe having delegated 19 responsibilities under the Emergency Management Act 20 insofar as he was deputy state coordinator of 21 Displan?---(Witness nods.) 22 He had also been asked by you or the situation had grown up 23 such that he also maintained oversight of 24 counter-terrorism and emergency management?---Correct. 25 We had Assistant Commissioner Fontana with his responsibilities 26 under the counter-terrorism and emergency management 27 regime?---Yes. 28 He was responsible for that unit. We had Superintendent 29 Collins holding the role of state emergency response 30 officer?---Yes. 31 And we had Inspector Hocking known as either SERO inspector or

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17310 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 deputy SERO?---Correct. 2 Now, we have just looked at the document that's still on the 3 screen dealing with Superintendent Collins's duties. 4 Prior to 7 February, were you aware that he planned to 5 operate that day from the IECC rather than from the 6 SERCC?---It certainly was something that, depending on 7 different circumstances, I had seen him in both places and 8 it's not unusual, I think, that he might have operated out 9 of one or the other location. 10 Had he spoken with you about plans he had to ensure that his 11 list of duties, which is still on the screen, could be 12 maintained in circumstances where he was not physically at 13 the SERCC?---Not just prior to that date, no. 14 Had he shown you a document that's been tendered in these 15 proceedings, a document he wrote in the couple of days 16 prior to the 7th setting out what he regarded as an 17 appropriate procedure or mode of operation for the IECC to 18 interact with the SERCC?---I was aware that that document 19 had been produced. I have obviously seen it since. But 20 I was actually away for a couple of days prior to the 21 actual 7th, I was travelling the state, and so I was 22 advised that there was a protocol being developed to allow 23 operation in both locations. 24 I will just have that brought up on the screen. It is part of 25 exhibit 66, attachment 3 to the Collins statement 26 (WIT.3010.001.0041). This is a document that 27 Superintendent Collins says he prepared on or about the 28 6th. This is a document that you have seen since the 7th 29 but not prior to, given your absence?---(Witness nods.) 30 You see that it has the two columns; the role of the IECC and 31 the SERCC are set out. It describes the IECC as having

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17311 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 the role of supporting information sharing, enabling 2 intelligence gathering, joint situation analysis and 3 informing fire control and coordination. The SERCC on the 4 right-hand column, it is said, supports police operations 5 including management of failures of public infrastructure 6 and supporting fire and emergency activities. 7 I appreciate you didn't see this before the date, but 8 having seen it since and perhaps reflecting upon it, does 9 it represent an appropriate split of those functions in 10 light of the way that the emergency management manual 11 requires Victoria Police to adopt a coordination 12 role?---I think given it was done I think in haste before 13 the operation and so that at least some arrangements and 14 some structure was put into place, I think it is a fair 15 attempt of that. Whether or not it has all of the 16 functions, as you point out, appropriately covered, it 17 seems to me to do a reasonable job of trying to deal with 18 the various ways that the IECC and the SERCC would 19 operate. 20 Why was it done in haste, Ms Nixon? Was there not a number of 21 days lead-in over the heatwave and the Delburn fires to 22 ensure there was a solid procedure going into the 23 7th?---I think there were clearly a range of people 24 looking to prepare once the warnings had been given in 25 regard to the fire situation. But it seems to me it was 26 developed to perhaps overcome many issues that there might 27 have been. As I think the Commission is very well aware, 28 that IECC was relatively new and the joint operation, 29 I think they were just trying to make sure they covered a 30 range of concerns. 31 Going into the 7th, though, you've indicated you were aware

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17312 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 that Mr Collins had from time to time been at both 2 locations. Had you spoken to him specifically about which 3 location he should physically operate out of on the 4 7th?---Superintendent Collins is a very responsible 5 person, as is Inspector Hocking, and the arrangement he 6 came to, he didn't have to ask me for permission for that. 7 He would have determined that he had good people 8 operating, one, and then he determined his best use of his 9 skills would have been in the IECC. 10 Can I go back to your statement for a moment. At paragraph 41 11 of your statement, and that's at witness page 0386, you 12 say, "I spoke to Superintendent Collins in particular as 13 we have worked together in a number of situations and 14 I have confidence in his knowledge and judgment." You 15 point out he had a direct line of report to Assistant 16 Commissioner Fontana and Deputy Commissioner Walshe under 17 the system of delegated responsibility you had 18 established. "Due to my previous working relationship 19 with Superintendent Collins I would sometimes interrupt 20 this line of reporting to obtain information promptly and 21 directly from him." Just a couple of matters arising from 22 that. Had you worked with Superintendent Collins 23 previously while he held the role of SERO?---I had. 24 And is that the previous working relationship to which you are 25 referring or does it predate his position of 26 SERO?---I knew of him previously because I was the 27 Commissioner of Police and he held numerous superintendent 28 responsibilities within Victoria Police, but I obviously 29 had more to do with him once he was appointed to the state 30 emergency response officer role. 31 You say you spoke to him in particular and refer to sometimes

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17313 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 interrupting the strict line of reporting to obtain 2 information promptly. Is that something you did during 3 the day on the 7th as well?---I actually had a practice of 4 doing that. I think my senior management team knew that 5 I had a right, as I think is reasonable, to call anybody 6 in any situation and I certainly did speak with him at the 7 IECC and asked him to explain to me what was happening and 8 what the situation was. 9 But you only spoke to him once on the 7th, didn't 10 you?---I think I saw him there. That would be right, yes. 11 I will go to the details or the chronology of the day in an 12 moment, but it appears from his witness statement and the 13 evidence he gave here that he briefed you once at about 14 4 o'clock at the IECC; does that seem right?---Look, 15 I think the timing is thereabouts. I had been down at the 16 SERCC and spoken with people there and went up to the IECC 17 and when I arrived there I remember speaking to him. 18 I just wonder why you refer to speaking to him in particular 19 and made a point about interrupting the line of reporting 20 when it appears he gave you one briefing which he has 21 described in evidence as a 10 to 15 minute 22 briefing?---I think it's just about a practice I was 23 explaining in the statement. 24 When we go into the 7th, who did you understand was going to be 25 on deck that day, if I can put it this way. Deputy 26 Commissioner Walshe was not going to be on duty; is that 27 right?---That's what I understood, yes. 28 Assistant Commissioner Fontana was on duty and operated out of 29 the IECC for all of the day through to the early hours of 30 Sunday?---He did. 31 Superintendent Collins operated out of the IECC for the bulk of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17314 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 the day, although he attended the SERCC on occasion. Is 2 that your understanding of how he spent his day?---Yes. 3 And Inspector Hocking spent his day at the SERCC?---Yes. 4 Deputy Commissioner Walshe did come into the IECC in the 5 evening and participated in media conference and other 6 work. What was the thinking behind who was to be on deck 7 on the 7th? For example, why was he with all his 8 seniority not on duty?---I assume he and the deputy 9 commissioner had discussed what was the appropriate 10 arrangement and I think very much we always had the view 11 that any of us were available 24 hours a day and that we 12 could either come in ourselves if we saw it was necessary 13 or in fact be called in if we thought that was appropriate 14 as well. So I think we're always available and I think 15 that was probably the model that was put in place, along 16 with, I think it is reasonable to say, a very solid 17 command structure through the rest of the state within 18 local divisions and others who were advised in terms of 19 assistant commissioners in charge of regions. I think all 20 of that, having understood that was all in place, we 21 believed that was the appropriate structure for the day. 22 Throughout the day Minister Cameron, the coordinator-in-chief, 23 was in country Victoria until the evening when he attended 24 the IECC; is that your understanding?---As I understand 25 it, yes. 26 We will go to the details in a moment, but you were at home 27 until about midday and then at the SERCC from midday to 28 about 1.30?---That is right. 29 You were then in your office from 1.30 to about 3?---That's 30 right. 31 You then attended the SERCC for a short time at 3 and were back

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17315 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 at the IECC by 3.35?---That's correct. 2 Where you stayed until 6?---That's right. 3 There is other evidence before the Commission which suggests 4 the minister was at the IECC in the evening. Do you know 5 what time he arrived?---I don't know. 6 Given the correction that you have indicated at the outset you 7 wish to make, are we to understand you did not see the 8 minister at the IECC?---No, I did not. 9 Superintendent Collins, the evidence is that he left the IECC 10 at about 5. Are you aware of that?---I am, and 11 I understood he was replaced because I think while I was 12 there superintendent - - - 13 Knight?---Knight, thank you, arrived to come into his role. 14 And throughout the period of time that I have just talked about 15 we had Assistant Commissioner Fontana at the IECC for most 16 of the time and Inspector Hocking at the SERCC for all of 17 the time?---That's correct. 18 Deputy Commissioner Walshe's evidence is that he was not on 19 duty, although, pretty much as you have said, he was on 20 standby and could come in if the need arose. He left home 21 at about 7 pm and came in to deal with the media. Did you 22 speak to Deputy Commissioner Walshe during the 23 day?---I said I did. Yes, I did. 24 What was the point of that, given he was not on duty and he was 25 not himself at either the IECC or the SERCC?---Look, 26 I assume the conversation was - I'm just trying to recall 27 it. It's something you do in a day like that sometimes, 28 on and off, just to see where things are going or what's 29 his view of the situation. I can't quite recall, I'm 30 sorry. 31 So you don't know how many times you spoke to him or what it

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17316 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 was about?---No. 2 I suppose that really leads to the next matter I want to 3 explore with you. You say at the outset of your statement 4 you prepared this statement on the basis of material 5 including information from other personnel?---Yes. 6 Do you yourself have any notes or diary or log entries in 7 relation to the events of the 7th?---No, I don't. 8 Did you usually maintain a diary or some sort of log during the 9 time you held the position of Chief Commissioner?---My 10 practice as the Chief Commissioner had been that I did not 11 hold a diary or a log. 12 Did your personal assistant maintain a diary in terms of 13 appointments, meetings, et cetera?---Of course. 14 Was that in electronic or hard copy form?---Electronic. 15 Was your personal assistant on duty on the 7th or did they fill 16 in any documentation relating to the 7th?---I think the 17 only documentation would have been that I wasn't going to 18 be at work that day, but the practice I've had of note 19 taking has always been generally that there are sufficient 20 people around in the meetings I might have been to or 21 other discussions that have generally always taken notes 22 and I have just developed a practice not to take notes. 23 Was part of the structure or the practice that you ever had a 24 log keeper or staff officer with you?---No. 25 Do the obligations that arise and attach under the Victoria 26 Police manual in terms of members keeping logs and notes, 27 do they not apply to the Chief Commissioner?---I think 28 they do to the extent that they also, though, for many 29 police officers suggest that we use common sense and if 30 other means are being used to take down information, then 31 we could rely on that. But I think it is a practice some

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17317 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 police officers do and they take notes, quite copious 2 notes, as in Assistant Commissioner Fontana, for instance, 3 who I knew that was his practice, or others they don't. 4 But it is also then obviously a matter of you rely on your 5 own recollections or use other sources to remember. 6 Have you used Assistant Commissioner Fontana's log as one of 7 the sources for preparing your statement?---I have seen 8 Assistant Commissioner Fontana's diary and I have great 9 difficulty reading it, but I have been able to interpret 10 some parts of it, but certainly know that he kept notes 11 and that is something he has always done. So I assumed 12 I could rely on him, assumed I could rely on logs from the 13 SERCC and logs from the IECC about what actually happened 14 on the day as well. 15 Having done that, at least initially, something must have been 16 wrong in one of them, given that you then had to make the 17 correction you have made this morning. What further 18 inquiries revealed that you did not in fact speak to the 19 minister?---That was an issue that I was not really sure 20 about. It seemed to me that I knew he was advised and 21 I assumed it must have been because he was there and 22 I made inquiries to confirm that he wasn't in fact there 23 until some time after that. 24 Inquiries with him or inquiries with Assistant Commissioner 25 Fontana?---Inquiries through Assistant Commissioner 26 Fontana. 27 Because Assistant Commissioner Fontana's log refers to the fact 28 that he briefed the minister at 5.40, doesn't it?---Yes, 29 it does. 30 That much is legible?---That's right. 31 Can I take you for a moment to the Victorian police manual

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17318 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 (VPO.001.081.0158). There is an instruction here in 2 relation to record of patrol duties and it is indicated 3 that "Sworn employees must keep a record of their patrol 4 duties performed in or on", and then three options are 5 given. Official diary is, for convenience apparently, 6 referred to as a PB 13. There is then requirements set 7 out in terms of the way that one has to keep this 8 documentation, but if we can go to page 0160 of 9 the document there is a section headed "Minimum guidelines 10 for completing an official diary entry". It is there 11 noted that the purpose is it is kept as a record of daily 12 duties including rest days, leave et cetera. "Its object 13 is to afford accurate information to supervisors as to the 14 manner in which duties are carried out; protect and assist 15 employees on all occasions of future reference to their 16 conduct." There are then suggestions made about the 17 detail, when and how to record certain events. Then 18 further down the page under "Management of official 19 diaries" there are obligations imposed in relation to the 20 security of the diary, not taking it away from location 21 unnecessarily et cetera and following therefrom 22 indications as to what to do when one ceases employment, 23 one should return the diary. 24 What appears from these provisions, Ms Nixon, is 25 that one purpose of the diary is to ensure that there is 26 an accurate record of the duties. Another purpose is to 27 assist employees on all occasions of future reference to 28 their conduct. A third aspect is of course allowing 29 supervision to be undertaken, which wouldn't be relevant 30 to you in your position. Did you not have the view during 31 the time you were Chief Commissioner that it would be

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17319 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 useful for there to be a record of your activities rather 2 than having to piece together from other people's logs or 3 minutes of other people who may have attended meetings 4 what had occurred on a particular day?---No, I didn't. 5 But the very difficulty that might arise has arisen just here 6 because in order to prepare a statement dealing with 7 the events of the 7th you have had to have regard to other 8 people's source material and it has in one instance not 9 provided the correct foundation?---I was the police 10 commissioner for eight years and I was a police officer 11 for 37 years and I think for all of the time I have 12 generally been able to - sometimes I took notes and other 13 times I didn't. Generally I can recall what happened on a 14 particular day and on that particular day I've done my 15 very best to recall what happened and, yes, I've been 16 supported by other notes, but I also very much recollect 17 what I did on the day. 18 All right. Let's start with what you say about the way the day 19 unfolded. You said a moment ago that all that might have 20 been in the diary that your PA kept was essentially a 21 notation of the fact that you weren't expecting to be at 22 work on the 7th. Did you form the view over the 5th and 23 6th given the weather and the predictions that it may be 24 necessary for you to attend to formal duties on the 25 7th?---On the 5th I was in Mildura and I was also aware of 26 documentation which had gone out under my name which said 27 that in fact that particular 7th was going to be a 28 terrible day and I thought that document, which set out 29 how the police would be prepared for it, was appropriate 30 and a good way to start that preparation. As the 31 statement sets out, I was in Mildura and then came through

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17320 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 a number of police divisions and spoke with a number of 2 the senior management in those areas around their 3 preparation. My office I had spoken to during that Friday 4 and believed that we were as well placed as we could be to 5 be able to deal with a terrible day that was predicted. 6 In my case I had intended to do a number of private 7 things, but determined as given I am the Commissioner of 8 Police and have always understood I had that 9 responsibility, was prepared if necessary to come in and 10 I formed the view early in the morning that I needed to 11 come in to see where we were and how we were placed in 12 terms of responding to the fires that I'd started to hear 13 about. 14 So in paragraph 32 of your statement, if we can just move down 15 a little there, with that background that you were 16 obviously aware of the forecast conditions, you say, 17 "I prepared for an active working day myself. Shortly 18 after 6 am I received an email forwarded by Assistant 19 Commissioner Fontana." So that email was accessible by 20 you from your home?---Yes. 21 But was it sent to an official police address or a personal 22 address?---I'm not sure. I've used both on occasions. 23 Have you been asked in the context of preparing this statement 24 to provide to VGS any of the emails, notes or other 25 records that you have of your activities on the 26 7th?---Yes. 27 There were a number of summonses issued in relation to any 28 diaries, notes or logs kept by you?---Yes. 29 And this email by way of example was not returned under that 30 summons. Have you been asked to search for emails that 31 you received on the 7th?---I know Victoria Police has been

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17321 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 asked to search the system. 2 You say here it was an email forwarded by Assistant 3 Commissioner Fontana. Do you recall where it came from? 4 Was it from one of the fire agencies or was it an internal 5 document?---No, I don't. 6 However, you can recall that it advised you Bunyip fire had 7 jumped containment lines?---Yes. 8 At 11.40 you were at home. I assume this briefing was received 9 by way of phone call from Assistant Commissioner 10 Fontana?---Yes. 11 You note there you asked him whether Paul Evans, the assistant 12 commissioner for region 5, had returned from leave. No 13 doubt that inquiry was inspired by the fact that the 14 Bunyip fire was in that region and the news you were 15 hearing thus far wasn't hopeful in terms of the progress 16 of that fire?---Correct. 17 When we go into the 7th, then, if Assistant Commissioner Evans 18 was on leave - first of all I should ask you I assume he 19 was able to get back on deck reasonably quickly, given 20 what you say there?---Yes, he was. 21 What about in the other regions where ultimately there were 22 major fires? Region 4, for example, is the home of a 23 number of the significant fires for the day. Was the 24 assistant commissioner for region 4, who I think was 25 Assistant Commissioner Hastings, on duty that 26 day?---I understood - whether he was in his office or not 27 I'm not sure - but certainly that he was available and 28 would have been involved in the response. 29 Region 3 had two significant fires and part of the Kilmore fire 30 travelled through it. Who was the assistant commissioner 31 for region 3?---Sorry, I can't remember at the moment.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17322 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 The Bendigo and Redesdale fires burned in region 3 and part of 2 the Kilmore fire?---Yes, I know they did, and 3 Superintendent Bull I certainly was aware of was in there, 4 as well as the area around there. I can't think. 5 So no doubt you don't know, then, whether they were on duty 6 that day or at least available?---I can't even think of 7 their name, I'm sorry, at the moment. 8 Region 2 was the name of the Horsham, Weerite and Coleraine 9 fires. Was Assistant Commissioner Nicholson on duty 10 and/or available?---I certainly understood she was 11 available. 12 And region 1, was Assistant Commissioner Jamieson on duty and 13 available?---I'm not sure. 14 In any event, returning to the chronology, in mid-morning you 15 asked for an inquiry to be made about Assistant 16 Commissioner Evans and that's dealt with. By midday you 17 attended the SERCC and when you arrived there you spoke to 18 Inspector Doug Hocking. By that time is the only 19 information you had about the fires the information from 20 Assistant Commissioner Fontana?---I had also obviously 21 looked at the websites for the Bureau of Meteorology as 22 well as the CFA. 23 Had Assistant Commissioner Fontana by that time referred to any 24 predictive maps that were available for the fire on the go 25 at that stage, the Bunyip fire?---No. 26 Had he referred to any information he had from the fire 27 chiefs?---No, I don't think so. 28 You hadn't by that time had any feedback from Inspector 29 Hocking, who was at the SERCC, until you arrived 30 physically at the location?---That's right. 31 Now, when you arrived at the SERCC what did Mr Hocking tell

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17323 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 you? What information was he able to provide?---As I have 2 set out there, he and others there spoke to me around the 3 fires, particularly around the Kilmore East fire, I think, 4 and the commencement of that. I looked at the maps to 5 determine where fires were and generally had a discussion 6 with a number of the people who were there. 7 What sort of maps were available at the SERCC? Were they maps 8 created by police officers or provided by the fire 9 services?---There were just basically geographic maps that 10 set out where the fires were generally undertaken, just 11 normal maps. I don't know whose maps they were. Probably 12 ours, Victoria Police's. 13 You refer in paragraph 34 to your attendance at the SERCC and 14 in paragraph 35 you say that while you were there you 15 received a briefing from fire liaison officer Tony O'Day 16 from the CFA. Do you know what his position was of the 17 CFA?---His formal rank? 18 Yes?---No. 19 You go on to say, "What I understood from these briefings is 20 that the fires represented a challenge", which is a 21 reference to Horsham and Kilmore East?---Yes. 22 "But were being actively fought and that there was hope they 23 would be brought under control soon." Is the source of 24 that information fire liaison officer Tony O'Day?---Yes. 25 Were you made aware shortly after the provision of that 26 information by Mr O'Day that the situation with the 27 Kilmore fire deteriorated very rapidly?---I have certainly 28 come to understand that. I'm not sure whether he told me, 29 but certainly I came to understand that myself. 30 Because if he gave you that information close to or around 31 midday, it was within a matter of minutes something that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17324 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 became a gross underestimate, if I can put it that way. 2 Can I take you to some information in the logs that are 3 available, first of all the SERCC log, which I think you 4 have said you had regard to as a typed log. It is exhibit 5 21. It is up on the screen. There is an entry there for 6 12.21, if that can be moved down and enlarged so Ms Nixon 7 can read it. "Fire in Kilmore causing concern with its 8 potential impact. Situated on Saunders Road, Kilmore 9 East, about halfway between Kilmore and the Hume Freeway. 10 Potential to cause major smoke hazard on the Hume Freeway, 11 if it isn't already." Immediately below that appears this: 12 "Further to the last email, this fire is a major concern 13 for the fire agencies at this stage. It is being managed 14 with the aid of several aircraft. Also possible future 15 impact on the Melbourne-Sydney rail line ... in addition 16 to the Hume", et cetera. That information comes in pretty 17 quickly after the briefing you'd just received. Do you 18 know when you were told that the Hume was not in the state 19 that Mr O'Day might have suggested, but rather heading for 20 the Hume and causing difficulties?---I think I understood 21 that the Hume was always a risk, anyway, because of where 22 that fire actually was. 23 Did you know that throughout the day there were regular 24 meetings being held at the IECC, including SEST meetings 25 that either Mr Collins or Mr Fontana or both were 26 attending?---Yes. 27 Were you updated as to each of those and the information 28 available at them as they occurred?---No, I wasn't. 29 At paragraph 36 you then say - sorry, it is at the end of 35. 30 "I was still at the SERCC at 1.15 when I was briefed again 31 by Assistant Commissioner Fontana by phone." So he is

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17325 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 ringing you from the IECC at this stage?---(Witness nods.) 2 What additional information was he able to impart at 3 1.15?---I can't remember. 4 Could he have mentioned that we now had ignition of the Horsham 5 and Coleraine fires?---He may have. I think what I had 6 started to understand by that stage was that there were a 7 number of fires breaking out. 8 In paragraph 36 you say that following your time at the SERCC 9 you went upstairs to your office. So within the same 10 building but into your private office, as I understand 11 it?---Yes. 12 You indicated you would be there for a while before going back 13 to the IECC. Now, reading all parts of the statement 14 together, it appears you were up in your office from about 15 1.30 until 3?---Yes. 16 And during that stretch of time what were you occupied 17 with?---I was doing various work within my office. 18 Pertaining to the fires or unrelated?---No, unrelated. 19 Were people able to contact you by phone if necessary?---Of 20 course. 21 Were they able to contact you by email?---Yes. 22 Do you know whether you received between 1.30 and 3 any 23 information or updates in relation to the fire 24 situation?---I know I didn't. 25 Because while you were up in your office the Pomborneit-Weerite 26 fire also ignited. I take it nobody told you about that 27 while you were up there?---No, they didn't. 28 The Churchill fire ignited at 1333. No-one told you about 29 that?---No. 30 And the Murrindindi fire ignited probably as you were making 31 your way down at 3 o'clock. Do you remember when you were

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17326 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 first told about the Murrindindi ignition?---No, I don't 2 remember the time. I remember going there and seeing 3 there were numerous fires when I went down to the SERCC 4 and they were extremely busy at the time and I looked at 5 all the displays and saw in fact a number of those fires 6 that you just spoke about. 7 What sort of displays were you looking at?---I looked at - the 8 website for the CFA was one which I'd looked at upstairs 9 and then I talked to different people who were there and 10 they were explaining to me there were a variety of fires 11 breaking out. 12 So no-one contacted you about the fires between 1.30 and 13 3?---No, they didn't. 14 In light of what you now know about other fires igniting and 15 the situation certainly getting no better, would you have 16 expected anyone to contact you with the news that more 17 fires have come on board?---Yes. 18 You came downstairs or back to the SERCC at 3, you say, in 19 paragraph 37?---Yes. 20 It "was busy and I did not ask for another briefing. I did not 21 feel an additional briefing was necessary." Why on earth 22 not? It was the heat of the day and, as far as you knew, 23 there were at least two significant fires burning, in fact 24 more that you didn't know about. Why did you not ask for 25 a briefing?---Because I understood that that was the case 26 and I could see - you didn't have to. The room was 27 already buzzing. There were people who were on the 28 phones, there were a range of people going about their 29 work and I think comments were made like, "This is looking 30 terrible, there are many more fires," those sorts of 31 things. I didn't need to waste their time by personally

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17327 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 getting a detailed briefing. 2 You said you were already aware of the situation. Is that 3 information that you gleaned solely by looking at fire 4 agency or Bureau of Meteorology websites?---And listening 5 to the radio as well. 6 If we look at the information that was available in, first of 7 all, the SERCC log by that time, there is an entry for 8 1333. We need to go to the next page of the typed log 9 that we were looking at a moment ago. This is at 10 TEN.0002. At 1333 there is an entry from Superintendent 11 Collins, "Bunyip and Kilmore the fire priorities. Kilmore 12 fire heading south at a rapid rate. Wandong is of concern 13 in that it may impact the township." Did anyone tell you 14 when you returned to the SERCC that the Kilmore fire was 15 now threatening a township as far away as Wandong?---No, 16 they didn't. 17 Did you have regard to this log during the time you were at the 18 SERCC? Did you have a look at it or scan its 19 contents?---No, I didn't. 20 At 1353 there is a notation, the first of the notations for 21 1353 from CFA duty officer, "Bunyip fire now spotting 22 south of Drouin. For the information of local areas due 23 to movement of fire vehicles to protect assets. Road 24 conditions may be affected", et cetera. "Police may be 25 required to assist." Did anyone tell you the Bunyip fire 26 had now started to spot so far south it was impacting on 27 Drouin?---I don't recall. 28 There is also available one of two logs that was being kept at 29 the IECC referred to as the SERO log. Extracts from that 30 document are at (TEN.020.003.0001). If we can go to page 31 0003 of that document. Just so you are aware, Ms Nixon,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17328 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 this is said to be a log kept by a log keeper, but a log 2 keeper for the SERO. Have you seen this document 3 before?---No, I haven't. 4 This is a document that Superintendent Collins indicated was 5 being kept by others in the IECC. I want to take you to 6 the entry for 1400, which is on page 0003. You see there 7 there is a reference to a teleconference, et cetera, but 8 it goes on to say, "CFA. Kilmore now crossed Hume and 9 near Wandong. Horsham fire nearing town south. Bunyip 10 spotting up to 12 kilometres and south of Drouin. Strike 11 teams deployed." A couple of lines lower down, talking 12 about possible loss of water to Kilmore and Wandong and a 13 nursing home in Neerim and Bunyip being evacuated. When 14 you came down to the SERCC at 3, did anyone bring to your 15 attention the fact that the Kilmore fire had crossed the 16 Hume?---I think someone explained to me that it had, yes. 17 Did anyone bring to your attention that steps had been taken to 18 evacuate nursing homes and a hospital in Neerim South and 19 near Bunyip?---No. I made the assumption that they in 20 fact had done what was appropriate and what would be to in 21 fact evacuate people if necessary. 22 Did anyone tell you that MFB strike teams had been deployed to 23 locations including dealing with the Bunyip fire?---I knew 24 the fires were being actively fought. 25 Sticking with this log for a moment, at 1440 there is a 26 reference to the Churchill fire and it is noted, "When 27 wind arrives has the ability to affect Loy Yang." Now, 28 you would have known that that is the significant provider 29 of the state's power. Did anybody tell you when you 30 reattended the SERCC that Loy Yang was under threat?---I'm 31 not at the SERCC. I think I understood that when I went

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17329 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 up to the IECC. 2 That piece of information would have changed the complexion of 3 the emergency, wouldn't it? If we were looking down the 4 barrel of the state losing some or all of its power, this 5 had the potential to become a significant disaster?---Of 6 course. 7 Further down onto the next page in this log there is a 8 reference to "homes lost near Drouin". Did anyone bring 9 to your attention the fact that there was now a report of 10 that sort of asset loss?---No. 11 Do you remember when you first heard that homes had been 12 lost?---Oh, I think from the fire chiefs when I met with 13 and spoke with them when I went to the IECC. 14 You were back at the IECC by 3.35, as I understand it, because 15 you refer to that in paragraph 39 of your 16 statement?---Yes. 17 Did you obtain that time by cross-checking against Assistant 18 Commissioner Fontana's log?---I think so. 19 How long did it take you to travel from the SERCC to the 20 IECC?---Only about 10 minutes or so. 21 Walking or a car, given the heat?---I went by car. 22 I should have asked you when I made inquiries about your 23 attendance at the SERCC, did you arrive for duty that day 24 in uniform?---I can't remember, I'm sorry. I thought 25 about this this morning and I'm not sure. 26 One of the reasons I ask is whether, having attended the SERCC, 27 you then treated it as an ordinary working day, even 28 though it was a Saturday?---I don't understand what that 29 means. 30 You travelled, for example, from the SERCC to the IECC. Was 31 that a staff member, a member of Victoria Police who drove

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17330 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 you?---No, I think I was driven by my husband, actually. 2 And you can't recall at this stage whether you were in uniform 3 or in civilian clothing?---No, I can't, I'm sorry. 4 You must have only been in the SERCC for a few minutes, then. 5 You needed to leave the SERCC by, say, 3.20 to arrive at 6 the IECC by 3.35?---I wasn't there - when I went down 7 I went to see them, I knew things were very difficult and 8 said "I'm going to the IECC." 9 Can I take you back to paragraph 37 for a moment. Just at the 10 end of paragraph 37 you refer to what you saw when you 11 were at the SERCC. You have explained why you didn't seek 12 an additional briefing and you go on to say the SERCC is 13 "quite visual and I find that I am able to glean the 14 relevant information from observing what is displayed and 15 going on around me. I would look at computer screens over 16 people's shoulders which displayed all of the fires 17 occurring across the state to see what they were working 18 on or to check websites such as CFA or Bureau of 19 Meteorology." This reference to websites that display the 20 fires, that is just the fire agencies' sites, is it 21 not?---Yes, that's right. 22 Victoria Police didn't have any composite website or document 23 that allowed them to track all the fires in some different 24 way?---No. I think they wish they had. No. 25 What could you or what did you glean by looking at computer 26 screens over people's shoulders?---I just saw that they 27 were very busy, that people were working on a range of 28 issues, that there clearly was a significant increase in 29 the number of fires and that people were going about their 30 work. 31 It sounds rather passive, Ms Nixon. Did you not say you needed

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17331 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 to be brought up to speed or ask someone whether they were 2 prepared to walk you through maps showing where these 3 fires were heading?---I thought the people in those areas 4 were carrying out their responsibilities effectively, the 5 best I could tell, and that they were very busy trying to 6 respond to a range of issues and in hindsight, yes, 7 I should have, but I didn't. 8 But what were they busy doing? Someone was obviously keeping 9 that typed log we just looked at. What were the other 10 people you are referring to doing?---There were other 11 agencies. There would have been power agency people, 12 there would have been and there were a range of people 13 have VicRoads, there were people from different groups who 14 were there carrying out different responsibilities. 15 But up to the time that we are concerned with, say 3 o'clock, 16 I don't think there is any reference to any regional 17 division, for example, seeking resources or indicating a 18 problem. It is more a compilation of information that's 19 coming in from various venues and entities. Would you 20 agree with that?---I'm not sure about whether or not 21 people were seeking support or other assistance, but it 22 certainly seemed to me like they understood the fires were 23 increasing in their severity and their number and that 24 they were working on various matters relating to the 25 fires. 26 How many people were at the SERCC at 3 o'clock?---I would have 27 thought there was about 12, 15 maybe. 28 And were there physically located there any representatives 29 from other agencies or did you mean that you were fielding 30 information from other agencies?---No, no. There were, as 31 I understood, a range of other people there, people from

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17332 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 different agencies. They have identification above their 2 heads in some cases and they were sitting under those. 3 Did you ask anyone while you were at the SERCC whether 4 consideration had been given to whether towns in the path 5 of the fires that had so far been ignited, whether those 6 towns had been warned?---No, I didn't. I assumed, again 7 in hindsight perhaps inappropriately, that that would have 8 been a standard part of the practice for advising the path 9 of the fire. 10 The POC, police operations command, was that also operating at 11 3 o'clock?---Yes, it was. 12 Did you attend that location on the 7th?---I can't recall. 13 Who was heading up the POC? Who was the most senior police 14 officer there?---One of our commanders was. 15 I take you back to paragraph 39 where you refer to going up to 16 the IECC and being briefed by Assistant Commissioner 17 Fontana. This was your first face-to-face briefing with 18 him for the day?---Yes. 19 I want to take you to Assistant Commissioner Fontana 's log. 20 That document starts at (VPO.001.081.0166) and we are 21 looking for the entry for 1450. Sorry, we will start with 22 2 pm which is on page 0170. It is difficult to read, but 23 what we see there at 2 pm is "IECC briefing" and it seems 24 to say "Attend briefing for IECC." The rest is difficult 25 to read, but there is then reference to "Bunyip, Kilmore, 26 Horsham, Coleraine, Bunyip spotting south of Drouin" and 27 other entries it is difficult to read. There is then a 28 reference over the page, if we can go to page 0171, to 29 2.50. It then says "Attend IECC. State emergency 30 strategy meeting. Chaired by Assistant Commissioner 31 Fontana." There is a reference to some material that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17333 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 appears to have come in from the bureau. But if we go 2 down to "CFA" there are then these entries for 2.50. It 3 seems to say "Situation - map. 7 times significant fires. 4 Horsham, Coleraine," maybe a second reference to Horsham, 5 "Weerite, Pomborneit, Kilmore, Wandong, Bunyip, Churchill 6 (Glendonald)", the fire was sometimes called the 7 Glendonald Road fire, and "Delburn complex". There is a 8 whole lot of other information here that is difficult to 9 decipher, but there is reference to, I think on the next 10 page, page 0172, you can see part way down that page the 11 number 47, "47 people evacuated from Neerim South 12 hospital, Bunyip aged facility" and other indecipherable 13 commentary there. By the time Assistant Commissioner 14 Fontana is filling in this information, he is referring to 15 at least seven significant fires. Did he bring those to 16 your attention when you received the briefing from him up 17 at the IECC?---He certainly said to me there were 18 significant numbers of fires that had broken out, there 19 were some in Gippsland and obviously up north and then the 20 main fire at Kilmore East. He explained to me that there 21 were significant fires. 22 Did he make reference to the issues pertaining to Loy 23 Yang?---I think he did. 24 When you attended the IECC, did you receive a face-to-face 25 briefing from either Mr Rees or Mr Waller?---I did. 26 At what time did they brief you?---Some time between - it 27 seemed to me somewhere around 5 o'clock, I think. I'm not 28 exactly sure of the time, but I did in fact go and talk 29 with both with them as I had known them well and they were 30 sitting in a joint office and I asked them to explain to 31 me the size of the fires.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17334 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 So they briefed you together or consecutively?---No, together. 2 When they briefed you, which fires did they draw attention to? 3 Did they prioritise the fires and say which were posing 4 the most difficult problems?---They particularly talked 5 about what had started as the Kilmore East and talked 6 about its effect through Humevale and Strathewen. We had 7 a conversation about that and the harm that we believed 8 would be done there, and they then talked about the 9 Churchill fire, I think, and a range of others. But we 10 went through and showed me maps and during the time we 11 were talking various people came in to talk with them and 12 ask questions about different fires. 13 Are you sure that they referred to the prospect of losses in 14 Strathewen at the time they briefed you?---Well, I don't 15 think they confirmed there were losses, but they believed 16 that there could be losses. I don't think they knew. 17 Because the evidence in the Commission is that Strathewen 18 appears to have been impacted by fire twice, spotfires 19 from 3.30 onwards and then after the wind change from 5.30 20 onwards. There is certainly no information to suggest 21 that the potential for fatalities had crystallised by 5 22 or 5.30. So were they talking about actual losses or just 23 a threat?---No, they were suggesting that there was a real 24 threat, a real potential for people to lose their lives 25 because of the kind of valley, I suppose, for want of a 26 better description, that Strathewen is. 27 You said they showed you maps. Did they show you any 28 predictive maps at that briefing?---No. 29 Did you see any predictive maps during the day on the 30 7th?---No, I didn't. 31 Did you not see a predictive map for the Kilmore fire that was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17335 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 faxed by a member of Victoria Police from the IECC to the 2 SERCC? No-one showed that to you at either 3 location?---Predictive in the sense of saying that it 4 would head this direction. What I understood was the 5 Kilmore East fire particularly was heading south, for want 6 of a better description, and my real concern of course was 7 having understood that the weather change would mean that 8 it would be pushed to the east. 9 But did anybody show you a map on which markings notated the 10 direction or indicated the direction that the Kilmore East 11 fire was likely to take and the towns that could be 12 impacted?---No. All I remember was the briefing that the 13 fire was on the way to Whittlesea. 14 I will just get a copy of that page to show you. We will just 15 search for that and find the right version. You are not 16 sure, then, whether you saw predictive maps that indicated 17 the path that a fire might travel as opposed to blank maps 18 that people made reference to?---I certainly did see white 19 boards with drawings on them where people were predicting 20 where it might go, but in terms of a formal predictive 21 map, no. 22 Sticking with Assistant Commissioner Fontana's log for the 23 moment, there is also an entry at 3.30 that I wanted to 24 direct your attention to. It is on the same page, "3.35 25 pm IECC", page 0172. There is a reference there - I think 26 it says "At IECC", the rest is difficult to read. It says 27 "Brief Chief Commissioner Nixon at IECC re SEST meeting." 28 So did Assistant Commissioner Fontana bring you up to 29 speed in relation to what had happened at SEST meetings 30 which I think were held at 2 and 3?---I'm not sure which 31 meeting, but he would have explained what the substance

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17336 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 was, yes. 2 Did anyone raise concerns that had been discussed in terms of 3 the potential for the fire, the Kilmore fire, to hit the 4 Whittlesea music festival? Is that something that was 5 raised with you?---No. 6 Did anyone raise with you the question of the breadth of the 7 Churchill fire; namely, that by 3 o'clock or 3.30 it was 8 clear it might stretch as far as Yarram?---I became aware 9 of that because people made comment to me about the 10 spotting of that fire and that it was spotting further 11 than they had ever seen before. 12 There is also an incident management log that was kept by the 13 VicPol liaison officer at the IECC and I want to direct 14 your attention to one entry in that. This entry is at 15 (TEN.020.004.0001). At page 0003 of that log, I can tell 16 you on the first page it indicates it is kept by a 17 "B Dixon" and "VicPol liaison" appears next to that name. 18 At page 0003 there is an entry for 1535, and this time the 19 notation is "DSE". We will start with the 1450 entry, 20 which is a little bit higher up the page. "Churchill 21 update, Drouin evacuate nursing home, Whittlesea re 22 country festival emailed SERCC." That was the matter 23 I wanted to draw to your attention. No-one raised with 24 you concerns about impact on Whittlesea?---Only that 25 I knew that Whittlesea could be impacted, not particularly 26 the reference around the music festival. 27 If we go down to 1555, "DSE Dave Rowles MERC. Firefighter and 28 campers. Murrindindi." It seems to be a reference on the 29 right-hand side, "Firefighter and campers taking refuge in 30 the river. Murrindindi. Ring IC DSE Alex - Andy Miller." 31 Do you remember when you were first told about the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17337 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 ignition of the Murrindindi fire?---No, I don't remember 2 the time. I just remember being told about Murrindindi 3 Mill, was what I was advised. 4 Presumably after you arrived at the IECC?---Yes. 5 Your contact with Rod Collins up at the IECC, I think you first 6 refer to it in paragraph 40 of your statement, if we could 7 go to that. You say there you asked him for a briefing in 8 respect to police resourcing. He gave you some advice 9 about the MECCs that had activated and some of the 10 locations in question. He was looking at sourcing 11 additional resources. Did he give you any information 12 about the fires? I appreciate what appears there in terms 13 of resourcing, but about the fires?---Only that there were 14 many of them and that they were dealing with them in 15 different ways and he understood - I said I was going to 16 see the fire chiefs and talk with them, but just simply 17 that the fires were escalating and they were getting out 18 of hand. 19 I take it from what you say there and the evidence that he has 20 given that he didn't give you any briefing in particular 21 in relation to the question of warnings?---No, he didn't. 22 Did you ever ask Assistant Commissioner Fontana for a briefing 23 in relation to warnings?---No. 24 And I can confirm there doesn't seem to be anything in his log 25 that refers to the same?---No. 26 During the day on the 7th, who then at Victoria Police had the 27 ultimate responsibility for ensuring that VicPol's 28 responsibilities in relation to warnings was 29 discharged?---Any of those people, including me, who would 30 have been, if asked by the fire services, as I understand 31 it, would have been responsible for doing that. So

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17338 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 clearly I knew that that would be part of my 2 responsibility, so did Assistant Commissioner Fontana, so 3 did Rod Collins and a number of us, and so I think did the 4 local division superintendents. 5 Have you had an opportunity to read the transcript of the 6 evidence that Superintendent Collins gave in these 7 proceedings?---Yes, I have. 8 You know then that he explained both in his statement and when 9 he was giving evidence that his interpretation of Victoria 10 Police's responsibilities under the emergency management 11 manual is that the practice is a little different from 12 what it says in the manual with respect to fires and that 13 essentially warnings in relation to fires are left to the 14 fire services; they know the fire science, they know where 15 fires are likely to travel?---I think that had been the 16 practice, yes. 17 In fact, when pressed on this matter, as he was by a number of 18 counsel cross-examining him, he said that really all he 19 did do in relation to warnings was satisfy himself that 20 some were being issued. He could see that they were being 21 issued on the radio and the website and that was the 22 beginning and end of it. You agree, then, that that was 23 the practice as at February 2009?---Yes, it was. 24 Why did you not seek an indication from either Superintendent 25 Collins or Assistant Commissioner Fontana as to whether at 26 least that level of responsibility had been adverted to by 27 Victoria Police?---Because I assumed, given the size of 28 the fires, the danger to the community, that was fairly 29 obvious to all of us that that would have been a 30 fundamental part of the responsibilities and the 31 information being given to the community.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17339 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Is it enough to assume that something must be being done 2 because it is so terrible? Is that the right assumption 3 to make?---Look, I think you make assumptions on the basis 4 of people who know their work and have carried out roles 5 and responsibilities previously and you believe instead of 6 a check and clearly as a result of the Commission and the 7 work that's been done, then many of these issues will be 8 far more focused in the way they were carried out. But 9 I think you have reasonable grounds to believe that people 10 who are well experienced, and fire agencies particularly, 11 would have been very capable of determining and ensuring 12 warnings were given. 13 But do you agree, Ms Nixon, that the only ways in which one 14 would be able to check whether warnings were being issued 15 in a timely and accurate fashion is probably one of a 16 couple of ways: either ask someone in relation to a 17 particular fire where is it going and have the towns in 18 the path been warned, or potentially getting out a map and 19 matching that to warnings up on the fire agencies' 20 websites or the warnings being issued by radio. Do you 21 agree those are the ways you would need to literally 22 check?---Yes, and I'm sure that will be the case in the 23 future. I think the other part about that time, though, 24 is that I think it was an incredibly intense time for 25 everybody, certainly in the IECC, the integrated emergency 26 control centre, and I think the same with various police 27 and other agencies responding. It was an extraordinarily 28 tense time and a very difficult time. I think those are 29 the kinds of things that don't get followed up. 30 I'm not sure if I understand that, Ms Nixon. Given what you 31 have said, the practice seemed essentially to be to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17340 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 assume, so long as some sort of warnings were being issued 2 on the radio or website, fire services must have it under 3 control. Is that why warnings weren't checked by Victoria 4 Police or were they not checked because people were tense 5 or stressed?---I think there was a range of issues but 6 I think they just weren't checked. It was a very busy 7 time I think for many people and they were trying to do 8 the job and I think locally people were doing the same 9 sort of thing, and it isn't an excuse, there should have 10 been a follow-up, and I should have done it. 11 You don't refer anywhere in your statement on the occasions 12 when you looked over people's shoulders at the SECC and 13 the IECC to detecting any air of panic or people not being 14 able to cope with their jobs. Was there any air like that 15 in terms of VicPol members?---I think I detected people 16 were gradually starting to see a disaster unfolding in 17 front of us and that they were very busy doing their jobs. 18 Isn't that exactly the time at which, Ms Nixon, you call in 19 your senior people and say, "Tell me: Fire number 1, have 20 the towns in its path been warned? If you don't know, go 21 and find out. Fire number 2, have the towns in its path 22 been warned?" Isn't that what you do? Isn't that what 23 the person in charge does?---I think that's the situation 24 in hindsight, that you could make that assumption 25 reasonably. I think what you are doing, though, is there 26 were meetings held within that IECC and there were a 27 variety of people who were in those meetings who had 28 various responsibilities who - I haven't seen the logs of 29 those meetings, but one would assume they did in fact talk 30 about the fires in these locations, "Are people being 31 warned, what's our strategy, what are we doing?" It is a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17341 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 reasonable assumption to make that that's what they were 2 doing. 3 Which people are you referring to?---Fire agencies, the police 4 officers who would have been at those matters, any other 5 person who was involved in - - - 6 The only police officers who would have been at meetings at 7 that level, Ms Nixon, are those we have talked about, 8 aren't they; Assistant Commissioner Fontana, 9 Superintendent Collins, perhaps Inspector Hocking. Is 10 there anyone else who would have been at the meetings to 11 which you are referring?---There are those meetings, but 12 there were also police officers out on the ground who were 13 involved and there were warnings given in different 14 locations and they did them by different sorts of means as 15 best they could. So I think there were a range of people 16 involved in giving warnings. But you are perfectly right 17 about the issue that, yes, we should have taken the time 18 to make sure that particular key matter was covered. 19 Can I put it to you this way, Ms Nixon. Inspector Hocking, his 20 activities can only be gleaned by looking at the SERCC 21 log, the typed log. The information we have is he didn't 22 keep any other log. There is nothing in there about 23 checking warnings issued by the fire agencies. Assistant 24 Commissioner Fontana's log has nothing of that kind. 25 Mr Collins didn't keep a log but those who kept logs 26 perhaps on his behalf, there is no reference to that sort 27 of matter. So what I'm putting to you is that at that 28 senior level the people you say you relied on who had the 29 delegated responsibility, formally and informally, didn't 30 discharge their responsibilities in relation to 31 warnings?---That's correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17342 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Is that an appropriate time for a short break, Commissioners, 2 before I turn to another topic? 3 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 4 (Short adjournment.) 5 MS DOYLE: Ms Nixon, I have located the map. I just wanted to 6 confirm with you whether you had seen it. 7 (TEN.020.002.0001). As this comes up, I can indicate to 8 you there are log entries which indicate that this map was 9 faxed by someone in Victoria Police from the IECC to the 10 SERCC at about 4.55 on the 7th. Did you see that map on 11 the 7th at either location?---I wasn't in the SERCC at 12 that time. 13 No, but it was faxed from the IECC, so did you see it at either 14 location?---Certainly something like that, but I'm not 15 exactly sure. I mean, in terms of the times, I assume 16 that's times? 17 On the map, yes?---Yes. I didn't see something like that, no. 18 I saw a map and I saw the fires but I didn't see something 19 like that. 20 So you didn't see a map like this which seems to suggest by 21 reference to markings, including times on a 24 hour clock, 22 when the Kilmore fire was predicted to hit certain 23 locations?---No. 24 Did you see anything like this that had times on it for other 25 fires?---No, I just simply saw a map which had where the 26 fires were and some arrows in some cases which were sort 27 of pointing where they would be going. Down, for 28 instance, in the Kilmore one, that sort of thing. 29 Who showed you that map?---I think I saw them there, the maps 30 on the tables, those sorts of things. 31 So it was a large map, the one you are referring to?---(Witness

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17343 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 nods.) 2 One on which you could see all the fires which were burning at 3 any given time?---I don't know if it covered all of those 4 fires. 5 I want to take you back to some log entries. Before I do, 6 obviously it is a laborious process going through four 7 logs written by other people, but it is necessary in order 8 to put context to some of these times and events. But 9 that gives rise to this question: You have explained this 10 morning that your practice was not to keep notes yourself 11 because, as you said, either you could recall what had 12 happened or others around you at the same meetings keep 13 them. That, in this instance, means that one would need 14 to rely on the logs and notes kept by people like 15 Assistant Commissioner Fontana, Superintendent Collins and 16 Inspector Hocking?---(Witness nods.) 17 If we just take each of those in turn. Assistant Commissioner 18 Fontana clearly has what looks like a detailed log; it is 19 just that it is almost impossible to read?---Correct. 20 Mr Collins didn't take any notes himself but there were two 21 logs kept at the place where he was located at the IECC by 22 people whose names are on the top of the sheets in 23 question?---Yes. 24 The information we have in relation to Mr Hocking is he didn't 25 keep any notes but the SERCC log was created from emails 26 that came into the SERCC. Otherwise he didn't keep any 27 other record of the day?---Right. 28 Your system of not keeping notes yourself obviously depends on 29 the accuracy and the fullness of the notes taken by others 30 who are involved in the same event as you?---Or any other 31 documentation. In some ways it also depends on the use

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17344 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 and what's the need to have to recall in detail what 2 happened on the day or at a particular event. 3 Yes. So this was probably Victoria's most significant 4 peacetime disaster, 173 people dead. The need to recall 5 it and recount it was going to be significant, wasn't 6 it?---It certainly has turned out that way and it was and 7 is the worst disaster this state has ever had. But at the 8 time and as I was there and undergoing my responsibility, 9 none of us could have understood what harm would be done 10 to our community as a result of those fires. 11 But of course that's again with the benefit of hindsight but 12 not really the test, is it? It was clearly going to be a 13 significant day, from 6.30 when the Bunyip fire jumped the 14 containment lines?---Yes. 15 The capacity of you now to recount these events depends in part 16 on the accuracy and detail of other people's notes. Did 17 you check, for example, Assistant Commissioner Fontana's 18 log in the days after the fire to see if it fit with your 19 recollections?---No, I had absolutely no time at all to do 20 that after the fires. 21 So when was the first time that you came to putting together an 22 account or any documentation about what occurred on the 23 day?---When you asked for this statement. 24 So the difficulty now in terms of checking matters against 25 other people's logs is of course you couldn't or you 26 haven't contemporaneously checked whether they fit with 27 your memory?---I have checked as to whether they fit with 28 my memory and there are some things I don't remember at 29 all and some that I do. 30 But the first time you checked any of these sources was when a 31 request was made for this statement?---That's correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17345 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I want to then take you to a couple of those logs, and we will 2 just work through where the important entries are in each 3 rather than doing it hour by hour, which will take longer. 4 Can I just ask you a couple of matters that arise in the 5 incident management log which was kept by VicPol liaison. 6 This is the one at (TEN.020.004.0001). We have already 7 looked at some of the entries. I want to take you to the 8 time 1620 which appears at 0004. There is an entry at 9 1620 that says, "To SERCC, fire prediction maps sent" and 10 then at 1625 a reference to the Yarra Ranges fire. Two 11 things about those entries. First, you have told us about 12 such maps as you saw. The second thing, Yarra Ranges 13 fire, Dandenongs, do you remember when you were told that 14 a fire had started in the Dandenongs?---No, I don't. 15 Do you remember your reaction on hearing that news? What 16 I want to suggest to you is that was the big one. That 17 was the one people were frightened of going into the 7th. 18 Would you agree with that? 19 MS JUDD: I object to this question. It is based on an 20 assumption that the witness was going to give a different 21 answer. The witness said she doesn't recall being told 22 this information and then Ms Doyle has gone on to ask her 23 what was her reaction upon being told. 24 The other point, whilst I'm on my feet, is that 25 Ms Nixon has indicated that she doesn't have her own log. 26 She's indicated that a number of times. She has indicated 27 that she hasn't looked at fire prediction maps. We can 28 recreate the events of 7 February from the moment the fire 29 started to the end of the day and take Ms Nixon through 30 what she heard, what she didn't hear, what she'd been 31 told, but I wonder if that's the best use of the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17346 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Commission's time with this particular witness. It would 2 be much more fruitful to ask this witness some questions 3 to give the Commissioners some assistance about matters 4 about which the Commissioners have not already heard 5 evidence. 6 MS DOYLE: I will certainly break down the question in relation 7 to the Yarra Ranges fire and I doubt that we will be 8 spending much more time on a close analysis of hour by 9 hour, but there are certain points during the day at which 10 either Ms Nixon received an important briefing or 11 decisions that may or may not have been made and it is at 12 those points in time or those snapshots that I now want to 13 direct her attention. There won't be a need to go through 14 hour by hour from this point forward, if the Commission 15 pleases. 16 I should correct what I asked you about the Yarra Ranges fire. 17 You don't recall hearing about it at 1625. Do you know if 18 you were briefed about a fire in the Dandenongs on the 19 7th?---No, I don't recall. 20 Can I take it then that when Mr Rees and Mr Waller briefed you 21 generally they did not take you to any detail of the 22 Ferntree Gully fire or Narre Warren fires?---No, they 23 didn't. 24 There are a couple of references from this point in time 25 onwards in each of the logs to information that was coming 26 in in relation to potential fatalities and at a certain 27 time in the evening it crystallises to actual 28 fatalities?---Yes. 29 Do you remember when you were first told about fatalities as a 30 result of the fires?---I think I first of all understood 31 there was potential to be fatalities when I spoke to the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17347 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 fire chiefs because of the intensity of the fire and then 2 I think that was, as you said, crystallised later in the 3 night by a conversation with the deputy commissioner. 4 That would be Deputy Commissioner Walshe?---Yes. 5 We will go to that in a moment. Another matter I want to take 6 you to, and it is the last couple of entries in the SERO 7 log, and that's the log at (TEN.020.003.0001) at page 6. 8 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: While that's coming up, could I just ask 9 a question on what we have just covered a moment ago. You 10 mentioned earlier that you had had a briefing from Mr Rees 11 and Mr Waller around about 5 pm, which would have given 12 you an overview of what the situation was at that stage. 13 Do you recall in that briefing the extent to which the 14 implications of a wind change may have been 15 addressed?---Yes, they did. They spoke to me about that 16 and I think all of us in fact understood that there was a 17 potential for a wind change and that would mean the fire 18 would move on a much broader front. I think they were 19 clearly taking that into account in their planning in 20 terms of response and explained that to me. 21 With a kind of indication of what that would mean for townships 22 that would then be brought into the path of the 23 fire?---They certainly didn't go into detail, but 24 I certainly understood that by looking at the maps myself. 25 MS DOYLE: On this page there is an entry for 1700, at page 26 0007. About halfway through that entry you will see the 27 word "Whittlesea" but if you move down a few lines you 28 will see a reference to "Ferntree Gully one house lost." 29 Then "Churchill could go to Yarram and coast and with wind 30 change heads to", it seems to say. "30 houses at Wandong 31 lost, not confirmed" seems to be the entry. There is a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17348 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 lot of information there. I won't read it to you line by 2 line. I also want to direct your attention to a little 3 further down the page in the same sequence where it says 4 "Triple 0 calls delays being monitored. Now direct 5 through Vic." At some time during the day on the 7th did 6 anyone bring to your attention the fact that there were 7 delays being experienced on the 000 answering 8 service?---Not delays, but that it was under enormous 9 pressure. 10 At the bottom of this page, to complete this notation which is 11 1700, "Churchill/Bunyip significant stock losses expected" 12 is mentioned there. If we could just go to the top of the 13 next page, because it completes a reference to Horsham. 14 "Fire expected to miss the town now due to the wind 15 change." It looks as though, particularly in light of the 16 answer you have given Commissioner McLeod, that there were 17 discussions at certain times by people about the wind 18 change, but your understanding of which particular towns 19 might be impacted was more informed by maps than by 20 particular briefings?---That's correct. Just in terms of 21 Horsham, I understood at that time it had just missed 22 Horsham. That was one of the conversations we'd had with 23 the fire chiefs. 24 Down on this page, an entry from 1900, I want to direct your 25 attention to part of the reference there that says 26 "Residents of Kinglake", can you see that?---Yes. 27 A dash, "20 to 30 houses lost", but then it continues "at CFA 28 station." Was it brought to your attention during the 29 evening that residents of Kinglake or some of them were 30 sheltering or located at the CFA station?---I'm not sure 31 whether I learned then. I certainly did know that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17349 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 happened, but I can't recall whether it was advised then 2 or certainly advised since. 3 The final matter I want to ask you about in this log is the 4 entry for 2000 which is on the next page and that is a 5 reference to a SEST meeting. You were at home by this 6 stage?---I was. 7 But do you know whether anyone who attended the 8 pm SEST 8 meeting updated you as to what had been discussed by that 9 time in the evening?---No, they didn't. 10 They didn't. Then there is no need to go through the detail 11 that is set out there. You can see the format. There is 12 a reference to each fire and then information next to the 13 fire on the right-hand side. I want to take you to 14 paragraph 42 of your statement, which picks up the 15 narrative by the early evening. You have just referred 16 there to receiving a briefing from Superintendent Collins 17 and you then went and talked with Mr Waller and Mr Rees, a 18 matter we have already touched on. You think that was at 19 about 5.30, but it may have been earlier. You have noted 20 there a matter that was brought to your attention about 21 Strathewen and we have already discussed that. What other 22 information did Mr Rees and Mr Waller give you about any 23 particular fire or about the statewide situation?---I 24 think they certainly conveyed to me that it was extremely 25 dangerous fires that were operating, they would be very 26 difficult to deal with, that they would expect I think 27 loss of life was predicted, they explained to me at the 28 time, and that was of course what then caused me we needed 29 to speak to the minister. So they explained the severity 30 of the fires. 31 Did they make any prediction about numbers of assets or houses

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17350 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 that may be threatened or lost?---No, they didn't. 2 Did they nominate any particular fire as being the most serious 3 or any group of fires as being the most 4 significant?---I think what in a sense became - we talked 5 about Strathewen and I made that point. I think they felt 6 that may well have had the most harm done. 7 And in that context did either of those two gentlemen raise the 8 wind change during that briefing?---We certainly knew the 9 wind was going to change. I could see that myself when 10 I had driven up actually from police headquarters to the 11 IECC and you could see the wind changing and I understood 12 that they would very much have been across that. 13 Was it your feeling at the end of this briefing, whether based 14 on information they gave you or what you saw with your own 15 eyes, that it certainly wasn't over. In fact, there was 16 potential for this incident to become worse as the evening 17 wore on by reason of the wind change?---Correct. 18 Did they or you mention any towns besides Strathewen?---We 19 obviously talked about areas around Kinglake and they then 20 spoke around Churchill and the fact that there were forest 21 fires, those sorts of things, as to how sort of dangerous 22 those fires would be. But they certainly in essence 23 emphasised the danger and particularly what might be the 24 potential loss of life. 25 So when you left that briefing, do you recall how long it went 26 for?---Half an hour or so, maybe a bit less. 27 When you exited that briefing, in your view what was the 28 severity of the situation facing Victoria at 6 o'clock 29 that night?---That we were facing a disaster. 30 And I think you just noted that you thought that that situation 31 was so serious you said "we needed to speak to the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17351 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 minister". Who needed to speak to the minister?---That's 2 when I asked the assistant commissioner to brief him 3 because he had been involved in the briefings, the SEST 4 briefings that had gone on, and I felt he had the detail 5 and was able to inform the minister. 6 I want to ask you about a couple of the other senior people who 7 were there. Was it your understanding when you exited 8 this briefing with the fire chiefs that neither of them 9 had yet briefed the minister?---I wasn't sure. 10 You note at the end of that paragraph that you saw Mr Esplin 11 but you didn't speak to him. So you weren't aware of 12 whether he had spoken to the minister?---No, I wasn't. My 13 assumption would be that he had, but that's been the 14 practice in previous occasions. 15 His evidence in this Commission is that he recalled speaking to 16 the minister a number of times during the day and that 17 some time in the early evening he rang the minister and 18 said, "It would be important for you to come down to the 19 IECC" and that the minister then arrived. He puts it at 20 about 5 o'clock, but do you know what time the minister 21 arrived?---I'm not sure. It was clearly after I'd left, 22 so somewhere in the evening. 23 You say you asked Assistant Commissioner Fontana to brief the 24 minister, and I think you gave as one of the reasons 25 because Fontana had been involved in briefings with the 26 fire chiefs?---No, that he had been involved in the - 27 well, there were fire people involved in the SEST 28 meetings. He had been the one who had gone along to those 29 meetings. 30 So in terms of the people who were in and out of the IECC, you 31 think that you left before Minister Cameron

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17352 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 arrived?---Yes. 2 So, given that you left at about 6, it may be that Minister 3 Cameron - we may need to look at these times. Even as 4 amended you have Assistant Commissioner Fontana briefing 5 him at 5.40 and that is certainly what his note 6 says?---Yes. 7 Does that suggest then that perhaps you left before 5.40?---No. 8 You just didn't see him while he was there?---Correct. 9 Why didn't you stay to brief the minister or go with Assistant 10 Commissioner Fontana to brief the minister?---I believed 11 that the minister would get the information off Assistant 12 Commissioner Fontana. I believed also that the minister 13 was being briefed by a whole range of other people as he 14 had been in normal practice otherwise. 15 Did you need to be somewhere that evening?---No. 16 I just wonder then why you didn't stay or search the minister 17 out and even sit in on the minister, even if Assistant 18 Commissioner Fontana did all the talking. Why would you 19 not do that?---It was a practice that I believed he would 20 get the information and he and I often spoke on phones at 21 various times in different cases. If he wanted to, he 22 would call me up, or I would call him up. In this case 23 I felt that was an appropriate response. 24 But throughout the day of the 7th you didn't call him?---No. 25 He didn't call you?---No. 26 He was in Bendigo for most of the day?---Right. 27 When you left the IECC you left it on the basis that Assistant 28 Commissioner Fontana would brief him?---Yes. 29 Did Assistant Commissioner Fontana tell you afterwards what he 30 had told the minister?---No, but I understood that he 31 would convey to him the current situation.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17353 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 You see, Assistant Commissioner Fontana's log book just says 2 "Briefed Minister Cameron at 5.40", no content?---Yes. 3 You weren't there?---No. 4 At this stage, short of asking the minister, we don't know what 5 he was told, or Mr Fontana?---I think it is reasonable to 6 make an assumption that he was told there were serious 7 fires. 8 Sometimes assumptions aren't correct, though?---I understand 9 that. 10 Given the information the fire chiefs gave you, that they told 11 you it was an extremely dangerous situation and one could 12 expect loss of life, and what you knew, namely the wind 13 change wouldn't bring relief but possibly make things 14 worse, why did you leave the IECC?---I believed that as 15 best I could I had understood the situation and that 16 Assistant Commissioner Fontana and others were 17 appropriately placed and I understood Deputy Commissioner 18 Walshe would be arriving in the not too distant future. 19 Would you be surprised if I suggested to you that some people 20 might expect a little bit more than you assuming that 21 people understand a situation? You are the Chief 22 Commissioner of Police?---I'm sure that some people would, 23 but other people who have been involved and experienced in 24 this situation would I think understand. 25 At the time you left, had you given any thought to speaking to 26 the Premier and in particular speaking to the Premier 27 about the prospect of declaring a state of disaster?---No, 28 I hadn't. 29 You say in paragraph 45, which is the next paragraph on the 30 screen, that you are aware that the Premier has to 31 consider a number of matters under the Act and will

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17354 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 consider your advice if it comes to that. You say, "While 2 I did give the issue consideration, I was not of the 3 opinion that the declaration of a state of disaster would 4 be useful in the circumstances" and you didn't have any 5 discussion with the Premier about that. I just want to 6 clarify some matters. Did you have any discussions with 7 the Premier at all on the day?---No, I didn't. 8 So that obviously subsumes the question of making this 9 declaration. Why did you form the view that it was not 10 appropriate?---Because my understanding of that particular 11 part of the Emergency Management Act is it is a useful 12 tool when one needs cooperation or one needs additional 13 resources or something that isn't being offered or given 14 or in use at the time, and I didn't think we were at that 15 situation where we needed to be gaining access to the 16 powers or resources that that piece of legislation would 17 give us. 18 And did you hold that view late into the evening? Your view 19 didn't change, didn't it think it was necessary to discuss 20 it with the Premier or the minister?---I think it was a 21 matter that I obviously turned my mind to, but in terms of 22 the substance of that piece of legislation I was of the 23 belief that all of the resources that were going to be 24 needed would be available and that there was time 25 afterwards to determine whether or not there needed to be 26 considered this state of disaster. 27 At paragraph 46 of your statement you indicate that you 28 returned home. If you needed to come back into the IECC, 29 how long would it have taken you on the Saturday 30 evening?---About five minutes. 31 You say you monitored the situation. You continued to review

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17355 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 the website, so you had email and web access?---Yes. 2 Throughout the evening were you available by phone?---Of 3 course. 4 And did you speak to Assistant Commissioner Fontana during the 5 evening?---I believe I did, yes, and I certainly got a 6 number of texts off the assistant commissioner in 7 continuously updating me. 8 In terms of your capacity to monitor the situation, is it 9 something that you devoted the whole evening to or were 10 you otherwise engaged and just checking on websites or 11 emails?---No, I had a meal and then I went backwards and 12 forwards. I was obviously listening to the radio, the ABC 13 Radio as the broadcaster, I was aware of that, and 14 watching television and also obviously, as it says there, 15 other sources as well. 16 You say in the last line that having spoken to various staff, 17 including Assistant Commissioner Fontana and 18 Superintendent Collins, you were "confident that all 19 responding agencies were doing their best and that 20 Victoria Police was adequately resourced." Superintendent 21 Collins left the IECC at 5, so what sort of information 22 was he able to impart by early evening through the 23 night?---It was more the absence of it. Given that people 24 have always felt very confident to call me if they needed 25 any assistance or any additional resources, then given 26 that didn't happen I assumed that one was being properly 27 dealt with. 28 Deputy Commissioner Walshe then did a media spot before 9.30. 29 He was able to speak to you by 9.30. I think he said in 30 his evidence at about transcript page 667 he left home 31 about 7 and he thought he did the media at about 8. In

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17356 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 any event, by the time he did the media spot he knew of 14 2 deaths that he was able to speak of; six at Kinglake, four 3 at Wandong, three at Strathewen and one at Clonbinane. 4 Did Deputy Commissioner Walshe give you that level of 5 detail about where the deaths were and the numbers in his 6 possession?---He didn't say where the deaths were, but he 7 said that there had been a significant number of deaths. 8 He had been at home until he came in to do that media slot. 9 Did you discuss with him about who was going to be 10 available over the remainder of the evening after 9.30 to 11 deal with requests, whether it be you, him, 12 both?---I think all of us at that point were all available 13 to requests. Certainly the text information that was 14 conveyed went throughout the entire night and all of the 15 senior management team of Victoria Police, excepting then 16 Deputy Commissioner Overland who was out of the state at 17 the time, were all then looked to be available to be able 18 to provide assistance and to start to think through the 19 resources that might be needed for the future. 20 We have talked about the fatalities in relation to which there 21 was information. By 9.30 did you have a clearer picture 22 about asset loss?---From all of the variety of sources 23 that I had access to, I assumed there would be significant 24 asset loss. 25 So if we just take a snapshot at 9.30, say after you have 26 spoken to Deputy Commissioner Walshe, the news that was 27 available to you, not all of it incredibly detailed, but 28 the news included multiple fatalities?---(Witness nods.) 29 Did you understand or expect there would be multiple homes 30 lost?---I did. 31 There are some log references that refer to people missing or

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17357 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 unaccounted for. Was that something you were aware 2 of?---I assumed that would be the case, yes. 3 Had you heard any reports yet about infrastructure apart from 4 houses, namely larger infrastructure, businesses, schools, 5 et cetera? You hadn't heard that yet?---No, I hadn't. 6 Were you aware that some places remained inaccessible or there 7 was trouble getting through on the roads for fire 8 services?---I was, and that had actually been the case 9 during the day as well. 10 You heard that 000 calls, I think the terminology you used, 11 "were under pressure"?---Yes. 12 Have you since learnt that they were under significant pressure 13 to the extent that many, many calls were unable to be 14 answered on the day?---I have, and I have heard that 15 directly from people who tried to call 000. 16 And you knew, obviously, that there were seven significant 17 fires, many of which were still burning?---Yes. 18 Given the fatalities, there was likely to be a need in the 19 morning to set up crime scenes at a number of places as 20 well as swing into action with DVI?---Yes. 21 In fact, during the evening, and I think it is the next 22 paragraph you refer to this, by 10.50 you had had an offer 23 from the New South Wales police in relation to DVI. You 24 clearly, I take it, accepted the reality that DVI alone 25 was going to be a big task in the coming days?---I had, 26 and I think as the media was also clearly following, and 27 I was watching that, it became clear that we had some 28 resources for DVI, but the offer was then made by not only 29 the New South Wales police, actually by the Australian 30 Federal Police as well. 31 In terms of police operations, the significant fires, many of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17358 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 which may have resulted in fatalities, had burned through 2 regions 2, 3, 4 and 5 with 4 quite badly hit?---Yes. 3 Can I ask you again, then: as at 9.30, if all of those pieces 4 of information don't generate a discussion with the 5 Premier about a state of disaster, what would?---A 6 situation where people were being uncooperative, where 7 resources were unavailable, where the departments were not 8 responding in a way that was appropriate. The disaster 9 situation, it seems to me, is designed to overcome a 10 particular problem and give you powers to be able to deal 11 with it in a way that I actually already understood we 12 were dealing with the situation effectively. 13 Is there no benefit in terms of what unfolds when a state of 14 disaster is declared, you have the commander-in-chief and 15 you have that sort of level of control, is there no 16 benefit in doing that, even if only to signify that the 17 government has taken charge, things aren't out of control, 18 the community shouldn't panic? Do you see it as having 19 that role as well?---It could, but I think that what the 20 community already understood was that the Premier had 21 obviously become involved by this stage late that night, 22 that Victoria Police was conducting a briefing and 23 explaining the situation, and that they were being 24 encouraged to have confidence that the State and 25 ultimately the Commonwealth as well would be able to 26 respond and support in this regard. 27 After you spoke to Deputy Commissioner Walshe in particular 28 about the information he'd had to give to the media at 29 9.30 in terms of fatalities, did it seem to you there was 30 any need for you to return to the IECC or the SERCC to 31 oversee things during the evening?---No, it didn't.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17359 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I understand that Deputy Commissioner Walshe would be 2 there, as was Assistant Commissioner Fontana and so was 3 Assistant Commissioner Scott, and I knew that given the 4 size of the situation that I needed to be early from the 5 following morning, as I was, out to these particular 6 locations to make an assessment myself and to assure the 7 community as well. 8 You say in paragraph 49 that in the lead-up there had been 9 other pressures, including the long heatwave and the 10 pressure on police resources. Earlier in your statement 11 you also refer to a couple of the steps you took, 12 including on the 5th making sure that an email went out to 13 tell people at the regions at the municipal levels to get 14 ready. Are you satisfied that in terms of the police 15 structure, the MERCs and the MECCs and the DERCs on the 16 day, that all operated as it should?---I certainly believe 17 that they had followed the instruction that was given to 18 set those up and/or have them available to be set up and 19 my experience in a number of those that I checked myself 20 as I proceeded down from Mildura, they seemed to 21 understand the situation, and then since, of course, I 22 have understood in different cases, in Bendigo for 23 instance, with Superintendent Taylor in Gippsland, with 24 others, that they had put into place what was requested of 25 them. 26 Because of the timing, it is unlikely you saw these documents, 27 but have you seen documents containing debriefs at the 28 regional level through Victoria Police since the 29 fires?---No, I haven't. 30 If I can indicate to you that there are some in evidence in 31 which some members of Victoria Police have indicated that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17360 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 they felt their MECC or DERC was not as prepared as it 2 could have been and they have identified their concerns, 3 but I take it that the debriefs wouldn't have made it 4 through to you given the timing?---No. 5 I have asked you about warnings. There is a matter in relation 6 to evacuations I also want to ask you about. When Deputy 7 Commissioner Walshe gave evidence and when Superintendent 8 Collins gave evidence, they made a similar comment about 9 evacuations as for the issues we have explored in relation 10 to warnings; namely, that despite what the emergency 11 management manual says, the practice has evolved a little 12 differently in relation to fires and by reason of the 13 expertise of the fire agencies and the "stay or go" 14 policy, VicPol is not traditionally directly involved in 15 directing and organising evacuations during fires. Does 16 that fit with your understanding of what the practice was 17 as at February 2009?---My sense would be that they would 18 have been involved in evacuations and assisted or in fact 19 in some cases taken it upon themselves, which I'm clearly 20 aware police officers have, to evacuate people in certain 21 circumstances. So I think in conjunction with the fire 22 services they've made those sorts of decisions. 23 I want to direct your attention to two paragraphs in 24 Mr Collins' statement. His statement is at 25 (WIT.3010.001.0013) and I just want to ask you to look at 26 paragraphs 47 and 48. At paragraph 47, Mr Collins is 27 saying, "Any decision to evacuate any person during an 28 emergency must be made by the relevant incident controller 29 at the local level. I was satisfied that coordinators at 30 the local level were well equipped to ensure consideration 31 was give to the need for evacuation, based in part on the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17361 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 education provided in relation to the evacuation policy. 2 I was also aware that any decision had to be made 3 following a case-by-case assessment. What was appropriate 4 for one area might not be for another." In paragraph 48 5 he then turns to the manual. He says, "While the 6 emergency management manual states that coordinators must 7 ensure that consideration is given to the need for 8 evacuation, in relation to a wildfire emergency there are 9 a number of documented reviews, including the review of 10 the 2003 fires compiled by the Office of the Emergency 11 Service Commissioner, that supports the proposition within 12 the "stay or go" policy that an attempt to evacuate in the 13 face of an approaching fire should not be considered. 14 Accordingly, I do not believe that the provision requiring 15 emergency response coordinators to give consideration to 16 the need for evacuation is appropriate in relation to 17 fires. I do, however, consider the provision to be highly 18 relevant to other emergencies." He confirmed that belief 19 in his oral evidence. So, it seems Superintendent Collins 20 went into the day believing that evacuation is certainly 21 something that might apply in some situations but not in 22 respect of fires. Was that something known to you, that 23 he went into the 7th with that understanding of the VicPol 24 obligations?---I would have thought that that wasn't his 25 view and I'm not sure that even in reality that was his 26 view as to what would have occurred. 27 Can I ask you then to look at this part of the transcript. If 28 we can bring up transcript page 2168. While that's coming 29 up, I will tell you what Mr Collins said at that page. 30 This was evidence given on day 17 of the hearings at page 31 2168. We are going to start at the bottom of page 2167.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17362 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Mr Collins has just been asked about evacuation and it has 2 been put to him, "Are you saying it is not appropriate in 3 relation to bushfires?" Part of his answer is as follows. 4 He says at 2167 line 28, "Fire is taken outside the - it 5 has evolved outside the normal arrangements in relation to 6 this 'stay or go' policy. I think it is called something 7 a little bit longer than that, but 'stay or go' is sort of 8 my synopsis. That's what I understood it to be at the 9 time. The problem would have been, and when you consider 10 evacuations, is that at 11 o'clock, maybe even later, we 11 were publicly telling - when I say 'we', collectively the 12 emergency services group - telling people that 'You should 13 have made your decision now,' this is before the fires 14 have effectively started, 'and you should have enacted 15 your 'stay or go' policy." He goes on to give some 16 information about what the Emergency Services Commissioner 17 said during the middle of the day. "So if at 12 o'clock 18 we are going to change policy on the run, I wouldn't have 19 considered it. That's why I'm saying no, I didn't 20 consider the evacuation, because if the fire services had 21 come to me and asked for advice, I probably would have 22 said 'We have just left it too late.' I don't know, 23 I would have to get all the circumstances, but that was 24 the belief that I had and I think, without speaking on 25 their behalf, but I believe that would be the 26 understanding of the DERCs. Again, as I said in the 27 earlier part and I think my counterparts in fire are 28 looking at this, too. This has probably come out of what 29 we call the slow moving-type fires. We may have to 30 now - well, we do have to look at the policy and whether 31 it stays or not. I'm not forming an opinion there, but we

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17363 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 are currently looking at whether that is appropriate in 2 these fast moving fires. Forget about the monster fire. 3 It could be relevant to one of these specific fires by 4 itself. So it is a situation we are looking at and we 5 need to consider that. But I think it was applied 6 appropriately on the day in relation to the policy that 7 existed and has evolved. Yes, it doesn't reflect the 8 manual, and is it appropriate? Well, that's what we are 9 now looking at." The questioner then says: "To summarise 10 what you have said, your understanding is that the 'stay 11 or go' policy precludes evacuation other than early on a 12 day of high fire danger, is that correct?" He says, "The 13 'stay or go' policy, even though the incident controller 14 will always have the right to make the assessment, 15 I believe that in a situation like this the philosophy 16 that underpins the policy is that it will not be made at 17 the last minute, or not the last minute, the last hour, 18 the last couple of hours. So, in answer to your question, 19 no, it doesn't preclude it, but in applying it the policy 20 that has evolved and been accepted on the way through 21 would mean that the advice would probably suggest you 22 don't." So, it would seem, Ms Nixon, that that was 23 Mr Collins' understanding of the practice that he 24 described as having evolved from the manual, if you like, 25 and being informed by the "stay or go" policy. Did you 26 know that that was his understanding of the way VicPol 27 exercised its responsibilities in relation to 28 evacuation?---What I believed was that he would have 29 understood the situation about the dangers involved with 30 an approaching fire and the difficulties in trying to 31 evacuate people too late. That's been a common

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17364 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 understanding. I don't exactly understand any more than 2 that. 3 It seems then that he went into the day thinking that once the 4 fire started it would be too late for anyone in Victoria 5 Police to advise or assist in implementing an 6 evacuation?---Well, I don't think that's the case. 7 Indeed, in Mr Walshe's evidence, if you have read his 8 statement, he identifies a number of particular examples 9 where members of VicPol at what you might call even the 10 very last minute physically evacuated people from certain 11 places around the state?---Yes, I understand that. 12 He gave some moving accounts of particular members engaging in 13 great bravery, including a member who went to a rehab 14 centre and physically took the residents out in his own 15 four-wheel-drive?---Yes. 16 Have you read that account?---No. 17 He also referred to the police officers who were involved in 18 leading many citizens from the Marysville oval. You are 19 obviously aware of that account?---Very much. 20 He referred to a Sergeant Hess who went on foot up a road and 21 found a young girl severely injured who had lost her whole 22 family and took her out by himself?---Yes. 23 When these examples were put to Deputy Commissioner Walshe, 24 those in his evidence and others that counsel were aware 25 of, he agreed that these were examples of members acting 26 very bravely and in some instances against the rules, 27 deciding to put saving lives before following a procedure 28 to the letter?---Yes. 29 Would you agree with the Deputy Commissioner's 30 assessment?---I would certainly think that and I think 31 that police officers always will put the common sense and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17365 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 saving life particularly above following rules. 2 Indeed, Deputy Commissioner Walshe went further and said he 3 would expect nothing less. He said it may be spontaneous 4 bravery by members but in essence he would expect nothing 5 else. Those members I have referred to, those who were 6 dealing with the events at the Marysville oval, 7 individuals who took the initiative and saved others, they 8 were out in the field doing this work into the evening and 9 through the night of 7 February in difficult 10 circumstances. During the evening did you speak to any 11 DERCs or assistant commissioners who were out in the 12 regions about how members were faring and what sorts of 13 things they were having to do?---No, but I had asked and 14 had conversations previously around the fact that our 15 members were very important and that we needed to make 16 sure that they were supported and if not that night, then 17 the following day certainly the peer support officers 18 needed to be deployed to make sure our people were being 19 supported. 20 You didn't receive any feedback either directly from a DERC or 21 through Assistant Commissioner Fontana or others that 22 there were any in the divisional command positions or even 23 the municipal command positions who were seeking 24 assistance, advice or input?---I would have thought 25 following the normal processes they would have asked at 26 their divisional level or regional level for support or in 27 fact the SERCC for support or even IECC if they wanted 28 that kind of assistance or perhaps even gone direct to the 29 HR department in terms of personal support. So I didn't 30 think there was any reason for them to call me. 31 Do you know if any request for either strict resourcing or

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17366 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 support went through to the police operations command 2 centre?---No, I don't know. 3 Again, would that be a place that you would think any of those 4 resourcing questions might go if regions were having 5 difficulties?---Or the police operations centre would be 6 the location because that was established so that if there 7 were additional resources needed they could access that 8 and in fact over time as the response unfolded then we 9 were able to provide a lot of assistance in different ways 10 using that technique. 11 Now, I just want to return to the chronology again for a 12 moment. You have talked about the fact that Assistant 13 Commissioner Fontana is the one who briefed the minister. 14 Has Assistant Commissioner Fontana told you whether the 15 minister either asked for anything, sought advice or gave 16 directions in that briefing?---No, he hasn't. 17 Did you get any feedback on the night about what the minister's 18 view was of the statewide situation or whether there was 19 anything he wanted done?---No, I don't have any view. 20 So that's not information that you got on the night and you 21 haven't got it subsequently?---Subsequently I obviously 22 came to understand that the minister was extremely 23 concerned about the situation, was very supportive of all 24 of the emergency services agencies and obviously the 25 community in terms of wanting to provide assistance. 26 Can we recap, then, the events of the day in terms of who was 27 where and just get a handle on various segments of the 28 day. I just want to understand who overlapped with whom 29 and why. As far as you understand it, the minister was in 30 contact with at least Mr Esplin but not with you by phone, 31 and he arrived in at the IECC by 5.30. That's about the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17367 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 best we can do on the timeframe?---I don't know what time 2 the minister arrived, but the practice in a number of 3 emergency situations is the minister was briefed by a 4 range of people from the emergency services areas. He may 5 well have been briefed by his own office, I assume. 6 That's been the history that my experience with that 7 minister and others has been. He may well have been 8 briefed by the fire services. He may well have been 9 briefed by the Premier's Department. He may well have 10 been briefed by a range of others, state service, SES, 11 because they all actually worked to him as well. 12 When you left at about 6, can I just clarify with you did 13 Assistant Commissioner Fontana leave the building with 14 you?---I can't recall. 15 Those entries in his log are difficult to decipher, but on one 16 view of what is written there it looks as though he walked 17 out with you and went to the SERCC to check on things. Is 18 that something you can recall now?---I think that is what 19 I recalled by looking at his notes. It's one of the 20 things I think I could determine. 21 We have already established that Superintendent Rod Collins 22 handed over to Knight at about 5?---And I think also 23 Assistant Commissioner Scott I think was perhaps at the 24 IECC as well. 25 So in terms of those who have responsibilities and powers under 26 the Emergency Management Act, namely you, the minister 27 above you and Deputy Commissioner Walshe below you, none 28 of you were present at the IECC prior to 3.30 when you 29 arrived?---Correct. 30 You then spent some time there and we have been over that in 31 detail. You left at 6 and it is possible that Assistant

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17368 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Commissioner Fontana left with you, but it appears from 2 his log he spent much of the night back at the 3 IECC?---Yes. That's what I understood. 4 Mr Knight came on duty at 5. Presumably he got some sort of 5 handover from Superintendent Collins?---Of course. 6 So during the evening at the IECC there would have been 7 Mr Knight who came on deck at 5 and at some stage in the 8 evening Assistant Commissioner Fontana returned and would 9 have been there with him throughout the evening?---And 10 Assistant Commissioner Scott who was there as well prior 11 to me leaving. 12 And what are Assistant Commissioner Scott's duties in terms of 13 matters pertaining to emergency management?---I assume he 14 was there to assist Assistant Commissioner Fontana in any 15 way necessary. His responsibility - he'd been a chief of 16 staff previously, he had been a serving police officer for 17 a number of years, he'd had a range of experiences. 18 And also, we have already dealt with this, but over at the 19 SERCC you had Inspector Hocking and at times it seems 20 Collins called in there, Fontana called in there and you 21 spent the time there we have talked about?---Correct. 22 Ms Nixon, on a day like this, even by 3.30, do you think it may 23 have been better to have someone more senior, namely 24 someone with any of those powers under the Emergency 25 Management Act, the minister, you or Deputy Commissioner 26 Walshe, to have one of you three at the IECC during the 27 day prior to 3.30?---I think in hindsight it's a 28 reasonable statement to make. 29 If we then move ahead and talk about after 6, the people who 30 were left there in terms of the Victoria Police presence, 31 Assistant Commissioner Fontana, Assistant Commissioner

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17369 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Scott, but then Mr Knight who had only come on at 2 5?---Mr Knight is an extremely experienced officer within 3 Victoria Police, vast experience in terms of events and 4 event management as well as serious situations, disaster 5 situations, so a very competent individual. We also of 6 course had various people in regional areas and in DERCs 7 and other areas of responsibility who on the ground were 8 also carrying out their duties. 9 But there was no-one there who had the responsibilities for 10 coordination in relation to the state emergency response 11 plan. The only people with those powers and 12 responsibilities are the minister, you and DC 13 Walshe?---But I think it isn't as though one stands and 14 directs, I have to say, for want of a better description, 15 to all other agencies what they should or shouldn't do. 16 It is in fact about coordination and it is about 17 cooperation and it is about a range of people who have 18 worked together over time and were, again, being briefed 19 regularly and working towards what was the situation and 20 what needed to be done for the future. 21 I don't think there is any doubt, Ms Nixon, given what you have 22 said and the other evidence, that there was a desire on 23 the part of everyone to be cooperative and that there was 24 no entity or agency that was digging in and not revealing 25 information or not making its best effort. But there is 26 also the element under the state Displan or SERP and under 27 the Emergency Management Act in relation to which you 28 might ask this question: but who was in charge? If the 29 Commissioner of Police who is also a deputy state 30 coordinator and the coordinator of the SERP is not there, 31 who was in charge?---Well, I wasn't in the premises but

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17370 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 clearly I was still in charge. 2 So in relation to Victoria Police's responsibility - - - 3 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Excuse me, can I just have a bit more 4 clarification of that? In saying you were in charge, what 5 did you see yourself being in charge of? The operational 6 response to the bushfires?---The overall coordination 7 responsibility. 8 Which is different to the operational responsibility for 9 managing the bushfires?---The IECC is a coordination 10 centre. It is not a command or control centre. My 11 understanding of the process is that much of the 12 operational decision making was being made on the ground 13 through the appropriate regional and divisional 14 structures, which were well practised in doing that. What 15 the coordination centre does is provides assistance, 16 provides resources. It wasn't in command of the disaster. 17 I just wanted to clarify what seemed to be a bald statement 18 that you made in response to that question?---Thank you. 19 MS DOYLE: If we break down the matters for which Victoria 20 Police has responsibility in the coordination realm, so 21 here I'm talking about the Emergency Management Act 22 responsibilities and the emergency management manual 23 explanation of them, including the SERP, did you retain 24 responsibility for Victoria Police's obligations in 25 relation to warnings throughout the day, including when 26 you were physically absent from the IECC?---As 27 I understand the issue around warnings, Victoria Police 28 has an obligation if asked by the fire service to 29 discharge that obligation about warnings, and my advice 30 and my own experience is that we weren't asked to 31 undertake that responsibility.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17371 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Victoria Police also has responsibility to give consideration 2 to the question of whether the question of warnings is 3 being facilitated or whether it is being executed by the 4 control agency. 5 MS JUDD: If the Commissioners please, we have been through 6 this so many times. 7 CHAIRMAN: I'm sure we want to go through it again with this 8 witness. 9 MS JUDD: We have been through it with this witness. That's my 10 point. 11 CHAIRMAN: Okay. I think there is benefit. 12 MS DOYLE: I was asking you about the aspect of the 13 responsibility to give consideration to whether the 14 control agencies are doing it. Did that obligation 15 ultimately rest with you throughout the 7th even while you 16 weren't there?---As I said earlier today, that was the 17 case and I should have put into place a mechanism to check 18 that fire services were appropriately giving warnings in 19 all of the necessary locations. 20 Can I suggest to you, Ms Nixon, that one way that could be done 21 within the VicPol structure - I think I put a practical 22 example to you about maps and checking - but one way in 23 which it might be done within the organisation structure 24 is that someone, whether it be an assistant commissioner 25 for the region or a DERC or someone higher up the chain, 26 check in relation to significant fires that what is known 27 about the predicted path of the fire matches with the 28 warnings being rolled out for towns predicted to be in the 29 path of the fire?---Obviously, and that's one of the key 30 lessons from this Commission that all involved in 31 emergency management have clearly learned.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17372 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 The final matter I want to ask you before we turn to questions 2 of recovery just goes back to this issue of the split of 3 personnel and responsibilities between the IECC and the 4 SERCC. Things have evolved again since the 7th because 5 the IECC is now known as the SCC, the state command centre 6 or control centre. But sticking with the old terminology, 7 in terms of lessons that have been learnt, do you think 8 during a major fire it's more important for the senior 9 echelons of Victoria Police to be at the IECC, howsoever 10 named, or at the SERCC?---I think there is a lot of 11 lessons that will be taken on board about what kind of 12 integrated centres need to be in place for the future and 13 I understand that's actually been dealt with by all of the 14 agencies involved. As I understand it, the intent is that 15 they will in fact have a centre where people will come 16 together and the senior management will be there, as well 17 as all of the resources necessary to be able to deal with 18 this kind of a catastrophe if it ever happened again, or 19 any other. 20 In terms of the senior management, the terminology you have 21 just used there, would you agree that it is appropriate 22 throughout the whole of the day, should the 7th or 23 anything like it be repeated, that either you or a deputy 24 commissioner with delegated responsibilities under the 25 emergency management stream be on deck at the IECC or its 26 equivalent?---If you take the structure of this 27 legislation which has the minister and then the Chief 28 Commissioner and the deputy commissioners, I would have 29 thought that there needs to be any of those or all of 30 those people, depending on the circumstances, might need 31 to be there.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17373 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Can you see then in light again of lessons learned and of 2 course with the benefit of hindsight, that it may have 3 been better for you not to leave the IECC at 6 but to be 4 on deck, even if only to offer comfort, but be on deck to 5 deal with matters as they unfolded throughout the 6 night?---I made a judgment call on the day and I had faith 7 in the people who had worked for me that they would go 8 about their work appropriately and that others involved 9 would continue to do that, and I made the decision to 10 leave. 11 I want to take you to a wholly different matter. There has 12 been a document prepared, I assume with your input, but a 13 document relating to recovery matters. I will just 14 identify it for the transcript. It is (VBRA.300.001.0001) 15 and this is a report dated March this year. While that is 16 coming up, this is not in the form of a witness statement 17 but I take it, Ms Nixon, you have had a chance to look at 18 this report?---I have. 19 Are the contents of the report true and correct?---Yes. 20 I tender this and I will seek to give it a different exhibit 21 number, if I may, as it is a wholly different topic. 22 #EXHIBIT 837 - Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery 23 Authority report dated 12 March 2010 (VBRA.300.001.0001). 24 MS DOYLE: This involves shifting gear somewhat, Ms Nixon, and 25 it involves obviously your work as chair of the recovery 26 authority. I'm going to take you to a number of matters 27 in the report, but at the outset can I indicate it is 28 obviously detailed and it deals with a number of phases of 29 recovery as well as discrete areas in which the authority 30 has been instrumental in organising the relief and 31 recovery effort, so a lot of the detail we won't need to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17374 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 rehearse. It is all in the document. This is a role, 2 namely the role of chair, that you took on on 2 March in 3 2009, it having been filled in on an interim basis by 4 Major General John Cantwell?---Correct. 5 The statement explains that some work was done in terms of 6 setting up what's called a recovery framework. Were you 7 involved in that initial work or was it presented to you 8 following researches by others?---No, I was involved. The 9 timeline was that the government had asked me to become 10 the chair of the recovery authority and because at the 11 time Victoria Police was still involved in emergency 12 management response and was still involved with fighting 13 fires and a range of other matters, I determined to stay 14 with Victoria Police, but I appointed a liaison officer 15 and adviser who went to the authority and I had daily 16 contact with the authority as it developed. The actual 17 framework that was chosen was drawn from a range of other 18 research and experience in terms of emergency management 19 and that was then the model chosen to both reinforce the 20 Emergency Management Act but also to draw on others' 21 experience as well. 22 As I understand it, the model that was adopted is a modified 23 version of a New Zealand model in terms of recovery. But 24 on the way through attention was devoted to looking at 25 emergency management and recovery regimes in other 26 jurisdictions?---That's correct. 27 The emergency management manual has a whole section devoted to 28 recovery and a structure that is set up there. Is there 29 any reason why we simply didn't move to part 4 and follow 30 the emergency management recovery section?---I think much 31 of that emergency management recovery is really designed

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17375 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 to meet particular incidents, small incidents or incidents 2 contained within a particular region. There are some 3 other pieces of advice if it had to be across. But 4 because I think of the size of this disaster and the 5 significant number of people who died - 173, as you said - 6 and the harm and the variety of locations, it was 7 determined we would have constructed a recovery and 8 reconstruction authority. It was then looked to see what 9 was the best model to be able to use for that kind of a 10 reconstruction and recovery authority. 11 Is there any reason why we couldn't have, though, just stuck 12 with what we have? I understand it probably hadn't been 13 used previously for a disaster of this scale?---No. 14 But part 4 of the emergency management manual is titled "State 15 emergency recovery arrangements". It calls for the 16 appointment of a recovery coordinator and it sets out the 17 fact that there can be municipal recovery planning, 18 regional recovery planning and state level planning; so 19 three tiers drilling down to the level of the 20 municipality. That part of the manual is replete with 21 references to things that are clearly important to VBRRA: 22 involving the affected community, community briefings, 23 coordinating services. I guess what I'm driving at, 24 Ms Nixon, is it doesn't seem too bad or too ill-suited to 25 dealing with the situation that presented itself, and it 26 is of course the manual that was in force?---No, it 27 doesn't, and much of what we have done exactly reflects 28 what's in there. I think the use of a particular way to 29 display it, it goes through in the state emergency 30 recovery arrangements. It talks about the environment. 31 It talks about the economy. It talks about a range of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17376 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 other resources. All of the things you have said were all 2 part of what we put into place that reflected what was in 3 the legislation. 4 A couple of things are different, though, and I might ask you 5 to speak to each of these. They seem to have been 6 successful and welcomed by the community. The use of 7 community recovery committees and then the use of 8 community service hubs and the case management service; 9 those three entities which all are interrelated don't 10 really find expression in the emergency management manual. 11 Perhaps you can tell us about how they work, but also 12 indicate whether there is now a feeling that the emergency 13 management manual will be updated to reflect this 14 successful experience?---If I took each of those, if 15 that's okay. 16 CRCs, if you can explain how they work?---Partly the response 17 and the adoption of the New Zealand model had at its core 18 the community. I believe personally and our research and 19 experience and advisers had suggested to us that keeping 20 the community at the centre was an important part. So the 21 construction of community recovery committees is in fact 22 I think mentioned in the Act. But the way I think that 23 was done, to put up to 33 community recovery committees 24 and in fact a bereavement committee, which has more 25 recently been established as a 34th committee, was a model 26 we believed was appropriate to have local communities 27 involved in their own recovery, and I think a very 28 successful model. It is in a sense outlined in the Act, 29 but my view was that it has been integral to our success 30 in terms of being able to work with communities and to be 31 able to understand clearly what their needs are. So

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17377 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I would hope and believe that it will be the case that the 2 Act would need to take reference to that in the future and 3 perhaps have it as part of a key response to fires that 4 occur or any other disaster situation. 5 It seems from what you have then outlined in your statement 6 that one of the core tasks of a community recovery 7 committee is to devise a community recovery plan. Again, 8 is that something that in your experience has worked well 9 during the recovery phase?---I think it has. I think by 10 bringing together people from across all of the 11 communities, and if I might just use one, if you took 12 Kinglake just as an example, the Kinglake community 13 recovery committee, it's brought together a range of 14 people from very disparate backgrounds to try to work 15 through what are the appropriate things that need to be 16 put in place. It could be from the very early days, which 17 is about support, different sorts of assistance around 18 water, for instance, a range of those all the way through 19 to the plans, as you have said, that then gave us a way to 20 assist those communities to recover, whether physical 21 recovery or environmental recovery or economic recovery. 22 There are about 33 of those plans. In fact the 34th, 23 which is to do with the bereaved community, has also been 24 developed now with the bereaved community as part of that 25 too. So I think it is a very important and very 26 significant model, and one that we have tried very hard to 27 support and to have those plans put in place and then 28 deliver for those communities. 29 How is a community recovery committee established? Are they 30 self-appointed, nominated, elected?---It's been a very 31 interesting experience. Principally most of them have

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17378 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 been constructed with local government as a support. In 2 others they spontaneously came together in particular 3 locations and said to us that their council had not wanted 4 to have a recovery committee but they had wanted to be 5 one, and they spontaneously came together. Kinglake 6 Ranges, which I spoke about, in fact had an election which 7 was supervised by the Australian Electoral Commission to 8 have them put in place. The Flowerdale community recovery 9 committee had a process where local people were written to 10 to nominate and then to put that committee in place. So 11 it varies, but we obviously then supported those 12 committees in their operation. As the plans were 13 developed, we provided administrative assistance and other 14 sorts of advice to be able to help them determine a way 15 forward. 16 Community service hubs, again not an unfamiliar notion in some 17 areas of health services et cetera, but how have they been 18 developed to support the recovery program and has it been 19 successful?---I think these have been one of the 20 outstanding successes and I hope that in the future not 21 only in emergencies would these kind of models of delivery 22 of service be put into place. We have 12 of these hubs 23 established. They range in size. But if you took one at, 24 say, Whittlesea, which is in fact the busiest hub, it has 25 got local government, state government, federal government 26 resources. So it could be Centrelink, job advisers. It 27 also has people obviously from the bushfire authority, 28 rebuilding advisers, charities, a range of other people. 29 And also internet access. So anybody who perhaps lost 30 their internet access could go there. They are generally 31 very informal. People wear T-shirts who are the staff.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17379 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 They came from across a range of government departments. 2 They were established under the auspices of the Department 3 of Human Services under the people stream. But I think 4 they have been an enormously important way of helping 5 people access services, get advice quickly, particularly 6 in a number of these areas where there wasn't that kind of 7 assistance available always previously. 8 Again, the role of the community service hub, is that something 9 that you would hope to ultimately find reflected in a 10 revision of the manual?---Certainly in a revision of the 11 manual and, in terms of just taking your broader question 12 about the lessons learned and what worked and what didn't, 13 we are in the process of working our way through that to 14 be able to put into place and advise government of those 15 lessons and how they might apply, I have to say not just 16 particularly to disasters but in fact more broadly. 17 Another element that seems to have been successful is the case 18 management service. In paragraph 62 you identify the fact 19 that it was established very quickly after the fire and 20 the fact that it is a joint initiative of the state and 21 federal governments. Can you comment on that and your 22 experience of that as a service being offered to people in 23 the recovery phase?---I think very much in the first few 24 days the Prime Minister announced that there would be a 25 case management service put into place, and this had come 26 from previous Commonwealth experience in dealing with 27 major disasters where they had made available people from 28 Centrelink generally and other Commonwealth government 29 services to be able to provide assistance to those 30 affected by the bushfires or any other disaster. Very 31 quickly this model was put into place. I think there was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17380 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 some scrambling, for want of a better description, to get 2 it into place and to get it to the size that it eventually 3 became, and all of the materials about who was a case 4 worker, how do we obviously pay for that process. I think 5 the case working system eventually has settled down 6 relatively quickly with very good people coming on board. 7 They have provided advice to over 5,500 families and 8 individuals. So you could say at one stage there may have 9 been up to 15,000 people who were being supported through 10 the case management system who provided assistance with 11 grants, with other applications, with a range of ways that 12 they have supported the community. So I think that we 13 have learned a very significant lesson again about case 14 management. It wasn't easy to start with. There were 15 criticisms about some of the people who became case 16 managers and the support they offered. But I think they 17 were dealt with. This is the biggest case management 18 system in this country, and it was put into place probably 19 in a period of about two and a half months. 20 In terms of the benefit it offers to people who are dealing 21 with issues during the recovery phase, it seems on the 22 face of the model you have described and from the evidence 23 we have had from lay witnesses, at least anecdotally, that 24 one benefit it offers is it is a person, a go-to person 25 for the victim?---That's right. 26 Who can then assist them with navigating different departments, 27 different requirements and also advising and supporting 28 them?---That's exactly the case. I think those people who 29 became case managers in many cases had a background in 30 social welfare. So they were also able to identify if 31 people needed whatever kind of assistance it was. But

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17381 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I have to say I think one the case managers made the point 2 she felt like she was 10 families' personal assistant, and 3 it went from all of the sort of processes that were then 4 putting things into place to, as you said, gift 5 applications, grants, as well as becoming very supportive 6 and able to assist people in different sorts of ways. 7 Does the feedback you have had include an underscoring of this 8 point: it seems that when people are at their most 9 vulnerable in the aftermath of a disaster like this they 10 find it even more difficult - apart from the physical 11 difficulties - to navigate bureaucracy, to deal with 12 setbacks, to deal with paperwork and that seems to be an 13 area where a case manager can help bridge those gaps and 14 bridge those problems?---I think one of the things I have 15 often said is you can't underestimate the enormous harm 16 and damage that has been done to our communities. The 17 loss of the 173 people, the loss of homes and businesses 18 and communities and towns can't be underestimated. 19 I think there are a range of supports that have been put 20 into place. But, even with all of those, people are still 21 enormously traumatised and will be for some time. One of 22 things people talk about, and you will have heard it here, 23 is bushfire brain, describing a kind of an inability to be 24 able to actually do things that you fundamentally could do 25 well before. I think we have also tried to make it easier 26 for people in filling in forms and with council 27 applications, with insurance. But if you have insurance 28 and licences and grants and gifts and all those things, 29 then having assistance not just from case managers but 30 hubs and by a range of other people at least helps people 31 to come to terms with some of that enormous harm they have

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17382 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 suffered. 2 Can I ask you about information sharing from the other end. It 3 seems that a case manager can be a conduit of information 4 and provider of advice. Have you found, though, that in 5 terms of the number of entities and agencies that deal 6 with recovery that there is a bit of a tension between 7 achieving efficiency by sharing information and the 8 privacy constraints that operate through privacy laws and 9 other laws about retention of information which mean that 10 sometimes people express frustration that one department 11 didn't know what they had told another department. Have 12 you encountered those problems?---Yes, we have encountered 13 them. I think it is an issue that needs really to be far 14 more sort of developed. We have data sharing groups 15 trying to understand that. From the very beginning 16 I believed we needed information to know what was 17 happening in different locations. But what we found, and 18 quite reasonably, is there are quite significant privacy 19 concerns and, unless people had originally given authority 20 for their information to be used, it often became more 21 difficult to actually understand some of the problems. 22 I think you overcome those problems, but I think in terms 23 of a future situation this needs a fair bit of thinking 24 about how we could have much better sharing of information 25 and also hopefully being able to protect people's privacy 26 as well, because this is some of the most detailed 27 information people will ever give about their lives. 28 Whether it is in applying for a gift from the bushfire 29 fund or in to their case workers, I think we need a way to 30 work through it. I think we have worked through it and we 31 have come out with ways to be able to deal with it. But

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17383 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 it is a significant issue. 2 Is it possible then that thought ought to be given to provision 3 for an exemption in the Privacy Act or elsewhere that 4 allows in the situation of a serious emergency or a 5 widespread emergency for there to be some relaxing of what 6 are otherwise quite strict privacy requirements in order 7 to achieve efficiency when victims say they want 8 information to be shared to be able to fast-track 9 that?---I think if we could take that on board from the 10 very beginning of a disaster and to be able to collect the 11 information in a way that people don't have to tell the 12 same story so many times over and it is collected and it 13 is accessed, I think that would be an important part; that 14 people perhaps get some sort of identity card, which we 15 eventually had to develop, so that they are then able to 16 gain access to resources and support in different sorts of 17 ways. That would probably overcome some of it. In terms 18 of the exemptions, it is also very much about the way 19 people who have protected information - I think an 20 exemption would be an important thing, but we then have to 21 make sure we work with people that understood that the 22 exemption meant you could in fact share that data if the 23 people had given the authority in the first place to do 24 that. 25 I want to take you back to a couple of brief matters about 26 the macro plan and then the community plans. If we go to 27 paragraph 35 of your statement, you refer there to the 28 overarching plan, which is the "Rebuilding together" plan 29 published in October. You note in paragraph 36 it sets 30 out the steps for the long-term recovery and rebuilding. 31 Is the right way to understand this that there is the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17384 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 overarching "Rebuilding together" plan, but there are then 2 the community recovery plans that would go down to the 3 level of the detail about the particular town or 4 community?---Yes, they do. They would talk about a 5 walking track or a school might have been part of it, 6 whatever the lost asset was, or in fact it may even be 7 events that they wish to have part of the future, those 8 sorts of things. So they are quite complex, but they are 9 available for each of the communities. 10 Just while we are here, the reference in paragraph 37 deals 11 with the funding. You have given the breakdown there of 12 $193 million for reconstruction and recovery, and the 13 breakdown set out there, $117 from the two tiers of 14 government and so on in terms of donor 15 contributions?---Yes. 16 You also mention in paragraph 39 the role of local government. 17 I take it from what you said earlier about CRCs that in 18 some locations the CRC will be working very closely with 19 the council or perhaps even be the subcommittee of 20 council; in other locations they will be freestanding 21 efforts, the council will be doing some parts of recovery 22 and the CRC will be doing others?---There are two issues 23 there. One is I think we are now at a point where all of 24 the community recovery committees are acknowledged by the 25 local councils. It was complicated to start with, but we 26 have now worked to that point. In terms of actually 27 delivering the material within the plan, in some cases it 28 may well be a council, it may well be a state government 29 department, it might be private contractors. So there is 30 a range of ways that they be delivered. It could in fact 31 be an entity already existing within the community. It

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17385 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 might be a trust that already exists that will be given 2 funds to be able to deliver particular aspects. So it has 3 a range of ways that these plans can be put into place and 4 a range of people responsible. 5 Can I move forward to paragraph 44. This confirms some of the 6 information you have given about the way CRCs work and the 7 plans. Just in terms of the stats there, they have 8 generated through these plans more than 1,000 ideas and 9 projects. How are those projects funded?---They have a 10 range of sources. They could be funded via the Victorian 11 bushfire appeal fund. In some cases that has set aside a 12 proportion of funds to meet the community needs. Those 13 things that fit under that fund's Red Cross status, its 14 charity status, can be funded. Some are funded by private 15 donors; some are funded by corporations; some by insurance 16 from properties; some by the state government and the 17 federal government. 18 Then in section 4 you set out in some detail the way various 19 grants operate. We won't go through that in detail. Can 20 I just confirm with you an aspect about the structure of 21 VBRRA itself. You explain throughout the statement that 22 you have had to bring in staff from public and private 23 sectors, I assume there is a combination of people on 24 secondment, people on contracts et cetera?---Yes. 25 The current complement of staff you set out in an attachment. 26 If we can look at witness page 0063. We will have that 27 brought up on the screen. Actually 0064 is the most 28 recent chart. It has been brought up on the screen. 29 I also have a larger hard copy?---I have a copy. 30 Obviously the question of who is on the staff has been changing 31 as you have increased the complement of staff and had

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17386 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 people come in. This seems to be as at 12 February this 2 year?---Yes. 3 I think you explain elsewhere in your statement that this is a 4 total of 113 staff or thereabouts at present?---Yes. 5 Divided into a number of different areas. It is very hard to 6 see on the screen, but across the top obviously we have 7 the office of the chair and office of the chief executive 8 officer, Mr Hubbard. Under that I will just run through 9 from left to right the different streams. We have policy 10 secretariat and business services, communications and 11 media management, community engagement, built and natural 12 environment, operations, which has within it 13 reconstruction, donations and logistics, people, which has 14 responsibilities including it seems community hubs and 15 communications, and case management and economic. We then 16 have a regional structure that seems to sit below regional 17 community engagement, reconstruction and donation 18 management. As I said, it seems from your statement and 19 other charts provided that the number of staff has ebbed 20 and flowed a little. But at the moment with this 113 is 21 it anticipated that you will continue to operate with this 22 sort of structure and these sort of numbers for some 23 time?---I think, as you made the point, demands change. 24 Donations management, for instance, we have come to a 25 point where now a very small amount of donation is left, 26 and material aid. So we are closing down. So it is a 27 matter of as the particular aspects are dealt with then 28 either people have moved off back to their own departments 29 or moved into other responsibilities. But at this stage 30 this will stay for the next two or three months in the 31 main, I think, but then gradually change as different

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17387 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 sorts of responsibilities change. We may well have to 2 bring in more people in terms of project managers to 3 deliver projects. Those sorts of things are all part of 4 the ebb and flow, as you said. 5 How do the CRCs get into this structure? With whom do they 6 liaise or whom do committee members report to or provide 7 material to?---Through the area of community engagement 8 which has a number of senior committee coordinators and 9 then it nominates a number of locations, but through that 10 particular area we have people who are responsible for, 11 for instance, Bendigo, Redesdale, Horsham and Coleraine 12 and those sorts of areas that we deal with. Gippsland has 13 a senior coordinator. So they would meet on a very 14 regular basis with the community recovery committee 15 members. I meet with them, the CEO does, and determine 16 whatever the sort of issues might be. But their feed into 17 us is through community engagement. 18 Perhaps using Marysville as an example, we have had some 19 evidence in the proceedings about various initiatives in a 20 number of towns, but in relation to Marysville a 21 Ms Fraser-Jansz gave evidence and said she had been one of 22 the foundation members of MATDG, Marysville Triangle 23 Development Group, who she described as a group of locals 24 who were initially self-appointed and seemingly quite 25 highly motivated. They incorporated quickly. They set up 26 a charter and then they held some elections in June last 27 year. They are not, though, the official CRC. She 28 understood that to be the case. But she pointed to a 29 number of concerns she and members of MATDG had about the 30 number of committees and the number of layers of 31 committees, her point being there was MATDG, the CRC, the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17388 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 council, VBRRA, the State and the Commonwealth. She gave 2 quite an impassioned plea for that to be streamlined in 3 some way. No doubt those complaints have been brought to 4 your attention. Perhaps using Marysville as an example, 5 that is a lot of entities all with goodwill and resources 6 available, but a lot of entities working towards the same 7 end. Is there some way of streamlining things or 8 simplifying the number of committees and the 9 structure?---I understand Judy's perspective and we have 10 had discussions with her and others around how to do that. 11 Over time I think we have tried to make that easier for 12 communities to be able to engage in and for us to be able 13 to help them and for us all to deliver on the needs. 14 I think Marysville should be congratulated for the way 15 that that particular group formed very early under the 16 auspices of the federal member and then people came 17 together. I think the other issue that makes Marysville a 18 little different is that Marysville wasn't opened to the 19 broader community until 21 March. So the MATDG group was 20 operating very effectively and I was very happy to have 21 them there as a group to work with. But once the 22 community more broadly was able to return and also the 23 Murrindindi Shire itself decided that it needed to put 24 expressions of interest out for people to be able to come 25 together in a CRC, it really came to a point where we 26 tried to amalgamate and then tried to make more effective 27 the structures. I think that's probably a bit more detail 28 than you are asking, but it did in effect mean that some 29 of the MATDG people were in fact joined with some 30 representatives from community recovery committee and in 31 July that group came together. Now, is the outcome of all

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17389 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 of those plans what people would want? Is the plan what 2 represents all of those views? Yes, it is. It is a very 3 extensive plan that takes into account much of what the 4 MATDG organisation and a range of others want; the 5 historical society, local business people, there is a 6 range of those people who have contributed. I think we 7 have learned some lessons about how to very quickly start 8 that process. But you are also talking about various 9 people who at various times feel like they would like to 10 contribute. So there may have been a group to start with 11 and then others feel like now they can be part of it. So, 12 as I have often said, each community and each person at 13 their own pace. So you have to work with each community 14 about how they feel and how they are able to operate 15 together. But we do look continuously to try to 16 streamline the process to make it less complicated for 17 people. 18 Can I ask you about a matter you refer to in paragraph 170 of 19 your statement, and in this context you are referring to 20 some of the learning from overseas, including the 21 United States. You say in paragraph 170, which is at 22 witness page 0033, that FEMA, the United States Federal 23 Emergency Management Agency, has obviously got some 24 information to share in terms of their experience. One 25 thing they have said is, "Recovery is not a return to 26 normalcy. A return to pre-disaster circumstances may not 27 be desirable where circumstances are no longer 28 sustainable, competitive or functional to the post 29 disaster community." Can I ask you a couple of things 30 flowing from that. Take an example like towns where 31 schools were destroyed. You had destruction of schools in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17390 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Strathewen, Marysville and Middle Kinglake. The FEMA 2 suggestion there would appear to ring true; namely, you 3 don't always want to replace a school exactly with what 4 you have. You might want to achieve best practice or 5 better practice. It might be a golden opportunity to 6 build a bigger, better child-care centre or school. Is 7 that something that has come through in some of the 8 discussions you have had with communities?---Certainly, 9 I think from the very beginning when I addressed the 10 thousand people at Marysville on 21 March. Those people 11 had just been allowed back into their town. It was very 12 much a discussion about they wanted some certainty. They 13 were very, very emotional, as you can imagine, and had 14 lost so many members from that community. So they were 15 looking for some certainty. They were looking for "better 16 than". So, in terms of your point about the school, it 17 was very much about having a school that was a better 18 school and with great deal more facilities. That 19 certainly has been the case. Perhaps that's why it has 20 taken a bit longer. The school, by the way, is going to 21 be open next week. But the point is that that certainly 22 underpinned our response in terms of working with 23 communities to make sure it is better for them, better 24 facilities, perhaps better communities in many ways, 25 better structured and supported communities than before. 26 Can I perhaps put the question around the other way. There is 27 sometimes also an overwhelming desire in the early stages 28 for people to get back what they had but there may be also 29 a need to give attention to questions like whether it is 30 too dangerous or ill-advisable to rebuild in particular 31 places. Has that part of the debate featured in VBRRA's

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17391 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 work?---I think very much from the beginning that has been 2 a tension that we have understood. You've, through the 3 Commission, conducted various hearings and lay witnesses 4 and other professionals have come and talked about it. We 5 have obviously been aware of that as well. So we have 6 tried to balance that with what appears to me from my 7 experience in working with all of the communities an 8 overwhelming desire to want to have their communities 9 back, and in some cases want to have their businesses 10 back. You have got to be realistic and you have to work 11 with people about how to do that. So I suppose what we 12 have tried to do, if you took Marysville as an example, 13 there was a strong overwhelming desire from the community 14 to come back together and a very vocal desire from the 15 group you spoke about that Marysville not be ever thought 16 about as not coming back and not coming back bigger and 17 stronger. So as we have worked we have also obviously had 18 to put mitigation into place about what that would need 19 for those communities coming back and what might need to 20 change. 21 In terms of rebuilding, whether it be public assets or private 22 assets, does VBRRA direct those who receive grants or 23 those who are implementing plans towards any advice about 24 making sure the building they rebuild or the home they 25 rebuild is better in a fire safety sense as 26 well?---Certainly again Marysville probably the most would 27 be impacted in this regard. We have certainly had those 28 discussions with the community. Our urban designers have 29 worked with that community about how it should be designed 30 for the future. It is things like tree plantings, tree 31 clearing as well, access to water, the type of buildings

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17392 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 and their bushfire attack level standards they need to be 2 built at. Clearly the community itself is aware through 3 the regulations that were changed in March last year of 4 the kind of standards they need to be building their new 5 residences in, and the same with any other facilities that 6 are going into place. So we try and take them into 7 account and provide them that protection according to the 8 knowledge that we have at this stage. 9 Related to that - this may not be a question for VBRRA - 10 I assume in light of what you have said VBRRA does not in 11 its work pose the prior question. What I mean by that is 12 you don't ask whether the town or the street should be 13 resettled at all; it sounds as though what you do is you 14 advise and then you support, assuming that anyone who 15 wants to rebuild is entitled to?---That's very much been 16 the assumption from the very beginning and a good 17 assumption in this case, I think, for two reasons. One is 18 clearly the government had made those sorts of commitments 19 but, more importantly for me, the community itself. It 20 would have been a very rash judgment to have said to those 21 communities there and then that they weren't able to 22 return to their homes and to their communities. I think 23 the balance was about - I have to say I can't even imagine 24 the damage of having to tell people that there and then. 25 I think we have learned a lot, and clearly the Commission 26 will make their views known about that in the future in 27 terms of perhaps the future. But from what we knew at 28 that time I think that we did as best we could. 29 I personally have to say I did contemplate this issue 30 myself particularly when I, as the Police Commissioner, 31 travelled around those areas and then as the head of the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17393 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 authority for months and months on end and looked at some 2 locations and just couldn't quite believe people were 3 going to rebuild there. But, as you came to talk with 4 people and as new standards came into place, it seemed to 5 me there were very few who would say to me, "I don't want 6 to live here and I want someone to buy my land." What 7 I did say to them was, "If you want that to happen, you 8 need to come back to us and you need to tell us and we 9 will do the very best we can to support you in that 10 choice." 11 Perhaps related to that is a matter in paragraph 168. If we 12 can just conclude by looking at this. You make the point 13 there that assessing the success of recovery and 14 rebuilding is difficult, but mostly because each impacted 15 community will define the success differently depending on 16 its circumstances, challenges, visions and priorities. 17 You then in the remainder of the report ask a number of 18 questions. For example, at paragraph 173 you look at 19 people, have those who were impacted received what they 20 need, and you move through housing, reconstruction, local 21 economies et cetera. I won't go through it all with you, 22 but again has that evolved from the New Zealand model; 23 namely, you break it down into those groups and then you 24 ask yourself, "Are we achieving these goals"?---I think 25 from the very beginning when we came to understand the 26 size of the situation, because the Recovery and 27 Reconstruction Authority was very much in what would be 28 called early relief, we were there from the beginning - in 29 some cases you move a bit down the track before you put a 30 reconstruction and recovery authority into place - but we 31 set ourselves goals there and then, and it might have been

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17394 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 things like getting water and food into Kinglake. So you 2 set those tasks and you understood they were what the 3 community were raising and you then went and dealt with 4 those. Fencing, for instance, is another indicator. We 5 know that we lost thousands of kilometres of fencing and 6 about 84 per cent of it has now been replaced. So what 7 you try and do is set those sorts of ways up as indicating 8 the success. In terms of the people, as I said, enormous 9 harm done, and obviously again to my respects to those 10 people who lost their lives and those who lost neighbours 11 and all of that, I think we still have a long way to go to 12 be able to say that we have been able to meet the needs of 13 all of those people because I think it will be many, many 14 years before we can actually say that. 15 There has been other evidence in the proceedings about initial 16 psychological support and then the ongoing effects of 17 trauma. The way that witnesses then described the matter 18 was that initially you can apply some psychological or 19 psychiatric first aid but the problems persist and they 20 can endure for years and require constant 21 attention?---Look, I think that's exactly the case. So 22 our planning is also about the long-term, the long-term 23 particularly in terms of the bereaved community because we 24 very much understand that that group, and there are 25 probably 600 people within that group, will be ones 26 needing support for many, many years to come and then, as 27 you said, the broader bushfire-affected communities that 28 may well seem in some cases to be fine now and within a 29 year may not. So I think our planning and process for the 30 future has to take into account particularly around the 31 people and their support for the longer term.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17395 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 The final matter I want to ask you about is bereavement 2 obviously has affected people all across the state, but if 3 we focus in on townships that were particularly hard hit, 4 you have spoken of Marysville, there is of course Kinglake 5 and many others, did you find in the early days something 6 of a catch-22 in re-establishing those communities? What 7 I mean by that is this: it is very hard for people to live 8 in a community without schools, child-care centres, petrol 9 stations or businesses. Equally you need the people there 10 before those business and community centres can flourish 11 and be supported again. Are there any learnings from your 12 experience about how we break that catch-22 when an entire 13 town is decimated?---Yes. I think we have learnt ways to 14 deal with that. If you took Marysville, part of the 15 initial circumstance in Marysville is there were only 14 16 houses that were left. So keeping people out of those 17 communities, and particularly because of the number of 18 deaths - I believe there were at least 34 people who died 19 in that area - is a very difficult thing to do. I'm not 20 sure again that I would give anybody advice that that 21 happen again. But there were various requirements. 22 I think we have to find ways to allow people more quickly 23 to come to understand what's happened. So I think that 24 piece of it we need to be careful about. I think the 25 whole process around all of those other communities, we 26 probably do need very quickly to get people on the ground, 27 perhaps not the local council affected - the council, 28 I think in some cases we have to think about the effects 29 that these kinds of disasters have on local communities 30 and whether or not they are able to do the things you are 31 asking of them to start with. So I think we need to get

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17396 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 people very quickly onto the ground. I know later on 2 today you are going to be talking to Anne Leadbeater. 3 I think someone like her and Inspector Tess Walsh and 4 others who were on the ground in Kinglake, for instance, 5 who tried on a daily basis to brief people and to keep 6 them informed, I think those sorts of things are very good 7 practices and I think they are helping us. Why we 8 couldn't get fuel into Kinglake for 12 months is beyond 9 me, I have to say. We eventually did. But again it is 10 something that - we did have fuel at one point, and it was 11 supplied by the army. Maybe in the future that's the kind 12 of way we need to cut through and to deliver those sorts 13 of services. In terms of the schools, I think Education 14 did a very good job of making sure those children stayed 15 together who came from that school. So they were sent as 16 a group to Taggerty or they were sent to Wattleglen. 17 I think that way also meant that at least they stayed 18 together so that when they come back into their school, 19 that they have been involved in thinking about that, 20 hopefully they will settle back again. 21 Thank you. I notice the time. It is likely that there will be 22 a couple of people seeking to ask some questions. I might 23 just get an estimate. We may not need to. It's lucky 24 I did that, because it means that Ms Nixon can be excused 25 and not have to return after the lunch break and we can go 26 straight into the lay witness at 2. 27 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Just a brief question, Ms Nixon. The 28 term "bushfire brain" I don't think has been introduced 29 into the Royal Commission before. We can add that to the 30 lexicon. It doesn't have an acronym either, so that's a 31 bit of a help. With the 12-month anniversary of the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17397 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 fires, do you think that that has had a psychological 2 boost for individuals and communities that might propel 3 the recovery forward a little?---We worked very hard with 4 the communities and with a whole range of authorities and 5 the media to make sure that whatever those communities 6 wanted to do to remember that day and the areas 7 surrounding, given some of our fires are before that time, 8 I think that people were pleased about the way the day 9 went because they really didn't know what to expect. 10 I hope and believe that the bereaved community with the 11 service that was held here and in others that were held in 12 different locations felt like they were recognised and 13 supported, and that was a very important goal for us. 14 I think what we are seeing now is two sets of behaviours. 15 Some people in effect have been far more harmed and 16 showing signs of that on the basis of now having to say, 17 "This is my life and I have to come to terms with it," 18 both in a negative way and also in some cases a positive 19 way. I talked to our rebuilding advisers and they have 20 said that we are now seeing more people who are starting 21 to say, "I need to get on and think about my house. 22 I need now to be able to make some decisions about what 23 happened." I think as you work with these communities you 24 just see - I mean, again, I have said it before, but 25 I want to say it again - the enormous harm and emotional 26 damage that's been done. Commissioner McLeod would 27 understand that from the fires in Canberra. But you can't 28 really underestimate it. I think that's what we are 29 seeing. So we try to be aware of the way people will 30 behave, the pain and the grief that these communities have 31 suffered, and to be able to help them to be able to come

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17398 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 to term with what they describe to me as the new normal. 2 So I think we are seeing different responses from 3 different people. As I understand it from our advisers, 4 the two-year anniversary will again be a point for some 5 people to be again traumatised and others to have 6 different reactions. I remember one father said to me, 7 "The further we get away from that day, the further I go 8 from remembering my children." He lost his children on 9 the day. So I think this whole process that we have been 10 working through is one that is very significant for so 11 many people still and will be for some time to come. 12 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, do you have any other questions in 13 relation to those topics? Can I ask that Ms Nixon be 14 excused, but also just attend to adding some of those 15 documents I took her to this morning to exhibit 836. 16 I better identify these for the transcript. Exhibit 836 17 was Ms Nixon's principal statement in relation to the 18 events of the 7th. Can I add to that the log of Assistant 19 Commissioner Fontana at (VPO.001.081.0166); the various 20 items in relation to delegations and position descriptions 21 to which I took Ms Dixon at (INDX.820.001.0001); various 22 extracts from the Victoria Police manual to which I took 23 Ms Nixon, (INDX.821.001.0001); for completeness, a letter 24 from VGSO which establishes the matter I put to Ms Nixon 25 about the absence of any other log from Inspector Hocking, 26 (CORR.1003.0165_R); and a version of the then Emergency 27 Management Act, that which was in force as at February 28 last year, (TEN.254.001.0001). I seek to make all of 29 those part of exhibit 836. 30 Then quite separately and on the topic of 31 recovery there is a bundle of material served on the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17399 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 parties that complete the picture, various reports and 2 documents pertaining to recovery and reports prepared by 3 some government departments. That is (INDX.833.001.0001). 4 I seek to make that a separate exhibit, exhibit 838, if 5 I may. 6 I have just noticed I missed one document to 7 bundle up with exhibit 836. It is the Kilmore prediction 8 map, (TEN.020.002.0001). 9 #EXHIBIT 838 - Relief and recovery tender bundle index 10 (INDX.833.001.0001). 11 MS DOYLE: With those formalities taken care of, that concludes 12 the evidence of Ms Nixon. 13 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you for your evidence and you are 14 excused. We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock. 15 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 16 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17400 NIXON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 UPON RESUMING AT 2.00 PM: 2 MS NICHOLS: If the Commissioners please, I call Anne 3 Leadbeater. 4

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17401 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 On and after Black Saturday you have had a very significant 2 role in the recovery process in Kinglake?---Yes, up until 3 August when I went to work with the OESC, yes. 4 You have prepared a statement with the assistance of the 5 lawyers for the Commission in relation to your own 6 experiences of Black Saturday, but more particularly your 7 role and your observation of others in the recovery of 8 Kinglake, Kinglake West and Toolangi?---That's right, yes. 9 Is the statement true and correct?---Yes, it is. 10 I tender the statement. 11 #EXHIBIT 839 - Witness statement of Anne Elizabeth Leadbeater 12 (WIT.153.002.0001). 13 MS NICHOLS: Ms Leadbeater, I want to ask you principally about 14 the recovery of Kinglake and surrounding areas, but before 15 we do that I just want to ask you briefly about your own 16 personal experience of Black Saturday?---Yes. 17 You and your family stayed and successfully defended your 18 house?---Yes, we did. 19 And you live on a 12-acre property which was largely 20 cleared?---It is actually 12 hectares. 21 I beg your pardon. Many of your friends and neighbours lost 22 their homes?---Yes, they did. 23 And you also had friends and neighbours who died in the 24 fires?---That's right, yes. 25 Your parents lived in Strathewen?---Yes. 26 And they survived the fires but their house was destroyed in 27 the fire?---That's right. 28 Your sister and her son, who also lived at Kinglake, lost their 29 house in the fire?---That's right, yes. 30 And on the 7th you had quite a houseful of people?---Yes, we 31 did. My parents had left Strathewen and come up to us in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17402 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 Kinglake and my sister and her partner and son had come to 2 our home also, as had my stepson and his partner and their 3 two children, with my husband and I, so there was quite a 4 crew of us, yes. 5 Between you, whilst the full front of the fire didn't attack 6 your house, you had to spend quite some time defending the 7 property from fire throughout the night?---That's right, 8 yes. There were fires burning all around the property and 9 we were fortunate that we didn't experience the firefront 10 as it had occurred in other areas, but certainly it seemed 11 like a reasonably challenging time despite that. So, yes, 12 we were very engaged in trying to control what was 13 burning. 14 Having spent a very difficult day and night on the 7th, can 15 I take you to 8 February?---Yes. 16 Your sister, Fiona, was at your house during the fires with her 17 partner and her son, Daniel?---That's right, yes. 18 And you and your sister went to see her place, which was about 19 four kilometres away?---That's right, yes. 20 And you learnt that it had been destroyed by the fire?---Yes, 21 we did know it had been destroyed. Fiona was wanting to 22 go up and actually see it herself first before she went up 23 there with Daniel, so we left our home in Orchard Road and 24 we travelled via the main street area of Kinglake up to 25 her house up near the top of Bowden Spur. 26 Can you describe what your experience was like on that day when 27 you looked around and saw the devastation and learnt about 28 what had happened to people you knew?---Yes. One of the 29 things that strikes me is that, where we were, we were 30 very aware of what was happening for us but it was very 31 difficult to tell what was happening anywhere else. So it

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17403 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 wasn't until we actually left home and drove out into the 2 main street area that we got a sense of the scale of what 3 had occurred, and it was quite shocking. There were burnt 4 houses, so many that it seemed difficult to imagine. In 5 fact, it seemed at that time there were more burnt than 6 there were left standing, and burnt cars, trees across the 7 road. It was quite a scene of devastation and a lot of 8 confusion and a lot of distress, yes. 9 At about 4 pm on 8 February, the Sunday, there was a meeting at 10 the fire shed at Kinglake?---That's right, yes. 11 And you say that people were very distressed and angry and 12 anxious at that meeting?---Yes. That meeting had been 13 called by the CFA to try and provide some information for 14 the people who were still in Kinglake at that time. There 15 was I think about - there seemed to be about 60 people and 16 everyone was very unsure about what was going to happen. 17 The key concern at that point seemed to be water and fuel, 18 as it was the next day when we had another meeting that we 19 had organised. But the main issue seemed to be that 20 people were unsure about how recovery was going to 21 progress at that stage. I was certainly waiting to hear, 22 as was everyone else, how that might happen, but there 23 didn't seem to be a lot of information that was available. 24 You worked for the council at that stage?---Yes. 25 And you happened to have email access?---Yes, I did. 26 You emailed the council?---Yes, I emailed the council when 27 I got back. The phone lines were very congested, the 28 mobile service. The landlines had been down since before 29 the fire, so communication at that point was quite a 30 challenge. It seemed that the remote internet device did 31 work, which was great, so I emailed council and just asked

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17404 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 them a series of questions about how recovery was to be 2 managed and gave them a bit of an overview of some of the 3 challenges that I had observed at that meeting that I had 4 attended at the CFA. 5 In your mind at that time, what were the most pressing concerns 6 that people had the day after the fire?---Well, I think 7 the key things that people were concerned about was 8 certainly access to water and fuel and perishable foods. 9 All of the businesses were closed, of course. Those that 10 hadn't been damaged were not open for business. Also 11 I had a concern that I understood a lot of people had left 12 the area already, so they'd been involved, they'd been 13 there when the firefront had passed through, but they had 14 consequently left Kinglake and I was concerned that we 15 didn't know who they were and whether or not they lost 16 their homes and also then in fact whether they would have 17 homes to come back to. So it seemed that we may have 18 benefited from having that knowledge and that we needed 19 some process in place that we might be able to start 20 recording that. 21 At about close to 10 o'clock that night you received an email 22 saying that you would be coordinating recovery for 23 Kinglake?---Yes, that's right. I had done bushfire 24 recovery for Murrindindi Shire Council after the 2006 25 fires, so I imagine that was part of the reason for me 26 being given that responsibility in Kinglake. But the 27 other difficulty that the council faced is that the fires 28 were burning between Kinglake and the head office in 29 Alexandra and so they were very restricted in their 30 ability to be able to send anyone from that area down. 31 Because I was there, that meant that I was probably in a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17405 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 good position to be able to do that. 2 As we will learn, the magnitude of the task in which you became 3 involved was quite enormous. Did you have any idea of how 4 enormous that task would be when you received that email 5 on 8 February?---I don't think we had much idea about 6 anything at all at that point. This experience was 7 unfolding sort of minute by minute, so it was very 8 difficult to predict what anything would end up looking 9 like at that stage. 10 On Monday the 9th you went and opened the council's office and 11 you found that there were already some things happening, 12 some people barbecuing outside the CFA shed, people 13 bringing food and sharing it and so on?---That's right, 14 yes. There was quite a hive of activity at the CFA. 15 There were people doing some catering, there were lots of 16 local people who were coming into the CFA with food from 17 their own freezers that was beginning to need to be cooked 18 and used and certainly the hotel had made available all of 19 the contents of their fridges. So there was a very active 20 catering process going on, which was useful. At that time 21 I also met up with our ward councillor, councillor Peter 22 Beales, who is a member of the CFA and we agreed that we 23 would take a quick trip to Kinglake West so we could 24 verify for ourselves what was still remaining and what 25 wasn't, because there was a lot of misinformation even at 26 that early stage about what was burnt and what was still 27 okay, so we thought that we would take a drive out and 28 then we would be able to know exactly what we were faced 29 with. 30 What did you see?---It really is difficult to imagine with a 31 community as picturesque and beautiful as ours what we saw

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17406 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 on that drive. Primarily everything was black. Lots and 2 lots of burnt homes. There were burnt horses and cows on 3 the road verges. There were cars that were damaged and 4 burnt. We were very pleased to see that some community 5 infrastructure was okay. The Kinglake West Hall was still 6 standing, the new primary school at Kinglake West seemed 7 to be unaffected, but the community centre, Middle 8 Kinglake Primary School, a number of churches, all of 9 those had been destroyed. So it was really about taking 10 stock and getting a sense of what remained and what was 11 lost. 12 One of the important things you talk about is being able to 13 communicate to the community about forming meetings and so 14 on and you formed a contact very early on with an ABC 15 Radio journalist, Michael Vincent?---That is right. 16 And that contact was important in enabling you to have meetings 17 at which all the community were informed and 18 attended?---That's right. In my email, one of my replies 19 to council after contacting them, I indicated to them that 20 I felt the best way for us to proceed was to call a 21 meeting at the CFA shed on Monday 9 February at 12 noon, 22 and that was primarily about being able to get information 23 to the community but also just to find out how many people 24 were still in the area at that point. I had sent a 25 request via email, but I didn't actually have time to 26 listen to 774 so I wasn't sure whether that information 27 had been relayed. So when I met Michael I asked whether 28 he could make sure that that information had been 29 broadcast, and he said that he would. Michael stayed with 30 us at Kinglake at the office for about five days and any 31 time we needed to be able to relay information by radio we

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17407 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 were able to approach Michael with that request. I would 2 often hear him arguing with his producers about how 3 important it was that exactly the right information was 4 broadcast and at exactly the time that we needed it to be. 5 So he was a great help to us. 6 You talk about the first few days at some length in your 7 statement, and just to highlight a few issues you say that 8 the access on and off the mountain was important and 9 roadblocks were a concern to many people?---Yes. The 10 roadblocks, whilst very, very necessary, made it difficult 11 for the people who were within the roadblocked area 12 because there were things that people needed that weren't 13 able to be brought up easily through the roadblocks, and 14 also people initially at least had the desire to be able 15 to travel in and out through the roadblocks and that was 16 not possible, so certainly the roadblocks were a concern. 17 We were able to overcome most of the issues once we were 18 able to establish the processes, so we were able to get 19 fuel for people and I think that was certainly the 20 critical issue on that first Monday meeting, was access to 21 fuel, and the main reason for that was we were still under 22 fire threat and people needed fuel for their generators 23 and firefighting pumps. 24 The SES were able to do fuel runs in which they picked up other 25 necessary things from other parts and brought them back to 26 Kinglake, is that right?---That's right. The SES were a 27 great help for us in that way. They took jerry cans with 28 people's names painted on them down to Whittlesea and 29 fuelled them up and brought them back and they continued 30 to do that until there was no more jerry cans waiting to 31 go, so it was a fairly organic process but it worked

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17408 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 effectively and it was very useful. 2 And there were other organic processes such as the supermarket 3 being opened up at Kinglake?---Yes. I met with Sue 4 Rabjones who works at the supermarket and she had been in 5 touch with her employer, who had said to take people in 6 and get them what they needed. It was very dark in the 7 supermarket, so we felt that the best way would be for Sue 8 to take people two at a time by torchlight and they could 9 select the things that they needed such as baby formula 10 and nappies and toothbrushes and things of that nature, 11 pet food, things that they really needed to get straight 12 away. So we agreed that we would let people know about 13 that at the first meeting that we held on the Monday. 14 You then continued to have fuel runs for quite some time, in 15 fact until the army got involved a bit later?---Actually 16 after - I believe it was the Tuesday night I was given a 17 number to follow up by council's recovery manager for a 18 company that had a tanker that could dispense unleaded 19 petrol and diesel from the one vehicle, and so I rang that 20 gentleman, got him out of bed and we had a long chat about 21 what might be needed and he agreed that he would come up 22 the next day and he came up daily and dispensed fuel for 23 the community until the army made alternative 24 arrangements. 25 And you had Bill Purcell from Telstra who came up for several 26 days and made sure that landlines were connected and 27 mobile phones were available?---Yes. Bill connected a 28 landline for us at the shire office. He wasn't able to do 29 very much for people in terms of their home landlines 30 because of the loss of the actual infrastructure, but with 31 Bill and Peter Dowling they attended the community

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17409 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 meetings, they assisted people with information about 2 phones and diverting home phones to mobiles and providing 3 information so that people could keep in touch by phone 4 and that was very important. 5 You say that by about the Monday in fact donations began to 6 arrive at the council's office. Can you give the 7 Commission some idea of what was involved in receiving and 8 distributing material aid, not just on that day but after 9 that?---Yes. On the Monday afternoon people started to 10 bring things in, people who hadn't lost their homes, and 11 leave them in the foyer of the council office. Very 12 quickly quite a significant pile of goods was beginning to 13 gather, so I contacted my colleague, Gail Atkins, who was 14 the manager of the neighbourhood house at that time, and 15 I asked her to come up and start a material aid 16 distribution process. She had run an op shop so I felt 17 that she was eminently qualified to be able to help us in 18 this way and so she gathered up a whole lot of volunteers 19 and they began to transfer the goods that we were 20 receiving to an empty warehouse behind one of the cafes in 21 the main street with the support of the owner of the 22 warehouse and we had by that afternoon the beginnings of a 23 material aid distribution process established. It took us 24 many, many hours over many weeks to process and manage the 25 material aid. It was desperately needed, but it certainly 26 was a challenge and some of the things that we received 27 were curious and some were very, very useful. The 28 quantities that we received them in was also a challenge. 29 The first little while we would have semitrailers arriving 30 loaded with goods. We didn't have a forklift to unload 31 them, so we managed to procure a forklift and that made

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17410 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 life easier. So it was a very complicated and challenging 2 process, but the generosity that was motivating those 3 donations was quite profound and remarkable. 4 For how long did the material aid distribution process go on 5 for?---It's continuing up until this day, so there is 6 material aid being distributed from the neighbourhood 7 house currently. We did get it all out of the main street 8 after the end of the second week because the businesses 9 were needing to re-open and it was counterintuitive to 10 have free things lining the main street when businesses 11 were trying to get back into business. So at that point 12 we were able to contain it and condense it into a number 13 of different locations, so it was still available for 14 people who needed it, but it wasn't quite as problematic 15 in terms of just being in the way. 16 How many people had worked at the distribution centre?---A lot. 17 Look, it was a constant job that people needed to do, so 18 whenever anyone came and said, "What do you need help 19 with?" we would send them across to the material aid. We 20 also distributed material aid from that location over to 21 Toolangi and also to Flowerdale and Kinglake West, so 22 there was always plenty of work to do. Sometimes people 23 stayed for a long time, sometimes they might only work 24 there for an afternoon, but that was a very useful role 25 that people were helping us with, and also some of our 26 corporate volunteers such as the volunteers from Westpac 27 were also heavily involved in the material aid processing. 28 When you say corporate volunteers, were these people who came 29 up, for example, from Melbourne for the day or did they 30 come repeatedly?---Some people came for a period of time 31 and others came as part of their corporate volunteering

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17411 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 program, so they might come up and work for a day with us, 2 but there was a regular supply of volunteers. For 3 example, Westpac sent 10 people a day for some weeks and 4 they would come up each day and do whatever it was that we 5 needed them to do, so that was a great help. 6 You say that a very important part of the recovery process, 7 what you call the response process from early on was the 8 coordination and communication between the various 9 agencies, and you started by meeting on Tuesday the 10th 10 and you say you had a meeting arranged between the police, 11 the CFA, Centrelink, DHS, the Red Cross and paramedics and 12 you met at the council offices?---That's right. We had 13 had two community meetings at that point at Kinglake and 14 one at Kinglake West. The agency representatives had 15 attended those meetings, so it seemed like a bit of a 16 natural process for us to get together afterwards and talk 17 about how we were going and how we might deal with the 18 issues that were emerging. That process became very 19 important as we moved through the recovery. The agencies 20 would get together every morning at 8.30 and then every 21 afternoon at 5 o'clock. I was chairing those meetings. 22 Everyone who was anyone was there, so we had all of the 23 agencies represented and we would take a very 24 collaborative approach to thinking about the issues that 25 we were dealing with and how we might best resolve those 26 issues and also keeping track of the things as they 27 emerged. So we would be discussing issues all together 28 and we would be coming up with solutions that we felt 29 collectively would work well. 30 I think you say at paragraph 81 that you also had 31 representatives from Centrelink, from Telstra, Ambulance

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17412 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 Victoria, the Victorian Council of Churches and local 2 volunteers?---Yes, it was quite a crowd. We ended up 3 having to meet in the police garage because that was the 4 only room in the main street area that could fit us all 5 in. So they were lively and creative meetings and the 6 things that we discussed were very important and ever 7 changing, so there seemed to be a lot of merit in having 8 that process where we could work together and work out how 9 best to deal with the issues that the community was 10 experiencing. Also importantly those representatives 11 would attend the community briefings and they would stand 12 up behind me in a long, wide line and sometimes the 13 community would ask them questions specifically about an 14 issue that their agency were dealing with. At other times 15 they were just there as a show of support and that seemed 16 to be very, very important. It gave great legitimacy to 17 the process that we were using and the messages that we 18 were giving. 19 How long did that process go on for?---We had daily meetings in 20 Kinglake for the first five weeks. We had daily meetings 21 in Toolangi for the first two weeks. After that time the 22 Toolangi situation had resolved to an extent because the 23 fire threat had diminished, but certainly the community 24 meetings still continue but in a different format now and 25 they are managed by the community recovery committee. 26 The community recovery committee is what? Who sits on it and 27 who organises it?---The community recovery committee was 28 formed by VBRRA as part of the statewide recovery process. 29 So the process that began with you has effectively subsumed 30 into that process?---It has evolved into that, yes, that's 31 right.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17413 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 You mention at paragraph 82 of your statement that there were 2 three police officers who arrived in Kinglake and stayed 3 for a number of weeks, and that that was integral to 4 communications and recovery. Why and how is that 5 important?---It was very important because we had the same 6 three inspectors who were managing the policing 7 operations. They were attending the agency briefings 8 every morning and every afternoon and then one or two of 9 them at least would be present at every of the community 10 meetings, including those in Toolangi, and one of the 11 police inspectors would travel each day to Flowerdale with 12 one of our volunteers so that we were in touch with how 13 their recovery was progressing as well. I think each day 14 was a new adventure in terms of what we might need to try 15 and deal with, so there were a number of issues that we 16 needed to call on their support for in terms of managing 17 materials or people through the roadblocks or helping 18 people understand what, for example, it meant when the 19 Coroner's orders were handed down regarding the searches 20 of properties. So they with great compassion and great 21 legitimacy were able to convey to the community what the 22 police were working on and how they were working and why 23 what they were doing was necessary. That created a 24 tremendous sense of trust and respect between the affected 25 community and the police. 26 You mentioned that the decision and the process of having the 27 roads re-opened was quite a difficult one, including 28 because you were going to have many people coming back who 29 were going to face trauma and not know what to 30 expect?---Yes. At the meeting on Tuesday the 10th I spoke 31 to the people who were still in Kinglake at that point and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17414 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 that was before the roads had re-opened for the rest of 2 the residents. We talked about the fact that we had 3 witnessed this event ourselves, we had been there when the 4 firefront came through, and so our experience was going to 5 be very different to the experience of the people who were 6 seeking to return to Kinglake and that we needed to be 7 aware of that because we had a sense of actually 8 understanding how we had gone from what we were before to 9 what we were now, we had actually seen that process occur, 10 but for the people who had left before the fires and were 11 returning, they were going to have to try and process what 12 had happened all in one go and that was going to be a very 13 difficult and traumatic process for them. It occurred to 14 me at that time that we were under-resourced to be able to 15 cope with the influx of people who would be wanting to 16 return. We evacuated before the 2006 fires and so the 17 need they would have felt to get back I could understand 18 because I had felt the same way in 2006, but the 19 difficulty was that the people who were outside the area 20 didn't know what they were coming back to and so it seemed 21 very important that, if it was possible, we try and 22 actually put some processes in place to help them 23 understand that before they got there. The other concern 24 I had was that I had been unaware about how complex 25 recovery would be and the sorts of information that we 26 would need to urgently convey to people, things like 27 worrying about contaminated water, asbestos exposure, ash 28 holes where trees had been. There were lots of hazards 29 and lots of things that people would need to know about 30 and, knowing how difficult it was for us to be taking that 31 information in, I could only imagine how hard it would be

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17415 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 for people to take it in once they had seen what we knew 2 they were going to have to see. 3 You say in your statement that, when people did return, a sense 4 of loss and grief was devastating and that you would look 5 out and see lots of faces and feel like you were seeing a 6 sea of grief?---Yes. The difficult part of that process 7 is that we didn't really at that point understand who we 8 still had and who we had lost. So you would see someone 9 and you would feel very glad that you had seen them and 10 then you would feel bad that you'd forgotten to worry 11 about them and then you would feel glad you were seeing 12 them again. So there was this tumultuous emotional 13 process that everyone was going through and that was very, 14 very hard. Also we were learning daily about who had 15 passed away. The whole community was learning that, so 16 no-one really knew at any point who knew about who and so 17 that sort of information was being exchanged as well. It 18 was a very difficult time. 19 You say that by about the Thursday the 12th volunteers had hit 20 the wall in the sense that you had a lot of things to do, 21 a lot of things to distribute, but just not enough 22 resources to do it, and the Premier was called and came to 23 visit?---That's right. 24 At that point a decision was made to involve the army?---That's 25 right. 26 You say that that was a turning point. The army was a very 27 significant contributor to helping the recovery?---Yes. 28 It just seemed that the scale of what was needed was well 29 beyond our scope and also the degree of challenge that 30 people were facing as they returned and discovered their 31 homes were lost or discovered that they had lost friends

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17416 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 or family members, it became very overwhelming. So we 2 contacted the Premier and he did come and talked about the 3 scale and the size of the community and the fact that we 4 would certainly need more assistance. So the army sent a 5 group of officers on the Friday to have a look at what we 6 might need and then a contingent - I'm not sure about the 7 terminology - but a contingent of army personal, a large 8 number, I think it was about 200, came on the Saturday 9 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Craig Madden. 10 You also talk about some extraordinary acts or continuous acts 11 of generosity and compassion, large and small, that 12 occurred. You had the coffee people who appeared daily to 13 make sure that people had their coffee?---Yes. It was 14 surprising. I would not want anyone to imagine that there 15 was any sense of a grand plan in terms of recovery. 16 Things happened and often they were as much a surprise to 17 me as anybody else. We learnt to be quite resilient about 18 that and we would just nod and say, "Okay, that's 19 happening today. That's fine. Let's embrace that." But 20 when the coffee carts arrived I remember perhaps a little 21 impatiently just wondering whether that was the biggest 22 concern that we might have, and of course it was a huge 23 concern and it was a huge boost to people's morale to be 24 able to gather together. What was lovely was to look out 25 and see the police and the CFA and the local community all 26 standing around have a coffee and having a chat about what 27 was going on. So it was as much a social benefit as a 28 need for caffeine, I think. 29 You had, in addition to the numerous catering endeavours, you 30 also had help from the bushfire legal help, the ATO 31 even?---Yes.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17417 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 And giving advice to business people who were concerned about 2 what they would do with their businesses and their 3 financial affairs?---That's right. We took particular 4 notice each day of the sorts of questions that we were 5 being asked and often we didn't actually have the answers 6 for those, but we certainly made it our business to try 7 and find the answers for people. It was interesting to me 8 to note that on the first couple of days the issues were 9 very primary in their nature, so it was about food, fuel, 10 water, water tanks, accommodation, the things that people 11 needed immediately. Within a reasonably short space of 12 time the issues had become much more complex and so 13 people, for example the small business owners, were 14 concerned that their BAS statements were due. Around 15 15 February we had a lot of residents concerned that their 16 rates were due to be paid. So people's recovery was 17 progressing and we understood that because they were able 18 to focus on these sorts of issues, but they were issues of 19 great concern and so we needed to get some resolution for 20 them. In one instance the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 21 flew down from Canberra and stood up in the white tent and 22 reassured our small business owners that they didn't need 23 to concern themselves about their BAS just at the moment, 24 and hearing that information from someone with that level 25 of authority to give it was of great comfort and it was 26 really important. 27 So having people on the ground there in person in the white 28 tent at community meetings was really a critical way of 29 helping people through that?---Yes. It is difficult to 30 understand, but it wasn't about the agencies working for 31 the community; the approach that we adopted was that we

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17418 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 were all in this together and we were all actually working 2 it out together. I was reflecting recently that I ran 3 community meetings for five weeks, sometimes three times a 4 day, and I was only yelled at by two people, and one of 5 them came up later and apologised. So it wasn't about 6 people being angry and demanding outcomes and demanding 7 solutions; it was about all of us working collectively to 8 come up with a way forward, and that was the way that it 9 worked. 10 You mentioned before that you wouldn't want to give the sense 11 that there was a grand plan. I gather from what you said 12 about your experience that you hadn't been an expert in 13 disaster recovery before 7 February happened?---No. In 14 the 2006 fires we had 8,500 hectares of land burnt in 15 Murrindindi, but we didn't lose any homes and there was 16 one loss of life which was a firefighter from another area 17 who tragically was killed in a rollover in Highlands. 18 That seemed like a pretty bad experience. The fires that 19 we were recovering from in 2006 felt like quite a serious 20 and difficult process. But, no, I didn't have any 21 understanding about what recovery after an event like 22 Black Saturday might look like. 23 Yet there are some things you drew on and some lessons you say 24 have been learned, particularly about what works, and you 25 start in your statement with the importance of good, 26 honest information about how you communicate?---Yes. The 27 need for honest information was paramount. It is not only 28 the information we were giving out, but it was also the 29 information that we were receiving, so we took a very 30 pragmatic approach about everything needing to be truthful 31 and honest and timely. I said to the community on the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17419 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 Tuesday after Black Saturday that I wouldn't ever tell 2 them anything that I didn't know to be true, but the 3 trade-off was that they were going to have to hear from me 4 things that they would prefer not to have heard and that 5 was just how it was going to work. I wouldn't tell them 6 things to make them feel better, but they would have to 7 hear from me things that they wished they didn't have to. 8 That was the basis that we established our working 9 relationship and the agencies as they came up seemed to 10 see some merit in that and they worked very, very hard to 11 be able to work on that basis as well. The strength that 12 we got from that was that we didn't have to convince 13 people of anything. If we said a certain thing was a 14 certain way, then they understood that that's how it was 15 and, whilst it wasn't always great, then that's what we 16 needed to work with for that day. 17 In terms of lessons learnt, you say at paragraph 119 of your 18 statement that, "The essential element of sustainable 19 recovery is to find and engage with the strengths and 20 networks that existed in the community before the 21 disaster. Every community has something that works for 22 them and that they value. It is worth taking the time to 23 identify and connect." Can you perhaps elaborate on that 24 in terms of what, in your experience, works in disaster 25 recovery?---I think that the key is to not assume that the 26 community that you are seeing in its disaster state is the 27 community. The community is what was happening before the 28 disaster occurred. I think in my experience every 29 community has something that works well and it is 30 something they are proud of. Sometimes they have a whole 31 lot of things that work well. I think in terms of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17420 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 recovery the importance is finding out what that is and 2 finding the people that made it happen because there are 3 natural leaders in communities wherever you go and it 4 might be the local shopkeeper or it might be the president 5 of the footy club or it might be the person who runs the 6 local hall, but those people are the people who understand 7 how the community connects and how it operates. If those 8 people are available to give advice and to help paint the 9 picture of what that community looked like before whatever 10 the event is that they are needing to recover from, then 11 the recovery can actually work towards valuing and 12 understanding that rather than risking defining the 13 community by the fact that it has had a flood or a fire or 14 some other thing happen to it. 15 In that context, what do you say worked well about the 16 engagement between the agencies and the community?---We 17 had lots of local people who were volunteering. We had 18 local people that were sitting in on the agency briefings, 19 local people that the agencies could go to when they 20 needed advice or some inside information about the way 21 that the community used to work. I think it's about 22 valuing the resilience and the skills and the capacity of 23 the local community, because those things do exist. If 24 you understand that that's something that you can draw on, 25 then the recovery is actually expedited and made more 26 successful by the fact that you are tapping into what is 27 in essence the lifeblood of that community and you are 28 working with that, you are not discounting it or 29 disregarding it. 30 How important is it that the people from the agencies who work 31 in recovery understand that?---I don't think it can be

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17421 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 overstated. I think it is very, very important. 2 You say at the end of your statement that this really barely 3 scratches the surface and that you have worked with some 4 extraordinary people who have been very 5 dedicated?---(Witness nods.) 6 How do you say that that recovery process is going now?---I'm 7 not working directly in recovery. 8 But you live in Kinglake?---I live in Kinglake, so I'm 9 observing it as someone who lives in the community. I've 10 been reading extensively the work of Dr Rob Gordon who 11 talks about the stages of recovery that occur after 12 disasters. I suspect that we are probably a textbook 13 example of how recovery works. It is not a linear 14 journey; it tends to be a couple of steps forward and one 15 or two steps back. So I think our community is working 16 very hard on its recovery and I think that progress is 17 generally forward, which is great, but I think that once 18 again the fact that people are still able to go about 19 their business and to be able to commit to continuing 20 their life in the community is an example of how resilient 21 they actually are, and I think that recovery is going to 22 be a very slow journey but I think that certainly all 23 signs are positive that we're going to get there. 24 Is there anything that you would like to see happening, at 25 least from your present place as a member of the 26 community, that's not happening in terms of 27 recovery?---No, I think that sort of question is probably 28 better answered by people whose effect was more 29 long-lasting. We are very fortunate that we still have 30 our home and our personal recovery has progressed 31 reasonably straightforwardly as a result of that.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17422 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 Certainly there's been a lot of challenges and even though 2 the challenges in the immediate aftermath were complex and 3 difficult, there's been many, many challenges since then 4 that people have had to endure and almost everyone's story 5 is a little bit different. So there is a great deal that 6 we can learn by talking to people and asking them and 7 understanding what this process has been like for them. 8 Likewise, I think we can learn a great deal from the 9 agency people who worked on the ground in those 10 communities. Their ability to rise to the occasion and to 11 adapt their processes to what was needed was quite 12 remarkable and really quite integral to us being able to 13 move forward. So, there's an enormous amount of knowledge 14 that we can draw on and that's going to be hopefully of 15 great value in the future. 16 Thank you, Ms Leadbeater. Commissioners, do you have any 17 questions? 18 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Yes, I have one question, Ms Leadbeater, 19 particularly in relation to the vivid description you 20 included in your submission about the efforts that needed 21 to be put into saving your home. As you mention in the 22 submission, you had a big crew, you had a number of people 23 to help and you had a property that was very well prepared 24 with water and sprays, although you had some difficulty 25 when the power went off. But you also mention that you 26 had to toil well into the night to continue to protect 27 your property from fires and embers presumably?---(Witness 28 nods.) 29 Given the experience that you have gone through, reflecting on 30 it, do you have any views about the nature of the 31 community education program that was in place to help to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17423 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 prepare people for an experience such as this where the 2 literature does refer to the need for people to be 3 able-bodied and emotionally well adjusted to the task and 4 that the property needs to be well prepared? Do you think 5 the literature as a whole really prepared you well for the 6 experience that you had to go through?---The sort of 7 preparations that we put into place were in response to 8 the literature, so it was our understanding from what we 9 had learnt from reading the literature that was why we had 10 prepared the way we had. It's interesting because you 11 imagine that you are prepared but until the event occurs, 12 of course, you really have no way of measuring that or 13 knowing how prepared in fact you are or are not. That is 14 the great challenge, that fires when they come are rarely 15 the same, there is a huge amount of variation and 16 variables in the way that a fire might impact and so being 17 well prepared for one fire may not be sufficient in the 18 event of another. I knew people who I would say were 19 better prepared than us who are not here any more, and 20 I knew people who were less prepared than we were who 21 managed to survive and to save their homes. So, it is a 22 very difficult question that you pose because there are so 23 many different elements to that. This is a very 24 complicated question and a complicated issue, how best to 25 prepare people for something that's difficult to measure 26 and to understand before it comes. 27 Do you have any view on whether a single able-bodied person is 28 in a position to defend a house successfully given the 29 circumstances of a serious fire?---No-one is allowed to 30 stay at home on their own at our house now. So my 31 position would be, no, that would be very hard. I'm not

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17424 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 saying that it is impossible, but I wouldn't like to be on 2 my own in that situation and I wouldn't like for any of my 3 family to be on their own. But other people who have 4 perhaps more experience of fires than me could potentially 5 manage that depending on how they had prepared and how 6 were resourced, but it is certainly not something that 7 I would encourage for our situation. 8 So you would agree it is not a trivial decision to decide to 9 stay and defend a home?---It is a terribly serious 10 decision, yes, and we are still vacillating backwards and 11 forwards about any subsequent events. So, we've done it 12 both ways now. We have evacuated, which was terrible, and 13 equally we need to say that that also is a very serious 14 and difficult decision, and we have stayed, and both have 15 their merits and both have their challenges, so I wouldn't 16 necessarily say one is easier than the other. I think 17 they are both extremely difficult. 18 Do you think the previous literature was explicit enough in 19 relation to the risks of staying?---I think that the 20 previous literature - the improvements have been about the 21 fact that it is more accurate in its representation now. 22 I think we know a lot more now about the scale of an event 23 that we might be required to face. For example, when 24 I was writing my statement I observed that I wasn't 25 concerned about the fires because they were a long way 26 away in Kilmore. From what we now know, that seems very 27 foolish, but in the world before Black Saturday a fire in 28 Kilmore was not necessarily a threat to Kinglake. So, 29 I think that looking back in hindsight there are some gaps 30 in our knowledge or in the way we presented information 31 that now seem quite surprising, but it is viewed through

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17425 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 what we now know rather than what we knew then. 2 Thank you. 3 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Ms Leadbeater, I have been struck by one 4 phrase in your statement of the myriad acts of kindness, 5 generosity and compassion, and you have given in this 6 statement some wonderful examples which I won't read back 7 to you, but I think each of them is very touching, 8 actually, and I suppose I will just highlight the KFC that 9 was brought to you, the Westpac volunteers who bought 10 chocolates and flowers for Valentines Day, some of the 11 very thoughtful ways that people in the broader Melbourne 12 and Victorian and Australian community sought to try to 13 assist in the healing process and your statement and your 14 commentary today has been very helpful in fleshing that 15 out for us. You may not be aware, but a number of 16 witnesses in this Royal Commission have made comment on 17 the leadership role that you had in the community and how 18 important that was to community recovery, and I think you 19 have demonstrated some of the qualities here today. But 20 it struck me perhaps that the community was blessed in 21 that you were both a local person and trained in community 22 development work, so that being there, having witnessed 23 the event, were able to move very quickly into response 24 and then recovery. I wonder whether an outsider would 25 have been able to achieve what you and a quickly assembled 26 team around you were able to achieve for the pretty 27 devastated community of Kinglake on the 28 day?---I've thought a lot about this and I think of those 29 two things, being local and being trained in community 30 development, the latter is probably the important one. 31 I have a great and by and large unshakeable faith in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17426 LEADBEATER XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS NICHOLS 1 communities and in their ability to do remarkable things, 2 both in good times and in bad. So it really didn't occur 3 to me that we weren't going to be able to get through it 4 provided we approached it in the right way. Being local 5 certainly helped because I was able to perhaps engender 6 some trust and some support very quickly, but I think that 7 anyone going into a community who truly believes that 8 communities have the answer, then they would be able to 9 find those people and to seek them out very quickly as 10 well. Communities know what works for them, so it is 11 about listening and really having faith that, if you 12 listen and you take the community's lead, that will be the 13 right way to go. At no point did it really feel like 14 I was in charge so much as just trying to coordinate lots 15 of work by some really remarkable people. It wasn't about 16 being the boss or having sway over decisions. It was 17 about facilitating the best outcomes. So I think that it 18 is possible for it to happen in other situations, but it 19 requires that really strong faith that communities are 20 remarkable in their ability to find a way forward. 21 Thank you. 22 MS NICHOLS: May Ms Leadbeater be excused? 23 CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your evidence, and you are 24 excused. 25 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 26 MR RUSH: Commissioners, I call Mr Comrie. 27 Neil Comrie. On 29 4 November 2009 you accepted an appointment from the 30 Victorian government to be the implementation monitor of 31 the Victorian government's response to the interim

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17427 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 recommendations of the Royal Commission?---That's correct. 2 Mr Comrie, for the purposes of giving your evidence you have 3 prepared a statement which attaches to it your 4 report?---I have, yes. 5 Are there any changes that you would like to make to either the 6 statement or the report?---No. 7 I take it the contents are true and correct?---Yes, I believe 8 so. 9 I tender the report of Mr Comrie. 10 #EXHIBIT 840 - Statement of Murray Neil Comrie 11 (WIT.3031.001.0001); Report of Murray Neil Comrie 12 (WIT.3031.001.0004). 13 MR RUSH: Just by way of preliminary background, and you refer 14 to it in your statement, Mr Comrie, at paragraph 5, you 15 have been a police officer of 35 years standing and were 16 Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police between 1993 and 17 2001?---Correct. 18 And since your retirement in 2001 you have undertaken a number 19 of roles producing reports for both state and Commonwealth 20 governments?---Yes. 21 And I see at one stage held the visiting professorial position 22 with the faculty of business and law at Victoria 23 University?---Correct, yes. 24 If we could turn to the report at (WIT.3031.001.0004). If we 25 can go, Mr Comrie, to the introduction at 0014. You set 26 out in the introduction the mechanisms of the State 27 response and you refer at 0015 and following, which is 28 page 12 of your report, to a number of committees that 29 were established by the government to oversee both a 30 response to the Royal Commission and also an 31 implementation of the interim recommendations?---I do,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17428 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 yes. 2 I don't particularly want to go to each one, but you at some 3 stage have had a role on or would go to weekly meetings of 4 the committee?---Yes, I attended the weekly meetings of 5 the state coordination and management council. 6 What is the nature of the function of that council?---It is a 7 council essentially made up of the secretaries of a number 8 of the key departments and other senior officers such as 9 CEO of the CFA, CEO of a number of other emergency service 10 organisations. It is probably best described as a senior 11 policy making committee. 12 The committees that we see there set up, the third one is the 13 coordination of the state's input to the Bushfire Royal 14 Commission. Again, I take it you were informed of the 15 existence of each of these committees and have referred to 16 them, apart from the one that you sat in on, in the 17 report?---Yes, I had interaction with each of the 18 committees at various stages. I had a regular meeting, 19 weekly meeting, with the committee chaired by the former 20 director of police and emergency services, Dr Ros 21 Kelleher. Her role was to oversight the delivery of the 22 activities that emanated from the Commission's 23 recommendations. 24 Could we just have a look at page 13, 0016, at the fire 25 communications taskforce. As I understand it, one of the 26 principal roles of that taskforce was to oversee 27 communications and to ensure messaging was - you use the 28 words "strategic, consistent and capable of being easily 29 understood"?---Correct, yes. 30 And are you able to tell us just who was involved in 31 that?---Louise Martin, who is the director of strategic

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17429 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 communications for the Department of Justice was the 2 chair, but the other members of the committee were the 3 senior media advisers or strategic media personnel at each 4 of the major emergency service agencies. 5 Then the next committee is an emergency management joint public 6 information committee which you indicate has the foremost 7 responsibility "to ensure public information is 8 coordinated, distributed in a timely and accurate manner 9 to inform communities during a major emergency as well as 10 ensuring media needs are met through coordinated 11 multi-agency approach." So I take it that is a committee 12 that was oversighting, if you like, the immediate 13 messaging and communication, for example, during a fire 14 incident?---Perhaps the best way of putting it is the fire 15 communications taskforce was the strategic body. The 16 emergency management joint public information committee 17 was perhaps the tactical element where it was dealing 18 directly with the community. 19 Are you able to tell us just how it dealt with the 20 community?---Well, it was the mechanism by which messages 21 were developed and delivered to the community. For 22 example, if a media release was to go out, it would go out 23 through that committee to the media. 24 So is it on a particular day with a particular emergency that 25 that committee would be the committee that was responsible 26 for sending out a particular media communication?---Yes. 27 The chair of the EMJPIC is the senior media adviser for 28 Victoria Police. If there was a particular emergency, 29 that officer would coordinate the response if it was a 30 cross-agency response or would deal with it directly if it 31 was a Victoria Police response.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17430 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 So, with a cross-agency response, how would it work?---As 2 I understand it, the officers would liaise with each other 3 and discuss the best means of communicating the 4 information they wished to circulate to the community and 5 then work together in the delivery of that message. 6 It is obviously different to the messaging from an incident 7 control centre?---Yes. 8 This is at a very high level, I take it, in relation to 9 messaging that might go out before a day like 10 7 February?---Yes. The announcements leading up to Black 11 Saturday, for example, would have been coordinated through 12 that committee. 13 You then at 0017 turn to matters and you specifically deal with 14 matters requiring a Commonwealth response. Before going 15 to that, if I can just ask you in relation to your 16 approach which we deal with at 0018, you were provided 17 obviously, from reading your report, with many, many 18 documents?---(Witness nods.) 19 Which outlined the approach and the methodology that was being 20 adopted for implementation of the recommendations?---Yes. 21 It was quite substantial, I would have to say. 22 So you perused key documents. You indicate you had access to 23 key personnel as necessary?---Yes. 24 And you used that in what sort of manner? To facilitate your 25 knowledge, obviously, but how would you go about 26 approaching?---The process we followed was we had an 27 initial meeting with the CEOs of each of the key 28 organisations. We explained the approach that we intended 29 to take. We then had a second meeting with them where we 30 requested specific information. We then awaited the 31 arrival of that information. In the meantime, we started

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17431 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 doing what I would describe as field visits where we would 2 go and look at certain scenarios or situations. As issues 3 arose, if we needed further information from the agencies, 4 we would go back and request further information. So it 5 was a constant flow of documentation coming into the 6 office. 7 You refer to visits to the state control centre?---Yes. 8 And as we will see, that occurred at a time in January when 9 there was the need for the operational capacity of the 10 state control centre to be put into effect?---Yes, on 11 11 and 12 January they were both declared code red days, so 12 I and one of my team attended on those days. 13 You visited incident control centres?---I did not personally, 14 but some of my team did, visited a number of them around 15 the state and made certain observations, yes. 16 Were they visits with or without notice?---Generally with 17 notice because some of the ICCs I'm sure you understand 18 are not necessarily staffed full-time, so it was to make 19 sure that there were people there. Some of these ICCs 20 operate out of buildings where there are people 21 undertaking other day-to-day functions and they become 22 converted into an ICC in the event of an incident. 23 At 0020 you set out your observations on the implementation 24 timeframe. If I can summarise it perhaps by putting 25 this: it is your observation that there was a commitment 26 generally demonstrated to put into effect the 27 implementation of the interim report recommendations, but 28 there was some complexity to the task and also a fairly 29 concentrated timeframe in which it could be done?---That's 30 correct, yes. 31 If I could just return to 0017 and the Commonwealth response.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17432 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 You note there a couple of recommendations that concerned 2 the Commonwealth, one putting the forest fire danger index 3 into weather bureau information for relevant fire days, 4 and also a once a year briefing between the agencies with 5 the Commonwealth in relation to the way in which the 6 Commonwealth resources may be best facilitated for 7 emergencies, in this sense bushfire?---Yes. 8 You haven't looked specifically at those matters?---The only 9 matter I did look at, and I think I report it against 10 11.2, is a meeting which did occur with some Commonwealth 11 agencies and a number of state agencies. It was best 12 described as a pre-season briefing. But, no, my task was 13 to do matters for which the State of Victoria was 14 responsible and not the Commonwealth. 15 You may or may not know this, but on the code red days are you 16 aware if anything was put in place on those days from the 17 Victorian perspective to put on notice the Commonwealth 18 for the potential use of the resources that are there 19 referred to?---I'm not aware of any such action being 20 taken, no. 21 In your report, Mr Comrie, you have gone through each of the 22 recommendations from the interim report and then reported 23 as to the implementation?---Correct. 24 The first recommendations that you refer to are those at 4.1 25 and 4.2 at page 18 on 0021 of your report. This in 26 essence were recommendations of the Commissioners about 27 the warnings, that the warnings should be clear and 28 concise in their construction, indicate the area of risk, 29 where the threat would move to, and attempt to predict, if 30 you like, the severity of the impact. So you were looking 31 at those warnings?---Yes.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17433 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 You then, what, had a look at the templates that were prepared 2 in relation to the warnings?---Yes. I inquired about the 3 process of the events leading up to the preparation of 4 those templates and was advised that they had actually 5 resulted from a national meeting of experts from the 6 emergency service, some communications experts and various 7 other people with particular skills that had occurred last 8 year. There was an agreed national framework and set of 9 words which the individual jurisdictions then took away 10 and applied to their own jurisdiction. So I looked at the 11 templates against that background and having been advised 12 that they took into account the matters that the 13 Commission had recommended be addressed in those templates 14 and looked at the recommendation, looked at the templates 15 and following that drew a conclusion that the 16 recommendation had been satisfactorily implemented. 17 You at page 20, 0023 of your report, specifically refer to 18 observations of the CFA and DSE websites for the 19 Genoa-Broome Creek Track fire between 19 January 2010 and 20 10 February 2010?---Yes, correct. 21 What were you looking at there?---Looking to see that the words 22 used on the templates were consistent with the language 23 that had been recommended and that the templates had 24 indeed been used rather than something being manufactured 25 just for the event. 26 We will come to it later, but the messaging occurred 27 concurrently on CFA and DSE websites for that fire?---It 28 did, yes. 29 The way in which it worked, I think you also go into, is the 30 template is prepared by the information officer at the 31 incident control centre?---Yes.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17434 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 Signed off by the incident controller and then distributed to 2 inform the community?---Correct, yes. 3 You also at page 22 indicate that there has been training 4 carried out in relation to the course of conduct to be 5 undertaken by those responsible for the issuing of the 6 templates?---Yes, that's correct. 7 We had some evidence last week in relation to the templates, 8 and I very briefly want to go to that. I understand from 9 some material that's been received by the Royal Commission 10 today there have been some amendments to the 11 templates?---Yes. 12 But perhaps if we go to what has been tendered before the Royal 13 Commission which is at (RESP.3001.001.0358), which is the 14 common alerting protocol bushfire messages. If we can go 15 to the first message, which is at 0360, which is for a 16 code red (catastrophic) emergency warning. So it is, if 17 you like, the most serious template in terms of bushfire 18 emergency warning?---(Witness nods.) 19 We will tender it, but in relation to the first three dot 20 points, one of the amendments, as I understand it, is to 21 insert a new addition as of January 2010 which is to this 22 effect: "A wind change is expected any time in the next XX 23 hours which may cause the fire to change direction towards 24 X." So that's been inserted as an option for the incident 25 controller to sign off on in relation to the 26 template?---Yes. There have been, as I understand it, a 27 number of amendments to the various templates, somewhat 28 changing the language that was previously used in some 29 instances. 30 It was suggested last week that the messaging in relation to, 31 if we look at what to do, could be said to be confusing

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17435 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 when one sees the first dot point, "Seek shelter 2 now - heat from the fire can kill you. It (is 3 likely/could be) too late to leave", then "Your home is 4 unlikely to be a place of safety in these conditions," and 5 the confusion arising from telling someone to seek safety 6 but then telling them that their home is unlikely to be a 7 place of safety?---Well, I think we need to be mindful of 8 the fact that this particular template only applies to the 9 last two hours, if you like, before the likelihood of an 10 event on a code red day. It is not a statement that's 11 applied across all of the templates. This is two hours 12 out from the event on a code red day. That's a pretty 13 serious and dramatic situation for anyone to find 14 themselves in. I think in that sort of scenario it 15 becomes increasingly difficult for the fire agencies to 16 give very specific information about what one might do in 17 a particular circumstance without being able to view that 18 circumstance before giving the advice. The reality is, 19 I think, that people who might be caught in that sort of 20 environment would probably have as good an idea as anybody 21 as to where the best shelter might be; for example, a dam 22 or someone near a property. The fact that they are caught 23 in that situation probably eliminates a number of the 24 other possibilities that might have been open to them in 25 the hours leading up to that final two hours. 26 So I want to suggest to you that to be telling someone who is 27 at home to seek shelter, but to tell them in the two hours 28 before the potential of a catastrophic fire that their 29 home is potentially or is unlikely to provide a safe 30 shelter is a pretty confusing message?---I accept that 31 some people may have some difficulty with that. I also

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17436 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 understand that these messages are subject to ongoing 2 review and are going to be reviewed again at the end of 3 this fire season. Behind that of course is a substantial 4 review of the whole "stay or go" policy which I think will 5 perhaps give some clearer direction to those putting these 6 messages out. But, as I said a moment ago, I think really 7 when you come down to the last period of time before 8 anyone can actually do anything in the face of an imminent 9 fire, there are very few pieces of advice I think that the 10 authorities can offer of a specific nature that could be 11 relied upon because the circumstances can change so 12 quickly and so dramatically. But I do accept that those 13 words could cause some confusion in some people's minds. 14 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Comrie, one of the reasons that 15 I think this is a really difficult situation, and I'm not 16 disagreeing with your analysis, is the information you 17 have provided on page 64 of your report which is that the 18 OESC has completed research into people movement during 19 the bushfires in February and March this year and 20 discovered that almost 80 per cent of people in high 21 bushfire risk areas continue to adopt a wait and see 22 approach?---Yes. 23 Really that means they continue to place themselves in quite 24 serious danger in relation to particularly a code red day. 25 So I think for the fire agencies that really makes it very 26 difficult in trying to frame the recommendations and 27 perhaps it underscores the point that was made in the 28 interim report that this is very much a relationship 29 between individuals and government; government can do so 30 much, but individuals also need to avail themselves of 31 available information and to try and place themselves in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17437 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 circumstances of safety. When you read the results of 2 that research and see that it is still at 80 per cent it 3 is, frankly, very alarming?---I agree entirely. I mean, 4 in an ideal world there wouldn't be anyone in the face of 5 an imminent fire on a code red day who hadn't well 6 prepared and thought through what they would do in those 7 circumstances. But, sadly, the research tells us that 8 that's not the situation. I think once the new "stay or 9 go" policy has been completely thought through and signed 10 off there really needs to be a concerted effort to try and 11 reapproach the community with this issue. I think to some 12 extent the problem has arisen because the previous policy 13 was brought into question. There is a lot of discussion 14 taking place about what a new policy might look like, but 15 in the interim period there is I think some element of 16 confusion about what's the best approach. I note that 17 this is a matter very much on the Commission's agenda for 18 forthcoming hearings. From my perspective, I think an 19 approach that all of the agencies could actually focus on 20 and concentrate their efforts on and start really getting 21 that message out to the community would be very helpful. 22 MR RUSH: Mr Comrie, I just want to go to the next message 23 which is number 2 at 0361, which is for the next level 24 down, an extreme fire day. Again, when one looks at what 25 to do there, the first dot point, "Go to your safer place 26 only if the path is clear - heat from the fire can kill 27 you. It (is likely/could be) too late to leave." Just 28 those two messages when we are looking at concise and 29 straightforward advice - and appreciating what 30 Commissioner Pascoe said that people have to be 31 responsible too, but people look for advice and consider

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17438 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 options - that's a confusing message, I suggest?---I guess 2 it depends on how you approach it. If you had taken on 3 your role in the shared responsibility model and had 4 properly prepared yourself, the decision about when to do 5 something would probably be best made by you because you 6 are there at the scene. The difficulty of course with 7 these messages is that by the time they are drafted and 8 they are circulated and on the website it could be some 9 minutes before people read the message. Can I say as 10 someone who has a country property that's on dial-up 11 rather than broadband, that can be a very long period of 12 time before that sort of information gets through. In 13 that intervening period an extraordinary change of 14 circumstances might occur that makes the advice that's on 15 this message no longer appropriate. So my view is that 16 I think the State needs to do all it can possibly do to 17 equip people to make informed decisions, but in the end 18 I think individuals have to make those decisions for 19 themselves based on the knowledge that they have and the 20 circumstances in which they find themselves and they 21 should have in advance thought of a safe place to go as 22 part of their bushfire plan. 23 That's true, but what we are looking at here is the course of 24 information to the community. I just wonder when one is 25 looking at direct, concise information to the community 26 nowhere in the templates is it, for example, put forward 27 to the information officer that "the road to X may be open 28 or may provide your safest route". I wonder whether you 29 picked up any feel of a fear of litigation for giving 30 direct advice to the community in information, whether 31 there is some background that, "If we give that sort of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17439 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 advice, we may face consequences in litigation or 2 elsewhere"?---The short answer is, no, I didn't receive 3 any such advice. But can I say that these templates are 4 editable. Any information that needs to be put on them 5 can be put on them. This is, if you like, the bare bones 6 of the template. So the information officer has the 7 capacity to add any further information that they may 8 choose to add in any given circumstances. I think, rather 9 than the threat of litigation, the concern would be more 10 one of providing people with advice at, say, 3.52 in the 11 afternoon that at 3.55 in the afternoon may be completely 12 wrong. If the road that you thought was open at 3.52 is 13 no longer open, the people don't get the message until 14 4 pm, I think there is a real risk that we could actually 15 place people in danger rather than actually advise them of 16 a safe way out. 17 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: I think the converse of that is also 18 true. If there is a safe way out, even if it is not 19 recognised, to encourage people to stay because of the 20 possibility that the roads may be unsafe can also have 21 disastrous consequences, as I'm sure it did in some cases 22 in this fire. So that to raise a doubt about an option 23 without certainty being associated with whether the doubt 24 is justified or not in itself can be a dangerous form of 25 advice because it discourages a person from making a 26 choice which may in the circumstances prove to be the 27 right choice even though there is incomplete 28 knowledge?---I don't disagree with what you are saying at 29 all. But I'm, I guess, reflecting the sorts of 30 information that has come to me in the course of this 31 where the message that's been conveyed to me is that the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17440 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 CFA/DSE feel that they are in a rather invidious position 2 in providing advice which may take some minutes to 3 actually appear on the website so that a community can 4 have that advice, in the meantime that situation could 5 change dramatically. If the fire is approaching from one 6 direction and it is quite clearly not going to be able to 7 spot ahead for a long distance or it is unlikely to 8 advance rapidly, then I think the proposition you put is 9 quite appropriate. But in the situation that occurred on 10 Black Saturday where spotting was occurring many 11 kilometres ahead of the main fire, I think the agencies 12 were in a very difficult situation to predict where at any 13 time the fire might take out. 14 We may be bogging down on a single issue that we will be 15 addressing as we proceed, but it is a very important area. 16 I think the point can be made that, unless there is a high 17 level of certainty about the advice that's given, it can 18 sometimes be dangerous to over-generalise a situation 19 where there are often in fact a multitude of different 20 circumstances that need to be dealt with in a particular 21 incident; that generalised advice, one-size-fits-all, 22 while it's given with the best of intentions, may in 23 certain cases unfortunately be the wrong advice?---As 24 I said, I don't disagree with what you are saying at all. 25 If I can just reiterate that these templates are the bones 26 of the advice. They are editable. If the information 27 officer felt that there was more appropriate advice that 28 should be given, they can enter that on to the template. 29 MR RUSH: This is the last one we will go to, Mr Comrie. At 30 0366, which is template 7, which is an emergency warning 31 for an extreme fire day, there when it comes to what to do

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17441 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 it is more direct, "Leave now only if the path is clear if 2 you don't have a bushfire survival plan, or your plan is 3 to leave - heat from the fire can kill you." That is more 4 direct. But, again appreciating that we are dealing with 5 people that are leaving late and the emergency of the 6 situation, do you see the potential for room to at least 7 in a message such as that to be a little bit more 8 informative as to where the potential exit route may 9 be?---Yes. 10 If we could turn to 0023 and recommendation 4.3, which was the 11 recommendation into a new fire severity scale. You 12 indicate that work has commenced on that and there's some 13 considerable research going on in relation to it with a 14 report by July 2010?---Correct, yes. 15 You deal with the progress at 0024 as to the research that's 16 being undertaken and the way in which it's being 17 progressed?---Correct. Yes. 18 In that case, 4.4, at 0025, was a recommendation that the 19 warning system be confined to two categories: information 20 for a fire going with potential, and a warning that a fire 21 is dangerous and out of control. The State has adopted, 22 rather than the two-stage warning system, a three-stage 23 warning system?---Yes, but as I indicated in my report, 24 I think it is actually arguable whether the warnings are 25 two stage or three stage. The first level, if you like, 26 the advice is simply that; that a fire has started, there 27 is no immediate danger, general information to keep up to 28 date with developments. An example of that might be if 29 you have got, say, a DSE burn-off and people are concerned 30 because they can see smoke. It doesn't require them to do 31 anything and the advice would actually tell them what was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17442 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 occurring. The watch and act and emergency warnings 2 warnings are the ones that require some action, and 3 I believe in the spirit of the recommendation they are 4 fairly close. 5 I think the two-stage warning was a South Australian model and 6 the three-stage warning has been picked up 7 nationwide?---Including South Australia, yes. 8 Your view was that in relation to that recommendation it's been 9 fairly well brought together with the three-stage 10 warning?---Yes. Again, like a number of these 11 recommendations, there was some subsequent national 12 discussion under the national emergency framework and 13 Victoria as a contributor to that has agreed with a 14 national model. In some instances there have been some 15 adjustments to seek particular jurisdictions' situations. 16 But generally this is the model that all jurisdictions in 17 Australia have now signed up to. 18 Recommendation 4.5 is the recommendation in relation to the 19 standard emergency warning signal and the use of SEWS. 20 You set out there that that has been taken up, and it was 21 used on I think three occasions during the fire season in 22 Victoria?---The SEWS I don't think was used. NEWS was 23 used. SEWS to the best of my knowledge - I'm sorry, I've 24 got confused the two of them. SEWS was used; Cann River 25 and Tintaldra and Mount Clear. It does precede the NEWS 26 message. I'm sorry, I confused the two. 27 That was picked up by the media broadcasters?---Yes. Indeed 28 the media have been very cooperative. As the next 29 recommendation refers to, virtually every media outlet in 30 Victoria is now a signatory to an MOU in relation to SEWS. 31 If we deal with that, the State was to invite the commercial

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17443 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 broadcasters to join a memorandum of understanding similar 2 to that that the ABC has joined with the State?---Yes. 3 The position is, is it not, Mr Comrie, that all commercial 4 radio broadcasters have signed up to such a memorandum of 5 understanding?---They have, and also Sky Television News, 6 which was perhaps not envisaged at the outset. 7 How does it work with Sky Television News in general 8 terms?---It is on the same basis generally as the radio 9 stations, as I understand it. The MOUs have been signed 10 with senior officials of each of those commercial radio 11 broadcasters and Sky News who have the authority to 12 actually intervene and make decisions about when programs 13 should be interrupted and so on. So it's slightly 14 different because it is actually television than radio, 15 but the intent and output is almost identical. 16 You refer to continuing in negotiations with SBS and also 17 attempts to involve community broadcasters?---Indeed, yes, 18 they are ongoing. 19 At 4.7, at the bottom of 0029, the Office of the Emergency 20 Services Commissioner - this was the recommendation - and 21 the CFA develop guidelines for the use of sirens in 22 communities. You at 0030 set out the nature of the 23 guidelines that have been created for the use of 24 sirens?---I do, yes. 25 But the position is that, apart from Ferny Creek, there have 26 been no sirens or community based sirens put in place in 27 Victoria?---No. From the visit made to Ferny Creek and 28 talking to the coordinator of that, there have been a 29 number of discussions that she's had with other townships. 30 But at this point in time no applications have been made, 31 as I understand it.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17444 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 I wonder whether that might be because there is still 2 reluctance to get involved or to advertise or to promote 3 the use of the community sirens, which I think it can be 4 said in the community consultations that the Commission 5 has had was a theme that was fairly constantly raised by 6 various communities affected by bushfire?---That's 7 possible. It is also possible that the community don't 8 have enough information on which to base a decision or 9 make the approach. I do elsewhere in the report refer to 10 the fact that the information on community sirens is found 11 on the Emergency Services Commissioner's website, which 12 intuitively is not the place I suspect a member of the 13 community would go to to seek that sort of information. 14 I have suggested that there ought to be perhaps one single 15 portal where people can seek information on bushfires and 16 related issues. So perhaps that's a matter that requires 17 a bit more public attention. 18 You refer at the bottom of 0031, page 28, to the - you use the 19 word - cautious approach to the acquisition and use of 20 sirens. I am wondering what that comment is based 21 upon?---I think what the guidelines are really aimed at 22 doing is making sure that if a community siren is to be 23 put in place that everything that should be considered has 24 been considered; that it is not necessarily an easy task, 25 but the ramifications of getting it wrong can be quite 26 serious. The Emergency Services Commissioner guidelines 27 also have included occupational health and safety 28 guidelines, where perhaps one might ask whether or not 29 they were necessary given that they are exempt under EPA 30 Victorian requirements. But they have put them there 31 I think again as a bit of a safety measure to make sure

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17445 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 that everything that can be done to make sure that they 2 work and work effectively is in place. It may well be 3 that this is a matter that, if there is no further public 4 interest in the matter, needs to be revisited and perhaps 5 explored again as to whether or not the community has 6 sufficient understanding of this issue. 7 Certainly when you went to Ferny Creek I take it there was 8 still a fair degree of enthusiasm and they fought fairly 9 hard as a community to have that facility available to 10 them?---The answer is, yes, very much so; a very high 11 degree of enthusiasm and commitment. 12 And the other example that you refer to that the Commission has 13 heard evidence of where it was effective was of course 14 Boolarra?---Yes, I'm aware of that. 15 CHAIRMAN: Can I just say there are eight dot points on your 16 page 28 and on my examination of those it would require an 17 extraordinary amount of determination on the part of an 18 individual or a group to get through all of those eight 19 propositions?---Yes. 20 It reminds me - I don't know whether you are familiar with the 21 position - with respect to the requirements in relation to 22 refuges. In effect there is less than a handful of 23 refuges because the requirements are so onerous that it is 24 impossible to meet those requirements. It seems that 25 these policy requirements are such that it is almost 26 impossible to have the kind of siren that we know from our 27 community consultations and the submissions to us an awful 28 lot of people think ought to have been an appropriate way 29 to go, but this effectively rules them out?---I'm 30 certainly prepared to concede it is a difficult road. 31 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: I think as a generalisation on the matter

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17446 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 of sirens almost all of the submissions we received from 2 the community were in favour of them and the negative 3 advice we got were generally from the authorities. So 4 I think you made a reference to, unless the community 5 really wants these things, maybe a conservative approach 6 is appropriate. But I think, harking back to the evidence 7 that we received as a cross-section of the community, 8 there was strong support from a considerable number of 9 people for the value of having sirens as an alert?---My 10 own view is I think community sirens have a place as long 11 as they are appropriately managed and that people in the 12 community understand what the siren means when it goes 13 off. Some of the difficulty - - - 14 I think that stands to reason; that you don't put it there 15 without some educational process?---Yes. That's I think 16 part of the dilemma. The level of enthusiasm in some 17 communities has not really been able to be accurately 18 gauged from the work we have done because we have just not 19 seen applications coming in that have been able to give us 20 some idea of the depth of commitment in communities to 21 this approach. 22 Maybe it is the same 80 per cent of people who haven't heeded 23 other warnings who represent the silent majority on these 24 matters?---Well, invariably it is the other 20 per cent 25 who seem to drive most of the initiatives in the community 26 and we haven't heard from them either unfortunately. 27 We certainly heard from a reasonable cross-section of them. 28 MR RUSH: Mr Comrie, moving to recommendation 4.8, which deals 29 with the national telephony based warning system, you deal 30 with it as phase 1 and phase 2, and the recommendation 31 really related to the second phase. But you indicate that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17447 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 phase 1 was used I think on three occasions in Victoria 2 during the season?---Yes. 3 And, from what you could see, satisfactorily?---Yes. 4 And also used nationally, as you point out in your 5 report?---Yes. 6 There has been somewhat of a hold-up in relation to phase 7 2?---Yes. A request for information was put out to the 8 technology industry to try and seek some sort of solution 9 to delivering on this initiative. However, the results of 10 the RFI have not indicated that that's immediately able to 11 be achieved, but further work is ongoing to see what might 12 be done to pursue the matter. I can report that Victoria, 13 through the OESC, is leading the push for this nationally, 14 as it did for phase 1 of NEWS. I have certainly witnessed 15 a very strong commitment to pursue this particular 16 initiative. 17 What is it that has held up phase 2? Just to explain, I think 18 phase 2 is where it is a geographically based system, 19 technology that allows a particular area to receive the 20 emergency warning?---I think the best that I can offer 21 from my very limited knowledge of technology is that there 22 is some technological issue which presents a problem, but 23 I think another person with more knowledge in this area 24 would be better to seek advice on that matter. 25 But from your investigations you are satisfied that the State 26 of Victoria at least is attempting to propel the use of 27 phase 2?---Yes. There is a very strong commitment, 28 I think I can say, having spoken to the senior officer in 29 the OESC who is tasked with pursuing this matter. 30 You then refer to recommendation 5.1, which is to the effect 31 that the Australian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17448 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 and the Bureau of Meteorology collaborate to explore 2 options for the fire danger indices beyond extreme and 3 then adjusting the ratings to correspond with higher fire 4 danger index values and developing a revised fire severity 5 scale?---Yes. 6 What happened there?---Again, a national meeting of experts and 7 representatives came together and, following that meeting, 8 a six level scale of ratings was agreed with the level 9 beyond extreme being code red catastrophic. That has been 10 the fire danger rating that has been used in the fire 11 season just concluded. It is clear from all of the 12 evidence available that there are some significant 13 problems with this particular term. I spoke to the chief 14 fire officers in New South Wales and South Australia as 15 well as those in Victoria and I think they all share the 16 same view that the "code red" or "catastrophic" term has 17 created a number of problems for them. I understand that 18 this month there is to be a further meeting of the 19 national council to reconsider that matter and see 20 whether, in the light of the experience of this current 21 fire season, there is not a more appropriate term. 22 One of the issues that you refer to in relation to the 23 catastrophic code red at 0035 is, firstly, the use of the 24 FDI for extreme, I think from 50 to 74?---Yes. 25 I'm sorry, extreme 75 to 99, and then once you get to 100 at 26 the moment there is this automatic requirement to move to 27 catastrophic code red?---Yes. That presents some 28 problems. I was in the state control centre on the 29 morning of 11 January when discussions were taking place 30 with a briefing from the Bureau of Meteorology about the 31 following day. At best it could be said it was border

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17449 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 line. The way that the issue has been conveyed to me is 2 that a fire danger index of 125 in the Mallee would not be 3 unusual, and in fact if you closed down all of the schools 4 and various other public facilities in the Mallee every 5 time it reached 125 that would be a very regular 6 occurrence. However, in the Dandenongs a fire danger 7 index of 75 could be extremely dangerous. The concern is 8 that it is a mechanical scientific process which really 9 doesn't take into account a whole range of particular 10 issues that might apply at a local level. The constant 11 view that I was given was there needs to be more 12 flexibility in the application of the fire danger index so 13 that other issues can be taken into account to balance out 14 whether or not a code red day or indeed one of the other 15 ratings should be applied. 16 You refer to that in your report at 0036, the potential 17 ramifications of the call for a code red day. You 18 indicate that it is so finely balanced that the difference 19 between a five kilometre per hour wind can tip the balance 20 and therefore create the requirement for calling a code 21 red catastrophic day?---Yes. Perhaps one of the more 22 strident examples of the implications of that was conveyed 23 to us by the education department, who have undertaken to 24 try to give 48 hours notice to schools and families so 25 that appropriate arrangements can be made for the 26 safe-keeping of children on those days. Because of that 27 very fine tipping point, if you like, that was impossible 28 on 11 and 12 January simply because the debate was still 29 going on at midday the day before as to whether or not the 30 following day was likely to be a code red day. 31 As you have indicated, you spoke to Mr Ferguson and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17450 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 Mr Fitzsimmons of the South Australian Rural Fire Service 2 and New South Wales Rural Fire Brigades?---I did. 3 Each of them expressed concern to you as to this 4 category?---Yes. I think on one hand they actually said 5 that it had had some benefits in that it had raised the 6 public profile and awareness of the severity of those 7 types of days. But on the other hand there was a debate, 8 particularly in New South Wales, that the word 9 "catastrophic" is actually an outcome, not a predictor. 10 There are a lot of different views, I have to say, to the 11 point where that's been a distraction from what really 12 needs to be achieved here in sending out a clear message. 13 I think on that basis alone it is worthy of a revisit. 14 You indicate that in your conversation with Mr Ferguson he 15 indicated that from his point of view something closer to 16 125 would be appropriate, but he also made the point that 17 the sort of day that we are looking at you might expect 18 once every two years rather than a recurrence of it during 19 the fire season?---Yes. Actually I include in the report 20 the occasions when, from his memory - and I understand 21 that he was a former Victorian senior fire officer as 22 well, so he has a good grasp of the environment here - he 23 spelt out the days that he was aware of in south-east 24 Australia and in Western Australia where the very few days 25 in his view that ought to be code red catastrophic could 26 be listed as such. The other days he thought we stood the 27 risk, if we used this terminology too often, that there 28 was a risk of complacency creeping in. 29 In summary, is it fair to say that the perspective of both 30 those chief officers was a call for much more discretion 31 and flexibility in relation to its use?---I think when you

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17451 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 look at it overall their concerns were quite consistent 2 and their desire was that there be a more locally focused 3 opportunity to declare a fire danger rating. One of the 4 other complicating factors which I talk about elsewhere in 5 the report are the boundaries in Victoria which add 6 another dimension to this where you have boundaries used 7 for fire danger ratings and boundaries used for warnings, 8 as such; nine on one hand, five on the other. New South 9 Wales, as I understand it, have managed to align their 10 boundaries. So when they actually issue a warning you are 11 talking about the same geographical area, whereas in 12 Victoria we have a significant issue where a warning might 13 be appropriate in one part of that particular district but 14 not in another. 15 You towards the bottom of 0035 set out the issue of boundaries, 16 that the Bureau of Meteorology website displays nine 17 weather forecast districts to designate FDRs for the state 18 and the CFA uses five districts. So that is a potential 19 difficulty in relation to not having boundaries aligned, 20 as you say?---Yes, indeed. 21 Then you set out the example of the differences that can occur 22 between two adjoining shires that might be thought to be 23 fairly similar?---I don't recall the name of the town, but 24 one town was described to us where on one side of the 25 street it was one fire danger rating and the other side of 26 the street it was another. If that is indeed the case 27 then that's not very helpful, I would suggest. 28 As you indicate in your evidence, there is a revisiting of this 29 issue nationally?---The revisiting of the fire danger 30 ratings, yes; but not of the boundaries, that I'm aware 31 of.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17452 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: In a general sense then our 2 recommendation still remains as a valid recommendation 3 because we didn't recommend a specific outcome; we 4 recommended that there be further work done with 5 scientists or researchers, but with the purpose of 6 creating a level higher than what appeared to us to be the 7 top level that didn't adequately deal with the type of day 8 we had on 7 February?---And they are the sort of days 9 I think Mr Ferguson was talking about. So I think the 10 answer to your question is, yes, it is still valid. 11 The search is continuing?---Yes. 12 MR RUSH: But both those chief fire officers were supportive of 13 the idea of a need for a term that covers that sort of 14 day?---Yes, they were. 15 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Victoria has chosen code red. Was there 16 a view amongst those fire officers about the usefulness of 17 that, leaving the "catastrophic" aside?---I think from 18 what I could glean from the conversation was that there 19 was a bit of confusion where you have got two colours of 20 red, if you like, as extreme and then code red. I think 21 the view would be that we really need to go back, in light 22 of what's occurred this fire season, and revisit this and 23 see whether or not the messaging that goes out really 24 conveys the message that we want to send. At the moment 25 I think that's very much in question. The "code red" 26 really was brought in because of concerns over the use of 27 the word "catastrophic". So it's been, if you like, an 28 adjustment in mid-stream to try and address what appeared 29 to be an obvious problem. But the agencies were caught in 30 a bind because they had spent an awful lot of time, money 31 and energy advertising the code red catastrophic at the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17453 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 start of the fire season and throughout the fire season, 2 and they thought, as I understand it, that on balance it 3 would even be more confusing to try and change it 4 mid-stream. So they thought it was better to persist with 5 something that they weren't wedded to until at least the 6 end of this fire season and revisit it then. 7 MR RUSH: Recommendation 5.2, Mr Comrie, we have dealt with and 8 I think there will be some evidence later in the week from 9 the Commonwealth in relation to this point of the fire 10 danger index in the forecasts. You then turn to 5.3 and 11 5.4 and the single multi-agency portal for bushfire 12 information. 5.4 is that the State ensure that the single 13 multi-agency portal for bushfire information be designed 14 to allow incident control centres to directly post 15 information and warnings. So you investigated this. 16 Firstly, on the single portal, I think you have referred 17 to it?---Yes. 18 That has been created?---Yes. The one source one message, or 19 OSOM as it is commonly referred to, is now in place and it 20 does allow for messages entered at one agency to be 21 instantly entered onto the websites of other agencies. 22 At this stage, and you may not know this, is there any work 23 being done just to have one website?---I'm not aware of 24 that, no. The answer is no. 25 Then in relation to the direct input of information from the 26 incident control centre onto the portal, what's the result 27 there?---Yes, that is possible and indeed occurred on a 28 number of occasions through the fire season that's just 29 concluded. While we were at the Victorian bushfire 30 information line centre at Ballarat I was able to watch 31 the operator there actually going into the site and taking

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17454 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 messages from the site. 2 You refer to the joint standing operations procedure 4.01 and 3 the chief officer having the responsibility for provision 4 of information and warnings?---Yes. 5 That is delegated to the incident controller?---Yes, it is. 6 But, overall, the monitoring requirement exists for the chief 7 officer to monitor and to keep some form of control in 8 relation to that?---Yes. There is an information unit at 9 the state control centre that constantly monitors the 10 messages coming out of any incident control centres, and 11 they would follow up in the event of any issue that they 12 might have issues about. 13 You then under "Outcome and effectiveness" refer to phase 1 and 14 phase 2. Phase 1 relates to CFA and DSE, and phase 2 to 15 the MFB. Can you just explain the difference?---Yes. The 16 CFA and DSE have access to the current phase of one source 17 one message. It is programmed that the MFB will have 18 access to that a little later in the year, and that means 19 all of the key fire agencies will have access to the one 20 site. 21 Then as I understand it, and you refer to it on 16 December 22 2009, there was a widely reported breakdown in relation to 23 the servicing of the information on the website?---Yes. 24 Again you will have to pardon my lack of technical 25 expertise, but as I understand it it was an issue that had 26 its genesis in the fact that this quite substantial 27 software program was introduced into the fire agencies in 28 very short term. With hindsight, it would have been 29 better if time was available to adequately test it, but 30 the urgency to put it in place overrode that 31 consideration. When the problem occurred it was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17455 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 identified as an overloading issue which probably would 2 have been picked up through a rigorous testing program, 3 but was rectified very shortly thereafter. 4 I join you in the technical ignorance, but you suggest a log 5 file limit was exceeded. I take it throughout this fire 6 season there was no real stress or pressure put on the 7 system, and I think you referred to it, just to ascertain 8 what it can handle?---Yes. I have made that point I think 9 on a few occasions through the report, that really the 10 best I have been able to judge on a number of these 11 initiatives is that they appear to be functioning well, 12 but because of thankfully the nature of this benign fire 13 season we have just been through there hasn't been any 14 high-pressure testing of any of these systems. So what 15 I have suggested is they need to be thoroughly tested now 16 that this fire season has passed to make sure that they 17 are pretty much bulletproof for the next fire season. 18 Recommendation 5.5 concerns the bushfire information line and 19 that it be funded to meet surge capacity. You refer to an 20 increase from 20 to 35 seats at the organisation and also 21 an increase in the number of lines?---Yes, correct. They 22 have also negotiated arrangements, apart from the standing 23 arrangement they had with Centrelink, with the State 24 Revenue Office and VicRoads offices in Ballarat so that at 25 short notice they can bring additional operators in to man 26 those additional positions over an extended period. 27 You also set out arrangements with Centrelink and the State 28 Revenue Office?---Yes. 29 To increase capacity if necessary?---Yes, indeed. 30 With training for the personnel from each of those 31 offices?---Yes, they have all had training and because

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17456 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 they are located in Ballarat they are able to be called 2 upon at short notice. 3 You also make mention in about the fifth last paragraph of 0042 4 that the capacity of VBIL is limited by the available 5 office space at its current site?---Yes. 6 How is that impacting on the ability of the bushfire 7 information line to meet surge capacity?---I think now, 8 given the reconfiguration of the service - and the 9 photograph over the page perhaps doesn't adequately convey 10 the message, but it is an old building, it is a fairly 11 cramped environment and the point I was trying to make 12 here is there is not a lot of flexibility to do anything 13 else. They have probably consumed all available space. 14 It will be a significantly enhanced capacity to deal with 15 calls than what was there on 7 February. But I don't 16 believe that they will be able to take it any further 17 simply because of the limitations of the room that they 18 are in. 19 So at some stage we need to be looking at better 20 facilities?---And I would have to say, if one compared the 21 facilities at ESTA compared to the VBIL, ESTA was, if 22 I can put it colloquially, light-years ahead. 23 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Just to close off on that then, the 24 indication of confidence that they are better equipped and 25 more capable of dealing with a major event than they were 26 in 2009 in itself doesn't have much of a ring of 27 confidence about it. Given the substantial amount of 28 extra funding and extra lines and so on obviously, unless 29 something is sadly amiss, you would have to have a lot of 30 confidence that they would perform much better than they 31 did in February last year?---I certainly have quite a deal

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17457 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 of confidence that they would be able to perform 2 significantly better. They do have more terminals. They 3 do have more staff available. They have the capacity now 4 to call upon resources that were not there before through 5 Centrelink and VicRoads. I think they would be able to 6 maintain the VBIL over a protracted period to a far more 7 significant degree than they were previously. 8 MR RUSH: On 4 January 2010, Mr Comrie, there was an outdated 9 message that remained on the VBIL line?---Yes. 10 I think you indicate you saw the results of the investigation 11 of that which suggested it was human error?---Yes. 12 In the sense of someone not going through the various checks 13 that are required?---Yes, and as a result of that 14 protocols have been updated to try and eliminate that 15 problem in the future. 16 Then 6.1 was the recommendation that the state emergency 17 response plan be amended so that the word "relocation" is 18 used in preference to the word "evacuation", except where 19 "evacuation" is clearly more appropriate. In relation to 20 that, there has been an amendment or a notation made, 21 I think you point out, in relation to the wording so that 22 in the SERP the word "relocation" is used except where 23 "evacuation", for example for a police operation or 24 emergency, is the more appropriate terminology?---Yes, and 25 being mindful of the fact that the state emergency 26 response plan is an all hazards plan, it is not confined 27 just to bushfires, it is necessary to have the opportunity 28 to evacuate, for example, in perhaps a life-threatening 29 situation with a flood or some other emergency of that 30 nature. 31 You refer to the potential for confusion between the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17458 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 terminology?---Yes. 2 In what sense?---I think "evacuation" means different things to 3 different people. We have no legal authority in Victoria 4 to forcibly remove anyone from their property. 5 "Evacuation" has that connotation, whereas "relocation" is 6 a voluntary process, if you like, where people may do so 7 at request, but not necessarily of their own initiative, 8 but nevertheless they leave voluntarily. "Evacuation" 9 really is much of a more planned approach where the 10 emergency service agencies would actually play a role in 11 perhaps guiding the people out of an area into another 12 location or something of that nature, and where the risk 13 that something is likely to happen is very high. So to 14 leave people there might be a very high risk. So it was 15 really a matter of trying to differentiate between the two 16 so people could understand what the two terms meant. The 17 clarification that's been put into the state emergency 18 response plan goes some way towards that, I would suggest. 19 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Could I also just in passing bring to 20 notice the emergency management manual I'm sure is under 21 review, but in the previous one, January 2006, through 22 that manual there is reference to "evacuation" in respect 23 of the "stay or go" policy, and it talks about "evacuate 24 or stay and fight". "Evacuate" in my terms, and I think 25 in your terms, isn't an evacuation in that sense; it is to 26 leave or stay and fight. It is nothing to do with an 27 external decision that a community evacuate. It is about 28 a personal decision to leave or to stay and 29 fight?---(Witness nods.) 30 Even the heading of that appendix 5, "Evacuation during 31 wildfire emergencies", is really a dissertation on the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17459 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 "stay or go" policy?---Yes. 2 But "evacuation" is used as the synonym for "leave" all the way 3 through it. So I think there does need to be a common 4 approach by the State in its documentation to the use of 5 "evacuation" in a bushfire preventative sense, as it just 6 adds to confusion. 7 MR RUSH: Thank you, Commissioner. Mr Comrie, you then deal 8 with the recommendation concerning that personnel be 9 trained to give advice concerning the defending of 10 households, communities, locations, and the assessment of 11 defendability. You refer to the self-assessment tool 12 that's been created and put on the CFA website?---Yes. 13 Firstly in relation to that, you set out on page 0046 that as 14 at 8 February there had been 52,006 hits on the website 15 for use of that tool and 2,500 hard copies which enable 16 the assessment in hard copy to be undertaken. I think you 17 indicate later on that that was felt to be a fairly 18 minimal use of the tool?---Yes. I think that this is an 19 area that again is one that really needs to be revisited. 20 One of the other concerns was that the actual tool itself, 21 I think a person undertaking the tool could strike some 22 difficulties, might get two pages into a several page 23 document and think it's all too hard and so doesn't go any 24 further with it. I think that probably it needs to be 25 made more user friendly. I think perhaps the bar has been 26 set a little bit too high in trying to achieve a highly 27 desirable outcome, and perhaps that might be also a bit of 28 a deterrent. I'm conscious of the fact that it is going 29 to be revisited. But I think that, even though 52,000 is 30 a significant number, those that have actually completed 31 it, that number needs to be raised to a considerable

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17460 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 degree. 2 The intent of the recommendation was picked up by a change to 3 the standing operating procedures enabling the chief fire 4 officer to provide that sort of advice?---Yes. 5 So from your investigations it would appear that certainly 6 there is a desire to provide that information?---Yes. 7 And you also refer to the training of fire safety officers, 8 wildfire to visit individual properties?---Yes. 9 But again I want to suggest to you that that also at this 10 stage, to 30 January, with 180 properties - do people 11 request that or how does that operate?---Yes, it is an 12 issue that's raised at public meetings. One of our team 13 visited a Community Fireguard meeting where that issue was 14 raised. It is also information, as I understand, that's 15 on the CFA website. But I do comment in the report that 16 I believe this is a matter that the community needs to be 17 better informed about so that they can actually make the 18 decision to seek the services of one of these officers if 19 they need to. 20 You also refer to there having to be a further hard copy 21 booklet put out because of an amendment that needed to be 22 made?---Yes. After printing of the first, there was an 23 error that was discovered. So they recalled that booklet 24 and reprinted it. 25 The overall effectiveness of the use of the various tools at 26 the moment is the subject of a review to be performed by 27 30 June?---Correct. Yes. 28 Then 6.4 dealt with the recommendation that the municipal 29 emergency management plans be appropriately reviewed so as 30 to include relocation or provision for relocation during 31 bushfire?---Yes.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17461 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 You indicate that the MAV sent out a survey of councils and 2 shires regarding the program. They got 53 responses, and 3 28 of the 53 municipalities indicated some form of 4 provision in relation to relocation and compliance with 5 the interim emergency relief centre guidance 6 notes?---Correct. Yes. 7 You may not be able to answer this, but is that a continuing 8 matter on your investigations, that municipalities will be 9 taking up this issue?---Yes. The time of reporting is 10 later this year, I think, and the commitment that we have 11 from the MAV is that this process will be completed by 12 then. It is an ongoing process. The councils I think in 13 some instances have had some resource issues in trying to 14 address this issue. But with the assistance of the MAV 15 they are progressing. One would hope that this process 16 would be completed before the commencement of next fire 17 season. 18 I understand, Commissioners, that the advances in this will be 19 dealt with in the MAV delivery report which will be 20 tendered tomorrow. I think if we can go to 7.1, which is 21 a fairly substantial recommendation concerning CFA 22 publications and programs to prepare the community for 23 bushfire. It set out in dot point form the various 24 principles that from the Royal Commission recommendations 25 needed to be properly addressed in the communications of 26 CFA. The first two give some hint as to the 27 recommendations which are set out there: "The safest 28 option is always to leave early rather than stay and 29 defend; and not all homes are defendable in all 30 circumstances and householders are advised to undertake an 31 individual assessment of defendability." You then refer

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17462 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 to numerous publications and other means of communication 2 of the CFA over the ensuing pages, Mr Comrie?---Yes. This 3 has been a quite comprehensive campaign of communicating 4 particular messages to the community. It is an ongoing 5 campaign, but it really is quite substantial in its 6 overall form. 7 I think your view is that there has been a genuine attempt to 8 meet the recommendations that were made by the 9 Commissioners in the various publications and publicity 10 that has been associated with information to the 11 community?---Yes, that's correct. 12 I don't, Commissioners, intend to go to each one of those 13 documents, but I just want to read something which is from 14 a publication put out by the New South Wales Rural Fire 15 Brigades in relation to that issue of defendability. For 16 a code red day it indicates under "Impact", "People in the 17 path of the fire will almost certainly die or be injured, 18 significant numbers of homes and businesses destroyed or 19 damaged." And under "Your action", it says, "Under no 20 circumstances will it be safe to stay and defend." Now, 21 I want to suggest that nowhere in any of the Victorian 22 literature is it put as bluntly or as succinctly as that, 23 the potential impact of staying at home to 24 defend?---I would agree with that. I think there is a 25 serious attempt to convey the message that remaining is a 26 serious risk, but I think that's fairly blunt language 27 that conveys a particular message. 28 Commissioners, I don't intend to go to each of the individual 29 publications. Perhaps if we deal with 7.2 this evening, 30 which is at 0059, that the CFA consider the means of 31 providing individual advice to residents in bushfire-prone

.Wordwave:MB/SK 06/04/10 17463 COMRIE XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR RUSH 1 areas as to the defendability of their homes. You come 2 back there to the appointment of the 10 officers that we 3 spoke about earlier and the assessment that has been made, 4 I think, of 180-odd homes or dwellings. Again, I think 5 your overview of this is that it is something that needs 6 to be promoted and developed?---I agree, yes. 7 MR RUSH: Is that a convenient time, Commissioners? 8 CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will adjourn now until 9.30 tomorrow 9 morning. 10 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 11 ADJOURNED UNTIL WEDNESDAY, 7 APRIL 2010 AT 9.30 AM 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

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