MOWAT RESEARCH #158 | DECEMBER 2017
The Road to Paris Navigating the intergovernmental path to our climate commitments
BY ERICH HARTMANN, CALEB HOLDEN & MICHAEL CRAWFORD URBAN Acknowledgements The Mowat Centre thanks the Metcalf Foundation whose generous support made this report possible. The authors would like to thank the many anonymous reviewers who provided helpful feedback and suggestions, with specific thanks going to Douglas Macdonald for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this report. The authors would also like to thank Elaine Stam for her design work on this report as well as Sunil Johal, Paul Sommerville, Bill Forward and Andrew Parkin for their helpful contributions.
All content and any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of any other organization or agency.
Authors ERICH HARTMANN CALEB HOLDEN MICHAEL CRAWFORD Practice Lead, Policy Intern URBAN
Intergovernmental Affairs Caleb joined Mowat as a Policy Intern Practice Lead, Government Erich Hartmann is the Mowat Centre’s in May 2017. He is a Master of Public Transformation Policy candidate at the University Practice Lead for Intergovernmental Michael joined the Mowat Centre as of Toronto and a Junior Fellow at Affairs. Erich has a deep knowledge of a Policy Associate in January 2016 Massey College. Caleb has previously intergovernmental affairs and federal and took on the role of Practice Lead worked with Statistics Canada and fiscal issues. Previously, Erich spent for Government Transformation in has provided research support to 13 years in the Ontario Public Service September 2017. He brings a varied set the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney at the Ministry of Finance in a number of experiences to his work at Mowat General and faculty members at both of policy and management roles, most ranging from his academic research the University of Toronto and McGill recently serving as Manager of Federal- as a Visiting Fellow at the Bill Graham University. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Provincial Relations. Erich holds an Centre for Contemporary International (Honours) in Political Science from MPA and a BA (Hons) from Queen’s History, to his more operational work McGill University. University. as the Returning Officer for the federal riding of Spadina-Fort York in the 2015 federal election. He has also worked with Global Affairs Canada and in the think-tank and NGO sectors in Toronto and Ottawa.
MOWATCENTRE.CA @MOWATCENTRE 439 UNIVERSITY AVENUE The Mowat Centre is an independent public policy think tank SUITE 2200, TORONTO, ON located at the School of Public Policy & Governance at the M5G 1Y8 CANADA University of Toronto. The Mowat Centre is Ontario’s non-partisan, evidence-based voice on public policy. It undertakes collaborative applied policy research, proposes innovative research-driven recommendations, and engages in public dialogue on Canada’s most important national issues. ©2017 ISBN 978-1-77259-058-6 Contents
Executive Summary 1 Key Arguments in this Paper 3
1 Introduction 5 The Policy Problem 12 2 A Carbon Tax, but...… 14 Complementary Measures 14 Political and Intergovernmental Questions 17 Institutional Structures 18 Burden Allocation and Mitigation 20 Federal Leadership 21 The Key Argument So Far… 22
Lessons of History 24 3 Early Climate Policy 1988-1992 25 The Road to Kyoto 1993-1997 27 The National Climate Change Process 1998-2002 29 Lessons Learned 32
Towards a Better Intergovernmental Institution 34 4 Structures of Ability and Responsibility 34 The Current Institutional Context 35 Features of a New Institution 38 Creating a New Institution 41
Tasks and Responsibilities of the New Institution 43 5 Lines of Business 44 FORECASTING AND REPORTING 44 RESEARCH AND POLICY ANALYSIS 45 CONNECTING, CONVENING AND COORDINATING 48 Guiding the Federal Spending Power 49 Governance of the Federal Transfer 52 The Institutional Assessment and Advisory Cycle 55
6 Conclusion 58 4THE | ROADTHE ROAD TO PARIS TO PARIS Paris targets to meet Canada’s by itself, enough progress is not, direction, this progress in this constitute real agreement does intergovernmental While thebroad EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and the likely results of the policies aggregated in the Pan-Canadian Framework remains significant. of these scenarios has presented itself yet, the challenge of closing the gap between Canada’s Paris targets reductions have already been made while simultaneously deals forothers.While leavingneither sweetheart blunt orpoorlytargeted costly emissions reductions policies seekto pry from areas where significant of missingitsParis targets entirely. On theother, Canadiansfacethepossibilityofanapproach where The potentialcostsofgettingthiswrong are significant.Ontheonehand,Canadafacespossibility reductions burdens. ensure equitybetweenjurisdictionsinthecontextofanecessarilyasymmetricallocation ofemissions shown themselves largely incapableofsuccessfullygrapplingwithcriticalissuessuchashowto addressing thecomplexissuesthatcharacterize thispolicyspace.Inparticular, pastapproaches have demonstrates thatexistingintergovernmental institutionsare notuptothetaskofsatisfactorily Unfortunately, ofCanada’s thehistory federal-provincial-territorial engagementaround climatechange context, willrequire significantintergovernmental cooperation. jurisdiction. Assuch,identifyingthemoststrategicmeasures, anddeploying theminapan-Canadian less efficiently. Control over measures, manyofthosecomplementary however, rests inprovincial can beprecisely targeted toachieve specificpolicyoutcomesthatblunter toolsmay missorachieve reductions measures” willalsobecritical.These“complementary asthey are important particularly Nonetheless, policiesandinitiatives thatworkalongside carbon pricestodrive additionalemissions chief amongstthem–willplay anessentialrole inanyprogress Canadamakes towards itstargets. True, themeasures andcommitmentsincludedinthePan-Canadian Framework –carbonpricing meet Canada’s Paris targets. Climate Changedoesconstitutereal progress inthisdirection, broad intergovernmental agreement thatisthe2016Pan-Canadian Framework onCleanGrowth and FPT governments’ policies.To date,however, noframeworkfordoingsohasbeendeveloped. Whilethe “getting thepolicyright”;itwillalsorequire thesuccessfulalignmentandoptimizationof14separate problem even more complex.Indeed,effectively responding toclimatechangewillnotsimplyinvolve environmental policybetweenfederal, provincial andterritorial(FPT)governments makes tacklingthe that willrequire tobesolved. amonumentaleffort IntheCanadiancontext, theshared jurisdictionof Tackling theproblem ofclimatechangemay wellprove tobe Canadian Framework. 1 Acoupleholdouts notwithstanding–atthetime ofthiswriting,theprovinces ofSaskatchewanand Manitoba had notadoptedthePan- the policyproblem ofagenerationandone 1 thisprogress isnot,by itself,enoughto
1 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 2 | THE ROAD TO PARIS generational policyproblem. FPT tablesalike thatisneeded tosolve this based advicetoindividual governments and independence required togive thegood,evidence- problemthis purview aswelltheoperational the intergovernmental buy-inneededtosolve co-created by theFPTgovernments, willhave Only apermanentandindependentinstitution, fair pan-Canadianclimatechangeframework. the development ofaneffective, efficientand integrated, cross-jurisdictional advicetoinform has themandateorlegitimacytogive specific, not uptothetask.Currently, nosingleinstitution existing intergovernmental institutionsare simply new approaches togovernance asCanada’s Enabling thetwo-pronged approach willrequire maintained throughout thiseffort. and toensure equitybetweenjurisdictionsis spending powertomitigatethisuneven burden is aimed,namelythedeployment ofthefederal problem thatthesecondprong ofourapproach greater emissionsreduction burden. Itisatthis emissions intensive, will needtobeararelatively Saskatchewan, whoseeconomiesare particularly that thoseprovinces, and Alberta particularly one thingthatwealready is knowforcertain ofthisanalysisnotwithstanding, The importance jurisdictions. meeting thosetargets shouldbeshared between Paris commitments andhowtheburden of combine tomeetingtheentirety ofCanada’s climate changeplansshouldcontributeand of evidence-based adviceonhowindividualFPT approach. Thefirstprong consistsofthecreation Specifically,effort. wesuggestatwo-pronged jurisdictions –couldenableasuccessfulnew Canada’s historicalexperienceandfrom other – butonethatalsodrawslessonsfrom Therefore, weargue thataninnovative approach the analysiselaboratedinthispaper. The followingninepointsprovide ofthelogicthatunderlies ahighlevel summary Key ArgumentsinthisPaper limitations ofexistingones. frameworks toovercome the intergovernmental institutional to innovate andcreatenew and policymakers willhave Canadian decision-makers provinces andterritories. on itsown...andneithercanthe meet Canada’s climatetargets The federalgovernment cannot emissions reductiontargets. Canada’s greenhousegas(GHG) will notbesufficienttomeet Clean GrowthandClimateChange The Pan-Canadian Framework on 4 1 7 climate changepolicymaking. challenges facedby Canada’s to successfullyovercome the intergovernmental buy-inneeded will beabletowinthe created by theFPTgovernments independent institution,co- Only apermanentand efficient andfairmanner. targets aremetinaneffective, policies toensureCanada’s separate FPTclimatechange for howtooptimize Canada’s 14 Currently, thereisnostrategy mitigation acrossprovinces. burden ofclimatechange failure toaddresstheuneven unilateralism, lackofbuy-inand have founderedbecauseof climate changepolicymaking Previous attemptsatcollaborative 8 5 2 Canadian climatepolicy. developing anoptimal,pan- policymaking tosucceedin must engageincollaborative territorial (FPT)governments The federal,provincial and » guidethedeployment ofthe » give evidence-based advice designed to: The institutionshouldbe governments inthefuture. that willcollectively challengeFPT dogged theclimatechangefile,or the problemsthathave previously not uptothetaskofovercoming intergovernmental institutionsare Canada’s existing jurisdictions. policies equitablyacross impacts ofemissionsreduction the burdenofuneven economic emissions reductionsandshare cost-effective as tosupport federal spendingpowerso policies 14 separateFPT climate change aimed atadvancing Canada’s 3 9 6
3 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 4 | THE ROAD TO PARIS the federal level at non-starter it a political it a political problems, as to make and national unity as well as legitimacy regional opposition, spark such significant would likely country solution across the “one-size-fits-all” Imposing such a
1 2030 (seeFigure 1). Canadian GHGemissionswouldreach 742Mtby as of1November, 2016–estimatedthattotal that hadbeenlegislatedorprovided withfunding that tookintoaccountFPTpoliciesandmeasures emissions projection madeinDecember2016– by 2030.For comparison,a“businessasusual” tories/national_inventories_submissions/items/10116.php. 1.pg7.http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_invenPart - sion To TheUnitedNationsFramework Convention OnClimateChange 2015: Greenhouse GasSources AndSinksInCanadaCanada’s Submis 2 Government ofCanada.2017. First,itaggregates main parts. participating – represents real progress. ThePCFhasthree territories except ManitobaandSaskatchewan the federal government andalltheprovinces and agreement reached on9December, 2016between Clean Growth andClimateChange(PCF)–the In thiscontext,thePan-Canadian Framework on (Mt) ofcarbondioxide equivalent (C0 reduce itsemissionsfrom about747megatonnes 2030. Inotherwords, Canadahascommitted to emissions by 30percentfrom 2005levels by committed toreduce itsgreenhouse gas(GHG) Under thetermsofParis Accord, Canadahas FPT policies. “getting thepolicyright”;itwillalsorequire thesuccessfulalignmentandoptimizationof14separate problem even more complex.Indeed,effectively responding toclimatechangewillnotsimplyinvolve environmental policybetweenfederal, provincial andterritorial(FPT)governments makes tacklingthe that willrequire tobesolved. amonumentaleffort IntheCanadiancontext, theshared jurisdictionof Tackling theproblem ofclimatechangemay wellprove tobethepolicyproblem ofagenerationandone INTRODUCTION 2 National Inventory Report 1990- National Inventory Report 2 e) to523Mt - , robust formofcarbonpricingitsown. does notimplementasufficientlybroad and implement acarbontaxinanyjurisdictionthat carbon pricethrough afederal commitmentto mechanism forensuringaminimumnational Third, itcreates thefederal carbonbackstop,a based carbontaxes orcap-and-tradesystems. and territoriesinvarious ways includingbroadly- that canbeappliedflexiblyby Canada’s provinces Second, itestablishesanationalcarbonprice governments’ planstoreduce GHGemissions. targets. gas (GHG)emissionsreduction to meetCanada’s greenhouse Change willnotbesufficient on CleanGrowthandClimate The Pan-Canadian Framework 1
5 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 6 | THE ROAD TO PARIS pace ofdecarbonisation[required] increases.” to actnowmeanscostswilllikely riseasthe thatmustbeginimmediately,efforts as“failure and willrequire massive decarbonization target of150Mt willbeeven more challenging Canada’s significantlymore ambitious 2050 without anybacksliding.Moreover, achieving that allthesepoliciesare implementedperfectly Paris targets by 2030–andthat’sassuming by themselves, notenoughtomeetCanada’s measures ofthePCFare, announcedaspart As isillustratedinFigure 1,however, the &n=CCED3397-1. Greenhouse GasEmissionsReduction Target. Government of Canada. http://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/ default.sp?lang=en Source: Environment and Climate Change Canada. 2017.CanadianEnvironmental Sustainability Indicators: Progress Towards Canada’s November 1,2016 compared toCanada’s Paris target andPCFmeasures, 2005to2030 Greenhouse gasemissionsandprojections to2030withpolicies andmeasures asof FIGURE 1 century_long-term_strategy.pdf. files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/canadas_mid- Low-Greenhouse GasDevelopment Strategy 3 Government ofCanada.2016. 44 Mt–isarguably aconservative estimate, Furthermore, thegapillustratedinFigure 1–
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2017 sites/default/files/whitepaperlce.pdf. Prosperity Institute.pg2.http://institute.smartprosperity.ca/Smart The Policy Research AgendaforGetting to 2030andBeyond 2017 Institute. June2017.WhitePaper: Toward Canada’s ClimateGoals: nario prevails, reduce Prosperity thisgapto 29Mt.See alsoSmart ofthePCFcould,if thebestcasesce nounced policiesnotapart closer to 68Mt,thoughthey alsonotethatanumberofrecently an- Climate-Action-to-2030 Sawyer andBatailleargue thatthegapis post/2017/03/31/Taking-Stock-Opportunities-for-Collaborative- EnviroEconomics. https://www.enviroeconomics.org/single- The Pan-Canadian Framework onCleanGrowth andClimateChange forCollaborative ClimateActionto 2030;Policy Brief.2: portunities 4 Sawyer, D. andBataille,C.31March, 2017. higher. with otherssuggestingthegapmay infactbe Sustainability foundinits2017fallauditthat“the federal CommissionerontheEnvironment and not workaswellprojected. Indeed,the derailed by politicalparalysisorsimplymay there isstillavery real riskthatthey may be announced butnotyet enactedorimplemented, of thepoliciescontainedinPCFhave been 2018
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2022 567 Mt Emissions PCF Measures Projected 2023 523 Mt Canada s Paris Target
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2030 - . . - implemented.” contained inthisplan[thePCF]hadyet tobe measures toreduce greenhouse gasemissions www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?id=510001. 051-0001 Estimates ofpopulation,by age group andsex forJuly1,Canada, provinces and territories, annual(persons). CANSIM. http:// in Canada. Government of Canada. http://www.ec.gc.ca/ges-ghg/default.asp?lang=En&n=83A34A7A-1and Statistics Canada. Source: Environment and Climate Change Canada.2017. (tonnes perperson) Per persongreenhouse gasemissionsby province andterritories,1990,20052015 FIGURE 2 parl_cesd_201710_01_e_42489.html#hd4c. tor GeneralofCanada.http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/ Gases—Environment andClimateChangeCanada ment. Fall 1—Progress 2017. Report onReducingGreenhouse 5 CommissioneroftheEnvironment andSustainableDevelop targets. Even withthenew measures –such of reductions required tomeetCanada’s Paris andthelevelexpected underexistingefforts gap betweenemissionsreductions thatcanbe beyond itare stillrequired inorder toclosethis needs tobeginandthatadditionalmeasures First, itmeansthatimplementationofthePCF implications. This analysishastwoimportant
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Ontario achieve itsobjective. through broadly-based carbonpricing willfailto by Canada toreach itsParis targets exclusively contained inthispapersuggeststhatanyattempt this pricewilllikely beessential,theanalysis the centralpillarofPCF. Whileincreases to the minimumnationalcarbonpricethatforms measures couldtake theformofanincrease in Some have suggestedthattheseadditional this gap(hereafter, thePCF-Paris gap). implemented –thatwouldclosetheentirety of strategy hasyet beenannounced–yet alone announced sincethesigningofPCF, no as higherfuelstandards –thathave been
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7 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 8 | THE ROAD TO PARIS every year”. could besuccessfullyimplementedby 2030. $100 pertonnecarbonprice(andprobably more) approach thatwouldrequire apriceofatleast controversial, itisdifficulttobelieve thatan in whichcarbonpricesstillremain politically a carbonpriceofmore than$30pertonneand no jurisdictionhasyet managedtoimplement likely politicallyinfeasible. For inwhich acountry allowing flexibilityofimplementationby PTs, is approach toemissionsreduction, even while implementation ofsuchacarbon-price-reliant beingthatthe with themostimportant There are avariety ofreasons forthisconclusion 7 Jaccard, M. etal.2016.IsWin-WinPossible? EMRG-REM-SFU%20Sep%2020%202016.pdf. sfu.ca/papers/jaccard/Jaccard-Hein-Vass%20CdnClimatePol%20 Management SimonFraser University. pg23.http://rem-main.rem. ment .andGetRe-Elected? Win Possible? CanCanada’s Government Achieve ItsParis Commit policy announcements.Jaccard, M.Hein.Vass, T. 2016.IsWin- per tonne, thoughtheirmodeldoesnotaccountforsomerecent priceatsomewhere between$200and$215 mate thenecessary the purchase ofany credits). MarkJaccard andcolleaguesesti through their capandtraderegime) and$220pertonne (without tional reductions credits by Ontario andQuebecfrom California the priceat$150pertonne (withsignificantpurchases ofinterna in Sawyer and Bataille’s model.Theirlessfavourable modelsset nominal termsasitisindexed to inflationbeginningat2016levels Moreover, this$100pertonne pricewouldactuallybehigherin 6 SeeSawyer, D. andBataille,C.31March, 2017. increased carbontaxes by $15/tCO the electoralprospects ofagovernment that Vass suggest,“itisinteresting tocontemplate Indeed, asMarkJaccard, Mikela HeinandTiffany efficient andfairmanner. targets aremetinaneffective, policies toensureCanada’s separate FPTclimatechange for howtooptimize Canada’s 14 Currently, thereisnostrategy 2 7 School ofResource andEnvironmental pg23. 2 each and Taking Stock 6
. - - - starter atthefederalstarter level. unity problems, as to make itapoliticalnon- opposition, aswelllegitimacyandnational would likely spark such significantregional country, atleastinthecurrent politicalcontext, such a“one-size-fits-all” solutionacross the on thisfile,from apoliticalone.Indeed,imposing ofprovincialimportance cooperationtoprogress a basicfairnessperspective butalso,given the unbalanced impactpresents problems from both box below).Anyapproach thatresults insuchan burdens across Canada’s different regions (see reductions wouldimposeinequitablyunbalanced size-fits-all carbon price” approach toemissions Thus, given thisdiversity, theimpositionofa“one- emissions-intensive jurisdictions. than three timeshigherthaninthenextmost provinces andSaskatchewanare ofAlberta more emissions perpersonintheemissions-intensive This is because, as is shown in Figure 2, economy. regional differences whichcharacterize Canada’s adequately take intoaccountthesignificant measures, suchanapproach wouldalsofailto Additionally, unlessaccompaniedby additional meeting-ottawa-december-12-1997/. produit/news-release-joint-communique-first-ministers- Conference Secretariat. http://www.scics.ca/en/product- Ottawa, December12,1997 Release –JointCommuniquéFirst Ministers’ Meeting 8 FirstMinisters’Meeting.12December, 1997. December 1997 First Ministers’MeetingCommuniqué, unreasonable burden.” that noregion isasked to bearan andmustdosoin suchaway part issue andthatCanadamustdoits global change isanimportant Protocol. They agreed thatclimate “First MinistersdiscussedtheKyoto 8 . CanadianIntergovernmental News this policy problem on their own. that provincial governments will be able to solve for emissions reductions, it is unrealistic to expect context characterized by significant popular support personal convictions orinhabit a provincial political while someprovincial leaders may possess haveexceptions, been fairly limited. Ultimately, withafewemissions theseefforts, notable have moved independentlytoreduce theirGHG successful. Whilesomeprovincial governments significant intergovernmental cooperationtobe will needtobepan-Canadianandrequire toemphasize It isimportant thatthiseffort intergovernmental negotiationandcooperation. a pan-Canadiancontextwillrequire significant most strategicmeasures anddeploying themin provincial jurisdiction.Assuch,identifyingthe of theseadditionalpolicytoolsrests under miss. Critically, however, control over many tools like aneconomy-widecarbonpricemay achieve policyoutcomesthatblunter particular appeal asthey canbeprecisely targeted to measures”“complementary have particular emissions reductions thatwillbeneeded.These alongside carbonpricingtodrive theadditional term,work at leastintheshort-to-medium Thankfully, there are otheroptionsthatcan, pan-Canadian climatepolicy. succeed indeveloping anoptimal, in collaborative policymakingto (FPT) governments mustengage The federal,provincial andterritorial 3 approach wouldconsistof twoprongs: atovercomingnew effort thischallenge. This jurisdictions –couldenable asuccessful climate changenegotiation andfrom other historical experienceofintergovernmental — butonethatalsodrawslessonsfrom Canada’s challenge. Nevertheless, aninnovative approach This allcombinestocreate quiteapolicy overcome. that nationalactiononclimatechangemust the structuralandinstitutionalobstacles negotiations between1998and2002illustrate of Canadianintergovernmental climatechange As wediscussinthenextsection,history not seenmuchsuccessinCanadahistorically. cooperation onclimatechangemitigationhas forward. Unfortunately, suchintergovernmental cooperation seemstobethepreferable way action likely tobeinsufficient,intergovernmental costly imprecision, andindependentprovincial table duetoconcernsaboutitslegitimacyand So, with unilateral federal action seemingly off the and politicalcosts. and are already producing, economic important that anymoves toreduce emissionswillproduce, andSaskatchewanconfrontAlberta thereality intensive provinces. For provinces theirpart, like swamped by emissionsgrowth inemissions- the prospect oftheiraccomplishmentsbeing reductions costs,growing politicalpushbackand to thembutnowfacemuchhighermarginal already taken manyoftheeasierstepsavailable Ontario, BritishColumbiaandQuebechave a demonstratedongoinginclinationtoact,like meeting Canada’s Paris targets. Provinces with emissions tobeablecontributemuchtowards and theMaritimeprovinces produce toofew jurisdictions, like theterritories,Manitoba There are afew reasons forthis.Many
9 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 10 | THE ROAD TO PARIS aspect ofthe exercise. essential toa successfuloutcomeas anyother obstacles. Figuringouthow todosowillbeas require overcoming ahostofpotentiallydivisive the PCF-Paris gapispossible,butdoingsowill intensive jurisdictionsonthetable.Closing leaving muchless costlyreductions inemissions- where there are few reductions lefttogive while economichardshipunnecessary injurisdictions but poorlytargeted policiescouldinduce Paris targets entirely. Alternatively, ambitious significant. Bluntly, Canadaeasilycouldmissits costs ofmishandlingtheclimatefileare Finally, remembering itisworth thatthepotential need tobeco-created by alltheFPTgovernments. defection by FPTgovernments, thisinstitutionwill able todoitsworkanddiscourageunilateral will beneededtoensure thattheinstitutionis that financialsustainabilityandpoliticaldurability andevidence.scientific expertise Moreover, given and sustainingitsownlegitimacyonthebasisof Canadian governments andcapableofbuilding capacity willneedtobeindependentofall14 in subsequentsections,thispolicydevelopment For politicalreasons discussedingreater depth » Thecreation ofanewpan-Canadianinstitution » Useofthefederal spendingpowertoinduce pan-Canadian climatechangeframework. development ofaneffective, efficientandfair jurisdictional adviceneededtoinformthe policy area by providing theintegrated,cross- institutional vacuum thatcharacterizes this capable offillingtheexistingintergovernmental approach. institution describedinthesecondprong ofour measures available asdeterminedby the be targeted atfundingthebestcomplimentary these jurisdictionsface.Thesesubsidieswould subsidies toalleviate theasymmetriccoststhat intensive provinces through theprovision of byoutsized theemissions- participation electricity generation electricity generation Ontario’s phase out Ontario’s phase out reduction initiative reduction initiative At around 30 Mt, At around 30 Mt, implemented in implemented in North America America North represents the represents the largest single largest single of coal-fired of coal-fired emissions emissions to date
11 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 12 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 2 illustrates this part ofthechallenge. illustrates thispart only beginstoengagethesechallengesclearly The factthatthePCF, assignificantitis, transforming majorsectorsofoureconomy. require thatlikely monumentalefforts involve that willhave far-reaching impactsandwill catastrophic climatechangeisadifficulttask emissions totheextentrequired toprevent is asubstantive one,namely, thatreducing GHG climate change.Thefirstelementofthisproblem governments every timethey have triedtotackle problem thathave confronted Canadian on thepathtomeetingCanada’s Paris Accord targets. terms ofactualprogress onemissionsreductions, itiswidelyacceptedthat thePCFisonlyafirststep achievementboth animportant from anintergovernmental in cooperationstandpoint and agoodstart aggregation ofFPTplans(excluding Manitoba’s andSaskatchewan’s) toreduce GHGemissions.While announced withgreat fanfare followingaFirstMinisters’MeetinginOttawa.ThePCFrepresents an On 9December, 2016,thePan-Canadian Framework onCleanGrowth andClimateChange(PCF)was window The limitationsofthePCFprovide agood 2017. Taking Stock Futures-Project-March31.pdf; Sawyer, D. andBataille,C.31March, cae-acg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/WEB-Trottier-Energy- Academy ofEngineering;David Suzuki Foundation. https://www. tions inGHGemissions Canada’s Transformations ChallengeandOpportunity: formajorreduc Trottierplementary-policies/; Energy Futures Project. April2016. iii. https://ecofiscal.ca/reports/supporting-carbon-pricing-com economy-wide carbonprice Pricing: Howto identifypoliciesthatgenuinelycomplementan 9 Canada’s Carbon Ecofiscal Commission. June2017.Supporting Cleaner Future. and Opportunity 10 Trottier Energy Futures Project. April2016.Canada’s Challenge 9 onto thedimensionsofpolicy TheConference Board ofCanada. . Macdonald,A.8 Sepember, 2017. . Jaccard, M. etal.IsWin-WinPossible? PROBLEM THE POLICY . Trottier Family Foundation; TheCanadian . Canada’s Ecofiscal Commission.pg The Costofa 2016. 10
- - meet Canada’s Paris commitments. levels that,ontheir own,wouldbeinsufficientto politically costlyastolimit itsusetocarbonprice its implementationmay yet prove sufficiently not beenuniversally accepted,however, and legality ofthisessentiallycoercive measure has from beingabletodefect from The thiseffort. an attempttostopanyprovince ofterritory recognition ofthisproblem andrepresents backstop indicatesthefederal government’s The decisiontocreate thefederal carbon economic andpolitical–mount. PCF commitments,especiallyascosts–both governments may stillbackslideaway from their sustained politicalwilltoadhere to it. Individual will onlybeeffective totheextentthatthere isa agreement whichisunenforceable andwhich level, thePCFisavoluntary intergovernmental measures describedintheframework.At one achieving theplannedreductions through the announcement ofthePCFisnotsameas by Canada’s federal character. the Inshort, one thatstemsfrom thedifficultypresented A secondelementoftheproblem isastructural 9 elements, will needtocombineatleastthefollowingthree any nationalclimatechangemitigationstrategy to meetCanada’s 2030and2050Paris targets, graphically inFigure 3,andholdsthat,inorder must possess.Thisunderstandingissummarized characteristics thatanysolutiontothisproblem policy problem facing policymakers andofthe is guidedby anoverarching assessmentofthe problem confronting policymakers. Ouranalysis In thissection,weanalyze thedimensionsof achieved. simplest –andthecheapesthave already been after thoseemissionsreductions thatwere the to bewhollynewandwillneedachieved achieve marginal emissionsreductions willhave difficult, astheadditionalstepsneededto forwardMoving willbecomeincreasingly farther other provinces’ commitment tofollowsuit. provinces toputapriceoncarbonandaffirmed plans, includingpre-existing moves by thelargest inthatitrecognizedthe easypart existingFPT In somerespects, thecreation ofthePCFwas across governments stripe. ofevery partisan negotiation andcollaborationover decades and require skilfulandongoingintergovernmental Paris gap.Crafting suchastrategy, however, will cooperative nationalstrategytoclosethePCF- Ultimately, Canadaneedsawell-coordinated da’s CarbonPricing. Ecofiscal Commission.June2017.Supporting 11 Muchinspiration forthisunderstandingwastaken from Cana » » Cost-effectiveness: theabilitytolower » Political feasibility: alevel ofpolitical Effectiveness: theabilitytoactuallylower is able to survive governmentalis able to survive turnover over time garner sufficiently broad so that it public support agree tothestrategyandfor strategyto acceptability thatwillenablegovernments to emissions atamanageablecost emissions 11 namely: - Mitigation Policy Elements ofanOptimized ClimateChange FIGURE 3 Paris targets. politically feasible strategyformeetingCanada’s various governments toacost-effective and will ariseover timeandanchoringallofCanada’s capable ofbuffering themanychallengesthat a of building durable intergovernmental institution analysis willhelptodemonstratetheimportance institutional contextasCanada.Ultimately, this willfaceinasdecentralizedany sucheffort an – especiallythestructuralchallengesthat gap. Finally, wealsoexplore thechallenges in order tosuccessfullyclosethePCF-Paris features thatanystrategywillneedtoinclude Using thisunderstanding,weidentifyasetof Mercer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZC4SlbOH4w. *Government of Canada. 2004. One-Tonne Challenge w/Rick Effective Complimentary
measures-only plans Politically Feasible Required Challenge $2 One Tonne Carbon-tax National 00/tonne Pan-Canadian Framework Effective Cost-
13 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 14 | THE ROAD TO PARIS taxes. they already have theanswer, namelycarbon over howitwouldbebesttodoso.Somebelieve fact thatthere isstillsignificantdisagreement and thisdifficultywillonlybemultipliedby the Achieving Canada’s Paris targets willbedifficult, A Carbon Tax, but...… sarily-costly. news/andrew-coyne-the-federal-carbon-tax-has-become-unneces TheNationalPost unnecessarily costly”. 12 Coyne, A.19May, 2017.“Thefederal carbontaxhasbecome floor thatissignificantly higher thanthefederal analyses suggestthatanational carbonprice meeting Canada’s Paris targets. Infact,numerous Yes, of part carbonpricingwillbeanimportant simplicity, itcouldalsobeprofoundly damaging. ofapparentvirtue economicefficiencyand Yet, whilesuchanapproach mighthave the for CanadatomeetitsParis targets. carbon pricesgraduallyrisetothelevels required federal backstopandrequiring thatprovincial problem by simplyextendingthelogicof could solve theentire climatechangepolicy a carbontaxargue thatthefederal government of implement itsowncarbonprice.Supporters tax inanyprovince thatdoesnot orterritory by whichithascommittedtoimplementacarbon to create afederal carbonbackstop,amechanism ofthewaypart inthisdirection withitsdecision federal government already seemstobemoving plan basedonanationalcarbontax.Infact,the unilaterally implementanemissionsreduction likely gives thefederal government theabilityto of simplicity, given thatCanada’s constitution Carbon taxes seemingly alsohave thevirtue efficient meansofreducing emissions. because, over thelongterm,they are themost much thesameway –are attractive inabstract which accomplishmuchthesamegoalin pricing schemeslike cap-and-tradesystems 12 Carbontaxes –alternatively, carbon- . http://nationalpost.com/ - years andremain inapositiontoimplementit. carbon tax(andindexingittoinflation)inonly12 propose more thantriplingthehighestexisting tonne, itishard toseehowanygovernment could a lowof$100pertonnetoupwards of$200per required toreach ourParis targets rangefrom tonne. Given thatestimatesofthecarbonprice implement acarbonpriceofmore than$30per that noCanadianjurisdictionhasyet managedto will alsolikely prove politicallyinfeasible. Recall on the table in the short-to-medium term, on thetableinshort-to-medium only leaving somecriticalpotentialreductions undifferentiated nationalcarbonpricerisksnot Nonetheless, relying tooheavily onan Paris targets. aimedatreachingany successfuleffort Canada’s backstop describedinthePCFwillbeintegralto 15 SeeJaccard, M.etal.2016.IsWin-WinPossible? 14 Jaccard, M. etal.2016.IsWin-WinPossible? Pricing 13 Canada’s Carbon Ecofiscal Commission. June2017.Supporting reduce theseemissionscan helptoaddress this to efforts aimed specificallyatsupporting them hard measures totax;complementary emissions –canbehard tomeasure making carbon emissions–suchasfugitive methane a variety ofmechanisms.For example,some drive additionalemissions reductions through initiatives thatworkalongsidecarbon pricesto measuresComplementary canbedefinedas an essentialcomplementtocarbontaxes. experts Thus, itisnotsurprisingthenthatmany MeasuresComplementary worse off. citizens believe thatithasmadethemfinancially vast majorityofcitizens, more than70percentof had anobjectively neutralfinancialimpactonthe Columbia, where theprovincial carbontaxhas Indeed, existingresearch showsthatinBritish . pg9. see complementary measuressee complementary as 15 pg23. pg5-6. 13 but 14
at least in the short term. at leastintheshort blunt theimpactofacarbontaxinsomesectors, enabling infrastructure –thatwouldotherwise help toovercome barriers–suchasalackof problem. measures Othercomplementary can understand them as complementary measures.understand them ascomplementary of thisspecificityitisbetter, forthepurposesofthisanalysis,to specifically targeted atasinglesector oractivity, but because measures may infactconsistofcarbon taxes orpricesthatare ally to large oftheeconomy. proportions Somecomplementary we are referring to broad-based taxes orpricesthatapplygener 17 Notethatwhenweusetheterm carbontaxorpricing, Pricing 16 Canada’s Carbon Ecofiscal Commission.June2017.Supporting largest singleemissionsreduction initiative fired electricitygenerationrepresents the around 30Mt,Ontario’s phaseoutofcoal- significant emissionsreductions. Infact,at demonstrates, thesemeasures canresult in decade ofthe21stcentury. Asthisexample electricity generationinOntarioduringthefirst measure wasthephaseoutofcoal-fired A goodexampleofasuccessfulcomplementary lower political,andsometimesfinancial,cost. greater termreductions short atsignificantly measuresthis, complementary canenablemuch not bepossibleonalarger scale.Becauseof initiatives thatwould alongside compensatory be appliedwithgreater precision, orimplemented carbon pricing, can betargeted muchmore specificallythancan provinces andterritories. on itsown...andneithercanthe meet Canada’s climatetargets The federalgovernment cannot . pgiii-iv. 4 17 complementary measures complementary can 16 Also,becausethey - implemented in North Americatodate. implemented inNorth Howe Institute.http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary_385.pdf. Approach to Evaluating Government Infrastructure Investment. C.D. year. SeeDachis,B.July, 2013. Toronto andHamilton Area economy more than$11billiona 19 Itisestimated,forinstance,that congestioncoststheGreater reduce-ontario-air-pollution.pdf. www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/did-the-coal-phase-out- Phase-out ReduceOntarioAirPollution? 2017. gy-act andMcKitrick,R.Aliakbri,E.January environmental-and-economic-consequences-ontarios-green-ener- Act Environmental andEconomic ConsequencesofOntario’s Green Energy to meetCanada’s Paris targets. SeeMcKitrick, R.11April,2013. reductions ofanyeffort willalsoneedto formasignificantportion it seemssafe atemissions to assumethatdomestic efforts imposes, that periodandthevulnerabilitysuchuncertainty the unpredictable movements inthepriceofsuchoffsetsduring were madeto reduce emissionsbetween nowand2050,aswell basis to offsetCanadian emissionsentirely ifnospecificefforts volume ofcredits thatwouldneedto bepurchased onanongoing strategy foremissionsreductions inCanada.However, given the that thepurchase ofanysuccessful ofoffsetswilllikely formapart able to expectto be ableto purchase thesecredits –weaccept are correct –suchas,forinstance, thepriceatwhichitisreason debate asto whethertheassumptionsunderlyingtheiranalyses of carbonoffsetsontheinternationalmarket. Settingasidethe reductions canbeachieved more effectively through thepurchase Ontario’s phaseoutofcoal-fired powerplants,GHGemissions (2013 and,withAliakbri,2017)argue thatinmanycases,suchas notingthatRossMcKitrick weather1/20170125-en.pdf. Itisworth www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/environment/documents/ Address ClimateChangeandGrow theEconomy Framework onCleanGrowth andClimateChange:Canada’s Planto Yukon, Territories, Northwest Nunavut, Canada.2016. BritishColumbia, Scotia, NewBrunswick,Québec,Ontario,Alberta, 18 NewfoundlandandLabrador, PrinceEdward Island,Nova coal). Othersconsistofinducementsdesignedto proscribe activities(suchasburning certain government legislationandregulation that of forms.Somethemostdirect involve measuresComplementary cantake avariety emissions reductions they generate. be difficulttojustifysolelyonthebasisof and astrong rationaleformeasures thatmight a criticalrole by helpingtobuildpublicsupport directly related toemissionsreductions, canplay economic activity. benefits suchasincreased productivity and such measures canproduce ahostofadditional congestion andimproving theliveability ofcities, mass transitsystems.Moreover, by reducing make asignificant impactistheexpansionof measureexample ofacomplementary thatcan . FraserInstitute. pg10.https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/ 19 These“co-benefits,” whilenot Cars, CongestionandCosts:ANew Fraser Institute.pg7.https:// . pg10.https:// 18 Pan-Canadian Another Did theCoal -
15 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 16 | THE ROAD TO PARIS the highcostsinvolved infinancingprojects. through theirownactionsbutare obstructedby of thepublicdesire tohelpreduce emissions charging stations.Finally, sometimesmembers EVs by fundingafirstgenerationnetworkof governments couldacceleratetheadoptionof sector may eventually buildsuchanetwork, charging stationsisestablished.Whiletheprivate EVs isunlikely tooccuruntilareliable networkof subsidies topurchasers, widespread adoptionof measures. For example,even withgenerous represent ofcomplementary anothercategory to lesscarbon-intensive ways ofdoingthings or encouraginglarger economicorsocietalshifts broadly, publicinvestments aimedatsupporting vehicles (EVs),fallintothiscategory. More such asthoseextendedtobuyers ofelectric subsidies orpayments madeby thegovernment, specificactivities.Directencourage andsupport publications/112_step_change.pdf. and MowatCentre https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/ Federal Policy IdeasToward aLow-CarbonCanada. 20 Broadbent Centre andMowatCentre. 2015. emissions reductions efforts. can helptoenableindividualscontribute grants forhomeheatingretrofits, governments through programs like preferential loansand obtainable, andby adjustingincentive structures By ensuringthathelpfulinformationiseasily Step Change: Broadbent Centre 20
Executive Summary. 3] 2] 1] by activating oneofthree mechanisms: measures generallyachieve emissionsreductions Whatever specificformthey take, complementary Pricing 23 Canada’s Carbon Ecofiscal Commission. June2017.Supporting Pricing 22 Canada’s Carbon Ecofiscal Commission. June2017.Supporting individuals willswitchto EVseven ifdoingsowere cheaper. are noeasilyaccessible charging stations forEVs,itisunlikely that example. Ifacarbontaxincreases thecostofgasolinebutthere 21 Thebuildingofcharging stationsforEVsrepresents agood the bestreturn oninvestment. a simplefailure toprioritizes projects with reductions twoorthree timesover orthrough governments enduppaying forthesame can result insignificantwasteeitherbecause conjunction withcarbon-pricingschemes, measures, especiallywhenundertaken in design andimplementationofcomplementary significant results. Indeed,theuncoordinated easy tospendalotofmoney withoutachieving that asinitiatives proliferate, itbecomes very oftheseis risks. Oneofthemostimportant measurescomplementary are notwithouttheir Finally, torecognize itis also important that handled withcare. reduction strategy, theirinclusionmustbe critical componentofanysuccessfulemissions measurescomplementary willlikely represent a Benefit-expanding: Signal-boosting: Gap-filling: reductions andotheradditionalbenefits on thebasisofacombinationemissions Enabling measures thatrequire justification behaviour change of carbonpricingby reducing barriersto thatenhancetheeffectivenessInterventions well-covered by carbonpricing Actions thathelpreduce emissionsthatare not ; Sawyer, D. andBataille,C.31March, 2017. . pg8.
21
23 Thus,while Taking Stock 22 . and direction ofacoordinated emissionsreduction strategywillbecritical. time in theUnitedStates. being underscored inreal of thatpointiscurrently essential. Theimportance durable approaches will be climate policy, politically sustaining meaningful horizons involved in Given thelongtime – iseven more important. consequently, durability legitimacy –and, the greatest political is theonelikely toenjoy collaborative approach thefactthata powerful, of cooperationis Key Argument infavour While thejurisdictional between FPTgovernments. measuresany optimalplanthatincludescomplementary willrequire intergovernmental cooperation 4) –represents aprimeexample.But,withprovincial actionaloneunlikely toclosetheParis-PCF gap, emissions reductions measures, suchastheadoptionofEVs,are tohave theirfullimpact(seeFigure of Canada’s carbonemissionsandwhichwillneedtobesignificantlydecarbonized ifmanyother jurisdictions. Provincial jurisdictionover electricitygeneration–whichcurrently produces 11percent emissions through measures complementary willalmostinevitably engagewhatare clearlyprovincial While acarbontaxmay ormay notfallwithinfederal jurisdiction,mostattemptsatreducing Political and Intergovernmental Questions News. http://globalnews.ca/news/3075335/many-canadians-unaware-of-magnitude-of-challenge-in-reaching-2050-climate-goals/. 25 TheCanadianPress. 18November, 2016.“ManyCanadiansunaware of‘magnitudechallenge’ inreaching 2050climategoals”.Global Times 24 Friedman, L.andPlumner, B.9October, 2017.“E.P.A. AnnouncesRepealofMajorObama-EraCarbonEmissionsRule”. TheNewYork education andpersuasionrequired, to-medium terms.Given ofthetask,andsignificance public themagnitudeandimportance meeting Canada’s Paris targets willinevitably entailsignificantcostsforcitizens, atleastintheshort- measures, successfully the emissionsreductions the negative impactof surely bemadetoreduce will Indeed, whileefforts . https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html?_r=0. 24
Greenhouse GasSources andSinksinCanada. Source: Environment 1990-2015: and Climate Change Canada. 2017.NationalInventory Report 1990 to2015 Greenhouse gasemissionsby economicsector, Canada, FIGURE 4
(Mt of CO2e) 300 00 500 600 700 800 100 200 25 0 aligningallofCanada’s sovereign governments ontheimportance W Agriculture 1990 aste and others 1991
1992 1993 199 1995 1996 Electricity Heavy industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 T Buildings ransportation 2003 200 2005 2006 2007
Oil and gas 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 201 2015
17 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 18 | THE ROAD TO PARIS democratic state,itwillnotbesuccessful. political perspectives inpowerthatisnaturala unless thisbargain canwithstandtherotation of need tooperateover thecourseofdecades, that anyplantoclosethePCF-Paris gapwill despite inevitable governmental turnover. Given will alsoensure ofthisstrategy thesurvival and agreement ofall14Canadiangovernments providing allthesebuttresses, theinvolvement Finally, and perhaps mostimportantly, by governments toparticipate. the strategyandwillhelpmake iteasierforwary will alsospread thepoliticalriskassociatedwith it. Having all14Canadiangovernments involved potential rallyingpointsforpoliticaloppositionto agreement, thereby reducing thenumberof these governments shares ownershipofthe centre, itiscriticaltoensure thateachoneof represents itsownindependentpoliticalpower Moreover, given thateachPTgovernment achieving Canada’s targets. interests ofCanada’s diverse regions whilestill frame abargain thatsufficientlybalancesthe these compromises, itmay notbepossibleto interests. Infact,withoutnegotiationstoforce to accommodateeachjurisdiction’s competing simplybecauseitwillhavesurvival beenforced likely tobe theonewithgreatest chanceof the bargain produced by thesenegotiations is compromises by allinvolved. Nonetheless, for the2050targets willrequire difficult Canada’s 2030targets andtosetthefoundation The ongoingnegotiationsrequired toachieve may alsobetheonlyfeasible pathforward. Politically, suchacollaborative approach those targets shouldbeshared ormitigated. provide advice onhowtheburden ofmeeting Canada’s collective Paris commitmentsandto individual FPTplanscontributetomeeting or possessingthelegitimacytoassesshow is noinstitutioninCanadaeithermandated intergovernmental institutions.Currently, there is toaddress theweaknessinCanada’s existing challenges thatare inherent tothesenegotiations mechanism forovercomingOne important the priorities, andjurisdictionalwrangling. the issue,players whoare focusedonother reluctance ofvarious politicalplayers toaddress fairness ofanyinitiative betweenprovinces, challenges includingconcernsabouttherelative of negotiationsneedtoovercome numerous to climatechangeare noexception. Thesesort and negotiationsfocusedonCanada’s response Intergovernmental negotiationsare oftenfraught achieving suchanagreement willbeeasy. approach may benecessary, thisdoesnotmean Nonetheless, whileanintergovernmental next section. – atrackrecord describedingreater detailinthe comes tocooperationonclimatechangepolicy record thatCanadiangovernments have whenit Moreover, itisalsocriticalgiven thepoortrack measurescomplementary asdescribedearlier. stem from combiningcarbonpricingand ineffective orinefficientpoliciesthatcould givenis especiallyimportant thepotentialfor this cooperationcanbebestdesigned.This targets, itbecomesessentialtoconsiderhow cooperation isneededtoreach Canada’s Paris If oneacceptsthatintergovernmental Institutional Structures » Enjoy theconfidenceofparticipating » Maintainstrong connectionstodecision-makers » Beresilient tounilateralexitby anyofthe » Have diverse geographicalrepresentation on andpossess » Bepermanent,expert-lead, » Beindependent,arm’s length,politicallyneutral, » Have toprovide thepurview adviceonhowthe » Beco-created by allofCanada’s governments to the PCF-Paris gapwillneedto: institution constructedtoenableCanadaclose has concludedthatinorder tobesuccessful,any clear over thecourseofthispaper, thisanalysis current situation.For reasons thatwillbecome challengesofthe an analysisoftheparticular lessons thatcanbedrawnfrom themaswell Canadian climatechangenegotiationsandthe close examinationsofprevious intergovernmental this paper. Thisdesignhasbeendeveloped after are proposing are outlinedinthe finalsectionof The dimensionsandstructure oftheinitiative we contribution toCanadameetingitsParis targets. address canmake thisshortcoming amajor We believe thatinstitutionalengineering to discussions andshared decision-making. foundationfortheir as acommonevidentiary governments such thatitsresearch canserve to ensure therelevance ofitsadvice. governments.participating government andemissions-intensive provinces. its board, butweightedtowards the federal significant in-housetechnicalexpertise. objective andevidence-based initsapproach. other. shaped tomosteffectively interactwitheach both individuallyandasagroup –shouldbe policies ofCanada’s various governments – ensure buy-in. regional diversity ofCanada’s economy. with themostsignificantofthesebeing with thechallengepresented by climatechange, confront Canada’s governments asthey grapple also justifiedby theuniquesetofobstaclesthat the creation ofthisnewinstitutionalstructure is Moreover, andmore immediately, webelieve that additionalsourceimportant forthisjustification. is analyzed inthenextsection,provides an negotiating suchastrategy, afailure that The failure ofCanada’s previous at efforts justification. this proposal callsoutforcareful andadditional constructed. Consequently, we recognize that intergovernmental institutions,shoulditbe make ofCanadian ituniqueinthehistory be sufficientlyambitiousastoprobably institutional structure justdescribedwould We recognize thattheintergovernmental » Have theultimategoalofinforming » Publishmost,ifnotall,ofitsresearch publicly. asacommoncentre» Serve forthedevelopment making withrespect toclimatechangepolicy. intergovernmental negotiationanddecision- and complementing,notsupplanting, governments involved. of adviceandpolicycoordination forthe14
19 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 20 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 1990, 2005and2015 Greenhouse gasemissionsby province andterritory, Canada, FIGURE 5 installed electricitygenerationcapacitycomesfrom hydroelectric sources. emissions andthecostsassociatedwithdoingso.For example,almost99percentofQuebec’s to ensure reduce equitybecauseithasanimpactonthesejurisdictions’capacitiestofurther their change mitigationinitiatives. Thistoowillimpacthowburdens willneedtobeallocatedinorder also cometothetablefrom different phasesandlevels ofambitionwithrespect toexistingclimate In additiontothedifferences intheemissionintensitiesoftheireconomies,provinces andterritories creating intergovernmental anewinstitutiontosupport climatechangenegotiations. challenges facingCanada’s climatechangepolicymakers andoneofthecentraljustificationsfor Paris targets. Allocatingtheseburdens inanequitablefashionrepresents oneofthemostsignificant inevitably meansthatdifferent jurisdictionswillfacedifferent burdens asCanadaworkstoachieve its different typesofeconomicactivitiesthatpredominate inthesejurisdictions.Thiseconomicdiversity of theeconomiesCanada’s provinces andterritories.Thesedifferences derive primarilyfrom the As showninFigure 2intheIntroduction, there are significantdifferences intheemissionintensities Burden Allocation and Mitigation 26 Hydro-Québec. 2017.“Hydro-Québec Production”. Hydro-Québec Production 1990-2015: Greenhouse GasSources andSinksinCanada. Source: Environment and Climate Change Canada. 2017.NationalInventory Report. make reductions further inthissectorwillbeextremely limited. Newfoundland and Labrador
(Mt of CO2e) 200 250 300 100 150 50 0
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia . http://www.hydroquebec.com/generation/.
Territories 2015 2005 1990 work anyotherway. arithmetic simplydoesnot 2), theemissionreduction carbon intensity(seeFigure significantly lowerlevels of already operatingatsuch Quebec andBritishColumbia economies like Ontario, and withtheotherlarger emissions (seeFigure 5), cent perofCanada’s producingAlberta 38per provinces. Indeed,with most emissions-intensive need tocomefrom the on aperpersonbasiswill the greatest reductions Canada toreach itstargets it seemsclearthatfor reduced across thecountry, emissions willneedtobe and despitethatfact Because ofthisdivergence, 26 Assuch,itscapacityto the solidfoundationofaccountability thatan close thePCF-Paris gapcanbereached without agreement onastrategyforhowCanadacan it ishard toseehowany intergovernmental difficult ifnotimpossible.Nevertheless,be very agreement insuchacompetitive situationcould responsibilities andassociatedcosts.Achieving each jurisdictionwillcompetetominimize itsown and unproductive zero-sum bargaining inwhich that doingsorisked devolving intoacrimonious This isperhapsbecausethoseinvolved feared discuss theallocationoftheseunequalburdens. it difficulttoeven acknowledgetheneedto Canadian emissionsreduction have efforts found As isdiscussedinthenextsection,previous across jurisdictions. impacts thatthesereduction willhave efforts share theburden ofthenegative economic and cost-effective withtheneed toequitably emissions reductions thatare themosteffective Paris targets willrequire acareful balancingof politically realistic pathtomeetingCanada’s jurisdictions. Infact,webelieve thattheonly inevitably berequired oftheemissions-intensive achieving theoutsized reductions thatwill economic impactsthatwillbeassociatedwith to ensure equitablemitigationofthenegative willbethestepsthatmusttakenimportant efficiently achieving Canada’s targets. Butequally for thesereductions accordingly willbecriticalfor reductions capacityandallocatingresponsibility which jurisdictionshave thegreatest emissions as efficientlypossible.Clearly, identifying ofdoingso underlinestheimportance further inimpactsacrossasymmetry jurisdictionsonly represents adifficultandcostlytask,this Given thatclosingthePCF-Paris gapalready Meeting. 12December, 1997. region isasked to bearanunreasonable burden”. FirstMinisters’ andmustdosoinsucha way thatno Canada mustdoitspart globalissueandthat agreed that“climatechange is animportant 27 Indeed,inthecommuniquéfrom the1997FMM,FirstMinisters 27 News Release . The current government’s approach, andthe to collaborateeffectively with PT governments. have failedrepeatedly duetoa lack ofwillingness government toprovide climatechangeleadership shortly, previous attemptsby thefederal almost three decades.Infact,asisdiscussed Canadian climatechangepolicymakers for like anobvious solution,itis onethathaseluded While federal may leadershipofthissort seem between jurisdictions. burden allocationbargaining thatmustoccur power –toreduce thezero-sum nature ofthe well-positioned –through theuseofitsspending however, thefederal government isuniquely accepting responsibility foremissions reductions, By helpingtoreduce thecostsassociatedwith or politicallyfeasible toclosethePCF-Paris gap. unlikely tobesufficientlyeffective, cost-effective unilaterally imposescostsontheprovinces is As already discussed, federal actionthat nature ofthesituation. federal leadershipwhichalleviates thezero-sum that theonlyway outofthistrapisthrough that strategy, whatistheway forward? We believe zero-sum debatethatcouldscuttlenegotiation of devise aworkablestrategyriskignitingdivisive discussions betweengovernments to necessary development ofasuccessfulstrategy, butthe intergovernmental forthe buy-inisnecessary question ofhowtosquare thiscircle. Ifbroad If thisforegoing analysisiscorrect, itraisesthe Federal Leadership thisconclusion. experience, seemtosupport emissions reductions, andEurope’s opposite Canada’s previous experienceswith unsuccessful Indeed, asisdiscussedinthenextsection, associated withsuchastrategywouldprovide. agreement onhowtoallocatedtheburdens
21 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 22 | THE ROAD TO PARIS efforts. to avoid thepitfallsthatscuttledearlier previous climatefailures andworkshard need toensure thatitlearnslessonsfrom to thisprocess, thefederal government will leadership toremain apositive contribution territories’ core interests. Inorder forfederal and willincreasingly engageprovinces’ and PCF willgetprogressively more difficult learned. Nevertheless, moving beyond the to indicatethatsomelessonshave been governments signedontothePCF, seems fact thatallbuttwoofCanada’s provincial important lessons and examples of approachesimportant to avoid. failure, least, offer but at the very today’s policymakers arecooperation. These efforts largely of a history previous atintergovernmental efforts climatechange however, itmakes sensetofirstlookbackwards at Before diving intothismore detailedexploration, explored ingreater depthinsubsequent sections. intergovernmental climatechangeinstitution, are all they canbebrought togethertobuildaneffective These various elements,aswellideasforhow » Includeasignificantrole forthefederal government » Becoordinated by anindependent, andsupported » Includeanallocationofresponsibility betweenthe » Bebasedonanintergovernmental involving effort all » Includeacentralrole forcarbonpricing,butalsoa » Balanceeffectiveness, cost-effectiveness and solution tothispolicyproblem must: to resolve them.To summarize, webelieve thatthe collaborative intergovernmental structure couldhelp elements ofthisproblem andtheways inwhichanew pausing foramomenttoquicklyreview thecritical Canada’s 14governments nowcomplete, itisworth With thisanalysisofthepolicyproblem confronting The Key Argument So Far… territorial governments. to avoid zero-sum bargaining between provincial and jurisdictions toenableclimatechangediscussions impacts ofemissionsreduction policiesacross with respect tomitigatingtheasymmetric economic making. basisforFPTdiscussionsanddecision- evidentiary providing evidence-based adviceandacommon intergovernmentalexpert-led institutioncapableof the PCF-Paris gap. reductions thatadduptothetotalrequired toclose provinces andterritoriesforspecificemissions 14 Canadiangovernments. significant role measures. forcomplementary political feasibility. The federal government’s willingness to repeatedly defect from intergovernmental processes has permanently scarred Canadian climate change policymaking 23 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 23 | THE MOWAT 24 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 3 viewpoints withinanegotiatingprocess backed by technicalexpertise. Kyoto targets, duringthisperiodrepresent efforts asustainedattemptatincorporatingdisparate FPT Though ultimatelyunsuccessfulintermsofcraftinganeffective strategyformeetingCanada’s the mostsignificantattemptsatintergovernmental climatechangepolicymakinginCanadianhistory. the NationalClimateChangeProcess andCanada’s ratificationoftheKyoto Protocol in2002–covers Nations Conference onEnvironment andDevelopment (theRio Conference) in1992totheconclusionof change policymaking.PriortothePCF, thisperiod–whichstretches from therunuptoUnited to drawlessonsfrom by examiningthekey thishistory momentsinCanada’s firstperiodofclimate imperfect, thoughnecessary, meansofadvancing Thissectionseeks climate changemitigationefforts. ofCanadianenvironmentalThe history policymakingsuggeststhatintergovernmental relations are an (UNFCCC). Canadawithdrew from thetreaty in2012. 28 TheKyoto Protocol isaninternationaltreaty thatextended theoriginal1992UnitedNations Framework Convention onClimateChange intergovernmental collaborationaimedatclosingthePCF-Paris gap. discussionsonhowto generate successful wecanbetterinformcontemporary of theseefforts, LESSONS OF HISTORY
28 Byidentifyingthekey failings » Aburden-sharingarrangementisanecessary » Thefederalgovernment possesesaunique » Collaborative policymakingonemissions lessons: of theperiodalsoilluminatesthree important of theinstitutionsandactorsinvolved, areview intergovernmental relations and the shortcomings ascribed itsfailure totheinherent weaknessof While previous studiesofthisprocess will notsucceed. reduction across jurisdictions, climate initiatives share theburdens associatedwithemissions and develop anagreement onhowtoequitably Without awillingnesstodiscuss thisissue change mitigationstrategywillneedtoaddress. and willremain acentralissuethatanyclimate areof emissionsmitigationefforts unavoidable Regional asymmetriesintheeconomicimpacts climate policyframework precondition toasuccessfulpan-Canadian accountability. consequences forintergovernmental trustand federal actionwillhave lastingdetrimental institutional backing.Conversely, unilateral collaboration through financialincentives and to cultivate provincial andclimate buy-in change The federal government isuniquelypositioned program andmustproceedaccordingly capacity tomake orbreakaCanadianclimate to afailure togeneratecollaborative action. intergovernmental negotiations and contributing of theobjectives, thereby undermining discouraged provincial andterritorialownership into Canadathrough federal channels.This agreements, whichresulted intheirintroduction policymaking flowedfrom international Canada’s atclimatechange earliestefforts objectives reduction requiresclear, commonly-held Energy Program. imposed federal target asakintoanewNational whichcharacterizedwas ledby Alberta, an concerns over itsprojected economicimpact, industry-level oppositiontotheplan,basedon emissions by 20percentof1988levels by 2005. including Canada’s firstcommitmenttoreduce the earliestGHGemissionsreductions targets, salience ofclimateissuesandoffered someof Conference” helpedtoincrease theinternational Implications forGlobalSecurity.” This“Toronto Toronto entitled,“TheChangingAtmosphere: and UnitedNations’agenciesheldameetingin policymakers, non-governmental organizations on theinternationalstage.In1988,scientists, change coincideswiththeissue’s emergence ofCanadianactiononclimate The history Common Objective Limited Progress Without a 1988-1992 Early Climate Policy year 2000. stabilize GHGemissionsat1990levels by the Plan, whichunveiled anewcommitmentto government circulated draftsofCanada’s Green Soon thereafter, inearly1990,thefederal Canada 2012. RealityCheck:TheStateofClimateChangeProgress in 29 NationalRoundTable ontheEnvironment andtheEconomy. implications ofthesetargets. Energy, MinesandResources over theeconomic Ministries ofFinance,InternationalTrade, and ofEnvironmentbetween theDepartment andthe both levels ofgovernment. Federal conflictsarose development process hadearneditopponentsat 32 Hoberg, G. and Harrison, K. 1994. “It’s Not Easy Being Green” pg. 124. 32 Hoberg, G.andHarrison,K.1994.“It’s NotEasyBeingGreen” pg.124. De Politiques The Politics of Canada’s Green Plan”. CanadianPublicPolicy/Analyse 31 Hoberg, G.andHarrison,K.1994.“It’sNotEasyBeingGreen: Environment andtheEconomy . 2012.Reality Check.pg29. Mt CO 30 In absoluteterms,thischangedCanada’s commitmentfrom 470 loads/2012/06/reality-check-report-eng.pdf. chives2/20130222165457/http://nrtee-trnee.ca/wp-content/up 2 e in2005to 590MtCO2ein2000.National RoundTable onthe . Ottawa.pg29.http://collectionscanada.gc.ca/webar 20(2)pg.123. 30 Importantly, thePlan’s lengthy 32
31 Provincial and
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25 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 26 | THE ROAD TO PARIS on howtoimplementthestabilizationtarget. favour documentthatwasvague ofavoluntary regulations andafueltaxhadbeenabandonedin concerns. Earlierproposals includingdirect by thefederal government toaddress provincial of theGreen Planreflected anoverdue attempt specific regions orsectors.” was “anationaltarget to anddoesnotpertain also specifiedthatGHGstabilizationby 2000 Plan’s development. Critically, thedocument insufficient provincial involvement intheGreen reflectingof theeconomy” displeasure with “jointly by governments andallothersectors The strategycalledforactiontobeundertaken National ActionStrategyonclimatechange. were developing aseconddocument,theDraft Simultaneously, Canadianenvironment ministers ronmental Policy”. pg.8. 35 Smith,H.1998.“CanadianFederalism andInternationalEnvi The Montreal Gazette. B1. 34 McIlroy, A.28March, 1990.“’Green Plan’ drops fueltaxidea.” Archive/1998/1998-5HeatherSmith.pdf. webpublish.queensu.ca.iigrwww/files/files/WorkingPapers/ University. pg7.Available at:http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/sites/ Working Paper –InstituteofIntergovernmental Relations. national Environmental Policy: TheCaseofClimate Change,” 33 QuotedinSmith,H.1998.“CanadianFederalism andInter to attendnegotiatingsessions. and selectprovincial ministrieswere allowed Territorial Committeewasestablished Advisory greater provincial consultation.AProvincial- prior tothe1992RioConference included government’s development ofCanada’s position Informed by thisexperience,thefederal on federal decision-making. impact whether theseactionshadanymeaningful Rio Conference, however, raisesthequestionof commitment toits1990stabilizationtarget atthe 33 Thefinalversion 35 Canada’s re- Queen’s 34 -
- to repeated boutsofprovincial opposition. provinces tothatpolicyafterthefactcontributed context andthenattemptingtoreconcile the unilaterally developing policyinaninternational however, thefederal government’s preference for anincreasedto assert role. Duringthisperiod, economicimpactsforthem,began important atemissionsreductioneffort wouldgenerate governments, recognizing thatanysignificant change gainedinternationalsalienceprovincial the previous twodecades, action hadbeenlimitedinthisarea over constitutional jurisdiction.Intergovernmental decision-making required by anarea ofshared transition towards ofmultilateral thesort Overall, thisearlyperiodrepresents anincomplete negotiation. an increasingly interconnected process ofpolicy bodyin the JMMbecameacentrallyimportant Overbetween equalpartners. theensuingdecade principles ofco-jurisdictionandcooperation consultations, thesemeetingsacknowledged issues. a “nationalconsensus”onclimatechange FPT governments withtheaimofestablishing annual JointMeetingofMinisters(JMM)from Management Framework, whichformalized an ministers approved theComprehensive AirQuality also occurred in1992.Energy andenvironment developmentheadlines, anotherimportant While thenegotiationsatRiodominated Oxford University Press Canada. 130-145. Canadian Environmental Policy andPolitics ernmental Relations,andtheEnvironment” inVanNijnatten, D. (ed) 1970s and1980sseeSimmons,J. 2016.“Federalism, Intergov- 37 For ofCanadianenvironmental agoodsummary policyin pg.7. mental Policy”. 36 Smith,H.1998.“CanadianFederalism andInternationalEnviron 36 Unlike theearlierlimitedprovincial 37 butasclimate ; 4thEdition. DonMills: - concern over negative economicimpacts. ledtheopposition,citing itscontinued Alberta measures. Provinces were splitonthematter. having theprovinces commit tobindingreduction attended consecutive JMMswiththe intentionof In 1994,thefederal environment minister measures. all advocated foraprogram basedonvoluntary of naturalresources government andtheAlberta emerged, leaders, thefederal asindustry minister stabilization target. Oldconflictsquicklyre- issue thatprovinces hadyet toacceptthe1990 governments, itdidnotaddress theunderlying the potentialforgreater inputfrom provincial (UNFCCC) in1995.WhiletheJMMoffered Framework Convention onClimate Change (COP1)totheUnitedNations of theParties stabilization target intimeforthefirstConference that wouldprovide optionsforreaching the National ActionPlanonClimateChange(NAPCC) established JMMprocess hopingtodevelop a The federal government entered thenewly negotiation onclimatepolicy. remained thecentraltopicshapingdomestic formal commitmenttotheRioConference target formed government. into acoherent politicalstrategyoncetheparty Conference, thiscommitmentdidnottranslate targets thatCanadahadagreed toattheToronto federal Liberalplatformincludedthestronger intensified afterthe1993election.While aroundUncertainty Canada’s climatetargets From Disparate Objectives toUnilateral Action The Road to Kyoto 1993-1997 paper-2003/stilborn.pdf. Conference. Halifax,Canada.pg.3.https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ prepared ScienceAnnual fortheCanadianAssociationofPolitical tions andtheKyoto Protocol: WhatHappened,Didn’t”. Paper 39 Stillborn,J.May 2003. “CanadianIntergovernmental Rela- The GlobeandMail 38 Corcoran, T. 1June,1994.“Goodbye CarbonTax, Hello Sanity”. . B2. 38 Meanwhile,Canada’s 39
progress inaddressing climatechange.” is ameaningfulandsubstantive way tomake resources suggested that approach“the voluntary inadequate, whiletheministerofnatural measuresminister dismissingvoluntary as itself divided,withthefederal environment impacts. Second,thefederal government was detailed assessmentoftheirpotentialeconomic resistance tolegislative commitmentsabsenta the federal government largely ignored provinces’ government’s strategyatthesemeetings.First, Two centralproblems doggedthefederal climate change.” InternationalJournal made, promises broken: QuestioningCanada’s commitmentsto 40 QuotedinMacdonald,D. andSmith,H.March 2000. “Promises specific emissionsreduction targets priority. international climateagreements whichgave pointand economic impactsastheirstarting that insisteduponstrategiestookprovincial namely poisedbetweendomesticnegotiations in whichthefederal government founditself, highlights theprecarious andchallengingposition salvage theappearanceofconsensus.Thisresult a lowestcommondenominatorapproach to binding legislative measures, thereby accepting sector-basedinitiativea voluntary thatlacked Voluntary Program ChallengeandRegistry (VCR), document advanced theClimateChange approachof thevoluntary hadprevailed. The 1995, however, itwasclearthat proponents wasofficiallyunveiled in When theNAPCC
. 55(1)107-124.pg. 112. 40
27 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 28 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 3 percentreduction below1990levels by 2010. Kyoto conference thatCanadawouldcommittoa government reversed itselfandannouncedatthe had beenreached, however, thefederal provinces. Almostasquicklythisconsensus with thepreferences oftheemissions-intensive year 2000to2010,adecisionthatagainaligned emissions stabilizationat1990levels from the all provinces agreed toextendthetarget for common position.Withtheexception ofQuebec, met inReginaforafinalattempttocraft In preparation fortheKyoto meetingtheJMM meeting inKyoto inDecember1997. These issuesunderlay discussionsattheCOP3 targetscountry-specific forprogress tobemade. attention wouldneedtobefocusedonmandatory in 1995,COP1hadacknowledgedthatmore principle insteadofself-interest. concerns toframetheiroppositionasamatterof Regina enabledthoseprovinces witheconomic defection from theoriginaltarget agreed uponat in ratifyingtheKyoto Protocol. More importantly, behaviour unacceptableandshowedlittleinterest government’s unilateraldecision,declared its several premiers publicly rebuked thefederal face aFirstMinisters’Meeting(FMM)atwhich The Canadiandelegationreturned from Kyoto to targets acceptedattheRioConference. most countries,includingCanada,wouldmissthe By 1996-97,emissionsmodellingsuggestedthat says dealonemissions‘notacceptable’.” The GlobeandMail. 43 Greenspon, E.12December, 1997.“Provinces letdownatKyoto, Klein Road NotTaken”. pg101. Relations and the Kyoto Protocol”. pg 4.and Harrison, K. 2007. “The commitments. SeeStillborn,J.2003. “CanadianIntergovernmental cited adesire to matchor even exceed theUnitedStates’Kyoto growing reputation asanenvironmental laggard, whileothershave point to personaldispleasure thePrimeMinister’s withCanada’s pg. 104.Thespecificmotivation forthismove isunclear. Some States.” GlobalEnvironmental Politics Road NotTaken: ClimateChangePolicy inCanadaandtheUnited to aneven loftier6%below1990levels. Harrison,K.2007.“The 42 BytheendofCOP3atKyoto, thetarget hadmoved again reached, ministersconcede”. TheGlobeandMail 41 Rusk,J.13December, 1996.“Emissions target won’t be , 7(4)92-117. 43 . A4. 41 A1. Indeed, 42 governments. actual domesticcompromises arrived atby FPT Canada’s internationalcommitmentsandthe result, gapopenedupbetween animportant progress towards emissionsreduction. Asa these earlierfailingsby sacrificing meaningful federal oftenovercompensated efforts for agreed towithouttheirconsent.Inresponse, garner posthocprovincial acceptancefortargets left thefederal government repeatedly totry to failure permanentlytaintednegotiationsand preferred emissionsstabilizationtargets. This to address provincial skepticism towards its First, thefederal government consistentlyfailed Kyoto Protocol wascharacterized by twotrends. Overall, theperiodbefore theadoptionof emissions reduction strategy. negotiations focusedondesigninganational concerns thatwouldunderliesubsequent also present oftheprovincial acleararticulation Kyoto target. Furthermore, thesecommitments by itsunilateraldefection from theagreed-upon belated recognition ofthechallengesignored commitments reflect thefederal government’s in mitigatingclimatechange. region isasked tobearanunreasonable burden” by PTgovernments. Finally, itagreed that“no implementation andmanagement of the Protocol” inthe Second, itcalledfor“fullparticipation... and thebenefitsof[Kyoto’s] implementation.” “thorough understandingoftheimpact,costs agenda. First,itrecognized ofa theimportance tothe currentcentrally important climatechange 1997 FMMhighlightsthree elementsthatremain The JointCommuniquéconcludingthisDecember 44 FirstMinisters’ Meeting.12December, 1997. 44 Together, these News Release . measurement. unaddressed, demandsforregional impact such asprovinces’ longstanding,butpreviously were created toaddress specificchallenges, Framework. workinggroups UnderNAIC-CC, 1992 Comprehensive AirQualityManagement Steering Committeethathademerged outofthe the jurisdictionofNationalAirIssues – ClimateChange(NAIC-CC) wasplacedunder A NationalAirIssuesCoordinating Committee and thegrowing numberofstakeholders involved. institutions tomanagetheflowofinformation The NCCPalsocreated complementary meeting Canada’s Kyoto targets. and thepracticalrequirements associatedwith for meaningfulintergovernmental partnership process reflected awareness ofbothaneed Change Process (NCCP)inearly1998.Thisnew environment JMMintoabroader NationalClimate government integratedtheenergy and controversial Kyoto defection, thefederal climate changenegotiationsfrom their In anattempttodistanceintergovernmental Burden Sharing’s Costly Delay The National Climate Change Process 1998-2002 the Kyoto Protocol”. pg. 6. 46 Stillborn,J.2003.“CanadianIntergovernmental Relationsand Toronto. pg.53. learning from European Union,Australia andGermany greenhouse gasemissionreductions amongstsources andprovinces: 45 Macdonald,D. Monstadt,J.Kern, K.2013. emission reduction goals. over on how Canada could achieve 450 experts its tables were convened tosolicitresponses from policy discussions.For instance,sixteenissue institutional frameworkunderpinningclimate also represented arobust expansionofthe 46 45 TheNCCP Allocating Canadian . University of a nationaldeal. be forced by sheermomentumintosigningonto thatanyholdoutprovincesenough support would instead soughtanagreement thatwouldgarner framework asanunlikely outcome,theseofficials provincial consensusonafairburden allocation of emissionsreduction responsibilities. Viewing their preferred optionofsector-basedallocation government. omission wasanintentionalmove by thefederal Subsequent research suggeststhatthis tangentially, ithadyet tobeconfronted explicitly. burden sharinghadbeenpreviously referenced been aparamountconcern.Nevertheless, while development ofsuchaframeworkshouldhave the emissions-intensityofPTeconomies, burdens. Given thediversity inpopulationand would minimize theirrespective economic responsibilities across provinces inaway that of howtoallocatespecificemissionsreduction Noticeably absent,however, wasanassessment emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces. 49 Macdonald,D. et al. 2013. emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces 48 Macdonald,D. et al. 2013. reductions amongstsources andprovinces. 47 Macdonald,D. etal.2013. Allocating Canadian greenhouse gasemission The newNCCSwasco-directed by thefederal the existingfederal ClimateChangeSecretariat. bring greater intergovernmental representation to Change Secretariat (NCCS)wasestablished to the process. For instance,anew NationalClimate objective ofkeeping provincial actorsengagedin structures were designedwiththegenuine Nevertheless, theNCCP’snewinstitutional emissions reductions across provinces. transfers –aimedatequalizingtheimpactof require federal –i.e.financial interventions that differences inreduction costswouldlikely 47 Federal officialshopedtoadvance 48 Crucially, itwasalsounderstood Allocating Canadiangreenhouse gas Allocating Canadiangreenhouse gas pg. 53. pg.53. . pg.53. pg.53.
49
29 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 30 | THE ROAD TO PARIS underlying concerns. that addressed emissions-intensive provinces’ collaborative process could produce aresult initially appeared tosuggestabelief thatthis intheNCCS theirwillingparticipation NAPCC, both theGreen Planandinitialversions ofthe leaders hademerged asearlyopponentsof officialsandindustry position. WhileAlbertan the NCCSreflected apotentialshiftinAlberta’s this motivation, however, theannouncementof the resulting policyframework.Regardless of it wouldbemore difficult forthemtocriticize a centralrole inthedecision-makingprocess, affording theprovinces greater equalityand The ideabehindthisstrategywasthatby the process. the province forthedurationof intoparticipating continuedoppositionandtolock diffuse Alberta’s position, thefederal government hopedtoboth dual objective: by offering aco-director Alberta federal officials.Thisjointmakeup reflected a by astaffoftenprovincialand supported and government representative, andanAlberta the Kyoto Protocol” pg. 6. 50 Stillborn,J.2003. “CanadianIntergovernmental Relationsand were lived. short across provinces. uneven burdenof climatepolicy buy-in andfailuretoaddressthe because ofunilateralism,lack policymaking have foundered collaborative climatechange Previous attemptsat 5 50 Unfortunately, thesehopes shared.” target, andhow anyresulting burden would be territorial orsectoralallocationsofanyCanadian to analyze “possibleapproaches toprovincial/ and Burden Sharing Working Group (EABSWG) 2000 JMMcreated theEmissionsAllocation To keep Quebecintheprocess, theOctober by provincial populationandtotalemissions. industry. Quebec preferred allocatingtargets western interests and harmitspulp-and-paper emissions reductions by sectorwould favour out ofnegotiationsarguing thatallocating costly. At theMarch 2000JMM,Quebecwalked to omitburden-sharing discussionssoonproved Additionally, thefederal government’s decision whether the[Kyoto] target couldbemet.” the purposeofprocess was“toseemerely enteredclear thatAlberta theNCCPbelieving that lacked atrulyshared objective. Critically, itisnow to afford greater equalitytotheprovinces, itstill consider thatwhiletheprocess wasdesigned quick return to toopposition–itisimportant intheNCCP–anditssubsequent to participate To newfoundwillingness understandAlberta’s emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces 53 Macdonald,D. etal.2013.AllocatingCanadian greenhouse gas the Kyoto Protocol”. pg.7. 52 Stillborn,J.2003.“CanadianIntergovernmental Relationsand emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces 51 Macdonald,D. etal.(2013).AllocatingCanadiangreenhouse gas minister describedas“asuicidalcourse.” of Alberta’sobjections,amove thatAlberta’s musing thatCanadawouldratifyKyoto regardless re-appear, withthefederal environment minister the country. ByAugust,oldpatternsbeganto strainandautonomyemergedbudgetary across Provincial concernsover competitiveness, institutional frameworkwasimmediatelytested. As negotiatingbeganin1998,thisnew means tothisend. Kyoto forgrantedandsawtheNCCPas whotooktheneedtoimplement participants, contrasted withtheviewsofmore supportive 53 Beginninginlate2001,the burden- . pg.48. . pg.51. 51 52 This
met itsKyoto targets. regulation mightberequired toensure Canada process hadbeencompromised, andthatfederal Canada officialsbegantosuggestthattheJMM Alberta’s economy. Simultaneously, Environment national dataonhowratificationwouldimpact study ofKyoto’s regional impactsthatquestioned governments. ThatFebruary, released Alberta a a confrontation betweenthefederal andAlberta since 1990.Thistensionculminatedin2002 PT economiesthatthey hadbeendemanding the informationonprojected impactson to believe thattheprocess wasnotdelivering between theFPTgovernments aspremiers came following twoyears sawescalating tensions Despite thisprogress onburden sharing,the which isdiscussedinabox onpage53). developed aneffective burden-sharing model Canada (theEuropean Unionhad,by thispoint, European-style burden-sharing agreement for cost allocationmodelsandthefeasibility ofa sharing workinggroup beganastudyofequitable emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces 56 Macdonald,D. etal.2013.AllocatingCanadian greenhouse gas emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces. 55 Macdonald,D. etal.2013.AllocatingCanadiangreenhouse gas EABSWG hadtimeto issueitsfinalreport. of great losses ofthisperiodthattheNCCPwouldfailbefore the emission reductions amongstsources andprovinces. 54 Macdonald,D. etal.2013.AllocatingCanadiangreenhouse gas consensus building. goal ofratificationthrough intergovernmental move effectively signalledtheendofNCCP’s level, allbutabandoningprovincial input.This proceeded tobeginnegotiations attheindustry that CanadawouldratifytheKyoto Protocol and few monthslater, thePrimeMinisterannounced an outcome that [Alberta] didnotagreean outcomethat[Alberta] to.” federal government was locked intoachieving withdrew from theJMMprocess, citingthat“the such regulation mightbeimplemented,Alberta of afederal discussion paperthatoutlinedhow 55 Prompted by therelease . pg.54. pg.54. pg.54.Itisone 54
56 A
31 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 32 | THE ROAD TO PARIS permanently scarred Canadianclimatechange defect from intergovernmental processes has federal government’s willingnesstorepeatedly commitment attheKyoto Conference, the of the1990stabilizationtarget, toitsunilateral unilateral actions.From theinitialintroduction the negative impactsofitsoverly ambitious Second, thefederal government mustrecognize been made. progress onthis criticaldimensionhasalready while notcompleteorirreversible, significant FPT governments have already endorsed.Thus, namely Canada’s 2030Paris target, thatall14 the PCFincludesacommonly-heldobjective, consensus around existingtargets. Conversely, they repeatedly aimedatgeneratingretroactive generate greater intergovernmental collaboration, institutional arrangementswere developed to could advance negotiations.Even asnew shared objectives from whichFPTgovernments they continuouslyfailed toproduce asetof strategies tookmanyformsduringtheseyears, national context.First,whileemissionsreduction as directly applicabletothecontemporary Three key lessonsfrom thisperiodstandout decision-making inCanadianhistory. intergovernmental climatechangepolicy-and the bestexampleofasustainedattemptat ignore thisepisode’s instructive potentialas Despite thisfailure, notto itisimportant and implementationoftheKyoto Protocol. intergovernmental consensusonratification target forGHGemissions,nordidthey generate government’s original–oranyalternative – they didnotdeliver agreement onthefederal were objective: unsuccessfulintheirprimary governments thatlastedfrom 1990to2002 The climatepolicynegotiationsbetweenFPT Lessons Learned suggests aneedfornewapproach. ill-equipped toaddress thisdifficultissueand that existingintergovernmental institutionsare Canadian climatechangepolicymakingsuggests burden-sharing issueover three decades of the repeated failure toadequatelyaddress this economic impactsacross jurisdictions.Indeed, fairness intermsofthedistributionnegative of emissionsreductions soastoensure efforts the challengeofhowbesttoallocateburden Finally, governments willneedtoreckon with inevitably getstougher. defecting from thisprocess whenthegoing will require thatthe federal government resist after potentialchangesinpoliticalleadership, embedded remains genuinelycollaborative, even intergovernmental process inwhichthePCFis architectthe primary ofthePCF. Ensuringthatthe previous thefederal efforts, government isstill characterized by greater collaborationthan climate changepolicymakingprocess hasbeen inthefuture.counterparts Whilethecurrent tocooperatewiththeirfederalof thesepartners andhaveof PTpartners reduced thewillingness national targets thatlacked legitimacyintheeyes policymaking. Theseactionshave resulted in Paris commitments plans contribute to plans contribute to meeting Canada’s meeting Canada’s Currently, there is no governmental or equipped with or equipped with to assess how to assess how the legitimacy, individual FPT individual FPT Canada either Canada either institution in institution in mandated, mandated,
33 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 34 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 4 already discussed. theoretically meetCanada’s Paris targets, doingso would notbeadvisableforavariety ofreasons albeit untested,constitutional authoritytounilaterallyenactemissionsreduction policiesthatcould impose anationwidepolicy solution.Althoughthefederal government doesseemtopossessthe, As wasdiscussedearlier, itishighlyunlikely that thefederal government willbeabletounilaterally intergovernmental approaches andinstitutionsare simplynotuptothetask. integrated intergovernmental decision-makingdirected tothisend.Bluntly, Canada’s existing assess howindividualFPTplanscontributetomeeting Canada’s Paris commitments, ortosupport there isnogovernmental institutioninCanadaeithermandated,orequippedwiththelegitimacy, to to mosteffectively mitigatetheresulting ineconomicimpactsofthisallocation.Currently, asymmetry decisions onhowtoallocatetheburden ofresponsibility forspecificemissionsreductions andhow evidence-based advice,andbeinformedby acommonsetoffactsanddata,capable ofsupporting obstacles remain. To successfulovercome theseobstacles,allgovernments willneedtobenefitfrom While thebottom-upapproach employed toformulatethePCFrepresents progress, significant governments willneedtosuccessfullybalanceeffectiveness, cost-effectiveness andpoliticalfeasibility. As discussedinthefirstsectionofthisreport, forCanadatomeetitsParis targets, itsvarious Structures of Ability and Responsibility economic impactinherent toemissionsreductions inCanada. efforts facilitate theeffective deployment ofthefederal spendingpowertohelpalleviate inthe theasymmetry intergovernmental fact-basedevidence negotiationswithimpartial, andadviceand,ontheother, to pronged approach isfoundedonanintergovernmental institutiondesigned,ontheonehand,tosupport In thissectionofreport, wepropose amodelfor howtoovercome theseobstacles.Thistwo- Canada’s Paris targets. reductions willimposeacross jurisdictionsrepresent twoofthelargest tomeet obstaclesfacingefforts substantively engagethechallengesthatstemforinevitably asymmetricburdens thatemissions sharing considerations.Assuch,ineffective intergovernmental collaborationandthefailure thusfarto need forbroad intergovernmental ofengagingproactively buy-inandtheimportance withburden- The Canadianexperienceofclimatechangepolicymakingtodateclearlydemonstratesboththe INSTITUTION INTERGOVERNMENTAL TOWARDS ABETTER of climatepolicy.” to bringaboutanymeaningfulcoordination their distincteconomicandpoliticalcontexts divisions amongstprovinces thatare rooted in premiers] hasbeenunabletoovercome thedeep which comprisesalltheprovincial andterritorial premiers, “theCOF[CounciloftheFederation – environmental policy. Even actingcollectively as to intergovernmental institutions. an intergovernmental problem, Canada mustturn reductions. Ultimately, tosolve whatisatitscore also beunabletogeneratesufficientemissions Consequently, ontheirown,provinces willlikely if theirrespective interests are incompatible. coercing orincentivizingeachother, especially do nothave therighttoolsattheir disposalfor move slowlyanddisparately,” federal leadership,provinces have tendedto so. Historically, infact,“intheabsenceofstrong on theirownnorare they likely tobeabledo able toachieve sufficientemissionsreductions provinces –even collectively –have notbeen contributionstoemissionsreductions,important leadership. Whileindividualprovinces have made be solved absentfederal involvement and This isnottoimplythattheproblem can pg. 9.http://irpp.org/research-studies/insight-no12/. ing andIntergovernmental RelationsinCanada.” IRPPInsight 58 Snoddon,T. and VanNijnatten, D. November 2016. “CarbonPric- research-studies/insight-no15/. of theFederation, 2003-16.” IRPPInsight 57 Collins,E.March 2017.“Coming into ItsOwn?Canada’s Council FPT governments inthe future. or thatwillcollectively challenge dogged theclimatechangefile, the problemsthathave previously not uptothetaskofovercoming intergovernmental institutionsare Canada’s existing 6 58 Thisisbecauseprovinces 57 . 15.pg.12.http://irpp.org/ inthearea of . 12. associated withemissions reductions. or equitablyredistribute theasymmetriccosts shared onanongoingbasis,andhowtomitigate of meetingemissionreduction targets shouldbe difficult tomeaningfullyquantifyhowtheburden by jurisdictionalself-interest willfinditvery intergovernmental negotiationsinformed solely inappropriate orunexpected.Nonetheless, constituents. Thatapproach isnotunjustified, can toachieve thebest possibleoutcomeforits seeks toexercise whatever rawpoliticalpowerit interest –andsometimesitsownfacts comes tothetableinformedby itsownself- 14 Canadiangovernments. Eachgovernment designed tooptimize policyoutcomesforall they informedby acommonfact-baseexplicitly as wasillustratedinthepreceding section,are ever, exercises incollective problem-solving. Nor, Currently, negotiationsatFMMsare seldom,if currently standswillneedtobeaddressed. endure, however, akey limitationtotheFMMasit role.play animportant Ifthosesolutionsare to First Ministers’tablewillneedtocontinue problems thatremain onthe road ahead,the brokering ofthePCF. Given thedifficultpolicy role, includingintheKyoto process andinthe climate change,FMMshave already played akey level meetings.” and gives direction tothenetworkoflower which “resolves conflictsonthehighestlevel at thecentre ofallintergovernmental negotiation FMM. TheFMMisthelocusofexecutive power conversations beginandendwiththe important pressing intergovernmental policyissues,allthe When itcomestoaddressing Canada’s most Context The Current Institutional Press. pg.71. Choices inFederal SystemsandBeyond 59 Bolleyer, N.2009. Intergovernmental Cooperation: Rational 59 Withrespect toaddressing . Oxford: Oxford University
35 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 36 | THE ROAD TO PARIS environmental agenda-settingandnegotiations.” institutionofintergovernmentalis “theprimary natural candidatetotake onthistask.TheCCME on environmental issues–wouldappeartobea intergovernmental forumforcollective action of theEnvironment (CCME)–theminister-led At firstblush,theCanadianCouncilofMinisters associated withemissionsreduction. inthedistributionofcosts the asymmetry shared onanongoingbasisandhowtoalleviate meeting emissionsreduction targets shouldbe on policiesforquantifyinghowtheburden of intergovernmental buy-inmandatedtoadvise landscape, however, isaninstitutionwithbroad Notably absentfrom theCanadianinstitutional CCME, withthechairrotating annually. FPT governments asequalsatthe participate the highercarbonintensityoftheireconomies. basis from emissionsreductions dueto efforts –willfacehighercostsonaperperson particular andSaskatchewanin economies –Alberta It iswellunderstoodthatresource-intensive across provinces isnotinitselftheproblem. burden thatemissionsreductions willimpose issue, alackofrecognition oftheasymmetric Despite thefailure toexplicitlyaddress this Capacity inCanada 63 Inwood,G.,Johns, C.O’Reilly, P. 2011.Intergovernmental Policy Intergovernmental RelationsinCanada”. pg.18. 62 Snoddon,Tand VanNijnatten, D. 2016. “Carbon Pricingand pg. 182. Capacity inCanada 61 Inwood,G.,Johns,C.O’Reilly, P. 2011.Intergovernmental Policy pub/1910. Suzuki Foundation; Pembina Institute.http://www.pembina.org/ below 1990and20%2006levels by 2020.Vancouver: David Exploration oftwoCanadiangreenhouse gasemissiontargets: 25% 60 M.K.Jaccard and Associates.18October, 2009. areas ofshared policyjurisdiction. more formalized thanonegenerallyfindsinother from theFirstMinisters’ process. TheCCMEis Functionally, theCCME operatesquitedifferently Prime Minister. FMMagendasare alsotightly federal government, andpresided over by the are adhocandconvened exclusively by the practices standinstarkcontrasttoFMMs,which . pg.183. . Montreal andKingston: McGill-Queen’s Press. 62 Inaddition, 63 Final Report: Final Report: These 60
61
particular government.”particular “ministers remain oftheir firstofallpart remains anFPTministerialtable,atwhich Despite theseadvantages, however, CCME decisions. results ofFMMsare prone tounilateralfederal controlled by thefederal government, andthe Canada 65 Inwood,G.et al.2011.Intergovernmental Policy Capacityin 64 Bolleyer, N.2009. policymaking institution.” CCME is“anadministrative mechanism,nota of environmental regulation, functionally, the to agreat inthearea dealoftechnicalexpertise governments. Whilethesecretariat hasaccess reduction policieswillimposeonCanada’s overcoming theasymmetriccoststhatemissions right institutionalfitforadvisingonpolicies regard, theCCMESecretariat isnotactuallythe borders. promising Whilesuperficially inthis of environmental regulations across jurisdictional FPT officialstasked withharmonizing allmanner ofthelegion function, helpingtoaligntheefforts secretariat plays coordination animportant permanent, jointly-fundedsecretariat. The by asmallbut The CCMEisalsosupported in engagingjointproblem-solving. constituents, leaving themlessableorinterested allegiances liewiththeirrespective Cabinetsand . pg.185. limitations ofexistingones. frameworks toovercome the intergovernmental institutional to innovate andcreatenew and policymakers willhave Canadian decision-makers 7 Intergovernmental Cooperation 64 Assuch,ministerial 65 . pg.143. jurisdictions andhowtoovercome it. an asymmetricdistribution ofburdens across how tosatisfactorilyaddress thekey issueof will lacktheaccesstoneutraladviceon yield insufficientresults, andalloftheabove on effectiveness, bottom-upapproaches will compliance initiatives voluntary willfallshort federal approaches onbuy-in, willfallshort previous have efforts all foundered. Unilateral analysis suggestthatitisessentialas andtheforegoingchallenging, bothhistory While constructingsuchaninstitutionwillbe effective andcost-effective ontheother. one hand,andtheneedforpoliciesthatare both achieve political acceptabilityanddurability, on for thebroad intergovernmental buy-inneededto This newapproach willhave tobalancethe need to overcome thelimitationsofitsexistingones. new intergovernmental institutionalframeworks policymakers willhave toinnovate andcreate Ultimately, Canadiandecision-makers and policy framework. intergovernmental Canadianclimatechange at hand:designinganoptimalcollaborative are notequippedtodealwiththecore problem Canada’s existingintergovernmental institutions these decision-makers isinsufficient.Overall, the existinginstitutionalapparatusforinforming for reaching thesetargets themselves. Moreover, it difficultforthemtoactuallybuildthestrategy necessary, theirpoliticalresponsibilities make making roles. Butwhiletheirinvolvement willbe Ministers willinevitably play key decision- targets, bothFPTFirstMinistersandEnvironment collaborative FPTapproach tomeetingitsParis responsibility fornegotiatingCanada’s far, aselectedrepresentatives withthemain To sumupthisinstitutionalpanoramaso “how andwhere toreduce emissions.” tasked by FirstMinisterstoidentifyoptionsfor Vancouver DeclarationonMarch 3,2016–was (orMWG)–created ofthe Opportunities aspart The Working Group onSpecific Mitigation intergovernmental buy-in:theworkinggroup. turned toamechanismoftenusedachieve deficiency. Inanattempttoaddress it,they demonstrated somerecognition ofthis In theleaduptoPCF, FPTgovernments these typesrepresents amajorpolicygap. exists toproduce assessmentsand adviceof That nointergovernmental institutioncurrently should becollectively optimized, are missing. are not,workingtogether, andadviceonhowthey of howwellallthoseindividualpoliciesare, or FPT governments. Thismeansthatassessments necessarily combines the actions of the individual aggregate. Thistypeofnationalapproach of whatCanada’s governments are doingin neutral basis,thusoffering anassessment assessments are conductedonajurisdictionally- exist. Invariably, however, thesenationwide assessments ofclimatechangepolicyalso litter thepolicylandscapeatalllevels. National data, facts,assessmentsandrecommendations from ofinformation.Vast ashortage swathsof The fieldofclimatechangepolicydoesnotsuffer This typeofapproach precludes attheoutset jurisdictionally-neutral, nationalperspective.” usually limitedtopresenting “optionsfrom a In developing options,workinggroups are problem.”“purview working group wasimmediatelyhamstrungby the the promise containedintheMWG’smandate, Change. sis ofthePan-Canadian Framework”. Canada’s ActiononClimate 66 Government ofCanada.22 December, 2016.“Economic analy port_specific_mitigation_opportunities_en_v04.pdf. content/6/4/7/64778dd5-e2d9-4930-be59-d6db7db5cbc0/wg_re- https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/migration/cc/ Environment andClimateChange Canada. Final Report. Working67 SpecificMitigationOpportunities Group. 2016. er/climatechange/climate-action/economic-analysis.html. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weath 66 Despite 67
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37 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 38 | THE ROAD TO PARIS governments as far out as2030and 2050. that it will require the sustainedattention of warranted in the context of climate change given would be able to provide will be especially predictability and resilience a permanent institution a common objective on an ongoingbasis. The response capable of anchoring governments to represent a much more enduring institutional produce lowest-common-denominatorresults.” “where consensualdecisionmakingtendsto working groups andFPTrelations more broadly, in thisregard isendemictointergovernmental of othergovernments. Confinementofpurview shaped tointeractmosteffectively withthose policies ofindividualgovernments shouldbe governments individuallyoradviceonhow the the possibilityofproviding eitheradviceto 69 Bolleyer, N.2009. the Environment. pg. 1. Change Burden-Sharing Agreement. University ofToronto, Schoolof 68 Macdonald,D. 20June,2017. voluntary.” are internally, sinceinteraction isforemost routines thantheindividualgovernment units less structured by formalrulesandestablished as theintergovernmental arena, which ismuch environmentwhen facinganuncertain such decision-makers. Predictability is“essential will beessentialforcreating predictability for by individualgovernmentsof non-participation institutional solutionthatisresilient toperiods mandate andcreate considerableuncertainty. An setting ofaworkinggroup canundermineits even asinglegovernment inthetime-limited limits theireffectiveness. by Non-participation The time-limitednature ofworkinggroups also problem.surmount thepurview not have enoughoperationalindependenceto policy advicetoinformtoughdecisions.They do groups asatoolforproviding comprehensive This represents akey limitationofworking 69 Apermanentinstitutionwould Intergovernmental Cooperation Why CanadaNeedsaClimate- . pg.29. 68
state” ofhealthinformationinCanada. by FPTgovernments toaddress the“deplorable (CIHI), establishedin1994,wasjointlycreated The CanadianInstituteforHealthInformation the arena ofCanadianintergovernmentalism. problem in isnotentirely territory uncharted intergovernmental bodytosolve alarge policy The FPTco-creation ofanindependentyet balance effect through theinstitution’s design. creators tocarefully consider howtogive this such abalancewillrequire theinstitution’s the needforintergovernmental buy-in.Achieving the institutionwillhave tobalanceneutralityand achieving Canada’s Paris targets. To dothisright, the development ofapan-Canadianapproach to cross-cutting, evidence-based advicetoinform jointly create onethatistasked withdeveloping be fortheFPTgovernments tocometogether The bestway tocreate suchaninstitutionwill by variousparticipation FPTgovernments. the resilience periodicboutsofnon- tosurvive tables alike. Ifdesignedwell,itcouldalsohave advice toindividualgovernments andFPT independence togive good,evidence-based problemthis purview andtheoperational intergovernmental buy-inneededtosolve body willhave theabilitytogarner Only apermanent,co-created andindependent Institution Features of a New Council. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/4220352-eng.pdf. Task Force onHealthInformation.Ottawa:National Information of theNational 70 Wilk, M.1991.HealthInformation forCanada:Report an intergovernmental organization. Naturally, legitimacy andrelevance canbeentrenched in provides usefulexamplesofhowaccountability, maintaining anintergovernmental characterand roadmap forhow toenableindependencewhile organizational designofCIHIprovides auseful 70 The primary locusofauthoritywhointurnowetheir primary Thedirectorssector experts. oftheboard are the by aboard ofdirectors, whichiscomposedof mandate ofitspermanentsecretariat are guided FPT ministriesits ofhealth. As such,workandthe independent, not-for-profit corporation,fundedby FPT table.Instead,CIHIisincorporatedasan a specificminister, cabinet,jurisdictionor intergovernmental, CIHIdoesnotreport to As abodythatisbothatarm’s lengthand to whomthey are answerable. Cabinet, reporting through aresponsible minister government, thatlocusofauthorityisstillaFPT organizations thatoperateatarm’s lengthfrom definitive powerandresponsibility.” requires a‘locusofauthority,’ acentre of setting. AsPaul Brown “accountability observes, independent bodyinanintergovernmental accountability structure neededforan The firstlessonCIHIprovides isthe useful lessons. many ofCIHI’skey designfeatures canprovide change policymakingposesuniquechallenges, while intergovernmental collaborationinclimate Administration laborative Federalism: TheCanadianExperience.” CanadianPublic 71 Brown, P. 1983. “Responsiveness versus AccountabilityinCol climate changepolicymaking. challenges facedby Canada’s to successfullyovercome the intergovernmental buy-inneeded will beabletowinthe created by theFPTgovernments independent institution,co- Only apermanentand 8 26(4)629-639.pg. 634. 71 For many - and regions ofCanada.” for creating “abalanceamonghealthsectors composition oftheboard are features important balanced geographicalrepresentation andexpert perspectives respected. InthecaseofCIHI,both governmental stakeholders shouldhave their consideration forhowaninstitution’s many This independencemustbebalancedwith undue influencefrom anysinglegovernment. context isthatitallowsforindependencefrom benefit ofthismodelintheintergovernmental nurture themonanongoingbasis. these connections,CIHIhasproactively soughtto to thissector. of Recognizingtheimportance anditsproductsserve are andservices useful CIHI’s workisinformedby thesectoritseeksto represents avaluable resource inensuringthat cooperation ofthesestakeholders and networks networks across thecountry. and Thesupport connected toadiverse setofstakeholders and relevance by ensuringthatitsboard iswell- has alsoenabledCIHItomaintainitsongoing This geographicallyvaried board andexpert-led governments. challenges andinterests oftheregions, not information whorepresent theperspectives, inthefieldsofhealthor instead experts not direct governmental representatives. They are positions ontheboard, butboard membersare able toprovide listsofnomineesformembership fiduciary dutytothecorporation. fiduciary document/governance-handbook_2016_en_web.pdf. Health Information.pg.10.https://www.cihi.ca/sites/default/files/ tors’ Governance Handbook2016 73 CanadianInstituteforHealthInformation. 2016. Primer_en.pdf. www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cilp-pdci.nsf/vwapj/Primer_en.pdf/$FILE/ and Practices (ed) PrimerforDirectors ofNot-for-Profit Corporations: Rights,Duties, J.2002.“DutiesofDirectors”.72 Burke-Robertson, inBroder, P . Ottawa: Industry Canada.14-30. pg.14.https://. Ottawa:Industry . Toronto: CanadianInstitutefor 73 FPTgovernments are 72 The primary Theprimary Board ofDirec-
39 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 40 | THE ROAD TO PARIS of Canada(HCC). example provided by theerstwhileHealthCouncil arrangements, especially whencompared tothe good exampleofthebenefitssuchco-funding funding from allFPTgovernments, asa serves tool.CIHI,which receives asapowerful also serve intergovernmental setting,FPTco-funding can In thequestforinstitutionalresilience inan that itwillneedtosuccessfullycompleteitswork. imbue thisnewinstitutionwiththebroad support playersimportant atthetable,thereby helping to strategy wouldbemore likely tokeep these the formationofaCanadianemissionsreduction government andemissions-intensive provinces in weighting oftheperspectives ofthefederal representation ontheboard. Anoutsized government shouldalsobegiven substantial with emissionsreduction policies,thefederal to mitigatetheunbalancedburdens associated use ofthefederal spendingpower as ameans institution’s mandatewillbetoadviseonthe Similarly, sinceasignificantaspectofthe with outsized representation ontheboard. should begiven toproviding thoseprovinces with emissionsreductions, consideration will bearagreater share of theburden associated provinces, andSaskatchewan, suchasAlberta For example,given thatemissions-intensive representation. board’s membershipgives effect toregional should begiven, however, tohowthe representatives. consideration Particular asdirectand shouldnotserve government directors shouldbecomposedofexperts intergovernmental character. Itsboard of constituted tocombineanindependentand climate changeinstitutionshouldbesimilarly We believe thattheproposed intergovernmental must besought. another intergovernmental co-fundingmodel and therefore wouldnotsellanything. Assuch institution, however, role would play anadvisory Theproposedand services. climatechange almost exclusively from thepurchase ofgoods derives from provinces andterritories comes climate changeinstitution.Therevenue CIHI is nottheperfect template fortheproposed co-funding canprovide, CIHI’srevenue model lessonintheresilienceWhile animportant organization, albeitwithareduced footprint. its Core Plancouldsustaintheexistenceof funding CIHI,thecontinuationofPTfor federal government were ever todecidestop down fundingfortheHCC.Incontrast,if In 2013,thefederal government decidedtowind subject tothewhimsofasingledecision-maker. solely by thefederal government, andthus of theHCC,however, wasthatitfunded and key audiences(seebox). Akey vulnerability needsfortheirclients deemed tomeetimportant bodies inthehealthcare policyspace.Bothwere CIHI andHCCwere bothintergovernmental . Toronto.Report pg.22. 75 KPMG.2013. Evaluation oftheHealthCouncilCanada: Final sites/default/files/evaluation_sum_nov2010_en.pdf_0.pdf. Information: Executive. Ottawa.pg.3.https://www.cihi.ca/ Summary 74 KPMG.2010.Evaluation oftheCanadianInstituteforHealth important needs fortheirorganization.”important CIHI’s products have andservices met “...the majority ofCIHI’s clients feel that and perspective are significant.” needs andthatHCC’snational scope believe that HCCresponds to important “The Health Council’skey audiences 74 75 74 one of its fundamental operating principles.” the CCME uses “consensus decision-making as agenda-setting andnegotiations, environmental institutionforintergovernmentalthe primary well-balanced solution.Inadditiontobeing is theFPTtablebestpositionedtodevise a need forintergovernmental buy-in,theCCME informed bothby policy considerationsandthe the board. To arrive ataninstitutionaldesign federal government, to have astrong voice on Saskatchewanandthe in additiontoAlberta, regional representatives ofotherjurisdictions, may bedeemedappropriate forexample, by ajointdecisionoftheFPTgovernments. It for appointingtheboard, shouldbedefined this proposed institution,includingthe process Ultimately, thefinalstructure andcompositionof Creating a New Institution exit by individualparticipants. discourage, andreduce theimpactof,unilateral terminate theinstitution,afactthatcanhelpto can ensure thatnosinglegovernment isableto Most importantly, multiplesources offunding governments periodicallydeclinetoparticipate. resilience tosustainitshouldsome necessary to ensure thattheinstitutionpossesses change institution,FPTgovernments couldhelp adopting asimilarmodelfortheproposed climate 14 governments madeonaprorated basis.By co-funded through transfer payments from all permanent secretariat, locatedinWinnipeg.Itis discussed earlier, by a theCCMEissupported Thankfully, analternative modelexists.Aswas sensus”. About 76 CanadianCouncil ofMinisterstheEnvironment. 2014. “Con and relevance right from the outset. toensurebuy-in thatwill be necessary its resilience could insure that ithas the broad intergovernmental using consensustodesign the proposed institution advice to inform tough decisions on burden sharing, consensus is not the best model for formulating . http://www.ccme.ca/en/about/consensus.html. 76 While While - 2] Guidethedeployment ofthefederal spending 1] AssesshowindividualFPTplanscontribute mandated toachieve twobroad strategicgoals: the proposed climatechangeinstitutionshouldbe making, butrathertobetterinformit.To thatend, intergovernmental negotiationanddecision- The institution’s aimshouldnotbetosupplant the burdens entailedby emissionsreductions. how Canada’s various jurisdictionsshouldshare oftheneededdiscussion and datainsupport be well-positionedtofurnishashared setoffacts where itisneeded,thisproposed institutionwill todirectbased adviceandthepurview thatadvice Armed withtheindependencetogive neutral,fact- policies across jurisdictions. economic impactsofemissionsreduction emissions andequitablysharingthenegative deemed tobestcombinethegoalsofreducing measuressubsidies tothosecomplementary power through theallocationoffederal basis. be shared betweenjurisdictionsonanongoing of meetingCanada’s Paris targets couldbest institution shallalsoadviseonhowtheburden beyond theseplans.Given this information,the jurisdictions toreduce theirGHGemissions commitments andthecapacityofindividual to meetingtheentirety ofCanada’s Paris » guidethedeployment ofthefederal » give evidence-based adviceaimedat The institutionshouldbedesignedto: across jurisdictions. of emissionsreductionpolicies equitably the burdenofuneven economicimpacts effective emissionsreductions andshare cost- spending powersoastosupport climate changepolicies advancing 9 Canada’s 14separate FPT
41 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 42 | THE ROAD TO PARIS available and publicly be transparent institution must the proposed developed by and advice the information auditors-general, Critically, as with 5 efforts. toassisttheminoptimizingtheeffectivenessuse itsexpertise andcost-effectiveness oftheirindividual directly withindividualgovernments toevaluate measures andadviseonpotentialcomplementary and estimates ofthecoststhatwouldbeassociatedwithdoingso.Additionally, the institution couldwork assessments ofwhichprovinces have capacitytoproduce greater reductions andprovide highlevel arehow various jurisdictions’efforts contributingtothisprogress. Suchreporting couldalsoinclude periodic assessmentsofhowCanadaisprogressing towards itsemissionsreductions targets and accomplished isfairlystraightforward. Statedsimply, theproposed institutionwouldpubliclypublish The way inwhichthefirstofnewinstitution’s twobroad strategicgoals(seebox) wouldbe structure. we explainhowthisproposed institution shouldactuallydischarge thismandategiven thisproposed as welltheinstitutionalstructure thatwouldbestenableittoadvance thismandate.Insection, In thepreceding sectionweoutlinedavisionfortheproposed climatechangeinstitution’s mandate 2] Guidethedeployment ofthefederal spendingpowerthrough theallocationoffederal 1] AssesshowindividualFPTplanscontributeto meetingtheentirety ofCanada’s Paris Strategic GoalsoftheProposedInstitution reduction policiesacross jurisdictions. reducing emissionsandequitablysharingthenegative economicimpactsofemissions measuressubsidies tothosecomplementary deemed tobestcombinethegoalsof an ongoingbasis. burden ofmeetingCanada’s Paris targets couldbestbeshared betweenjurisdictions on beyond theseplans.Given thisinformation,theinstitution shallalsoadviseonhowthe commitments andthecapacityofindividualjurisdictions toreduce theirGHGemissions THE NEWINSTITUTION RESPONSIBILITIES OF TASKS AND
43 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 44 | THE ROAD TO PARIS through onecomplete cycle of its work. envision the institution following as it progresses Finally, we close by outlining the procedure we it its greatest chance of achieving this potential. transfer would need to be designed in order to give then discusstheways inwhichsuchafederal Canadian climatechangepolicylandscape.We of thefederal spending powercouldhave onthe transformative effect awell-designeddeployment ongoing basis.Next,wediscussthepotentially that willformitsday-to-day operationsonan institution, thatis,thosetasksandfunctions outlining thelinesofbusinessproposed This sectionproceeds asfollows.We beginby this sectionisdevoted. how thiswouldbeaccomplishedthatthebulkof work toreduce emissions.Itistoadiscussionof economic impactsbetweenjurisdictionsasthey power asameansofsmoothingtheimbalancein guiding thedeployment ofthefederal spending first strategicobjective withthesecond,namely, institution actuallyliesinthecombinationofthis the transformative potentialoftheproposed a transformative policyinnovation. Rather, landscape, thisalonewouldnotconstitute a gapintheCanadianclimatechangepolicy was contributingtothisprogress –wouldfill well asanassessmentofhoweachjurisdiction Canada’s progress towards itsParis targets –as While providing anationalperspective on data, rather than a primary producerdata, rather thana primary ofit. consumer and analystofECCC’sGHG emission proposed institution wouldthusact asbotha working. Ifthisrecommendation isaccepted, the this newinstitutionintoa process thatisalready leave thecurrent systeminplaceand notinsert the contrary, webelieve itwillbepreferable to sidebar). WithoutacompellingKey Argument to this submissionare bothwideanddeep(see Canada (ECCC). Thenetworks involved increating NIR isledby Environment andClimate Change refinement andreview ofCanada’s dataforthe emissions andsinks.Currently, thecollection, (NIR)ofGHG Report a NationalInventory under theUNFCCC,Canadaisrequired tosubmit and reporting regime. ofitsobligations Aspart potential role inCanada’s GHGemissionsdata organization, itmay assessingits beworth As thenewinstitutionmatures asan of business. capacity be the new should institution’s first order and projects. Thus,buildingitsforecasting emissions reduction impactsofvarious policies its abilitytoreliably andaccuratelymodelthe to meetingCanada’s Paris targets willhingeon governmentsindividual contribute canandshould The newinstitution’s abilitytoassesshow – andby whichitcanitselfbeheldaccountable. publicly available dataonwhichtobaseitsadvice institution willneedthecapacitytocreate robust, In order tomeetitsfirststrategicgoal,thenew FORECASTING ANDREPORTING connecting, convening andcoordinating. reporting, (2)research andpolicyanalysis,(3) linesofbusiness:(1)forecastingprimary and We envisionthisnewinstitutionpursuingthree institution willactuallydoonaday-to-day basis. explanation concernsthequestionofwhat will discharge itsmandatethatneedssome The firstaspectofhowtheproposed institution Lines of Business 45 | THE ROAD TO PARIS its credibility andeffectiveness. harmfully politicize itsadvice andundermine to specificpolicyinstruments, however, could approach by thenewinstitutionwithrespect or perhapsothers.Anoverly prescriptive or lessheavily onsomeofthesetools, reduction policyframeworksmay leanmore measures. Inthefuture, optimalemissions trade regimes andmyriadcomplementary ranging andincludecarbontaxes, cap-and- chosen toreduce emissionsare wide- The policiesCanada’s governments have providing specificpolicyrecommendations. of the newinstitutionshouldstopshort the formulationofitspolicyadvice,however, capacities. Inorder tomaintainneutralityin develop itsresearch andpolicyanalysis the proposed institutionwillalsoneedto function To effectively leverage itsforecasting ANALYSIS RESEARCH ANDPOLICY toreactample opportunity andrespond. potential surprisesandtogive governments them inadvance ofpublicationtominimize on theirworkbutalsocommunicatewith tonotonlybriefgovernmentsopportunities such, itsleadershipshouldactively pursue all 14ofCanada’s FPTgovernments. As that itmustexpressly anddutifullyserve but alsoitsintergovernmental character in effect toitsneutralityandindependence, in theseregards willbeinstrumentalingiving for requests from FPTgovernments. Freedom ratherthanpassively waiting and important, publish studiesthatitidentifiesasrelevant institution mustalsobefree toinitiateand and publiclyavailable. Similarly, thenew proposed institutionmustbetransparent information andadvicedeveloped by the Critically, aswithauditors-general,the into the formulation ofpolicyadvice, measurement.” andinformation, dataand expertise available technicalandscientific ECCC seekstodrawupon“thebest to meetinternationalstandards, arrangements.” ways, rangingfrom informaltoformal contributorsin avarietyand expert of many agreements withdataproviders and reference documents.” on ClimateChangemethodologies accepted Intergovernmental Panel are consistent with internationally emission andremoval estimates “the methodsusedtoprepare the a vast array ofcontributorsand process requires contributionsfrom and sinkstotheUNFCCC.This ofGHGemissions national inventory preparing andsubmittingCanada’s Canada (ECCC) leadstheprocess for Environment andClimateChange Change: Part 1.Gatineau.pg.36. Change: Part United NationsFramework Convention onClimate and SinksinCanada;Canada’s Submissionto the 1990-2015:Greenhouse GasSources tory Report 80 Government ofCanada.2017. 1.Gatineau.pg.36. Change: Part United NationsFramework Convention on Climate and SinksinCanada;Canada’s Submissionto the 1990-2015:Greenhouse GasSources tory Report 79 Government ofCanada.2017. 1.Gatineau.pg.35. Change: Part United NationsFramework Convention onClimate and SinksinCanada;Canada’s Submission to the 1990-2015:Greenhouse GasSources tory Report 78 Government ofCanada.2017. 1&offset=3&toc=hide. default.asp?lang=En&n=391052E4- www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/ and ClimateChangeCanada.https:// sources andmethods,chapter 3. Greenhouse gasemissionsindicators:data 77 Government ofCanada.13April,2017. governments. with provincial andterritorial universities andbilateralagreements associations,consultants, industry StatisticsCanada, departments, contributors includeotherfederal Inventory Report Inventory Canada’s National 80 78 79 ECCC“isinvolved in Dataproviders and Environment 77 National Inven- National Inven- National Inven- Inorder
45 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 46 | THE ROAD TO PARIS national perspective thatiscurrently lacking. it by providing independentinformationfrom a andinform and decision-making,buttosupport not betosupplantintergovernmental negotiation electorates. Again,theinstitution’s aimshould accountable forthosedecisionstotheir the electeddecision-makers whoare ultimately to employ willinevitably, andproperly, betaken by decisions onwhichpolicylevers andapproaches avoid prescriptive recommendations asthefinal and associatedeconomicimpacts.Itshould with informationabouttheirlikely costs,benefits present governments withpolicyoptions,along for theproposed institutiontoplay willbeto researchThe mostimportant andpolicyrole 1] Impartial Convener 1] Impartial a prolonged politicaldisputeover thegovernment’s rationalefordoingsoandover theinstitution’s worth. In 2012,theGovernment ofCanadawound-up theNRTEE by eliminatingitsoperationalfunding,prompting identifying, explainingandpromoting... principlesandpracticesofsustainabledevelopment.” Table ontheEnvironment andEconomy Act.TheActmandatedtheNRTEE toplay “therole ofacatalystin In 1993,theNRTEE’s role expandedthrough itsformalestablishmentasacorporationundertheNationalRound by apermanentsecretariat.supported members from thepublic,private, non-profit andacademicsectors,appointedby Cabinetonthree-year termsand to theUnitedNationsWorld CommissiononEnvironment andDevelopment, theNRTEE consistedof24rotating role informingsustainabledevelopment policywithinCanada.Establishedby thefederal government inresponse From 1988-2012,theNationalRoundTable ontheEnvironment andtheEconomy (NRTEE) occupiedacentral Special Edition: Charting Sustainable Development inCanada, 1987-2007. Special Edition: Charting of theNationalRound Table ontheEnvironment andtheEconomy” inMeadowcroft, J.andToner, G.(eds).Innovation, Science, Environment responsibilityment changedits reporting to ofEnvironment. the Ministry Boutras, S.2009.“AChildofBruntland: TheInstitutionalEvolution 84 NRTEE’s relationship reporting to thePrimeMinister (orFinanceMinisterdesignate) lastedfrom itsinception untiltheHarperGovern- ca/news/politics/environment-panel-s-end-blamed-on-support-for-carbon-tax-1.1164935. 83 TheCanadianPress. 15May, 2012.“Environment forCarbon Tax.” Panel’s EndBlamedonSupport CBCNews|Politics www.pembina.org/blog/705. 82 Horne,M.28March, 2013.“Farewell to theNationalRoundTable ontheEnvironment andtheEconomy.” Blog.Pembina Institute 81 Canada. 3] Solutions-Focused Advice 2] ConnectiontoCentralDecision-Makers lessons thatshouldinformthedesignofproposed climatechangeinstitution. Regardless ofthemotivation behindthedecision,originalpurposeofNRTEE includesthefollowingkey government stakeholders officials,industry andthepublicatlarge. reports were recognized asexhaustively researched, publicationsthatcould beequallyvaluable to non-partisan forestry resources orcomprehensive examinationsofspecificpolicyinstrumentssuchascarbon pricing, NRTEE long-term recommendations fortransitioningCanadatoalow-carboneconomy, sector-basedstudiesofwaterand This broad mandateempowered theNRTEE toaddress adiverse rangeoftopics.Whetherproviding medium-and forasustainablefuture.deemed necessary private sectortointegratesustainablepracticesintopolicymakingandeducatedthepubliconpolicychanges goal, NRTEE research non-partisan undertook andanalysis,facilitatedcooperationbetweengovernments andthe The NationalRoundTable ontheEnvironmentandEconomy Building onaSolidFoundation and Environment. For themajorityofitsexistence,NRTEE reported tothePrimeMinister, butalsotothe MinistersofFinance presents arangeoftheoptionsforachieving aspecificoutcomemay beamore effective model. to adviceonspecificpolicylevers may have contributed totheNRTEE’s undoing.Indeed,advicethatinstead with privately fundedinstitutions.Itisnoteworthy, however, thatanoverly prescriptive approach withrespect a forecasting role tooffer policyrecommendations withoutconcernsover ulterior motives oftenassociated government, andtheacademy. industry Thisplacementensured thatNRTEE publicationscouldmove beyond analyze forecasts, few institutionsholdtheinfluentialpositionthatNRTEE occupied atthecrossroads of While otherclimatescientistsandgovernment reporting agencieshave thetechnicalability toproduce and legitimacy. society andtorelay theirmessagestogovernment officialsinaninformalmannerwithoutsacrificing identified theNRTEE’s strength primary asitsabilitytoconnectleadingvoices from ofCanadian allparts disciplines isaprerequisite forinformedpolicyrecommendations. Past NRTEE membershave repeatedly On anissuesuchasclimatechangemitigation,theabilitytoconvene andstakeholders experts across voices. National RoundTable ontheEnvironment andtheEconomy Act. 84 Thisdegree ofaccessgave itsignificantinfluence inapolicyfieldbesetby manycompeting
156-180.pg.169. R.S.C. 1993,c.31,s.4. 82 81 To achieve this . http://www.cbc. 83
. http://
47 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 48 | THE ROAD TO PARIS emissions reduction projects. in order toassisttheminidentifyinghigh-impact todecision-makersshould alsoconnectexperts development oftheirinformationandadvice.It decision-makers, andstakeholders experts inthe institution shouldseektoconnectgovernment bodies liesintheirconvening power.” strength ofgovernment-funded policyadvisory NRTEE Lyon chairStuart Smith,“themain and maintainrelevance. Asnotedby former the newinstitutionshouldemploy toestablish diverseConnecting groupsis anothermechanism access todecision-makers. unvarnished adviceandshouldthushave direct be free toprovide allgovernments withdirect, its independence,thenewinstitutionshould First MinistersandEnvironment Ministers.Given the sphere ofclimatechangepolicy, thismeans to seniordecision-makers wouldbeideal.In by theexampleofNRTEE, astrong connection work ismeetingtheirneeds.Asdemonstrated their prioritiesandensure thattheinstitution’s from allgovernments togainawindowonto collaborate leadership should with andseek input be akey factorinitssuccess.Theinstitution’s strong relationships withallgovernments will the abilityofitsleadershiptobuildandmaintain bureaucracies andexistinginstitutions.Thus, or wrongly, asincompetitionwithestablished in apolicyspacewhere itmay beseen,rightly assiduously forongoingrelevance, especially The proposed institutionmustalsostrive COORDINATING CONNECTING, CONVENINGAND reports/NRTEE-Reflections-from-past-leaders-of-the-nrtee.pdf. Economy of theNRTEE. 85 Government ofCanada.2013. Reflectionsfrom Past Leaders . pg.4.http://tcan.ca/sites/default/files/files/NRTEE%20 National RoundTable ontheEnvironment andthe 85 Thisnew projects are launched. potential inefficienciescanberooted outbefore kept planssothatsuch informedofeachother’s should beabletoensure thatallgovernments are information andadvice,thenewinstitution are achieved. asacentralpointof Byserving goals ofeffectiveness andcost-effectiveness of potentialprojects inorder toensure thatthe interactions withotherpoliciesinitsevaluation new institutionwillneedtointegratepotential their costs. negative impactsofsuchmeasures by raising many timesover. Doingsocanexacerbatethe can enduppaying forthesamereductions measures,by thecomplimentary governments are affecting thesameactivitiesbeing targeted impacts ofcarbonpricesorothermeasures that are designedwithouttakingintoaccountthe measures. measures Whencomplimentary inefficiently withotheremissionsreduction their own,ispotentialtooverlap orinteract in conjunctionwithacarbonpriceoreven on measures,complementary eitherwhenused Finally, onebigchallengefacedby plausible potential extensionoftheinstitution’s competencies. this paperandour plansforthenewinstitution,itdoes represent a While considerationofsuchanapproach isbeyond thescopeof Sawyer, D. andBataille,C. 31March, 2017. targets couldbesignificantly reduced –they claimby 36percent. sectors withinCanada, theoverall costofmeetingCanada’s Paris enable thetradingofcarbonallowances betweenjurisdictionsand and ChrisBataillesuggestthatby building‘bridges’that would 87 Inaneven more ambitiousformofcoordination, Dave Sawyer 86 Sawyer, D. andBataille,C.31March, 2017. 86 Initsadvicetogovernments, this 87 Taking Stock Taking Stock . pg.7-8. . pg3. responsibilities. Thisabilityisreferred toas it needstodischarge itsownconstitutional structurally, ithasaccessto more money than leadership role ofthefactthat, by virtue government hasbeen abletoplay apolicy policymaking. Indeed,for decades,thefederal familiar traditionofCanadianintergovernmental Such atwo-pronged approach fitswellwithina burdens. cost-effectiveness andadvancing afairsharing of projects whichbestmet thecombinedcriteriaof this fundingasitwouldbeawarded onlytothose would have of anautomaticclaimonany portion reductions across jurisdictions.Nojurisdiction the economicburdens associatedwithemissions emissions reductions andequitablesharingof that bestbalancethegoalsofcost-effective with theaimofselectingonlythoseprojects funding thatthenewinstitutionwoulddisburse also provide asecond‘selective’ envelope of territory. Second,thefederal government should reducing GHGemissionsineachprovince and measuresto subsidize complementary aimedat amount of‘baseline’ federal fundingdesigned all jurisdictionsshouldhave accesstoaprorated spending powershouldcomeintwoforms.First, We suggestthatthedeployment ofthefederal mitigation transfer. in thispaper: administrationofaclimatechange leveraged thelastfunctiondiscussed tosupport all oftheselinesbusinesswillneedtobe measures across jurisdictions.More specifically, uneven economicimpactsofemissionsreduction effective emissionsreductions andmitigatethe the federal cost- spendingpowersoastosupport strategic goal,namelytoguidethedeployment of essential toitsabilityachieve itssecond outthefunctionsoutlinedabovecarry willbe The proposed institution’s capacitytoeffectively Guiding theFederal Spending Power outcomes.” purse, toinfluenceandbringaboutnationalpolicy capacity, especiallythrough thepowerof Government ofCanadadoeshave substantial the federal spendingpower, andwithit“the Fund (LCEF), are positive butinsufficientsteps coupled withthefive-year LowCarbonEconomy funds collectedfrom thefederal carbonbackstop, currently contemplated. Theplantodistribute action from thefederal government thanis closing thePCF-Paris gapwillrequire greater As hasbeenargued throughout thisreport, emissions reduction measures. the inevitably asymmetriceconomicimpact of that willbeborneby different regions dueto and toaddress theimbalanceinburdens effectively inducegreater emissionsreductions spending powercanandshouldbeusedto care across thecountry. Inthiscase,thefederal into adoptinguniversal hospitalandmedical the 1950sand1960stoinduceprovinces of thisabilityistheusefederal transfers in ism.” Publius:TheJournal ofFederalism tal RelationsinCanada: TheEmergence of Collaborative Federal- 88 Cameron, D. andSimeon,R.1January, 2002.“Intergovernmen- otherwise mightnothaveotherwise accessto. a role insettingprioritiesareas it This provides thefederal government often through transfers to the provinces. spend inareas outsideitsjurisdiction, federal government having themeansto relative toitsneedsresults inthe responsibilities. Thisexcess revenue outits ownconstitutional needs tocarry much larger share oftaxroom thanit The federal government occupiesa Federal SpendingPower 88 Perhaps themostfamiliarexample 32(2)49–72.pg. 50.
49 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 50 | THE ROAD TO PARIS contemplated by existinggovernment policies. emissions reductions beyond what iscurrently new projects andpoliciestoinduceadditional forward-looking. Investments mustbeaimedat to meetCanada’s 2050target, must be efforts necessary the deepdecarbonizationefforts both closethePCF-Paris gapandtosupport policies thathave already beenenacted.To investments thathave already beenmadeor not beusedtocompensateprovinces for Critically, thisadditionalfederal fundingmust years is toosmallandtime-limited–$2billionover five anditsdivisionintotwotranches, participation from receiving fundingtoincentivize ongoing case foritsexampleofexcluding non-participants LCEF inparticular, althoughinstructive inthis towards achieving Canada’s Paris targets. The and Opportunity 90 Trottier Energy Futures Project. April 2016.Canada’s Challenge low_carbon_economyfund.html. www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2017/06/ Economy Fund. 89 Government ofCanada.25 October, 2017.LowCarbon biomass/ biofuels.” the electricitysupply, [and]increasing theuseof of fossilfuelsforenduses,decarbonisation Canada’s energy options,including “reduced use include asignificantandcostlytransformationof the pathway tomeetingthe2050targets will multiple sectorsoftheeconomy. For example, measuresinvestments incomplementary across Canada’s 2050targets willrequire significant deep emissionsreductions tomeet necessary carbon-pricing regimes. Moreover, achieving the need tobemadeinparallelCanada’s various measuresinvestments incomplementary thatwill federal money isneededtofundthesubstantial Rather, amuchlarger andongoinginfusionof 89 – to serve asanenduringsolution. –toserve . pg.8. Environment andClimate ChangeCanada 90 . https:// program.” that itwasessentiallyawealth-redistribution the NEP–Alberta’s andSaskatchewan’s fears the basicchallengewhichithadinheritedfrom that FPTgovernments hadnever, “fullyaddressed to ratifytheKyoto Convention lieswiththefact for example,muchoftheblamefailure longstanding anxieties.Aswasdiscussedearlier, are challengingbecausethey are imbuedwith Negotiations around emissionsreduction policies change. approach toeffectively addressing climate governments toagree onapan-Canadian previously contributedtotheinabilityofCanada’s reductions measures. Failure todosohas across jurisdictionsassociatedwithemissions address theasymmetriceconomicimpacts must alsobeemployed tosubstantively policy tosucceed,thefederal spendingpower reductions, forpan-Canadianclimatechange In additiontoinducingsignificantnewemissions sion ReductionsAmongst SourcesandProvinces 92 Macdonald,D. 2013.AllocatingCanadian Greenhouse GasEmis Change Burden-Sharing Agreement. pg.4. 91 Macdonald,D. 20June,2017. on jurisdictionaltoes. most needed reductions thatare required intheplacesthey are effective way toinducetheadditionalemissions to meetingthosetargets. Itisalsothemost of thesecostsmore equitablewillbenecessary Financial compensationtomake thedistribution will bearinachieving Canada’s Paris targets. address theasymmetricburden provinces toolthefederalprimary government usesto The federal spendingpowershouldbethe had available tomake costsmore equal.” federal government did notuseallthepowersit the federal spendingpower, butatthetime,“the could perhapshave beenavoided withuseof 91 Thefailure oftheKyoto process withoutconfrontationally stepping Why CanadaNeedsaClimate- . pg.60. 92 - design willbe criticaltohelpingalleviate the provinces. Thisfeature ofthenewinstitution’s would thuslikely flowtotheemissions-intensive percentage ofthissecondenvelope’s funds in termsofburden sharing,adisproportionate fairnessbetweenjurisdictions namely tosupport When combinedwiththisenvelope’s othergoal, effectiveness andcost-effectiveness perspective. measurescomplementary –from both an host manyofthemostpromising potential overall and,more specifically, wouldalso would have boththehighestcapacity to reduce likely thattheemissions-intensive provinces Given thenature oftheireconomies,itishighly measures couldbeexpectedtohave. them andthewidereconomicimpactthese produce, thecostsassociatedwithimplementing reductions thatthesemeasures wouldlikely available toeachjurisdiction,theemissions high level, measures thepotentialcomplementary reduce” measure wouldalsoidentify, albeitata economic costs.Additionally, the“capacityto various carbonpricesaswelltheassociated that eachjurisdictionwouldlikely achieve at based onmodellingoftheemissionsreductions This “capacitytoreduce” measure wouldbe allocated. element offundingwouldbemoststrategically measurement toinformdecisionsonhowthat function todevelop a“capacitytoreduce” new institutionshouldleverage itsforecasting reductions are mostneeded.To thatend,the emissions-intensive jurisdictions where these of emissionsreduction projects inthevery this transfer couldenabletargeted inducement the goalofinterregional equityinburden sharing, balance cost-effective emissionsreductions with measuresfunding forcomplementary that aside asubstantialproportion ofthefederal inthisrespect.especially important Bysetting The second‘selective’ fundingenvelope willbe transfer is an important part ofdoingthat. transfer part isanimportant benefit ofthefederal climatechangemitigation possible anddisqualificationfrom receiving the designed toenable–shouldbemadeashigh framework thatthisinstitutionalarrangementis ofthesolution change institution–notbeingpart intheproposedcost ofnotparticipating climate aspossible.Thus,theopportunity participate all governments beasstrongly incentivized to FPT governments canprovide, itisessentialthat unpopular decisionsthatnationalunitybetween of thebroad politicalcover fortakingpotentially this newinstitutionismeanttoprovide consists stick. Given thatoneofthecriticalbenefits access toacarrot canbeausefulproxy fora climate changemitigationtransfer. Lackof a jurisdictionfrom receiving fundingfrom the in theproposed institutionshouldalsodisqualify substantively coerce theother, non-participation neither order ofgovernment hasthepowerto Finally, intheCanadiancontext,where have previously blocked progress onthisfile. overcome someofthebiggestobstaclesthat across jurisdictions,enablingCanadato asymmetric impactofclimatechangemitigation
51 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 52 | THE ROAD TO PARIS jurisdictions. potential forbiastowards board members’home would beadvisableasitreduce the project approval subcommittee toanexpert emissions-intensive provinces –delegationof composition ofitsboard –skewed towards character andtheproposed asymmetric funding. Given theinstitution’s intergovernmental with thepowertomake decisionsonproject independent yet intergovernmental organization institution wouldrepresent auniquemodelasan If suchadesignwere adoptedtheproposed public fundsanddelivering value formoney. maximum impactwhileprudentlymanaging of howanindependentorganization canachieve asusefulexamples Genome Canada,couldserve as theCanadaFoundation forInnovation or creation. Federally created foundations,such all governments atthetimeofinstitution’s that are clearlyunderstoodandagreed toby made according toatransparent setofcriteria of bias–fundingdecisionswouldneedtobe avoid thepotentialforbias–orappearance made, andthedesignoftransfer itself.To implications forbothhowthosedecisionsare of project fundingandallocation,thiswouldhave proposed institutionshouldhave finalapproval Should itbedecidedthattheboard ofthe Two potentialoptionspresent themselves. who isempowered tomake thefinaldecision. fundamental questionthatmustbeanswered is approval ofproject fundingisconcerned,the governance. Specifically, insofarasthefinal to theproposed federal transfer concernsits The finaldesignelementtoaddress withrespect Governance of the Federal Transfer expertise.” because they comewithasealofneutralfiscal recommendations are generallyadopted program’s fundingallocations,“theCGC’s government makes thefinaldecisionon that program. WhileAustralia’s Commonwealth government onhowtoallocatefundsunder equalization program, advisesthefederal led agencywhichadministersthecountry’s Commission (CGC), anindependentandexpert- of funds.TheAustralianCommonwealthGrants roleevidence-based advisory ontheallocation independent institutioncanplay aneutraland Australia provides aworkablemodelofhowan funding approvals istooambitiousanapproach, institution tomake finaldecisionsonproject Alternatively, ifempoweringtheproposed institution’s funding. the needforperiodicreplenishments ofthe accountability wouldstillbemaintainedthrough institution. Undersuchascenario,democratic would provide maximumindependencetothe fund thatisdepletedandperiodicallyreplenished administering thetransfer from asequestered makers to approve theirrecommendations – itself –thatis,withoutrequiring electeddecision- the board beempowered toapprove projects in termsofthedesigntransfer. Should The foundationsmodelcouldalsobeinstructive the CCME oranFMM. decision-makers, such as the federal government, another body that would becomposed of elected making authority regarding thetransfer resting with role on theallocationof funds, withfinal decision- institution’s board would beassigned an advisory to ourproposed institutionwouldmeanthat the Centre. pg.1.https://mowatcentre.ca/equalization-at-arms-length/. 93 Béland,D. andLecours,A.2012.Equalization atArm’s Length.Mowat 93 Transposing suchanarrangement in whichpolicieswerebeingdrivenby EU-level bureaucrats. such astheUnitedKingdomandGermanytookissuewithimpositionofatop-downapproach states were notsuccessfulandrejectedonthreeseparateoccasions.Ineachcase,powerful occurring asearly1990.Earlyattemptsatburden-sharingagreementsbetweenmemberstates Conference withministerial-level meetingsbetweenEuropean environmentalandenergyministers European countriesbegantodevelop emissionsreductionstargetsaftertheToronto voluntary The Triptych Model(1997) change policymaking. capacity-based financialcompensationcancontributetosuccessfulconsensus-basedclimate holds theprincipleofequitableburdensharingatitscore.Thus,itoffershelpfullessonsinhow The European Union(EU)offersa comparatorthatisbothstructurallysimilartoCanada’s andthat European bubble”. Energy Policy 95 Phylipsen,G.Bode,J.Blok,K. Merkus, H.Metz,B.1998.“ATriptych sectoral approach to burden differentiation; GHGemissionsinthe University Press. 83-102.pg.84. Berkhout, F. (eds).ClimateChangePolicy intheEuropean Union:Confronting theDilemmasofMitigationandAdaptation? 94 Haug,C.andJordan, A.2010. “Burden inJordan, sharing:distributingburdens A.Huitema,D. orsharingefforts?” van Asselt,H.Rayner, T operating energy-intensive sectors,andother domesticsectors. the bulkofmemberstateemissionsintothreedistinct categories:thepowersector, internationally Developed atUtrechtUniversity inearly1997,thisapproachtookitsnamefromseparationof Eventually, the “Triptych model” provided thebreakthroughneededtoovercome thisstalemate. a convergence inlivingstandardsacrossEU memberstates. efficiencystandardsand such asreductionsincoal-basedpowerortheadoption ofindustry-wide efficiency standards.Thisdatacouldthenbeused tostudythedifferentialimpactofassumptions metrics forpopulationgrowth,climate,fuelmix, standardofliving,economicstructureandexisting atthenationallevel andtheirprospectiveof eachcategory growthratesbasedonforecasted Burden Allocation,theTriptych Model,andtheClimateEnergyPackage Lessons fromtheEuropean Union 26(12)929-943.
94 95 Themodelofferedanalysis Cambridge:Cambridge
53 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 54 | THE ROAD TO PARIS European emissionsreductiontarget. from arelatively acceptanceofabinding worse-offposition and wereessentialtoachieving of memberstatesrevenues towardsthosecountriesperceived tobeenteringthepolicyagreement to exceed. from theircurrentemissionslevels, whichnosinglememberstatewouldbeallowedorrequired identifyingawindowof+/-20percent Instead, negotiatorssoughttoaddressequityconcernsby to themodel. (mostly duetorelianceoncoalasanenergysource)thatwouldhave requiredsignificantrevisions the challengingcombinationofbelow-average standardsofliving andhigheremissionsprofiles on toabandontheTriptych becausethetennewestentrantsintoEUpresented model,partly and memberstatesadjust. GDP perpersonstatesaswellseveral vulnerablesectors otherexceptions aimedathelpcertain wasearmarked allowances ETS cent of per ten to low totalling from high fund transfer solidarity for addition offinancialcompensationtoincreasethelikelihood ofpoliticalagreement.Aspecialized reduction inemissionsbelow1990levels by 2020. The European Commissionspearheaded negotiationsfocusedonanewtargetof20percent allocate theremaining60percentofEurope’s emissions. impending UNFCCCmeetinginCopenhagennecessitatedanewburden-sharingagreementto into force,creatinganemissionstradingmarket for40percentofallEUemissions.By2008,the Union andtheEuropean Trading –theEU’scarboncap-and-tradesystementered System(ETS) The subsequentdecadesawmajorchangesinEUclimatepolicyastennewcountriesjoinedthe The ClimateandEnergyPackage (2008) their aggregateallowance. according totheirowninternallydeterminedpriorities,solongasnationaltotalsremainedwithin allowances. Thismeantthatstateswerefreetodirecttheirownemissionsreductionsinitiatives targets onagiven memberstate,thenumbersweretaken inaggregatetodeterminenational than usingtheforecastedreductionsforeachofthreecategoriestoimposesector-based The flexibilitybuiltintotheTriptych modelwasacrucialelementinitsoriginaladoption.Rather National preferences, European norms andcommonpolicies 98 Volger, J. 2011.“EUPolicy onglobalclimatechange:thenegotiationofburden sharing” inThomas,D. (ed). 97 Haug,C.andJordan, A.2010. “Burden Sharing”.pg.88. 96 Macdonald,D. andProvinces 2013.AllocatingCanadianGreenhouse GasEmission ReductionsAmongstSources 97 Targets werenegotiatedbasedonGDPperpersonwithinthisbandwiththecrucial 98 Together, theseconcessionsamountedtoasignificantredistribution . NewYork: Palgrave MacMillan. 96 TheCommissionmadethedecisionearly Making EUForeign Policy: . pg.77. policies tailored tothese sectorsasappropriate. generated so thatitcanbeusedtocraft specific intensive trade-exposed(EITE) industries canbe concern suchastheelectricity sectorandenergy- doing, informationabout sectorsofspecial costs associatedwiththese reductions. Inso that helpstoidentifymore clearlytheeconomic group potentialemissions reductions inaway advantage ofmodelslike theTryptich isthatthey similar totheEU’sTryptich model(seebox). The estimations wouldbecarriedoutusingamodel that context.Ideally, theseassessmentsand with various levels ofreduction ambitionwithin and thecostseconomicimpactsassociated by ahighlevel estimationofthecarbonprices capacity assessmentwouldbeaccompanied reducejurisdiction tofurther itsemissions.This assessment oftheoverall capacityofeach in eachcycle wouldbetoconductahighlevel The firststepthattheinstitutionwouldtake harmonized withtheinstitution’s businesscycle. be adopted,thetimelinesofthatcycle couldbe Should a“deplete-and-replenish” fundingmodel to provide authoritative advice onthesematters. makers, ideallytheinstitutionitselfwouldbeable would likely needto besetby politicaldecision- reductions identifiedasatarget forthatcycle, business cycle, andthequantityofemissions and coursecorrections. Whilethelengthofeach also allowforregular reassessment ofprogress into smallermore manageablechunksandwould reductions required toclosethePCF-Paris gap ofbreakingvirtue upthelarge totalofemissions A cyclic approach ofthistypewouldhave the process beingrepeated atregular intervals. would discharge itsmandate.We envisionthis process through whichthenewinstitution remaining taskistobrieflydescribethe With thisanalysisnowcomplete,theonly A Potential Model Cycle: The Institutional Assessment and Advisory its Paris targets. required forCanadatoremain oncoursetomeet cycle thatmettheemissionsreductions totals reduction allocationplanforthatassessment the taskofagreeing onanationalemissions information, decision-makers wouldthenhave offered by afederally-run FMM.Armedwiththis discussion inamore neutralsettingthantypically play arole inconvening decision-makers fora and, ifdeemedappropriate, theinstitutioncould briefings wouldbeoffered toalljurisdictions and provided todecision-makers. Individual information wouldbemadepubliclyavailable capacity ofeachjurisdictionwascompleted,this Once anassessmentoftheemissionsreduction the institutionwould alignitsplanning. outlined anemissions reduction trajectory orpathway along which that atthetimeof itscreation, decision-makers willhave also 99 Thisdescriptionoftheinstitution’s businesscycle assumes sector. frompartners theprivate sectororbroader public by governments aloneorinconjunctionwith cost-effectiveness. Projects could beundertaken adhere totheprinciplesofeffectiveness and likely impactoftheseprojects sothatthey jurisdiction toselect,develop andassessthe funding, theinstitutioncouldworkwitheach the caseofthisfirstenvelope of‘baseline’ reductions measures ineach jurisdiction.In andadviseonoptimalemissions to support funding toalljurisdictionsby usingtheirexpertise would worktodisbursethebaselinefederal Throughout thisprocess thenewinstitution to inthenationalplan. the jurisdiction-specificreductions targets agreed institution todevelop theirownplansformeeting the various jurisdictionswouldworkwiththenew 99 Oncesuchaplanwasagreed,
55 | THE MOWAT CENTRE Assessment and Advisory Cycle
1Assess $ Assess capacity to reduce in each » 2 Cost
jurisdiction Analysis
An outline of the » range of potential economic costs
3Report Report publicly
and brief » individual governments
4 Discuss Convene meetings 5Plan of decision-makers » Work with jurisdictions to develop plans and 6 Baseline identify projects to
meet targets » Funding
Distribute baseline funding for projects » in all jurisdictions
7Selective Funding Distribute funds from the selective funding envelope to the most promising projects 56 | THE ROAD TO PARIS TO 56 | THE ROAD their emissionsreductions obligations. projects they oughttofundinotherways tomeet provide advicetojurisdictionsonwhatadditional the case,institutionwouldalsobeableto national planthrough thisprocess. Ifthisisnot emissions reductions obligationsunderthe jurisdictions couldpotentiallyfulfillalltheir successes insecuringfundingforprojects, suite ofprograms selectedandjurisdictions’ Depending onthecost-effectiveness ofthefull recommend forfunding. retain finalauthorityfordisbursementoffunds— fund or–shouldpoliticaldecision-makers wishto institution woulddeterminewhichprojects to all project applicationshadbeensubmittedthe Canada’s Once climatechangemitigationefforts. interregional equityintheeconomicimpactsof effective reductions anditsabilitytohelpimprove estimated abilitytoachieve substantialcost- would beevaluated againstbothaproject’s applications tothis‘selective’ fundingenvelope weighting forthiscomponentoffunding.Assuch, interregional fairnesswouldbegiven significant As discussedearlier, considerationsrelated to from thesecond‘selective’ fundingenvelope. to theinstitutionforadditionalfederal support Additionally, provinces andterritorieswouldapply
57 | THE MOWAT CENTRE 58 | THE ROAD TO PARIS 6 necessary tomeetthem. necessary has consistentlymadeclimatechangemitigationcommitmentsandthenfailedtotake thesteps so are. Given thisuniquecombination offormidableobstacles,itisperhapsnotsurprisingthatCanada problems forwhichthenegative consequencesare notimmediately apparent whilethecostsofdoing FPT governments aswellscientificcomplexityandthenaturalhumantendencytoresist actingon challenge. Itcombinessignificanteconomiccostswithshared constitutionaljurisdictionbetweenthe Tackling climatechangepresents Canadiandecision-makers withaonce-in-a-generationpolicy based understanding ofhowtheirjurisdiction’s makers currently lackthecommon evidence- figuring especiallylargely. First,decision- interrelated problems, withtwoofthese problems are constrainedby anumberofdifficultand toaddressthe stepsnecessary climatechange To befair, Canadian governments’ abilitiestotake Paris targets. – anultimatelymuchmore – 2050 important stage formeetingCanada’s even more ambitious to bothclosethePCF-Paris gaportosetthe under theumbrella ofthePCF, isstillinsufficient progress thathasbeenskilfullygathered together Canada’s governments have maderecently, now. Whileanimpressive firststep,theprogress somethingnewandboldis that thetimetotry climate changefiletodate,however, webelieve enough? Given Canada’s abysmal record onthe what they are doingtosolve thisproblem isnot purposeistopubliclytellthemthat primary organization, asweare suggesting, whose any government wanttocreate andfundan In thiscontext,onecanfairlyask:Whywould CONCLUSION provinces bearingan inequitably–andultimately intensive provinces withoutvoters inthese to significantlyreduce emissionsinemissions- Bluntly, Canada’s governments needtofindaway andwilldosoagain. change mitigationefforts rolean important inscuttlingprevious climate to confront this“elephantintheroom” hasplayed should Canadaseriouslyseektodoso.Afailure will faceasymmetricnegative economicimpacts thing thatiscleardifferent jurisdictions to meetCanada’s Paris targets islacking,one cost-effective emissionsreductions sufficient could worktogethertoachieve effective and of howthevarious provinces andterritories Second, whileacomprehensive understanding collaboratively address thiscollective problem. the distractionsofday-to-day politicsandto long-term planningthatisneededtotranscend not beabletoengageinthetypeofinformed, jurisdictional perspective governments will change. Withoutsuchacomprehensive, multi- of Canada’s approach toaddressing climate fitandcouldintothelargerefforts entirety a meansofensuringthat noprovince orterritory federal spendingpower, thisinstitutionalsooffers providing avehicle forthedeployment ofthe emissions reductions targets. Moreover, by on howbesttocooperatively achieve Canada’s required foranintergovernmental negotiation providing foundations thecommonevidentiary an intergovernmental institutioncapableof collaborative option.We have proposed building In thispaper, wehave provided analternative targets. reductions tomeetCanada’s necessary Paris in amannercapableofachieving theemissions climate changemitigationpolicyontheprovinces the politicallegitimacytounilaterallyimposea unlikely thatanyfederal government wouldhave Canada’s Paris targets. Finally, itseemshighly about jurisdictions thathadoptedoutofworrying being swampedby emissionsincreases inother to foresee theirhard wonemissionsreductions and couldbeeasilyunderminedifcitizens were emissions, butthiswillingnesswillonlygosofar may have astronger willingnesstoreduce provinces todoso. unlikely thatsufficientpoliticalwillexistsinthese if they were toactindependentlyanditseems share ofCanadianemissionsreduction targets face significantlyhighercostsforachieving their Emissions-intensive provinces, forexample, would file are either sub-optimalorunpredictable. option ofgoingitaloneontheclimatechange compelling. For provinces andterritories,the themselves forresolving thischallengeare not The obvious andsimpleoptionsthatpresent overall targets. the economicburden required tomeetCanada’s politically unacceptably–highproportion of carbon-pricing-advisory-note-eng.pdf. the Economy. pg.33. http://neia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ Policy forCanada. 100 Government ofCanada.2009. NationalRoundTable ontheEnvironment and 100 Someotherprovinces Achieving 2050:ACarbonPricing hope thatthiswillsoonchange. levels whichhave We notyet beenforthcoming. governments commensuratetoitsseriousness, innovation andcooperationfrom allofCanada’s generation –isgoingtorequire levels ofeffort, mitigation –likely thepolicychallengeofthis Truly meaningfulprogress onclimatechange butitisnotenough. The PCFisagoodstart, to have anychanceofmeetingthisnewtarget. action isneeded,andneededsoon,ifCanada reduction targets clearlydemonstrates,bold ofmassivelyCanada’s missedemissions history asked tostepupandwriteacheque.Butas yet again,thefederal government isbeing be worked outandsomemay complainthat there are stillmanydetailsthatwouldneedto climate changemitigationinCanada.Naturally, progressidentified asblockingnecessary on the twocentralobstaclesthatouranalysis institution offers aninnovative way ofaddressing The creation ofthisnewclimatechange to overcoming thispolicychallenge. onthisissue,willbeessential been forthcoming level offederal commitment,whichhasnotyet economic impactsasthepriceforaction.This faces theprospect ofanunfairburden ofnegative
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