The Philosophy of the Face and 20Th Century Literature and Art
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Tragedy, Euripides, Melodrama: Hamartia, Medea, Liminality
Vol. 5 (2013) | pp. 143-171 http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_AMAL.2013.v5.42932 TRAGEDY, EURIPIDES, MELODRAMA: HAMARTIA, MEDEA, LIMINALITY BRIAN G. CARAHER QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND [email protected] Article received on 29.01.2013 Accepted on 06.07.2013 ABSTRACT This article examines socio-historical dimensions and cultural and dramaturgic implications of the Greek playwright Euripides’ treatment of the myth of Medea. Euripides gives voice to victims of adventurism, aggression and betrayal in the name of ‘reason’ and the ‘state’ or ‘polity.’ Medea constitutes one of the most powerful mythic forces to which he gave such voice by melodramatizing the disturbing liminality of Greek tragedy’s perceived social and cultural order. The social polity is confronted by an apocalyptic shock to its order and its available modes of emotional, rational and social interpretation. Euripidean melodramas of horror dramatize the violation of rational categories and precipitate an abject liminality of the tragic vision of rational order. The dramaturgy of Euripides’ Medea is contrasted with the norms of Greek tragedy and examined in comparison with other adaptations — both ancient and contemporary — of the myth of Medea, in order to unfold the play’s transgression of a tragic vision of the social polity. KEYWORDS Dramaturgy, Euripides, liminality, Medea, melodrama, preternatural powers, social polity, tragedy. TRAGEDIA, EURÍPIDES, MELODRAMA: HAMARTÍA, MEDEA, LIMINALIDAD RESUMEN Este artículo estudia las dimensiones sociohistóricas y las implicaciones culturales y teatrales del tratamiento que Eurípides da al mito de Medea. Eurípides da voz a las víctimas del aventurerismo, de las agresiones y de las traiciones cometidas en nombre de la ‘razón’ y del ‘estado’ o el ‘gobierno’. -
Behind the Mask the Real Face of Corporate Social Responsibility Contents Christian Aid/Liz Stuart
Behind the mask The real face of corporate social responsibility Contents Christian Aid/Liz Stuart Above: People from communities living around Coca-Cola’s bottling plant in Kerala, India, protesting about the company’s use of their ground water. Front cover: A Shell oil spill in Ogoni. Loveday Fomsi looks into a polluted stream, formerly a source of drinking water. Front cover photo: Sophia Evans/NB Pictures Behind the mask: The real face of CSR 1 Section 1 Unmasking CSR 4 Section 2 Sustained misery: Shell in the Niger Delta 22 Hooked on tobacco: BAT in Kenya 34 Living its values: Coca-Cola in India 44 Section 3 From CSR to corporate social accountability 50 Notes 60 Behind the mask The real face of CSR ‘We have lived so long at the mercy of uncontrolled economic forces, that we have become sceptical about any plan for human emancipation. Such a rational and deliberate reorganisation of our economic life would enable us, out of the increased wealth production, to establish an irreducible minimum standard which might progressively be raised to one of comfort and security.’ Lord Harold Macmillan, UK Prime Minister 1957-631 All day a steady file of people make their way up and Sadly, this story of failure is not new. In 1990, when 1 down the potholed main road running through the country was under military rule, local young Umuechem, going to and from a polluted stream people mounted a protest about the lack of such that is now their only source of water. Large trucks facilities. Shell called in the police, most of the thunder by at regular intervals, on their way to and town was burned to the ground and 80 people from the oil pumping station on the outskirts of were killed. -
From Logic to Animality, Or How Wittgenstein Used Otto Weininger
Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas | 04 (2001.2) FROM LOGIC TO ANIMALITY OR HOW WITTGENSTEIN USED OTTO WEININGER Allan Janik The Brenner Archives Research Institute Innsbruck University I want to regard humans here as animals; as a primitive being to which we grant instinct but not reasoning. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough a primitive means of communication suffices, we do not need to be ashamed of it. Language did not emerge from a reasoning process. On Certainty § 475 It is part and parcel of the view of knowledge advanced in On Certainty that we shall not understand the nature of human knowledge until we grasp how human intelligence develops out of animal instinct. (1) To be sure, Wittgenstein does not in any sense a advance scientific "theory" of human nature such as behaviorism nor does he endorse the views of the lunatic fringe of ethology that humans are merely "naked apes". However, he does think that modern philosophers' failure to acknowledge the epistemological significance of our natural history (2) is intimately linked to a refusal to recongize the limits that nature itself imposes upon an animal that speaks. In effect, he claims that our problems in epistemology are to a certain extent moral problems insamuch as they are rooted in a hybris that makes us unwilling to see ourselves as we really are rather than as we would like to be. (3) Indeed, the assertions that Wittgenstein makes on the basis of facts as general as they are undeniable about how humans learn are so radically different from anything we find the tradition from Descartes to Russell that he has come to be viewed as demented or perverse by philosophers of that ilk. -
The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play, and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W
DePaul University Via Sapientiae College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 8-2012 The idea of mimesis: Semblance, play, and critique in the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno Joseph Weiss DePaul University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd Recommended Citation Weiss, Joseph, "The idea of mimesis: Semblance, play, and critique in the works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno" (2012). College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 125. https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/125 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play, and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy October, 2011 By Joseph Weiss Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts and Sciences DePaul University Chicago, Illinois 2 ABSTRACT Joseph Weiss Title: The Idea of Mimesis: Semblance, Play and Critique in the Works of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno Critical Theory demands that its forms of critique express resistance to the socially necessary illusions of a given historical period. Yet theorists have seldom discussed just how much it is the case that, for Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. -
Hyper-Realistic Face Masks: a New Challenge in Person Identification
Sanders et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications (2017) 2:43 Cognitive Research: Principles DOI 10.1186/s41235-017-0079-y and Implications ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access Hyper-realistic face masks: a new challenge in person identification Jet Gabrielle Sanders1*, Yoshiyuki Ueda2, Kazusa Minemoto2, Eilidh Noyes1, Sakiko Yoshikawa2 and Rob Jenkins1 Abstract We often identify people using face images. This is true in occupational settings such as passport control as well as in everyday social environments. Mapping between images and identities assumes that facial appearance is stable within certain bounds. For example, a person’s apparent age, gender and ethnicity change slowly, if at all. It also assumes that deliberate changes beyond these bounds (i.e., disguises) would be easy to spot. Hyper-realistic face masks overturn these assumptions by allowing the wearer to look like an entirely different person. If unnoticed, these masks break the link between facial appearance and personal identity, with clear implications for applied face recognition. However, to date, no one has assessed the realism of these masks, or specified conditions under which they may be accepted as real faces. Herein, we examined incidental detection of unexpected but attended hyper- realistic masks in both photographic and live presentations. Experiment 1 (UK; n = 60) revealed no evidence for overt detection of hyper-realistic masks among real face photos, and little evidence of covert detection. Experiment 2 (Japan; n = 60) extended these findings to different masks, mask-wearers and participant pools. In Experiment 3 (UK and Japan; n = 407), passers-by failed to notice that a live confederate was wearing a hyper-realistic mask and showed limited evidence of covert detection, even at close viewing distance (5 vs. -
Attuning Poetry and Philosophy
The old quarrel Article Accepted Version De Gaynesford, M. (2020) The old quarrel. Forum For Philosophy. Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/93065/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . Published version at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/theforum/the-old-quarrel/ All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online ATTUNING POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY Maximilian de Gaynesford on the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy Analytic philosophers may find nothing untoward about the following snippet of autobiography: I stopped writing in the fashion of a poet who puts down what sounds good to him and who needn’t defend his lines (either they resonate with a reader or they don’t). Instead, I tried to ask myself, when writing: precisely what does this sentence contribute to the developing exposition or argument, and is it true? You become analytical when you practise that sort of (frequently painful) self-criticism. The author captures what drew many of us towards this way of doing philosophy, what keeps us at it. Quote this to a wider audience however, and you may find people react with a mixture of recognition and horror. Recognition, because the author captures exactly what keeps them away from analytic philosophy. -
What Literature Knows: Forays Into Literary Knowledge Production
Contributions to English 2 Contributions to English and American Literary Studies 2 and American Literary Studies 2 Antje Kley / Kai Merten (eds.) Antje Kley / Kai Merten (eds.) Kai Merten (eds.) Merten Kai / What Literature Knows This volume sheds light on the nexus between knowledge and literature. Arranged What Literature Knows historically, contributions address both popular and canonical English and Antje Kley US-American writing from the early modern period to the present. They focus on how historically specific texts engage with epistemological questions in relation to Forays into Literary Knowledge Production material and social forms as well as representation. The authors discuss literature as a culturally embedded form of knowledge production in its own right, which deploys narrative and poetic means of exploration to establish an independent and sometimes dissident archive. The worlds that imaginary texts project are shown to open up alternative perspectives to be reckoned with in the academic articulation and public discussion of issues in economics and the sciences, identity formation and wellbeing, legal rationale and political decision-making. What Literature Knows The Editors Antje Kley is professor of American Literary Studies at FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany. Her research interests focus on aesthetic forms and cultural functions of narrative, both autobiographical and fictional, in changing media environments between the eighteenth century and the present. Kai Merten is professor of British Literature at the University of Erfurt, Germany. His research focuses on contemporary poetry in English, Romantic culture in Britain as well as on questions of mediality in British literature and Postcolonial Studies. He is also the founder of the Erfurt Network on New Materialism. -
Violence on the Brain: a Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law
VIOLENCE ON THE BRAIN: A CRITIQUE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW Amanda C. Pustilnik* Is there such a thing as a criminally "violent brain"? Does it make sense to speak of "the neurobiology of violence" or the "psychopathology of crime"? Is it possible to answer on a physiological level what makes one person engage in criminal violence and another not, under similar circumstances? Current research in law and neuroscience is promising to answer these questions with a "yes." Some legal scholars working in this area claim that we are close to realizing the "early criminologists' dream of identifying the biological roots of criminality." These hopes for a neuroscientific transformation of the criminal law, although based in the newest research, are part of a very old story. Criminal law and neuroscience have been engaged in an ill-fated and sometimes tragic affair for over two hundred years. Three issues have recurred that track those that bedeviled earlierefforts to ground criminal law in brain sciences. First is the claim that the brain is often the most relevant or fundamental level at which to understand criminal conduct. Second is that the various phenomena we call "criminal violence" arise causally from dysfunction within specific locations in the brain ("localization"). Third is the related claim that, because much violent criminality arises from brain dysfunction, people who commit such acts are biologically different from typical people ("alterity"or "otherizing"). This Article first demonstrates parallels between certain current claims about the neurobiology of criminal violence and past movements that were concerned with the law and * Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. -
Our Social Discontents: Revisiting Fromm's Redemptive Psychoanalytic Critique
KRITIKE VOLUME TWELVE NUMBER ONE (JUNE 2018) 277-292 Article Our Social Discontents: Revisiting Fromm’s Redemptive Psychoanalytic Critique Ian Raymond B. Pacquing Abstract: Modern society is marked with utmost ambivalence. There is the utmost desire to be free, creative, and productive. Yet, our creative and productive desires trap us and now control our own freedom to become. Couple this inconsistency with the rapid sociostructural changes, fragmentation of traditions, and dissolution of communal well-being, what we have is a life of uncertainty. It is a life debased from its very ontological foundation with the transmission of technorationalities of the capitalist industry. In modernity, we could no longer speak of individuality and subjectivity since the very historical thread that serve as its foundation is now wavered towards accumulation and possession of the capital. Moreover, this overleaning towards the capital deadens us unconsciously that we mistake this for reality. The market ideology with all its rationalizations reifies human consciousness to the extent that we consider the technorationalities as the ontological normative structure. As a result, there is a growing dislocation of subjectivity which leads to neurotic social behaviors and inner social contradictions. As a result, we have our own social discontents. It is then the aim of this paper to ponder on the psychosocial effects of the market economy. I argue that there is a need to look at the effects of this economic system that perpetually delineate subjective experiences and plunge humanity into incontrovertible pseudo images. It is at this point that Fromm’s radical psychosocial interpretation of society becomes binding. -
PARATEXTUALITY and the LOST URTEXT Anthony Enns the Term
ANTHONY ENNS PARATEXTUALITY AND THE LOST URTEXT Anthony Enns The term “paratext” refers to the elements of a literary work that ac- company the text but are not considered part of the text itself, such as title pages, introductions, annotations, appendices, etc. Gérard Genette famously described the paratext as the “threshold…between the inside and the outside” of a text, and this threshold represents “a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an influence on the public, an influence that…is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it” (2). In other words, the contextual information and critical commentary provided in the paratext ultimately serves the author’s own interests by ensuring that the text is interpreted correctly: “The way to get a proper reading is…to put the (definitely assumed) reader in possession of information the author considers necessary for this proper reading…[such as information] about the way the author wishes to be read” (209). Genette also noted that paratextual elements have expanded over time in order to satisfy “the educated public’s growing curiosity about the ‘making’ of the text and about the unearthing of versions the author had abandoned” (339). Paratexts were thus increasingly seen as necessary “supplements” or “acces- sories” to a literary work, and a text without a paratext is now viewed as “a power disabled…like an elephant without a mahout” (410). If a text without a paratext is “an elephant without a mahout,” then a “paratext without its text is a mahout without an elephant,” which Gen- ette dismissed as “a silly show” (410). -
Faculties and Phrenology
Reflection University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online The Faculties: A History Dominik Perler Print publication date: 2015 Print ISBN-13: 9780199935253 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2015 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199935253.001.0001 Reflection Faculties and Phrenology Rebekka Hufendiek Markus Wild DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199935253.003.0009 Abstract and Keywords This Reflection considers how the science of phrenology relates to the notion of faculty. It asks: why is phrenology so appealing? It illustrates this with reference to modern culture. Firstly, the Reflection argues, phrenology relies on an easy line of reasoning: moral and mental faculties are found in specific areas of the brain. The more persistently such faculties prevail, the bigger the respective part of the brain. Secondly, phrenology produces easy visible evidence. You can read the mental makeup of someone by looking and feeling the lumps in their head. The Reflection goes on to look at the history of phrenology and relate it to issues of race. Keywords: phrenology, brain, race, head, history of phrenology Page 1 of 8 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Universitat Basel; date: 20 June 2018 Reflection In Quentin Tarantino’s western Django Unchained (2012), the southern slave owner Calvin Candie, played by Leonardo DiCaprio, explains to his guests the unwillingness of slaves to rise up and take revenge by putting the skull of a recently deceased slave on the dinner table. -
Genres of Experience: Three Articles on Literacy Narratives and Academic Research Writing
GENRES OF EXPERIENCE: THREE ARTICLES ON LITERACY NARRATIVES AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH WRITING By Ann M. Lawrence A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Rhetoric and Writing – Doctor Of Philosophy 2014 ABSTRACT GENRES OF EXPERIENCE: THREE ARTICLES ON LITERACY NARRATIVES AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH WRITING By Ann M. Lawrence This dissertation collects three articles that emerged from my work as a teacher and a researcher. In Chapter One, I share curricular resources that I designed as a teacher of research literacies to encourage qualitative research writers in (English) education to engage creatively and critically with the aesthetics of their research-writing processes and to narrate their experiences in dialogues with others. Specifically, I present three heuristics for writing and revising qualitative research articles in (English) education: “PAGE” (Purpose, Audience, Genre, Engagement), “Problem Posing, Problem Addressing, Problem Posing,” and “The Three INs” (INtroduction, INsertion, INterpretation). In explaining these heuristics, I describe the rhetorical functions and conventional structure of all of the major sections of qualitative research articles, and show how the problem for study brings the rhetorical “jobs” of each section into purposive relationship with those of the other sections. Together, the three curricular resources that I offer in this chapter prompt writers to connect general rhetorical concerns with specific writing moves and to approach qualitative research writing as a strategic art. Chapters Two and Three emerged from research inspired by my teaching, during which writers shared with me personal literacy narratives, or autobiographical accounts related to their experiences with academic research writing.