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Home , The Governance of China, Xi Jinping Thought

POLICY BRIEFING 171 MARCH 2018

CHINA IN THE ERA OF ‘ THOUGHT’: FIVE KEY TRENDS FOR AFRICA

COBUS VAN STADEN1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS This policy briefing identifies five trends that could affect Africa, emerging from ’s 19th African universities and think tanks Congress, held in Beijing in October 2017. The congress 1 need to develop greater capacity saw the institutionalisation of several of President Xi to keep track of changes in China, Jinping’s key initiatives, which will determine Chinese building on links with Chinese policy over the next few years. While widely discussed in institutions. the Global North, the direct implications for Africa have Governments should draw on these received little attention. Xi is the general secretary of the 2 skill sets and integrate this specialist Communist Party of China (CPC), and is seen as a more knowledge of China into national and hard-line and hands-on leader than his predecessors. The regional development and security congress entrenched this power by enshrining ‘Xi Jinping policy frameworks. Thought’ in the CPC constitution. This means he is now African universities and think tanks seen as a political leader on par with , a figure should remain in close conversation fundamentally shaping the core of the 89 3 with African governments to advise million-member party. His views on China’s development them of new developments in the Belt trajectory and growing global role will have an impact on and Road Initiative, and their possible both domestic and foreign policy. Drawing on Xi’s writings, impacts on African development. this policy briefing identifies five key trends for African governments and populations: the strengthening of CPC African civil society should demand rule in both China’s internal and external behaviour, the full 4 the most suitable Internet regime for institutionalisation of the , China’s their countries, taking into account support for UN reform, the expansion of China’s military that certain governments are drawing role on the global stage, and stricter Internet governance. on China’s campaign for Internet control to advance illiberal regimes. INTRODUCTION: WHY SHOULD AFRICA TAKE to with Chinese characteristics. The People’s NOTE OF THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS? Republic of China is prosperous and strong. It would not exist without the CPC.’4 When Xi stepped onto the stage of the Great Hall of the People in October 2017, he was not only the focus of China focuses significant funds on African capacity the 2 300 black-suited party delegates. The world was building, training thousands of African officials, journalists, waiting for clues about how he would use the power he and students per year. In 2016 China increased the number had consolidated through his first term, and how this of training scholarships to junior African politicians to would shape China’s global role. 1 000 per year, from the 200 per year allocated from 2011 to 2015. More anglophone African students are studying These questions particularly concern Africa. The in China than in the UK and US combined. The total 2 projected Sino-African trade for 2017 is $180 billion number of African students in China increased 26-fold, (down from the 2014 peak of $210 billion) and China has from just under 2 000 in 2003 to 50 000 in 2015.5 African been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009. China’s governments should take into account that this capacity African investments passed the $100 billion milestone building is framed by CPC doctrine, especially since the in 2016, a 50-fold increase since 2010. Yet few analyses publication of CPC Document No. 9 in 2013, which called of the congress’s implications for China–Africa relations for the elimination of a range of so-called Western ideas have emerged. (for example, constitutional democracy, neoliberalism, civil society promotion) from Chinese institutions. This policy briefing uses Xi’s statements at the congress and his earlier writings to pinpoint five trends in China’s This does not mean that African students (or their Chinese policy towards the Global South and Africa specifically. instructors) are being ‘brainwashed’. Rather, all knowledge Here a caveat is important: the language used at the is ideologically inflected, and African governments congress is coded and vague. The dearth of specific pursuing skills training should take into account the policy pronunciations forces reading between the lines. complexities of the Chinese academic environment. Secondly, there is a tendency to read these indicators as Xi’s personal directives. However, as Jeffrey A Bader3 has BELT AND ROAD pointed out, many have been a part of CPC thinking for a long time. What changes is their prioritisation and mode The 19th Party Congress reaffirmed that the Belt and Road of implementation. Xi’s vision as a leader emerges less Initiative (BRI) lies at the heart of Xi’s foreign policy. The from a set of personally issued diktats and more from how BRI is an integrated infrastructure and development he interprets and curates existing party doctrine. scheme made up of the Silk Road Economic Belt, linking China with Europe overland through central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a series of sea THE CENTRALITY OF CPC RULE routes connecting China to Kenya and Egypt, on the Xi’s writings reveal a long-standing dedication to way to Europe. Not only did the congress restate Beijing’s strengthening the CPC as the overarching governing dedication to the trillion-dollar scheme, but it was also mechanism for China, from the local to the international the occasion for the scheme’s inclusion into the CPC level. While the party has of course been central to Chinese constitution.6 This means that Africa is now explicitly governance since the ascendancy of Mao Zedong in 1949, part of a key mechanism of Beijing’s development and the 19th Party Congress showcased Xi’s reassertion of foreign policy. party power at all levels of government. The BRI should thus also be a key factor in the continent’s China’s relationship with African countries is dominated thinking about China. While it is officially limited to two by bilateral ties. However, African governments should African countries, it opens up development and financing recognise that there is no clear distinction between the opportunities for wider parts of Eastern and Northern Chinese state and the CPC. ’s key Africa, and possibly further afield, owing to Chinese- themes of ‘The ’ and ‘Socialism with funded cross-border infrastructure. The political will Chinese Characteristics’ are fundamentally rooted behind the scheme also means projects face fewer hurdles in the centrality of the party in all aspects of Chinese to financing approval, despite Beijing’s attempts to stem decision-making: ‘The leadership of the CPC is essential capital outflow.7

2 SAIIA POLICY BRIEFING 171 However, the BRI could also increase debt burdens expanding China’s military: ‘[W]e must … build a and derail local development agendas. Kenya’s recently powerful and modernized army, navy, air force, rocket inaugurated Nairobi–Mombasa railway line (a BRI-related force, and strategic support force, develop strong and project) was enabled by a loan equivalent to 6% of the efficient joint operations commanding institutions for country’s gross domestic product. The repayment burden theater commands, and create a modern combat system could affect the government’s future development agenda with distinctive Chinese characteristics.’12 and result in humiliating trade-offs, as was recently seen when the Sri Lankan government granted a 99-year lease China’s ambition to expand its military capability to offset its debts with Beijing. directly affects Africa. Its first overseas military base was operationalised in Djibouti, on the east African coast, The October congress provided a clear signal that the in 2017. Chinese troops have also joined multilateral BRI would remain central to China’s dealings with peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Mali and South Africa. While it commits China to openness and global Sudan, as well as anti-piracy initiatives off the Somali integration in an era when many global powers are coast. Africa provides strategic positioning on the Indian pulling up the drawbridge, its vision is of a Beijing-centric Ocean rim, and crucial in-theatre training for Chinese global trade and investment order. African governments military personnel. interested in partnering with China, whose enthusiasm is tied to Beijing’s being an alternative to Western In his speech, Xi made the importance of this kind of dependency, will have to consider the BRI’s implications. experience clear: ‘A military is built to fight. Our military must regard combat capability as the criterion to meet in all its work and focus on how to win when it is called AFRICA-CENTRED UN REFORM on.’13 The CPC Congress is not the occasion for specific policy discussion. Most pronouncements are broad, and in coded While Africa has certainly gained from these initiatives, language. So a reader of Xi’s speech will be struck by his an expanded military role for China should lead Africa sudden shift into specificity regarding the UN: ‘China to grapple with the implications of the continued supports the United Nations in playing an active role in militarisation of the superpower presence on the continent, international affairs, and supports the efforts of other and how China’s stated adherence to non-intervention developing countries to increase their representation and and African sovereignty should be interpreted. strengthen their voice in international affairs.’8 INTERNET GOVERNANCE This stance is not new. In a 2005 position paper the Chinese government opposed calls for the UN Security Xi’s first term saw greater pressure on the media, academia Council’s inclusion of countries such as Japan and and the Internet. In 2017 the US-based Freedom House Germany, and instead called for the body to include more labelled China’s Internet as the least free in the world.14 developing countries.9 China has acknowledged that its A new Cyber Security Law compels media companies to own UN membership was aided by African support, store user data and to police content. China is campaigning and it has been a vocal advocate of higher-level African for even greater control of the Internet by national representation.10 The congress suggests that African governments on the grounds of ‘Internet sovereignty’. campaigns for greater representation can probably count Instead of seeing the Internet as a transnational space, on Chinese support. this approach views it as a series of national spaces subject to government control. In his congress speech, GLOBAL MILITARY ROLE Xi called for increased party control over the Internet: ‘We will provide more and better online content and put While China’s official annual military spending ($144 in place a system for integrated Internet management to billion in 2016) still trails that of the US ($600 billion), ensure a clean cyberspace.’15 the military budget was increased by 8.1% in 2018.11 The congress followed an anti-graft crackdown on military Western authorities have accused China of exporting figures and a restructuring of the force, widely seen authoritarian rule.16 However, media scholars such as as consolidating Xi’s control. Calling the congress ‘a Iginio Gagliardone have shown that there is little evidence new historical starting point’, he committed to further that China puts pressure on African governments to

CHINA IN THE ERA OF ‘XI JINPING THOUGHT’: FIVE KEY TRENDS FOR AFRICA 3 adopt its regime of Internet censorship and surveillance.17 7 Wu K & S Chatterjee, ‘Exclusive: China’s Belt Rather, African leaders tend to see its control of the and Road acquisitions surge despite outbound Internet as a prototype that can be implemented locally. capital crackdown’, Reuters, 16 August 2017, Ten African countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, the https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-m-a/ Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The exclusive-chinas-belt-and-road-acquisitions-surge-despite- outbound-capital-crackdown-idUSKCN1AW00K, accessed Gambia, Mali, Uganda and Zimbabwe) closed down 12 March 2018. Internet services completely, or blocked instant messaging 8 Xi JP, ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately or social media sites, in 2016 alone.18 Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a It is important for African civil society to interrogate the New Era: Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the impact of elite relations between African and of China October 18, 2017’, Xinhua, officials on African Internet governance. It is important 18 October 2017b, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ for African populations to keep an eye on African official download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_ decision-making about Internet access, and to track Congress.pdf, accessed 9 December 2017. the implications of the Internet sovereignty debate for 9 Xinhua, ‘Position paper clarifies China’s stance on UN African Internet access. Security Council reform’, 9 June 2005, http://www.china. org.cn/english/international/131439.htm, accessed CONCLUSION 10 December 2017. 10 FOCAC (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation), ‘China Africa’s relationship with China will be shaped by the calls for more representation of African countries in UN dominant discourses in Beijing. It is crucial for Africa to Security Council’, 24 February 2016, http://www.focac. build capacity, both in government and in civil society, org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t1342707.htm, accessed 10 December to track these developments. Knowledge about the 2017. 11 Lim YL, ‘NPC 2018: China raises military budget by inner workings of the CPC will crucially aid Africa in 8.1% in face of “profound changes” to national security formulating a comprehensive and unified approach in environment’, The Straits Times, 5 March 2018, order to maximise its relationship with this emerging http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-raises- superpower. 2018-defence-spending-by-81-per-cent, accessed 12 March 2018. ENDNOTES 12 Xi JP, 2017b, op. cit., p. 47. 13 Ibid., p. 49. 1 Cobus van Staden is a Senior Researcher: China–Africa at 14 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report 2018, SAIIA. ‘China: Profile’, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- 2 Chinese Embassy in South Africa, ‘Sino-African world/2018/china, accessed 9 February 2018. cooperation makes steady progress’, 17 November 2017, 15 Xi JP, 2017b, op. cit., p. 37. http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/znjl/t1514248. 16 See, for example, Congressional Executive Commission htm, accessed 12 March 2018. on China, ‘The Long Arm of China: Exporting 3 Bader JA, ‘How Xi Jinping Sees the World … And Why’, with Chinese Characteristics’, 13 Brookings, Asia Working Group Paper, 2, February 2016, December 2017, https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ the-long-arm-of-china-exporting-authoritarianism-with- xi_jinping_worldview_bader-1.pdf, accessed 8 December chinese-characteristics, accessed 9 February 2018. 2017. 17 Gagliardone I, ‘China and the African Internet: 4 Xi JP, ‘CPC leadership is essential to Chinese socialism’, Perspectives from Kenya and Ethiopia’, Index in II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Comunicación, 3, 2, 2013, pp. 67–82. Press, 2017a, p. 18. 18 Turianski Y, ‘Balancing Cyber Security and Internet 5 Sun Y, ‘Political party training: China’s ideological Freedom in Africa’, SAIIA Occasional Paper, 275, 2018, push in Africa?’, Africa in Focus, Brookings Blog, http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/1292-balancing- 7 May 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ cyber-security-and-internet-freedom-in-africa/file, africa-in-focus/2016/07/05/political-party-training-chinas- accessed 9 February 2018. ideological-push-in-africa/, accessed 9 December 2017. 6 Xinhua, ‘“Belt and Road” incorporated into CPC The African Governance and Diplomacy Programme Constitution’, 24 October 2017, http://news.xinhuanet. is funded by the Swedish International Development com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm, accessed Cooperation Agency 12 March 2018.

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