Traders vs. Relationship Managers: Reputational Conflicts in Full-Service Investment Banks∗ Zhaohui Chen, Alan D. Morrison, McIntire School of Commerce, Sa¨ıdBusiness School, University of Virginia. University of Oxford. William J. Wilhelm, Jr.,y William G. Shenkir Eminent Scholar, McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia. March 28, 2013 ABSTRACT We present a model that explains why investment bankers have struggled in recent years to manage conflicts of interest. The model captures two conflicting dimensions of reputation. On the one hand, banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, bankers can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. Unproven banks favor type reputation over behavioral reputation; being ethical in our model is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model also sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavior- and type- reputation concerns. ∗Chen and Wilhelm received support from McIntire Foundation's King Fund for Excellence and the Walker Fund; Morrison received support from the Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation. We thank Jonathan Cohn, Sheridan Titman and seminar participants at the University of Texas for their helpful comments. yCorresponding author. McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia, Rouss & Robertson Halls, East Lawn, P.O. Box 400173, U.S.A. email:
[email protected]; tel: 434-924-7666; fax: 434-924-7074 Traders vs. Relationship Managers I.