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Afghanistan at Transition: the Lessons of the Longest

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1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Afghanistan at Transition: Lessons of the Longest War War the Longest Lessons of Transition: Afghanistan at Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Afghanistan Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301- 459- 3366 | www.rowman.com at Transition Lessons of the Longest War Cover photo: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini/Released AUTHOR Anthony H. Cordesman with Aaron Lin ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN ISBN 978-1-4422-4080-3 Ë|xHSLEOCy240803z v*:+:!:+:! MARCH 2015 A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy Blank Afghanistan at Transition Lessons of the Longest War AUTHOR Anthony H. Cordesman with Aaron Lin March 2015 A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2015 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-4080-3 (pb); 978-1-4422-4081-0 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... IX I. THE STRATEGIC VACUUM IN AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA ..... 1 US STRATEGY WRITES OFF AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN, AND THE REGION ................................. 7 A QDR That Largely Wrote Off the Region ............................................................................ 7 President Obama’s Statement on Afghanistan on May 27, 2014 ........................................... 8 President Obama’s New Strategy Speech at West Point ........................................................ 9 NO CLEARER LEAD FROM NATO ............................................................................................. 12 A CIVIL FAILURE BY USAID, THE UN AND OTHER DONORS ................................................... 15 No Real Future Aid Plans or Afghan Deliverables on Reform ............................................. 15 The London Conference in December 2014 ......................................................................... 16 The Death of the Tokyo Conference Deliverables ................................................................ 16 President Ghani on Reform .................................................................................................. 17 II. UNCERTAIN PRIORITIES FOR US STRATEGY ........................................................... 20 US “STRATEGIC TRIAGE” IS CRITICAL ..................................................................................... 20 THE ISSUE IS NOT RESOURCES, BUT STRATEGIC PRIORITY ..................................................... 21 THE COST-BENEFITS OF UPPING THE ANTE .............................................................................. 22 III. THE “THREAT” FROM AFGHAN POLITICS, LEADERSHIP, GOVERNANCE, AND PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ............................................................................................... 23 THE SHELL OF DEMOCRACY: THE REALITY OF THE PRESIDENCY, POWER BROKERS, PARALLEL DONOR COUNTRY GOVERNANCE.............................................................................................. 23 The Reality of National Versus Local Governance............................................................... 23 Parallel Governance by ISAF Regional Commands and National Air Donors ................... 23 The US Role in Weak and Failed Afghan Governance ......................................................... 25 A DIVIDED, POOR, AND STRUGGLING NATION ......................................................................... 30 FAILED AND CORRUPT 2014 ELECTIONS THAT DID MORE TO DIVIDE THAN UNITE ................ 31 AN AWKWARD AND UNCERTAIN COMPROMISE ....................................................................... 34 A Deeply Uncertain Compromise at the Top ........................................................................ 34 Limited Progress in Signing a Bilateral Security Agreement ............................................... 35 UNCERTAIN AFGHAN LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: TWO YEARS TOO LATE? .................. 36 THE HERITAGE OF FAILED GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION .................................................. 37 Corruption and Incompetence .............................................................................................. 38 Keeping Corruption in Perspective ...................................................................................... 46 THE BUDGET CRISIS IN REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES .......................................................... 47 The Failure to Win US and Other Outside Domestic Political Support ............................... 54 The Combined Threat from Host Country Politics, Governance, and Budgeting ................ 57 IV. THE ANSF AND THE THREAT FROM AN INTENSIFYING CONFLICT ................ 58 The President’s “Sell by Date”: Slashing Advisors and Support Regardless of Conditions in Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................... 58 The Impact of a Late and Erratic Effort to Create Effective Afghan Forces ........................ 59 The US as a Self-Inflicted Threat .................................................................................................................... 60 A Brief and Largely Ineffective US Surge ...................................................................................................... 61 Host Country “Threat” .................................................................................................................................... 62 Rushing Force Development beyond Afghan and ISAF Capacity ........................................ 64 The Uncertain Threat ........................................................................................................... 70 The Uncertain Integrity of ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting on the Growing Security Challenges at the Time of Transition .................................................................................... 75 The Warnings in UN and SIGAR Casualty Data and Other Reporting ................................ 79 iv | Anthony H. Cordesman The Final UN Report on Casualties through the End of 2014 Calls ISAF and Department of Defense Reporting into Even More Serious Question ........................................................... 85 Estimating the Growth of Taliban and Other Insurgent Influence and Control ................... 91 Mixed Data on Popular Support for the ANSF ..................................................................... 95 V. PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE ANSF ............................................... 102 THE QUESTION OF SIZE AND COST .......................................................................................... 102 UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANSF...................................................................................... 111 Grossly Over-classifying Data on Afghan Combat and Police Forces for Political Ends . 111 Issuing Meaningless Metrics on ANSF Capability .............................................................. 112 AN UNREADY AND CORRUPT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR .............. 114 UNCERTAIN PROGRESS IN THE ANA ....................................................................................... 116 FOCUSING ON FORCE GENERATION RATHER THAN COMBAT CAPABILITY ............................. 117 THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE POLICE CHALLENGE ...................................................................... 119 Designing a Force with Limited Paramilitary Capability .................................................. 120 A Force in Transition at the Time of Transition ................................................................. 123 Token Paramilitary forces ................................................................................................... 124 THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ........................................................ 126 OTHER ISAF COMMAND VIEWS IN MID TO LATE 2014 .........................................................
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