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Egyptian Migration to Libya

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Egyptian Migration to Libya International Organization for Migration (IOM) Cairo [email protected] www.egypt.iom.int/publications.htm twitter: @IOMCairo Egyptian Migration to Libya 14 The estimated 330,000 to 1.5 million Egyptians in Formal Remittances sent from Libya (ml USD) 12 Libya remit up to 33 million USD every year. It is estimated that 147,800 Egyptian migrants returned 10 from Libya via Tunisia and Sallum in February and 8 March 2011. The implications for the Egyptian 6 economy of the current crisis in Libya are 4 significant. Egyptians working in Libya come 2 predominantly from rural areas and Lower Egypt 0 and the majority of them have completed only basic 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 education. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Source: Monthly bulletin of Central Bank of Egypt (2009). Migrants in Libya While accurate statistics are not available, Libya According to IOM data based on official sources, as of remains the major destination country in North Africa. March 9, 65,000 Egyptians entered Tunisia from Libya UN statistics show that migrants represented 10.5 per while 82,800 returned from Libya through the Sallum cent of the total Libyan population in 2010, the highest border in the month 19 February to 22 March. Based percentage in North Africa (IOM, 2010a) and in 2009 on this data, it can be estimated that 147,800 these migrants sent home an estimate 1 billion USD in Egyptians lost their job in Libya (and potentially all of remittances, or 1.7 per cent of Libya’s GDP (World their belongings) due to the crisis and may now be Bank, 2011). looking for employment in Egypt. Libya is also a transit country for irregular migrants 60,000 from sub-Saharan Africa aiming to reach Europe. 50,000 Those who fail to cross the Mediterranean tend to stay in Libya to seek employment informally. The 40,000 informality of migration to Libya makes it more 30,000 difficult to estimate the composition of its migrant 20,000 population. 10,000 Egyptians returning from Libya 0 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Official sources estimate that between 330,000 (IOM, (19 -25 (26 Feb - 4 (5 - 11 (12 - 18 (19 Mar - 2010b) and 1.5 million Egyptians worked in Libya Feb) Mar) Mar) Mar) 22 March) before the current crisis. Egyptians Non Egyptians Source: IOM operations data based on daily reports from Egyptian Based on latest available data, Egyptians in Libya send authorities home between 19.5 and 33 million USD in remittances every year. This figure can be considered a low Egyptian migrants in Libya estimate due to the nature of migration to Libya and the fact that many migrants may prefer to send money Libya ranks on top of the list of destinations of home through informal channels. Egyptian migrants. This is the result of geographical proximity and various open border policies that until For further information: Roberto Pitea, IOM Cairo mob: +2 012 3125886, tel: +2 02 23580011 ext 202 or email: [email protected] or [email protected] International Organization for Migration (IOM) Cairo Egyptian Migration to Libya 2006 allowed Egyptians to enter and reside in Libya Education level of Egyptian youth who with an ID only. migrated to Libya University A 2009 nationally-representative survey of 15,000 and above Illiterate Egyptian youth reveals that when asked about their 11% 28% aspired migration destination, 32 per cent of Egyptian General youth chose Saudi Arabia as the most aspired Secondary 4% destination followed by Kuwait (18%), UAE (16.7%), Italy (6.4%) and Libya (4.6%). The same study reveals Post- Primary that 36.4 per cent of Egyptian youth thinks that Libya secondary 18% Vocational is the easiest destination for irregular migration institute Secondary (followed by Italy, 34.7%), while 14 per cent think it is 9% Preparator 15% an easy destination for regular migration (second to y 15% Saudi Arabia, 46.9%) (IOM, 2011). Source: IOM (2011) Unemployment and underemployment are the main push factors for Egyptian youth to migrate. Looking at The vast majority of youth that had migrated to Libya youth aged 15-29 that had migrated in the past (either reported being satisfied with the experience. independently for work or study or as family Compared to youth who migrated to other dependants), Libya is the top destination for Egyptian destinations, young Egyptians who worked in Libya youth with 38 per cent of youth that migrated to were less likely to have entered with a valid visa (56%), Libya, followed by 29.4 that migrated to Saudi Arabia. to have had a work contract before leaving (8%) but they were more likely to send remittances (54%) and as likely to accept a job below their qualifications than Main regions of origin of Egyptian youth who migrated to Libya the average migrants. Rural Upper Urban 90% Egypt Governora 80% 34% tes 70% 8% 60% 50% 40% Rural Urban 30% Lower Lower 20% Egypt Egypt 10% 51% 7% 0% Had a good Entered with Had valid Sent Accepted job Source: IOM (2011) migration valid visa work remittances below one's experience contract qualifications Based on the same survey, the majority of Egyptians Libya All destinations who worked in Libya and were living in Egypt in 2009 References came from Lower Egypt (58%) and from rural areas Central Bank of Egypt (85%). Egyptian youth who migrated to Libya tend to 2009 Monthly Bulletin http://www.cbe.org.eg/Publications.htm have a basic level of education (8 years of schooling or International Organization for Migration 2010a World Migration Report 2010, IOM Geneva less, with a quarter being illiterate). The remaining 24 2010b Remittances and Investment Opportunities for Egyptian Migrants. per cent has a vocational education background and IOM Cairo 15 per cent has a general secondary high school or 2011 Migration Aspirations of Egyptian Youth. IOM Cairo, forthcoming. World Bank university background. 2011 Migration Aspirations and Experiences of Egyptian Youth, 2011 For further information: Roberto Pitea, IOM Cairo mob: +2 012 3125886, tel: +2 02 23580011 ext 202 or email: [email protected] or [email protected] .
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