Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Labor Movements in Tunisia and Egypt WP Drivers vs. Objects of Change in Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Dina Bishara S

Egyptian and Tunisian unions have played radically different roles in their countries’ transition from authoritarian rule since the ouster of longstanding Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in early 2011. The legacy of different variations of authoritarian rule as well as the history of the respective labor movements has had significant consequences for their ability to shape post-transition politics. Whereas the Egyptian labor movement is fragmented, and control over labor organizations has become a battlefield for competing political forces in Egypt, organized labor emerged as an actor in its own right, playing a leading role in the Tunisian transition by miti- gating political conflict and helping to move the process along. In both Tunisia and Egypt, “official” unions will need to address issues of internal reform to become more effective representatives of their members’ interests. In addition, the legal framework will have to be significantly altered, at least in Egypt. German and European policy- makers, unions, and political foundations should support steps toward more effective and empowered unions that can represent workers’ rights by encouraging legal reform and supporting independent unions through training and exchange.

Both Egyptian and Tunisian workers par- played a key role in supporting anti-Ben ticipated massively in the uprisings leading Ali protests. to the ouster of longstanding presidents in Since the ouster of Mubarak and Ben Ali, early 2011. Although the Egyptian Trade both Egypt and Tunisia have witnessed the Union Federation (ETUF) discouraged Egyp- emergence of a multiplicity of new unions tian workers from participating, workers and union confederations, posing a chal- staged nationwide strikes and protests in lenge to established unions. In Egypt, the the three days prior to Mubarak’s ouster in increase in the number of unions has not February 2011, placing added pressure on been matched by any changes in the legal the Egyptian military to respond to popular framework governing labor organization. In mobilization. The Tunisian General Labor Tunisia, despite a more permissive legal en- Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Tra- vironment, new unions have been struggling vail, UGTT), especially its local branches, to compete with an organizational power-

From September to December 2013, Dr. Dina Bishara was a fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization SWP Comments 1 in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office January 2014 in framework of the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1

ful and resource-rich UGTT. In both coun- ever more subservient to the regime and tries, the post-Mubarak and Ben Ali periods unwilling to defend workers’ interests. In have seen a great deal of workers’ mobiliza- addition, there were allegations that the tion in the face of deteriorating economic regime had interfered more heavily in conditions. According to Kamal Abbas, union elections beyond the level of the top head of the Center for Trade Unions and leadership. This had the effect of further Workers’ Services, more than 4,500 fac- isolating the ETUF leadership from rank- tories across Egypt have closed since the and-file concerns as well as driving activists January 2011 uprising, resulting in 12,000 to press for their demands outside official workers losing their jobs. In Tunisia, un- ETUF channels. Frustrated with official employment rates have increased from channels of representation, angered by the around 13 percent in May 2010 to 17.6 adverse effects of the accelerating pace of percent in January 2013, and food prices economic liberalization in the mid-2000s, have increased by 8 percent from the end and emboldened by the decrease in the of 2010 to the end of 2012. government’s violent repression of workers’ mobilization, Egyptian workers staged an unprecedented number of protests in the Different authoritarian legacies 2004–2011 period. These strikes and pro- To understand the challenges that Egypt’s tests occurred largely without the support and Tunisia’s unions are faced with today of the ETUF leadership. Nearly two years and the roles that they can play in the tran- before Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, sition, one has to understand their histories a group of real estate tax collectors formed and their positions at the time of national Egypt’s first independent union since 1957, independence. The ETUF is the product thereby directly challenging the state of the post-independence regime in Egypt corporatist system in place. Within two and was created by President Gamal Abdul years, three groups – namely pensioners, Nasser in 1957 as a tool to control workers’ teachers, and health technicians – had discontent. Under Nasser, rank-and-file followed suit. workers were given economic benefits, in- In Tunisia, by contrast, the UGTT was cluding job security, in exchange for their formed in 1946, that is, 10 years prior to political quiescence. Within the frame- independence. Indeed, the UGTT’s major work of a state-dominated economy, unions role in the struggle for Tunisia’s indepen- played no collective bargaining role but dence made it difficult for the regime of were rather used as instruments for politi- Habib Bourguiba to bring it under its com- cal control. The ETUF was given monopoly plete control, as the union’s bases main- over workers’ representation, and the for- tained a commitment to the UGTT’s inde- mation of more than one union per profes- pendence from Tunisia’s rulers. Over the sion or industry was prohibited by law. The years, the UGTT experienced a great deal of ETUF’s leadership enjoyed access to sub- internal struggle that resulted in relations stantial institutional resources. Critics in with Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes vary- the independent labor community charge ing between periods of tight political coop- that this led to rampant corruption with- eration and periods of relative autonomy. in the organization, especially at higher The most contentious times in the relation leadership levels. Nasser’s successors con- between the UGTT and Tunisia’s rulers tinued to use the ETUF as a tool to maintain include 1978 and 1985, when the UGTT control over workers while retrenching the openly opposed the regime’s economic economic benefits previously bestowed policies and engaged in militant activities. upon workers. In January 1978, the UGTT organized a gen- In the last 10 years of Mubarak’s rule, the eral strike, resulting in severe repression ETUF’s leadership was increasingly seen as and the imprisonment of the organization’s

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

2

secretary general. On other occasions, how- greater contestation over the rules gover- ever, especially during the 1960s and 1990s, ning trade union affairs rather than an op- the UGTT vowed to respect the regime’s portunity for the labor movement to assert economic policies and restrain workers’ itself as an actor with agency of its own. activism. In addition, the UGTT’s leadership Labor activists saw the revolution as an demonstrated its loyalty to Ben Ali by sup- opportunity to push for freedom of organi- porting his presidential campaigns in 1995 zation, both in practice and on the legal and 1999. Nevertheless, even during peri- front. On 30 January 2011, in the midst of ods where the top leadership was loyal to the 18-day uprising, independent unions Ben Ali, the UGTT’s local branches managed established under Mubarak announced the to retain a certain level of independence. establishment of the Egyptian Federation Still, local UGTT branches did not support of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU). The the 2008 revolt in the Gafsa mining basin. number of independent unions has expo- The revolt, which lasted over a period of six nentially increased since. In late 2013, months, involved a wide range of activists EFITU claimed a membership of around who protested unemployment and the eco- 300 unions. The Egyptian Democratic Labor nomic marginalization of the region. It was Congress (EDLC) was also formed in the harshly repressed by security forces. aftermath of the January 2011 uprising and In sum, while the ETUF had become formally established as an independent a tool of political control of workers for trade union federation with a proclaimed Egypt’s authoritarian rulers, the UGTT membership of 300 unions in April 2013. proved to be a much less pliant organiza- For the first time in Egypt’s contem- tion. On the eve of the January 2011 up- porary history, the ETUF’s monopoly over risings in Egypt and Tunisia, the UGTT workers’ representation was thus broken, therefore had much greater credibility as in practice if not in law. The EFITU and the a national actor with a history of relative EDLC have received international recogni- autonomy and militancy at key junctures tion from organizations such as the Inter- in Tunisian history than the largely dis- national Labour Organization, the Inter- credited ETUF. In January 2011, the ETUF national Trade Union Confederation, and actively discouraged Egyptian workers from Public Services International. In addition participating in anti-regime protests. The and in contrast to the ETUF, they boast a UGTT, on the other hand, played a key role democratically elected leadership, which in organizing anti-Ben Ali protests, despite makes them legitimate representatives of the fact that the organization’s top leader- their members’ interests. ship did not formally endorse these protests until two weeks into the uprising. Here, the activism of the UGTT’s local branches Legal and organizational challenges forced the executive bureau to eventually Yet, the nascent independent unions face support anti-Ben Ali protests. a myriad of organizational and legal ob- stacles that make it extremely difficult for them to effectively represent workers’ Egypt’s embattled labor rights, let alone exert political influence In the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, a largely during the transition. Independent unions discredited official trade union organiza- remain in legal limbo, given the fact that tion was confronted with an ever growing trade union affairs in Egypt continue to be effort by long-time activists to revitalize the governed by law no. 35 (1976), which bans realm of trade union affairs and competi- the establishment of more than one union tion among political actors over the control per profession or industry. This effectively of labor organizations. As a result, the post- means that independent unions have diffi- Mubarak era turned out to be a period of culties collecting membership fees and

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

3

gaining the recognition of employers’ rep- Government interference resentatives and administrations. In addition, the power struggle that has Independent labor activists’ efforts to plagued Egypt’s transitional politics push for major legal reforms have been has been reflected in the struggle over the met with stiff resistance from Egypt’s new redefinition of the rules governing interest rulers as well as the official unions that representation in post-Mubarak Egypt. Trade have a vested interest in maintaining the union affairs have thus emerged as a major status quo. Both the Supreme Council of arena of political struggle, rendering the the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled Egypt organizations the targets of political con- from February 2011 to June 2012, and the testation rather than drivers of reform. Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Under Morsi’s rule, the FJP tried to use Party (FJP), which was in power until early corporatist arrangements in place for polit- July 2013, resisted the passing of a new ical control. Thus, the appointment of an trade union law. FJP member, Khaled al-Azhari, as minister Notably, Egypt’s post-Mubarak rulers not of manpower in Morsi’s first cabinet, which only resisted the passage of a more liberal otherwise only included a handful of FJP- union law, they appeared set to restrict affiliated ministers, was a clear indication workers’ right to organize strikes and pro- that the FJP wanted to have a strong say in tests. As early as March 2011, the SCAF labor affairs. Also, the FJP put forward a approved a decree issued by the Egyptian draft law on labor unions that would have cabinet, criminalizing protests that disrupt prohibited the establishment of new profes- work. The transition government installed sional unions, preserved the structure of by the military in July 2013 has enacted a centralized decision-making within the controversial protest law that places restric- ETUF, and made it difficult for workers to tions on workers’ ability to organize and leave the ETUF without risking losing their puts them at risk of imprisonment for their access to social funds. The close connection involvement in strikes. between ETUF membership and access to In the absence of effective formal chan- these funds poses significant obstacles for nels of communication with employers, the emergence of independent unions. including the state, workers have had to In a further move to expand control organize strikes and protests to raise their over workers’ organizations, President Morsi demands. In addition, independent union- issued decree no. 97 in November 2012, ists have also relied on mass mobilization introducing important amendments to as a tool to exert pressure on the relevant Egypt’s 1976 labor law. The amendments authorities to recognize them as legitimate included a provision to remove any ETUF representatives of their members’ interests. board member over the age of 60. This Yet, the need to invest in organization- move was meant to revitalize the organi- building and the fragmentation of the in- zation by introducing new figures and dependent union scene undermine their removing Mubarak-era unionists. Most con- capacity to exert political pressure, at least troversially, however, the decree gave the in the short run. Divisions over strategies or minister of manpower the right to nomi- personal differences have made it more dif- nate replacement candidates. As such, the ficult for the two independent trade union decree signaled Morsi’s willingness to use federations created after Mubarak’s ouster executive power to intervene in trade union to collectively advance their shared goals. affairs, thereby continuing with – rather These goals include the passage of a new than breaking – the authoritarian practices trade union law that would guarantee trade of the past. The FJP then tried to use its union pluralism, realizing constitutional position of power to strengthen its foothold clauses that support workers’ rights, as well in the ETUF, by stacking the organization’s as improving workers’ economic conditions. executive board and federation-level boards

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

4

with unionists sympathetic to its own legalized in 2011. Founded by former UGTT ideological orientation. activist Habib Guiza, the CGTT champions Following President Morsi’s ouster in trade union pluralism and advocates giving July 2013, the political struggle over trade workers viable alternatives for representa- union affairs in Egypt continued. In a sur- tion. According to CGTT officials, the orga- prising development, Kamal Abu Eita, nization has increased its membership former head of the independent union for from 10,000 in 2011 to 50,000 in 2013. In real estate tax collectors, replaced Khaled May 2011, The Union of Tunisian Workers al-Azhari as minister of manpower. It is not was formed by former UGTT Secretary entirely clear what motivated the military- General Ismail al-Sihbani. Al-Sihbani had installed government’s decision to appoint resigned from his position in 2000 follow- Abu Eita to this position. Given his history ing internal struggles, accusations of of activism and his popularity in the in- authoritarian practices, and corruption dependent trade union movement, his charges. A third trade union federation, appointment can be viewed as an attempt the Organisation Tunisienne du Travail, is by Egypt’s new political leadership to court thought to be affiliated with the Islamist the independent trade union movement. Ennahda movement, given that it was Much like his FJP predecessor, however, formed by Islamist unionists. Ennahda lead- Abu Eita was charged with using his posi- ers, however, deny any organizational links tion to change the composition of the between the party and the federation. ETUF’s executive board. Soon after his ap- In contrast to Egypt, the emergence of pointment, a struggle erupted within the the independent unions in Tunisia has not ETUF that resulted in the ousting of the posed a significant challenge to the UGTT’s organization’s president, Gibali al-Maraghi, status as the strongest and most organized and several Muslim Brotherhood unionists union federation. Although they present from the ETUF’s executive board. In fact, 80 some competition to the UGTT and offer its percent of the ETUF’s executive board mem- discontented bases with viable alternatives, bers were replaced. Although it is not clear due to the UGTT’s history of relative inde- who was behind the reshuffling, it is clear pendence, the UGTT has retained a great that Abu Eita endorsed the decision. Both deal of credibility in the post-Ben Ali peri- Abu Eita and Abdul Fatah Ibrahim, the new- od. In addition, many UGTT activists are ly-selected ETUF president, deny Abu Eita’s committed to reforming the organization involvement in the reshuffling and insist from within because they value its history that the process was legally sound. Still, and are keen on maintaining its legacy. some activists in the independent labor It is worth noting that, unlike Egyptian community argue that the reshuffling con- law, Tunisian law recognizes trade union tinues a tradition of executive interference pluralism; though, in practice, no union in union affairs. confederation other than the UGTT was legalized before Ben Ali’s ouster. In the post-Ben Ali period, new union confeder- The UGTT’s mediating role ations have been legalized but they face Much like in Egypt, the 2010/2011 uprising tremendous obstacles in competing with in Tunisia was a catalyst for increased work- the UGTT, given its large membership base ers’ organization. Since then, three major and superior financial resources. In addi- trade union federations have been formed tion, only the UGTT has been allowed to or legalized in addition to the UGTT, as well take part in collective bargaining proce- as several smaller ones. The Tunisian Gen- dures, and the new confederations remain eral Labor Confederation (Confédération excluded from tripartite negotiations with Générale Tunisienne du Travail, CGTT), the government and Tunisia’s largest busi- which had been formed back in 2006, was ness association. This again is a difference

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

5

to Egypt, where no regular practice of tri- geographic reach and its ability to mobilize partite negotiations exists. Activists in the thousands of members render it more new confederations argue that both the powerful than many of Tunisia’s current UGTT and Ennahda do not support trade political parties. union pluralism in Tunisia. UGTT activists Third, given the lack of political plural- deny such accusations but insist that the ism under Tunisia’s authoritarian regimes, unions representing the greatest number the UGTT had become a haven for political of workers per sector should be the ones activists who often turned to union activ- involved in collective bargaining. Ennahda ism as a main outlet for political activism. officials recognize the legality of trade Even political activists not involved in union pluralism but argue that it frag- union activism had turned to the UGTT for ments workers and weakens the union support. The UGTT thus acted as an um- movement. brella organization that supported politi- cal activists and took up issues such as the struggle for human rights and general The UGTT as a mediator freedoms. Having filled a sort of political Beyond representing workers’ concerns, vacuum under successive authoritarian in the post-Ben Ali period, the UGTT has regimes, the UGTT acquired a great deal emerged as a national actor and assumed of political clout. a mediating role between various political Indeed, despite having some reservations parties, among other methods by brokering concerning the current role of the UGTT, several rounds of national dialogue to most political parties have a lot of respect help mitigate the political crisis in Tunisia. for the UGTT and applaud its attempt to Three sources of strength have positioned bridge political differences during the un- the Tunisian UGTT to play a leading medi- folding political crisis. Notably, the coun- ating role in post-Ben Ali politics: the try’s main political parties have agreed to UGTT’s political clout, its organizational participate in the national dialogue spon- strength, and its history of militancy. sored by the so-called quartet (comprised of First, given the UGTT’s history and its the UGTT; the Tunisian League for Human role in the national independence move- Rights; the Tunisian Union for Industry, ment, the UGTT perceives itself – and is Trade and Handicrafts; and the National perceived by many Tunisian activists and Bar Association) in September 2013. In political observers – as being a constitutive addition, there is widespread recognition player in the national development project. that only an organization of the stature of As such, UGTT activists resist a strict differ- the UGTT could play such a mediating role. entiation between the unionist and nation- However, the UGTT’s efforts did not alist dimensions of the UGTT’s activism. always yield success. Indeed, the Ennahda In this sense, the UGTT’s prominent role in party refused to join a round of national Tunisia’s current transition is seen as an dialogue initiated by the UGTT in February extension rather than a departure from its 2013, citing the participation of certain historic role, even though the UGTT’s cur- parties it considered illegitimate, such rent political involvement is much deeper as Nidaa Tounes, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, than before. minister of interior under President Bour- Second, the UGTT is one of Tunisia’s guiba and Tunisia’s interim prime minister most powerful players in organizational following the resignation of Mohammed terms. The UGTT’s membership has almost Ghannoushi in February 2011. Ennahda doubled (from 350,000 to 700,000 mem- did, however, agree to participate in the bers) since Ben Ali’s ouster, with the inclu- latest round of dialogue organized by the sion of workers without permanent con- UGTT following the July 2013 assassination tracts into the UGTT. The UGTT’s extensive of Mohammed Brahmi, former leader and

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

6

founder of the People’s Movement party. branches, there is a sense that the UGTT’s During this round of dialogue, the UGTT political commitments may place con- presented a “roadmap,” outlining a number straints on the leadership’s capacity to of measures to get out of the political dead- negotiate on behalf of its bases in a timely lock that had plagued the country. The manner. For instance, workers with tem- roadmap also provided a timeline for the porary contracts mobilized in November government’s resignation and steps toward 2013 to demand permanent contracts, but the selection of a more consensual govern- negotiations over their demands were ment. delayed because the UGTT’s central leader- In December 2013, after months of polit- ship was not available to attend the nego- ical deadlock and weeks of negotiations, tiations. Given the pressing nature of some Tunisia’s national dialogue resulted in the of the issues involved, it is likely that the nomination of Mahdi Jomaa as head of a organization’s bases may become aggravat- caretaker government that is supposed ed by such delays. to replace the Ennahda-led government. The UGTT’s political involvement has Jomaa’s election was not consensual, how- also come at the cost of addressing serious ever, highlighting ongoing disagreements internal reform issues. These include among Tunisia’s political parties. He internal corruption, the underrepresenta- received 9 out of 11 votes, but parties of tion of women in the organization’s leader- the major opposition bloc, the National ship positions, issues of internal democra- Salvation Front, as well as Nidaa Tounes cy, and membership expansion. Even those abstained from the vote because Jomaa sympathetic to the UGTT point to the need was already the minister of industry in for a serious effort in dealing with internal the Ennahda-led government and thus corruption issues. There also is recognition perceived as close to Ennahda. With the that decision-making within the UGTT is nomination of a caretaker government still dominated by men and that it will being only one of the first steps in the im- require significant efforts to reverse the plementation of the roadmap, it is foresee- prevailing organizational culture. This able that the process will continue to be is linked to broader concerns regarding difficult. internal democracy. Finally, the UGTT’s leading role in trying to resolve the current political crisis exposes Challenges to the UGTT it to a wider range of criticism, especially Despite its strengths, the UGTT faces a num- from political parties. Ennahda representa- ber of challenges as it assumes such a prom- tives have warned, for instance, that the inent political role. These include the need UGTT risks becoming a partisan player by to balance its political and social functions allying itself closer with the leftist political as well as the need to address internal re- parties. Ennahda was also critical of the form issues, competition from newly-formed UGTT’s reliance on street mobilization as a trade union federations, and greater vulner- tool to pressure the government, especially ability to criticism from political parties. prior to the start of the July 2013 national By choosing to prioritize its political over dialogue round. For their part, some leftist its social role at this juncture, the UGTT forces have complained that the UGTT has risks taking steps that might alienate its not done enough to champion revolution- bases, such as committing to maintaining ary goals and instead chosen to take a more the social peace without consulting them. consensual approach. Critics also point to the fact that the UGTT has not paid sufficient attention to social issues as a result of its current engulfment in political affairs. At the level of the local

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

7

Conclusions and recommendations the credibility of the UGTT, the organiza- The legacy of authoritarian rule in Tunisia tion is well-positioned to propose recom- and Egypt as well as the pre-independence mendations concerning the country’s history of labor activism has played an economic policy. The UGTT will remain a important role in conditioning the pivotal player in the transition as it con- opportunities available for workers’ tinues to mediate deep political divisions organizations in the two cases of transition between Tunisia’s political parties. At the from authoritarian rule. It would be same time, however, the UGTT will have to mistaken, however, to assume that such maintain a delicate balance between its legacies determine the course of workers’ political engagement and its socio-eco- activism in both countries. nomic agenda. If successful in its mediating In the short to medium term, the rules efforts, this will ease the pressure on the governing workers’ representation in Egypt organization and boost its credibility, both will remain highly contested. There are among its bases and the wider Tunisian

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und indications that Egypt will not easily move public. In the long-term, however, the UGTT Politik, 2014 beyond its history of corporatism, given will need to address issues of internal All rights reserved entrenched interests in old union struc- reform as well as resume its social role These Comments reflect tures and fears among Egypt’s rulers of more vigorously in order to avoid internal solely the author’s views. losing control over workers. dissent and splintering. SWP Workers need to have effective organiza- European policymakers should support Stiftung Wissenschaft und tions that can channel their interests in workers’ rights by encouraging the Politik German Institute for order to avoid frequent recourse to strikes adoption of a new trade union law in Egypt International and and protests as the primary means to air that guarantees freedom of organization Security Affairs their grievances. This can only be done and by addressing the issue of the privileges Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 through legal changes that allow for free- that “official” unions (ETUF and UGTT) 10719 Berlin dom of organization, ensure that new have. European NGOs already working with Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 unions are recognized by both the state and Egyptian and Tunisian unions, such as the www.swp-berlin.org private employers, and remove any restric- Friedrich Ebert Foundation, should con- [email protected] tions on the new unions’ ability to collect tinue to support new independent unions ISSN 1861-1761 membership fees and thus the opportunity by providing training in areas such as to build financially viable organizations. collective bargaining and union manage- The question as to whether trade union ment as well as encourage the consolida- pluralism is a necessary step to ensure tion of mechanisms for internal union freedom of organization remains extremely democracy. They might also be able to offer controversial in Egypt. Critics typically guidance on the question of trade union argue that it would weaken workers’ pow- pluralism, drawing on the variety of repre- er, while advocates hold that it would sentational models adopted across Euro- ensure that Egypt will move beyond state pean countries. In addition, they should control of workers’ organizations and that support the established union federations competition among unions would only to address issues of internal reform. Finally, benefit workers. Regardless of one’s posi- these organizations may also encourage tion, however, it is clear that Egyptian independent activists from new union workers should be permitted a voice in federations to coordinate campaigns with shaping any future legal framework con- regards to shared goals. cerning their representation. In Tunisia, as in Egypt, workers face increasingly strained economic conditions, and unions will need to play a more active role in bringing socio-economic issues to the forefront of transition politics. Given

SWP Comments 1 January 2014

8