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brill.com/shrs osce and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process
Carey Cavanaugh us Ambassador (retired); Professor of Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, University of Kentucky’s Patterson School; Executive-in-Residence, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract
The Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh has directed unprecedented engagement from key world powers on this decades-old dispute. osce’s first peacemaking effort survived a rocky start, evolving into a functional multi-faceted conflict management instrument. While the envisioned “Minsk Conference” was never held, not one of the myriad peace proposals adopted, no status determination for Nagorno-Karabakh ever made, and no refugees or lands returned, the Minsk Process may still be considered a success. Frequent criticism notwithstanding, it has kept Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in a near continuous diplomatic dialogue, restrained large-scale fighting, and belied fears of a significant regional conflagration. That is a noteworthy achievement.
Keywords osce – Nagorno-Karabakh – conflict – mediation – Minsk Group – Armenia – Azerbaijan
osce and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process
Context On the tenth day of his presidency George W. Bush received a telephone call from French President Jacques Chirac to convey congratulations and to brief him on an important topic: Nagorno-Karabakh. Chirac had already coordinated with Russian President Vladimir Putin on this dispute a week before Bush
* From 1999–2001, Carey Cavanaugh was the us Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts and osce Minsk Group Co-Chair, and led the Key West Peace Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh.
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formally took office. Furthermore, Bush and Putin had spoken by phone just 1 day earlier, touching on several key issues and noting the importance of developing us-Russian cooperation to facilitate solutions to global problems. Chirac had met on 26 January 2001 in Paris at the Elysée Palace with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan President Heydar Ali- yev following the admission of both states the day before to the Council of Europe where they reaffirmed their commitment to make every effort to find a peaceful solution to the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Chirac’s talks in Paris were building directly upon work that the osce Minsk Group Co-Chairs – France, Russia, and the United States – had been advancing for almost 2 years. A settlement proposal, in fact, that had emerged from a direct dialogue between the Armenian and Azerbaijan presidents. Chirac and Putin believed that these discussions had signaled a potential path forward and the French president conveyed to Bush the latest state of play and his strategy. Kocharyan would be back in France for a formal state visit on 12 February, and Chirac would have both Aliyev and Kocharyan in Paris on 5 March to continue the Nagorno-Karabakh discussion. Putin had already engaged the Armenian and Azerbaijan leaders in Moscow, had met with Aliyev in Baku in January to push the current efforts forward, and would huddle with Chirac in Stockholm on 23 March on this and other matters. It was now the United States’ turn to take the diplomatic lead. In the tenth week of Bush’s presidency, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (osce) peace talks took place at former us President Harry S Truman’s Little White House in Key West, Florida. As one of his first major acts, the new us Secretary of State Colin Powell directly promoted a N agorno-Karabakh settlement, opening the Key West Peace Talks on 2 April with Presidents Ali- yev and Kocharyan, plus the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, seated around Truman’s personal poker table. Once the talks concluded, both presidents flew to Washington, d.c. to meet separately with President Bush in the White House. The remarkable pace of exchanges and actions detailed above underscores the significant role the osce has played during the conflict between Arme- nia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh through its Minsk Process.1 These mediation efforts have garnered unprecedented high-level engagement by the
1 References to the osce Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh have been muddled by the emergence in 2014 of a new 3-party “Minsk Process” – the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine – which includes osce, Russia and Ukraine. Talks under this format led to the September 2014 signing of the “Minsk Protocol”, implementing a ceasefire in Ukraine’s Don- bass region. Since then, there have been multiple rounds of “Minsk peace negotiations” that have included representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s
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Introduction
The aim of this article is to describe and analyze the convoluted evolution and development of the osce Minsk Process, its emergence as a multi-faceted conflict management instrument, as well as its merits today as a mechanism for mediating a peaceful resolution of this dispute. The history and origins of
Republics, as well as the February 2015 “Minsk Agreements” brokered under the Normandy Format (Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine). 2 The fighting that erupted on 2 April 2016 (the 15th anniversary of the osce Key West Peace Talks) represented the greatest loss of life in this conflict since a durable ceasefire was first established in May 1994. Well over 100 civilians and military personnel were killed, with estimates as high as 350 casualties. See “Background Briefing on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” us Department of State, Vienna, Austria, 16 May 2016 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2016/05/257263.html).
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Development of a New Peace Process
Present from the Beginning osce has been focused on Nagorno-Karabakh since the early stages of the dis- pute, even before the Organization’s formal inception. Indeed, this was the first
3 For general background on the region and the conflict see Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003); for more detail on the panoply of negotiation activities and the current state of play see Philip Remler, Chained to the Caucasus: Peacemaking in Karabakh, 1987–2012 (New York: Inter- national Peace Institute, 2016) and Laurence Broers, The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Default- ing to War, Chatham House Research Paper, July 2016.
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4 The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe called upon csce to respond to emerging post- Cold War challenges in Europe. This provided a mandate that supported these initial efforts toward conflict resolution and later led to the establishment of permanent institutional and operational structures, as well as the renaming in December 1994 of csce to osce. 5 The Minsk Conference was to have 11 participants: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czecho- slovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United States, plus “interested parties” (i.e., elected and other representatives of the Nagorno-Karabakh region). See “Sum- mary of Conclusions,” csce First Additional Meeting of the Council, Helsinki 24 March 1992. Belarus, then the newest csce member, offered to host this conference and the Council im- mediately accepted. 6 Boutros-Ghali communicated this directly to the csce CiO. The un Security Council sub- sequently issued a statement “commending and supporting” the efforts undertaken within the framework of csce (un Document S/23904, 12 May 1992) and in its first resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh reconfirmed its “support for the peace process being pursued” within the csce framework (un Security Council Resolution 822, 30 April 1993). 7 Maresca provides an almost poetic description of this “kick-start” (his term) at Rome’s Villa Madama, describing the gathering as reminiscent of W.H. Auden’s sonnet, The Embassy. “Highly-trained diplomats, fancily dressed, gathered at a rural villa with little to use but their charm, while far off armies waited for a verbal error with all their instruments for causing
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The 11 states designated by the csce Council to participate in the “Minsk Conference” proved to be not well suited to coordinate and manage effectively an embryonic negotiation process. Some states were heavily engaged in the Minsk Group (Russia, United States) or decidedly bias (Turkey), while oth- ers had sent only local representatives with insufficient interest in the task at hand. Discussions in Rome took place primarily in a 3+1 format (us, Russia, Turkey, plus Italy as chair), and later, upon the inclusion of Armenia and Azer- baijan, a 5+1 format. A key stumbling block in Rome was determining how to include representa- tives of Nagorno-Karabakh and what their status would be. The decision call- ing for a Minsk Conference had spoken only of “interested parties”, and did not address how they would be accommodated in what was already becoming a more complicated process than had been anticipated. The Rome sessions did not go well, nor did later gatherings in Geneva and Stockholm. Increased fighting in the region, however, would prove to be an even greater stumbling block for holding peace negotiations than questions over status. So too would competing efforts to advance a solution. Despite actively engaging in the osce Minsk Group talks in Rome, Russia maintained its own significant indepen- dent mediation approach through Russian Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov (who was a principal in both efforts). us Ambassador John Maresca also trav- eled separately to the region, but did not advance a separate process. Kazakh- stan, though not part of the established Minsk Process, also sought to become involved in peace efforts at the time, seeking to broker a ceasefire along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Further experimentation with the Minsk Group negotiating structures con- tinued in 1993. In January, a new 5+1 negotiating format was proposed (us, Rus- sia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, plus Nagorno-Karabakh). This approach was rejected initially by Nagorno-Karabakh because of Turkish participation and later by Azerbaijan during a round of discussions in Geneva. There was also a rotation of the Minsk Conference chairman, with Swedish diplomat Jan Eliasson taking the lead. He moved toward a “shuttle diplomacy” model that diminished the potential for significant coordinated Minsk Group action,
pain and laying a land and people to waste. The cost of diplomatic failure was decidedly high.” John J. Maresca, Helsinki Revisited: A Key us Negotiator’s Memoirs on the Development of the csce into the osce, (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2016). While perhaps an accurate portrayal of the first talks in Rome, Minsk Group members could later be found visiting bleak refugee camps, observing demining operations, and donning Kevlar flak jackets to cross the no man’s land along the Line of Contact, all to ensure those instruments for causing pain and laying peoples and lands to waste that Auden alluded to would remain silent.
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Somewhat Clearer Structure and Mandate The osce’s commitment and preeminence on Nagorno-Karabakh became manifest at the December 1994 Budapest Summit which called for an “inten- sification” of action in relation to this conflict and pledged a “redoubling” of efforts. The intent of the Summit was to harmonise the array of separate activi- ties that had been evident for 2 years into “a single coordinated effort” within the framework of the osce.8 The Summit now called upon the CiO to name “co-chairmen” of the Minsk Conference to ensure an agreed basis for negotia- tions and to realise full co-ordination in all mediation and negotiation activi- ties. It was understood that Russia would henceforth be a permanent co-chair. The new Minsk Conference co-chairs were tasked with strengthening the ceasefire, working with the parties to the conflict to develop a basis for nego- tiations, exploring confidence building measures, and working with the CiO on the establishment of a potential multinational osce peacekeeping force. Toward that end, osce also authorised the establishment of a high-level plan- ning group in Vienna that would make recommendations regarding size, com- mand and control, rules of engagement, and other aspects of such a force.
8 See “Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the aus- pices of the osce (“Minsk Conference”)”, osce Doc. 525/95, Vienna, 22 March 1995. For a detailed overview of international engagement see Rexane Dehdashti, Internationale Organi- sationen als Vermittler in innerstaatlichen Konflikten: Die osze und der Berg Karabach-Konflict (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2000).
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The Minsk Conference co-chairs were to visit the conflict region jointly, or when appropriate separately, to advance all of these goals. They were also in- structed to provide periodic briefings to the osce, the osce Permanent Coun- cil, the un Secretary General, the un Security Council, the Minsk Group at the osce, as well as to maintain contact with relevant international and regional organisations, (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and to cooperate with the CiO’s personal representative. Mediation for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has rested ever since firmly in osce hands.9 This is fitting. The osce has emphasised that it is the world’s largest regional security organisation, working to ensure peace and stability for more than a billion people living between Vancouver and Vladivostok. It is also the richest regional security organisation. These factors alone are testament to why the osce should perform an active conflict mediation role. Just as impor- tant is the fact (long acknowledged by the United Nations and enshrined in Articles 33 and 52 of the un Charter) that regional entities can and should be involved in promoting peace. Such institutions and their Member States bring to such engagement a shared history, understanding, and mix of interests that can make them particularly suited to the task at hand. Regional organisations also lessen significantly the substantial preventive diplomacy and mediation burden that fell upon the un with the end of the Cold War.10 The timing for osce to undertake the mediating role in Nagorno-Karabakh could not have been more opportune. Fighting had halted, the brokered cease- fire held, and time was now available to work on a solution. Furthermore, following the decision to have Russia take a leadership role within the process, there was no longer any significant outside competitor seeking to assume the task. The un had no interest in leading this mediation effort, gladly offering to provide political and technical support for the osce’s actions. This included un Security Council preparedness to authorise the deployment of a multina- tional osce peacekeeping force upon the conclusion of an accepted political agreement.
9 Aside from periodic suggestions by Azerbaijan that the United Nations should mediate the conflict, the osce actions largely put an end to “forum shopping” which had been incessant up until 1995. See Tehri Hakala, “The osce Minsk Process: A Balance After 5 Years”, Helsinki Monitor, No. 1, 1998. 10 From March to December 1992, the un had undertaken 31 missions to trouble spots around the globe; 8 of which had been focused on Nagorno-Karabakh, more than any other dispute. See “A Report on Preventive Diplomacy”, un Department of Political Affairs, March-December 1992.
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Evolving Structure of Engagement Not surprising, as a first mediation effort by a newly established regional organisation dealing with an active conflict, what was originally envisioned does not remotely match what eventually came to pass. The initial plan set forth by the csce in March 1992 detailed a clear template of who would do what, where and when:
Under the leadership of a single chairman, 11 designated Minsk Conference Members would advance a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, meeting at a gathering in Minsk, Belarus, as soon as possible, and the csce would assemble a peacekeeping force to implement the political settlement.
Reality, however, in the face of jockeying for diplomatic advantage in the peace process, intensified fighting in the region, questions regarding which nations would contribute and participate in such a peacekeeping force or whether it was even needed, and a lack of clarity on how Nagorno-Karabakh would be represented in the dialogue quickly intruded. What had been a straightforward plan to advance a peaceful settlement has evolved enormously. Aside from csce/osce remaining the international lead to advance the mediation effort, almost everything else in the original formula changed within the first 5 years of engagement. The single rotating neutral “Minsk Conference chairman” to shepherd the process gave way in 1994, under considerable Russian pressure that Moscow should lead the effort, resulting in a 2-person co-chairmanship in which 1 state would rotate (the neutral) and the other (Russia) would not. After the first Minsk Conference single chairmen – Italy followed by Sweden – the chairman- ship was shared between Sweden and Russia in 1994, and Finland and Russia in 1995–1996. All these states designated separate Minsk Conference chairmen and Minsk Group chairmen.11 This morphed in early 1997 to a 3-person co- chairmanship (with Russia, France and the United States) in which all three states have become permanent. The question of Nagorno-Karabakh participation in formal negotiations has largely been addressed by having Armenia and Azerbaijan each represent the interests of their ethnic brethren from the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The elec- tion of Armenia’s second and third presidents, Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008)
11 See also “Finland as a Mediator in the Karabakh Conflict,” Report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Tarja Halonen, to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament on the Activities of Finland as Co-Chairman of the osce Minsk Conference, 11 February 1997.
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12 Minsk Group co-chairs still visit Nagorno-Karabakh and meet with local leaders, but it is widely accepted that the last 2 Armenian presidents have been fully capable of effec- tively representing the interests of the ethnic Armenians in the region at the negotiating table. The chief opposition to this 3+2 format has come from local Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. For the perspective from Nagorno-Karabakh, see Masis Mayilian, Karabakhskiy Mirniy Protsess: Vzglyad iz Artsakha (Yerevan: De Facto, 2016). 13 France and Russia raised the profile of their delegations at Key West with the inclusion of Philippe de Suremain (a confidant of President Chirac, and then Ambassador to Iran) and Vyacheslav Trubnikov (first Deputy Foreign Minister and former Head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service). Both participated, however, without clear titles, neither served offi- cially as “Conference”, nor “Group” chairmen. Both states’ earlier designated Minsk Group co-chairs also participated in those peace talks. 14 Some osce participating States have sought unsuccessfully to become Minsk Group members, most notably the United Kingdom and Kazakhstan. 15 Questions regarding the mandate and legitimacy of the Minsk Group are raised in detail by former Head of Russia’s mediation mission and its first Minsk Group co-chair Vladimir Kazimirov. See Mir Karabakhu: Posredichestvo Rossiy v Uregulirovaniy Nagorno- Karabakhskogo Konflicta (Moscow: International Relations, 2009).
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16 See John J. Maresca, “Agony of Indifference in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1994, p. 19. 17 The “no co-chair nation, no neighbors formula” advanced in the run up to the 2001 Key West Peace Talks would also have helpfully excluded Iran if a decision had been made
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While there has been sporadic small-arms fire and occasional loss of life along the Line of Contact and the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the 1994 ceasefire basi- cally held firm until April 2016, lending support for such a minimal approach.
Current Multi-faceted Mediation Support Structure
Today 5 distinct components comprise the osce Minsk Process mediation effort for Nagorno-Karabakh:
1 osce Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) The Chairperson-in-Office’s engagement ensures periodic high-level attention regardless of the state of negotiations. Every year, as osce’s leadership rotates, high-level visits take place in the region and yet another European nation’s leadership becomes deeply versed in the history of the conflict and the situ- ation on the ground. CiOs have frequently played a valuable role in helping keep the diplomatic process on track, communicating with osce’s Permanent Council and the Minsk Group co-chairs on developments and potential areas for constructive engagement, and working to dampen tensions. More impor- tantly, they are in place and ready to play a greater leadership role should a solution be found that is acceptable to all parties.18
2 Minsk Group Co-Chairs: Russia, France, and the United States The Minsk Group co-chairs offer a constant diplomatic engagement with the parties to the conflict from 3 veto-wielding un Security Council Member States.19 Such a forum would be the envy of many other unresolved conflicts,
to permit non-osce participating States to contribute to a peacekeeping/observer force. Georgian participation, not a particular concern at that time, would also have been blocked. 18 While not formally part of the Minsk Process, the CiO also has at his disposal a Special Representative for the “South Caucasus”. In addition to assisting the CiO with Nagorno- Karabakh, the Special Representative has also co-chaired the Geneva International Discussions to address consequences of the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. 19 France has stressed that its participation in the Minsk Group is as a sovereign nation and not as a representative of the European Union (eu). Nevertheless, as a leader in the eu, Paris’ engagement has been particularly valuable in ensuring that any possible agreement would also take into account broader European concerns. Since 2003, the eu has also maintained a Special Representative (eusr) for the South Caucasus to play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. The first, Ambassador Heikki Talvitie, had served earlier as a Minsk Conference Co-Chair. The eusr reports directly to
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the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. For more on eu activity in the region see Esmira Jafarova, Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus: Challenges to Inter- national Efforts (London: Lexington Books, 2015). 20 Two key exceptions here would be the “Quartet” on the Middle East peace process and the “Contact Group” for the former Yugoslavia, each of which engaged 4 unsc permanent members. For a solid analysis of “friends” groups and their limitations see Teresa Whit- field, Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, dc: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
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3 Minsk Group The Minsk Group is made up of the 3 co-chair nations (Russia, France, and the United States); 6 regular permanent participating States (Belarus, Fin- land, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey); the rotating membership of the osce Troika;21 plus Armenia and Azerbaijan. Independent of the co-chairs, the Minsk Group itself is not a significant actor in the current process. Nevertheless, its regular members occasionally play a role on an individual basis on specific issues (such as having Turkey en- courage normalisation of relations or the expansion of trade in the region). The Minsk Group might also be tapped as a potential group of donor states for funds or peacekeepers/observers should the need arise as part of a future Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
4 Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the osce Minsk Conference22 This individual, who is based in the South Caucasus region, plays a particularly valuable role that has also expanded beyond original expectations. Ambassa- dor Kasprzyk and his team maintain a constant on-the-ground presence in the region. They have been key in monitoring activities along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Line of Contact.23 This office has also helped facilitate exchanges of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and the return of the deceased. During visits of the CiO to the region, the Personal Repre- sentative’s support is essential. He also provides significant assistance to the Minsk Group co-chairs, especially when they visit Nagorno-Karabakh where
21 In 2017, the osce Troika only added Austria, since both Germany and Italy are already regular members of the Minsk Group. 22 This position was established in August 1995 and has been occupied since July 1996 by Polish Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (the longest-serving, high-level osce official). He is based in Tbilisi, Georgia, and has field assistants who rotate between Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert/Xankəndi. See http://www.osce.org/cio/andrzej-kasprzyk. 23 These activities generally take place twice a month. Agreement was reached at the 16 May 2016 Vienna Summit and the 20 June 2016 St. Petersburg Summit between the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia to increase the number of staff within the Office of the Personal Representative to carry out responsibilities in the conflict zone. There have been only 6 unarmed osce observers, but that number may now rise to 15. (See President Aliyev’s statement on “Results of St. Petersburg Summit,” 27 June 2016). This measure was proposed in response to the April 2016 fighting.
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5 High-Level Planning Group (hlpg) The hlpg was established in December 1994 to assist with the anticipated deployment of peacekeepers to support a settlement. The hlpg is normally staffed by less than 10 military experts seconded by osce participating States. In 1994–1995, it had a staffing of 35 and was very active, developing 4 options for potential peacekeeping/observer operations for Nagorno-Karabakh.24 Since that time, however, its role has been decidedly limited due to the inabil- ity of the conflicting parties to accept a solution to the dispute. hlpg members have participated in the monitoring activities carried out by the Personal Rep- resentative and have maintained contact with the un Department of Peace- keeping Operations. In summary, the osce Minsk Process has evolved into a format that consti- tutes an unprecedented diplomatic tool-kit. It has drawn support from 3 major world powers, focusing on high-level international engagement, supporting an enduring diplomatic dialogue, and dampening aggression in the region. Its multi-faceted structure offers a flexibility that should be capable of addressing any need or challenge that might arise in the effort to move a peaceful settle- ment of the Nagorno-Karabakh region forward.
Effective Conflict Management
While it has not achieved a definitive settlement to the conflict, the osce’s Minsk Process for Nagorno-Karabakh has in fact advanced the mission it was given. The mediation effort that began in 1992 and evolved into a 3+2 format by 1997 has been effective. It has kept the parties engaged in a decades-long dialogue, explored and promulgated potential solutions to the dispute, helped maintain the established ceasefire, and belied fears of a significant regional conflagration.25
24 Three of the hlpg options detailed a mix of armed peacekeeping troops and unarmed military observers; the fourth was for an unarmed military observer mission. 25 Large-scale fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan could quickly draw in other states. Strategic interests and defense arrangements in the South Caucasus (Russia’s commitment
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The fundamental issue in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute remains centered upon 2 competing and largely irreconcilable international principles: respect for territorial integrity (sovereignty) and the right of ethnic minorities to self- determination (secession). On top of that is the need to resolve conflicts by peaceful means and not by military force. Both parties have repeatedly stated their commitment to seek a peaceful settlement, but they have expressed scant willingness to accept serious compromises on the main issues. Azerbaijan con- tinues to declare that it is prepared to provide the Nagorno-Karabakh region with special autonomous status within Azerbaijan (a status similar to what existed before the original fighting began) and insists upon the return of all oc- cupied territory. Armenia and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh demand that the region be able to freely decide its status – a degree of self-determination that could lead to complete self-governance (independence) or unification into a single Armenian state. These basic stances encompass no common ground. The Minsk Group co-chairs have advanced several comprehensive plans for the conflicting parties’ consideration. These have addressed in various fashion, the return of occupied lands, return of refugees, a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, lifting of economic blockades, ways to determine the final legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, international security guaran- tees, and the deployment of peacekeepers/observers. Other approaches have also been developed, including one looking at a possible territorial exchange that grew from the direct dialogue from 1999–2001 between the Armenian and Azerbaijan presidents.26 A variation of this proposal was under consideration at Key West. None have been embraced by all of the conflicting parties. Any durable political settlement to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh must overcome considerable hurdles. It must accommodate the political, economic, and security interests of the conflicting parties; satisfy general con- cerns of the Minsk Group co-chair nations (such as type, number, and source
to protect Armenia, Turkey’s pledge to defend Azerbaijan, Collective Security Treaty Organization arrangements, and Turkey’s nato membership) introduce complexities that place a major premium on effective conflict management. In 1992, Russian Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov of the cis Joint Armed Forces declared “third party intervention in this dispute could trigger a Third World War”. See Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia- Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 80–82. 26 Interestingly, such a territorial exchange was first broached with Armenian and Azerbai- jani leaders in 1992 during the visit of then un Special Envoy Cyrus Vance. See Paul Goble, “Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Summer 1992), pp. 19–26 and “How the Goble Plan was Born and How it Remains a Politi- cal Factor,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, Vol. 3, No. 23 (9 June 2000).
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Problem is Not with the osce Mediation Process, but the Conflicting Parties Some argue that the osce Minsk process is too passive and that the co-chairs should adopt a more aggressive posture to achieve peace.28 While greater engagement can and should take place when conditions are amenable to move forward, it has not been incumbent upon the Minsk Process to force a deal upon the parties to the conflict. That was never in question and would be un- imaginable in a peace process conducted under the auspices of a consensus organisation like the osce where either Armenia or Azerbaijan, as participat- ing States, could object. A potentially more valid criticism is that 2 of the Minsk process co-chairs – Russia and the United States – are not impartial players. It is true that each has strategic interests in the region and beyond that could be significantly im- pacted by a settlement. At the same time, it can also be argued that because of those greater interests – as well as the interests of the parties themselves – it would be hard to imagine a mediation format that could achieve a definitive settlement that did not include both Russia and the United States. Other states have offered to mediate this dispute, most recently Iran, Kazakhstan and Geor- gia. There is no reason to assume that another state (or group of states) could deliver a consensus among the conflicting parties any more than the current
27 “Third Party Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Part of the Cure or Part of the Disease,” Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Vol. 3, 5, 2008, p. 105. 28 In April 2016, for example, Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdoğan said the effort to strike a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan under the osce umbrella had mostly failed because the leading 3 world powers treated the matter lightly and showed weakness by not pressing for a common solution. See also, Thomas Ambrosio’s discussion of passive versus active mediation stances in “Unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? Evaluating Peacemaking Efforts under the Obama Administration”, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 93–114, March 2011.
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29 Thomas Franck argues that the unsg “first of all seeks not solutions, but ameliorations to keep the parties … talking under his aegis, rather than fighting” and that to the states of the global system “a negotiation is as good as a solution”. Thomas M. Franck, “Three Major Innovations of International Law in the Twentieth Century”, Quinnipiac Law Review/qlr, Volume 17, Issue 1, 1997, p. 145.
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A Pivotal Point
The April 2016 fighting may have set in motion a significant challenge to the osce Minsk Process’ ability to manage the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.31 Engagement by the 3 Minsk Group co-chair countries quickly reestablished a general ceasefire and obtained agreement from the presidents of Arme- nia and Azerbaijan to carry out 2 confidence and security building measures (csbms) – the aforementioned decision to permit a minor increase in osce field observers and plans to put in place an incidents investigation mechanism. Nevertheless, following the April clash, ceasefire violations have become an almost daily phenomenon, with more frequent loss of life. Implementation of the 2 csbms has been blocked. Declarations made by Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan in May and June 2016 to reengage in substantive settlement negotia- tions have not borne fruit. What marks the April 2016 clash as a turning point, aside from the use of more substantial weaponry and the considerable loss of life, was Azerbaijan’s seizure of 2 small slices of territory. This minor alteration in the 22-year old Line of Contact fed nationalist sentiments on both states, strengthening op- position to any negotiated compromise or concession. Most notably, it showed Azerbaijan that it is possible – without significant political cost – to use mili- tary force to regain lost territory. Absent a greater commitment by the conflicting parties to accept a compro- mise, there can be no peace agreement. Each side has called for a more proac- tive stance from the osce Minsk Group negotiators. Their desire, however, is
30 This is somewhat surprising, as the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan have at different junctures in this negotiation process approached – in secret – very serious compromises designed to provide all sides with concessions to satisfy their political and security needs and to make a final agreement a “win-win” solution. 31 See Carey Cavanaugh, “Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh”, Contingency Plan- ning Memorandum No. 30, Council on Foreign Relations (February 2017). Also, “Nagorno- Karabakh’s Gathering War Clouds”, Crisis Group Report No. 244, (June 2017).
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32 This sentiment was also reflected in Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coat’s 11 May 2017 statement to the us Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It noted “both sides’ unwillingness to compromise and mounting domestic pressures suggest that a potential for large-scale hostilities will remain in 2017”. 2017 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the us Intelligence Community, p. 19. 33 Interview with Sergei Brilev on Rossiya 1 (vgtrk) television, 9 April 2016.
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