Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 2000

Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting_2000

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Afternoon Session - 2000 Meeting

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett defends a big retirement package for Coca-Cola's outgoing CEO. He also identiﬁes an unexpected factor in spiraling CEO pay, explains why buying Berkshire Hathaway was a "terrible mistake," and admits he's a little "crazy" because he doesn't mind paying taxes.

1. Most companies hide the true cost of stock options 大多数公司都隐藏了股票期权的真实成本

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, if area one is ready, we're ready to start answering. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，如果第一区准备就绪，我们已经准备好开始接听了。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. 观众：嗨。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. WARREN BUFFETT：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Steve Check.I'm from Costa Mesa, California. 听众：我的名字是Steve Check。我来自加州科斯塔梅萨。

My question is regarding stock options.I've taken your suggestion and have been attempting to subtract stock option compensation from reported income when evaluating companies.When I read annual reports, I usually ﬁnd companies estimating option costs using the Black-Scholes model. 我的问题是关于股票期权。我已经采纳了你的建议并且在评估公司时试图从报告的收入中减去股票期权补偿。当我阅读年度报告时，我通常会找到使用Black-Scholes模型估算期权成本的公司。

However, the assumptions going into the Black-Scholes model seem quite different from company to company.These assumptions, of course, are what is used for risk-free interest rates — quote unquote, "risk-free" interest rates, expected option lives — even though options have stated lives, and expected volatility. 然而，进入Black-Scholes模型的假设在公司与公司之间似乎有很大不同。当然，这些假设是用于无风险利率的 - 引用无引用，“无风险”利率，预期期权寿命 - 即使期权已经表明生命和预期的波动性。

Help me out a little bit.What is the best way to calculate option costs?Do you think Black- Scholes is appropriate?If so, how should we normalize the assumptions? 帮助我一点点。计算期权成本的最佳方法是什么？你认为Black-Scholes合适吗？如果是这样，我们应该如何规范假设？

And just one short follow-up: how can we possibly estimate future earnings for companies, when companies, such as even Microsoft last week, in response to a lower stock price, simply reissue a bunch of new options? 还有一个简短的跟进：我们怎么可能估计公司未来的收益，当上周公司，比如微软，为了应对较低的股价，只需重新发布一系列新选项？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the — I can tell you, from some personal experience, that companies attempt to use the lowest ﬁgure they can, even though it doesn't hit the income account. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我可以告诉你，从个人经验来看，公司试图使用尽可能低的数字，即使它没有达到收入账户。

So they like to make fairly short assumptions as to the life of the options, even though they're granted on a ten-year basis.Because they'll make certain assumptions about exercise date or forfeiture and so on. 所以他们喜欢对期权的生命做出相当简短的假设，即使它们是在十年的基础上授予的。因为他们会对行使日期或没收等做出某些假设。

I think the most appropriate way, when you've got a pattern, which you have at many companies, of what they do on options, is simply to make an educated guess as to the average option issuance that they're going to incur,or they're going to elect to do over time. 我认为最恰当的方式是，当你有一个模式，你在许多公司，他们在选项上做了什么，只是对他们将要发生的平均期权发行做出有根据的猜测，或者他们会随着时间的推移选择做。

And, generally, what you really want to — if you were to be precise — you would try to ﬁgure out what they could've sold those options for in the open market.Because that's the opportunity cost of giving them to the employees instead of selling the same option in the market. 而且，一般来说，你真正想要的 - 如果你准确的话 - 你会试着找出他们可以在公开市场上出售这些选项的东西。因为这是给员工的机会成本，而不是在市场上出售相同的选项。

I think you'll ﬁnd, generally, that if you take a value of about a third, for a ten-year option, if you take a value of about a third — obviously, it depends on dividend rate and volatility and a whole bunchof things — but about a third of the market value, strike price, at the time they're issued, that's the expectable cost. 一般来说，我认为你会发现，如果你拿一个三分之一左右的值，十年选项，如果你拿一个大约三分之一的价值 - 显然，它取决于股息率和波动率以及一大堆事情 - 但大约三分之一的市场价值，执行价格，在他们发行时，这是可预期的成本。

We believe in using the expectable cost versus the actual cost.I mean, that is how we would look at it. 我们相信使用可预期的成本与实际成本。我的意思是，这就是我们如何看待它。

If we were issuing options at Berkshire, and we issued options on $100 million worth of stock a year, we would ﬁgure it was costing us, probably in our case, with no dividend, at least $35 million a year to issue those options. 如果我们在伯克希尔发行期权，并且我们每年发行价值1亿美元的股票期权，我们认为这可能会花费我们，可能在我们的情况下，没有股息，每年至少3500万美元来发行这些期权。

And we would ﬁgure that if we gave people $35 million in some other form of result-oriented compensation, that it would be a wash.And that is not the way most managements, of course, ﬁgure.At least that's my experience. 而且我们认为如果我们给人们3500万美元的其他形式的结果导向的补偿，那将是一个洗。当然，这不是大多数管理层的方式。至少这是我的经历。

And we would ﬁgure we could use that 35 million in a more shareholder-oriented way and one where the employee (who) was productive would be sure of getting results, as opposed to having it be at the whims of the market. 而且我们认为我们可以以更加以股东为导向的方式使用3500万，而员工（谁）具有生产力将确保取得成果，而不是让它成为市场的一时兴起。

And I think you'll see a lot of option repricing.Everybody says they won't reprice their options, until they do it.And, you'll see that with a lot of schemes. 而且我认为你会看到很多选项重新定价。每个人都说他们不会重新定价他们的选择，直到他们这样做。而且，你会看到很多方案。

It would be interesting to see whether CONSICO is willing to bankrupt all the executives who made loans to buy the stock and had those loans guaranteed by the company. 看看CONSICO是否愿意破产所有提供贷款购买股票的高管并让公司担保这些贷款，这将是很有意思的。

And the company initially said they would enforce those loans.And we'll see whether they do it.I would say, in many cases, they won't.I don't know what CONSICO will do. 该公司最初表示将执行这些贷款。我们会看看他们是否这样做了。我会说，在许多情况下，他们不会。我不知道CONSICO会做什么。

But, a lot of things that are said in connection with executive option schemes and that sort of thing are what they'll do if it works in their favor.And then they'll do something else if it doesn't work in their favor.And that's not spelled out in the initial approval that's granted. 但是，很多与执行期权计划有关的事情，如果它对他们有利，他们会做什么。如果不利于他们，他们会做点别的事情。并且在最初的批准中没有明确规定。

Charlie, you have anything to add? 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, Warren's somewhat critical attitude is very understated compared to mine.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，与我的相比，Warren有点批评的态度非常低调。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We're going to leave raisins out of this particular — (laughter) — analysis.Let's go to area 2. WARREN BUFFETT：我们要把葡萄干放在这个特别的地方 - （笑声） - 分析。我们去第2区。

We do believe, incidentally, if a company is going to end up giving out 10 percent of the, company over a 10-year period or 15 percent on options, that is like buying an apartment house and letting the seller keep a 10 or 15percent interest in the upside. 顺便说一句，我们确实相信，如果一家公司最终会在10年内给出10％的公司或15％的期权，那就像购买公寓并让卖家保持10或15上升利率百分比。

Or it's like buying an oil ﬁeld and giving somebody a 10 or 15 percent interest-free override.It changes the value of the property.Make no mistake about it. 或者就像购买油田并为某人提供10％或15％的免息覆盖。它会更改属性的值。别搞错了。

It is a — it has a huge economic impact on the value of a property.And just go out and try and sell your house and say, "I want to keep 15 percent of the appreciation in it," and ask the buyer whether he's going to pay the same price for the house. 它是 - 它对房产的价值产生巨大的经济影响。然后出去尝试卖掉你的房子并说：“我想保持15％的升值，”然后问买家他是否愿意为房子支付相同的价格。

Options subtract value the moment they are granted.And, like I say, unless companies — some companies follow a practice of making a mega-grant every three or four or ﬁve years.A lot of them just issue a fairly constant amount annually.And you can ﬁgure out the cost. 选项在授予时减去值。而且，就像我说的，除非公司 - 一些公司遵循每三到四年或五年制作一笔巨额赠款的做法。他们中的很多人每年只发出相当稳定的金额。你可以弄清楚成本。

And, you know, they don't want to tell the shareholders there's a cost.And that's why they fought through Congress and everything else in order to prevent it from being the truth.But, you know, Galileo had that problem many years ago and ﬁnally won out.So maybe we will, too.(Laughs) 而且，你知道，他们不想告诉股东这是一笔费用。这就是为什么他们为了防止它成为真理而在国会和其他一切事务中进行斗争的原因。但是，你知道，伽利略很多年前就遇到过这个问题，并最终胜出。所以也许我们也会。（笑）

2. Moody’s moat has "poisonous characters" 穆迪的护城河有“有毒人物”

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, area 2. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，第2区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Dennis Jean-Jacques from Chatham, New Jersey.I ﬁrst would like to thank you personally for taking the time out of your busy schedule to visit MBA students throughout the country on a regular basis. 听众：我的名字是来自新泽西州查塔姆的Dennis Jean-Jacques。我首先要感谢您个人在繁忙的日程中抽出时间定期访问全国的MBA学生。

In fact, I consider your visit to the Harvard Business School campus many years ago my personal rational awakening. 事实上，我认为你多年前访问哈佛商学院的校园是我个人理性的觉醒。

My question is in regard to Dun & Bradstreet.Many academics would argue that two of the many factors that determine a ﬁrm's sustainable competitive advantage are the threat of new interest through imitation, and the threat of substitution through technological advances, such as, you know, the internet and things of that nature. 我的问题是关于Dun＆Bradstreet。许多学者认为，决定公司可持续竞争优势的众多因素中有两个是通过模仿产生新兴趣的威胁，以及通过技术进步替代的威胁，例如互联网和这种性质的东西。

My question is, how deep is the moat around Moody's and the operating company? 我的问题是，穆迪和运营公司的护城河有多深？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don't want to go into too much detail about our marketable investments. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们不想详细介绍我们的市场投资。

But I would say that the moat is, just in our view, is far wider, deeper, and infested with far more poisonous characters, in the case of Moody's, than in the case of the operating company. 但我会说，在我们看来，护城河的范围更广，更深，并且在穆迪的情况下，其毒性更大，而不是在经营公司的情况下。

We've had experience — just in terms of making decisions about how you either obtain credit information, in the case of the operating company, or if you want to obtain ratings on securities or something — I think you'd conclude that Moody's is amuch stronger franchise than the operating company. 我们有过经验 - 只是在决定如何获得信用信息方面，对于运营公司，或者如果你想获得证券或其他东西的评级 - 我认为你得出的结论是穆迪是一个比运营公司更强大的特许经营权。 Doesn't mean the operating company can't turn out to be a better business.It might have more upside under certain circumstances, too. 并不意味着运营公司不能成为更好的企业。在某些情况下，它可能会有更多的上行空间。

But if you're really thinking of, you know, what bad can happen to you, I think that you would regard Moody's as a considerably stronger franchise than the operating company. 但是，如果你真的想到，你知道，对你来说会发生什么不好，我认为你会认为穆迪是一个比运营公司更强大的特许经营权。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I'd certainly agree.The — CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我当然同意。 -

Moody's is a little like Harvard.It's a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.(Laughter) 穆迪有点像哈佛。这是一个自我实现的预言。（笑声）

You know, I hate to think of how much you could mismanage Harvard now and still have it work out pretty well. 你知道，我不想想你现在对哈佛大学管理不善的程度，并且还能很好地解决这个问题。

3. Harvard Business School isn't affected by supply and demand 3.哈佛商学院不受供求关系的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: If you cut the price of the admission to the Harvard Business School by $10,000 a year, you would have less demand, in all probability, than an increase in demand. 沃伦·巴菲特：如果你每年将哈佛商学院的入学费降低10,000美元，那么你的需求很可能会比需求增加更少。

I mean, it's totally counterintuitive in that respect.Because the cachet of the school, in that case, is not only reinforced, it almost makes it necessary, that it be priced toward the top. 我的意思是，在这方面它完全违反直觉。因为在这种情况下，学校的名声不仅得到了加强，而且几乎使它成为必要，它被定价为顶级。

So, it — you can throw away the demand and supply curves that they teach you in Economics 101 on something like that. 所以，它 - 你可以抛弃他们在经济学101中教给你的需求和供给曲线。

I — frequently, I have a little fun with — when I attend business schools.Because I ask them, you know, what the deﬁnition of a wonderful business is, and we go through all this stuff. 我 - 经常，我有一点乐趣 - 当我上商学院。因为我问他们，你知道，一个美好的企业的定义是什么，我们经历所有这些。

And then I say, you know, I tell them that — really — the best business I've seen is the Harvard Business School or the Stanford Business School, because the more they increase the price, the more people want to get in, andthe more people think the product is worth. 然后我说，你知道，我告诉他们 - 真的 - 我见过的最好的生意是哈佛商学院或斯坦福商学院，因为他们提高价格越多，人们就越想进入，越多人认为该产品是值得的。

And that is a marvelous position to be in. (Laughter) 这是一个非常了不起的位置。（笑声）

And I thank you for your comments on the — you know, I was lucky enough to have a great, great teacher in Ben Graham at Columbia.And Ben didn't need to go up to Columbia once a week, on Thursday afternoon, to talk to a bunch of us. 我感谢你的评论 - 你知道，我很幸运能在哥伦比亚的本格雷厄姆有一位伟大的，优秀的老师。 Ben周四下午不需要每周一次去哥伦比亚，和我们一起聊聊。

So it — I really feel it’s — I enjoy, sort of, passing that along.I haven't had any original ideas in this ﬁeld at all.But I, you know, I had a terriﬁc teacher.And it's fun to talk to students. 所以它 - 我真的觉得它 - 我喜欢，有点，传递它。我根本没有在这个领域有任何创意。但是，我知道，我有一位了不起的老师。与学生交谈很有趣。

If you talk to a bunch of guys my age, nothing happens.I mean, they just want to be entertained. (Laughter) 如果你和我这个年龄段的一群人谈话，没有任何事情发生。我的意思是，他们只是想娱乐。（笑声）

But they want predictions always and that sort of thing.So I don't do any of that at all.I'd rather talk to students.And I thank you for coming. 但他们总是想要预测和那种事情。所以我根本不做任何事情。我宁愿和学生说话。我感谢你的到来。

4. Energy and transportation need a lot of capital 能源和运输需要大量资金

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's go to number 3. WARREN BUFFETT：我们来看3号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name's Jared Placeler (PH).I'm 15 from St. Louis. 观众：我叫Jared Placeler（PH）。我今年15岁，来自圣路易斯。

Are you considering investing in energy and transportation companies, such as ones that deal with fuel cell and environmentally friendly energy resources? 您是否正在考虑投资能源和运输公司，例如那些涉及燃料电池和环保能源的公司？

And if you are, will you thus be replacing any other energy-based investments you may currently hold, such as your newly acquired holdings in MidAmerican Energy? 如果您愿意，那么您是否会取代目前可能持有的任何其他基于能源的投资，例如您在 MidAmerican Energy中新获得的股权？ WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.I would say that energy and transportation, in the very broad sense, are both things that we've at least got a chance of understanding.So those are the kind of areas in which, we would think about making investments. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我会说，从广义上讲，能源和交通都是我们至少有机会理解的事情。所以这些是我们考虑投资的领域。

We would probably think about it less in connection with new technology.We might expect the people who run MidAmerican Energy to be thinking about that all the time. 我们可能会认为它与新技术的关系较少。我们可能期望经营MidAmerican Energy的人会一直在思考这个问题。

But Charlie would be better at it than I am, because he has a different background and thinks better about that, anyway, in terms of evaluating newer technologies.I wouldn't be very good at it at all. 但查理会比我更好，因为他有不同的背景，无论如何，在评估新技术方面都要考虑得更好。我根本不会很擅长。

But those ﬁelds are, they're big, in terms of capital investment, for one thing.So they're very big ﬁelds. 但就资本投资而言，这些领域是巨大的，一方面。所以他们是非常大的领域。

And then secondly, we would probably think we were capable of evaluating the potential, some years down the road, of many companies in energy and transportation. 其次，我们可能会认为我们有能力评估许多能源和运输公司未来几年的潜力。

So those would be ﬁelds we would consider.And of course, as you mentioned, we made an investment in MidAmerican Energy. 那些将是我们会考虑的领域。当然，正如您所提到的，我们对MidAmerican Energy进行了投资。

I doubt if the technology changes dramatically in any near term as to the product that they're delivering. 我怀疑这项技术在短期内对于他们提供的产品是否会发生巨大变化。

But if there were changes on the horizon, I think we've got the management there that would be very good at spotting that ahead of time and capitalizing on it in a proper way. 但是，如果出现变化，我认为我们的管理层已经非常善于提前发现并以适当的方式利用它。

I wouldn't take that function on myself. 我不会把这个功能放在自己身上。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, historically, we've done very little in either ﬁeld.And mostly, the past is a pretty good guide to the future. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，从历史上看，我们在这两个领域都做得很少。而且大多数情况下，过去是一个很好的未来指南。

WARREN BUFFETT: Historically, the transportation ﬁeld, I mean, it's been a terrible place to have money, and, whether it's been in airlines or in the rails.If you — we've mentioned Value Line from here — from time to time. WARREN BUFFETT：从历史上看，运输领域，我的意思是，这是一个赚钱的好地方，无论是在航空公司还是在轨道上。如果你 - 我们从这里提到价值线 - 不时。

If you go to the rail transportation section and just run your eye across on the revenues and look at the capital investment, the amount of capital required to produce incremental revenues is just — is horrible. 如果你去铁路运输部门，只是关注收入并考虑资本投资，那么产生增量收入所需的资金数量就是 - 太可怕了。

And on the other hand, there's not much alternative here in the game to doing that.So there — many railroads will spend hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars.And it will not move the top line hardly at all.The ones where the top line has changed is where there's been acquisitions or mergers. 而另一方面，在游戏中没有太多替代方法可以做到这一点。所以 - 许多铁路将花费数百，数亿和数亿美元。它根本不会移动顶线。最重要的变化是收购或兼并的地方。

Airlines, you'll see just the opposite.You'll see this great movement in the top line, but again, a disastrous amount of capital investment and very little in the way of returns.So, it hasn't been a great ﬁeld. 航空公司，你会看到相反的情况。你会看到这个伟大的运动在顶线，但再次，一个灾难性的资本投资和很少的回报方式。所以，它并不是一个伟大的领域。

Most ﬁelds that require heavy capital investment, most of the time, they don't turn out very well over time.There are plenty of exceptions to that. 在大多数情况下，大多数需要大量资金投入的领域，随着时间的推移，它们都不会很好。有很多例外。

But if you ﬁnd a business that has to keep adding up huge sums of money every year, there always will be a reason why they're doing it.But the net result, after ﬁve or 10 or 20 years usually isn't very good. 但如果你发现一家企业每年必须不断增加巨额资金，那么他们就会有这样做的原因。但净结果，经过五年或十年或二十年后通常不是很好。

Charlie, got anything? 查理，有什么事吗？

5. Buffett defends Coca-Cola CEO Doug Ivester's big exit package 巴菲特为可口可乐首席执行官道格·艾维斯特（Doug Ivester）的大退出计划辩护 WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4? WARREN BUFFETT：第4区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.My name is Bob Odem (PH) from Seattle, Washington. 观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，下午好。我的名字是来自华盛顿州西雅图的Bob Odem（PH）。

I'd like to say, ﬁrst of all, how nice it is to come out to Omaha, and how I am made to feel comfortable by its people.I hope you both are as enthusiastic about the meeting as you seem to be in years to come.Mr. Munger, by the way, I am looking forward to your book coming out. 我想说，首先，来到奥马哈是多么美好，以及我如何让人感到舒服。我希望你们两人对你们的会议充满热情，就像你们未来几年一样。顺便说一句，芒格先生，我很期待你的书出来。

My question has to do with Doug Ivester's severance package and what justiﬁes it, considering he had a very short tenure as CEO and that he took the reins from some very strong performance from Goizueta and to be relieved of his dismal performance by Doug Daft. 我的问题与Doug Ivester的遣散费有关，并且考虑到他作为首席执行官的任期非常短，并且他从 Goizueta的一些非常强大的表现中获得了控制权，并且被Doug Daft的惨淡表现所取代。

My brother, still in the bottling and distribution business of Coke, cut this article from Bottlers' World Magazine concerning the severance package.He said he also would retire, if he were offered this — (laughter) — 97.4 million in stock, 3 million per year for 2000 to 2002, 2 million per year, 2002 to 2007, 1.4 million per year from 2007 for the rest ofhis life. 我的兄弟，仍然在可口可乐的装瓶和分销业务，从“瓶装世界”杂志上剪下这篇关于遣散费的文章。他说他也会退休，如果给他这个 - （笑声） - 库存9740万，2000年到2002年每年300万， 2002年到2007年每年200万，其余每年140万。他的生命。

Anyway, I don't see how — or here, car and cell phone, he gets that.That's a Mercury Grand Marquis and mobile telephones, laptop computer, and the like.I don't know why he'd need that. (Laughter) 无论如何，我没有看到 - 或者在这里，汽车和手机，他得到了。那是Mercury Grand Marquis和移动电话，笔记本电脑等。我不知道为什么他需要那个。（笑声）

Anyway, I have been wondering how you voted on this, whether you supported it or not, or what degree, considering executive pay at Berkshire hasn't risen except, perhaps, for the CFO who last got a raise, I believe, in 1997. 无论如何，我一直想知道你是如何投票支持的，无论你支持与否，或者考虑到伯克希尔的高管薪酬没有上升的程度，可能是因为我认为，1997年最后一次加薪的首席财务官。

WARREN BUFFETT: You asked — no, CFO's gotten a raise every year. WARREN BUFFETT：你问过 - 不，CFO每年都会加薪。

But the — you asked whether I supported it.Yeah, I can tell you, I supported it.Because with my 35 percent interest in 8 percent of Coca-Cola, I paid almost 3 percent of it myself, personally. 但是 - 你问我是否支持它。是的，我可以告诉你，我支持它。因为我对可口可乐8％的百分之五十五的兴趣，我亲自支付了近3％的可口可乐。

I probably paid more severance pay than any man in the history of the world, personally. (Laughter) 个人而言，我可能比世界历史上的任何人支付更多的遣散费。（笑声）

I was not on the comp committee.But I will say this.Doug Ivester did all kinds of really wonderful things for the Coca-Cola Company, over time. 我不在comp委员会。但我会说这个。随着时间的推移，Doug Ivester为可口可乐公司做了各种非常好的事情。

He was — for many, many years, when Roberto was running things, Doug — working with Don Keough, too, and I had this ﬁrst hand from both of them.I wasn't in Atlanta.But there was no question that he was a huge, huge asset and conceived and carried out many of the things that other people may have gotten even more credit for. 多年来，当罗伯托在经营东西时，他也是道格 - 与唐·基夫一起工作，而且我从他们两人那里得到了第一手资料。我不在亚特兰大。但毫无疑问，他是一个庞大的巨大资产，并构思并实施了许多其他人可能获得更多信誉的东西。

Most of what you described, not the little things at the end, but most of what you described was contractually in place at the time that he left.I mean, those were deals that were made, restricted stock and all of that, that really occurred, in signiﬁcant part, when Roberto was the chief executive ofﬁcer and at Roberto's recommendation. 你所描述的大部分内容，不是最后的小事，而是你描述的大部分内容在他离开时合同到位。我的意思是，当罗伯托担任首席执行官并且在罗伯托的推荐下，这些都是制造，限制股票和所有这些交易，这些交易确实发生在很大程度上。

Doug's devotion to Coke, his knowledge of Coke, I mean, he lived and ate and breathed Coke.But in my opinion, Doug Daft was the man for the job.And a change was made. 道格对可口可乐的热爱，他对可口可乐的了解，我的意思是，他生活，吃了可口可乐。但在我看来，道格达夫特是这份工作的人。并且做出了改变。

But it was not because of any lack of attention by Doug Ivester.It was not because he hadn't done great things as CFO of the company. 但这并不是因为道格·艾华士没有引起注意。这并不是因为他没有做公司首席财务官的伟大事业。

But I think he was not the right man at the time he took over as CEO.He took over, as you know, when Roberto died quite suddenly.And there wasn't any real option in terms of the — 但我认为他在担任首席执行官时不是合适的人选。如你所知，当罗伯托突然去世时，他接手了。并且没有任何真正的选择 -

He was Roberto's hand-picked successor.It's almost inconceivable that somebody else would've been chosen at that time. 他是罗伯托精心挑选的继任者。几乎不可思议的是当时其他人会被选中。 And we made a decision, within a couple of years, that the company would move faster and better with Doug Daft in charge.And we made a deal in severance which was about 80 percent, or some very high percentage, embedded. 我们在几年内决定公司将在Doug Daft负责的情况下更快更好地行动。我们在遣散费上达成了一笔约80％或者非常高的百分比。

And like I say, I paid more of it than anybody else.So it isn't like it was all academic. 就像我说的那样，我付出了比其他任何人更多的钱。所以这并不像是学术上的所有。

And I think, considering some other factors, which maybe I'll put in a book sometime, that entered into it, it was deﬁnitely the right decision for the Coca-Cola Company. 而且我认为，考虑到其他一些因素，我可能会在某个时候出现在书中，这对于可口可乐公司来说绝对是正确的决定。

Whether the computer should've been included or the car or anything, I can’t — I would not want to defend small item by small item.But I can — I think the Coca-Cola shareholders are going to be many billions of dollars ahead over time by what was done then.And it wasn't easy to do. 是否应该包括电脑或汽车或任何东西，我不能 - 我不想小项目保护小项目。但我可以 - 我认为随着时间的推移，可口可乐的股东将会提前数十亿美元。这并不容易。

We'll go to 5 — Charlie, do you have anything to add on that?You paid a fair amount, too. 我们将去5 - 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？你支付了相当数额。

6. Excessive CEO pay creates "hostility" to corporations 6.过高的CEO薪酬会给公司带来“敌意”

CHARLIE MUNGER: Generally speaking, I think it's a mistake for corporate America to create as much hostility as it does, which is based on the way it compensates principal ofﬁcers of corporations. CHARLIE MUNGER：一般来说，我认为美国公司制造尽可能多的敌意是错误的，这是基于它补偿公司主要官员的方式。

It is simply maddening to add a little clause that the corporation will scratch the guy's back for just tiny, little bits of stuff that looks terrible.To me, that is extremely stupid. 添加一个小条款是一件令人抓狂的事情，该公司会抓住这个家伙的背部，只看一些看起来很糟糕的小东西。对我来说，这是非常愚蠢的。

And I see it where the corporation helps him prepare his tax return for 10 years after he leaves and so forth. 而且我看到公司在离开之后帮助他准备10年的纳税申报表等等。

I think that makes a terrible impression on shareholders, generally.And I think corporate America's crazy to do it.They get sold this stuff by these damn consultants.(Laughter) 我认为这通常给股东留下了可怕的印象。我认为美国公司很难做到这一点。他们被这些该死的顾问卖掉了。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I agree with Charlie.And what — it is true — (applause) — what Charlie says. 沃伦巴菲特：我同意查理的观点。什么 - 这是真的 - （掌声） - 查理所说的。

We don't have a contract, at least that I can think of, at Berkshire.It's perfectly easy to run a company without them. 我们在伯克希尔没有合同，至少我能想到的。没有它们的公司经营起来非常容易。

We've got wonderful managers.You know, we've got things that might be called contracts.I mean, we've got deals with them, in terms of we work out compensation arrangements and all that. 我们有很棒的经理人。你知道，我们有可能被称为合同的东西。我的意思是，就我们制定补偿安排而言，我们与他们达成了交易。

But I can't remember a case of anybody that's been with us that ever has called in a lawyer or anything of the sort, or where we even had to reduce things to writing, basically.And it works ﬁne. 但我记不起曾经和我们在一起的任何人曾经打电话给律师或类似的事情，或者我们甚至不得不将事情简化为写作的事情。它工作正常。

And it is a little maddening, as Charlie says, to have a CEO, you know, show up with a lawyer with a 20-page contract.It’s become standard operating procedure. 正如查理所说，让一位首席执行官与一位律师签订20页合同，这有点令人抓狂。它已成为标准操作程序。

And once you get a big, public company with committees, consultants to the committees, consultants who, usually, are picked by the ofﬁcers of the company, they look around at what everybody else is doing and say, "Well, that's the way theother guy does it. So I'll do it." 一旦你找到一家大型上市公司，其委员会，委员会的顾问，通常由公司官员挑选的顾问，他们会环顾其他人正在做的事情并说：“嗯，这就是其他人这样做。所以我会这样做的。“

I think you can — I think the proxy statements of the last 20 years, what that's induced in the way of behavior by people at somewhat comparable companies that look at the proxy statements of their competitors and then say to their lawyer, "Well, JoeBlow got this. Why shouldn't I have it?" 我认为你可以 - 我认为过去20年的代理声明，这是由于某些可比公司的人们在行为方式上所引起的行为，这些公司会查看竞争对手的代理声明，然后对他们的律师说：“好吧，乔Blow得到了这个。为什么我不应该拥有它？“

It just escalates and escalates and escalates.And it ratchets.And it won't stop.I have never seen a compensation consultant come into a public company and suggest a plan that, net, reduces the cost of compensation. 它只是升级，升级和升级。它棘轮了。它不会停止。我从未见过一名薪酬顾问进入一家上市公司，并提出一项计划，即减少补偿成本。

At — and I see all kinds of people leave companies with — who have made tremendous amounts of money.And nobody wants to hire them at half the price, or a quarter of the price, or a tenth of the price.I mean, it's not a market system. 在 - 我看到各种各样的人离开公司 - 谁赚了很多钱。并且没有人愿意以一半的价格，或价格的四分之一，或价格的十分之一来雇佣他们。我的意思是，这不是一个市场体系。

CEO compensation is not a market system.And it's not subject to market tests.And I don't know what you do about that, particularly.But I — it doesn't seem to bother shareholders very much.The ones that could change it — CEO薪酬不是市场体系。它不受市场测试的影响。我不知道你对此做了什么，特别是。但我 - 它似乎并没有打扰股东。可以改变它的那些 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I think it bothers them a lot, Warren.It's just they feel powerless. CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，我认为这让他们很烦恼，Warren。只是他们感到无能为力。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, but institutional shareholders could change that.My guess is that the top 30 institutions, probably, control — what — two-thirds of the big companies in the country.And they don't seem to care that much. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，但机构股东可以改变这一点。我的猜测是，排名前30位的机构可能控制着这个国家三分之二的大公司。他们似乎并不那么在乎。

They — actually, they spend their time on what I regard as peripheral issues, usually.They talk about other things.They get involved in rituals of corporate governance that, frankly, don't mean a damn in terms of how the company performs.And they seem to ignore these other issues. 他们 - 实际上，他们通常会将时间花在我认为的外围问题上。他们谈论其他事情。他们参与了公司治理的仪式，坦率地说，这并不意味着公司的表现如此糟糕。他们似乎忽略了这些其他问题。

But, you know, there’s — we've got enough to do running Berkshire.So we can't reform the world on that. 但是，你知道，我们已经足够运营伯克希尔了。所以我们不能改变这个世界。

We will run Berkshire in a rational manner.And we have yet to hire a compensation consultant.And we've yet to lose an important manager. 我们将以理性的方式经营伯克希尔。我们还没有雇用薪酬顾问。我们还没有失去一位重要的经理人。

7. Buffett: Economists aren't needed 7.巴菲特：不需要经济学家

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll go to number 5. (Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们将进入第5名。（掌声） AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. 听众：你好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. WARREN BUFFETT：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Diane Ryan (PH) from Prairie Village, Kansas.This is the fourth year I've attended the stockholder meeting.And I'd like to say, every year, I feel like I've learned a little bit more. 听众：我是来自堪萨斯州Prairie Village的Diane Ryan（PH）。这是我参加股东大会的第四年。而且我想说，每年，我觉得我已经学到了更多。

This year, my question is, do you see a deﬂationary trend in the global economy?And if so, what is your investment advice? 今年，我的问题是，您是否看到全球经济出现通缩趋势？如果是这样，您的投资建议是什么？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Diane, I'm no good on the macro questions.And I've proven that by being way too worried about inﬂation for, probably, the last 20 years.Fortunately, it hasn't made much difference, the fact that I've been wrong on that. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，黛安，我对宏观问题并不擅长。而且我已经证明了过去20年来过于担心通货膨胀的可能性。幸运的是，它没有太大的区别，事实上我错了。

So I don't really think my judgment is any better than yours, at all, in terms of assessing what's going to happen to global prices over time.My opinion would be that the world is not going in a deﬂationary situation. 因此，在评估全球价格随时间推移会发生什么变化方面，我根本不认为我的判断总比你的好。我的观点是世界不会陷入通货紧缩的境地。

But, you know, I've not earned any stars for my past economic predictions.And the good thing about my economic predictions, even if I do make them, is that I pay no attention to them myself, so.(Laughter) 但是，你知道，我过去的经济预测并没有获得任何明星。我的经济预测的好处，即使我确实做到了，也就是我自己不关注它们，所以。（笑声）

I really — and the way we pick our investments is we just don't get into the macro factors.I can't recall a time when Charlie and I have looked at a business, either buying it in its entirety or buying pieces of it through the stock market. 我真的 - 我们选择投资的方式是我们只是不了解宏观因素。我不记得有时查理和我看过一家公司，无论是全部购买还是通过股票市场购买它。

I just — macro conclusions are — just never enter into the discussion.I mean, I'll pick up the phone.We've had these two in recent months.And I'll tell Charlie about it.And, you know, we talk about a few things.But we don't talk about anything remotely macro.And that's really the way it'll stay. 我只是 - 宏观结论 - 只是从未进入讨论。我的意思是，我会拿起电话。最近几个月我们有这两个。我会告诉查理这件事。而且，你知道，我们谈论一些事情。但我们不会谈论任何远程宏观。这就是它留下的方式。

You know, I've seen a lot of bank mergers recently.And one of the things they do, because they want to cut the costs and justify a merger, which they're dying to do, I mean, that's the reason — so they cut costs they wouldn't have cut if they weren'tdying to do the merger in the ﬁrst place and get bigger. 你知道，我最近看到很多银行合并。他们所做的其中一件事，是因为他们希望削减成本并为合并提供合理性，他们迫切希望这样做，我的意思是，这就是原因 - 因此他们削减了成本，如果他们不这样做就不会削减成本渴望首先进行合并并变得更大。

But frequently — I know one in particular that I'm thinking of — you know, they'll cut out the economics department.You know, I always wondered why the hell they had it in the ﬁrst place. (Laughter) 但经常 - 我特别知道我正在考虑 - 你知道，他们会削减经济学系。你知道，我总是想知道他们为什么一开始就拥有它。（笑声）

You know, because what do they do?You know, I mean —the guy comes in and says, "I think GDP will be 4.6 this year instead of 4.3."So what? 你知道，因为他们做了什么？你知道，我的意思是 - 那个人进来说，“我认为今年的GDP将是4.6 而不是4.3。”所以呢？

You know, I mean, you're still trying to make every good loan you can make.You're still trying to take in deposits as cheap as you can.And you should be trying to cut costs wherever you can.It's got nothing to do with running the business. 你知道，我的意思是，你仍然在努力赚取所有可以获得的好贷款。你仍然试图尽可能便宜地存入存款。你应该尽力削减成本。这与经营业务无关。

But, you know, it's fashionable.And every bank had its economist and economics department.And when a big client would come in, they'd take him to lunch.And it just — it always has struck me as just a lot of nonsense. 但是，你知道，这很时髦。每家银行都有经济学和经济学系。当一个大客户进来时，他们会带他去吃午饭。它只是 - 它总是让我觉得很多废话。

So if we ever get an economics department at Berkshire, sell the stock short.(Laughter) 因此，如果我们在伯克希尔获得一个经济学部门，那就卖空股票。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6, please.Oh, Charlie, I didn't — WARREN BUFFETT：请给我6号。哦，查理，我没有 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: (Inaudible) CHARLIE MUNGER :(听不清楚）

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, OK.(Laughter) He'd rather eat peanut brittle. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，好的。（笑声）他宁愿吃花生脆。 8. "Take on the qualities of other people you admire" 8.“承担你钦佩的其他人的品质”

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett — 听众：你好，巴菲特先生 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Hi. WARREN BUFFETT：嗨。

AUDIENCE MEMBER — Mr. Munger.My name is Aaron Wexler (PH).And I'm from Santa Maria, California. 观众 - 芒格先生。我叫Aaron Wexler（PH）。我来自加利福尼亚州的圣玛丽亚。

I have — my question has two parts.The ﬁrst part is, when you and Bill Gates had a television show some time ago, you were asked about the people who were — had different role models. 我有 - 我的问题有两个部分。第一部分是，当你和比尔盖茨不久前有一个电视节目时，你被问到了那些人 - 有不同的榜样。

And you said, "Well, if I know a person's role model, I can pretty well tell the kind of a person he is and what kind of a future he has." 而且你说，“好吧，如果我知道一个人的榜样，我可以很好地说出他是一个人，他有什么样的未来。”

Mr. Buffett, my role model is Warren Buffett.Do you think I have a chance?(Laughter) 巴菲特先生，我的榜样是沃伦巴菲特。你觉得我有机会吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I hope you're choosing me on the basis you hope to expect to live to an advanced age.I like to think that that's what I bring to the party. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我希望你能在我希望活到高龄的基础上选择我。我想这就是我带给派对的东西。

It does pay to have the right models.I mean, I was very lucky, early, very early in life, that I had certain heroes — and I've continued to develop a few more, as I've gone along — and they've been terriﬁc.And they never let me down.And it takes you through a lot. 拥有合适的型号确实是值得的。我的意思是，我很幸运，很早，很早就生活过，我有一些英雄 - 我继续发展了一些，因为我已经走了 - 而且他们一直都很棒。他们永远不会让我失望。它会带你经历很多。

And I think that, you know, it just stands to reason that you copy, very much, the people that you do look up to, and particularly if you do it at an early enough age. 而且我认为，你知道，这只是你理所当然地复制了你所擅长的人，特别是如果你在足够早的时候这样做的话。

So I think, if you can inﬂuence the model — the role models — of a 5-year-old or an 8-year-old or a 10-year-old, you know, it's going to have a huge impact. 所以我认为，如果你能影响一个5岁或8岁或10岁的模特 - 榜样 - 你知道，它会产生巨大的影响。

And of course, everybody, virtually, starts out with their initial models being their parents.So they are the ones that are going to have a huge effect on them.And if that parent turns out to be a great model, I think it's going to be a huge plus for the child. 当然，每个人，实际上，最初的模型都是他们的父母。所以它们会对它们产生巨大影响。如果那个父母原来是一个伟大的模特，我认为这对孩子来说将是一个巨大的优势。

I think that it beats a whole lot of other things in life to have the right models around.And I have — like I say, even as I've gotten older, I've picked up a few more.And it inﬂuences your behavior.I'm convinced of that. 我认为生活中有很多其他东西可以拥有合适的模型。而且我 - 就像我说的那样，即使我已经长大了，我还会再多拿几个。它会影响你的行为。我确信这一点。

And if you — you will want to be a little more, or a lot more, depending on your personality, like the person that you admire. 如果你 - 你会想要多一点，或多一点，这取决于你的个性，就像你钦佩的人。

And I tell the students in classes, I tell them, you know, "Just pick out the person you admire the most in the class and sit down and write the reasons out why you admire them. And then try and ﬁgure out why you can't have those same qualities." 我在课堂上告诉学生，我告诉他们，你知道，“在课堂上挑选出你最钦佩的人，然后坐下来写下你为什么钦佩他们的理由。然后试着弄明白为什么你可以没有那些相同的品质。“

Because they're not the ability to throw a football 60 yards, or run the 100 in ten ﬂat, or something like that.They're qualities of personality, character, temperament, that are — can be emulated.But you've got to start early.It's very tough to change behavior later on. 因为他们不能投掷60码的足球，或者在十个单位中投球，或类似的东西。他们具有个性，性格，气质等特质，可以效仿。但你必须尽早开始。以后改变行为非常困难。

And you can apply the reverse of it.Following Charlie's theory, you can ﬁnd the people that you don't like — (laughter) — and say, "What don't I like about these people?" 你可以反过来应用它。按照查理的理论，你可以找到你不喜欢的人 - （笑声） - 然后说：“我不喜欢这些人？”

And then you can look — if, you know, it takes a little strength of character.But you can look inward and say, you know, "Have I got some of that in me?"and — 然后你可以看 - 如果，你知道，它需要一点点力量的性格。但你可以向内看并说，你知道，“我有一些在我身上吗？”而且 -

It's not complicated.Ben Graham did it.Ben Franklin did it. 这并不复杂。本格雷厄姆做到了。本富兰克林做到了。

And it's not complicated.Nothing could be more simple than to try and ﬁgure out what you ﬁnd admirable and then decide, you know, that the person you really would like to admire is yourself.And the only way you're going to do it is take on the qualities of other people you admire. 而且并不复杂。没有什么比试图找出你认为令人钦佩的东西更简单，然后决定你真正想要欣赏的人就是你自己。而你要做的唯一方法就是接受你所钦佩的其他人的品质。

Anyway, that's a two-minute answer on something Bill and I did talk a little bit about. 无论如何，这是关于比尔的一个两分钟的答案，我和我谈了一些。

Charlie?(Applause) 查理？（掌声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.There is no reason, also, to look only for living models.The eminent dead are the — are, in the nature of things, some of the best models around. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。也没有理由只关注生活模型。从性质的角度来看，杰出的死者是一些最好的模特。

And, if it's a model is all you want, you're really better off not limiting yourself to the living.Some of the very best models are — have been dead for a long time.(Laughter) 并且，如果它是一个模型就是你想要的，你最好不要限制自己的生活。一些最好的模型 - 已经死了很长时间。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie has probably read more biography than any three people in this room put together.So he has put this into practice.And, as somebody mentioned earlier, Janet Lowe has a biography of Charlie coming out here in — later this year.So you can read all the secrets of Charlie's life.(Applause) 沃伦·巴菲特：查理可能阅读的传记比这个房间里任何三个人都要多。所以他把这个付诸实践。而且，正如之前提到的那样，珍妮特罗威有一本查理传记出现在今年晚些时候。所以你可以阅读查理一生的所有秘密。（掌声）

9. Buffett and Munger have no interest in running the Federal Reserve 9.巴菲特和芒格没有兴趣管理美联储

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，7号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen.My name is Gary Bradstrom (PH) from here in Omaha, Nebraska. 听众会员：下午好，先生们。我的名字叫Gary Bradstrom（PH），来自内布拉斯加州的奥马哈。

And my question is, if Alan Greenspan just decided to retire, and that job was offered, to either of you, would you take it? 而我的问题是，如果艾伦格林斯潘刚刚决定退休，而且这项工作被提供给你们两个人，你会接受吗？ WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can tell you my answer is no, in a hurry.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我可以告诉你我的答案是否定的，匆忙。（笑声）

I think Charlie will give you his answer. 我想查理会给你答案。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I would say "no" more quickly.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我会更快地说“不”。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: You notice, we gave you very unequivocal answers.And of course, that alone would disqualify us from the job at the Fed.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：您注意到，我们给了您非常明确的答案。当然，仅凭这一点就会使我们失去美联储的工作资格。（笑声）

I think it was Alan that said to one senator, he said, "Since you, you know, since you've seem to have stated my remarks so accurately, you must've misunderstood them."(Laughter) 我想是艾伦对一位参议员说，他说，“既然你，你知道，因为你似乎已经如此准确地陈述我的言论，你一定是误解了他们。” （笑声）

I don't think you could ﬁnd a job in public life that would entice either one of us. 我不认为你能在公共生活中找到一份会吸引我们其中任何一个人的工作。

And the truth is, we're having too much fun.I mean, this — we've got the best job in the world.We get to work with people we like and admire and trust every day of the year.We get to do what we want to do the way we want to do it. 事实是，我们有太多的乐趣。我的意思是，这 - 我们在世界上做得最好。我们可以与我们喜欢的人一起工作，并在一年中的每一天都很佩服和信任。我们可以按照我们想要的方式做我们想做的事情。

We should pay, and this is true of some other CEOs, too, but we should pay to have this job. 我们应该付钱，其他一些CEO也是如此，但我们应该付钱才能有这份工作。

I mean, it is really interesting.I've often thought, if you could get, you know, you had a sealed envelope, and you got — and you had the compensation committee say what they would pay to have the job ﬁlled, but then you had the chief executive also saywhat he would do before he would leave, there would be a huge, huge gap. 我的意思是，它真的很有趣。我经常想，如果你能得到，你知道，你有一个密封的信封，而且你得到了 - 并且你让补偿委员会说出他们为填补这份工作会付出什么，但是你让首席执行官也说在他离开之前他会做什么，会有巨大的巨大差距。

And I mean, it’s — there are all kinds of — I mean, it's a lot of fun to start with interesting problems you come up with, interesting things to do, something different every day.You can't beat the job.And to get paid for it is just the frosting on the cake. 我的意思是，它是 - 有各种各样的 - 我的意思是，从你想出的有趣问题开始，有趣的事情要做，每天都有不同的事情，这很有趣。你不能胜过这份工作。而获得报酬只是蛋糕上的糖霜。 And I don't see any jobs like that in public life, myself. 我自己也没有在公共生活中看到过这样的工作。

Charlie, have you got anything to add?Charlie takes on these public jobs.He runs a hospital and a few things.And he can tell you the wonders of it.Charlie? 查理，你有什么需要补充的吗？查理接受了这些公共工作。他经营一家医院和一些事情。他可以告诉你它的奇迹。查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, yeah.There's an old saying that, "He lied like a ﬁnance minister on the eve of a devaluation."I never wanted to have a job where lying was a required part of the activity.(Laughter and applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，是的。有一句老话说，“在贬值前夕，他像财政部长一样撒谎。”我从来没有想过一份工作，说谎是活动的必要部分。（笑声和掌声）

10. Berkshire is the "Metropolitan Museum of businesses" 10.伯克希尔是“大都会商业博物馆”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8. WARREN BUFFETT：8号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is Norman Rentrop.I'm from Bonn, Germany.I want to thank you very much for so patiently listening and answering and sharing yesterday and today.And I'm a shareholder since 1992. And this is my ﬁrst meeting. 观众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，我叫Norman Rentrop。我来自德国波恩。我非常感谢你昨天和今天如此耐心地倾听，回答和分享。我是自1992年以来的股东。这是我第一次见面。

I came here being inspired by Robert Miles' book, “101 Reasons to Own Berkshire Hathaway.” And I was very careful, listening to you, the reasons how you pick good people, that it's love for the business and not so much love forthe money. 我来到这里受到罗伯特迈尔斯的书“伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有的101个理由”的启发。我非常小心，听你说，你选择好人的原因，是对商业的热爱，而不是对爱的关注。钱。

And I'd like to hear a little bit more on your philosophies, now that Berkshire Hathaway is more and more buying companies.On this, how you make sure that it's true love and how you pick people. 现在Berkshire Hathaway越来越多地购买公司，我想更多地了解你的理念。在这方面，你如何确保它是真正的爱，以及你如何挑选人。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's a terriﬁc question.I don't know exactly how to answer.Maybe Charlie will think of it while I'm stumbling around, but — WARREN BUFFETT：这是一个非常棒的问题。我不知道该怎么回答。也许查理会在我磕磕绊绊的时候想到它，但是 -

I really — I think I can do that quite well.But I don't know of any way to give somebody else a set of questions to ask, or, you know — I don't know how to tell someone else how to select managers using those criteria: do they love the business or dothey love the money? 我真的 - 我想我能做得很好。但我不知道有什么方法可以给别人一些问题，或者，你知道 - 我不知道如何告诉别人如何选择使用这些标准的经理：他们喜欢这个行业还是做他们喜欢这些钱？

It's very, very important.I mean, it's crucial.Because it — well, we see it all the time.I mean, you've got people around who love the money.And you see them in public companies and doing things that we wouldn't want to have associated with us. 这非常非常重要。我的意思是，这是至关重要的。因为 - 好吧，我们一直都在看。我的意思是，你有很多人喜欢这些钱。而且你在公共公司看到他们并做我们不希望与我们联系的事情。

And on the other hand, if they love the business, and we’ll tell — I'll tell an owner this.I will say to them, "You built this business lovingly for 50 years, and maybe your parents before you, maybe even your grandparents."One of these businesses we're buying is fourth generation. 而另一方面，如果他们喜欢这项业务，我们会告诉他 - 我会告诉业主这个。我会对他们说，“你这个事业已经建立了50年，也许是你父母在你之前，甚至是你的祖父母。”我们购买的这些业务之一是第四代。

And the clincher, in fact, I used it with Jack Ringwalt back in 1967. I said to Jack, who had built it over a long period of time, "Do you want to sell this? You know, do you want to dispose ofthis, the most — you know, your creation, your painting? Or do you want some 26-year-old trust ofﬁcer to do it the day after you die?" 事实上，在1967年我和Jack Ringwalt一起使用了它。我告诉杰克，他在很长一段时间内建造了它，“你想卖掉它吗？你知道吗，你想要处理掉吗？这个，你知道的，你的创作，你的画作最多吗？或者你想要一个26岁的信托官在你死后的第二天去做吗？“

And the thought of who was going to handle this masterpiece, which he'd created himself, was important to him.And I tell him, If they want to put it in our museum, we will make sure, A, it doesn't get resold, that it gets the proper respect, and that you can keep painting it. 关于谁将要处理这件他自己创造的杰作的想法对他来说很重要。我告诉他，如果他们想把它放在我们的博物馆，我们会确保，A，它不会被转售，它得到适当的尊重，并且你可以继续画它。

We won't come in and tell you to use reds instead of yellows or anything like that.So even though it's a masterpiece now, you can keep adding to it. 我们不会进来告诉你使用红色而不是黄色或类似的东西。所以即使它现在是一个杰作，你可以继续添加它。

So we like to think that we're the Metropolitan Museum of businesses and that we can get really outstanding creations to reside in our museum.But it — we've got to deliver the kind of museum to these painters of businesses, in effect, that we would want, if we were doing the same sort of thing. 因此，我们认为我们是大都会商业博物馆，我们可以在博物馆中获得非常出色的创作。但它 - 我们必须为这些企业的画家提供这种博物馆，实际上，如果我们做同样的事情，我们会想要。 To some people, that doesn't mean a damn thing.I mean, all they want to do is auction their business, you know.And they probably cheat on their ﬁgures a little in the last year or two before they sell it to dress it up.And they do all kinds of things. 对某些人来说，这并不意味着该死的东西。我的意思是，他们想做的就是拍卖他们的生意，你知道。他们可能会在过去一两年内将他们的数据作弊，然后才卖掉它。他们做各种各样的事情。

And they employ some investment banker who pretends that he's getting bids from other people to jack it up some more.And that's standard procedure for a lot of people. 他们聘请了一些投资银行家，假装他正在接受其他人的投标，以便更多地提升自己。这是许多人的标准程序。

We have no interest in buying in with them at any price because we don't want to be on the other side of the table for the rest of our lives with somebody that's going to do that. 我们没有兴趣以任何价格购买它们，因为我们不希望在我们的余生中站在另一边与那些将会这样做的人。

If somebody loves their business — and I love Berkshire, I mean, you create something over a period of time — it means something to you. 如果有人喜欢他们的生意 - 我喜欢伯克希尔，我的意思是，你在一段时间内创造了一些东西 - 这对你意味着什么。

Some people get it out of how they decorate their home, or some people get it out of all kinds of different things, their golf game or whatever.But some of us get it out of building a business.And it has to be enormously important, what kind of a home it ﬁnds. 有些人从他们如何装饰他们的家中得到它，或者有些人从各种不同的东西，他们的高尔夫球比赛或其他任何东西中得到它。但我们中的一些人将其从建立业务中解脱出来。它必须非常重要，它找到了什么样的家。

And there comes a time, in many situations, for estate taxes, or because the kids don't get along, or whatever the hell it may be, why people need to do something with that business.But they don't want it auctioned off.And we get — we have a good home for that. 在许多情况下，有时间来征收遗产税，或者因为孩子们不和睦相处，或者无论他们到底是什么，为什么人们需要对这项业务采取行动。但他们不希望它被拍卖掉。我们得到了 - 我们有一个很好的家。

I think I can tell pretty well what people's motivations are when they come in with a business.And so far, we've batted pretty well. 我想我可以很好地说出当他们进入企业时人们的动机是什么。到目前为止，我们打得相当不错。

We've made mistakes.There's no question about that.But in a sense, I think they've gotten fewer over the years. 我们犯了错误。毫无疑问。但从某种意义上说，我认为这些年来他们的收入减少了。

And we have — our disappointments with people have been very, very few.We've been wrong about the economics of the business sometimes.But that's our mistake, not theirs.We've seldom been wrong about the people. 我们有 - 我们对人们的失望非常非常少。有时我们对商业经济学的看法是错误的。但这是我们的错误，而不是他们的错误。我们对人民很少有错。

And I wish I could give you a checklist that you could go down, and you could say, "Well, this guy loves the money. So he's going to be gone in six months. And this one loves the business. So as long asI leave him alone to do his job and appreciate what he does, be fair with him, that he's going to stay around here as long as he can." 而且我希望我能给你一份你可以下去的清单，你可以说，“好吧，这家伙很喜欢这笔钱。所以他会在六个月内离开。而且这个人喜欢这项业务。所以只要我让他独自完成自己的工作并欣赏他的所作所为，与他公平对待，只要他能，他就会留在这里。“

Charlie, have you got any thoughts on how you separate these people out? 查理，你有没有想过如何将这些人分开？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think our culture is very old fashioned.In other words, I think it's Ben Franklin and Andrew Carnegie.It's very old fashioned. CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为我们的文化很老套。换句话说，我认为是本·富兰克林和安德鲁·卡内基。这是非常老式的。

And what I think is amazing about Berkshire is how well these very old-fashioned ideas still work. 我认为伯克希尔令人惊讶的是这些非常老式的想法仍然有效。

Can you imagine Andrew Carnegie calling in a compensation consultant or — (laughter) — an investment banker to tell him whether he should buy another steel mill?Or — 你能想象安德鲁卡内基打电话给赔偿顾问，或者 - （笑声） - 投资银行家告诉他是否应该买另一家钢厂？要么 -

We don't get imitated much.We're imitating the behavior of a period that has been gone for a long time.But, I don’t see — a lot of the businesses we buy are kind of cranky like us and old fashioned.And I hope we continue it that way. 我们不会被模仿太多。我们正在模仿已经消失了很长时间的一段时期的行为。但是，我没有看到 - 我们购买的很多商家都像我们这样老式的胡思乱想。我希望我们继续这样做。

WARREN BUFFETT: They're sitting out there, Charlie.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：他们坐在那里，查理。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, yeah.Well, but I think the businesses do have standards.See’s has standards.It has its own personality.But it’s — but maintaining standards is a huge part of it. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，是的。好吧，但我认为企业确实有标准。看到有标准。它有自己的个性。但它是 - 但保持标准是其中很重要的一部分。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie hit on one thing.The idea of asking investment bankers or somebody to evaluate the businesses you're going to buy, I mean, that strikes us as idiocy.If you don't know enough about a business to decide whether to buy it yourself, you'd better forget it. 沃伦·巴菲特：查理打了一件事。要求投资银行家或某人评估你要购买的业务的想法，我的意思是，这让我们感到愚蠢。如果您对某个企业的了解不足以决定是否自己购买，那么您最好忘掉它。

It does not make sense.(Applause) You bring in somebody who's going to get a very large check if you buy it, and a very small check if you don't, that displays a faith in human nature that would strain Charlie and me.(Laughter) 它没有任何意义。（掌声）你带来一个人，如果你买的话会得到一张非常大的支票，如果你不买的话，会带一个非常小的支票，这显示了对人性的信仰会让查理和我感到紧张。（笑声）

It's a key point, which you raise.And frankly, if I think there's anything we're good at, I think we're pretty good at what you're talking about there. 这是你提出的一个关键点。坦率地说，如果我认为我们擅长的是什么，我认为我们对你所谈论的内容非常擅长。

It's an important part of capital allocation.Because we do not — we are not in a position to manage the businesses ourselves. 这是资本配置的重要组成部分。因为我们没有 - 我们自己无法管理业务。

And we want management as well as the business.And we've gotten it.And we've gotten it in spades from people that stay on and have done a terriﬁc job for us.And it makes life a lot easier, too. 我们想要管理和业务。我们已经得到了它。我们已经从留下来的人那里得到了它，并为我们做了一个了不起的工作。而且它也让生活变得更轻松。

11. What Buffett means when he can't "understand" a business 11.当巴菲特无法“理解”某项业务时，这意味着什么

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's go to number 1 again. WARREN BUFFETT：我们再来一次。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren.Hello, Charlie.My name is Doug Paterson.I'm from here in Omaha. 观众成员：你好，沃伦。你好，查理。我的名字是Doug Paterson。我来自奥马哈。

I teach down the road at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.And I teach in theater, which is also the greatest job in the world.And I have to say that I enjoy the theater that you provide every year.Thanks so much. 我在奥马哈的内布拉斯加大学教授这条路。我在戏剧教学，这也是世界上最伟大的工作。我不得不说我喜欢你每年提供的剧院。非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just sitting here, there are so many questions that come to those of us who have been sitting here for three or four hours.I've got three very disconnected questions. 听众：刚坐在这里，有很多问题出现在我们这些坐了三四个小时的人身上。我有三个非常不连贯的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll do them one at a time. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们一次只做一个。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Cool.In terms of these tech stocks, you say that you don't understand them.Can you say if you think — I can't imagine you not understanding something. 观众成员：很酷。就这些科技股而言，你说你不理解它们。如果你想的话，你能说 - 我无法想象你不理解某些东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, we understand the product.We understand what it does for people.We just don't know the economics of it 10 years from now. WARREN BUFFETT：哦，我们了解该产品。我们了解它对人们的作用。我们10年后才知道它的经济学。

That, I mean, you can understand all kinds — you can understand steel.You can understand home building.But if you look at a home builder and try and think where it's going to be in ﬁve or 10 years, the economics of it, that's another question. 那，我的意思是，你可以理解各种 - 你可以理解钢铁。你可以了解住宅建设。但是，如果你看一个住宅建筑商，并试着思考它将在五年或十年内发生什么，那就是它的经济学，这是另一个问题。

I mean, it's not a question of understanding the product they turn out or the means they use to distribute it, all of those sort of things.It's the predictability of the economics of the situation 10 years out.And that — that’s our problem. 我的意思是，这不是理解他们产生的产品或他们用来分发产品的方式的问题，而是所有这些事情。这是10年后形势经济学的可预测性。那 - 那是我们的问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Right, and I'm not trying to provoke you into doing it.I'm glad you haven't.Because I probably would've gone into cardiac arrest this last couple of months. 观众成员：是的，我并不想激怒你。我很高兴你没有。因为在过去的几个月里我可能会进行心脏骤停。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, so would we. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我们也一样。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah.So your projection is that you are not going to try to make an attempt to understand it.You think it’s — is it not comprehensible?Is that it, it's not comprehensible? 听众会员：是的。所以你的预测是你不会试图去理解它。你认为它是 - 它是不可理解的？是这样，它是不可理解的？ WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Every business I look at, I think about its economics.It's built into me.It's built into Charlie. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我看到的每一项业务，我都考虑其经济学。它内置于我的身上。它内置于查理。

So it isn't like, when some — if I'm with Andy Grove, or actually, I knew Bob Noyce back at Grinnell in 1968 and '69, when they were starting Intel. 因此，当有一些人 - 如果我和Andy Grove在一起时，或者实际上，我知道鲍勃·诺伊斯在1968年和69年回到格林内尔时，他们正在启动英特尔。

I — when he talked to me about starting Intel, or anybody talks to me about a business, I think about its economics.I'll think about the economics of UNO, you know, if we talk for three or four minutes. 我 - 当他跟我谈起启动英特尔，或者有人跟我谈过一项业务时，我想到了它的经济学。如果我们谈三到四分钟，我会考虑UNO的经济学。

But — I — so it isn't that we shut off the valve.It's just that we don't get anyplace.We don't know what it'll look like.And it’s, you know, there are a lot of things in life that, you can — they're just beyond comprehension for many of us.And — 但是 - 我 - 所以不是我们关闭了阀门。只是我们没有得到任何地方。我们不知道它会是什么样子。而且，你知道，生活中有很多事情，你可以 - 他们对我们中的许多人来说都是无法理解的。而且 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So you'd say that like, nobody, really, probably, can understand this, where it'll be in 10 years.Nobody could understand it. 观众成员：所以你会说，没有人，真的，可能，可以理解这一点，它将在10年内。没有人能理解它。

WARREN BUFFETT: We would be very skeptical about it.I would say that — and incidentally, my friend, Bill Gates, would say the same thing.And actually, Bob Noyce would’ve, and Bob died some years ago, but — or Andy Grove — they would say the same thing.I've taken long walks with Andy. 沃伦巴菲特：我们对它持怀疑态度。我会说 - 顺便说一下，我的朋友比尔盖茨会说同样的话。实际上，鲍勃诺伊斯会这样，而鲍勃在几年前去世了，但是 - 或者安迪格罗夫 - 他们会说同样的话。我和安迪一起长途跋涉。

And they would not want to put down on paper their predictions about where 10 companies you would choose in the tech ﬁeld would be in 10 years, in terms of their economics.They would say, "That's too hard." 他们不希望在经济学方面对他们在技术领域中选择的10家公司在10年后的预测中做出预测。他们会说，“这太难了。”

12. Buffett: Berkshire will be ﬁne if I'm hit by a truck 12.巴菲特：如果我被卡车击中，伯克希尔将会没事的 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Cool.A second question, again, not related.But I've heard this question several times today.And it comes up every year. 观众成员：很酷。第二个问题，再次，没有关系。但我今天已多次听到这个问题。它每年都会出现。

I'd like to couch it in sort of a different phrase.Let's say that you stepped outside of this building and were hit by a bus. 我想用一种不同的语言来解决它。让我们说你走出这栋楼外，被一辆公共汽车撞了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.We've got one fellow who objects to that here who's a shareholder.It’s normally a truck. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我们有一位反对的人是这里的股东。它通常是卡车。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: A truck, OK. 观众：一辆卡车，好的。

WARREN BUFFETT: And he happened to be in the trucking business, so he — WARREN BUFFETT：他碰巧在卡车运输业务，所以他 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Or, given — 观众成员：或者，给予 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Just so it isn't a GEICO driver.But — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：就是这样，它不是GEICO的驱动程序。但是 - （笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Given Omaha, it could be a road grader. 观众成员：鉴于奥马哈，它可能是一个道路平地机。

What kind, I mean, that would be a sudden — maybe you'd come out of it with a great fastball.Maybe that's it.But you wouldn't have your facility at stocks. 什么样的，我的意思是，这将是一个突然的 - 也许你会用一个伟大的快球走出它。也许就是这样。但你不会有你的设施库存。

What kind of advice would you give people that hold Berkshire Hathaway at a moment such as that? 你会给那些持有伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的人提供什么样的建议呢？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it’s — I've got the ultimate test on that.Because my estate, at that point, would be 99 3/4 percent invested in Berkshire.And I feel totally comfortable, considering the arrangements that have been made, and the businesses we own, and the managers we have in place, in terms of that. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这是 - 我已经对此进行了最终测试。因为我的遗产在那时将占伯克希尔的99 3/4％。考虑到已经做出的安排，我们拥有的业务以及我们拥有的管理人员，我感到非常舒服。 But no one will be more affected, ﬁnancially, let alone in other manners, by that truck than me. (Laughter) 但是，没有人会在经济上受到影响，更不用说用卡车比其他方式更有影响了。（笑声）

So it's a thought that's crossed my mind. 所以这是我的想法。

And it's a more important question to me than to anybody else.And I've answered it to my satisfaction.The directors have some of my thoughts on the subject.But the world will go on.The businesses will go on.And I think you'll have terriﬁc management in place. 这对我来说是一个比其他人更重要的问题。我很满意地回答了这个问题。董事们对这个问题有一些看法。但世界将继续下去。企业将继续。我认为你将拥有出色的管理。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.I appreciate that.And thank you for taking all three of these.They're so disconnected. 听众会员：谢谢。我很感激。谢谢你们拿走了这三个。他们是如此脱节。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，谢谢。

13. Buffett: No interest in buying the Omaha World-Herald newspaper 13.巴菲特：没有兴趣购买“奥马哈世界先驱报”

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Given your comments about newspapers, may we assume that you are probably not going to buy the Omaha World-Herald? 观众：鉴于您对报纸的评论，我们可以假设您可能不会购买“奥马哈世界先驱报”吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: I think that's a fair assumption.But that would probably be true regardless of my thoughts about newspapers.Because they're not going to sell. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为这是一个公平的假设。但不管我对报纸的想法如何，这都可能是真的。因为他们不打算出售。

Charlie, have you got anything to add on any of those? 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that story about the World-Herald is interesting.The truth of the matter is that, if Warren had been offered the Omaha World-Herald 20 or 25 years ago, he would've cheerfully bought it.And now he doesn't want it.And that isn't because of the economics. CHARLIE MUNGER：那个关于世界先驱报的故事很有意思。问题的真相是，如果沃伦在20或25 年前获得奥马哈世界先驱报，那他就会乐意买下它。现在他不想要它。这不是因为经济学。

WARREN BUFFETT: That's true.Yeah, I mean, there's no question — I have not been offered it, never will be offered it.And all — the ownership's all set.But what Charlie said is true. 沃伦巴菲特：那是真的。是的，我的意思是，毫无疑问 - 我没有得到它，永远不会被提供。而所有 - 所有权都已设定。但查理所说的是真的。

If it were still owned by an individual, and they offered it to me, for economic reasons, I wouldn't want to buy it.And for other reasons, I wouldn't want to buy it. 如果它仍然由个人拥有，并且他们提供给我，出于经济原因，我不想买它。而出于其他原因，我不想买它。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But you wouldn't want to buy it now, because your life would be less congenial afterward than before.There'd be more people after you. CHARLIE MUNGER：但是你现在不想买它，因为你的生活会比之前变得不那么适合。你后面会有更多的人。

WARREN BUFFETT: There'd be no plus in life to owning the World-Herald, at all.Yeah. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：拥有世界先驱报，生活中没有任何好处。是啊。（笑声）

And, as Charlie said, that's probably not the way we would've thought 30 years ago. 而且，正如查理所说，这可能不是我们30年前所想的那样。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Not at all. CHARLIE MUNGER：完全没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think we're right now. WARREN BUFFETT：我想我们现在就是这样。

14. Internet is good for society, bad for businesses 14.互联网对社会有益，对企业不利

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2. WARREN BUFFETT：2号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Howard Winston (PH) from Chicago, Illinois.I wanted to thank Charlie and you for your hospitality. 观众成员：嗨，来自伊利诺伊州芝加哥的Howard Winston（PH）。我想感谢Charlie和你的热情好客。

My question is, Berkshire has benefitted enormously over the years from the low cost of its float.Do you think the internet will make the insurance business more competitive and, therefore, raise the cost of your float? 我的问题是，伯克希尔多年来从浮动的低成本中获益匪浅。您是否认为互联网将使保险业务更具竞争力，从而提高您的浮动成本？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question.I would say that the internet, from what I see now, is unlikely to increase the cost of Berkshire's ﬂoat. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，这是一个很好的问题。我会说，从我现在看来，互联网不太可能增加伯克希尔的浮动成本。

It will have different effects on different aspects of our insurance business.And it will change the insurance industry in some ways, not — and I can't tell you exactly what.But I — 它将对我们的保险业务的不同方面产生不同的影响。它会在某些方面改变保险业，而不是 - 我无法确切地告诉你什么。但是我 -

You know that any system of distribution is going to be affected by something that changes the economics of distribution as much as the internet does.So there's no question it'll have an impact. 你知道任何分配系统都会受到像互联网一样改变分配经济性的东西的影响。所以毫无疑问它会产生影响。

I think in the end, the competitive advantages we have among our group of insurance companies, net, will not be hurt by the internet.But I could be wrong on that.And therefore, I don't think that our cost of ﬂoat will be changed much. 我认为最终，我们在保险公司网中的竞争优势不会受到互联网的影响。但我可能错了。因此，我认为我们的浮动成本不会有太大变化。

I don't think industry economics, in aggregate, for insurance companies, are going to be changed very much.The economics haven't been that good.I think they'll be about, you know, in that same range. 我认为保险公司的总体行业经济学不会发生太大的变化。经济学并不那么好。我认为他们会在同一范围内。

And I don't think our competitive advantage will be cut.So therefore, I think our cost of ﬂoat, in the future, is going to be higher than it has been in the past.But that's for reasons other than the internet.I still think we'll have an attractive cost of funds over time on ﬂoat. 而且我认为我们的竞争优势不会被削减。因此，我认为未来的浮动成本将高于过去。但这是出于互联网以外的原因。我仍然认为随着时间的推移，我们的浮动资金成本会很高。

It's a good business for us.I don't think it's necessarily a good business for the average company. 这对我们来说是一件好事。我认为这对普通公司来说不一定是好事。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there's a marvelous issue buried in your question.Will the internet, by making competition so much more efﬁcient, make business generally harder for American corporations, meaning more competitive, lower returns on capital?And my guess would be yes. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，你的问题中埋藏着一个奇妙的问题。通过提高竞争效率，互联网能否使美国企业的业务更加困难，这意味着更具竞争力，资本回报更低？而我的猜测是肯定的。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.My guess would be yes, too.I would say that, on balance, for society, the internet is a wonderful thing.And for capitalists, it's probably a net negative. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我的猜测也是肯定的。我会说，总的来说，对于社会来说，互联网是一件很棒的事情。而对于资本家来说，它可能是净负值。

CHARLIE MUNGER: So all of you can be happy that the progress of the species will affect your economic futures for the worse.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：所以你们都很高兴物种的进步会影响你们的经济前景。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: A sacriﬁce, at which our ages, we're willing to do.But we wouldn't be at your age.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：牺牲，我们的年龄，我们愿意做的。但我们不会在你这个年纪。（笑声）

That — incidentally, that — there's plenty to think about there. 那 - 顺便说一下 - 那里有很多想法。

The internet, I mean, if you analyze it, you have to think it's much more likely that it will reduce the proﬁtability of American business and improve it. 互联网，我的意思是，如果你分析它，你必须认为它更有可能降低美国业务的盈利能力并改善它。

It will improve the efficiency of American business.But all kinds of things improve the efficiency of American business without making it more profitable. 它将提高美国企业的效率。但是，各种各样的事情可以提高美国企业的效率而不会使其更有利可图。

And I think that the internet is likely to fall into that category.So far, it's improved the monetized value of American business. 我认为互联网很可能属于这一类。到目前为止，它改善了美国企业的货币化价值。

But that will eventually follow the underlying economics of what the internet does.And I think it's way more likely to make American business, in aggregate, worth less than compared to what it would've been otherwise. 但这最终将遵循互联网的基本经济学。而且我认为这样做的可能性更大，总体而言，美国企业的价值低于其他情况。

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, that's perfectly obvious and very little understood.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一句，那是非常明显的，很少被人理解。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: So there.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：那么。（笑声）

15. Egos and proxy statements fuel excessive CEO pay 15. Egos和委托陈述助长了过多的CEO薪酬 WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，3号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, good afternoon.My name is Tom Gayner from Richmond, Virginia. 听众会员：是的，下午好。我叫弗吉尼亚州里士满的汤姆盖纳。

And in the current environment, it seems that the attacks on the moats of wonderful businesses are coming from inside the castle, in the form of option-based compensation, just as much as from outside competitors. 在目前的环境中，对于精彩企业的护城河的袭击似乎来自城堡内部，以基于期权的补偿形式，与外部竞争对手一样多。

One of your role models, Ben Franklin, said, "Even a small hole can sink a great ship."It seems like the holes are getting bigger. 你的一个榜样，本富兰克林说，“即使是一个小洞也可以沉没一艘大船。”似乎洞越来越大了。

Can you discuss what, if any, forces may cause this to change?Is it a problem that will get worse or get better? 你能否讨论一下可能会导致这种变化的力量？这是一个会变得更糟或变得更好的问题吗？

My second is speciﬁcally, in your role as directors of companies like Coke and Gillette, are you seeking to change these practices?And what kinds of success do you expect there?Do they let you on the comp committee? 我的第二个具体是，在您担任可口可乐和吉列等公司的董事时，您是否正在寻求改变这些做法？你期望在那里取得什么样的成功？他们让你参加comp委员会吗？

And three, if these compensation practices are irrational, does Berkshire beneﬁt from this irrationality?Thank you. 三，如果这些补偿做法不合理，伯克希尔是否会受益于这种非理性？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, to carry the castle analogy further, we not only look for a great economic castle, but we look for a great knight in charge of that castle.Because that's important.He's the one that throws the crocodiles into the moat and widens the moat over time. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，为了进一步进行城堡比喻，我们不仅要寻找一座伟大的经济城堡，而且还要寻找一位负责这座城堡的伟大骑士。因为那很重要。他是将鳄鱼扔进护城河并随着时间的推移扩大护城河的人。

And of course, the question is, you know, how much does the knight get of the castle for doing that?And I think, generally speaking, at Berkshire, you get a very fair deal in terms of the amount that — 当然，问题是，你知道，骑士得到了多少城堡来做这件事？我认为，一般来说，在伯克希尔，就金额而言，你会得到一个非常公平的交易 -

We've got a lot of castles around.And we try to pay people fairly.But I don't think that the division of — is unfair between the owners of the castle and the knights that are around there, protecting the moat. 我们周围有很多城堡。我们试图公平地向人们付钱。但我不认为 - 城堡的主人和周围的骑士之间的分裂是不公平的，保护护城河。

The — it's hard for me to imagine how the compensation practices — the question of how much the knight gets of the castle — how that changes in favor of the owners of the castle over time.The ratcheting effect is just unbelievable. - 我很难想象补偿的实践 - 骑士得到多少城堡的问题 - 随着时间的推移，这对城堡主人的影响有多大。棘轮效应令人难以置信。

No one, no compensation committee in America, will be listening to a consultant who walks in and says, "I think your management should have an arrangement that ends up in them being in the lower half." 在美国，没有人，也没有薪酬委员会会听取一位顾问的意见，他说：“我认为你的管理层应该有一个最终处于下半部分的安排。”

And if no one wants to be in the lower half, believe me, the median is going to move up. 如果没有人想要进入下半部，相信我，中位数将会上升。

I mean, there is no way around that.I mean, these people meet yearly or more often.And they sit there with a proxy statement of every other company in their business.You know, and they pick out the ones that have the biggest numbers in them. 我的意思是，没有办法解决这个问题。我的意思是，这些人每年或更频繁地会面。他们坐在那里，对其业务中的其他公司发表代理声明。你知道，他们挑选出数量最多的那些。

And they say, "Well, gee, we need a management at least as good as this. And how are we going to attract people?"and all this other stuff. 他们说，“好吧，我们需要一个至少和这样好的管理层。我们如何吸引人们？”以及所有其他的东西。

And it'll only ratchet upward.And I think that's a fact of life.And I think that it's important for shareholders to understand that. 它只会向上攀升。而且我认为这是生活中的事实。而且我认为股东了解这一点非常重要。

I've been on the board of 19 companies, not counting any Berkshire subsidiaries or anything like that.The last comp committee I was on was at Salomon.And I was chairman of the comp committee, I think.I may be wrong on that.There were three of us.And the other two guys were terriﬁc guys. 我一直在19家公司的董事会，不包括伯克希尔的任何子公司或类似的东西。我参加的最后一个委员会是在所罗门。我想，我是comp委员会的主席。我可能错了。我们三个人。其他两个人都很棒。

And the earnings came in one year, $100 million or so — I think it was 1990 — below the previous year.And comp was up a fair amount. 收入来自一年，1亿美元左右 - 我认为是1990年 - 低于去年。而comp则相当可观。 And I'd found that there had been some earlier issues involved and so on.I just said, I couldn't swallow it anymore.And I voted against it. 而且我发现有一些早期问题涉及等等。我只是说，我再也忍不住了。我投了反对票。

I can't remember whether I was chairman or not.But in any event, it was two to one against me.And I think it would've been two to one against me if I'd been chairman. 我不记得我是否是主席。但无论如何，这是对我的二对一。如果我担任董事长，我认为这对我来说是两对一的。

And the other two fellows were perfectly rational.They said, "How do we keep these people? And, you know, how can we repudiate our management?"All the sort of things you get. 其他两个人是完全理性的。他们说：“我们如何留住这些人？而且，你知道，我们怎能否认我们的管理层呢？”所有你得到的东西。

So as a practical — I've got one friend, terribly well-regarded businessman — and he’s been — they don't throw you off the comp committee.They just don't re-nominate you. 所以作为一个实际的 - 我有一个朋友，非常受好评的商人 - 而且他一直都是 - 他们不会让你离开 comp委员会。他们只是不会重新提名你。

And he's been bounced from two of them simply by raising some questions that — about things you would ﬁnd outrageous. 他只是通过提出一些问题来解决他们中的两个问题 - 关于你会发现令人发指的事情。

I'm not on the comp committee.I've been on only one comp committee.And they saw what I did.So that was the end of it. 我不在comp委员会。我一直只参加一个委员会。他们看到我做了什么。所以这就结束了。

People say, "We love your ideas,” And, you know, “You think creatively. We don't want to hear about your thoughts on compensation."And that, you know, it's understandable. 人们说，“我们热爱你的想法”，而且，你知道，“你创造性地思考。我们不想听到你对补偿的看法。”而且，你知道，这是可以理解的。

You know, and every — and you run into some terriﬁc cases of people.I mean, the fellow who runs Fastenal, for example, they are just outstanding.And there are a number of cases where people behave very well. 你知道，每一个 - 你遇到了一些非常棒的人。我的意思是，例如，运行Fastenal的人，他们就是出类拔萃的。在许多情况下，人们表现得非常好。

But most of them, I think some — I don't think it's money so much, sometimes.I just think it's ego.They just can't stand to see some guy that they think is batting .280, and they're batting .300, and he's getting paid more money.And, you know, and that process is endless. 但是大多数人，我认为有些人 - 有时候，我认为这不是很多钱。我只是认为这是自负。他们只是无法忍受看到一些他们认为正在击球的家伙.280，而他们正在击球.300，而且他得到了更多的钱。而且，你知道，这个过程是无止境的。 And that, I, you know, that's understandable.It's like who gets top billing in a movie or something of the sort.People care about, you know, where their name is compared to somebody else's.And their name, in this case, is compensation.And it — I doubt if it reverses itself. 那，我，你知道，这是可以理解的。这就像谁在电影或类似的东西中获得最高收费。你知道，人们关心他们的名字与其他人的名字相比。在这种情况下，他们的名字是补偿。它 - 我怀疑它是否会逆转自己。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I think we can conﬁdently expect that the situation will get worse.And I think we can conﬁdently expect that that is bad for Berkshire Hathaway to the extent that it's a passive shareholder in big corporations. CHARLIE MUNGER：不，我认为我们可以自信地预计情况会变得更糟。而且我认为我们可以自信地认为这对伯克希尔哈撒韦来说是不利的，因为它是大公司的被动股东。

There is one place where we get an advantage: our own culture and attitude being so different, it does attract some of these people that own wonderful businesses. 有一个地方我们可以获得优势：我们自己的文化和态度是如此不同，它确实吸引了一些拥有精彩业务的人。

I mean, we literally, on occasion, ﬁnd people for whom we're the only acceptable buyer.They don't like this culture of other big corporations any better than you do.And that does give us an advantage. 我的意思是，我们有时会找到我们唯一可以接受的买家。他们不喜欢其他大公司的文化。这确实给了我们一个优势。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.You asked us a question, also, about the — how active we might be in saying this.We're not going to ever sit here and tell you what we say in other boardrooms, because it would reduce any effectiveness we might have.And we probably don’t have that much effectiveness anyway.But — WARREN BUFFETT：是的。你问我们一个问题，关于 - 我们说这个问题的积极程度。我们不会坐在这里告诉你我们在其他会议室里所说的话，因为它会降低我们可能拥有的任何效率。而且我们可能没有那么多的效率。但是 -

You can only belch so many times at the dinner table and get invited back.And — (laughter) — we've probably done enough of our share of that.And you — we try to run Berkshire in a way that we ﬁnd admirable.And we try to spell out our reasoning on it and everything else.And we hope that maybe somebody latches onto that as a model someplace. 你只能在餐桌上打嗝这么多次并被邀请回来。并且 - （笑） - 我们可能已经做了足够多的事情。而你 - 我们试图以我们认为令人钦佩的方式经营伯克希尔。我们试图说明我们对它和其他一切的推理。我们希望也许有人会将其作为模型锁定在某个地方。 But going around condemning people by name does not work.And so we, you know, we hate the sin and love the sinner and all that sort of thing.And it doesn't have much effect. 但到处谴责人名不起作用。所以，我们，你知道，我们讨厌罪恶，爱罪人和所有这类事。并没有太大的影响。

16. Hard to predict how demographics will affect markets 16.很难预测人口统计将如何影响市场

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Warren and Charlie.My name is Erras (PH).I'm from Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.And my ﬁrst time in Nebraska, in Omaha, ﬁrst time hearing you guys live. 听众会员：下午好，沃伦和查理。我的名字是埃拉斯（PH）。我来自加拿大曼尼托巴省温尼伯市。我第一次在奥马哈的内布拉斯加州，第一次听到你们的生活。

And there's a big ice cream man behind you. 你身后有个大冰淇淋男人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Hmm.There we go! WARREN BUFFETT：嗯。我们去！

FEMALE VOICE: Here you go. 女声：你走了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, thank you. CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: And you think there are no management perks at Berkshire. WARREN BUFFETT：你认为伯克希尔没有管理特权。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, boy.(Laughter) All right, let's get down to business. 听众：哦，男孩。（笑声）好吧，让我们开始做生意吧。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is in reference to your article in Fortune magazine last November, where you talked about corporate earnings and what the market — are you guys listening?Or… 观众：我的问题是参考你去年11月在“财富”杂志上发表的文章，在那里你谈到了企业收益和市场 - 你们在听什么？要么…

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm listening.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：我在听。（笑声） We can chew gum and listen at the same time. 我们可以同时嚼口香糖并听。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right, all right, all right.As I was saying — 听众会员：好的，好的，好的。正如我所说 -

WARREN BUFFETT: But if we had — WARREN BUFFETT：但如果我们有 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — the point in your article in Fortune about corporate earnings and what the market is paying for them, painting a pretty gloomy picture for equities and market levels going forward. 听众会员： - 您在“财富”杂志上的文章中关于企业收益以及市场为他们付出的代价，为未来股市和市场水平描绘了一幅相当悲观的画面。

Now, as you may know, there exists a very strong trend in demographics.We see, in Canada and the United States, the aging of the population and, more importantly, the bulk of this population reaching their peak savings years, all at the same time. 现在，正如您所知，人口统计学中存在非常强烈的趋势。我们在加拿大和美国看到人口老龄化，更重要的是，大部分人口达到了他们的高峰储蓄年，同时也是如此。

WARREN BUFFETT: You're getting a little rude.But go ahead.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：你有点粗鲁。但是继续吧。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can't believe this.Warren actually called me rude. 观众：我不敢相信。沃伦实际上叫我粗鲁。

WARREN BUFFETT: I wanted to prove to you I was listening.Go ahead.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我想向你证明我在听。前进。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Anyways, OK, so there's a major retirement crisis as a majority of Canadians and Americans between the ages of, especially between 22 and 55, are worried that they won't have enough money to fund their retirement or let alone, last. 听众会员：不管怎样，好吧，所以有一个重大的退休危机，因为大多数加拿大人和美国人年龄在 22岁到55岁之间，他们担心他们没有足够的钱资助他们退休或更不用说，最后。

So for this reason, I mean, this population is expected to invest in equities, as opposed to ﬁxed- income instruments, to get the necessary long-term rates of return to fund their nest egg for retirement. 因此，出于这个原因，我的意思是，预计这一人口将投资于股票，而不是固定收益工具，以获得必要的长期回报率，为退休基金提供资金。

And therefore, many are calling for massive amounts of money to ﬂow into the markets over the next ﬁve, 10, 15 years through stocks and mutual funds and, consequently, fueling market prices and market levels.Many predicting the biggest growth ever in the stock markets. 因此，许多人呼吁通过股票和共同基金在未来五年，十年，十五年内将大量资金流入市场，从而推动市场价格和市场水平。许多人预测股市有史以来最大的增长。

So what is your opinion on this potential trend, separately or in conjunction with what you said in that article in Fortune?Thanks very much. 那么您对这一潜在趋势有什么看法，单独或与您在“财富”杂志上的文章中所说的一致？非常感谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good.To be, I'm not being rude here, but we don't think it means a thing, frankly.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好的。是的，我在这里并不粗鲁，但我们认为这不是一件事，坦率地说。（笑声）

The savings rate, the private savings rate, you know, is not high now.It doesn't need to be high. 你知道，储蓄率，私人储蓄率现在不高。它不需要很高。

What really determines how the people who are either aged or very young, because either way, the people who are in their nonproductive years depends, in aggregate, on aggregate production of goods and services, and then the division between those who are in their productiveyears and in their nonproductive years.And that's what Social Security argument's about and everything. 真正决定老年人或非常年轻人的方式，无论哪种方式，非生产年代的人，总体上取决于商品和服务的总产量，然后是生产者和生产者之间的分工。岁月和非生产性的岁月。这就是社会保障论点和所有内容。

The biggest single thing working for people in their nonproductive years on both ends, young and old, is the fact that the pie keeps growing.And that makes it easier to attack the problems of the nonproductive. 无论年轻人还是老年人，在非生产性年份为人们工作的最大的一件事就是馅饼不断增长。这使得攻击非生产性问题变得更容易。

And when I say, "nonproductive," there's obviously no — nothing derogatory about that term.It just relates to who's in the employable age and who isn't. 当我说“非生产性”时，显然没有 - 没有任何关于该术语的贬义。它只涉及谁在就业年龄和谁没有。

And our society is going to do extremely well in terms of being able to take care of the people in their nonproductive years. 我们的社会在能够在非生产性年代照顾人民方面做得非常好。

If there — there is a shift, obviously, as people live longer.And of course, there should be a shift, perhaps, in deﬁning — I think there should be — in deﬁning what's productive, because 65 was decided back in the '30s.And I think that's changed. 如果那里 - 显然有一个转变，因为人们的寿命更长。当然，也许应该在定义 - 我认为应该有 - 来定义什么是有效的，因为65在30年代被决定。我认为这已经改变了。 But the fact that the pie keeps growing is what makes it — it makes the problem easy.And — not easy — but it'll be easier 30 or 40 years from now, in my view, you know, than it was 30 or 40 years ago. 但是馅饼不断增长的事实就是这样 - 它使问题变得容易。并且 - 并不容易 - 但在我看来，30或40 年前，它会比现在更容易30或40年。

Because there'll be so much more in the way of goods and services produced per capita that the productive can take care of the nonproductive and the — or the aged — in a way that will be easier for them to sustain than it was in thepast.When — 因为人均生产的商品和服务的方式将会更多，生产者可以照顾非生产性和 - 或者老年人 - 以一种比他们更容易维持的方式。过去。什么时候 -

It's low amounts of output that strains society.I mean, when you get very small amounts of output, or huge disparities in the division of that, that you put real strains on a society. 它的产量很低，会使社会紧张。我的意思是，当你得到的产量非常小，或者它的分工中存在巨大的差异时，你就会给社会带来真正的压力。

But a society whose output is growing 3 percent a year and whose population is growing 1 percent a year is going to have way less in the way of strains than existed 20, 30, 50, 100 years ago.The — 但是，一个年产量增长3％，人口每年增长1％的社会，其压力方式将比现有的20年，30年，50 年，100年前少得多。 -

But, you know, we will need no big boom in savings or anything of the sort.The present savings rate will do — will just do ﬁne for the world.In the United States, I mean, I’m not speaking to the — I shouldn't speak to the whole world on that. 但是，你知道，我们不需要在储蓄或类似的任何东西上大爆炸。目前的储蓄率将会做 - 对世界来说只会做得很好。在美国，我的意思是，我不是在说 - 我不应该就此向全世界说话。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, generally, you can say that stocks are valued in two different ways. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，一般来说，你可以说股票的价值有两种不同的方式。

One, they're valued much the way wheat is valued, in terms of its perceived practical utility to the user of the wheat. 其一，它们对小麦的价值很重要，就其对小麦使用者的实际效用而言。

And there's a second way that stocks are valued, which is the way Rembrandts are valued. 还有第二种方式来衡量股票，这就是伦勃朗的估值方式。

And to some extent, Rembrandts are valued high, because in the past, they've gone up in price. 在某种程度上，伦勃朗的价值很高，因为在过去，它们的价格上涨了。 And once you get a lot of Rembrandt element into the stock market, and you fuel the stock market with massive retirement system purchases, you can get stocks selling at very high prices by past historical standards.And that can go on for a long, long time. 一旦你将大量伦勃朗元素纳入股票市场，并且通过大量退休系统购买为股票市场提供动力，你就可以按照过去的历史标准让股票以非常高的价格卖出。这可以持续很长一段时间。

That's what makes life so interesting.It isn't at all clear how it's going to work out.It isn't even clear what the level of interest rates is going to be. 这就是生活如此有趣的原因。目前还不清楚它是如何运作的。目前还不清楚利率水平是多少。

And nobody in this room ever expects to see 3 percent interest rates continue for a long time again.But that could happen.That would have an enormous effect on the price of equities. 在这个房间里没有人希望看到3％的利率再次持续很长时间。但那可能发生。这将对股票价格产生巨大影响。

You live in a world where you can't really predict these macroeconomic changes. 你生活在一个你无法真正预测这些宏观经济变化的世界。

WARREN BUFFETT: No, you can argue that increases in savings will drive down the returns on capital.The more capital is around, that the lower the returns will be on capital. WARREN BUFFETT：不，你可以说储蓄的增加会降低资本回报率。资本越多，资本回报就越低。

But I don't think you'll — I don't think it will help you make any decisions about businesses, you know, over your lifetime by — actually by thinking about matters like that.We're a little biased on that.But you'll ﬁnd all kinds of guys that will tell you.I mean, that's what books are written about.Because everybody likes predictions and books.So, you could all — 但我认为你不会 - 我认为它不会帮助你做出任何关于企业的决定，你知道，在你的一生中 - 实际上是通过思考这样的事情。我们对此有点偏颇。但你会发现各种各样的人会告诉你。我的意思是，这就是书籍的内容。因为每个人都喜欢预测和书籍。所以，你们都可以 -

Go ahead. 前进。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In addressing this question, you can see that we have acted much as one of my old Harvard Law professors acted.He used to say, "Let me know what your problem is. And I'll try and make it more difﬁcult for you."(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：在解决这个问题时，你可以看到我们的行为就像我的一位哈佛法学教授所做的那样。他曾经说过，“让我知道你的问题是什么。我会试着让你更难。” （笑声）

17. Buffett: The best book on how I invest 17.巴菲特：关于我如何投资的最佳书籍

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5, please. WARREN BUFFETT：请问第5区。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Eric Tweedie from Shavertown, Pennsylvania.Thanks again for another great meeting. 听众：我的名字是来自宾夕法尼亚州Shavertown的Eric Tweedie。再次感谢另一场精彩的会议。

During last year's meeting, my wife picked up a copy of a book called "Buffettology" at one of the shops around town that is written by Mr. Buffett's former daughter-in-law, a very well-written book, very interesting.And it attempts to outline the Warren Buffett approach to investing. 在去年的会议上，我的妻子在巴菲特的前儿媳写的一本商店里找到了一本名为“巴菲特学”的书，这本书是一本非常有趣的书。它试图概述沃伦巴菲特的投资方法。

My question is, I don't know if either of you gentlemen are familiar with the content or have read it.And if so, if you could comment on if you think it is a good outline of that type of investing. 我的问题是，我不知道你们中的任何一位先生是否熟悉这些内容或是否已经阅读过。如果是这样的话，如果你认为这是对这种投资的一个很好的概述你可以评论。

My second question related to that, I wonder if you — if Mr. Buffett could comment on why you bought the original textile mill in Massachusetts, and if that represented an earlier phase, when you were more of a strictly Graham-style, value investor, versus your current investing style. 我的第二个问题与此有关，我想知道你是否 - 如果巴菲特先生可以评论为什么你在马萨诸塞州购买原来的纺织厂，如果这代表了早期阶段，那么你更像是一个严格的格雷厄姆风格的价值投资者，与您目前的投资风格。

WARREN BUFFETT: Probably the best, I would say, the most representative book on my views is the one that Larry Cunningham has put together, because he essentially has taken my words and rearranged them in a more orderly — he's taken from a number of years.And what he has put together there best represents my views. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为，对我来说，最具代表性的一本书就是拉里·坎宁安（Larry Cunningham）所写的最具代表性的一本书，因为他基本上已经接受了我的话并且更加有序地重新安排了他们 - 他是从多年来开始的。。而他最好的组合在一起代表了我的观点。

We've got 20 years of annual reports or so, or more, on the internet, plus articles in Fortune, all kinds of things. 我们在互联网上有20年或更长时间的年度报告，还有“财富”杂志上的各种文章。

So it's probably a bias I have.But I would — I like to think that I laid out those views better than somebody who's rewriting them.But that’s — I'll let you make that decision. 所以这可能是我的偏见。但我会 - 我觉得我比那些重写它们的人更好地展示了这些观点。但那是 - 我会让你做出这个决定。

But I do think Larry's done a very good job of taking a number of those reports and rearranging them by topic in a way that makes it a lot easier to read than trying to go through year after year. 但我确实认为拉里做了很好的工作，收集了大量的报告并按主题重新排列，使得阅读比年复一年更容易阅读。 And actually, you'll have this book about Charlie, pretty soon, to read, too. 实际上，你很快就会看到关于查理的这本书。

We've said what — we’ve said in these meetings, we've said in the annual reports, we've said exactly what we do. 我们已经说过了 - 我们在这些会议中已经说过，我们已经在年度报告中说过，我们已经准确地说了我们的工作。

And some of the books, I would say, try to take that and — because people are looking for mechanistic things or formulas or whatever it may be.They try to hold — they may try to hold out that there's some secret beyond that.But I don't think there probably is. 我会说，有些书会尝试这样做 - 因为人们正在寻找机械的东西或公式或其他任何东西。他们试图坚持 - 他们可能会试图坚持认为除此之外还有一些秘密。但我不认为可能存在。

Charlie?You've read the books. 查理？你已经读过书了。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I skimmed that book.The — CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，我浏览了那本书。 -

I think what we have done all these years is, it wasn't all that hard to do.And it's not that hard to explain.All that said and done, I think a lot of people just don't get it.(Laughter) 我想我们这些年来所做的事情，并不是那么难。而且解释起来并不难。说了这么多，我想很多人都没有得到它。（笑声）

As Samuel Johnson said, famously, "I can give you an argument, but I can't give you an understanding."(Laughter) 正如塞缪尔约翰逊所说的那样，着名的是，“我可以给你一个论据，但我不能给你一个理解。” （笑声）

18. Buying Berkshire Hathaway was a "terrible mistake" 18.购买伯克希尔哈撒韦是一个“可怕的错误”

WARREN BUFFETT: What was the second part again? WARREN BUFFETT：第二部分又是什么？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just asked you if you could maybe comment on why you bought the original — 观众：我刚刚问你是否可以评论为什么你买了原版 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh. WARREN BUFFETT：哦。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — Berkshire textile mill. 观众成员： - 伯克希尔纺织厂。 WARREN BUFFETT: That's why I didn't remember.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这就是我不记得的原因。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I could say — 听众：如果我能说 -

WARREN BUFFETT: It was — WARREN BUFFETT：它是 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — one of the things, someone tapped me on the shoulder and asked me for you not to forget to give the current year's recommended books. 观众： - 其中一件事，有人拍了拍我的肩膀，问你不要忘记给当年推荐的书。

WARREN BUFFETT: It’s — I've got to recommend the book on Charlie.But I'll let Charlie recommend one, too. WARREN BUFFETT：这是 - 我必须推荐查理这本书。但我也会让查理推荐一个。

The original purchase of Berkshire was a terrible mistake and my mistake.No one pushed me into it. 最初购买伯克希尔是一个可怕的错误和我的错误。没有人把我推进去。

It was — I bought it, because it was what we used to call the cigar — 它是 - 我买了它，因为它是我们以前称之为雪茄的 -

It was a cigar butt approach to investing, where we would look around for something with a free puff left in it.You know, it was soggy and kind of disgusting and everything.But it was free. (Laughter) 这是一种雪茄对接方式进行投资，我们会在那里寻找带有免费粉扑的东西。你知道，它是湿透的，有点恶心和一切。但它是免费的。（笑声）

And Berkshire was selling below working capital, had a history of repurchasing shares periodically on tender offers.And it was selling, the ﬁrst purchase was, I think, at $7 1/2 a share.In fact, I've got the broker's ticket up in the ofﬁce, 2,000 shares. 伯克希尔以低于流动资金的价格出售，有过定期回购股票的历史。它正在销售，我认为，首次购买的价格为每股7 1/2美元。事实上，我已经在办公室买了经纪人的票，2000股。

And they — it looked to me like they were going to have a tender offer periodically.And it would probably be at some ﬁgure closer to working — net working capital — which might've been 11 or $12 a share, some such number. 他们 - 在我看来他们会定期收到要约。它可能会更接近工作 - 净营运资本 - 可能是每股11或12美元，有些这样的数字。

And we would sell on the tender.And that was — we had other securities we owned that way.And we bought some that way. 我们会在招标中出售。那就是 - 我们有这样的其他证券。我们买了那种方式。 And then, actually, I met Seabury Stanton one time, who was running Berkshire.And he told me and made me an insider, so I couldn't do anything, but he said he was thinking of having a tender.And he wondered what price we'd tender at. 然后，实际上，我曾经遇到过Seabury Stanton，他正在经营Berkshire。他告诉我并让我成为一名内幕人士，所以我什么也做不了，但他说他想要招标。他想知道我们的价格是多少。

And I — as I remember, I may be wrong on this, I could look back on it, but I think I said, "11 3/8."And he said again to me, "Well, if we have a tender at 11 3/8, will you tender?"And I said, "Yes, I will." 我 - 我记得，我可能错了，我可以回头看看，但我想我说，“11 3/8。”他再次对我说，“好吧，如果我们在11 3/8有一个投标，你会投标吗？”我说，“是的，我会的。”

And then I was frozen out, obviously, of doing anything with the stock for a little while.But then he came along with the tender offer. 然后我很快就冻结了对股票做了一段时间的事情。但后来他提出了要约收购。

And as I remember, I opened the envelope, and it was 11 1/4.I may be wrong.It may have been 11 1/2, 11 3/8.But it was 1/8 below what he had said to me and what I had agreed to. 而且我记得，我打开信封，它是11 1/4。我可能错了。它可能是11 1/2,1 11 3/8。但它比他对我说的和我同意的情况低了1/8。

So I found that kind of irritating.And I didn't tender.And then I bought a lot of stock. 所以我发现那种烦人的。而且我没有温柔。然后我买了很多股票。

Kim Chace was a director.His father had some members of the family, not his direct family, but related family, that wanted to sell a block.And we bought several blocks.And before long, we controlled the company. 金查斯是一名导演。他的父亲有一些家庭成员，而不是他的直系亲属，而是相关的家庭，想卖掉一块。我们买了几个街区。不久，我们控制了公司。

So at an eighth of a point difference, we wouldn't have bought it, the company, if they'd actually tendered at that price. 因此，如果他们真的按照这个价格进行投标，那么在八分之一点上，我们就不会买它，即公司。

We had a somewhat similar thing happen with Blue Chip, actually, later on, too. 我们在Blue Chip上发生了类似的事情，实际上，后来也是如此。

We would've been much better off, if we hadn't bought it.Because then things like National Indemnity and all of that, instead of buying it into a public company with a great many other shareholders, we would've bought it privately in the partnership.And our partners would've had a greater interest. 如果我们没有买它，我们会好得多。因为像国家赔偿这样的事情，所有这些，而不是购买与许多其他股东的公共公司，我们将在合伙企业中私下购买。我们的合作伙伴会有更大的兴趣。 So Berkshire was exactly the wrong vehicle to use for buying a bunch of wonderful companies over time.But I sort of stumbled into it.And we kept moving along. 因此，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔用于购买一堆优秀公司的工具是错误的。但我偶然发现它。我们继续前进。

And when I disbanded the partnership, I distributed out to Berkshire.Because it seemed like the easiest and best thing to do.And I followed through.And I enjoyed it enormously.I'm glad it all worked out this way. 当我解散合伙关系时，我分发给了伯克希尔。因为它似乎是最容易和最好的事情。我跟进了。我非常喜欢它。我很高兴这一切都成功了。

It did not work out the best way, economically, in all probability.It was the wrong base to use to build an enterprise around.But maybe, in a way, that's made it more fun. 从经济角度来看，它并没有最好的方法。这是用来建立企业的错误基础。但也许，在某种程度上，这使它变得更有趣。

Charlie, do you have anything to add on that?You can tell them about the Blue Chip story. (Laughs) 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？你可以告诉他们蓝筹故事。（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: No, one such story is enough.(Buffett laughs) CHARLIE MUNGER：不，一个这样的故事就足够了。（巴菲特笑）

But it is interesting that a wrong decision has been made to work out so well. 但有趣的是，做出错误决定才能做得很好。

We've done a lot of that, scrambled out of wrong decisions.I'd argue that's a big part of having a reasonable record in life. 我们做了很多这样的事情，从错误的决定中匆匆忙忙。我认为这是生活中合理记录的重要组成部分。

You can't avoid the wrong decisions.But if you recognize them promptly and do something about them, you can frequently turn the lemon into lemonade, which is what happened here. 你无法避免错误的决定。但是如果你及时认出它们并对它们做些什么，你可以经常把柠檬变成柠檬水，这就是这里发生的事情。

Warren twisted a lot of capital out of the textile business and invested it wisely.And that's why we're all here. 沃伦将大量资金从纺织业务中剔除，并明智地投资。这就是为什么我们都在这里。

WARREN BUFFETT: But Berkshire comes from three companies that came together: Diversiﬁed Retailing, Blue Chip Stamps, and Berkshire.Those were the three base companies. WARREN BUFFETT：但伯克希尔来自三家合并的公司：多元化零售，蓝筹邮票和伯克希尔。这是三家基地公司。 And Diversiﬁed started when we bought a company called Hochschild Kohn in Baltimore in 1966, a department store.And that company disappeared over time. 多元化开始于1966年我们在巴尔的摩购买了一家名为Hochschild Kohn的公司，这是一家百货公司。那家公司随着时间的推移而消失了。

Fortunately, in 19 — I think — 70, we sold it to Supermarkets General.Blue Chip, we've told you about the record of that. 幸运的是，19岁 - 我认为 - 70岁，我们把它卖给了超市。 Blue Chip，我们已经告诉过你这个记录了。

So, we started out with three disasters, and put them all together.(Laughter) 所以，我们从三次灾难开始，把它们放在一起。（笑声）

And it's worked out pretty well. 它的效果非常好。

But it was a mistake to be working from that kind of a base.Don't follow our example in that respect.Start out with a good business and then keep adding on good businesses. 但是从这种基础工作是错误的。在这方面不要效仿我们的榜样。从良好的业务开始，然后继续增加良好的业务。

CHARLIE MUNGER: But the example of quickly identifying the mistakes and taking action, there, our example is a good one. CHARLIE MUNGER：但是很快就发现错误并采取行动的例子，我们的例子很好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

19. Buffett would never trade Berkshire stock for gold 19.巴菲特永远不会交易伯克希尔股票换黄金

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 6. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，6号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger.Kathleen Lane (PH) from New York. 观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。 Kathleen Lane（PH）来自纽约。

I have a question out of left ﬁeld for you.You say you like to be entertained?This question will entertain you.It's also a serious question. 我有一个离开场的问题。你说你喜欢被娱乐吗？这个问题会让你感到愉快。这也是一个严肃的问题。

I know you don't like to speculate about the future.You won't do so.I appreciate that. 我知道你不喜欢猜测未来。你不会这样做。我很感激。 But some people do.For example, Edgar Cayce was one.He didn't pick stocks or investments.But if he had, he would've probably gone for that farmland that you were talking about earlier this morning. 但有些人这样做。例如，埃德加凯西就是其中之一。他没有挑选股票或投资。但如果他有，他可能会去你今天早些时候谈论的农田。

Because he had a dream that in the year 2158, Omaha would be located on the west coast of the United States.And you know how beachfront property goes.So it would be a good bet. 因为他有一个梦想，在2158年，奥马哈将位于美国西海岸。而且你知道海滨房产如何。所以这将是一个不错的选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: It will be good for our super catastrophe business, if that happens. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：如果发生这种情况，这将对我们的超级灾难业务有利。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: As you both said earlier, we're living in an extraordinary time, ﬁnancially especially. 听众会员：正如你们之前所说的那样，我们生活在一个非常特殊的时期，特别是在经济上。

You can't help but to hear disaster scenarios concerning the impending collapse of worldwide ﬁnancial markets, about major physical changes in the world as we know it, about a future when the world's resources will be better measured by their prospects for ensuring our basic survivalthan their value as speculative commodities.That's where that farmland would come in again. 你不禁会听到关于全球金融市场即将崩溃的灾难情景，关于世界上我们所知道的重大物理变化，关于未来世界资源将更好地衡量他们确保我们基本生存的前景的未来而不是他们作为投机商品的价值。这就是农田再次进入的地方。

Nobody does better what you two do.But even if your investment acumen wasn't what it is, I would invest with you, because you're honest. 没有人比你们两个做得更好。但即使你的投资敏锐度不是这样，我也会和你一起投资，因为你是诚实的。

In short, I came here to ask you, what would you tell a single mother to exchange her Berkshire share hold for gold coins?When, under what circumstances? 简而言之，我来到这里问你，你会告诉一位单身母亲将她的伯克希尔股票换成金币？何时，在什么情况下？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I can't imagine ever exchanging any of my shares for gold coins.But — WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，我无法想象我的任何股票换金币。但是 -

I would rather trust in the intrinsic value of a bunch of really ﬁne businesses run by good managers selling products that people like to buy and have liked to buy for a long time, and then exchanging their future efforts, the money that comes from their wages, for See's Candy or Coca-Cola or whatever, than take some piece of metal that people dig out of the ground in South Africa and then put back in the ground at Fort Knox, you know, after transporting it and insuring it and everything else.(Laughter) 我宁愿相信一群真正优秀的企业的内在价值，这些企业由优秀的经理人经营，他们销售的产品是人们喜欢购买并且喜欢长期购买，然后交换他们未来的努力，来自他们工资的钱，对于See's Candy或可口可乐或其他什么，而不是拿一些人们从南非挖出来的金属，然后在运输它并确保它和其他一切之后放回诺克斯堡的地上。（笑声）

I've never been able to get real excited about gold.Now, my dad was a huge enthusiast for a gold standard.So I grew up in a family where gold was revered, if not possessed.And I would — I gave it its full chance. 我从来没有对黄金感到兴奋。现在，我父亲非常喜欢黄金标准。所以我在一个家庭中长大，在这个家庭中，如果没有金子，金子就会受到尊重。我愿意 - 我给了它全部机会。

But I've never understood what the intrinsic value of gold is.And, you know, we'll sell you some at Borsheims, but I would never exchange — 但我从未明白黄金的内在价值是什么。而且，你知道，我们会在Borsheims卖给你一些，但我永远不会交换 -

The idea of exchanging a producing asset for a nonproducing asset would be pretty foreign to me. 为非生产资产交换生产资产的想法对我来说是非常陌生的。

20. Why Buffett ignores predictions 20.为什么巴菲特无视预测

WARREN BUFFETT: And I would say this: in terms of the predictions, and I know the spirit in which you asked the question, but in terms — there's a market out there all the time. WARREN BUFFETT：我会这样说：就预测而言，我知道你提出这个问题的精神，但从某种意义上说 - 那里总有一个市场。

And people love to hear predictions.If I said I was going to offer a bunch of predictions today, we would have a million people here.I mean, they're dying to have predictions and speeches at rotary clubs or trade associations or whatever.That’s — they just plain love it. 人们喜欢听到预测。如果我说我今天要提供一系列预测，那么我们这里将有一百万人。我的意思是，他们渴望在旋转俱乐部或行业协会或其他任何地方做出预测和演讲。那是 - 他们只是喜欢它。

And that's what a whole industry is built upon, you know, the people coming out of Washington to talk about political predictions and the — I don't read those in the paper at all.Because it's just — it's space ﬁllers, basically. 这就是整个行业的基础，你知道，从华盛顿出来谈论政治预测的人和 - 我根本没有阅读论文中的那些。因为它只是 - 它的空间填充物，基本上。 And, you mentioned Edgar Cayce.Ben Graham knew Edgar Cayce pretty well.But I just have never seen any utility to any of that at all. 而且，你提到了埃德加凯西。本格雷厄姆非常了解埃德加凯西。但我根本没有看到任何这种功能。

There will be some huge surprises in the world.There's no question about that.But I don't think that betting on any speciﬁc one is a very smart policy. 世界将会有一些巨大的惊喜。毫无疑问。但我不认为投注任何特定的政策是一个非常明智的政策。

In fact, our — we usually bet against them, in terms of super catastrophes.We know there will be a 7.0 or greater quake in California in the next 50 years.We don't know where it'll be or when it'll be or anything like that.We are willing to pay out a lot of money if it happens tomorrow. 事实上，我们 - 我们通常在超级灾难方面打赌他们。我们知道未来50年加利福尼亚州将发生7.0或更高的地震。我们不知道它将在何处，何时它将是什么或类似的东西。如果明天发生，我们愿意支付很多钱。

And because people do worry about catastrophes.And in this case, it's perfectly proper, with insured values.But it just isn't any way, in our view, to get through economic life. 而且因为人们确实担心灾难。在这种情况下，它是完全正确的，具有保险价值。但是，我们认为，通过经济生活并不是什么办法。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I suppose the one time when a single mother might want to own gold compared to anything else is if she faced conditions like a Jew in Vienna in 1939, or — CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我想有一次当一个单身母亲想要拥有黄金时，与其他任何东西相比，如果她在1939年遇到像维也纳的犹太人一样的条件，或者 -

I mean, there are conditions you can imagine where some form of transportable wealth would be useful, compared to anything else. 我的意思是，有些条件你可以想象某些形式的可运输财富与其他任何东西相比都是有用的。

But absent those extreme conditions, I think it's for the birds.Now, silver… (Laughter) 但是在没有这些极端条件的情况下，我认为这是针对鸟类的。现在，银...... （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It's hard to think of anything other than ﬂeeing the country.And Charlie and I don't give a lot of thought to ﬂeeing the country. 沃伦巴菲特：除了逃离这个国家之外，很难想到其他任何事情。查理和我并没有考虑逃离这个国家。

21. Buffett: "I'm a little crazy, I don't mind paying taxes" 巴菲特：“我有点疯狂，我不介意纳税” WARREN BUFFETT: Although, I must say that the one thing I really ﬁnd reprehensible is the people that make a lot of money in this country and then leave to, you know, to get another tax jurisdiction or something like this.I really — I don’t — WARREN BUFFETT：虽然，我必须说，我真正觉得应该受到谴责的一件事是那些在这个国家赚了很多钱的人然后离开去获得另一个税收管辖权或类似的东西。我真的 - 我没有 -

But I'm a little crazy.I don't mind paying taxes.(Applause) 但我有点疯狂。我不介意纳税。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's go to 7. WARREN BUFFETT：我们去7。

There are plenty of reasons, I think, perfectly valid reasons — I mean, people may want to live someplace else — but the ones who carefully arrange it so that they actually live here as much as they can. 我认为有很多理由是完全正确的理由 - 我的意思是，人们可能想住在其他地方 - 但是那些仔细安排它以便他们真正住在这里尽可能多的人。

I think one of them wanted to be appointed — he wanted to go to some very small entity, where there was no tax.And then he wanted to be appointed an ambassador to the United States, so that he could enjoy living here but enjoy the taxes of something else. 我想其中一个想要被任命 - 他想去一个非常小的实体，那里没有税。然后他想被任命为美国大使，这样他就可以享受在这里生活，但享受其他的税收。

And, you know, that is not my role model.Yup. 而且，你知道，这不是我的榜样。对。

22. Costs vary for Berkshire's ﬂoat 22.伯克希尔的浮动成本各不相同

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Warren.Hi, Charlie.Two questions.First, was anybody dumb enough to sell you Berkshire at less than 45,000 a share? 观众成员：你好，沃伦。嗨，查理。两个问题。首先，是否有人愚蠢到以低于45,000股的价格卖给伯克希尔？

WARREN BUFFETT: We did not repurchase any shares. WARREN BUFFETT：我们没有回购任何股票。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My second question concerns ﬂoat.The ﬂoat has been low cost most years for Berkshire and probably zero cost in many years, except last year, possibly. 听众：我的第二个问题涉及浮动。伯克希尔的浮动成本最低，多年来可能零成本，除非去年可能。

When you think about ﬂoat in terms of intrinsic value, do you have an idea in mind when you add new ﬂoat for how much it will increase the intrinsic value of Berkshire? 当你从内在价值的角度考虑浮动时，当你添加新的浮动数量来增加伯克希尔的内在价值时，你是否有一个想法？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well we add — that's a good question — but we consciously add float sometimes at a given cost.And then we, other times, add float at no cost.So we have different layers of float, if you will, that we've entered into. WARREN BUFFETT：我们补充一下 - 这是一个很好的问题 - 但我们有时会以给定的成本有意添加浮动。然后我们，其他时候，免费添加浮动。所以我们有不同的浮动层，如果你愿意的话，我们已经进入了。

We've entered in some transactions in the last month or two, where we will take on some ﬂoat, which will not have zero cost.But it's acceptable to us.And we couldn't get it at zero cost, although we're also creating ﬂoat which, I think, will be close to zero cost or better. 我们在过去一两个月进行了一些交易，我们将采取一些浮动，这将不会有零成本。但它对我们来说是可以接受的。我们无法以零成本获得它，尽管我们也在创造浮动，我认为它将接近零成本或更好。

So, we would be willing to take on float, obviously, at costs only modestly below the Treasury rate, if that was the only way we could get that float, and it didn't impede our ability to get other float, you know,at zero cost or something. 因此，我们愿意接受浮动，显然，成本仅略低于国债利率，如果这是我们能够获得浮动的唯一方式，并且它并没有妨碍我们获得其他浮动的能力，你知道，零成本或其他东西。

We don't want to raise the cost overall by a single transaction that would have an effect on other transactions. 我们不希望通过单一交易来提高整体成本，这会对其他交易产生影响。

But float, if you look at our historical record, and our future record can't be as good, but it's not —it’s the cost of float, and it's the amount of growth of float. 但浮动，如果你看看我们的历史记录，我们的未来记录不会那么好，但它不是 - 浮动的成本，而是浮动的增长量。

I mean, if you told me I could add $50 billion of ﬂoat and have a 3 percent cost to that, you know, I would take that any day over adding 10 billion at zero cost. 我的意思是，如果你告诉我，我可以增加500亿美元的浮动费用并且有3％的成本，你知道，我会在任何一天以零成本增加100亿美元。

So there are a lot of different ways, in the insurance business, that we can and will think about developing ﬂoat. 因此，在保险业务中，我们可以并且将会考虑开发浮动，有很多不同的方法。

And usually, one doesn't preclude another.Occasionally, one bumps into another.But usually, one doesn't preclude another. 通常，一个人不排除另一个人。偶尔，一个人碰到另一个人。但通常情况下，人们并不排除另一个人。 And believe me, we spend a lot of time thinking about that.And we'll continue to as long as we run Berkshire.It's a big part of our strategy. 相信我，我们花了很多时间思考这个问题。只要我们经营伯克希尔，我们就会继续。这是我们战略的重要组成部分。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I've been amazed how well we've done with the ﬂoat.And I've been watching it from the inside for a long, long time. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我很惊讶我们对浮子做得如何。我一直在里面看很长很长一段时间。

It is a very wonderful thing to generate millions and millions, and then billions and billions, of dollars of ﬂoat at a cost way below the Treasury rate.There are people who would kill for such opportunities. 以低于国债利率的成本方式产生数百万和数百万美元的浮动资金是一件非常奇妙的事情。有些人会为这样的机会而杀人。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.And of course, that makes it competitive.We do — we — there are plenty of other people that are thinking about it in a similar vein and probably observed what we do and all of that.So like everything else in capitalism, it's competitive. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。当然，这使它具有竞争力。我们这样做 - 我们 - 还有很多其他人正在以类似的方式思考它，并且可能观察到我们做了什么以及所有这些。就像资本主义中的其他一切一样，它具有竞争力。

We think we've got an edge in several very important respects.And we think that edge is sustainable for quite a — as far as we can see.And we intend to push it as hard as we can.And then we'll see where it leads. 我们认为我们在几个非常重要的方面都有优势。我们认为这种优势可持续发展 - 据我们所知。我们打算尽力推动它。然后我们会看到它的发展方向。

I would've had no idea, 10 or 20 years ago, that we would have the present situation.But we do ﬁnd, if you just show up every day, like Woody Allen said, and you answer the phone and read the paper, every now and then, you see something that makes sense to do. 在10年或20年前，我不知道我们会有目前的情况。但我们确实发现，如果你每天都出现，就像伍迪艾伦说的那样，你接听电话并阅读报纸，你会看到一些有意义的事情。

And we do find them occasionally.The hard part is finding them where they are material relative to our present size.If we were running a very small business, we would find plenty of things that would make good sense. 我们偶尔会找到它们。困难的部分是找到它们相对于我们目前尺寸的材料。如果我们经营一家非常小的企业，我们会发现很多很有意义的事情。

We ﬁnd a few things that make good sense now, relative to our size.And there's really no answer for that except to shrink dramatically, which is not a action we're contemplating. 相对于我们的尺寸，我们现在发现一些现在很有意义的事情。除了大幅度缩小之外，对此没有任何答案，这不是我们正在考虑的行动。

23. Munger on Wesco succession 23.芒格继承Wesco

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8. WARREN BUFFETT：8号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: James Pan (PH) from New York City. 听众：来自纽约市的James Pan（PH）。

I really have a question on Wesco, which is your 80 percent-held subsidiary, just a couple questions dealing with that. 我真的对Wesco有一个问题，这是你80％的子公司，只有几个问题要处理。

First question is, last time I checked, that was trading below intrinsic value. 第一个问题是，我上次检查时，交易价格低于内在价值。

And given that most of Wesco's assets are tied up in Freddie Mac, and Freddie Mac will arguably grow intrinsic value in the low teens for the next couple of years, how are you guys going to manage the, I guess, how would you manage thegap between intrinsic value, and what — the current price, and what intrinsic value will be two or three years from now? 鉴于Wesco的大部分资产都与Freddie Mac捆绑在一起，而且Freddie Mac在未来几年内可以说会在低十几岁时增加内在价值，那么你们将如何管理，我猜你们将如何管理内在价值与什么 - 当前价格之间的差距，以及从现在起两三年后的内在价值？

And also, is there a succession plan at Wesco or some kind of roll-up plan at Wesco eventually? 而且，Wesco是否有继任计划或最终在Wesco实施某种汇总计划？

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is the boss at Wesco.So — WARREN BUFFETT：查理是Wesco的老板。所以 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.We have paid almost no attention to the price of Wesco stock.So the chance to make any meaningful gain for the Wesco shareholders by buying in a few shares of Wesco stock is so tiny that we don't really bother thinking about it very much.The — CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我们几乎没有关注Wesco股票的价格。因此，通过购买几股Wesco 股票为Wesco股东带来任何有意义的收益的机会是如此之小，以至于我们并没有真正费心去考虑它。 -

As to succession, we are gradually making me so useless that I won't be missed.(Laughter) 至于继承，我们逐渐让我如此无用，以至于我不会错过。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, incidentally, you talked about Wesco being signiﬁcantly undervalued compared to intrinsic value.I'm not sure that's the case.Charlie, would — you're more of an expert on that than I am. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，顺便说一下，你谈到Wesco与内在价值相比被严重低估了。我不确定是这样的。查理，你会比我更专注于此。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there's certainly no huge gap. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，肯定没有巨大的差距。

And, we don't spend a lot of time thinking about things that will make, practically, no money. (Laughter) 而且，我们不会花很多时间思考那些会使实际上没有钱的事情。（笑声）

24. Munger: EVA valuation is "twaddle" and "medieval theology" 24.芒格：EVA评估是“双重”和“中世纪神学”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Jason Tang (PH) from Traverse City, Michigan.Before I ask my question, I want to know that it's true that you guys are going to be here tomorrow at 9:30 to answer more questions.(Laughter) 听众会员：您好，我的名字是来自密歇根州特拉弗斯城的Jason Tang（PH）。在我提出问题之前，我想知道你们明天将在9:30来到这里回答更多问题。（笑声）

My question, I just recently read the book, “Quest for Value,” by — I think the author is Bennett Stewart, from Stern Stewart consulting ﬁrm. 我的问题，我刚刚读了这本书，“追求价值”，我认为作者是来自斯特恩斯图尔特咨询公司的 Bennett Stewart。

And I want to talk to you a bit about — just ask you about different valuation methodologies, and EVA in particular, and how that may or may not be more valid than, let's say, other benchmarks of value, like P/E, orprice-to-book, or price-to-sales. 我想和你谈谈一下 - 只要问你不同的评估方法，特别是EVA，以及它可能会或者可能不会比其他基准价值更有效，比如P / E，或者价格对账单或价格对销售。

Is that something closer?I noticed that the language that was used in this book was real similar to the type of language you guys use in your writings.So I'd like you to talk a little bit about EVA, if you could. 那东西更近了吗？我注意到本书中使用的语言与你们在作品中使用的语言类型非常类似。如果可以的话，我希望你能谈一谈EVA。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, why don't you take EVA? WARREN BUFFETT：查理，你为什么不带EVA？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think there's an awful lot of twaddle and bullshit.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为有很多琐事和胡说八道。（笑声） WARREN BUFFETT: I knew that's what he was going to say.And I thought it deserved it, so I — and I didn't want to say it myself. WARREN BUFFETT：我知道他会这么说。而且我认为它应该得到它，所以我 - 我不想自己说出来。

CHARLIE MUNGER: In EVA, we keep stating, over and over again, that the game is to turn the retained dollars into something more than dollars. CHARLIE MUNGER：在EVA中，我们一遍又一遍地说，游戏是将保留的美元变成超过美元的东西。

And EVA tends to incorporate cost of capital ideas that just make no sense at all.They make it sound very fashionable. EVA倾向于融入资本理念的成本，这些成本根本没有任何意义。它们听起来非常时尚。

And, God knows, it's correct that a corporation that earns a huge return on capital and keeps retaining it for a long time has a great record in terms of EVA.But the mental system, as a whole, does not work.It's like medieval theology.(Laughter) 而且，天知道，一个能够获得巨额资本回报并长期保留资本的公司在EVA方面有着良好的记录是正确的。但整个心理系统并不起作用。这就像中世纪的神学。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I like that second term better than the earlier one.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我比第二个学期更喜欢早期的学期。（笑声）

25. How Buffett became friends with Bill Gates 25.巴菲特如何成为比尔盖茨的朋友

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 2. WARREN BUFFETT：2号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.My — excuse me — my name is Stewart Hartman from Sioux City, Iowa. 听众会员：下午好。我的 - 对不起 - 我的名字是来自爱荷华州Sioux市的Stewart Hartman。

First, I'd like to thank you both for allowing a couple of Berkshire employees to migrate north to Sioux City.I work with Corey Wrenn and Mark Sisley (PH).They're both great guys.You did a terriﬁc job training them. 首先，我要感谢你们让伯克希尔的几名员工向北迁移到Sioux City。我与Corey Wrenn和Mark Sisley（PH）合作。他们都是好人。你做了很棒的训练。

Mr. Buffett, you've known Bill Gates for several years and probably spent more time with him than any of us in this room.Would you feel —? 巴菲特先生，你已经认识比尔盖茨好几年了，可能和他在这个房间里待的时间比我们任何人都多。你觉得 - ？ WARREN BUFFETT: That isn't the case, if Jeff Raikes is here.I don't know.Is Jeff here? WARREN BUFFETT：如果Jeff Raikes在这里，情况并非如此。我不知道。杰夫在这儿吗？

Anyway, go ahead.But we did have a local fellow who comes from 30 miles from here, Jeff Raikes, who's a key Microsoft employee.And I think he's in town this weekend.I thought he was in the meeting. 无论如何，继续吧。但我们确实有一位来自这里30英里的当地人，杰夫莱克斯，他是微软的一名关键员工。而且我认为他本周末在镇上。我以为他在参加会议。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I didn't mean to make the broad generalization to be argumentative. (Laughter) 观众成员：我并不是要将广泛的概括作为论证。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I just didn't want to think Jeff — I was trying to muscle him out. WARREN BUFFETT：我只是不想想杰夫 - 我试图让他筋疲力尽。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sure, sure.That being said, I guess, here's a way I'll rephrase this.Would you feel comfortable sharing with us how your relationship began and how it evolved with Mr. Gates? 听众会员：当然可以。话虽这么说，我猜，这是一种我会改写的方式。您是否愿意与我们分享您的关系如何开始以及与盖茨先生的关系如何演变？

And with regard to his spirit and competitive nature, how vigorous do you expect him to defend his company's position against the government and state's current antitrust suit? 关于他的精神和竞争性，你期望他有多么有力地捍卫他的公司对政府和国家目前的反垄断诉讼的立场？

And then for both of you, Mr. Munger included, what, in your opinion, are the odds that the government and the states will prevail and split his company into pieces? 然后，对于你们两个人，芒格先生都包括了，在你看来，政府和各州将占上风并将公司分成几块的可能性是什么？

And then since Mr. Munger mentioned, I guess I'd ask, could we have an update on the company's silver position and its future as an investment, as well?(Laughter) Thank you for opening that door. 然后，自芒格先生提到，我想我会问，我们是否可以了解公司的白银头寸及其作为投资的未来？（笑声）谢谢你打开那扇门。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, he can close them, too.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，他也可以关闭它们。（笑声）

Yeah, I really don't feel comfortable speaking for Bill at all in terms of what he's going to do.In fact, I think they've been quite outspoken, he and Steve Ballmer both, about what Microsoft will do. 是的，根据他将要做的事情，我真的觉得对Bill说不出话来。事实上，我认为他们和史蒂夫鲍尔默都非常直言不讳，关于微软会做些什么。

So I don't want to try and rephrase that or modify it or do anything else.Because they know what they're saying when they say it.And I would take them at their word.And I really shouldn't be adding anything to it. 所以我不想尝试改写或修改它或做任何其他事情。因为当他们说出来时，他们知道他们在说什么。我会听从他们的话。我真的不应该添加任何东西。

I met Bill, because a very good friend of mine, Meg Greenﬁeld, was the editorial page editor at the Post.She called me one time, 10 or more years ago.And — she said, "Warren," — she loved the state of Washington and had grown up out there.So she said, "Can I afford to buy a second home?" 我遇到了比尔，因为我的一位非常好的朋友梅格·格林菲尔德是邮报的编辑页面编辑。十年或十几年前，她给我打了一次电话。并且 - 她说，“沃伦，” - 她喜欢华盛顿州，并在那里长大。所以她说，“我能买得起第二套房吗？”

She was living in Washington, D.C. now.And so she says, "Can I afford to buy a second home in Washington?"And I said — and she said, "I'll send you all my ﬁnancial information." 她现在住在华盛顿特区。所以她说，“我能在华盛顿购买第二套房吗？”我说 - 她说，“我会把所有的财务信息发给你。”

I said, "Meg, you don't need to."Anybody that asks me whether they can afford something can afford it.It's the people that don't ask me that never can afford it.So I said, "Just go do it."And, "It'll make you happy."And so she did. 我说，“梅格，你不需要。”任何询问我能否负担得起的人都可以负担得起。这是不会问我永远无法承受的人。所以我说，“就去做吧。”并且，“它会让你开心。”所以她做到了。

And, then a year or two later, she wanted to have me come out and see what she'd done with my mild encouragement.And so I went out there and visited.It was the July 4th weekend in 1991. And they had this parade on this island and everything she wanted me to see.And she had a few other people out, too. 然后，一年或两年后，她想让我出来，看看她在我的温和鼓励下做了些什么。所以我去了那里参观了。这是1991年的7月4日周末。他们在这个岛上举行了这次游行，以及她希望我看到的一切。而且她也有其他一些人。

And then, she was a friend of the — of Bill's parents.And so we went down there, to the Hood Canal, to visit them when I was back there, to meet the parents.And I think Bill didn't want to come.But Kay Graham was coming.And he wanted to meet her.He didn't want to meet me. 然后，她是比尔父母的朋友。所以当我回到那里时，我们去了胡德运河，去见他们，去见父母。我想比尔不想来。但凯格雷厄姆来了。他想和她见面。他不想见我。

And, so he came in. And then we hit it off immediately.We had a great time.And, I mean, he had this chimpanzee, to whom he was going to try and explain this technical stuff.But it was a — I was kind of an interesting chimpanzee to him.So, we — and he's a terriﬁc teacher. 而且，他进来了。然后我们马上就把它打了。我们很开心。而且，我的意思是，他有这只黑猩猩，他将尝试解释这些技术性的东西。但它是 - 我对他来说是一种有趣的黑猩猩。所以，我们 - 他是一位了不起的老师。

So, we spent a number of hours.And we just plain hit it off.And, I found it very interesting, what he had to say.And, we've had a good time good time ever since. 所以，我们花了好几个小时。而我们只是轻而易举。并且，我发现它非常有趣，他不得不说。而且，从那以后我们度过了愉快的美好时光。

And we play bridge together and golf together.So I can tell you that he's quite competitive in those games.But I, can't tell you anything about Microsoft or anything.I don't know that much about it.And it wouldn't be right, if I didn't know anything personal, to be talking about it.Charlie, you know Bill. 我们一起打桥，一起打高尔夫球。所以我可以告诉你，他在那些比赛中很有竞争力。但我，不能告诉你有关微软或其他任何事情。我对此知之甚少。如果我不知道任何个人话，那就说不出来是不对的。查理，你知道比尔。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.Well, I don't want to speak for anybody else, either.I happen to be quite sympathetic to the Microsoft side of the pending antitrust case.But — (Applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。好吧，我也不想为别人说话。我恰好对未决的反托拉斯案的微软方面表示同情。但是 - （掌声）

And regarding silver, all I can say is, so far, it's been a dull ride.(Laughter) 关于白银，我只能说，到目前为止，这是一个沉闷的旅程。（笑声）

26. Buffett and Munger on the antitrust case against Microsoft 26.巴菲特和芒格就微软的反托拉斯案提起诉讼

WARREN BUFFETT: I would say this about the Microsoft case.That — and I've expressed this to a couple news organizations who asked the question earlier. WARREN BUFFETT：我会这样说微软的案子。那 - 我已经向几个早些时候提出这个问题的新闻机构表达了这一点。

Twenty years ago, this country really had sort of an inferiority complex about its place in the world economic order. 二十年前，这个国家在世界经济秩序中确实存在着一种自卑感。

And we talked about having a country of hamburger ﬂippers.And, we thought we were going to lose our steel industry and our auto industry.And we really didn't quite see how America ﬁt into the world where it looked like the Japanese and the Germans, to some extent, and all those, were eating our lunch. 我们谈到有一个汉堡包鳍状肢的国家。而且，我们认为我们将失去钢铁业和汽车业。而且我们真的不太清楚美国是如何融入这个看起来像日本人和德国人的世界，在某种程度上，以及所有这些人正在吃我们的午餐。 And that — there are many of you are too young to remember that.But there are many of you in this room who will remember that.And we were very depressed about our economic situation in this country. 那个 - 你们中有许多人太年轻，不记得了。但是这个房间里有很多人会记住这一点。我们对这个国家的经济状况感到非常沮丧。

And then this, whatever you want to call it, information age or whatever, came along, fueled by technology.And we've just swept the world aside.I mean, it — we are so far number one that it's difﬁcult to think who's number two.So here we have — 然后，无论你想称之为什么，信息时代或其他什么，都是由技术推动的。而我们只是把世界扫到了一边。我的意思是，它 - 我们是第一位，很难想到谁是第二位。所以我们在这里 -

And it's changed — in some way, it's contributed to a change, I should say — in the national mood.And it — whether — what part of our prosperity is accounted for by it, no one knows.But I think everybody in the room would agree that it's signiﬁcant. 它改变了 - 在某种程度上，它改变了，我应该说 - 在民族情绪中。它 - 无论是 - 我们繁荣的哪一部分都由它来解释，没有人知道。但我认为会议室里的每个人都同意这一点很重要。

And that age is going to get — and that development — is going to get more and more important in the years to come.It's going to be fueling much of what happens in the world and for this country to be the world leader.And like I say, you can't even see who's in second place, and moving faster, even, to increase that lead, with all the beneﬁts that brings, you know, I think that — 而且这个年龄将会变得越来越重要 - 这一发展 - 将在未来几年变得越来越重要。它将为世界上发生的事情以及这个国家成为世界领导者提供大量资金。就像我说的那样，你甚至不能看到谁在第二位，甚至更快地移动，以增加领先优势，带来所有带来的好处，你知道，我认为 -

I think we've got something working very well that probably doesn't make a lot of sense to tinker with too much.So I would not want to go in with a meat axe into something that is pulling this country along, in my view, in a huge way. 我认为我们已经有了一些非常好的工作，可能没有太大的意义来修补太多。因此，在我看来，我不想用肉斧进入拉动这个国家的东西。

And I just, I don't like to tinker with success.And it's an important success.It's really an important success. 我只是，我不喜欢修补成功。这是一个重要的成功。这真的是一个重要的成功。

Charlie and I may not understand how to play that, in terms of buying the companies that are going to do well 10 or 15 years from now.But we know some companies will do well.And we certainly know it'll have a huge benefit to society, even if it makes business less profitable but makes the society more efficient. 在购买10年或15年后表现良好的公司方面，查理和我可能不会理解如何发挥这种作用。但我们知道有些公司会做得很好。我们当然知道它对社会有巨大的好处，即使它使企业的利润减少，但使社会更有效率。 I mean, that is a huge edge to have.I would love to have the most efficient industry in the world in this country, even though it might pull down returns on capital against the less-efficient system. 我的意思是，这是一个巨大的优势。我希望在这个国家拥有世界上最有效率的产业，尽管它可能会降低资本回报率，而不是效率低下的系统。

So we — I think neither one of us would be inclined to go in there and mess around with something that's working. 所以我们 - 我认为我们中的任何一个都不会倾向于去那里搞乱一些有效的东西。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think — (Applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：我想 - （掌声）

If you look at the big picture, in patriotic terms, having lost totally in radios, stereos, television sets, et cetera, and in many other places, and having lost position in other major industries to the Japanese and others, we ﬁnally get hugeleadership in a new and wonderful ﬁeld — software — that's needed all over the Earth. 如果你从爱国的角度看全局，完全失去了收音机，立体声音响，电视机等等，并且在许多其他地方，并且在其他主要行业中失去了对日本人和其他人的地位，我们终于变得巨大领导一个新的和精彩的领域 - 软件 - 这是全球所需要的。

And somebody who's drawing a salary from the United States government gets the bright idea that they should dramatically weaken the one place where we're winning big.(Applause) 从美国政府那里领取工资的人得到了一个明智的想法，即他们应该大大削弱我们赢得大奖的地方。（掌声）

And he actually goes home at night and is proud of himself.(Laughter) 他实际上晚上回家，为自己感到骄傲。（笑声）

27. GEICO beneﬁts from smaller industry-wide proﬁt margins 27. GEICO受益于较小的行业利润率

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 3. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，3号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.Joe Levinson (PH) from New York. 听众会员：下午好。 Joe Levinson（PH）来自纽约。

You mentioned, in this year's annual report, that the operating environment that GEICO is facing, especially with regard to pricing, is going to get even tougher this year. 您在今年的年度报告中提到，GEICO面临的运营环境，特别是在定价方面，今年将变得更加艰难。

I'm wondering if this tough environment that GEICO's been facing over the last few years, is it something cyclical?Or is there something more structural going on here that we should be concerned about? 我想知道GEICO过去几年所面临的这种艰难环境是否是周期性的？或者，我们应该关注哪些更具结构性的问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, actually, what has happened is that it's been unduly benign the last few years.So I would regard this as much more a return to normalcy, what's happening. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，实际上，发生的事情是过去几年它过于温和。所以我认为这更像是恢复正常，发生了什么。

The proﬁts in auto insurance, industrywide, have been far higher than, I think, are sustainable and higher than I would've predicted, ﬁve years ago, would've occurred. 我认为，全行业汽车保险的利润远远高于我五年前可能发生的可持续性和高于我的预期。

So the industry got very, very lucky for a while.That wasn't necessarily good for us, incidentally. 所以这个行业有一段时间非常非常幸运。顺便说一下，这对我们来说并不一定好。

We made more money than we would've otherwise made.But there was a big umbrella over the industry, too, so that less-efﬁcient competitors still did very well. 我们赚的钱多于我们原本赚的钱。但是，整个行业也存在一个巨大的保护伞，因此效率较低的竞争对手仍然表现得非常好。

We do not find the environment, which is going to be lower profits, we do not find that undesirable at all.We do not like having a huge umbrella over an industry.We want the most efficient to be the ones that do well and the less-efficient ones to have plenty of problems. 我们没有找到利润较低的环境，我们根本找不到那些不受欢迎的环境。我们不喜欢在一个行业中拥有一把巨大的保护伞。我们希望最有效率的是那些做得好而效率低的那些有很多问题。

So, we are not unhappy about the fact that margins in the auto insurance business are going down.We think they should go down. 因此，我们对汽车保险业务的利润率下降这一事实并不感到不满。我们认为他们应该走下坡路。

We will — as long as we feel that we are adding policyholders at a cost that's less than their net value to us over time, we will continue to do it.We'll love to do it. 我们将 - 只要我们认为我们会以低于其净值的成本增加保单持有人，我们将继续这样做。我们很乐意去做。

But we won't be making the kind of money, in the year 2000, that we made in 1999, which was not as good as 1998. But that doesn't — that's — as far as we're concerned, that's ﬁne.Because we will be the low-cost producer, over time or will — that is our goal.And I think we've got a lot of things going in our direction to enable us to do that. 但我们不会在2000年制造出我们在1999年制造的那种钱，这种钱不如1998年那么好。但事实并非如此 - 只要我们担心，那就没问题了。因为我们将成为低成本生产者，随着时间的推移或意志 - 这是我们的目标。而且我认为我们已经有很多事情朝着我们的方向努力，使我们能够做到这一点。 The low-cost producer in a huge industry is going to do very well over time. 随着时间的推移，一个庞大行业的低成本生产商将会做得很好。

And then question is just — is, it costs money to sign up people and bring them into our fold.Then we have to keep them in our fold.And we lose some every year.It's an hourglass problem, to a degree. 然后问题就是 - 是，注册人并将其带入我们的行列需要花钱。然后我们必须把它们放在我们的折叠中。而且我们每年都会失去一些。在某种程度上，这是一个沙漏问题。

But that's all part of the equation.And the GEICO equation is fundamentally good.It's not as good as it was a couple of years ago, just in terms of overall proﬁtability, because there isn't this big umbrella over the whole industry. 但这都是等式的一部分。 GEICO方程式基本上是好的。它不像几年前那么好，只是在整体盈利能力方面，因为整个行业都没有这个大伞。

But that umbrella was going to go away.And it doesn't hurt us to have it go away at all. 但那把雨伞将会消失。它根本不会让它消失。

The second thing is that we are, as I pointed out in the report, it is costing us more to develop inquiries than it did a couple of years ago.We knew that would be the case.It's going to cost more three years from now than it costs now. 第二件事是，正如我在报告中所指出的那样，与几年前相比，我们开展调查的成本更高。我们知道情况就是这样。从现在开始，它的成本将超过现在的成本。

So we believe in pouring it on.And we think that we can attract business at a lower cost and then run it at a lower cost than most of the competition, if not all.And we intend to plow ahead with that. 所以我们相信它会倾注。我们认为，我们可以以较低的成本吸引业务，然后以比大多数竞争对手更低的成本运营，如果不是全部的话。我们打算继续努力。

We will write — I said, in the annual report, I ventured that the industry might write at three points worse than last year.Well, three points on 120 billion of volume is $3.6 billion difference in the proﬁtability, if that forecast happens to be correct. 我们会写 - 我说，在年度报告中，我冒昧说这个行业的写作可能会比去年差3个点。那么，如果这个预测恰好是正确的，那么1200亿的三个点就是36亿美元的盈利差异。

That bothers us not at all.In fact, we will not only take that three points of industry worsening, but on top of that, we will spend even more money to bring in business, which will make our ﬁgures, speciﬁcally, look that much worse in the near term. 这根本不困扰我们。事实上，我们不仅要考虑三个行业的恶化点，而且最重要的是，我们将花更多的钱来引入业务，这将使我们的数据在短期内看起来更糟糕。

But that, you know — in the end, it is so much more attractive to bring in that kind of business, we'll say, than some e-retailer, who is losing cash by the ton, bringing in customers who are spending far, far less than our customers spend with us, and where the retention rate, I would venture to say, will be lower than our kind of retention rate. 但是，你知道 - 最后，我们会说，引入这种业务比吸引现金的一些电子零售商更具吸引力，带来了远远消费的客户，远远低于我们的客户与我们共度的费用，而且我敢说，保留率将低于我们的保留率。

We've got a very good business model.It's not as good as it was a couple of years ago.It's probably better than it will be a couple of years from now.But it's still far superior, I think, to the business model of most of the competition. 我们有一个非常好的商业模式。它不像几年前那么好。它可能比从现在起几年后更好。但我认为，它仍然远远优于大多数竞争的商业模式。

We've got a great machine at GEICO.And we've got a sensational man running it in Tony Nicely.He is the best in the world at running that business. 我们在GEICO有一台很棒的机器。我们有一个耸人听闻的人在Tony Nicely中运行它。他是世界上运营这项业务的最佳人选。

And he's been there since he was 18 years old.And he knows it every way from Sunday, in terms of how to run that business. 他从18岁起就去过那里。从周日开始，就如何经营这项业务而言，他都知道这一点。

I've known Tony for a good many years.I've never heard him say anything that didn't make sense.It's really interesting. 我认识Tony好多年了。我从来没有听过他说任何没有意义的话。这真的很有趣。

If you take a whole bunch of people with 140 IQs, it's a very uneven performance in what they actually do.Some of them say all kinds of things that make a lot of sense about 90 percent of the time.And then 10 percent of the time, they go crazy. 如果你把一大堆拥有140智商的人带走，那么他们实际上的表现就非常不平衡。他们中的一些人说90％的时间都是很有意义的各种事情。然后10％的时间，他们发疯了。

And Tony is — everything Tony says and does makes sense.And he is a huge, huge asset to Berkshire.And he's working with a business model that — that's very, very powerful. 托尼是 - 托尼所说的一切都是有道理的。他是伯克希尔的巨大资产。他正在使用一种非常非常强大的商业模式。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

28. MidAmerican Energy: "Decent" but not "extraordinary" returns 28. MidAmerican Energy：“体面”但不是“非凡”的回报 WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 4. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，4号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger.My name is Andrew Sole.And I'm from New York City. 观众成员：下午好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我的名字是Andrew Sole。我来自纽约市。

I was hoping, if you wouldn't mind, turning your attention to MidAmerican Energy.You've spoken about how much you respect the management of that company. 我希望，如果你不介意的话，把你的注意力转向MidAmerican Energy。您已经谈到了您对该公司的管理有多尊重。

But if you could elaborate upon what you see are the long-term competitive advantages of MidAmerican Energy, where you see the company 10 years from now, and is it your hope or your intention to make MidAmerican Energy the lowest-cost provider of electricity inthe United States? 但是，如果您能详细说明您所看到的是MidAmerican Energy的长期竞争优势，那么您将在10年后看到该公司，您希望或您的目的是使MidAmerican Energy成为最低成本的电力供应商。美国？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you — you're not going to do a great deal about the embedded cost that you have in generation.I mean, if you have a group of plants, they are, in the United States, they're relatively low-cost generation. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，你 - 你不会对你一代中的嵌入式成本做很多事情。我的意思是，如果你有一组植物，它们在美国是相对低成本的一代。

But if somebody else has a hydro plant or something that has built-in advantages that are going to enable them to turn out electricity cheaper than we can do it in Iowa with coal, so be it.I mean, it — 但是，如果其他人有一个水电站或具有内置优势的东西，这将使他们能够比在爱荷华州用煤做更便宜的电力，那就这样吧。我是认真的 -

So it is relatively well positioned as a generator, but we have nothing we could do there to speciﬁcally, dramatically change the cost of generation compared to other competitors. 因此它作为发电机的定位相对较好，但我们没有什么特别要做的，与其他竞争对手相比，大大改变了发电成本。

But — and you shouldn't expect to make extraordinary proﬁts in a business that is selling an essential, like electricity, to virtually every consumer in the country. 但是 - 你不应该期望在一个向国内几乎所有消费者销售必需品（如电力）的企业中赚取超常利润。

The whole idea behind the utility industry is not to allow extraordinary proﬁts.But we think it's a very good business. 公用事业行业背后的整体理念不是为了获得非凡的利润。但我们认为这是一项非常好的业务。 We do think that Dave Sokol has demonstrated ability, in the time he has been running that, to come up with a lot of ideas about doing various things that have made sense, various projects. 我们确实认为Dave Sokol在他运行的时候已经证明了能够提出很多关于做各种有意义的事情的想法，各种项目。

Not everything works.But his batting average is very high.And a good mind like that, we will expect that he'll produce more ideas over time. 不是一切都有效。但他的击球率非常高。像这样的好心，我们会期望他会随着时间的推移产生更多的想法。

But, it's not the sort of thing you get fireworks in. It's conceivable that, you know, we would get a chance to do something very big in that field at some time, just because it's a big field.It is the kind of field where you can write a $5 billion check.So it's not the jelly bean business. 但是，这并不是你得到烟花的东西。可以想象，你知道，我们有机会在某个时间在这个领域做一些非常大的事情，因为它是一个很大的领域。这是一个可以写出50亿美元支票的领域。所以这不是果冻豆业务。

But whether we do or not depends on a lot of things, including regulatory restraints.Because there are a lot of rules in that business, starting with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 但是，我们是否做出取决于很多事情，包括监管限制。因为该业务有很多规则，从1935年的“公用事业控股公司法”开始。

But there may be ways to do some very big things.And we've got the right management to do it.We've got the ﬁnancial wherewithal to do it.And we'll see what happens. 但是可能有办法做一些非常重要的事情。我们有合适的管理人员去做。我们有足够的财力来做这件事。我们会看到会发生什么。

I think MidAmerican is a very — we’ll get, in my view, we're very likely to get a very decent return on it.But we shouldn't get an extraordinary return, because it isn't that kind of business. 我认为MidAmerican非常 - 我认为，我们很有可能获得非常可观的回报。但我们不应该得到非凡的回报，因为它不是那种生意。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

29. We can do almost anything with insurance ﬂoat 我们几乎可以做任何保险浮动

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 5. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，5号。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, my name is John Shayne (PH) from Nashville, Tennessee.I want to join the other shareholders and thank you for the results you've achieved, but also for the example that you've set for business, generally. 观众：巴菲特先生，我的名字是来自田纳西州纳什维尔的John Shayne（PH）。我想和其他股东一起感谢你们取得的成果，也感谢你们为一般商业设定的榜样。

My question is about ﬂoat proceeds and whether they can go into common stocks.You've been asked that question before in prior years.Once, I asked you something on that.And I think at least one other shareholder has. 我的问题是关于浮动收益以及他们是否可以进入普通股。在前几年你被问到这个问题。有一次，我问你一些事情。我认为至少还有一个其他股东。

But I'm wondering if you might go into a little more detail.If I've understood you in the past, you've said, "Yes, you can — the ﬂoat's available to go into common stocks." 但我想知道你是否可以进一步细节。如果我过去了解你，你会说，“是的，你可以 - 浮动可用于普通股。”

I think it's an important question because it affects the intrinsic value of that float.If that float is locked into fixed income, it's worth one thing.If it could go into stocks at one point, it's obviously worth quite a bit more. 我认为这是一个重要的问题，因为它会影响浮动的内在价值。如果这个浮动被锁定在固定收益中，那是值得的。如果它可以一次进入股市，那显然值得多一点。

What I've had trouble understanding is, I think you must have some way that you can guarantee that the policyholders will be protected.Obviously, you can invest everything in a low market, and the market goes even lower. 我理解的是，我认为您必须有某种方式可以保证保单持有人受到保护。显然，你可以把所有东西投资到低市场，市场甚至更低。

Is it simply the size of the capital you've got that you think that'd be extraordinarily unlikely?Or do you use future insurance revenues, premium revenues, to pay off claims?Would you borrow to pay off claims? 是否只是你所拥有的资本规模，你认为这是非常不可能的？或者您是否使用未来的保险收入，保费收入来偿还索赔？你会借钱还清吗？

If you could give some detail on that, maybe we could get some comfort as to how you're thinking about that. 如果你可以提供一些细节，也许我们可以对你如何思考这一点感到安慰。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.The float, in no way, is limited to fixed-income securities.The float is really available for anything that we feel is the most intelligent at any given time. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。浮动绝不限于固定收益证券。对于我们认为在任何给定时间最聪明的任何东西，浮子都可用。 And the reason we can say that, and other insurance companies can't say that, is because we have an incredible abundance of capital, plus other streams of earning power which are unrelated to the insurance business. 我们可以说，和其他保险公司不能说的原因是，我们拥有令人难以置信的丰富资本，以及与保险业务无关的其他盈利能力。

So we could have the ﬂoat entirely in equities.And we have had that, in the past, or tantamount to that.And we could have a lot of it in operating businesses.We can have it anyplace it makes the most sense. 所以我们可以将浮动完全放在股票中。在过去，我们已经拥有了这一点，或者等同于此。我们可以在运营业务中拥有很多。我们可以在任何最有意义的地方拥有它。

But the only reason we can do that is because we have extraordinary capital.And we don't have much debt. 但我们能做到这一点的唯一原因是因为我们拥有非凡的资本。我们没有多少债务。

We run the business differently than, or think about it differently, than probably 90 percent of managements do. 我们以不同于90％的管理层的方式运营业务，或者以不同的方式考虑它。

We look at the assets on a consolidated basis with a few little exceptions.We look at the asset and the liability side — completely absent any linkage for speciﬁc assets and liabilities. 我们在合并的基础上查看资产，但有一些例外情况。我们看一下资产和负债方面 - 完全没有特定资产和负债的任何联系。

So our job at Berkshire is to get the liabilities as cheaply as possible.We want all the liabilities we can get and not have any worries about fulﬁlling as cheap as we can, plus a lot of capital.And then we want all the assets to be employed as intelligently as possible. 所以我们在伯克希尔的工作就是尽可能便宜地负债。我们想要我们可以获得的所有责任，而不是担心尽可能便宜地履行，加上大量资金。然后我们希望尽可能智能地使用所有资产。

And we don't match up, you know, a billion dollars of assets on the asset side against a billion of speciﬁc liabilities on the right-hand side.There's one or two exceptions to that, but that’s — where we're required to — but that's the basic approach. 你知道，资产方面的资产数十亿美元与右边的十亿特定债务相匹配。有一两个例外，但那是 - 我们需要的地方 - 但这是基本方法。

So, when Charlie and I think about Berkshire, we're thinking about, how do we get as much money as we can as cheap as we can without, in any way, endangering our ability, ever, to pay anybody, under any circumstances? 因此，当查理和我想到伯克希尔时，我们正在思考，在任何情况下，我们如何能够以任何方式获得尽可能多的廉价金钱，无论如何都会危及我们的能力。？

And then, how do we put it out in a way that we feel the most comfortable on the asset side, at the best returns?And frequently, that will be equities.And it has been, over the past.Sometimes, we — it won't be.We can't ﬁnd them.But that's the goal. 然后，我们如何以最佳回报让我们感受到资产方面最舒适的方式？而且经常是股票。过去一直如此。有时，我们 - 它不会。我们找不到他们。但这就是目标。

And ﬂoat is available just like — in virtually all cases — just like common equity.We don't distinguish those in our mind. 并且浮动就像 - 几乎在所有情况下 - 就像普通股权一样。我们不会在脑海中区分这些。

And that gives us — that ﬂexibility gives us some edge and, perhaps, quite an edge, at times, over other — over our competitors. 这给了我们 - 这种灵活性使我们在竞争对手中有一些优势，或许，相当于其他方面的优势。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, you can see that in the results to date.We have used that edge in the past.And we hope to use it in the future. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，是的，你可以在迄今为止的结果中看到这一点。我们过去曾使用过这种优势。我们希望将来能够使用它。

30. Liz Claiborne and Jones Apparel investments 30. Liz Claiborne和Jones Apparel的投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 6. WARREN BUFFETT：6号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I am Kevin Pilon (PH) from Simsbury, Connecticut. 听众：嗨，我是来自康涅狄格州锡姆斯伯里的凯文皮隆（PH）。

Let me just say, quickly, that I'm really looking forward to Charlie's book.And I hope it expands on the talks he gave that were reported in (inaudible) with regard to having a certain number of models that you need to understand and prosper in life. 我要快点说，我真的很期待查理的书。我希望它能够扩展他所提供的谈话（听不清），关于拥有一定数量的模型，你需要了解和繁荣的生活。

I have two questions.And I'll ask them quickly, in succession.Because you may want to punt on the ﬁrst one. 我有两个问题。我会连续快速地问他们。因为你可能想在第一个上踢。

The ﬁrst question is, I'm interested in any comments you might have that would expand on your general interest in the branded apparel companies, Liz Claiborne and Jones. 第一个问题是，我对你可能有的任何评论感兴趣，这些评论可以扩展你对品牌服装公司Liz Claiborne和Jones的一般兴趣。

And the second question is, I wonder if you would comment on the future of Freddie Mac with all the current brouhaha. 第二个问题是，我想知道你是否会对Freddie Mac的所有目前的骚动发表评论。

Every year, there's new brouhaha, as you know, with the buyback of the 30-year bond and the search for a new benchmark and the Treasury saying that, perhaps, the agency securities were not backed by the full faith and credit of the government. 如你所知，每年都有新的骚动，30年期债券的回购以及寻找新的基准和财政部的说法，或许，机构证券没有得到政府的充分信任和信誉的支持。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — we're not going to be able to help you too much on some of those.Because we may have some views, but they may be things that we don't really want to talk about. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们 - 我们无法帮助你解决其中一些问题。因为我们可能有一些观点，但它们可能是我们并不想谈论的事情。

The Liz Claiborne and the Jones Apparel investments you're talking about, the Jones Apparel is a decision that was made by Lou Simpson at GEICO. Liz Claiborne和您正在谈论的Jones Apparel投资，Jones Apparel是由Lou Simpson在GEICO做出的决定。

Lou runs a separate portfolio of equities for Berkshire.They're held in GEICO.But obviously, they're for the account of Berkshire.And that portfolio is well over 2 billion.And to some extent, it can be expanded or contracted based on what Lou would like to do. Lou为伯克希尔独立运营股票。他们被关注在GEICO。但显然，他们是伯克希尔的账户。这个投资组合超过20亿。在某种程度上，它可以根据Lou想要做的事情进行扩展或收缩。

And he runs that 100 percent on his own.And he's compensated based on how that portfolio does.He makes decisions, buying and selling, without talking to me at all, which is the way we like it. 他自己跑了100％。而且他根据投资组合的表现得到补偿。他做出决定，购买和销售，根本不与我交谈，这是我们喜欢的方式。

Sometimes, there's an overlap in our decisions.But when I, for example, when I ﬁrst found out about Jones Apparel, I’d never read an annual report of the company.I didn't know what they did or anything. 有时候，我们的决定会有重叠。但是，当我第一次发现Jones Apparel时，我从未读过该公司的年度报告。我不知道他们做了什么或什么的。

But that's Lou's baby.And he's very good at managing money.And he's a fellow that has 100 percent of my trust. 但那是娄的宝贝。而且他非常善于管理资金。他是一个100％信任我的家伙。

So I know his general criteria for investing, which is quite similar to mine, not identical, but quite similar to mine.And he's got a familiarity with businesses that, again, is quite similar to mine but not identical. 所以我知道他的投资的一般标准，这与我的非常相似，不完全相同，但与我的相似。而且他对业务的熟悉程度与我的相似，但并不相同。

And he runs a good portfolio.And it makes life a little easier for me, not to have that two and a fraction billion added to all the rest that I'm having trouble investing. 他经营着一个很好的投资组合。而且它让我的生活变得更轻松，而不是让那两个和十亿分之一增加到我投资的其余部分。

Liz Claiborne came about a little differently.I got a call one weekend, actually, on purchasing a large block that someone was going to sell.And we bought that on a Monday morning in London, as I remember. Liz Claiborne的情况略有不同。实际上，我在一个周末接到了一个电话，购买了一个有人要出售的大块。我记得，我们在伦敦的一个星期一早上买了它。

It was never reported on any exchange.I'm not quite sure even how it happened.But the broker that handled it arranged the trade over there. 在任何交易所都没有报道过。我甚至不确定它是怎么发生的。但处理它的经纪人在那里安排了交易。

And, you know, they've had a very, very decent record.They buy in their shares.I like the business that they run. 而且，你知道，他们的记录非常非常不错。他们买入他们的股票。我喜欢他们经营的业务。

It's not a Coca-Cola-type business or a Gillette-type business or even an American Express business.But we were offered that stock at a very attractive price.And it's worked out ﬁne. 它不是可口可乐型企业，也不是吉列式企业，甚至不是美国运通企业。但我们以极具吸引力的价格获得该股票。而且它很好。

The Freddie question, I'd rather not get into it, frankly.Because there's a lot of political overtones to that.But Charlie? 坦率地说，弗雷迪的问题，我宁愿不介入。因为这有很多政治色彩。但查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I can pass as well as you can. CHARLIE MUNGER：我可以尽可能地通过。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好的。（笑声）

31. Berkshire's next CEO won't be a "caretaker" 31.伯克希尔的下一任首席执行官将不会成为“看守人”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7. WARREN BUFFETT：7号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Garesh Paku (PH) from Croton, New York.First, regarding — I just have a couple of questions. 听众：来自纽约克罗顿的Garesh Paku（PH）。首先，关于 - 我只是有几个问题。

First, regarding the succession issue.I just can't imagine that you would allow someone else to paint over your picture afterwards, I guess, post-truck. 首先，关于继承问题。我无法想象你之后会让其他人在你的照片上画画，我猜，后卡车。

So I was wondering, would the — is your — is the nature of your succession plans more of a caretaker role of the museum?Or is it more active?That’s the — 所以我想知道， - 你的继承计划的性质是否更像是博物馆的看守角色？还是更活跃？那是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: It would be more active.No, the last thing in the world I would want would be a caretaker.That would be — no, that would not — I would not want that to be my legacy. WARREN BUFFETT：会更积极。不，我想要的世界上最后一件事就是看护人。那将是 - 不，那不会 - 我不希望那是我的遗产。

32. Potential impacts of inﬂation on GEICO 32.通货膨胀对GEICO的潜在影响

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the second question is regarding inflation.While I appreciate your focus on the specific businesses and your insistence that you not try to predict it, we've been very fortunate by successively lower rates of inflation. 听众会员：第二个问题是关于通货膨胀。虽然我很欣赏你专注于具体的业务，并且你坚持不试图预测它，但我们一直非常幸运，因为通货膨胀率会逐渐降低。

And I'm wondering, with all of the money sloshing around and between real estate and stocks and all the other places, whether you are concerned about inﬂation, what effect that would have on the insurance businesses at Berkshire, and what you can do toguard against those risks. 而且我想知道，随着所有的资金在房地产和股票以及所有其他地方之间摇摆不定，你是否担心通货膨胀，这会对伯克希尔的保险业务产生什么影响，以及你能做些什么防范这些风险。

WARREN BUFFETT: My record is just terrible, in terms of predicting the inﬂation rate.So, it is not something that enters into our decision making. 沃伦·巴菲特：就预测通货膨胀率而言，我的记录非常可怕。所以，这不是进入我们决策的东西。

The big danger in — a speed-up of inﬂation would lead to more dollar volume in the insurance business.And more dollar volume is basically good for us, even though there might be a lag in pricing, that would eventually catch up and all that. 最大的危险 - 通货膨胀加速将导致保险业务的美元数量增加。更多的美元交易量对我们来说基本上是好的，即使价格可能会有滞后，最终会有所收获。

So, absent the next factor I'm going to mention, inflation is not necessarily harmful at all to something like a GEICO. 因此，如果没有我要提及的下一个因素，通货膨胀对于像GEICO这样的东西来说并不一定有害。 As you get into longer-tail liability lines, such as a General Re might have, inflation has this effect of hitting liabilities that were created four, five, 10 years earlier, maybe, and they get resettled in current dollars.And obviously, that ratchets up the cost of settling those liabilities, in kind of an unpredictable way. 当你进入长尾责任线时，例如General Re可能会有这种情况，通货膨胀会产生这样的影响，即可能会提前4年，5年，10年创造的负债，而且它们会以当前美元重新安置。显然，这会以不可预测的方式增加解决这些债务的成本。

The danger in inﬂation to something like GEICO would be that people get, during inﬂation, they get irritated about the price of everything going up. 通货膨胀对GEICO这样的通货膨胀的危险在于，在通货膨胀期间，人们会对所有上涨的价格感到恼火。

And there are some things they can do something about.And there's others they can't.And then there are some they think they can, even though they can't.And one of those might be the cost of insurance. 他们可以做一些事情。还有其他人他们做不到。然后有一些他们认为他们可以，即使他们不能。其中一个可能是保险费用。

So the people might get very upset with the system of auto insurance, when they see a very signiﬁcant part of their annual budget.Because an auto insurance policy, on average, is signiﬁcant to people, and virtually every consumer in the country. 因此，当他们看到年度预算的很大一部分时，人们可能对汽车保险系统感到非常不满。因为平均而言，汽车保险政策对人们和几乎所有国家的消费者都很重要。

And there could be a lot of pressure on legislatures to do a variety of things that might change the system in a major way. 立法机构可能会面临很大的压力，需要做一些可能会以一种主要方式改变系统的事情。

It wouldn't reduce the number of cars that crashed into each other or the injuries that were done or anything else.But it would be a way of striking out against higher rates. 它不会减少相互撞击的汽车数量或者已经完成的伤害或其他任何事情。但这将是一种打击更高利率的方式。

And people would be unhappy about those rates.And that also might reﬂect itself in difﬁculty getting the increases that were required to take care of the costs that were ratcheting up fast. 人们会对这些费率感到不满。而且这也可能反映出难以获得为了快速提高成本所需的增加。

So net, I think, inﬂation is bad for the auto insurance business.Although, you can argue that, you know, GEICO — 因此，净值，我认为，通胀对汽车保险业务不利。虽然，你可以说，你知道，GEICO -

I think when I ﬁrst got interested in GEICO, they had about a — it was in 1951, I wrote it up in "Security I Like Best."I think they had about 175,000 policies.And I think they were writing about 7 million of business, which would be about 40 bucks a policy. 我想当我第一次对GEICO感兴趣时，他们有一个 - 它是在1951年，我把它写在“我最喜欢的安全”中。我认为他们有大约175,000份政策。而且我认为他们正在编写大约700万的业务，这将是一个约40美元的政策。

Now, if we were getting $40 a policy now, you know, our premium volume would — the company would be a whole lot less valuable than it is. 现在，如果我们现在获得40美元的保单，你知道，我们的保费数量将会增加 - 公司的价值将远远低于现实。

And so one way or another, it ended up going from that period of $40 an average policy to 12 — or $1,100 an average policy without the roof caving in on it. 所以，无论如何，它最终从平均政策的40美元到12美元 - 或平均政策的1,100美元，而没有屋顶崩塌。

And it has been made more valuable, in dollar terms, by a combination of inﬂation and a great business model, without it getting destroyed in the process. 从美元来看，通过通货膨胀和良好的商业模式相结合，它已经变得更有价值，而不会在此过程中被破坏。

Nevertheless, I would prefer a noninﬂationary environment.It's better for the whole world, over time.And that the way our hope goes. 不过，我更喜欢非通货膨胀的环境。随着时间的推移，它对整个世界都有好处。这就是我们希望的方式。

And then we have this, so far, unwarranted fear that the kind of conditions that have existed over the last 15 years might cause a re-ignition of inﬂation, which to date, it hasn't. 到目前为止，我们已经毫无根据地担心过去15年来存在的那种条件可能会导致通货膨胀重新燃起，而迄今为止，通货膨胀并没有。

I don't know any more about what's going to happen than you do on that. 我不知道会发生什么比你做的更多。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I don't know anything, either.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我也不知道。（笑声）

33. International expansion: interesting but not easy 33.国际扩张：有趣但不容易

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 8. WARREN BUFFETT：8号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, gentlemen.My name is Zeke Turner, and currently ﬁnishing up my senior year at Taylor University in Indiana.So four more weeks, and I'm out of there.(Buffett laughs) 听众会员：下午好，先生们。我的名字是Zeke Turner，目前正在印第安纳州泰勒大学完成我的高年级。再过四个星期了，我就不在了。（巴菲特笑）

As someone studying ﬁnance, I do appreciate your comments as to the teaching of investment in academia.It certainly has some development it can make there.I do say that with hope that very few grad school admissions ofﬁcers are listening right now. 作为一名学习金融的人，我非常感谢您对学术界投资教学的评论。它肯定有一些可以在那里发展的发展。我确实说，希望现在很少有研究生招生官员在听。

But I do want to say a special thank you quickly, if I could, to all those professors who do have the intelligence and the guts to actually teach value investing on that level and go away from efﬁcient market theories.I do kind of wish Benjamin Graham were still teaching. 但我确实想特别感谢你，如果可以的话，对所有那些有智慧和勇气的教授，实际上在这个层面教授价值投资，并放弃有效的市场理论。我有点希望本杰明格雷厄姆还在教学。

Many questions have been asked as far as technology and its development into the business model.I think the greatest effect of this will probably be in the globalization of the economy.This has had, and will continue to have, a signiﬁcant impact on the business model as we know it today. 就技术及其在商业模式中的发展而言，已经提出了许多问题。我认为这最大的影响可能在于经济全球化。正如我们今天所知，这已经并将继续对业务模式产生重大影响。

Now, except for certain growth opportunities, this may have a smaller effect on companies such as See's Candy or Nebraska Furniture Mart, but has had and probably will continue to have a dramatic effect on companies like Gillette, Coke, who have signiﬁcant international presence. 现在，除了某些增长机会外，这可能对See's Candy或Nebraska Furniture Mart等公司的影响较小，但已经并且可能会继续对像吉列，可口可乐这样具有重要国际影响力的公司产生巨大影响。

My question is, how does your approach change, if at all, in light of the international expansion? 我的问题是，鉴于国际扩张，你的方法如何改变，如果有的话？

I'm particularly interested in the introduction of greater difﬁculty in understanding the business models, in the understanding of the economic future and the economic risk associated with the international scene.In addition, do you actively search for a global scene for investment opportunities? 我特别感兴趣的是在理解商业模式，理解经济未来以及与国际舞台相关的经济风险方面引入更大的困难。此外，您是否积极寻找全球投资机会？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.The answer is that we obviously like businesses that are good businesses at present volume and that have the chances to expand signiﬁcantly with similar economics. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。答案是，我们显然希望企业在目前的数量上是良好的业务，并且有可能以类似的经济学显着扩展。 And with any business that's been around the United States a long time, there's probably more opportunity, potentially anyway, around the rest of the world than here. 对于长期以来在美国各地开展业务的任何企业而言，无论如何，世界其他地方的机会可能比这里更多。

And Coke has grown faster.Oh, it's grown well here.But it's grown faster around the world than here.And that's been true at Gillette, also, just because we were a more mature market. 可口可乐增长得更快。哦，它在这里生长得很好。但它在世界范围内的增长速度超过了这里。吉利也是如此，因为我们是一个更成熟的市场。

So we love the idea of products that will travel.Some travel well.Some don't.I mean, it's an incredible world that way. 所以我们喜欢旅行产品的想法。一些旅行很好。有些人没有。我的意思是，这是一个令人难以置信的世界。

Candy bars don't seem to travel so well, you know.Soft drinks travel terriﬁcally.And razor blades travel terriﬁcally.But the Cadbury bars sell in England.And, you know, and the Hershey bars sell here.And it's very hard, with some items, to try — 你知道，糖果棒似乎没有这么好的旅行。软饮料极度旅行。剃刀刀片非常划线。但吉百利酒吧在英格兰出售。而且，你知道，Hershey酒吧在这里卖。尝试一些项目非常困难 -

In fact, within this country, it's amazing to me.We talk about having a mobile society.And people are moving all the time.And we're all watching the same television and everything else. 事实上，在这个国家里，这对我来说太神奇了。我们谈论拥有移动社会。人们总是在不断前进。我们都在看同一台电视和其他一切。

And the supermarket share of Dr. Pepper in Dallas is 18 and a fraction percent.And in Boston, it's six-tenths of one percent.I mean, 18 to 0.6, 30 times the market share. 达拉斯的胡椒博士的超市份额为18％，而且只有百分之几。在波士顿，它只有百分之六的百分之十。我的意思是，市场份额的18到0.6倍，30倍。

Dr. Pepper's been around forever.You know, people move back and forth and everything.And how can you have that sort of a differential in this country? Pepper博士永远在身边。你知道，人们来回移动一切。你怎么能在这个国家有这种差别？

Royal Crown Cola, 3 percent in Chicago, one-tenth of a percent, you know, maybe, in Detroit, a couple hundred miles away, same kind of people, all that sort of thing.And Royal Crown's been around for 75 years or whatever it may be, 50 years, at least. Royal Crown Cola，芝加哥3％，百分之十，你知道，也许，在几百英里外的底特律，同样的人，都是这样的。皇家皇冠已经存在了75年或者不论它是什么，至少50年。

And you get these incredible differences in what people do, even within this country.So it's not easy to predict how — if you can't predict how Dr. Pepper — if you can’t ﬁgure out how to make Dr. — 即使在这个国家，你也会在人们的行为中获得这些令人难以置信的差异。所以不容易预测 - 如果你不能预测何博士如何 - 如果你不知道如何制作博士 -

If I owned Dr. Pepper and was selling 18 percent of the market in the supermarkets of Dallas, it would drive me crazy, you know, I was getting six-tenths of a percent in Boston.Or, I think it's ﬁve-tenths, maybe, in Detroit.That would drive me crazy, although maybe I should just be grateful that I've got 18 percent in Dallas. 如果我拥有Dr. Pepper并且在达拉斯的超市销售18％的市场，那会让我发疯，你知道，我在波士顿的收入只有百分之六十。或者，我认为这可能是底特律的五分之一。那会让我发疯，虽然也许我应该感激我在达拉斯获得了18％的成绩。

It just — it's very hard to predict how products will travel.With See's Candy, you know, we have this incredible penetration in the West and particularly in California.We know it's the best candy. 它只是 - 很难预测产品将如何传播。有了See's Candy，你知道，我们在西方尤其是加利福尼亚州有这种令人难以置信的渗透。我们知道这是最棒的糖果。

Now, boxed chocolates just do not sell big in this country.The annual consumption is low.But it still seems that, if we can make a lot of money in California, we ought to be able to make some money in New York or Pennsylvania. 现在，盒装巧克力在这个国家卖得不大。年消费量很低。但看起来，如果我们能在加利福尼亚赚很多钱，我们应该可以在纽约或宾夕法尼亚赚钱。

But we haven't ﬁgure out how to do it.And we've tried a lot of things. 但我们还没弄清楚如何做到这一点。我们已经尝试了很多东西。

So, the answer is we're always interested in geographical expansion, whether it's even in the United States or, going beyond that, into other countries. 所以，答案是我们总是对地理扩张感兴趣，无论是在美国还是在其他国家，都是如此。

It's not as easy as it looks.But when the chance to do it comes, then you ought to just pound and pound and pound. 它并不像看起来那么容易。但是当它有机会实现时，那么你应该只是捣蛋，捣蛋。

And we occasionally have bought stocks in other countries.I wrote a fellow the other day that I read about in Germany about his business.I've never met him or anything else.But it sounded like he had a pretty good business.And it sounded like he might be my type of guy. 我们偶尔会在其他国家购买股票。前几天我写了一篇文章，我在德国读到他的生意。我从未见过他或其他任何东西。但听起来他的生意非常好。听起来他可能是我的那种人。

So I just wrote him a letter.Haven't heard back, either.But I may.The odds are against it.But it sounded to me like I'd buy his business, if he chose to write back and wanted to do something. 所以我给他写了一封信。也没有回复过。但我可能会。可能性很大。但是，如果他选择回信并想做某事，那对我来说就像我买他的生意一样。 And we're very willing to do business, you know, in any country in the world, where we think we understand the nuances of the corporate governance system and taxation and that sort of thing. 我们非常愿意在世界上任何一个国家开展业务，我们认为我们了解公司治理体系和税收的细微差别等等。

We don't understand all 200 countries, by a long shot.But there's plenty we'd love to be in business in. 我们并不了解所有200个国家。但是我们很乐意参与其中。

We looked at a very signiﬁcant company in Japan a couple years ago.And some other fellow I know bought it and has done very well.It would've made sense for us.And we missed it. 几年前，我们看了一家日本非常重要的公司。我认识的其他一些人买了它并做得很好。这对我们来说是有道理的。我们错过了它。

We will continue to look at things, internationally.It makes a lot of sense.And we've got a lot of capital to employ. 我们将继续在国际上看待事物。这很有道理。而且我们有很多资金要用。

We're more likely, by some margin, to ﬁnd things here.But we may ﬁnd a big one outside of this country. 我们更有可能在这里找到一些东西。但我们可能会在这个国家之外找到一个大的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Nothing to add. CHARLIE MUNGER：没有什么可补充的。

34. Spending to expand GEICO's business 34.用于扩大GEICO业务的开支

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Number 1. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。 1号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm John Bailey (PH) from Boston, Massachusetts. 听众：我是来自马萨诸塞州波士顿的John Bailey（PH）。

You commented, in the annual report, that only part of GEICO's marketing expense last year was required to maintain the business. 您在年度报告中评论说，去年只有部分GEICO的营销费用需要维持业务。

This seems to get to the heart of owner earnings, where, in the ﬁrst part, you can value the existing business very well through this observation.And you get a direct measure of the dollars invested in new business. 这似乎触及了所有者收入的核心，在第一部分中，您可以通过此观察很好地评估现有业务。您可以直接衡量投资新业务的资金。 And it seems that you should be able to make similar observations about other businesses that you may be interested in investing in. 而且您似乎应该能够对您可能有兴趣投资的其他业务做出类似的观察。

So could you use this as a jumping off point to describe examples, perhaps, of how you contemplate companies' marginal investment opportunities or their return on marginal capital? 那么，您是否可以将此作为一个起点来描述您如何考虑公司的边际投资机会或其边际资本回报的例子？

And how much weight do you give to the value of the existing business in your investment decisions or the value of the, so to speak, in-force book? 您对投资决策中现有业务的价值或可执行账户的价值有多大的重视？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we, as we explained earlier, are looking for ways to create more than a dollar of value per dollar we lay out. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，正如我们之前解释的那样，我们正在寻找方法来创造超过1美元的价值。

We'd love to create $3 of value or $4 of value.But we'll settle for $1.10, if that's all we can get. 我们喜欢创造3美元的价值或4美元的价值。但如果我们能得到的话，我们将以1.10美元结算。

We don't consciously make decisions that are 90-cent decisions for a dollar laid out.None of this is that precise, when you get into the application of it. 我们不会有意识地做出一个90美分的决定，一美元的决定。当你进入应用程序时，这些都不是那么精确。

What we do know, is that there is enough of a margin at, say, a GEICO expansion effort, that it's pretty compelling that it makes sense.Part of the limitation there, as I explained in the report, too, is a question of infrastructure and all of that. 我们所知道的是，在GEICO的扩张努力中有足够的余地，这是非常有意义的，这是有道理的。正如我在报告中所解释的那样，那里的部分限制也是基础设施问题和所有问题。

So, it isn't solely a question of saying, you know, “Can we lay out another dollar?” and “Will that have a value of $1.10?” because if we strain the organization beyond its ability to service people, we maybe hurting the business already on the books. 所以，这不仅仅是一个问题，你知道，“我们可以再划出一美元吗？”和“它的价值是1.10美元吗？”因为如果我们使组织超出其服务人员的能力，我们可能会伤害了已经存在的书籍。

I used the GEICO example in the report, because it's big enough, so it's meaningful to shareholders.I mean, we're doing things all the time that cost us money in the short run that we think will more that produce a commensurate value over time, but not on the scale that we're doing it at GEICO currently.And we may step up that scale even. 我在报告中使用了GEICO的例子，因为它足够大，所以它对股东来说很有意义。我的意思是，我们一直在做的事情在短期内花费我们的钱，而我们认为随着时间的推移会产生相应的价值，但目前我们在GEICO的规模并不是这样。我们甚至可以提升这个规模。 So, I thought it important to lay out those ﬁgures, even though I can't be precise.When I say, you know, that it might be $50 million to maintain, I don't know that ﬁgure.It could be 70. It could be 30. Maybe I'm off even more than that. 所以，我认为列出这些数字很重要，即使我不准确。当我说，你知道，维持可能是5000万美元，我不知道这个数字。它可能是70.它可能是30.也许我的关闭甚至更多。

But that's my best guess.And I think the shareholders are entitled to my best guess.And they're entitled to know how much we are spending, beyond that maintenance cost, to build the business for the future, which we don't, obviously, capitalize on the balance sheet. 但这是我最好的猜测。我认为股东有权得到我最好的猜测。他们有权知道我们花了多少钱，超出维护成本，为未来建立业务，显然，我们并没有利用资产负债表。

So those — GEICO's, by far, the most dramatic.And we don't have comparable expenditures like that going on elsewhere. 那些 - 到目前为止，GEICO是最具戏剧性的。而且我们没有像其他地方那样可比的支出。

But we are spending signiﬁcant money, for example, to take NetJets to Europe.And we'll be spending it this year and next year. 但是，例如，我们花费大量资金将NetJets带到欧洲。我们今年和明年将花钱。

And then as soon as that starts looking good, we'll be going to Asia and spending more money.I mean, all of those decisions are made that way.They're not on the scale of the GEICO decision, though, at all. 然后，一旦开始看起来不错，我们将前往亚洲并花更多钱。我的意思是，所有这些决定都是这样做的。但是，它们根本没有达到GEICO决定的规模。

We want to give you the information in the report that, related to the size of the enterprise, would be material to Charlie or me, if we were reading the report and not involved in the business, in trying to ﬁgure out what our investment wasall about. 我们希望在报告中向您提供与企业规模相关的信息，如果我们正在阅读报告而不参与业务，那么查理或我将对我们的投资有所了解。所有关于。

That's the goal in what we write and then to keep it to a size that doesn't have to be sent UPS. 这是我们编写的目标，然后将其保持在不必发送UPS的大小。

35. Problems with Berkshire annual report distribution 35.伯克希尔年度报告分发的问题

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, I'm glad I got wandering along on that line.Because we did have a lot of shareholders this year that got their reports even later than they received them in past years. WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一下，我很高兴我在那条线上徘徊。因为我们今年确实有很多股东获得他们的报告，甚至比他们过去几年收到报告还要晚。 Now, they were delivered — the reports that go to registered holders were put in the mail a few days after we go up on the internet here in Omaha.And they seem to get delivered OK. 现在，他们已经交付了 - 在我们在奥马哈上网的几天后，寄给注册持有人的报告就被邮寄了。他们似乎得到了交付。

Street-name holders, which are ten times in number what the registered holders are, so we're really talking about nine out of ten shareholders, get their reports from a ﬁrm in New Jersey that is designated, by their broker, to take thereports from us and re-mail them.And we pay those people a fair amount of money to do that. 街道名称持有者，其数量是注册持有人的十倍，所以我们真正谈论的是十分之九的股东，从新泽西州的一家公司获得他们的经纪人指定的公司报告。我们的报告并重新发送邮件。我们向这些人支付了相当多的钱来做到这一点。

We know when we deliver those reports to them, which is promptly.And we know when they tell us that they send them out.And we inquire every day, or more than once a day, to ﬁnd out whether they've gone out. 我们知道何时向他们提供这些报告，这是及时的。我们知道他们何时告诉我们他们将它们发送出去。我们每天或每天不止一次地询问他们是否已经出去。

And we got a lot of complaints this year that people hadn't received them at a time when you would've thought they would've received them. 我们今年收到了很多抱怨，当你认为他们会收到它们时，人们还没有收到这些抱怨。

So, we can either — we know when the designated mailer received them.We don't know for sure when they got them out.And we don't know for sure what happens at the post ofﬁce. 所以，我们可以 - 我们知道指定的邮件收到它们的时间。当他们把它们拿出来时，我们不确定。我们不确定邮局会发生什么。

But we were — the mailing went out about the same as in previous years.But the receipt, apparently, was somewhat later.And all we can say is that we apologize, but we don't have any better system. 但是我们 - 邮件的发送方式与往年大致相同。但显然收据有点晚了。我们只能说道歉，但我们没有更好的制度。

The people that have them in their own name will always get them dropped in the mail a couple of days after the report appears on the internet.We can assure you of that. 在报告出现在互联网上几天之后，以他们自己的名义拥有它们的人将始终将其丢弃。我们可以向您保证。

We can't assure you of when the street-name holders will get their reports, because that is a mailing that we don't handle.And no other companies handle them, to my knowledge. 我们无法向您保证街头名称持有人何时会收到他们的报告，因为这是我们无法处理的邮件。据我所知，没有其他公司能够处理它们。 There is a ﬁrm that seems to do about 95 percent of that and is designated by the speciﬁc broker with whom you have your shares. 有一家公司似乎做了大约95％的公司，并由您拥有股份的特定经纪人指定。

Charlie, you got anything to add? 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？

36. The internet's effect on GEICO and auto insurance pricing 36.互联网对GEICO和汽车保险定价的影响

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 2. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，2号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.My name is Will Obendorf (PH).I'm from San Francisco, California, and I'm 11 years old.I have been a shareholder for six years at Berkshire Hathaway. 听众：嗨，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我叫Will Obendorf（PH）。我来自加利福尼亚州的旧金山，我才11岁。我在Berkshire Hathaway担任了六年的股东。

My questions are, what are GEICO's sustainable competitive advantages?And my other one is, what are the implications of the internet on pricing for the auto insurance industry? 我的问题是，GEICO的可持续竞争优势是什么？而我的另一个问题是，互联网对汽车保险行业的定价有何影响？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we — we're going to get your name and send it to human relations or whatever they call those departments.We want to hire you.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们 - 我们将得到你的名字并将其发送给人际关系或他们称之为那些部门的任何东西。我们想雇用你。（笑声）

The sustainable competitive advantage at GEICO is to be the low-cost producer providing very good service. GEICO的可持续竞争优势是成为提供优质服务的低成本生产商。

And there will be a number of companies that provide good services.So that does not distinguish us from a great many competitors. 并且将有许多公司提供良好的服务。所以这并不能将我们与众多竞争对手区分开来。

Having the low cost is crucial.There are companies that specialize in given groups of policyholders, but smaller groups, such as USAA, that have very good costs.So they are very, very competitive with us in their chosen area. 低成本至关重要。有些公司专门从事特定的保单持有人群体，但是较小的群体，例如USAA，其成本非常高。因此，他们在所选区域与我们的竞争非常激烈。

There's another company in Los Angeles that, geographically, called 21st Century Insurance, that has costs like ours.And so they are extremely competitive within that geographic area. 洛杉矶的另一家公司，在地理上称为21世纪保险，其成本与我们一样。因此，他们在该地理区域内极具竞争力。

I don't think anybody is any better than us who operates nationwide.We don't operate in Massachusetts or New Jersey.But in the other 48 states, we will have a quote for about anyone. 我认为没有人比在全国范围内开展业务的人更好。我们不在马萨诸塞州或新泽西州开展业务。但在其他48个州，我们将引用任何人的报价。

So, in terms of a broad-based insurance — auto insurance competitor — our competitive advantage has to be low cost over time. 因此，就广泛的保险而言 - 汽车保险竞争对手 - 我们的竞争优势必须是低成本。

Now, we also have to be as good at distinguishing among the risks posed by different kinds of drivers as other people.In other words, we have to be able to select people who are going to be better-than-average drivers.And we have to be able to understand who is likely to be a poorer- than-average driver. 现在，我们也必须善于区分不同类型的司机和其他人一样的风险。换句话说，我们必须能够选择那些比普通驾驶员更好的人。我们必须能够了解谁可能是一个比平均水平更差的司机。

But — and the ability to do that, to distinguish those people, would be a competitive advantage.I think that many companies tend to be fairly equal on that point.So it's really at this cost level. 但是 - 并且能够做到这一点，区分这些人，将是一种竞争优势。我认为很多公司在这一点上往往相当平等。所以它确实处于这个成本水平。

And we care very much about cost, the same way that Charlie mentioned a company called Costco does, you know, in terms of retailing.They ﬁgure their expense ratios out to hundredths of a percent.And that is important. 而且我们非常关心成本，就像Charlie在零售业方面提到的Costco公司所做的那样。他们将费用率计算为百分之一百。这很重要。

So that is the competitive advantage.Now when you get — and we have to sustain and widen that, if possible. 这就是竞争优势。现在当你得到 - 如果可能的话，我们必须维持和扩大它。

The question of the internet, it's going to be very important.It already is important to GEICO.It will be more and more important.It will be important to the insurance industry. 互联网的问题，这将是非常重要的。它对GEICO来说已经很重要了。这将变得越来越重要。这对保险业来说很重要。

Because when you have the internet, you have a situation where somebody thinking about insuring a car can click to one place, ﬁnd out what that rate will be.They can click to someplace else and ﬁnd out what that rate will be. 因为当你有互联网时，你有一种情况，有人在考虑投保汽车可以点击一个地方，找出那个价格。他们可以点击其他地方并找出该费率。 So, in effect, they can shop all around without going from place to place to place and driving all over town or calling lots of agencies.They can just do it right there in their den.And that makes it very important, again, that we be the low-cost company. 因此，实际上，他们可以在周围购物，无需从一个地方到另一个地方，并在城镇或驱动许多代理商。他们可以在他们的巢穴里做到这一点。这再次使我们成为低成本公司非常重要。

I think it's going to be an advantage for us, over time.For one thing, I think it makes brand very important.Because we want people to be thinking of GEICO as one of the possibilities to call. 我认为随着时间的推移，它对我们来说将是一个优势。首先，我认为它使品牌非常重要。因为我们希望人们将GEICO视为呼叫的可能性之一。

And if you've got the XYZ Company that nobody's ever heard of, nobody's going to think about clicking on them. 如果你有没有人听说过的XYZ公司，没有人会考虑点击它们。

And GEICO's brand is becoming extremely familiar to people throughout the country, and we're spending a lot of money to make it even more familiar. GEICO的品牌对全国人民来说变得非常熟悉，我们花了很多钱让它更加熟悉。

So you've asked two very good questions.And I think we're in pretty good shape on both of them.Thank you. 所以你问过两个非常好的问题。而且我认为我们两个都很好。谢谢。

Charlie? 查理？

37. We'll do real estate deals, but only at the right price 我们会做房地产交易，但价格合适

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3. WARREN BUFFETT：3号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon, Mr. Berkshire and Mr. Hathaway.(Laughter) 听众会员：下午好，伯克希尔先生和哈撒韦先生。（笑声）

My name's Anthony Priest.I'm from Washington, D.C. 我叫Anthony Priest。我来自华盛顿特区。

A couple months ago, I saw an ad in the "Wall Street Journal," where it said, "Berkshire Hathaway wants to see real estate ﬁnance opportunities in excess of $100 million." 几个月前，我在“华尔街日报”上看到一则广告，其中称，“伯克希尔哈撒韦公司希望看到超过1亿美元的房地产融资机会。”

I was curious about your thoughts in this area, the real estate ﬁeld, some of your goals, if you can talk about any of the deals you may have made, and if Donald Trump has given you a call yet.(Laughter) 我很好奇你在这方面的想法，房地产领域，你的一些目标，如果你可以谈论你可能已经达成的任何交易，以及唐纳德特朗普是否给你打电话。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I don't think Donald Trump will give us a call. 沃伦巴菲特：我不认为唐纳德特朗普会打电话给我们。

We have got about, what, three deals that we've put on in the last couple of years in real estate.And they are in this $100-million-and-up category. 我们在过去几年里在房地产领域已经有了三笔交易。它们处于这个价值1亿美元的类别中。

And we're willing to put billions and billions of dollars in, if we can ﬁnd the right sort of opportunities.Or nothing may happen, depending on — just depending on the market.We don’t have — 如果我们能找到合适的机会，我们愿意投入数十亿美元。或者根据市场情况，可能不会发生任何事情。我们没有 -

Most — a lot of places have a mortgage department, or they have a real estate department.And they sort of have a budget.And they put money out based on using up the budget.And they have a whole bunch of people that don't have a job, unless they do that. 大多数 - 很多地方都有抵押贷款部门，或者他们有房地产部门。而且他们有预算。他们基于用尽预算来放钱。他们有很多人没有工作，除非他们这样做。

That's not the way we operate at Berkshire.We’re willing — if the deals are right, you know, we'll do many billions.If the deals aren't right, we don't have anybody whose job is dependent on keeping busy in a ﬁeld like that.So, we look at the deals when they come in. 这不是我们在伯克郡经营的方式。我们愿意 - 如果交易是对的，你知道，我们会做很多十亿美元。如果交易不对，我们没有任何人的工作依赖于在这样的领域保持忙碌。所以，我们看看他们进来的交易。

Mike Goldberg is in charge of that operation.And we kick things around.He's in the ofﬁce right next to mine.So, if he hears about a deal, you know, we'll discuss it for three minutes.And we'll sort of know whether it passes the ﬁrst threshold.And then we'll go on to the second and the third. 迈克戈德伯格负责这项行动。我们踢东西。他在我旁边的办公室里。所以，如果他听到了一笔交易，你知道，我们将讨论它三分钟。我们会知道它是否超过了第一个门槛。然后我们将继续第二和第三。

But we don't waste a lot of time on things.And we don't care whether we make another deal or not.We'd like to, if the terms are right.And that ad produced some inquiries, not from Donald Trump. 但我们不会在事情上浪费大量时间。而且我们不关心我们是否再做一笔交易。如果条款合适，我们愿意。那个广告产生了一些问题，而不是唐纳德特朗普。

And, you know, one or — there’s one or two of — a couple of them are alive at the present time.And we'll see whether they work out. 并且，你知道，一个或者 - 有一个或两个 - 其中有几个在现在还活着。我们将看看它们是否成功。

Real estate deals, by their nature, take longer to put to bed than the kind of thing we normally do.In fact, I can buy a business faster than we can make a real estate deal, usually.That's just the way they work.But we could end up with a — 房地产交易，就其本质而言，比我们通常做的事情需要更长时间才能上床睡觉。事实上，我通常可以比我们通过房地产交易更快地买入一家公司。这就是他们工作的方式。但我们最终可能会 -

We're very happy with the three deals that we've got.They're good uses of money.And I hope we ﬁnd a lot more.But if we don't, I won't be upset. 我们对这三项交易非常满意。他们善用金钱。我希望我们能找到更多。但如果我们不这样做，我不会感到沮丧。

Charlie, do you have anything to add?Charlie's our real estate expert. 查理，你有什么要补充的吗？查理是我们的房地产专家。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Hardly. CHARLIE MUNGER：很难。

WARREN BUFFETT: We are not ﬁnancing Charlie's boat, incidentally, despite the rumors. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：尽管有谣言，我们并没有为Charlie的船提供资金。（笑声）

38. Berkshire is not a "fund" 38.伯克希尔不是“基金”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Joel.I'm an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia.Just — I have two questions. 听众：嗨，我叫乔尔。我是弗吉尼亚大学的本科生。只是 - 我有两个问题。

My ﬁrst question is, how important do you think the structure of your fund is to its long-term success? 我的第一个问题是，您认为您的基金结构对其长期成功有多重要？

And by that, I mean, in the last couple weeks, some other legendary investors, like Julian Robertson, Stanley Druckenmiller, have been forced to either close or restructure their funds as a result of a kind of vicious cycle of underperformance and subsequent redemptions andthen even worse performance. 就此而言，我的意思是，在过去的几周里，其他一些传奇投资者，如朱利安罗伯逊，斯坦利德鲁肯米勒，由于表现不佳以及随后的赎回和恶意循环而被迫关闭或重组他们的资金。然后表现更差。 Do you think that the structure of your fund, as a publically-traded company, as opposed to a private partnership, like Tiger and Quantum, has protected your business from a similar fate? 您是否认为您的基金结构，作为公开交易的公司，而不是像Tiger和Quantum这样的私人合伙企业，保护您的企业免受类似的命运？

Or phrased a different way, do you think that, if Tiger or Quantum were structured the way that Berkshire Hathaway is, that they might still be in business in the same way today? 或者用不同的方式表达，你是否认为，如果Tiger或Quantum的结构与Berkshire Hathaway的方式相同，那么它们今天可能仍以同样的方式开展业务？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we don't consider ourselves in remotely the same business as Tiger.I mean, they are managing a securities operation.And we aren't doing anything like what they do.So that — they have — WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们认为自己与Tiger没有同样的业务。我的意思是，他们正在管理证券业务。我们没有像他们那样做任何事情。所以 - 他们有 -

Thirty years ago, when I had the partnership, it was much more along their lines, although still far from what they do.But it was structured much more like what they did. 三十年前，当我有合作伙伴关系的时候，它更符合他们的要求，尽管他们的工作还远远不够。但它的结构更像是他们所做的。

And I — and, although we had bought control of businesses and all that, we were functioning much more — or, focusing much more on securities. 我 - 而且，虽然我们已经购买了对企业的控制权，但我们的运作更多 - 或者更多地关注证券。

We don't care whether we own a stock or a bond.We will over the next 20 years.But that's not what we're about.We're not a fund.We are an operating business that generates a lot of capital and uses that to buy other businesses in whole or part. 我们不关心我们是拥有股票还是债券。我们将在未来20年内完成。但那不是我们的意思。我们不是基金。我们是一家经营业务，产生大量资金，并用于购买其他全部或部分业务。

And we prefer in whole.But we sometimes do it in part. 而且我们更喜欢整体。但我们有时会这样做。

But I would — I don’t consider — which is a reason why I don't consider book value that important, although it — it's got the importance I attributed to it earlier. 但是我会 - 我不会考虑 - 这也是我不认为账面价值重要的原因，尽管它 - 我之前已经认识到它的重要性。

But, we could easily have 90 percent of the value of Berkshire, ten years from now, be represented by businesses that we own and 10 percent by securities.Or we could very easily have 60 or 70 percent represented by securities, depending on how markets develop. 但是，从现在起十年后，我们可以很容易地将伯克希尔90％的价值代表我们拥有的企业和10％的证券代表。或者，根据市场的发展情况，我们可以很容易地拥有60％或70％的证券代表。 I hope it develops in the former way.But I'm perfectly willing to go the other way, too.But it just has no relationship to the kind of funds you talk about.They — 我希望它以前一种方式发展。但我也非常愿意走另一条路。但它与你谈到的那种资金没有任何关系。他们 -

We are structured poorly, from a tax standpoint, compared to those fellows, and compared to what I used to have in the '60s. 从税收的角度来看，与那些研究员相比，我们的结构很差，并且与我过去60年代的情况相比。

But that's, you know, that's a decision we made.And we're stuck with it, more or less. 但是，这就是我们做出的决定。我们或多或少地坚持使用它。

It's not a great tax structure, if you're going to own securities.But we may not own that many securities over time. 如果你要拥有证券，这不是一个很好的税收结构。但随着时间的推移，我们可能不会持有那么多证券

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think that the people in the relative performance game, who are trying to attract so-called hot money, are living in a totally different world from ours. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我确实认为那些试图吸引所谓的热钱的相对表演游戏中的人们生活在与我们完全不同的世界中。

I mean, Soros, in the end, was not willing to have a lot of people make a lot of money in high- tech stocks and not be part of that game.And they got killed. 我的意思是，索罗斯最终不愿意让很多人在高科技股票上赚到很多钱而不是那场比赛的一部分。他们被杀了。

We're perfectly willing to let something we don't understand very well rage on while a lot of other people make a lot of money we don't. 我们非常愿意让一些我们不太了解的东西风靡一时，而很多其他人赚了很多钱我们没有。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we — it's just not a securities operation that we have.We own a lot of securities at present.And we'll probably own a lot ﬁve or 10 years from now.But it's not what Berkshire is necessarily about. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们 - 这不是我们的证券业务。我们目前拥有很多证券。从现在开始，我们可能拥有很多五年或十年。但这不是伯克希尔必然要做的事情。

Ideally, you know, I would love it if we could move all the money in securities into businesses that we liked.But that’s — that isn't going to happen, in all probability. 理想情况下，如果我们能将所有证券资金转移到我们喜欢的业务中，我会很高兴。但那是 - 这种情况不太可能发生。 It's too tough, because we can't ﬁnd multi-billion-dollar businesses to buy right and left.We ﬁnd a few.But they tend to be small. 这太难了，因为我们无法找到价值数十亿美元的企业来左右买入。我们找到了一些。但它们往往很小。

39. We wouldn't buy a company that lies to itself 我们不会买自己的公司

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5? WARREN BUFFETT：5号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Paul Tomasik from Chicago.My question is about intellectual honesty and your incredible ability of rising intellectual honesty in organizations. 听众：我叫芝加哥的保罗托马西克。我的问题是关于知识分子的诚实以及你在组织中提升知识诚信的难以置信的能力。

In particular, you look at General Re, a large, well-managed, publically-traded ﬁrm.And if you think about it, if you raise the intellectual honesty in an organization like that, initially, you're going to have an aberration, as you called it. 特别是，你看看General Re，这是一家规模庞大，管理良好，公开交易的公司。如果你考虑一下，如果你在这样的组织中提高知识分子的诚实，那么最初，你就会像你所说的那样有一种失常。

In particular, Berkshire Hathaway was the ﬁrst company to write-down the Uni — what is it — Unicover write-down, whereas Aon pushed it on into the year 2000. 特别值得一提的是，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司是第一家贬低Uni的公司 - 它是什么 - Unicover贬值，而 Aon将其推迟到2000年。

Can you comment, give us some hints, on how you raise the intellectual honesty in an organization? 您能否就如何在组织中提升知识分子诚实做出评论，给我们一些提示？

And somebody whispered in my ear, they wanted to know Charlie's reading list.I guess they ﬁnished “Guns, Germs, and Steel.” Thank you. 有人在我耳边低声说，他们想知道查理的阅读清单。我猜他们完成了“枪支，细菌和钢铁。”谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We really don't want to buy into any organization that we felt would be lacking that quality, in the ﬁrst place.Because we really don't believe in buying into organizations to change them. WARREN BUFFETT：我们真的不想购买任何我们认为缺乏这种品质的组织。因为我们真的不相信购买组织来改变它们。

We may, you know, we may change the comp system a little or something of the sort. 我们可能，您知道，我们可能会改变comp系统或类似的东西。 But, I'm not going to name names, but there are a whole lot of organizations that, if we bought into them, we wouldn't move their needle one point in terms of how they operate.And we wouldn't be comfortable with how they operated. 但是，我不打算命名，但是有很多组织，如果我们收购它们，我们就不会在它们如何运作方面提出一点意见。我们对他们的运作方式感到不舒服。

So, we try to buy into organizations that we think are very much like ours, at bedrock.And General Re would've recognized that Unicover loss just as quickly if we hadn't owned it, as we had. 所以，我们试图在基石上购买我们认为非常像我们的组织。如果我们没有拥有它，那么General Re将会认识到Unicover的损失就像我们一样。

Now, that was not true of some other people.But they didn't need any prodding from us in order to realize something like that. 现在，其他人并非如此。但他们并不需要我们的任何刺激来实现这样的事情。

We want people joining us who already are the type that face reality and that tell us, basically, tell us the truth but tell themselves the truth, which is even more important. 我们希望加入我们的人已经是那种面对现实的人，并告诉我们，基本上，告诉我们真相，但要告诉自己真相，这更为重要。

And once you get an organization that lies to itself, and there are plenty that do, I just think you get into all kinds of problems. 一旦你得到一个自己的组织，并且有很多事情可做，我只是认为你遇到了各种各样的问题。

And people know it throughout the organization.And they adopt the norms of what they think is happening up above them. 人们在整个组织中都知道这一点。他们采用他们认为正在发生的事情的规范。

And particularly in a ﬁnancial organization — really in any organization — but particularly in a ﬁnancial organization, you know, that is death over time.And we wouldn't buy into something that we felt had that problem, with the idea that we would correct it.Because we wouldn't. 特别是在金融机构 - 实际上在任何组织中 - 尤其是在金融机构中，你知道，这就是随着时间的推移而死亡。我们不会买入我们觉得有这个问题的东西，我们会纠正它。因为我们不会。

You know, it — Charlie and I have had a little experience with some organizations that have had that sort of problem.And it's not correctable, at least, you know, based on the lifespan of humans.It's too much to commit to. 你知道，它 - 查理和我对一些有这种问题的组织有一点经验。至少，根据人类的生命周期，这是不可纠正的。承诺太过分了。

Charlie? 查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think you're totally right about General Re.We didn't improve behavior at General Re.They already had a behavior just like ours. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为你对General Re完全正确。我们没有改善General Re的行为。他们已经有了像我们一样的行为。

And regarding a reading list, by the mischances of life, I didn't read one book last year that I thought was a lollapalooza.Therefore, I didn't make any recommendations to that bookstore at the airport. 关于阅读清单，由于生活的不幸，去年我没有看过一本我认为是lollapalooza的书。因此，我没有向机场的书店提出任何建议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, how many books do you think you've read, though?He reads a lot. WARREN BUFFETT：查理，你认为你读了多少本书？他读了很多。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don't count.And some of them, I skim through pretty fast.But there was no lollapalooza.A book like “Guns, Germs, and Steel” doesn't come along every year. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我不算数。其中一些，我快速浏览。但是没有lollapalooza。像枪，细菌和钢铁这样的书每年都不会出现。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK — WARREN BUFFETT：好的 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: And by the way, that guy was a little nuts in one way. CHARLIE MUNGER：顺便说一下，那家伙在某种程度上有点疯狂。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's hard to get an A from Charlie.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：很难从Charlie那里得到A. （笑声）

40. Berkshire's competitive advantages in reinsurance 40.伯克希尔在再保险方面的竞争优势

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, is it 6 we're going to? WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们要去6吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello.My name's James Armstrong (PH) from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Thanks for having us. 听众：你好。我叫宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡的James Armstrong（PH）。谢谢你拥有我们。

I'd like you to comment, please, on the reinsurance business and how it might look over the next 10 or 20 years. 我想请您就再保险业务发表评论，以及未来10年或20年后的情况。

At Berkshire, we've usually bought businesses that are insulated to some degree from easy entry by new competitors and from commodity-type pricing.We want businesses that possess defensible franchises, few substitutes, resistance to cyclical factors, et cetera. 在伯克希尔，我们通常会购买在某种程度上不受新竞争对手轻松进入和商品类型定价的商家。我们希望企业拥有可靠的特许经营权，很少的替代品，抵制周期性因素等等。

The reinsurance business carries a lot of characteristics that are the opposite of what we usually look for.There's a lot of excess capacity.We're hindered by irrational and unwise pricing decisions by competitors. 再保险业务具有许多与我们通常所寻求的相反的特征。有很多容量过剩。我们受到竞争对手的非理性和不明智的定价决定的阻碍。

For GenRe to prove out as an investment for us, we need better underwriting.And we also need prices to harden. 要让GenRe证明对我们来说是一项投资，我们需要更好的承保。我们还需要加强价格。

But in a world with great global liquidity, where capital moves very rapidly from place to place, why wouldn't the reinsurance business gradually evolve into a poor business, where all excess returns are competed away, where price is never ﬁrm for very long becausea new entrant arises and throws capital at the business? 但是，在一个全球流动性很强的世界里，资本从一个地方到另一个地方的流动非常迅速，为什么再保险业务不会逐渐演变成一个糟糕的业务，所有超额收益都会被淘汰出去，因为价格永远不会坚挺，因为一个新进入者出现并投入资金？

So I'd like you to comment on how GenRe could be made to work.And also, give us a broad view of how the reinsurance business might unfold in the next 10 or 20 years.Thanks. 所以我想请你评论GenRe是如何工作的。此外，让我们广泛了解再保险业务在未来10年或20年内如何展开。谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.You made some good points.And, I — we have been, actually, in the reinsurance business, at Berkshire Hathaway, for 30 years. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。你提出了一些好处。而且，我 - 实际上，我们已经在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的再保险业务工作了30年。

So it's a business, obviously, that we've paid a lot of attention to.And we've gotten some scars from it at times.But overall, we've done extremely well. 显然，这是一项业务，我们已经非常关注。我们有时会得到一些伤疤。但总的来说，我们做得非常好。

And the reason we've done extremely well is because we've had an absolutely sensational manager in Ajit Jain, who I wrote about, running that business. 我们做得非常好的原因是因为我们在Ajit Jain中有一个绝对耸人听闻的经理，我写过这个经理。

But Ajit is a good example of what somebody with brains and energy and discipline and the right temperament and some capital behind him can do in a business. 但是阿吉特就是一个很好的例子，说明一个拥有大脑，能量和纪律以及正确的气质和背后的资本可以在企业中做些什么的人。 It's not the world's most efﬁcient business.And it never will be the world's most efﬁcient business, because it's not strictly actuarial.It — 这不是世界上最有效率的业务。它永远不会是世界上最有效率的业务，因为它不是严格精算的。它 -

All excess returns will not be competed away.There will be people that will earn very subnormal returns in the business.There will be people who get killed in the business.And that means there will be quite a deviation from the mean in terms of the results of individual insurers. 所有超额回报都不会被淘汰。将会有人在业务中获得非常低的正常回报。将有人在企业中遇害。这意味着就个别保险公司的业绩而言，与均值存在相当大的偏差。

And we think that both at National Indemnity, under Ajit, and at General Re, that we have advantages, so that our returns will be signiﬁcantly better than average. 我们认为，在国家赔偿，Ajit和General Re，我们都有优势，因此我们的回报将明显好于平均水平。

But both of our businesses are subject to getting killed in any single year, will get killed in speciﬁc years, but also, in our view, will do better than average and more than satisfactory, in terms of Berkshire Hathaway's results. 但是，就伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的业绩而言，我们的两个业务都会在任何一年内被杀，在特定年份会被杀，但在我们看来，我们的业绩也会比平均水平更好，也更令人满意。

You know, I can't prove that to you now.I can show you what's happened over the past years. 你知道，我现在无法向你证明这一点。我可以告诉你过去几年发生了什么。

I don't think the situation in reinsurance is way different than some years back.There's always dumb competitors.There's always a lot of capital in the business. 我不认为再保险的情况与几年前的情况有所不同。总是有愚蠢的竞争对手。这项业务总是有很多资金。

In the '85, 1985, 1986 period, people felt very poor.But it wasn't really a lack of ﬁnancial capital.It was psychological capital that disappeared.People were just plain scared.And that was the best of times to be writing business, obviously.You know we like to — 在1985年，1985年，1986年期间，人们感到非常贫穷。但这并不是缺乏金融资本。心理资本消失了。人们只是害怕。显然，这是写作业务的最佳时期。你知道我们喜欢 -

Prices are somewhat better now.But there are always people that misevaluate risk.And when they misevaluate risk, it's our job to let them have the business. 价格现在好一些。但是总有人在评估风险。当他们对风险进行评估时，我们的工作就是让他们拥有业务。

That's easier to do with Ajit's business in National Indemnity than it is with General Re, because General Re has long-term relationships with many accounts. 使用Ajit在National Indemnity的业务比使用General Re更容易，因为General Re与许多账户有长期关系。 And the question of what you do when your competitor offers a price that's a little too low, with somebody you've been doing business with for 50 years, is a very tough decision to make. 当你的竞争对手提供的价格有点过低时，你所做的事情的问题，与你经营了50年的人，是一个非常艰难的决定。

And so sometimes, they probably do some business that might be labeled as "necessarily evil."And Charlie always says that he doesn't mind an occasional transaction like that, as long as you underline evil and not necessary. 有时，他们可能会做一些可能被称为“必然是邪恶的”的业务。查理总是说，他不介意像这样的偶然交易，只要你强调邪恶而不是必要的。

The nature of people in the business, usually, particularly the frontline guy, who was calling on the account, is to underline necessary.And as owners, our tendency is to underline evil. 业务人员的性质，特别是前线人员，他们正在呼叫该帐户，这是必要的。作为所有者，我们倾向于强调邪恶。

GenRe has done a terriﬁc job, over the years, of balancing the necessity of continuing a relationship so long with the discipline of making sure they get paid enough. 多年来，GenRe做了一项非常出色的工作，平衡了长期保持关系的必要性以及确保他们获得足够报酬的纪律。

That was not done perfectly last year.And the conditions were very difﬁcult for doing it perfectly, I might add, too. 去年这种做法并不完美。我也可以补充说，完美地完成这些条件非常困难。

But I think that, both at Ajit's operation and at General Re, we have two businesses that will do very well, in terms of what we get out of them and very well compared to their competition, but occasionally will have a very bad year. 但我认为，无论是在Ajit的运营还是在General Re，我们都有两家公司会做得非常好，就我们从他们中获得的而言，与竞争对手相比非常好，但偶尔会有一个非常糟糕的一年。

I mean, we could have something happen tomorrow, you know, a Tokyo earthquake.Or, I can name a bunch of them that would result in a very bad year.And that's what we're getting paid for. 我的意思是，明天我们可能会发生一些事情，你知道，东京地震。或者，我可以列出一些会导致非常糟糕的一年。这就是我们得到的报酬。

And if we price with discipline, our 20-year results can't be bad, no matter what any one year produces.And if we don't price with discipline, we'll get killed over time. 如果我们按照纪律定价，我们20年的成绩不会差，无论任何一年产生。如果我们不按纪律定价，我们会随着时间的推移而被杀死。

Charlie? 查理？ CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.I don't think the reinsurance business is quite as much of a commodity business as might ﬁrst appear.It's not like an execution transaction when you sell government bonds or something, where one broker is roughly just as good as another. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我不认为再保险业务与最初出现的商品业务差不多。当你出售政府债券或其他东西时，这不像是执行交易，其中一个经纪人大致和另一个经纪人一样好。

There's such a huge time lag between the time the premium is paid and the time the performance is given that you're making a — the customer is making a big prediction about the insurer's, A, willingness to pay what it really owes and, B, its ability to pay what it really owes. 在支付保费的时间和你所做的表现的时间之间存在着如此巨大的时间差 - 客户正在对保险公司做出很大的预测，A，愿意支付它真正的欠款，B，，它有能力支付它真正的欠款。

I think we have a huge edge in reputation and actuality, with reference to both those two factors. 我认为我们在声誉和现实方面都有很大的优势，并参考了这两个因素。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have a reputational advantage.And I think that, in actuality, it's even stronger than the reputational advantage.I mean, I can't think of a case where there's been any problem with having Berkshire or General Re write a check very promptly for anything it owed. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们有声誉优势。我认为，实际上，它甚至比声誉优势更强大。我的意思是，我想不出有这样一个案例，即Berkshire或General Re非常及时地为它所欠的任何东西写了一个问题。

I mean, we’ve, you know, we have never been subject to people suing us and getting money later on or anything like that after ﬁghting us out in courts.It just — it’s not the nature, it's not the attitude we bring toward the reinsurance transaction. 我的意思是，我们，你知道，我们从来没有受到过起诉我们并且在以后在法庭上与我们战斗后获得金钱或其他类似事件的人。只是 - 这不是本质，而是我们对再保险交易的态度。

And we have a reputational advantage.But like I said, I don't think it's quite as wide as it should be in some cases, even. 我们有声誉优势。但就像我说的那样，我认为它在某些情况下甚至不应该像它应该的那样宽。

And then we have a huge attitudinal advantage in that we have no need, none, to write more business, or the same amount of business, or even something close to the amount of business, next year that we wrote this year. 然后我们有一个巨大的态度优势，因为我们没有必要，没有必要写下今年我们写的更多业务，或相同数量的业务，甚至是接近业务量的东西。

We — there is no — there are no volume goals at Berkshire Hathaway at all.And that is not true at most insurance organizations. 我们 - 没有 - 根本没有伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的数量目标。大多数保险公司都不是这样。

We report the results as they come in and as we see them, which also, I think, gives us an advantage in being realistic about all aspects of our business. 我们报告结果，正如我们所看到的那样，我认为这也使我们在业务的各个方面都具有现实性。

We have huge amounts of capital behind us.So we can take large pieces of attractive business and keep them all for our own accounts. 我们拥有巨额资金。因此，我们可以采取大量有吸引力的业务，并将它们全部用于我们自己的帐户。

So we have a lot of advantages in the business.And they will translate into something better than the rest of the world gets. 所以我们在业务上有很多优势。他们将转化为比世界其他地方更好的东西。

I don't know how much better.And I don't know how much the rest of the world will get.But it's not insigniﬁcant, the advantages we have in the business. 我不知道有多好。我不知道世界其他地方会得到多少。但这并不是微不足道的，我们在业务中的优势。

Sat, Apr 29 2000 • 1:00 PM

Morning Session - 2000 Meeting

BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are criticized by some shareholders for underperforming tech stocks the previous year, discuss the relationship between "look-through" book value and intrinsic value, and detail what would prompt Berkshire to pay a dividend.

1. Meeting introduction and welcome 1.会议介绍和欢迎

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. 沃伦巴菲特：早上好。 Well, ﬁrst thing I'd like to do is to thank everybody that's helped us put this on. 好吧，我想做的第一件事就是感谢所有帮助我们实现这一目标的人。

As you saw in the movie, I think, at the time, we may have had 45,000 or so people working with Berkshire, with 12.8 at headquarters. 正如你在电影中看到的那样，当时我们可能有45,000左右的人在伯克郡工作，总部有12.8人。

We're probably up to about 60,000 now, and we still have 12.8, and they take care of putting on this whole meeting. 我们现在可能达到大约60,000，我们仍然有12.8，他们负责整个会议。

We get help from people in internal audit, and we get terriﬁc help from the people at all of our companies who work very hard to put on the exhibits.And we hope that you not only visit them, but patronize them, and we'll give you ample time to do that. 我们从内部审计人员那里获得帮助，我们得到了所有公司人员的极大帮助，他们非常努力地展示这些展品。我们希望您不仅可以访问它们，还可以光顾它们，我们会给您足够的时间来实现这一目标。

As you can see, I enlisted my family for the movie, and I want to thank them.I want to particularly thank Kelly Muchemore and Marc Hamburg for their work in putting this on.It's a real project to — (Applause) 如你所见，我邀请我的家人参加这部电影，我要感谢他们。我要特别感谢Kelly Muchemore和 Marc Hamburg的工作。这是一个真实的项目 - （掌声）

A lot of companies have a whole department that does this and, at Berkshire, Kelly processes 25,000 requests for tickets, and coordinates everything with the exhibitors, and it's a fabulous job. 许多公司都有一个完整的部门，在伯克郡，凯利处理25,000张门票请求，并与参展商协调一切，这是一项了不起的工作。

Now, we'll follow our usual routine.We do have a surprise at — a small surprise — at 11:45.It's not that Charlie's going to say anything — that would be a big surprise, but — (laughter) — we'll — well, we'll have this small surprise for you at 11:45. 现在，我们将按照惯例进行操作。我们确实有一个惊喜 - 一个小小的惊喜 - 在11:45。这不是查理会说什么 - 这将是一个很大的惊喜，但是 - （笑声） - 我们 - 好吧，我们会在11:45给你一个小小的惊喜。

The plan is to go through the business part of the meeting here in just a second, and we'll run from 9:30 to 12:00.Then, after conducting the business meeting, we'll take your questions.We'll go around the room.We have 10 stations.I guess we'll probably only be using eight stations in this room. 计划是在一秒钟内完成会议的业务部分，我们将从9:30到12:00。然后，在举行商务会议后，我们会回答您的问题。我们会绕过房间。我们有10个车站。我想我们可能只会在这个房间里使用八个电台。 And we have microphones everyplace that the eight stations — that you'll see, and you can step up to those.And we'll just keep answering questions. 我们在八个电台的每个地方都有麦克风 - 你会看到它们，你可以升级到那些。我们将继续回答问题。

And we'll break at 12 o'clock, and there will be food available down below, where you can also purchase things from us. 我们将在12点休息，下面会有食物，你也可以从我们这里买东西。

And we'll reconvene about 12:45, and then we'll stay until 3:30 and we'll try and answer whatever questions you have.And then we will have to cut it off at 3:30. 我们将在12:45重新开始，然后我们会一直待到3:30，我们会尽力回答你的问题。然后我们将不得不在3:30切断它。

We have — we had about the same number of ticket requests as in the past, but we had a different mix this year.We — as most of you know — we had change the venue, and the time, because Ak-Sar-Ben is winding down. 我们有 - 和过去一样有大约相同数量的机票请求，但我们今年有不同的组合。我们 - 大多数人都知道 - 我们改变了场地和时间，因为Ak-Sar-Ben正在逐渐减少。

And so, there's a little different rhythm to this meeting.A much higher percentage of our tickets than usual were requested by people from Omaha. 所以，这次会议的节奏有点不同。奥马哈的人要求我们的门票比例高得多。

And, of course, you've heard me say before that we're a little suspicious of these ﬁgures because we know that a lot of people claim to be from Omaha that aren't, for status reasons, and so — (laughter)— we can't really give you the geographical breakdown we normally would. 而且，当然，你之前听过我说过，我们对这些数字有点怀疑，因为我们知道很多人声称来自奥马哈，但由于地位原因，所以 - （笑声） - 我们无法真正为您提供通常的地理位置分类。

2. Introduction and election of BH directors 2. BH董事的介绍和选举

WARREN BUFFETT: I'd like to introduce, ﬁrst, our directors, and then we'll proceed into the formal business of the meeting.On my left here is the ever-animated Charlie Munger, our vice chairman.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：首先，我想介绍一下我们的董事，然后我们将进入会议的正式业务。在我的左边是我们的副主席Charlie Munger。（掌声）

And if the other directors will stand up as I announce their names.We have the better voice in the movie, my wife, Susan Buffett.Susie?(Applause) 如果我宣布他们的名字，其他董事会站起来。我的妻子苏珊巴菲特，我们在电影中有更好的发言权。苏茜？（掌声） We have Howard Buffett.(Applause) 我们有霍华德巴菲特。（掌声）

You can see we ﬁnd these names in the phone book, I mean — 你可以看到我们在电话簿中找到这些名字，我的意思是 -

And Kim Chace.Kim?(Applause) 和金查斯。金？（掌声）

Walter Scott, the star of "How to be a Gillionaire."(Applause) 沃尔特斯科特，“如何成为千万富翁”的明星。（掌声）

And Ron Olson.Ron?(Applause) 和罗恩奥尔森。罗恩？（掌声）

OK, we'll now take on the formal part of the meeting. 好的，我们现在将参加会议的正式部分。

We're going to try to set a new record, I think, 5:38.4, but the four-minute mile has always been our ambition on this.So I will go through this and then we'll get to the questions. 我认为，我们将尝试创造一个新纪录，5：38.4，但这4分钟的里程始终是我们对此的抱负。所以我将通过这个，然后我们将回答问题。

The meeting will now come to order.I'm Warren Buffett, chairman of the board of directors of this company. 会议现在将按顺序进行。我是沃伦巴菲特，这家公司的董事会主席。

I welcome you to this 2000 annual meeting of shareholders.I've introduced the directors.Also with us today are partners in the ﬁrm of Deloitte & Touche, our auditors.They are available to respond to appropriate questions you might have concerning their ﬁrm's audit of the accounts of Berkshire. 我欢迎你参加2000年的股东大会。我介绍了导演。今天与我们合作的还有我们的审计师Deloitte ＆Touche公司的合伙人。他们可以回答您对公司审计伯克希尔账户的适当问题。

Mr. Forrest Krutter is secretary of Berkshire.He will make a written record of the proceedings.Miss Becki Amick has been appointed inspector of elections at this meeting.She will certify to the count of votes cast in the election for directors. Forrest Krutter先生是伯克希尔的秘书。他将以书面形式记录诉讼程序。 Becki Amick女士在本次会议上被任命为选举检查员。她将证明在董事选举中投票的票数。

The named proxy holders for this meeting are Walter Scott Jr. and Marc D. Hamburg. 本次会议的指定代理人是Walter Scott Jr.和Marc D. Hamburg。

Does the secretary have a report of the number of Berkshire shares outstanding, entitled to vote, and represented at the meeting? 秘书是否有一份关于伯克希尔有限公司股票数量的报告，有权投票并出席会议？ FORREST KRUTTER: I do.Yes, I do.As indicated in the proxy statement that accompanied the notice of this meeting that was sent by ﬁrst-class mail to all shareholders of record on March, 3, 2000, being the record date for this meeting, there are 1,341,174 shares of Class A Berkshire Hathawaycommon stock outstanding, with each share entitled to one vote on motions considered at the meeting, and 5,385,320 shares of Class B Berkshire Hathaway common stock outstanding, with each share entitled to 1/200th of one vote on motions considered at the meeting. FORREST KRUTTER：我知道。是的，我愿意。如本次会议通知所附的代理声明所示，该会议通知是在2000年3月3日（即本次会议的记录日期）以一等邮件方式发送给所有记录股东的，这是 A类伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的1,341,174股股票。普通股已发行，每股有权对会议上审议的议案进行一票表决，以及5,385,320股B类Berkshire Hathaway普通股已发行股票，每股有权在会议上审议的议案中获得一票200票。

Of that number, 1,116,151 Class A shares and 4,342,959 Class B shares are represented at this meeting by proxies returned through Thursday evening, April 27th. 其中，1,116,151股A类股和4,342,959股B类股在本次会议上由4月27日星期四晚上返回的代理人出席。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.That number represents a quorum and we will therefore directly proceed with the meeting. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。该数字代表法定人数，因此我们将直接进行会议。

The ﬁrst order of business will be a reading of the minutes of the last meeting of shareholders.I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr., who will place a motion before the meeting. 第一项业务是阅读上次股东大会的会议记录。我认识了小沃尔特斯科特先生，他将在会议前提出动议。

WALTER SCOTT JR: I move that the reading of the minutes of the last meeting of the shareholders be dispensed with. WALTER SCOTT JR：我提议不要阅读上次股东大会会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Do I hear a second? WARREN BUFFETT：我听到第二个吗？

VOICE: I second the motion. 声音：我赞成议案。

WARREN BUFFETT: The motion has moved and seconded.Are there any comments or questions?We will vote on this question by voice vote.All those in favor say, "Aye." WARREN BUFFETT：议案动议并附议。有任何意见或问题吗？我们将通过声音投票对这个问题进行投票。所有赞成的人都说，“是的。”

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。 WARREN BUFFETT: Opposed?You can signify by saying, "I'm leaving."The motion is carried. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：反对？你可以说，“我要走了。”动议进行。（笑声）

The one item of business of this meeting is to elect directors.If a shareholder is present who wishes to withdraw a proxy previously sent in and vote in person on the election of directors, he or she may do so. 本次会议的一项业务是选举董事。如果股东在场，希望撤回之前寄出的代理人并亲自投票选举董事，他或她可以这样做。

Also, if any shareholder that is present has not turned in a proxy, and desires a ballot in order to vote in person, you may do so. 此外，如果在场的任何股东没有上交代理，并且希望投票以便亲自投票，您可以这样做。

If you wish to do this, please identify yourself to the meeting ofﬁcials in the aisles who will furnish a ballot for you.Would those persons desiring ballots please identify themselves, so that we may distribute them? 如果您希望这样做，请向过道的会议官员表明身份，他们将为您提供选票。那些希望投票的人能够表明自己，以便我们分发它们吗？

I now recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting, with respect to election of directors. 我现在承认Walter Scott Jr.先生在会议前就董事选举提出议案。

WALTER SCOTT JR.: I move that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. WALTER SCOTT JR：我谨此选举Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buffett， Malcolm G. Chace，Charles T. Munger，Ronald L. Olson和Walter Scott Jr.担任董事。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second? WARREN BUFFETT：还有一秒吗？

VOICE: I second the vote. 声音：我是第二次投票。

WARREN BUFFETT: It's been moved and seconded that Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. be elected as directors. 沃伦·巴菲特：感动并借调沃伦·巴菲特，苏珊·巴菲特，霍华德·G·巴菲特，马尔科姆·查斯，查尔斯 ·蒙格尔，罗纳德·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特当选为董事。

Are there any other nominations?Is there any discussion?The nominations are ready to be acted upon.If there are any shareholders voting in person that should — they should now mark their ballots on the election of directors and allow the ballots to be delivered to the inspector of election. 还有其他提名吗？有没有讨论？提名已准备就绪。如果有任何股东亲自投票应该 - 他们现在应该在选举董事上标记他们的选票，并允许选票交付给选举检查员。

Would the proxy holders please also submit to the inspector of elections a ballot on the election of directors voting the proxies, in accordance with instructions they have received?Miss Amick, when you are ready, you may give your report. 代理人是否还应按照他们收到的指示，向选举检查员提交选举投票代理人的选举投票？ Amick小姐，当你准备好了，你可以给你报告。

BECKI AMICK: My report is ready.The ballot of the proxy holders, in response to proxies that were received through last Thursday evening, cast not less than 1,136,497 votes for each nominee. BECKI AMICK：我的报告准备好了。代理人持票人的投票，以回应上周四晚上收到的代理人，每名被提名人投票不少于1,136,497票。

That number far exceeds a majority of the number of the total votes related to all Class A and Class B shares outstanding. 该数字远远超过与所有已发行A类和B类股票相关的总票数的大部分。

The certiﬁcation required by Delaware law of the precise count of the votes, including the additional votes to be cast by the proxy holders in response to proxies delivered at this meeting, as well as those cast in person at this meeting, if any, will begiven to the secretary to be placed with the minutes of this meeting. 特拉华州法律要求对投票的确切计数进行的认证，包括代理持有人为响应本次会议上发布的代理人而进行的额外投票，以及在本次会议上亲自投票的投票，如果有的话，将是给秘书安排这次会议的会议记录。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you, Becki.Warren E. Buffett, Susan T. Buffett, Howard G. Buffett, Malcolm G. Chace, Charles T. Munger, Ronald L. Olson, and Walter Scott Jr. have been elected as directors. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢，Becki。 Warren E. Buffett，Susan T. Buffett，Howard G. Buffett， Malcolm G. Chace，Charles T. Munger，Ronald L. Olson和Walter Scott Jr.当选为董事。

Does anyone have any further business to come before this meeting before we adjourn?If not, I recognize Mr. Walter Scott Jr. to place a motion before the meeting. 在我们休会之前，有没有人在本次会议之前有任何进一步的业务？如果没有，我会认出Walter Scott Jr.先生在会议前提出议案。

WALTER SCOTT JR: I move that this meeting be adjourned. WALTER SCOTT JR：我提议暂停这次会议。

WARREN BUFFETT: Is there a second?A motion to adjourn has been made and seconded.We will vote by voice.Is there any discussion?If not, all in favor say, "Aye." WARREN BUFFETT：还有一秒吗？已经提出并借调了休会动议。我们将通过声音投票。有没有讨论？如果没有，所有人都赞成说，“是的。”

VOICES: Aye. 声音：是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: All opposed, "No."This meeting's adjourned.Thank you.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：所有人都反对，“不。”这次会议休会了。谢谢。（掌声）

We will advise Guinness of those results, and maybe we'll get in the book. 我们会告知吉尼斯这些结果，也许我们会进入书中。

Just want to make one more announcement and then we'll start in the questions with area 1, which I believe will be right over here. 只想再发一个声明然后我们将从第1区的问题开始，我相信这将是正确的。

About — I think about 3,500 of you are attending the ballgame tonight.You know what you're supposed to do, incidentally. 关于 - 我认为今晚有3500名球员参加了比赛。顺便说一句，你知道你应该做什么。

And we — in the past, we've had some trafﬁc jams at — where the interstate goes off into 13th Street.So, the police, who are wonderfully cooperative throughout this whole weekend, in many ways, are going to do their darnedest to make sure that we don't have much of a jam. 而且我们 - 在过去，我们遇到了一些交通拥堵 - 州际公路进入第13街。因此，在整个周末期间非常合作的警察，在很多方面都会做出最大的努力，以确保我们没有太多的堵塞。

But if those of you who are attending the game would like to go a little early, that will probably be quite helpful. 但如果你们那些参加比赛的人想早点去，那可能会非常有帮助。

And I might say that we have probably got — well, we think it's probably the best zoo in the world here, thanks in very large part to our director, Walter Scott, and his wife Sue, who have really turned our zoo into a hugeattraction, draws well over a million people a year. 我可能会说我们可能已经 - 好吧，我们认为这可能是世界上最好的动物园，非常感谢我们的导演沃尔特斯科特和他的妻子苏，他们真的把我们的动物园变成了一个巨大的吸引力，每年吸引超过一百万人。

It's right adjacent to the ballpark.So if you get out a little early, and you want to go to the zoo, and then you won't even have to move your car.You can come over to the ballpark, and then there's also food there.And we have a — we serve Coca-Cola products. 它就在球场旁边。所以，如果你早点出去，想要去动物园，那么你甚至不需要搬家。你可以来到球场，那里也有食物。我们有 - 我们提供可口可乐产品。

And if you don't all try to come at 6:45, it will be a help to us. 如果你不是所有人都试图在6:45来，那将对我们有所帮助。 I will be pitching at 7:05, but my fastball will arrive at the plate almost instantaneously with the moment that it leaves my hand, so unless you're there, you'll miss it.And — (Laughter) 我将在7:05进行投球，但是当我离开我的手时，我的快球将几乎瞬间到达盘子，所以除非你在那里，否则你会错过它。而且 - （笑声）

3. Aesop's investing primer: Birds in hands and bushes 3.伊索公司的投资入门书：手中的鸟类和灌木丛

WARREN BUFFETT: So look with that, let's start in area 1, and we will go around.And feel free to ask any questions.You might identify yourself and where you're from before asking your question.Area 1? WARREN BUFFETT：那么看看，让我们从1区开始，我们将四处走动。并随时提出任何问题。在提出问题之前，您可能会确定自己以及您所在的位置。 1区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. 听众：早上好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。

My name is Steve Yates (PH), I'm from Chicago.I'm a Berkshire shareholder and this is my sixth year coming to this meeting.I'd like to thank you for all your time and advice through the years.It's been great. 我叫Steve Yates（PH），我来自芝加哥。我是Berkshire的股东，这是我参加这次会议的第六年。这些年来，我非常感谢你们所有的时间和建议。太棒了。

I'd also like to thank all those wonderful people who sold Berkshire this year for giving us an opportunity to purchase more of the world's greatest company for dirt-cheap prices.(Applause) 我还要感谢今年出售伯克希尔的所有优秀人才，让我们有机会以低廉的价格购买更多世界上最伟大的公司。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We will convey your thanks.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们将转达您的感谢。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I own another stock, which sells for four times current trailing earnings.Every quarter we get a report.Earnings go up, sales go up, cash ﬂow goes up, the equity base expands, they gain market share, and the stock goes down. 听众会员：我拥有另一只股票，它的当前追踪收益是其四倍。每个季度我们都会收到报告。盈利增加，销售增加，现金流增加，股本基础扩大，市场份额增加，股票下跌。

The company has a 60 percent ﬁve-year annualized growth rate and sells at four times earnings.I have two related questions. 该公司的五年年增长率为60％，销售额为四倍。我有两个相关的问题。

First, is this is a growth stock or a value stock, and could you please give us your deﬁnitions of these terms? 首先，这是增长股票还是价值股票，您能否告诉我们您对这些条款的定义？ Second, the company sells recreational vehicles.Demographic trends in the recreation and leisure areas, RVs, cruise lines, golf equipment, et cetera, seem to be quite good.Do you see any opportunities for Berkshire here?Thanks. 其次，该公司销售休闲车。娱乐和休闲区，休旅车，游轮，高尔夫设备等的人口趋势似乎相当不错。你觉得伯克希尔有机会吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the question about growth and value, we've addressed in past annual reports.But they are not two distinct categories of business.Every business is worth the present — WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，关于增长和价值的问题，我们已在过去的年度报告中提到过。但它们不是两个截然不同的业务类别。每个企业都值得现在 -

If you knew what it was going to be able to disgorge in cash between now and Judgment Day, you could come to a precise ﬁgure as to what it is worth today. 如果你知道在现在和审判日之间它能够以现金的形式出现什么，那么你可以准确地说出今天的价值。

Now, elements of that can be the ability to use additional capital at good rates, and most growth companies that are characterized as growth companies have that as a characteristic. 现在，其中的要素可以是以良好的利率使用额外资本的能力，并且大多数以增长公司为特征的成长型公司将其作为特征。

But there is no distinction in our minds between growth and value.Every business we look at as being a value proposition.The potential for growth and the likelihood of good economics being attached to that growth are part of the equation in evaluation. 但是我们的思想在增长和价值之间没有区别。我们将每项业务视为价值主张。增长潜力和良好经济学与增长相关的可能性是评估方程式的一部分。

But they're all value decisions.A company that pays no dividends growing a hundred percent a year, you know, is losing money.Now, that's a value decision.You have to decide how much value you're going to get. 但他们都是有价值的决定。你知道，一家不会每年增长百分比的股息正在亏损。现在，这是一个价值决定。你必须决定你将获得多少价值。

Actually, it's very simple.The ﬁrst investment primer, when would you guess it was written? 实际上，它非常简单。第一个投资入门，你猜你什么时候写的？

The ﬁrst investment primer that I know of, and it was pretty good advice, was delivered in about 600 B.C.by Aesop.And Aesop, you'll remember, said, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." 我所知道的第一个投资入门，这是一个非常好的建议，是在公元前600年左右交付的。由伊索。你会记得，伊索说：“手中的一只鸟在灌木丛中值两个。”

Now incidentally, Aesop did not know it was 600 BC.He was smart, but he wasn't that smart. (Laughter) 顺便说一句，伊索并不知道它是公元前600年。他很聪明，但他并不那么聪明。（笑声）

Now, Aesop was onto something, but he didn't ﬁnish it, because there's a couple of other questions that go along with that. 现在，伊索正在做点什么，但他没有完成它，因为还有其他几个问题。

But it is an investment equation, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.He forgot to say exactly when you were going to get the two in the — from the bush — and he forgot to say what interest rates were that you had to measure this against. 但这是一个投资方程式，手中的一只鸟在丛林中值两个。他忘了准确说出你什么时候准备把这两个人从灌木丛里拿出来 - 他忘了说你必须用什么样的利率衡量这个。

But if he'd given those two factors, he would have deﬁned investment for the next 2,600 years.Because a bird in the hand is — you know, you will trade a bird in the hand, which is investing.You lay out cash today. 但如果他给出了这两个因素，他就会在接下来的2，600年内确定投资。因为手中的鸟是 - 你知道，你将交易手中的鸟，这是投资。你今天存钱。

And then the question is, as an investment decision, you have to evaluate how many birds are in the bush.You may think there are two birds in the bush, or three birds in the bush, and you have to decide when they're going to come out, and when you're going to acquire them. 然后问题是，作为投资决策，你必须评估丛林中有多少只鸟。你可能会认为灌木丛中有两只鸟，或灌木丛中有三只鸟，你必须决定它们什么时候出来，什么时候你要去取它们。

Now, if interest rates are ﬁve percent, and you're going to get two birds from the bush in ﬁve years, we'll say, versus one now, two birds in the bush are much better than a bird in the hand now. 现在，如果利率是百分之五，并且你将在五年内从灌木丛中获得两只鸟，我们会说，与现在相比，丛林中的两只鸟现在比手中的鸟要好得多。

So you want to trade your bird in the hand and say, "I'll take two birds in the bush," because if you're going to get them in ﬁve years, that's roughly 14 percent compounded annually and interest rates are only ﬁvepercent. 因此，你想要用手交易你的鸟，然后说：“我会在丛林中捕获两只鸟”，因为如果你要在五年内获得它们，那么每年大约增加14％，而且利率只有五百分。

But if interest rates were 20 percent, you would decline to take two birds in the bush ﬁve years from now.You would say that's not good enough, because at 20 percent, if I just keep this bird in my hand and compound it, I'll have more birds than two birds in the bush in ﬁve years. 但如果利率为20％，那么从现在起五年后你就会拒绝在丛林中捕获两只鸟。你会说这还不够好，因为20％的时候，如果我把这只鸟放在我的手中并将其复合，我将在五年内拥有更多的鸟类而不是两只鸟。

Now, what's all that got to do with growth?Well, usually growth, people associate with a lot more birds in the bush, but you still have to decide when you're going to get them. 现在，与增长有什么关系？嗯，通常是成长，人们会在灌木丛中与更多的鸟类相关联，但是你仍然需要决定什么时候才能得到它们。

And you have to measure that against interest rates, and you have to measure it against other bushes, and other, you know, other equations. 而且你必须根据利率来衡量它，你必须针对其他灌木来衡量它，以及其他方程式。

And that's all investing is.It's a value decision based on, you know, what it is worth, how many birds are in that bush, when you're going to get them, and what interest rates are. 这就是所有的投资。这是一个价值决定，基于，你知道，它是什么价值，那个丛林中有多少只鸟，什么时候你会得到它们，以及利率是多少。

Now, if you pay $500 billion — and when we buy a stock, we always think in terms of buying the whole enterprise, because it enables us to think as businessmen, rather than as stock speculators. 现在，如果你支付5000亿美元 - 当我们购买股票时，我们总是考虑购买整个企业，因为它使我们能够将其视为商人，而不是股票投机者。

So let's just take a company that has marvelous prospects, is paying you nothing now, and you buy it at a valuation of 500 billion. 因此，让我们选择一家拥有惊人前景的公司，现在不给你任何费用，而你以5000亿美元的价格购买它。

Now, if you feel that 10 percent is the appropriate rate of return — and you can pick your ﬁgure — that means that if it pays you nothing this year, but starts paying next year, it has to be able to pay you 55 billion inperpetuity, each year. 现在，如果你认为10％是适当的回报率 - 你可以选择你的数字 - 这意味着如果它今年没有给你带来任何收益，但明年开始支付，它必须能够支付550亿美元永恒，每年。

But if it's not going to pay until the third year, then it has to pay you 60.5 billion in perpetuity — in perpetuity — to justify the present price. 但如果它要到第三年才能支付，那么它必须永久地支付650亿美元 - 永久性 - 以证明现在的价格。

Every year that you wait to take a bird out of the bush means that you have to take out more birds.It's that simple. 每年你等待从丛林中取出一只鸟意味着你必须取出更多的鸟。就这么简单。

And I question, in my mind, whether — sometimes, whether people who pay $500 billion implicitly for a business by buying 10 shares of stock at some price, are really thinking of the mathematical — the mathematics — implicit in what they are doing. 在我看来，我质疑 - 有时候，通过以某种代价购买10股股票来暗中为企业支付5000亿美元的人是否真的在考虑数学 - 数学 - 隐含在他们正在做的事情中。

To deliver, let's just assume that's — there's only going to be a one-year delay before the business starts paying out to you, and you want to get a 10 percent return and you pay 500 billion.That means 55 billion of cash that they have to be able to disgorge to you year, after year, after year. 为了交付，让我们假设 - 在业务开始支付给你之前只会有一年的延迟，而你希望获得10％的回报并支付5000亿美元。这意味着他们必须能够年复一年，年复一年地向你汇款550亿现金。

To do that, they have to make perhaps $80 billion, or close to it, pretax. 要做到这一点，他们必须赚取大约800亿美元，或接近它，税前。

Now, you might look around at the universe of businesses in this world and see how many are earning 80 billion pretax, or 70, or 60, or 50, or 40, or 30. And you won't ﬁnd any. 现在，您可以浏览一下这个世界上的商业世界，看看有多少人获得800亿税前，或70，或60，或 50，或40，或30。您将找不到任何。

So it requires a rather extraordinary change in proﬁtability to give you enough birds out of that particular bush to make it worthwhile to give up the one that you have in your hand. 因此，需要在盈利能力方面做出相当大的改变才能让你从特定的灌木丛中获得足够的鸟类，以便放弃手中拥有的鸟类。

Second part of your question, about whether we'd be willing to buy a wonderful business at four times earnings, I think I could get even Charlie interested in that.But let's hear it from Charlie. 问题的第二部分，关于我们是否愿意以四倍的收益购买一个出色的业务，我想我甚至可以让 Charlie对此感兴趣。但让我们从查理那里听到。

CHARLIE MUNGER: I'd like to know what that is.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：我想知道那是什么。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: He was hoping you would ask that.That fellow that's got all his net worth in this stock — (laughter) — and who has a captive audience. 沃伦巴菲特：他希望你会这么想的。那个人在这个股票中得到了他所有的净资产 - （笑声） - 并且有一个被俘的观众。

Tell us what it is.You've got to tell us.We're begging you.(Laughter) 告诉我们它是什么。你必须告诉我们。我们求你了。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: You want the name of the company? 听众会员：您想要公司名称吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: We want the name of the company.We're dying to get the name.Wait till I get my pencil out.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们想要公司的名称。我们很想得到这个名字。等我拿出铅笔。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's called National RV, and it's based in California, and they sell recreational vehicles. 观众成员：它被称为国家房车，它位于加利福尼亚州，他们出售休闲车。 WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well, you've got a crowd of people with — who have birds in the hand, and we will see what they do — (laughter) — in terms of National RV. WARREN BUFFETT：好吧，好吧，你有一群人 - 手里拿着鸟儿，我们会看到他们做了什么 - （笑声） - 就国家房车而言。

Charlie, do you have anything further on growth and value, et cetera? 查理，你对增长和价值有什么进一步的了解吗？

Watch him carefully, folks.(Laughter) 伙计们，仔细观察他。（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree that all intelligent investing is value investing.You have to acquire more than you really pay for, and that's a value judgment.But you can look for more than you're paying for in a lot of different ways. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我同意所有智能投资都是价值投资。你必须获得超过你真正付出的代价，这是一种价值判断。但是你可以用很多不同的方式寻找比你付出更多的东西。

You can use ﬁlters to sift the investment universe.And if you stick with stocks that can't possibly be wonderful to just put away in your safe deposit box for 40 years, but are underpriced, then you have to keep moving around all the time. 您可以使用过滤器来筛选投资领域。如果你坚持使用不太可能很好的股票，只需将你的保险箱存放40年，但价格低估，那么你必须不断地四处走动。

As they get closer to what you think the real value is, you have to sell them, and then ﬁnd others.And so, it's an active kind of investing. 当他们接近你认为的真正价值时，你必须卖掉它们，然后找到其他的。因此，这是一种积极的投资方式。

The investing where you ﬁnd a few great companies and just sit on your ass because you've correctly predicted the future, that is what it's very nice to be good at. 投资，你找到一些伟大的公司，只是坐在你的屁股，因为你已经正确预测了未来，这是擅长擅长的事情。

WARREN BUFFETT: The movie was G-rated even though — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：虽然电影是G级的 - （笑声）

Is that it, Charlie?(Laughter) 就是这样，查理？（笑声）

4. Munger on internet stocks: "If you mix raisins with turds, they're still turds" 4.芒格对互联网股票说：“如果你把葡萄干与粪便混合，它们仍然是粪便”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.We will move to area 2. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。我们将搬到第2区。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen.Wayne Peters.And where I come from our ladies are referred to as birds.(Laughter) 观众：先生们，早上好。韦恩彼得斯。我来自我们的女士们被称为鸟类。（笑声）

And I'm sure I know a lot that would trade one in the hand for two in the bush — (laughter) — irrespective of the interest rate.(Laughter) 而且我相信我知道很多东西会在丛林中交易两个 - （笑声） - 无论利率如何。（笑声）

I have two small questions. 我有两个小问题。

Firstly, with the speculation, and some would say rampant speculation, in the high tech and internet arenas, could you share your views on the potential fallout from the speculation for the general economy? 首先，在高科技和互联网领域的猜测中，有人会说猖獗的猜测，你能否分享一下你对整体经济投机潜在影响的看法？

And secondly, how long did it actually take you to perfect that curveball, and are we going to see it tonight? 其次，它实际上需要多长时间来完善曲线球，我们今晚会看到它吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: The — I don't think I want to give anything away about my pitches tonight. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT： - 我认为我不想在今晚宣传我的球场。（笑声）

Ernie Banks may be in the audience, I know he's in town, and I just can't afford to do that.But you'll see it tonight, and you can describe it anyway you'd like. 厄尼班克斯可能会在观众中，我知道他在镇上，我只是负担不起。但是今晚你会看到它，无论如何你都可以描述它。

The question about the high tech stocks and possible fallout, any time there have been real bursts of speculation in the market, you know that — it does get corrected, eventually. 关于高科技股票和可能的后果的问题，任何时候市场上都有真正的猜测，你知道 - 它最终会得到纠正。

Ben Graham was right when he said that in the short run it's a voting machine, and the long run it's a weighing machine.Sooner or later, the amount of cash that a business can disgorge in the future governs the value it has — that the stock commands — in the market.But it can take a long time. Ben Graham说得对，他说在短期内它是一台投票机，从长远来看它是一台称重机。迟早，企业在未来可以放弃的现金数量可以控制市场上的价值 - 股票指令。但这可能需要很长时间。

And, I mean, it's a very interesting proposition.For example, if you take a company that, in the end, never makes any money, but trades — changes hands — representing a valuation of 10 or $20 billion for some time, there's no wealth created.There's a tremendous amount of wealth transferred. 而且，我的意思是，这是一个非常有趣的主张。例如，如果你把一家公司最终从未赚钱，但交易 - 转手 - 代表一段时间10或200亿美元的估值，就没有创造财富。转移了大量的财富。

And I think you will see, when we look back on this era, you will see this as a period of enormous amounts of wealth transfer, but in the end the only wealth creation comes about through what the business creates. 我想你会看到，当我们回顾这个时代时，你会发现这是一个大量财富转移的时期，但最终只有财富的创造才能通过企业创造的东西来实现。

There's no magic to it.If a company that's not worth anything sells for 20 billion and 5 percent of it changes hands, somebody takes a billion dollars from somebody else.But investors as whole gain nothing. 这没有什么神奇之处。如果一家不值得购买任何东西的公司出售200亿美元，而其中5％的公司易手，那么有人会花费10亿美元。但投资者整体上都没有收获。

They all feel richer.It's a very interesting phenomenon.But they can't be richer except — as a group — unless the company makes them richer. 他们都感到更富有。这是一个非常有趣的现象。但除非公司让他们更富裕，否则除了 - 作为一个群体 - 他们不能更富裕。

And it's the same principle as a chain letter.If you're very early on a chain letter you can make money.There's no money created by chain letters.In fact, there's the frictional cost of envelopes, and postage, and that sort of thing. 它与连锁信的原理相同。如果你很早就发了一封连锁信，你可以赚钱。连锁信件没有赚钱。事实上，信封和邮资的摩擦成本就是这样的。

So the net, there's some money destroyed a little bit.And there's money destroyed by the frictional cost of trading and investing, and that comes out of investor's pockets. 所以网，有一些钱被破坏了一点点。交易和投资的摩擦成本摧毁了资金，这些资金来自投资者的口袋。

But the manias that periodically take place — and not just in stocks.We had a similar mania — not necessarily similar — we certainly had a mania in farmland here in Nebraska 20 years ago. 但是定期发生的狂热 - 而不仅仅是股市。我们有类似的狂热 - 不一定相似 - 20年前我们在内布拉斯加州的农田里肯定有过狂热。

And land which couldn't produce, we'll say, more than 70 or $80 an acre would sell for 2,000 an acre at times when interest rates were 10 percent. 我们会说，在利率为10％的情况下，无法生产的土地，超过70英亩或每英亩80美元，每英亩卖出 2000英亩。

Well, that math will kill you.And it killed the people who bought it at those prices, and it killed a great many banks here in Nebraska who lent based on that sort of thing. 好吧，那个数学会杀了你。它杀死了那些以这样的价格购买它的人，它杀死了内布拉斯加州的许多银行，他们根据这种事情借钱。

But while it was going on everybody thought it was wonderful, because every farm was selling for more than the similar farm had sold for a month earlier.And it was momentum investing in farmland. 但是，虽然它正在发生，但每个人都认为这很棒，因为每个农场的销售量都比同类农场一个月前卖得更多。这是投资农田的动力。

And, in the end, valuation does count.But it can go on a long time, and when you get a huge number of participants playing with ever increasing sums, you know, it creates its own apparent truth for a — what can be for a very considerable period of time. 最后，估值确实很重要。但它可以持续很长一段时间，当你得到大量参与者玩不断增加的金额时，你知道，它创造了一个明显的事实 - 在相当长的一段时间内可以发生什么。

It doesn't go on forever.And whether it has fallout to the whole economy, like it probably did in the late '20s, or whether it's just an isolated industry where the — or sector — where the bubble bursts and it really doesn't affect other values, who knows?But ﬁve or 10 years from now, you will know. 它不会永远持续下去。它是否会对整个经济产生影响，就像它可能在20年代后期所做的那样，或者它是否只是一个孤立的行业 - 泡沫破裂的地方 - 或部门 - 并且它确实不会影响其他价值观，谁知道呢？但是从现在开始的五年或十年，你会知道的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think the reason we use the phrase "wretched excess" is that there are wretched consequences. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为我们使用“可怜的过剩”这个词的原因是有可怕的后果。

If you mix the mathematics of the chain letter or the Ponzi scheme with some legitimate development, like the development of the internet, you are mixing something which is wretched and irrational, and has bad consequences, with something that has very good consequences. 如果你把连锁信或庞氏骗局的数学与一些合法的发展混合起来，比如互联网的发展，那么你就会混合一些可怜和不合理的东西，并且会产生不良后果，并带来非常好的后果。

But, you know, if you mix raisins with turds, they're still turds.(Laughter) 但是，你知道，如果你把葡萄干与粪便混合在一起，它们仍然是粪便。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: That's why they have me write the annual report.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这就是他们让我写年度报告的原因。（笑声）

5. Evaluating the internet's threat to Berkshire's businesses 5.评估互联网对伯克希尔企业的威胁 WARREN BUFFETT: So, I think we better move on to sector 3. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：所以，我认为我们最好转向第3部门。（笑声）

Way back there. 回到那里。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name — 听众：我的名字 -

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Thomas Kamay (PH).I am 10 years old and I go to Bacich School in Kentﬁeld, California.I have been a shareholder for two years.This is my third annual meeting.Here's my question. 听众：我的名字是Thomas Kamay（PH）。我今年10岁，去了加利福尼亚州肯特菲尔德的 Bacich学校。我已经成为股东两年了。这是我的第三次年会。这是我的问题。

I know you won't invest in technology companies, but are you afraid that the internet will hurt some of the companies that you do invest in, such as The Washington Post or Wells Fargo? Thank you. 我知道你不会投资科技公司，但是你害怕互联网会伤害你投资的一些公司，比如华盛顿邮报或富国银行吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's an absolutely terriﬁc question.You know, I may turn my money over to you.(Laughter and applause) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，这是一个非常棒的问题。你知道，我可以把钱交给你。（笑声和掌声）

There's probably no better question we'll get. 我们可能没有更好的问题。

And I hope Charlie answers in an appropriate vein considering your age.(Laughter) 考虑到你的年龄，我希望查理以适当的方式回答。（笑声）

We do not — we have no — you know, it's no religious belief that we don't buy into tech companies. 我们没有 - 我们没有 - 你知道，没有宗教信仰我们不会购买科技公司。

We just don't — we have never found one — as conventionally deﬁned — we've never found one where we think we know enough about what the business will look like in 10 years that we can make a rational decision as to how much wepay now for that business. 我们只是没有 - 我们从来没有找到 - 就像传统定义的那样 - 我们从来没有找到一个我们认为足够了解10年后业务将会是什么的我们能够做出理性决定我们有多少现在支付该业务。 In other words, we have not been able to ﬁnd a business where we think we know what that bush will look like in 10 years, and how many birds will be in it, so that we know how many birds we can give up today toparticipate in that future. 换句话说，我们无法找到一个我们认为我们知道10年后灌木将会是什么样子的企业，以及它中会有多少只鸡，这样我们就知道今天我们可以放弃多少只鸡参与那个未来。

Not any — there will be wonderful things, as Charlie so colorfully explained, that will evolve from many of these companies, but we don't know how to make that decision. 没有 - 正如查理如此丰富多彩地解释的那样，会有许多奇妙的东西会从这些公司中发展出来，但我们不知道如何做出这个决定。

And you're absolutely right that we should be thinking all of the time about whether developments in that tech area threaten the businesses that we're in now, how you might counter those threats, how we might capitalize in opportunities because of it. 你是绝对正确的，我们应该一直在思考这个技术领域的发展是否会威胁到我们现在所处的业务，你如何应对这些威胁，以及我们如何利用它来抓住机遇。

It's a very, very, very important part of business now and will become more important in the years to come, including many of our businesses. 它现在是业务中非常非常非常重要的一部分，并且在未来几年将变得更加重要，包括我们的许多业务。

For example, you mentioned The Washington Post.Even closer to home, we own a newspaper called The Buffalo News in Buffalo, New York.We own all of that.So we're in a position to make our own decisions of an operating nature as to what we should do in respect to the internet. 例如，你提到了华盛顿邮报。离家更近的地方，我们在纽约布法罗拥有一份名为The Buffalo News的报纸。我们拥有所有这一切。因此，我们可以自行决定运营性质，了解我们应该如何处理互联网。

And believe me, Stan Lipsey, who's here today, who runs that paper, and I have talked many, many hours, including considerable time yesterday about what we are doing on the internet, what we should be doing, what other people are doing,how it threatens us, how we can counter those threats, all of that sort of thing. 相信我，Stan Lipsey，今天在这里，谁负责这篇论文，我已经谈了很多很多小时，包括昨天相当长的时间，我们在互联网上做了什么，我们应该做什么，其他人在做什么，它如何威胁我们，我们如何应对这些威胁，所有这些事情。

And newspapers are a category that, in my view, are very threatened by the internet because we had an example — 在我看来，报纸是一个很受互联网威胁的类别，因为我们有一个例子 -

The internet is terriﬁc for delivering information.We have a product, World Book, that's terriﬁc for delivering information.And 15 years ago, print encyclopedias were the best tool, probably, for educating not only young children, but for educating me or Charlie when we wanted to look up something on a subject. 互联网对于传递信息非常有用。我们有一个产品，世界图书，它非常适合提供信息。 15年前，印刷百科全书是最好的工具，可能不仅教育幼儿，而且教育我或查理，当我们想要查找某个主题的东西时。

And the World Book is a marvelous product.But it requires chopping down trees, and it requires operating paper mills, and it requires binding it and printing, and it requires a delivery of a 70 pound, you know, UPS package.And it's a — 而世界图书是一个了不起的产品。但它需要砍伐树木，它需要操作造纸厂，它需要绑定和打印，它需要交付70磅，你知道，UPS包。这是一个 -

It was put together in a way that was, for 4- or 500 years, the best technique for taking that information and moving it from those who assembled it to those who wanted to use it.And then the internet changed that in a very major way. 它以一种方式组合在一起，持续4或500年，是获取信息并将其从组装它的人转移到想要使用它的人的最佳技术。然后互联网以一种非常重要的方式改变了这一点。

So we have seen ﬁrsthand, and experienced the business consequences of the improvement offered by the internet and the delivery of information. 因此，我们亲眼目睹了这一点，并体验了互联网和信息传递所带来的改进所带来的商业后果。

And newspapers, although not as immediately susceptible to that problem, still face that overpowering factor. 报纸虽然不是那么容易受到这个问题的影响，但仍面临这种压倒性的因素。

When you eliminate the delivery cost — I mean, we pay a signiﬁcant percentage of our circulation revenue to our carriers, and we pay additional money to the district managers, and we pay for the trucks to deliver the product out, and we pay for hugeprinting presses, and all of that sort of thing. 当您消除交付成本时 - 我的意思是，我们向运营商支付了相当大比例的流通收入，我们向区域经理支付额外费用，我们支付卡车交付产品，我们支付巨额费用印刷机，以及所有这些东西。

And people do chop down trees in order to give us the raw material to transmit information in Buffalo, you know, about what the Buffalo Bills did yesterday, on Sunday, with all the details. 人们确实砍伐了树木，以便给我们提供原材料来传递布法罗的信息，你知道，关于布法罗比尔昨天在周日所做的所有细节。

And now you have the internet that has virtually no incremental unit cost to anything and can deliver the information instantaneously.So it's a big factor for newspapers. 现在，您拥有互联网，几乎没有增加任何单位成本，并可以即时提供信息。所以这对报纸来说是一个重要因素。

And the newspaper world in my view will look very, very, very different in not that many years. 在我看来，报纸世界在很多年里看起来都非常非常不同。 And I ﬁnd it kind of interesting, because the people in the newspaper business are a little schizophrenic about this.They see this.They're afraid of it.They're, in almost all cases, trying to combat it on some way operationally. 而且我觉得这很有意思，因为报业的人对此有点精神分裂。他们看到了这个。他们害怕它。在几乎所有情况下，它们都试图在某种程度上以操作方式对抗它。

But some of them, at least, continue to go out and buy papers at a price that sort of reﬂects the economics that used to exist 20 years ago, when it's — to me it's very clear that it doesn't exist anymore. 但至少其中一些人继续走出去购买论文的价格反映了20年前曾经存在的经济学，当时对我来说很明显它已经不存在了。

So they sort of have their billfold, you know, in the past, even though they see the future.And, you know, I think, probably, they're making mistakes in many cases. 因此，即使他们看到未来，他们也会在过去拥有自己的折扣。而且，你知道，我认为，他们可能在很多情况下犯了错误。

All of our businesses, virtually — Coca-Cola will not be affected in any signiﬁcant way by the internet, you know?The razor and blade business won't be.Although you could dream up things about distribution or so on, but I think that it's very unlikely. 我们所有的业务，实际上 - 可口可乐都不会受到互联网的任何重大影响，你知道吗？剃须刀和刀片业务不会。虽然你可以想象有关发行的事情，但我认为这是不太可能的。

But other businesses we have — our insurance business, particularly at GEICO, will be very affected by the internet.Now, that may turn out to be a big advantage to us over time.I wouldn't be surprised if it is. 但我们拥有的其他业务 - 我们的保险业务，特别是在GEICO，将受到互联网的极大影响。现在，随着时间的推移，这可能会成为我们的一大优势。如果是的话，我不会感到惊讶。

But our retailing businesses are all threatened in one way or another by internet developments, and there may be some opportunities there, too.But it's a change. 但是，我们的零售业务都受到互联网发展的各种威胁，也可能存在一些机会。但这是一个变化。

It's a change in — it's going to be change in the world — how the world gets entertainment.It's going to be a change in the world — how the world gets information.And it is incredibly low cost compared to the — most of the methods of conveying entertainment and information now. 这是一个变化 - 它将改变世界 - 世界如何获得娱乐。这将是世界的变化 - 世界如何获取信息。与现在传达娱乐和信息的大多数方法相比，它的成本非常低。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, he asked if we were afraid that the internet would hurt some of our business and I think the answer is yes.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，他问我们是否担心互联网会伤害我们的一些业务，我认为答案是肯定的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm learning to appreciate these short answers, though, more as the day goes by.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我正在学习欣赏这些简短的答案，但是，随着时间的推移越来越多。（笑声）

I want to thank you for coming to our meeting, incidentally.You're way ahead of me.I didn't buy my ﬁrst stock until I was 11, and so you've got a real jump on me.And I wish you well. 我要感谢你顺便参加我们的会议。你领先于我。直到我11岁的时候才买到我的第一只股票，所以你真的对我跳了起来。我祝福你。

6. "There's nothing magic about a one-year period" “一年的时间里没有任何魔力”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Area 4. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。区域4。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Warren and Charlie, good morning.This is Mo Spence, Waterloo, Nebraska. 听众：沃伦和查理，早上好。这是Mo Spence，滑铁卢，内布拉斯加州。

In 1999, Berkshire Hathaway managed to produce a positive gain in net worth of one-half of one percent. 1999年，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）的净资产收益率增长了一半。

That means that since present management took over 35 years ago, Berkshire Hathaway has realized a positive gain each and every year, and produced an average annual gain of 24 percent. 这意味着，自从现在的管理层耗资超过35年以来，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司每年都实现了积极的收益，并且平均每年增长24％。

Including the years you ran the Buffett Limited Partnership, you have had a run of 48 consecutive years of positive gains and net worth without one single down year, producing a compounded rate of return of almost 26 percent annually. 包括您经营巴菲特有限合伙公司的年份，您连续48年获得正面收益和净资产，没有一个单一的下降年度，每年复合收益率几乎达到26％。

On behalf of the long-term shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, we want to thank you from the bottom of our pocketbooks.(Applause) 我们代表伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的长期股东，从我们的笔记本底部感谢您。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, thank you.I hope your question isn't going to be whether we can continue that, but go — you have a question? WARREN BUFFETT：好的，谢谢。我希望你的问题不是我们能否继续下去，而是去 - 你有一个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is, don't you think you could have ended the millennium with a bigger bang than one-half of one percent?(Laughter) 观众：我的问题是，难道你不认为你能以超过百分之一的百分比结束千禧年吗？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I certainly wish we could have.But the interesting thing about those ﬁgures — and, actually, the ﬁgures go back before that, because the very best period was pre- the partnership days, because the amount I was working with was so small. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我当然希望我们能有。但关于这些数字的有趣之处 - 事实上，这些数字在此之前就已经过去了，因为最好的时期是在合作日之前，因为我合作的数量非常少。

But the — there's nothing magic about a one-year period.I mean, it's the way the measurements come out.We've — if you took all the half-year periods, for example, I'm sure — well, I know that there were a number that were down, you know — 但是 - 一年的时间里没有任何魔力。我的意思是，这是测量结果的出现方式。我们 - 例如，如果你花了半年的时间，我肯定 - 嗯，我知道有一些数字下降，你知道 -

There're going to be lots of years in the future — assuming I live long enough, that — we will have plenty of down years.It's been a ﬂuke, to some degree, that we have not had any down years in terms of underlying value. 将来会有很多年 - 假设我活得足够长，那么 - 我们将有充足的失败岁月。在某种程度上，我们在潜在价值方面没有任何下跌时间，这是一种侥幸。

The stock has gone up and down in ways that are not related to intrinsic value a few times, but that is totally a ﬂuke.I mean, we're not going to be up every day.We're not going to be up every week.We're not going to be up every month, or even every year. 股票上涨和下跌的方式与内在价值无关，但这完全是一个侥幸。我的意思是，我们不会每天都起来。我们不会每周都起床。我们不会每个月，甚至每年都会上升。

And it's — the fact that, you know, the Earth revolves around the sun really is not totally connected to most business activities, or the fruition of most investment ideas, or anything of the sort. 事实上，你知道，地球围绕太阳旋转的事实并不完全与大多数商业活动，或大多数投资理念的结果，或任何类似的事物有关。

So we have to report every year, and, you know, I care about the yearly ﬁgures in that sense.I don't really care about them, totally, as a measure of what we're doing. 因此，我们必须每年报告，而且，您知道，我关心的是这方面的年度数据。我完全不关心它们，作为我们正在做的事情的衡量标准。

And, like I say, if we could've — we were — the capital allocation job that I did in 1999 was very, very poor.And it was partly because some of our main businesses did poorly. 并且，就像我说的，如果我们能够 - 我们 - 我在1999年做的资本分配工作非常非常糟糕。部分原因是我们的一些主要业务表现不佳。

I mean, Coca-Cola and Gillette had bad years last year.They'll have good years over time. 我的意思是，可口可乐和吉列去年的表现糟糕。随着时间的推移，他们会有好年景。

I wrote a few years ago — it's interesting, I called their soft drink business and their razor and blade business as "Inevitables." 我几年前写过 - 有趣的是，我称他们的软饮料业务和他们的剃须刀和刀片业务是“不可避免的”。

And the truth is they've got a higher market share now than they've ever had in history.They're selling more units than any year in history.But certain other factors hurt their business and therefore hurt their stock performance. 而事实是，他们现在拥有的市场份额比历史上更高。他们销售的单位比历史上任何一年都多。但是某些其他因素会损害他们的业务，从而损害他们的股票表现

But I would still call the soft drink — Coca-Cola's position in the soft drink business, and Gillette's position in the razor and blade business — I would characterize them as "inevitable," that they will gain share over time. 但我还是会说软饮料 - 可口可乐公司在软饮料业务中的地位，以及吉列在剃须刀和刀片业务中的地位 - 我认为它们是“不可避免的”，他们将随着时间的推移获得份额。

Gillette has over 70 percent of the blade and razor business in the world, which is — measured by value.And that's an extraordinary share. 吉列拥有超过70％的刀片和剃须刀业务，按价值衡量。这是一个非凡的份额。

Coke has 50 percent of the soft drink business in the world.That's well over a billion eight-ounce servings per day.A billion per day. 可口可乐拥有全球50％的软饮料业务。这是每天超过十亿八盎司的份量。每天十亿。

Eight percent of those are for the account of Berkshire, so over 80 million eight-ounce servings of soft drinks per day are being consumed by people for — where the economic beneﬁt comes to Berkshire Hathaway. 其中8％用于伯克希尔的账户，因此每天有超过8,000万份8盎司的软饮料被人们消费 - 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的经济利益也随之消耗。

In effect, we have over six percent of the — for Berkshire Hathaway's account — of the blade and razor business in the world.And it'll go up. 实际上，对于伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的账户，我们拥有超过6％的刀片和剃须刀业务。它会上升。

So I don't worry about the businesses in the least, long term.They will have bad years from time to time.And when they do, our performance will not look good in those years. 所以我不会长期担心这些业务。他们将不时有糟糕的岁月。当他们这样做时，我们的表现在那些年里看起来不会很好。 Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, it's been a very interesting stretch.One of the most interesting things about the stretch is that, during pretty much the whole period, the company has owned marketable securities in excess of its net worth. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，这是一段非常有趣的事情。关于这一趋势最有趣的事情之一是，在整个期间，该公司拥有超过其净值的有价证券。

And so you have this extraordinary liquidity in a company that has performed very well, to boot.That advantage has not gone away and, in fact, it's been augmented. 因此，您在一家表现非常出色的公司中拥有这种非凡的流动性。这种优势并没有消失，事实上，它已经得到了增强。

Give us reasonable opportunities and we are prepared. 给我们合理的机会，我们做好了准备。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well you've heard what you're supposed to do, now we'll do the rest.Just give us the opportunities. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，你已经听说过你应该做的事情，现在我们会做其余的事情。给我们机会吧。

7. We want a "mathematical edge in every transaction" 我们想要“每笔交易中的数学优势”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Greg Blevins (PH) from Bargetown, Kentucky. 观众：我的名字是来自肯塔基州Bargetown的Greg Blevins（PH）。

I have a question about intrinsic value.It comes from comments that you made in your annual report this year.In there, you describe the extraordinary skills of [Berkshire reinsurance chief] Ajit Jain in judging risk. 我对内在价值有疑问。它来自您今年年度报告中的评论。在那里，你描述了[伯克希尔再保险主管] Ajit Jain在判断风险方面的非凡技能。

When I think about Berkshire and its ability to increase intrinsic value, it seems to me that judging risk has been at least as important as an ability to calculate a net present value. 当我想到伯克希尔及其增加内在价值的能力时，在我看来，判断风险至少与计算净现值的能力同样重要。

So my question to each of you is, would you give us some comments on how you think about risk? 所以我向你们每个人提出的问题是，你们会就如何看待风险给我们一些评论吗？ WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we think of business risk in terms of what can happen — say ﬁve, 10, 15 years from now — that will destroy, or modify, or reduce the economic strengths that we perceive currently exist in a business. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们从可能发生的事情（比如说从现在开始的5年，10年，15年）开始考虑商业风险，这将破坏或修改或减少我们目前在企业中存在的经济实力。

In some businesses that's very — it's impossible — to ﬁgure — at least it's impossible for us to ﬁgure — and then we just — we don't even think about it then. 在一些企业中，这是非常 - 不可能 - 想象 - 至少我们不可能想到 - 然后我们只是 - 我们甚至都没有想到它。

We are enormously risk averse.We are not risk adverse, in terms of losing a billion dollars if there were an earthquake in California today.And we're thinking of writing a policy, for example, in the next week or so, on a primary insurance risk of over a billion dollars. 我们极度厌恶风险。如果今天在加利福尼亚发生地震，我们就不会有损失十亿美元的风险。我们正在考虑制定一项政策，例如，在接下来的一周左右，以超过十亿美元的主要保险风险为例。

That doesn't bother us as long as the math is in our favor.But in terms of doing a group of transactions like that, we are very risk averse.In other words, we want to think that we've got a mathematical edge in every transaction. 只要数学对我们有利，那就不会打扰我们。但就进行这类交易而言，我们非常厌恶风险。换句话说，我们想要在每次交易中都有一个数学优势。

And we think that we'll do enough transactions over a lifetime so that, no matter what the result of any single one, that the group expectancy would — gets almost to certainty. 而且我们认为我们将在一生中做足够的交易，这样无论任何一个人的结果如何，这个群体的期望值都会变得几乎确定。

When we look at businesses, we try to think of what can go wrong with them.We try to look [for] businesses that are good businesses now, and we think about what can go wrong with them. 当我们看待企业时，我们会尝试思考它们可能出现的问题。我们试图寻找现在是好企业的企业，并考虑可能出现问题的企业。

If we can think of very much that can go wrong with them, we just forget it.We are not in the business of assuming a lot of risk in businesses. 如果我们能够想到可能出错的问题，我们就会忘记它。我们不承担在企业中承担大量风险的业务。

That doesn't mean we don't do it inadvertently and make mistakes, because we do.But we don't intentionally, or willingly, voluntarily, go into situations where we perceive really signiﬁcant risk that the business is going to change in a major way. 这并不意味着我们不会无意中犯错误，因为我们这样做。但我们并非故意或自愿地自愿进入我们认为业务将以重大方式发生变化的重大风险的情况。 And that gets down to what you probably heard me talk about before, is, what kind of a moat is around the business? 这可以归结为你之前可能听到的内容，是什么样的护城河？

Every business that we look at we think of as an economic castle.And castles are subject to marauders.And in capitalism, any castle you have, whether it's razor blades, or soft drinks, or whatever, you have to expect the — 我们所看到的每一项业务都被视为经济城堡。城堡受到掠夺者的影响。在资本主义中，你拥有的任何城堡，无论是剃刀刀片，软饮料，还是其他什么，你都必须期待 -

And you want the capitalistic system to work in a way that millions of people are out there with capital thinking about ways to take your castle away from you, and appropriate it for their own use.And then the question is, what kind of a moat do you have around that castle that protects it? 而且你希望资本主义制度以数百万人在那里的方式运作，资本思考如何将你的城堡从你身边带走，并将其用于自己的使用。然后问题是，你在那个保护它的城堡周围有什么样的护城河？

See's Candy has a wonderful moat around its castle.And Chuck Huggins has taken that moat, which he took charge of in 1972, and he has widened that moat every year.He throws crocodiles, and sharks, and piranhas in the moat, and it gets harder and harder for people to swim across and attack the castle.So they don't do it. 看到糖果城堡周围有一条美妙的护城河。查克·哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）已经采取了他在1972年负责的护城河，并且他每年都扩大了护城河。他把鳄鱼，鲨鱼和食人鱼扔在护城河里，人们越来越难以游过去攻击城堡。所以他们不这样做。

If you look, since 1972, Forrest Mars tried with Ethel M — I don't know, 20 years ago.And I hate to think of how much money it cost him to try that.And he was a very experienced businessman. 如果你看一下，自1972年以来，福雷斯特火星尝试过Ethel M--我不知道，20年前。而且我讨厌想到他花了多少钱才能尝试。他是一个非常有经验的商人。

So we think of the — we think in terms of that moat and the ability to keep its width and its impossibility of being crossed as the primary criterion of a great business. 所以我们想到 - 我们从护城河和保持宽度的能力以及不可能成为伟大企业的主要标准的角度来考虑。

And to our managers, we say we want the moat widened every year.You know, that does not necessarily mean that the proﬁt is more this year than last year, because it won't be sometimes.But if the moat is widened every year, the business will do very well. 对于我们的经理，我们说我们希望护城河每年扩大。你知道，这并不一定意味着今年的利润比去年更多，因为它有时不会。但如果护城河每年都扩大，那么这项业务将会很好。

When we don't have a — when we see a moat that's tenuous in any way — getting back to your question — it's just too risky.We don't know how to valuate that, and therefore we leave it alone. 当我们没有 - 当我们看到护城河以任何方式变得脆弱时 - 回到你的问题 - 这太危险了。我们不知道如何评价，因此我们不管它。

We think all of our businesses — virtually all of our businesses — have pretty darn good moats, and we think the managers are widening them. 我们认为我们所有的业务 - 几乎所有业务 - 都有相当不错的护城河，我们认为管理人员正在扩大它们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: How could you say it better?(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：你怎么能说得更好？（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Here, have a — have some peanut brittle on that one.(Laughter) 沃伦巴菲特：在这里，有一个花生脆的那个。（笑声）

8. Insurance "attracts chicanery" and we'll have surprises 保险“吸引了诡计”，我们会有惊喜

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, 6. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，6。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. 听众：早上好。

WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning. 沃伦巴菲特：早上好。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Hugh Stevenson (PH).I'm a shareholder from Atlanta. 听众：我叫休·史蒂文森（PH）。我是亚特兰大的股东。

WARREN BUFFETT (to Munger): Why don't you open that? WARREN BUFFETT（对芒格）：你为什么不打开它？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question involves the company's activities before and shortly after the Gen Re acquisition. 受众成员：我的问题涉及公司在收购Gen之前和之后不久的活动。

I remember you saying once that, in insurance, virtually all surprises are negative ones.And I'm wondering, given the company's operating experience in insurance over long period of time, could you tell us what happened in the Unicover situation? 我记得你曾经说过，在保险方面，几乎所有的惊喜都是消极的。我想知道，考虑到公司长期在保险方面的运营经验，您能否告诉我们Unicover情况发生了什么？

How come in Gen — with Gen Re's experience and the company's experience, that it happened, they didn't foresee it, we didn't foresee it?What has the company done?I know they've taken a large reserve for the situation. Gen Gen怎么样 - 凭借Gen Re的经验和公司的经验，它发生了，他们没有预见到，我们没有预见到它？公司做了什么？我知道他们为这种情况投入了大量资金。

And how do they plan to operate in the future to prevent these things, ﬁnd them out, and strengthen the company from these kind of situations in the future? 他们如何计划在未来运营以防止这些事情发现，并在未来加强公司的这种情况？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the Unicover situation was discovered in about, I don't know, February of last year, or thereabouts.And it was a mistake, I mean, it should not have been made.A lot of other people made the same mistake, but that still didn't mean that we should have made that mistake. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，直升机的情况是在去年二月左右发现的，我不知道。这是一个错误，我的意思是，它不应该被制造出来。很多其他人犯了同样的错误，但这并不意味着我们应该犯这个错误。

We set up a reserve of $275 million when the mistake was discovered, and that reserve looks like it's about right still.There have been quite a few developments at Unicover that have deﬁned the limits of it better and resulted in the resolutions of many of the issues attached to it.Still looks like about a $275 million mistake. 当发现错误时，我们设立了2.75亿美元的储备，这个储备看起来仍然是正确的。在Unicover上已经有相当多的发展，它已经更好地定义了它的限制，并导致了许多附加问题的解决方案。看起来仍然是一个2.75亿美元的错误。

Now, that's a big mistake, but we've made bigger ones.We had one in the mid-'70s that probably cost Berkshire, measuring opportunity cost and everything, because we didn't know how bad it was going to be — 现在，这是一个很大的错误，但我们做了更大的错误。我们有一个在70年代中期可能花费伯克希尔，测量机会成本和一切，因为我们不知道它会有多糟糕 -

I would say that Berkshire would now be worth at least 10 percent more if that mistake hadn't occurred.Wouldn't you say so, Charlie?The Omni situation? 我想说如果没有发生错误，伯克希尔现在的价值至少要高出10％。你不是这么说的，查理？全方位的情况？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Absolutely. CHARLIE MUNGER：当然。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, so we had a mistake whose present value would be 8 or $9 billion.It cost us at least that. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，所以我们犯了一个错误，其现值为8或90亿美元。它至少花了我们这个。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it cost us less than 4 million at the time. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，那时我们花了不到400万美元。 WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Though, it — but we didn't know it for sure it was 4 million, so it tied our hands in other respects, too. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。虽然，它 - 但我们确实不知道它是400万，所以它也在其他方面绑在我们手上。

In insurance you will get surprises.Now, the test of good management is how many surprises you get.But there's no way you'll get no surprises. 在保险方面你会得到惊喜。现在，良好管理的考验是你得到多少惊喜。但是你不可能没有惊喜。

And if you look at our history, you will see some years when our ﬂoat cost us a lot of money.You will also see a history where over 33 or so years that it's been a very, very attractive business. 如果你看看我们的历史，你会看到我们的浮动花了我们很多钱的几年。您还将看到超过33年的历史，这是一个非常非常有吸引力的业务。

But we have had cases, I mean, our name causes problems.I think National Indemnity — we had a fraud, as I remember, down in Texas where an agent was using our paper, which incidentally was the same problem we had, the one that cost us so much. 但我们有案例，我的意思是，我们的名字会引起问题。我认为国家赔偿 - 我记得，我们在德克萨斯州有一个欺诈行为，代理商正在使用我们的论文，顺便提一下，我们遇到了同样的问题，这个问题让我们付出了太多代价。

And some guy is out there writing bonds on — surety bonds — on construction of schools.And he says he represents National Indemnity and the contract proceeds, and of course, we've never heard of the guy. 还有一些人在那里写关于保证金的债券 - 建设学校。他说他代表国家赔偿并且合同继续进行，当然，我们从未听说过这个人。

But if you get a school district in Texas with a half-ﬁnished school, and the choice is whether the taxpayers ante up more or whether you ﬁnd that this guy had apparent authority as an agent, and so on, and therefore we should pay ona policy we never heard of, written by a guy we never heard of, you know, on a school we never heard of.You know, we'll end up paying. 但是，如果你在得克萨斯州的一个学区就读了一个半完成的学校，并且选择是纳税人是否更多地吃了，或者你是否发现这个人有明显的代理权，等等，因此我们应该支付我们从未听说过的政策，由我们从未听说过的人写的，你知道，这是我们从未听说过的一所学校。你知道，我们最终会付钱。

So the surprises are unpleasant nine times out of 10. We'll have more.We had another one last year that shouldn't have happened.But they do happen. 所以10次中的惊喜很不愉快。我们会有更多。我们去年还有另外一个不应该发生的事情。但他们确实发生了。

And General Re has a terriﬁc record over time. 并且Re将军随着时间的推移有着惊人的记录。 We knew last year would not be a good business in the reinsurance business.It was worse than we thought it would be.But that had nothing to do — if you told me the ﬁgures that General Re would have at the end of the year, we would have made the same deal in a moment. 我们知道去年在再保险业务上不会是一件好事。它比我们想象的还要糟糕。但那没有任何关系 - 如果你告诉我将军将在今年年底获得的数字，我们会在一瞬间做出同样的交易。

And, you know, we didn't do so well with Coke and Gillette ourselves.So that the ratio of mistakes was probably fairly equal between the two organizations with me contributing our — my share. 而且，你知道，我们自己也没有和可口可乐和吉列那么好。因此，两个组织之间的错误比例可能相当平等，我贡献了我的 - 我的份额。

I think insurance, which will continue to have surprises in it, will turn out to be a very, very good business for Berkshire over time.It's the best one I know about that we can do in increasing scale over time. 我认为随着时间的推移，保险将继续出现意外，对于伯克希尔来说，这将成为一项非常非常好的业务。这是我所知道的最好的一个，我们可以随着时间的推移逐步扩大规模。

As a matter of fact, some of you may not have noticed but we announced another small insurance acquisition just last week. 事实上，有些人可能没有注意到，但我们上周宣布了另一项小型保险收购。

It's a tough ﬁeld.The average company is going to do poorly.We think we have some very special companies, and we really do think, over time, we will acquire and utilize ﬂoat at a cost that's very, very attractive. 这是一个艰难的领域。普通公司的表现会很糟糕。我们认为我们有一些非常特殊的公司，我们确实认为，随着时间的推移，我们将以非常非常有吸引力的成本获得和利用浮动。

It won't be zero like it's been in the past.I mean, we are in some lines of business where intentionally — I mean, we would be crazy to try to hold it to zero, because it's way better to have twice as much money at one or two percent as have half as much money at0 percent. 它不会像过去那样为零。我的意思是，我们在某些业务领域是有意的 - 我的意思是，我们会疯狂地试图将其保持为零，因为在一到两个百分点的情况下获得两倍的资金会更好0％。

But we will fully acknowledge that — I mean, Unicover was a surprise.But I don't know how many surprises I've had in insurance over the 33 years or so we've been in it. 但我们将完全承认 - 我的意思是，Unicover是一个惊喜。但我不知道在过去33年左右的时间里，我在保险方面有多少惊喜。

One of the surprises, incidentally, you know, worked to our incredible beneﬁt. 顺便说一下，你知道其中一个惊喜就是为了我们不可思议的好处。

GEICO has been a great, great company since I ﬁrst went down to Washington, and even before that, and met Lorimer Davidson almost 50 years ago.But they made a mistake in the early '70s that really did bankrupt the company. 自从我第一次去华盛顿以来，甚至在此之前，GEICO一直是一家伟大的，伟大的公司，并且差不多50年前遇到了Lorimer Davidson。但他们在70年代早期犯了一个错误，真的让公司破产了。

But fortunately, there was an insurance commissioner named Max Wallach in the District of Columbia, who saw that it could be resuscitated, and that mistake enabled us to make many, many billions of dollars.So mistakes can be useful on occasion, too. 但幸运的是，在哥伦比亚特区有一位名叫Max Wallach的保险专员看到它可能会被复苏，而这个错误使我们能够赚到数十亿美元。所以错误在某些情况下也很有用。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: All that said, it is perhaps the most irritating way to lose money there is, is to be taken by a sort of obvious lie.And — but it happens. CHARLIE MUNGER：所有这一切，也许是最令人恼火的亏钱方式，是一种明显的谎言。并且 - 但它发生了。

I don't think it's likely to happen again on that scale. 我不认为这种情况可能再次发生。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I wouldn't say that.(Laughs) 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我不会这么说。（笑）

I would say that it's unlikely that — in any 20 year period, or anything like that, we will get a big surprise.And it will come about, very often, through one form or another of three or four methods of obvious fraud that we've observed in the past. 我会说，在任何20年的时间里，或者类似的事情，我们都不会有太大的惊喜。而且，它经常会通过我们过去观察到的三种或四种明显欺诈方法的形式出现。

But they spring up again.And there are plenty of people that are, I'd have to say, "crooked," in insurance because it's a product where you deliver a piece of paper and somebody hands you money. 但他们又重新振作起来。在保险中有很多人，我不得不说，“歪”，因为它是一种产品，你可以提供一张纸，有人可以给你钱。

And that intrigues people.You know, you don't even hand them a Dilly bar, you know, or — (laughter) — or anything in exchange.They hand you a lot of money and you give them a little piece of paper. 这引起了人们的兴趣。你知道，你甚至不会把它们当作Dilly酒吧，或者 - （笑声） - 或任何交换。他们给你很多钱，你给他们一小张纸。

And of course, when you get into reinsurance and all that, then you hand that little piece of paper to somebody else and try and get them to hand you money. 当然，当你进入再保险和所有这些，然后你把那张小纸片交给别人，并试着让他们交你钱。 And all the way along the line you have brokers who are getting big chunks of money for sort of papering over some of the weaknesses in the project, and sometimes they may even be in on it. 在整个过程中，你有经纪人，他们正在获得大笔资金，用于解决项目中的一些弱点，有时他们甚至可能会参与其中。

So it's a ﬁeld that attracts chicanery.And often they — the same people — come back again and again.It's amazing to me. 所以这是一个吸引诡计的领域。通常他们 - 同样的人 - 一次又一次地回来。这对我来说太神奇了。

So, I would say that we will get a surprise or two over any 10-year period in insurance.It's almost impossible to avoid. 所以，我想说在任何10年的保险期内，我们都会得到一两个惊喜。这几乎是不可避免的。

We should try to minimize it.We do try to minimize it, but I would not want to bet my life that we've seen the last of a Unicover-type situation. 我们应该尽量减少它。我们尽量减少它，但我不想打赌我的生活，我们已经看到了最后一个 Unicover类型的情况。

They're always just a little bit different enough so that it doesn't get spotted, or somebody down the line doesn't get the message, but — 它们总是只是有点不同，所以它没有被发现，或者有人在线下没有得到消息，但是 -

I don't know.Don't you think, Charlie, we'll see another one?(Laughs) 我不知道。你不觉得，查理，我们会看到另一个吗？（笑）

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, perhaps so, but it was a long time from one to the other, and maybe I'll be able to get through without another.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，也许是这样，但从一个到另一个很长一段时间，也许我能够在没有另一个的情况下度过难关。（笑声）

One of these fraud artists, Warren caused me to meet years ago, and his proposition was that he had this perfectly marvelous business. 作为这些欺诈艺术家之一，沃伦让我多年前见过面，而他的主张是他拥有这项非常了不起的事业。

He says, "I — we only write ﬁre insurance on concrete bridges that are under water."He says, — (laughter) — "It's like taking candy from babies."And — 他说，“我 - 我们只在水下的混凝土桥上写保险。”他说， - （笑） - “就像从婴儿那里拿糖果一样。”而且 -

WARREN BUFFETT: We were the babies.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们是婴儿。（笑声） CHARLIE MUNGER: I looked in his eye.I thought he was kidding or something.He wasn't kidding.I mean, these people believe this kind of stuff. CHARLIE MUNGER：我看着他的眼睛。我以为他在开玩笑或什么的。他不是在开玩笑。我的意思是，这些人相信这种东西。

WARREN BUFFETT: The truth is Charlie — if Charlie and I could see everybody we dealt with, we would screen out some perfectly honest people, too.I think we could probably screen out the crooked propositions.I mean, they do have similar characteristics to them. WARREN BUFFETT：事实是查理 - 如果查理和我能看到我们处理的每个人，我们也会筛选出一些非常诚实的人。我想我们可能会筛选出弯曲的命题。我的意思是，他们确实有类似的特征。

And what happens is you get somebody out in the ﬁeld who is eager to write business or is being wooed by producers, and the intermediaries get very good at it.It's the same way lousy stocks get sold. 会发生什么事情，你会让那些渴望创业或者被生产者追求的人在外地，而中间人则非常擅长。这与糟糕的股票被抛售的方式相同。

I mean, you'll get people who are getting paid very well to part, you know, separate you from your money.And that's worked over the years.The good salesmen ﬁnd out they can make more money, you know, selling phony products with big tickets attached to them than they can selling lollipops. 我的意思是，你会让得到报酬的人很好地分开，你知道，把你和你的钱分开。多年来，这一切都奏效了。好的销售人员发现，他们可以赚更多的钱，你知道，销售附有大票的假冒产品，而不是销售棒棒糖。

9. Rules and fees for Buffett's 1950's partnerships 9.巴菲特1950年代合作伙伴关系的规则和费用

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 7. WARREN BUFFETT：7号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, and good morning Mr. Munger.My name is Mohnish Pabrai and I'm from Long Grove, Illinois. 听众会员：巴菲特先生，早上好，芒格先生，早上好。我的名字是Mohnish Pabrai，我来自伊利诺伊州的Long Grove。

I have been a student and disciple of yourself, Mr. Buffett, for some time, and especially Mr. Munger.And I have adopted, quite intensely, your theories of capital allocation, in the manner in which I run my business, as well as my portfolio, and quite pleased with the results so far. 一段时间以来，我一直是巴菲特先生的学生和门徒，尤其是芒格先生。而且我非常强烈地采用了你的资本配置理论，以我经营业务的方式以及我的投资组合，并对迄今为止的结果非常满意。

My question has to do with the original 1950s Buffett partnerships.There is some conﬂicting data in the various books about you pertaining to the rules of the partnership and the fees of the partnership. 我的问题与20世纪50年代最初的巴菲特合伙关系有关。各种关于合伙规则和合伙关系费用的书中有一些相互矛盾的数据。

What I wanted to understand is, I think some of the books allude to the principle being guaranteed — I think six percent a year being guaranteed — and then you took a fourth, and the partners got three-fourths. 我想要理解的是，我认为有些书暗示了保证的原则 - 我认为每年保证6％ - 然后你拿了四分之一，合伙人得到了四分之三。

In some cases they talk about four percent, and some cases they say there was no guarantee.I would just appreciate a clariﬁcation on that. 在某些情况下，他们谈论的百分之四，有些情况他们说没有保证。我要感谢对此的澄清。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll make it short because I'm not sure how much general interest there is to that.But there was never any guarantee. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们会缩短它，因为我不确定对此有多大兴趣。但是从来没有任何保证。

There was a guarantee that I wouldn't get a penny myself — there was none of this one percent fee and all that sort of thing that hedge funds now normally have.After a short period of time I told people I'd have all my capital in it, basically. 有一个保证，我自己也不会得到一分钱 - 没有这一百分之一的费用以及对冲基金现在通常拥有的那种东西。在很短的时间后，我告诉人们，我基本上都有我的全部资金。

So there was a guarantee I would follow — have a common destiny.There was never any guarantee of principle of any sort. 所以有一个保证我会遵循 - 有一个共同的命运。从来没有保证任何形式的原则。

Originally, the thing started by accident, so that there 11 different partnerships before they all got put together on January 1st, 1962, into Buffett Partnerships. 最初，事情是偶然发生的，所以在1962年1月1日他们在巴菲特合作伙伴关系中合并之前，有11个不同的合作关系。

So with the 11 different partnerships, they had different — some different arrangements — based on the preferences of the limited partners.I offered them an option of three or four different choices, and different families made different choices. 因此，在11个不同的合作伙伴关系中，他们根据有限合伙人的偏好有不同的 - 一些不同的安排。我为他们提供了三种或四种不同选择的选择，不同的家庭做出了不同的选择。

When we put them together we settled on the 6 percent preferential with a quarter of the proﬁts over that, with a carry forward of all deﬁciencies.Nobody was guaranteed anything on them. 当我们将它们放在一起时，我们确定了6％的优惠，其中四分之一的利润超过了这一优惠，并带来了所有缺陷。他们没有任何保证。 Charlie had a much better partnership.His was a third, as I remember, wasn't it Charlie? (Laughter) ? 查理有更好的伙伴关系。据我记得，他是第三个，不是查理吗？（笑声）？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes, but we were smaller and operating specialist posts on the stock exchange.(Buffett laughs) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，但我们规模较小，在证券交易所经营专家职位。（巴菲特笑）

The facts were different. 事实是不同的。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。

10. American Express isn't "inevitable" but has "huge value" 10.美国运通不是“不可避免的”，但具有“巨大的价值”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Let's go to 8. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。我们去8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, good morning.My name is Pete Banner (PH), and I'm from Boulder, Colorado. 听众：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，早上好。我的名字是Pete Banner（PH），我来自科罗拉多州的博尔德。

In the 1996 annual report, Mr. Buffett, you stated companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled "The Inevitables," and you just reafﬁrmed your view of Coca-Cola and Gillette. 在1996年的年度报告中，巴菲特先生，你说可口可乐和吉列等公司可能会被贴上“不可避免的”标签，你只是重申了你对可口可乐和吉列的看法。

My question to you is, do you have the same view of American Express?That is, do you view American Express as, quote, "The Inevitable"? 我的问题是，你对美国运通有同样的看法吗？也就是说，你认为美国运通是“不可避免的”吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.I would like to clarify one point, too.I didn't really say I regard the companies as "Inevitables."I regarded the businesses, their dominance of soft drinks, or their competitive strength in soft drinks and in razors and blades. WARREN BUFFETT：是的。我也想澄清一点。我并没有真的说我认为这些公司是“不可避免的”。我认为这些企业，他们在软饮料方面的主导地位，或者他们在软饮料，剃须刀和刀片方面的竞争力。

And as a matter of fact, I actually pointed out in talking about that — a few paragraphs later, I pointed out the danger of having a wonderful business is the temptation to go into less wonderful businesses. 事实上，我实际上已经在谈到这一点 - 几段之后，我指出，拥有一个出色的企业的危险是进入不那么精彩的企业的诱惑。

And to some extent, for example, Gillette's stumble in the last year or two has not been the product of their razor and blade business, but it has been some other businesses, which are not at all inevitable. 例如，在某种程度上，吉列在过去一两年内的失败并不是他们的剃须刀和刀片业务的产物，但它一直是其他一些企业，这些企业根本不可避免。

And that, you know, that is always a risk.And it's a risk I pointed out, that when a company with a wonderful business gets into a mediocre business, that usually the reputation of the mediocre business prevails over the supposed invincibility of the management of the wonderful business. 而且，你知道，这总是一种风险。我指出，这是一个风险，当一家拥有出色业务的公司进入一个平庸的业务时，通常平庸业务的声誉优于所谓的管理精彩业务的无敌。

American Express, an interesting case study, because it does have a — we always think in terms of share of mind versus share of market because, if share of mind is there, market will follow. 美国运通，一个有趣的案例研究，因为它确实有一个 - 我们总是考虑到心灵的份额与市场份额，因为如果有心灵的共享，市场将随之而来。

People — virtually — probably 75 percent of the people in the world — have something in their mind about Coca-Cola.And overwhelmingly it's favorable.Everybody in California has something in their mind about See's Candy, and overwhelmingly it's favorable. 人们 - 实际上 - 可能是世界上75％的人 - 对可口可乐有着一些想法。绝大多数都是有利的。在加利福尼亚州，每个人都有一些关于See's Candy的东西，绝大多数都是有利的。

The job is to have it in a few more California minds — or world minds in the case of Coke — over the years, and have it even be a little more favorable as the years go by.If we have that, everything else follows.And consumer product organizations understand that. 多年来，我们的工作就是将它放在加利福尼亚的一些思想中 - 或者在可口可乐的情况下，或者世界人士的思想中 - 并且随着岁月的流逝它甚至会更加有利。如果我们有，那么其他一切都随之而来。消费者产品组织也明白这一点。

American Express was — had a very special position in people's mind about ﬁnancial integrity over the years, and ubiquity of acceptance.When the banks closed in the early '30s, American Express traveler's checks actually substituted, to some extent, for bank activity during that period. 多年来，美国运通在人们心中对金融诚信的态度非常特殊，并且无处不在。当银行在30年代初关闭时，美国运通旅行支票在某种程度上实际上取代了那段时期的银行活动。

The worldwide acceptance of this name meant that when American Express sold traveler's checks — for many years, their two primary competitors were what are now Citicorp — First National City — and the Bank of America. 世界范围内对此名称的接受意味着当美国运通出售旅行支票时 - 多年来，他们的两个主要竞争对手是现在的花旗 - 第一国家城市 - 以及美国银行。

And, despite the fact that American Express charged you one percent when you bought your traveler's checks, and you had two other premier organizations, Citicorp, imagine, and BofA, and — actually, Barclays had one and Thomas Cook had one. 而且，尽管美国运通在你购买旅行支票时向你收取百分之一的费用，而且你有两个其他的主要组织，花旗，想象和美国银行，而且 - 实际上，巴克莱有一个，托马斯库克有一个。

And American Express still had two-thirds of the market after 60 or 70 years — two-thirds of the worldwide market — while charging more for the product than these other very well-known competitors charged. 美国运通在60或70年后占据了三分之二的市场份额 - 占全球市场的三分之二 - 同时对该产品的收费高于其他众所周知的竞争对手。

Anytime you can charge more for a product and maintain or increase market share against well- entrenched, well-known competitors, you have something very special in people's minds.Same thing came about when the credit card came around. 任何时候你都可以为一个产品收取更多费用，并保持或增加市场份额，对抗根深蒂固的知名竞争对手，你会有一些非常特别的想法。当信用卡出现时，同样的事情发生了。

Originally, American Express wanted the credit card because they thought they were going to get killed on traveler's checks.And they thought it was going to be a substitute, and therefore, they had to go into — it was a defensive move. 最初，美国运通想要信用卡，因为他们认为他们会在旅行支票上被杀。他们认为这将是一个替代品，因此，他们必须进入 - 这是一个防御性的举动。

It came about because a fellow named Ralph Schneider, and Al Bloomingdale, and a couple people came up with the Diners Club idea.And the Diners Club idea was sweeping, well, initially New York, and then the country in the mid-'50s. 之所以这样，是因为一位名叫Ralph Schneider和Al Bloomingdale的人和几个人想出了大莱社的想法。大莱社的想法一扫而空，最初是纽约，然后是50年代中期的国家。

And American Express got very worried because they thought, you know, people are going to use these cards.Nobody had ever heard of Visa at that point, or anything of the sort. 美国运通非常担心，因为他们认为，人们会使用这些卡。从那时起，没有人听说过Visa，或类似的任何东西。

But people were going to use these cards instead of traveler's checks.So they backed into the traveler's check business — I mean, it backed into the credit card business. 但是人们会使用这些卡而不是旅行支票。因此，他们支持旅行支票业务 - 我的意思是，它支持信用卡业务。

Immediately, despite the jump the Diners Club had on the — on this business — because Diners Club had the restaurants signed up already, and they already had the high rollers carrying around their card, and nobody had an American Express card. 尽管Diners Club在这项业务上出现了大幅上涨，但由于Diners Club已经签署了餐厅，他们已经有了高额的滚轮随身携带他们的卡，而且没有人持有美国运通卡。

But American Express went in and they started charging more than Diners Club for the card, and they kept taking market share away. 但美国运通进入后，他们开始收取超过大莱卡的费用，他们继续占据市场份额。

Well, that is a great position to be in people's minds where they are willing to — when faced with a choice — they're willing to go with the newer product, at a higher price, and leave behind the entrenched product. 嗯，这是一个很好的位置，在人们的心中，他们愿意 - 当面临选择时 - 他们愿意以更高的价格购买更新的产品，并留下根深蒂固的产品。

And it just showed the power of American Express.American Express had a special cache.It identiﬁed you as something special. 它只是展示了美国运通的力量。美国运通有一个特殊的缓存。它认为你是特别的东西。

When you pulled out your American Express, as opposed to your Diners Club card, and as opposed to the Carte Blanche card, which was the third main competitor at the time.Visa still did not exist.And you could see this dominance prevail. 当您拿出美国运通卡而不是您的大莱卡时，而不是Carte Blanche卡，这是当时的第三大主要竞争对手。签证仍然不存在。你可以看到这种支配地位占上风。

That told you what was in people's minds.It's why I bought into the stock in 1964. We bought 5 percent of the company for — a huge investment at the time for us.I was only managing $20 million at the time. 这告诉了你人们的想法。这就是我在1964年买入股票的原因。我们购买了该公司5％的股份 - 当时是我们的巨额投资。那时我只管理着2000万美元。

But you could see that this share of mind, this consumer franchise had not been lost. 但你可以看到，这种消费特许经营权并没有丢失。

In the — considerable period of time, American Express got into other businesses, they got into — Fireman's Fund Insurance was a very big acquisition.And, to some extent, they let the Visas of the world and all of those get established.They still had this preeminent cache position, but it was eroding. 在相当长的一段时间内，美国运通进入其他业务，他们进入 - 消防员的基金保险是一个非常大的收购。并且，在某种程度上，他们让世界的签证和所有这些签证得以建立。他们仍然有这个卓越的缓存位置，但它正在侵蚀。

But I would say that Harvey Golub, along with a lot of other people in the management, have done an extremely good job of reafﬁrming — intensifying — the cache.There will be probably $300 billion worth of charges, something in that area, put on American Express this year. 但我要说的是，Harvey Golub以及管理层中的很多其他人在重申 - 加强 - 缓存方面做得非常好。今年可能会有大约3000亿美元的收费，这个收费在美国运通上。

The — 300 billion, those are big numbers, even in today's world.The average discount fee is about 2.73 percent.If you look at the average discount fee on Visa, MasterCharge, you know, it's going to be a —probably, a full percentage point beneath that. 即使在今天的世界里，这些人数达到了3000亿。平均折扣费约为2.73％。如果你看一下Visa， MasterCharge的平均折扣费，你知道，这可能是一个可能的，完全低于百分点。

So you've got a percentage point on $300 billion, which is $3 billion of revenue that your competitor doesn't get.You can do a lot of things for your clientele. 所以你有3000亿美元的百分点，这是你的竞争对手无法获得的30亿美元的收入。你可以为你的客户做很多事情。

And they've segmented the card, as you know.They've even recently gone to this black card, and — which sells for a thousand dollars.It's got a very special cache. 如你所知，他们已经对卡片进行了细分。他们甚至最近都去了这张黑卡，而且 - 售价一千美元。它有一个非常特殊的缓存。

I would say that — I wouldn't use the word "inevitable," but I would say that nourished properly, that the American Express name has had — excuse me — has huge value and is very, very likely to get stronger and stronger asthe years go by. 我会说 - 我不会用“不可避免的”这个词，但我会说正确的滋养，美国运通这个名字已经 - 请原谅我 - 具有巨大的价值，非常非常可能变得越来越强大岁月流逝。

But I don't — I think that what they went through showed that it could take quite a beating and come back.But I don't want to — I don't think you'd want to test it that way indeﬁnitely. 但我不这样做 - 我认为他们所经历的事情表明它可能会受到相当大的打击而又会回来。但我不想 - 我不认为你想要无限期地测试它。

Incidentally, that's one of the things we look for in businesses, is how — you know, if you see a business take a lot of adversity and still do well, that tells you something about the underlying strength of the business. 顺便说一句，这是我们在企业中寻找的事情之一，就是如何 - 如果你看到一家企业遇到很多逆境并且仍然做得好，那就告诉你一些关于企业潜在优势的事情。

The classic case was on that was — to me, is AOL.Four or ﬁve years ago — you know, I'm no expert on this, but I got the impression there for a period of time when they were having a lot of problems, that a very signiﬁcant percentage of AOL's customers were mad at them. 经典案例就是 - 对我而言，是美国在线。四五年前 - 你知道，我不是这方面的专家，但是当我们遇到很多问题时，我在那里留下了一段时间的印象，AOL的很大一部分客户对他们很生气。

But the number of customers went up every month.And that's a terriﬁc business.I mean, if you have a business where your customers are mad at you and you're growing, you know, that has met a certain test, in my mind, of utility. 但是每个月的客户数量都在上升。这是一项非常棒的业务。我的意思是，如果你有一个企业，你的客户对你生气，而你正在成长，你知道，在我看来，这已经遇到了一定的考验。

And you might argue that American Express had that, to some degree.It wasn't that bad.But they had a lot of merchant unrest and all of that.So, occasionally, you will ﬁnd that an interesting test of the strength of a business. 而且你可能会说美国运通在某种程度上有这个。这并不坏。但他们有很多商人的动荡和所有这些。因此，偶尔，您会发现对业务实力的有趣测试。

Coca-Cola had some problems, you know, in Europe.But it comes back stronger than ever.They certainly had problems with New Coke, and they came back stronger than ever. 可口可乐在欧洲遇到了一些问题。但它比以往任何时候都更强大。他们肯定遇到了新可乐的问题，他们比以往任何时候都更强大。

So you do see that underlying strength.And that's very impressive as a way of evaluating the depth and impenetrability of the moat that we talked about earlier. 所以你确实看到了潜在的力量。作为评估我们之前谈到的护城河的深度和不可穿透性的一种方式，这是非常令人印象深刻的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think it would be easier to screw up American Express than it would Coke or Gillette.But it's an immensely strong business, and it's wonderful to have it. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为搞砸American Express会比Coke或Gillette更容易。但这是一项非常强大的业务，拥有它真是太棒了。

WARREN BUFFETT: We own about 11 percent of American Express.So when there are 300 billion of charges, we're getting 33 billion of those for the account of Berkshire, and it's growing at a pretty good clip.The ﬁrst quarter, it grew very substantially in both cardholders and charges. WARREN BUFFETT：我们拥有大约11％的美国运通卡。因此，当有3000亿美元的收费时，我们在伯克希尔的帐户中获得了330亿美元的收费，并且它的收益正在增长。第一季度，持卡人和收费都大幅增长。

My guess is that our 11 percent becomes more valuable over time.It's hard to think of anything that would destroy it. 我的猜测是，随着时间的推移，我们的11％变得更有价值。很难想到会破坏它的任何东西。

CHARLIE MUNGER: The business is very interesting.They made a deal to put American Express cards into Costco.I think that is a very intelligent thing for American Express to have done.And it's a very aggressive place that does a lot of interesting things. CHARLIE MUNGER：业务非常有趣。他们达成协议将美国运通卡放入好市多。我认为这对美国运通来说非常聪明。这是一个非常具有攻击性的地方，可以做很多有趣的事情。 WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie is a director of Costco, so he's a — Costco is an absolutely fabulous organization.We should have owned a lot of Costco over the years and we — I blew it.Charlie was for it, but I blew it. WARREN BUFFETT：Charlie是Costco的董事，所以他是一个 - Costco是一个绝对精彩的组织。多年来我们应该拥有很多好市多我们 - 我吹了它。查理是为了它，但我吹了它。

11. "We don't think in terms of absolutes" 11.“我们不以绝对的方式思考”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll go to number 1 again. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们再来1号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Jin Xi Wan (PH) from San Diego, California. 听众：我的名字是来自加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥的Jin Xi Wan（PH）。

First, I would thank both of you.My question is also about growth and value. 首先，我要感谢你们两个。我的问题也是关于增长和价值。

If you look at the business in this country, most of them, if not all of them, are cyclical to various degrees.Certain businesses are, of course, more cyclical than other businesses. 如果你看一下这个国家的业务，其中大部分（如果不是全部的话）都会有不同程度的周期性。当然，某些企业比其他企业更具周期性。

So when you buy a business or make a investment in a new stock, do you ever cut off — like if a business lose money in a downturn, we are not going to buy. 因此，当你购买一家企业或对新股进行投资时，你是否曾被切断 - 就像企业在经济低迷时期亏本一样，我们不打算购买。

If its earning begin to decline or downturn, we're not going to buy.But if the earning growth slows down, then we can look at a business and make an investment.So do you have a cutoff, in terms of this cyclical factor? 如果它的收入开始下降或下降，我们就不会购买。但如果盈利增长放缓，那么我们就可以看一个企业并进行投资。那么就这个周期性因素而言，你有一个截止点吗？

And also, when you buy a business — in terms of the current P/E ratio, also do you have a cutoff?Let's say, if it's P/E ratio is more than 15, 16, we are not going to buy the business, no matter how much the earning will grow in the future.So basically, it's about the growth and the value. 而且，当您购买企业时 - 就目前的市盈率而言，您是否也有截止？比方说，如果它的市盈率超过 15,16，那么无论未来的收益多少，我们都不会购买这项业务。所以基本上，它是关于增长和价值。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we have — to answer your question directly — we have no cutoff, whatsoever. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们有 - 直接回答你的问题 - 我们没有任何截止。 We don't think in terms of absolutes that way because, again, we are trying to think of how many birds are in the bush.And sometimes the number that are currently being shown could be negative. 我们不会以绝对方式来考虑这种方式，因为我们再次想到丛林中有多少只鸟。有时，目前显示的数字可能是负数。

One of the best buys we ever made was in 1976 when we bought a signiﬁcant percentage — what became through repurchases — 50 percent of GEICO at a time when the company was losing a lot of money and was destined to lose a lot of money in theimmediate future. 我们曾经做过的最好的购买之一是在1976年，当我们买了一个很大的百分比 - 通过回购变成了 - 在公司亏损很多钱的时候，GEICO的50％，并且注定会损失很多钱。眼前的未来。

And, you know, the fact they were losing money was not lost on us, but we thought we saw a future there that was signiﬁcantly different than the current situation. 而且，你知道，他们亏钱的事实并没有丢失在我们身上，但我们认为我们看到的那里的未来与当前形势有很大不同。

So it would not bother us in the least to buy into a business that currently was losing money for some reason that we understood, and where we thought that the future was going to be signiﬁcantly different. 因此，至少购买一家目前由于我们理解的某些原因而亏损的企业，以及我们认为未来将会发生巨大变化的情况，我们不会打扰我们。

Similarly, if a business is making some money — there's no P/E ratio that we have in mind as being a cutoff point at all.There are businesses — I mean, you could have some business making a sliver of money on which you would pay a very, very high P/E ratio.But it's basically — 同样，如果一家企业赚了一些钱 - 我们就没有P / E比率作为一个截止点。有些企业 - 我的意思是，你可能会有一些生意赚钱，你会支付非常非常高的市盈率。但它基本上 -

We look at all of these as businesses.We're, for example, in — at Executive Jet — NetJets — we're losing money in Europe.Well, we expect to lose money in Europe getting established. 我们将所有这些视为企业。例如，我们在Executive Jet - NetJets中 - 我们在欧洲亏损。好吧，我们预计在欧洲建立亏损的钱。

So does that mean it's a bad thing to buy a hundred percent of, if you own the whole company, or three percent of, if Executive Jet was a public company and you were buying into?No. I mean, it — 那么，如果您拥有整个公司，或者如果Executive Jet是一家上市公司并且您正在购买，那么购买 100％的百分之百是坏事吗？不，我的意思是，它 -

There are all kinds of decisions that involve the future looking different, in some important way, than the present.Most of our decisions relate to things where we expect the future not to change much. 有各种各样的决定涉及未来，以某种重要的方式，与现在不同。我们的大多数决定都涉及到我们预期未来不会发生太大变化的事情。

But you get this — well, American Express was a good example.And when we bought it in 1964, a fellow named Tino DeAngelis had caused them incredible trouble.You know, it was one of those decisions that looked, for a time, as if it could break the company. 但是你得到了这个 - 好吧，美国运通就是一个很好的例子。当我们在1964年购买时，一位名叫 Tino DeAngelis的家伙给他们带来了难以置信的麻烦。你知道，这是一段时间内看起来好像会破坏公司的决定之一。

So, we knew — if you'd been charging for what Tino had stolen from the company against the income account that year, or the legal costs that were going to be attached to it, you were looking at a signiﬁcant loss. 所以，我们知道 - 如果你一直在收取蒂诺从公司那里偷来的那一年的收入账户费用，或者附加在它上面的法律费用，你就会看到一个重大的损失。

But the question was, what was American Express going to look like 10 or 20 years later?And we felt very good about that. 但问题是，10年或20年后美国运通将会是什么样子？我们对此感到非常满意。

So there are no arbitrary cutoff points.But there is that focus on, how much cash will this business deliver, you know, between now and kingdom come?Now as a practical matter, if you estimate it for 20 years or so, the terminal values get less important. 所以没有任意截止点。但重点是，从现在到王国之间，这项业务将带来多少现金？现在作为一个实际问题，如果你估计它20年左右，终端价值变得不那么重要了。

So — but you do want to have, in your mind, a stream of cash that will be thrown off over, say, a 20-year period, that makes sense discounted at a proper interest rate, compared to what you're paying today.And that's what investment's all about. 所以 - 但你确实希望在你的脑海中拥有一股现金流，这些现金将会被淘汰，例如，20年期间，与你今天所支付的相比，这个现金有利于以适当的利率打折。这就是投资的全部意义所在。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, the answer is almost the exact reverse of what you were pointing toward.A business with something glorious underneath, disguised by terrible numbers that cause cutoff points in other people's minds, is ideal for us, if we can ﬁgure it out. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，答案几乎与你指向的完全相反。如果我们能够弄明白的话，那些在其他人心中产生切割点的可怕数字掩盖下来的事业就是我们的理想选择。

WARREN BUFFETT: And we've had a couple of those in our history that have made us a lot of money.I mean, we don't want to wish anybody ill, but — 沃伦巴菲特：我们历史上有几个让我们赚了不少钱的人。我的意思是，我们不希望任何人生病，但是 - CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, I wouldn't go that far — CHARLIE MUNGER：哦，我不会那么远 -

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well Charlie — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：好的，查理 - （笑声）

I think he's speaking for both of us.(Laughter) 我想他是在为我们两个人说话。（笑声）

Not if we don't understand it 如果我们不理解它，那就不行了

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll move on to number 2. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们将继续前进到第2位。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett, I would like to start my question by giving you and Charlie 10 lashes with a wet noodle, not because of 1999 and what happened to your net worth or our net worth, but because you have spoiled your shareholders intoexpecting 25 percent growth every year, since 1965. 观众：巴菲特先生，我想用湿面条给你和查理10次鞭子开始我的问题，不是因为1999年以及你的净资产或我们的净资产发生了什么，而是因为你已经破坏了你的股东预计自1965年以来每年增长 25％。

And then comes the bad, bad 199[9] and it hits all of us.But by my calculations, you personally, Mr. Buffett, have lost over 10 billion dollar — not million — billion dollars during 1999. 然后是坏的，坏的199 [9]并且它击中了我们所有人。但根据我的计算，你个人，巴菲特先生，在 1999年已经损失了超过100亿美元 - 而不是数十亿美元。

So I don't think we should get too mad at you because probably all of us have, at this point in our life, increased our net worth and made a lot of money.So you don't get a wet noodle today. (Laughter) 所以我认为我们不应该对你太生气，因为在我们生命的这一点上，我们所有人都可能增加了我们的净资产并赚了很多钱。所以你今天不要吃湿面条。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Hmm. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: And the shareholders have, I'm sure, lost thousands.And some have lost millions of dollars during the year 1999. 观众：我相信，股东们已经损失了数千人。有些人在1999年损失了数百万美元。

Now after reading your biography in November of 1998 — unfortunately I didn't know about you earlier — I started investing on November the 24th of '98.And of course, I'm a poor little investor, so I bought your B stock at 23.08. 在阅读了1998年11月的传记之后 - 不幸的是我之前并不知道你 - 我于98年11月24日开始投资。当然，我是一个可怜的小投资者，所以我买了你的B股23.08。

Then, because the market dropped, I bought some more on the 4th of December at 22.29.And then I bought, on January the 24th of 2000 at 16.89, so I do believe in dollar-cost averaging and I've been doing that for probably 30 years of my life. 然后，由于市场下跌，我在12月4日以22.29买入了更多。然后我在2000年1月24日以16.89买了，所以我确实相信美元成本的平均值，而且我已经这样做了大概30年的生命。

My January investment, I'm happy to say, is up 15 percent, so the worst may be over. 我很高兴地说，我1月份的投资增长了15％，最糟糕的可能已经结束了。

Now, I read your annual report and I want to compliment you that that is the easiest and most entertaining annual report I think created in the whole world.And your — and I hope you continue that kind of a report.(Applause) 现在，我读了你的年度报告，我想赞扬你，这是我认为在全世界创造的最简单，最有趣的年度报告。而你 - 我希望你继续这样的报道。（掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。

VOICE: (Inaudible) Your name and — 声音:(听不清）你的名字和 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh! 听众会员：哦！

VOICE: — where you're from 声音： - 你来自哪里

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm sorry.I was just told that I should have said who I am.My name is Gaylord Hanson and I'm from Santa Barbara, California — where investor Munger puts his big, multimillion-dollar boat in the water.(Laughter) 听众：我很抱歉。我被告知我应该说我是谁。我的名字是Gaylord Hanson，我来自加利福尼亚州的圣巴巴拉 - 投资者芒格把这艘价值数百万美元的巨型船放入水中。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm not going to make any comment on that. 沃伦巴菲特：我不会对此发表任何评论。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Please don't.(Laughter) 听众：请不要。（笑声）

Now, with technology, computers, electronics, and software transforming our entire world — not just here — the world, I must admit that I personally invested in four technology computer software and aggressive growth mutual funds and made up all of my 1999 losses on BerkshireHathaway.(Laughter and applause) 现在，随着技术，计算机，电子和软件改变我们整个世界 - 不仅仅是这里 - 世界，我必须承认，我个人投资了四种技术计算机软件和积极的增长共同基金，并弥补了我在伯克希尔的1999年亏损海瑟薇。（笑声和掌声）

Are we asking too much as shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway for you men to put your brains to work and possibly speculate a little bit, maybe 10 percent of our money, into the only play in town, which seems to be technology, electronic? 作为伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东，我们是否过多地要求你们让自己的大脑投入工作，并且可能将我们的资金投入一点点，也许可以投入到城里唯一的一部分，这似乎是技术，电子？

And I read your report, and I understand a lot of your reasoning that it's difﬁcult — and it is difﬁcult — to project earnings of a lot — people are going to be a little bankrupt.Are they going to out of business? 我读了你的报告，我理解你的很多理由，很难 - 并且很难 - 预测很多收入 - 人们会有点破产。他们会破产吗？

But isn't there enough left in your brainpower to maybe pick a few and — (laughter) — see what's going on?Because I made over a hundred percent proﬁt in 1999 on my aggressive position in the technology ﬁeld, so that's — 但是你的脑力不足以留下足够多的东西 - （笑声） - 看看发生了什么？因为我在技术领域的积极地位，1999年我赚了百分之百的利润，所以这是 -

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, well — WARREN BUFFETT：好的，好吧 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: — my question. 听众会员： - 我的问题。

WARREN BUFFETT: The answer is we will never buy anything we don't think we understand.And our deﬁnition of understanding is thinking that we have a reasonable probability of being able to asses where the business will be in 10 years. WARREN BUFFETT：答案是我们绝不会购买任何我们认为不理解的东西。我们对理解的定义是认为我们有合理的可能性来评估业务在10年内的位置。

But, you know, we'd be delighted — we have a man here who's done very well.And if he has any business cards, you know, you could always invest with him, and — (Laughter) 但是，你知道，我们很高兴 - 我们这里有一个人做得很好。如果他有任何名片，你知道，你可以随时和他一起投资，而且 - （笑声）

And we'd welcome — you know — you can — we'll give you a booth in our exhibitor's section.And anybody that wants to do that is perfectly — obviously — free to do it with you or through any other — through anybody else that they select. 我们欢迎 - 您知道 - 您可以 - 我们会在参展商的部分为您提供展位。任何想要做到这一点的人都完全 - 显然 - 可以自由地与你或通过任何其他人 - 通过他们选择的任何其他人。 Now, you have a whole bunch of people out there that say they can do this.And maybe they can and maybe they can't and maybe you can spot which ones can and can't.The only way we know how to make money is to try and evaluate businesses. 现在，你有很多人说他们可以做到这一点。也许他们可以，也许他们不能，也许你可以发现哪些可以和不可以。我们知道如何赚钱的唯一方法是尝试和评估业务。

And if we can't evaluate a carbon steel company, we don't buy it.It doesn't mean it isn't a good buy.It doesn't mean it isn't selling for a fraction of its worth.It just means that we don't know how to evaluate it. 如果我们无法评估碳钢公司，我们就不会购买它。这并不意味着它不是一个好买。这并不意味着它不会出售其价值的一小部分。这只是意味着我们不知道如何评估它。

If we can't evaluate the sensibilities of putting in a chemical plant or something in Brazil, we don't do it.If somebody else knows how to do it, you know, more power to them. 如果我们无法评估在巴西投放化工厂或其他东西的敏感性，我们就不会这样做。如果有人知道怎么做，你知道，他们有更多的权力。

There are all kinds of people that know how to make money in ways that we don't.But, you know, it's a free world and everybody can invest in those sort of things.But they would be making a mistake, a big mistake, to do it through us. 有各种各样的人知道如何以我们没有的方式赚钱。但是，你知道，这是一个自由的世界，每个人都可以投资这些东西。但他们会犯错误，这是一个大错误，通过我们来做。

I mean, why pick a couple of guys like Charlie and me to do something like that with — when you can pick all kinds of other people that say they know how to do it. 我的意思是，为什么选择像查理和我这样的人来做类似的事情 - 当你可以挑选各种其他人说他们知道如何去做。

I would say this.Incidentally, you mentioned a point earlier, which is how the popular press tends to think of things.But we don't consider ourselves — Charlie and I don't — richer or poorer based on what the stock does.We do feel richer or poorer based on what the business does. 我会说这个。顺便提一下，你之前提到了一点，那就是大众媒体对事物的看法。但我们不认为自己 - 查理和我不 - 基于股票的作用而更富裕或更穷。根据业务的不同，我们感到更富裕或更穷。

So we look at the business as to how much we're worth.And we do not look at the stock price, because the stock price doesn't mean a thing to us.I mean, it doesn't for a variety of reasons, but beyond that, imagine trying to sell hundreds of thousands of shares at the stock price. 因此，我们关注业务的价值。我们不看股票价格，因为股票价格对我们来说并不意味着什么。我的意思是，它不是出于各种原因，但除此之外，想象一下试图以股票价格出售数十万股。

We can always sell the business — we're not going to do it — but we could always sell it for what the business is worth.We can't sell our stock for what the — necessarily — what the stock price is.So we look at the business, entirely, in terms of evaluating our net worth. 我们总是可以出售这项业务 - 我们不打算这样做 - 但我们总是可以将它出售给业务的价值。我们不能出售我们的股票 - 必然 - 股票价格是多少。因此，我们在评估净资产方面完全看待业务。

We ﬁgure our net worth went up very, very, slightly — very slightly — in 1999. And we would ﬁgure that no matter what the stock was selling for — it just doesn't make any difference — because we do look at the businesses. 我们认为我们的净值在1999年非常，非常，略微 - 非常轻微地上升。我们认为无论股票卖什么都没有 - 它只是没有任何区别 - 因为我们确实关注业务。

We really look at it as if there wasn't any quote on the stock.Because we don't know what the stock is going to do. 我们真的看着它，就好像股票上没有任何报价一样。因为我们不知道股票会做什么。

If we do — if the business gets worth more at a reasonable rate, the stock will follow, over time.But it won't necessarily follow week by week, or month by month, or year by year. 如果我们这样做 - 如果业务以合理的价格获得更多价值，那么随着时间的推移，股票将随之而来。但它不一定会逐周，逐月或逐年跟随。

We had a lousy year in 1999, but the stock price did not calibrate with that in any perfect, or close to perfect, manner. 我们在1999年度过了糟糕的一年，但股票价格没有以任何完美或接近完美的方式进行校准。

And we've had good years other times, when the stock price is way overpriced or over- described what happened during the year. 而且，当股票价格过高或过度描述年内发生的事情时，我们已经过了好几年。

So we really measure all the time by the business.We think of it as a private business, basically, for which there's a quotation.And if it's handy to use that quotation, either in buying more stock or something of the sort, we may do it.But it does not govern our ideas of value. 所以我们真的一直在衡量业务。我们认为它是一个私人企业，基本上，有一个报价。如果使用该报价很方便，无论是购买更多的股票还是其他类型的股票，我们都可以这样做。但它并不支配我们的价值观。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.Generally, I would say that if you have a lot of lovely wealth in a form that makes you comfortable, and somebody down the street has found a way to make money a lot faster, in a way you don't understand, you should notbe made miserable by that process. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。一般来说，如果你有很多可爱的财富，让你感到舒服，而且街上有人找到了一种赚钱方式更快的方式，你不明白的方式，你不应该在这个过程中变得悲惨。

There are worse things in life than being left behind in possession of a lot of lovely money.I mean — (Laughter) 生活中有更糟糕的事情，而不是被拥有大量可爱的钱留下。我的意思是 - （笑声） WARREN BUFFETT: Would you want to name a couple?(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：你想说出一对情侣吗？（笑声）

No, Charlie made — I mean, when farmland was — went from — farmland probably tripled here in the late '70s, without any real change in yields per acre or the price of the commodity. 不，查理做的 - 我的意思是，当农田来自 - 农田可能在70年代后期在这里增加了两倍，每英亩产量或商品价格没有任何实际变化。

You know, are we going to sit around and stew because, you know, they — we didn't buy farmland at the start? 你知道吗，我们是否会坐下来炖，因为，你知道，他们 - 我们一开始并没有购买农田吗？

You know, are we going to stew because all kinds of stuff — uranium stocks in the '50s — or you can go back — all kinds of things that have — the conglomerates in the late '60s, the leasing companies, I mean, youcan just go down the line. 你知道，我们要炖是因为各种各样的东西 - 五十年代的铀库存 - 或者你可以回去 - 各种各样的东西 - 六十年代后期的企业集团，租赁公司，我的意思是，你可以顺其自然。

And it just doesn't make any — we're not in that game. 它只是没有 - 我们不在那场比赛中。

We would know how to create a chain letter, believe me.I mean, we've seen it down some many times.You know, we know the game.But it just isn't our game. 相信我，我们会知道如何创建连锁信。我的意思是，我们已经看过很多次了。你知道，我们知道游戏。但这不是我们的游戏。

Charlie?(Applause) 查理？（掌声）

13. Currencies are "important but not knowable" 13.货币“重要但不可知”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 3? WARREN BUFFETT：3号？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger.My name is Stacy Braverman (PH).I'm 15 years old, and I'm from South Setauket, New York.It was very nice meeting you Mr. Buffett, yesterday. 观众成员：巴菲特先生，芒格先生，早上好。我的名字是Stacy Braverman（PH）。我15岁，我来自纽约的South Setauket。昨天和巴菲特见面真是太好了。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I especially appreciated your internet stock tips.(Laughter) 听众会员：我特别感谢您的互联网股票提示。（笑声） WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughs) Yeah, keep it — keep it to yourself now, Stacey.That's our deal. (Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT :(笑）是的，保持它 - 现在就把它留给自己，Stacey。那是我们的交易。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I bought the B shares two years ago, when I decided that I needed to save some money for college.When the share price dipped below 1,500 I decided to investigate correspondence courses.(Laughter) 观众成员：两年前我买了B股，当时我决定为大学节省一些钱。当股价跌破1,500时，我决定调查函授课程。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Maybe you can get a scholarship.(Laughs) WARREN BUFFETT：也许你可以获得奖学金。（笑）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I'm glad to see that things are back on track now. 听众会员：所以我很高兴看到现在的事情已经回到正轨。

My question is, a lot of the companies that you invest in, like Coca-Cola and Gillette, seem to do better when the dollar is weak and interest rates are falling.That seems to be the opposite of what's happening now. 我的问题是，当美元疲软且利率下降时，许多你投资的公司，如可口可乐和吉列，似乎做得更好。这似乎与现在发生的情况正好相反。

So how is Berkshire positioning itself to take advantage of the current economic position, with that assessment in mind? 那么，考虑到这种评估，伯克希尔如何利用当前的经济地位来定位自己？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, that's a good question.But if we thought we knew what the dollar was going to do, or interest rates were going to do, we would — we won't do it — but we would just engage in transactions involving those commodities, in effect, or futures directly. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，那是一个很好的问题。但如果我们认为我们知道美元将要做什么，或者利率将要做什么，我们就会 - 我们不会这样做 - 但我们只是直接参与涉及这些商品的交易，或直接进行交易。

In other words, it would not be — if we thought that the dollar was going to weaken dramatically — and we won't get those kind of thoughts — but if we did, you know, we would buy other currencies. 换句话说，它不会 - 如果我们认为美元会急剧减弱 - 我们不会得到那种想法 - 但如果我们这样做，你知道，我们会购买其他货币。

And it would be — it might beneﬁt Coke, in dollar terms, if that happened. 如果发生这种情况，它可能会以美元计算对可口可乐有利。

But it would be so much more efﬁcient, directly, to pursue a currency play or an interest rate play than an indirect way through companies that have big international exposure.We would probably do it directly. 但是，直接采用货币游戏或利率游戏比通过具有大量国际风险的公司采用间接方式更有效率。我们可能会直接这样做。

We don't really think much about that.Because — just take currency.If you look at what the yen has traded at, you know over the last — well, since World War II, you know.From — what was it?Three-sixty down to — what?Seventy-some, Charlie?At lowest? 我们对此并没有太多考虑。因为 - 只需要货币。如果你看看日元交易的是什么，你知道最后一次 - 好吧，自第二次世界大战以来，你知道。来自 - 它是什么？三六十下来 - 什么？七十多岁，查理？最低？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Uh-huh. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯。

WARREN BUFFETT: And, you know, back up to 140-some.And now, I don't know, 105, or wherever it may be.I mean, those moves are huge. WARREN BUFFETT：而且，你知道，回到140多岁。而现在，我不知道，105，或任何地方。我的意思是，这些举动是巨大的。

But, in the end, we're really more interested in whether more people in Japan are going to drink Coca-Cola.And, over time, we're better at predicting that than we are at predicting what the yen will do. 但是，最后，我们对日本是否会有更多人喝可口可乐更感兴趣。并且，随着时间的推移，我们更倾向于预测这一点，而不是我们预测日元会做什么。

And if Coca-Cola satisﬁes people's needs — liquid needs — for more and more people, we will probably get a reasonable percentage of their purchasing power of those people around the world for their right to drink Coca-Cola, or for shaving, or whateverit may be. 如果可口可乐满足了人们的需求 - 液体需求 - 对于越来越多的人来说，我们可能会获得他们购买世界各地人的购买力的合理百分比，因为他们有可能喝可口可乐，或剃须，或其他任何东西。它可能是。

So, if the world's standard of living improves, bit by bit over time, in an irregular fashion, and we supply something the world wants, we will get our share in dollars, eventually. 因此，如果世界的生活水平随着时间的推移，以不规则的方式逐渐改善，我们供应世界所需的东西，我们最终将获得美元的份额。

And what it — quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year — how that moves around, because of currency moves, really doesn't make any difference to us. 而且，由于货币变动，它如何 - 季度或季度 - 如何变化，对我们来说真的没有任何影响。

It makes a difference to reported earnings in that quarter or — but in terms of where Coca- Cola's going to be 10 or 20 years from now, it would be a big mistake, I think, to focus on currency moves as opposed to focusing onthe product itself. 这对于该季度的报告收益有所不同 - 但就可口可乐从现在开始的10年或20年后的情况来看，我认为，关注货币走势而不是关注货币走势将是一个很大的错误。产品本身。

And Japan offers a good example of that because you had this — I mean, you really had a move from 360, or whatever it was, to the high 70s or thereabouts.I mean, that is an incredible move in currency, and it can overshadow in the short run, even, what's happening in the business. 日本提供了一个很好的例子，因为你有这个 - 我的意思是，你真的从360或其他任何东西转移到 70年代左右。我的意思是，这是货币的一个令人难以置信的举动，它可以在短期内蒙上阴影，甚至可以在业务中发生什么。

But long-range, what's really made Coca-Cola strong in Japan is the fact that the Japanese people have accepted their products in a big way.And Coca-Cola's built this tremendous, for example, vending machine presence. 但远程，可口可乐在日本的强势使得日本人民已经大大接受了他们的产品。可口可乐公司建立了这个巨大的，例如自动售货机的存在。

And the Japanese market is very different than all the rest of the markets in the world, virtually, in that such a high percentage ﬂows through vending machines. 而且，日本市场与世界上所有其他市场的差异很大，实际上，如此高的百分比流经自动售货机。

And my memory is that, you know, we may have something like 900-and-some thousand, out of something over 2 million, vending machines in the country. 我的记忆是，你知道，在这个国家，我们可能拥有超过200万件自动售货机中的900和几千件。

So we've got this tremendously dominant position.It's a little like billboards might be in this country.Plus, we have this terriﬁc product, Georgia Coffee, which is huge over there. 所以我们已经拥有了这个极具优势的地位。这有点像广告牌可能在这个国家。此外，我们有这个了不起的产品佐治亚咖啡，这是一个巨大的产品。

And that's the sort of thing we focus on, because that's something we understand. 这就是我们关注的事情，因为这是我们理解的。

We don't understand what currencies are going to do week-to-week or month-to-month or year- to-year.And we always try to ﬁgure on what — focus on what's knowable and what's important. 我们不了解每周或每月或每年的货币走势。我们总是试图找出什么 - 关注什么是可知的和什么是重要的。

Now, currency might be important, but we don't think it's knowable.Other things are unimportant, but knowable.But what really counts is what's knowable and important. 现在，货币可能很重要，但我们认为它不可知。其他事情并不重要，但可知。但真正重要的是什么是可知和重要的。

And what's knowable and important about Coca-Cola is the fact that more and more people are going to consume soft drinks around the world, and have been doing so year after year after year, and that Coca-Cola's going to gain share, and thatthe product is extraordinarily inexpensive relative to the pleasure it brings to people. 可口可乐的可知和重要之处在于，越来越多的人将在全球范围内消费软饮料，并且年复一年地这样做，并且可口可乐将获得份额，而且相对于它带给人们的乐趣，该产品非常便宜。

Coca-Cola — in the '30s, when I was kid, I bought, you know, for — six for a quarter and sold them for a nickel each.That was a 6 1/2 ounce bottle for a nickel, at Coke. 可口可乐 - 在30年代，当我还是个孩子的时候，我买了六分之一的四分之一，然后卖掉了每个镍。在可口可乐公司，这是一个6 1/2盎司的镍瓶。

And you can buy a 12-ounce can now at — pick a supermarket sale — for not much more than twice per ounce what it was selling for in the '30s.You won't ﬁnd many products where that kind of value proposition has developed over the years. 你现在可以购买一个12盎司的罐子 - 选择一个超市销售 - 不超过每盎司两倍于30年代的销售量。多年来，您不会发现许多产品已经形成这种价值主张。

So that's the kind of thing we focus on.And interest rates and foreign exchange rates, important as they may be in the short term, really are not going to determine whether we get rich over time. 所以这就是我们关注的事情。而利率和外汇汇率在短期内很重要，实际上并不能决定我们是否随着时间的推移致富。

The best time to buy stocks, actually was, in recent years, you know, has been when interest rates were sky high and it looked like a very safe thing to do to put your money into Treasury bills at — well, actually the primary gotup to 21 1/2 percent — but you could put out money at huge rates in the early '80s. 实际上，最近几年购买股票的最佳时机是，当利率高涨时，将资金投入国库券似乎是一件非常安全的事情 - 实际上，主要是高达21 1/2％ - 但你可以在80年代初以极高的利率存钱。

And, as attractive as that appeared, it was exactly the wrong thing to be doing.It was better to be buying equities at that time, because when interest rates changed, their values changed even much more. 并且，尽管看起来很有吸引力，但做起来却是错误的。当时买入股票更好，因为当利率发生变化时，它们的价值变化甚至更大。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, we have a willful agnosticism on all kinds of things.And that makes us concentrate on certain other things.This is a very good way to think, if you're as lazy as we are.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我们对各种事情都有一种任意的不可知论。这使我们专注于某些其他事情。如果你像我们一样懒惰，这是一种非常好的思考方式。（笑声） 14. We'll "probably" own M&T Bank stock 10 years from now 14.从现在起10年后，我们“可能”拥有M＆T银行股票

WARREN BUFFETT: We'll go to 4, please. WARREN BUFFETT：请到4点。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jerry Zucker (PH), Los Angeles, California.Good morning, boss. (Laughter) 听众：Jerry Zucker（PH），洛杉矶，加利福尼亚州。早上好老板。（笑声）

Calling your attention to the annual report and major investments, I'd appreciate your comments on two companies. 请您注意年度报告和重大投资，感谢您对两家公司的评论。

Number one, M&T Bank, a new name to that list, but not exactly a household name, at least on the West Coast. 第一，M＆T银行，这个名单的新名称，但不完全是家喻户晓的名字，至少在西海岸。

And company number two, deﬁnitely a household name, but missing from the list this year, the Walt Disney Corporation. 而公司排名第二，绝对是一个家喻户晓的名字，但在今年的名单中却遗漏了沃尔特迪斯尼公司。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we don't comment much on our holdings, particularly as to purchases or sales, but we do have the CEO — longtime CEO — of M&T here today, Bob Wilmers.Bob, would you stand up?He should be up here somewhere.There he is.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们对我们的持股没有多大评价，尤其是购买或销售，但我们今天在这里担任首席执行官 - M＆T的首席执行官，Bob Wilmers。鲍勃，你会站起来吗？他应该在某个地方。他在那。（掌声）

Bob is a terrific businessman, a terrific banker, and a terrific citizen.I've known him a long time.A good friend of Stan Lipsey, our publisher in Buffalo.Bob runs the kind of a bank that allows Charlie and me to sleep very comfortably. 鲍勃是一个了不起的商人，一个了不起的银行家，也是一个了不起的公民。我认识他很久了。 Stan Lipsey的好朋友，我们在布法罗的出版商。鲍勃经营着一家允许查理和我睡得很舒服的银行。

Someone once said there are more banks than bankers, which is something worth thinking about a little bit.But believe me, Bob is a banker and he's done a lot for Buffalo. 曾经有人说银行比银行家多，这值得考虑一下。但请相信我，鲍勃是银行家，他为布法罗做了很多。

And he runs — he's got a — he has a very big ownership position, which he achieved, at least in very large part, through purchase with his own money, as opposed to having options. 而且他经营 - 他有一个 - 他拥有非常大的所有权，至少在很大程度上，他用自己的钱购买，而不是选择。 He's got one of the largest ownership positions, probably, among the hundred largest banks in the United States. 他拥有最大的所有权职位之一，可能是美国最大的百家银行之一。

And it's just a very attractive business for us to be in, and we're very comfortable with it.And 10 years from now, Bob will be here, and I hope I'm here.We will — we'll probably own M&T. 这对我们来说只是一个非常有吸引力的业务，我们对它非常满意。 10年后，鲍勃将来到这里，我希望我能来到这里。我们会 - 我们可能会拥有M＆T。

The Disney Company, our ownership in that fell below the threshold level which we used, although we had ownership.And we think Disney is a terriﬁc business.Michael Eisner's done a great job there. 虽然我们拥有所有权，迪斯尼公司，我们在这方面的所有权低于我们使用的门槛水平。我们认为迪士尼是一项了不起的业务。 Michael Eisner在那里做得很好。

We have — as we put in the annual report — we have mildly reduced equities as prices began to — generally — began to get more and more full. 我们已经 - 正如我们在年度报告中所述 - 随着价格开始 - 通常 - 开始变得越来越充实，我们已经温和地减少了股票。

We do not think the general ownership of equities is going to be very exciting over the next 10 or 15 years, so we would like to buy businesses. 我们认为股票的总体所有权在未来10年或15年内不会令人兴奋，所以我们想购买企业。

We bought a few last year.We had this one we announced last week in the insurance ﬁeld.We got another small acquisition where we've got an agreement with somebody.It's very small. 我们去年买了一些。我们上周在保险领域宣布了这个。我们得到了另一个小型收购，我们与某人达成了协议。它非常小。

But we would love it if those were 10 times that size or 20 times that size, because — you will see more of that, relative to marketable securities, as we go along. 但是，如果这些尺寸是这个尺寸的10倍或20倍，那么我们会喜欢它，因为 - 相对于有价证券，你会看到更多这样的东西。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, regarding equities generally, I think that Fortune article, which was sent out to the Berkshire shareholders this year, should be absolutely must-reading for everybody.In fact, it would be a good thing to read two or three times. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，关于股票普遍，我认为今年发给伯克希尔股东的“财富”这篇文章对每个人来说都应该是必读的。事实上，阅读两三次是一件好事。

The ideas there sound so simple, that — you know, people have the theory that they must understand it.But I think the world is more complicated than that.I think we are in for reduced expectations eventually, with respect to the kind of returns people have had from investing in stocks. 那里的想法听起来很简单，你知道，人们有理论他们必须理解它。但我认为世界比这更复杂。我认为，就投资股票所带来的回报而言，我们最终会降低预期。

WARREN BUFFETT: You want to offer any thoughts as to what — that might — what the corollary might be? WARREN BUFFETT：你想提出任何想法 - 可能 - 推论可能是什么？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think if you have very unreasonable expectations of life, it makes life much more miserable.Much better to get your expectations within reason. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我想如果你对生活有非常不合理的期望，那就会让生活变得更加悲惨。在理性中得到你的期望要好得多。

It's much easier to reduce expectations to some reasonable level than it is to get superhuman achievements. 将期望降低到某种合理水平要比获得超人成就要容易得多。

WARREN BUFFETT: That's why my kids were almost delirious when they heard that announcement I was going to give them $300 each and they — (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：这就是为什么我的孩子几乎神志不清，当他们听到我要给他们每人300美元的消息时他们 - （笑声）

How to be — do you want to be a zillionaire, or whatever it was. 怎么样 - 你想成为一个亿万富翁，或者不管它是什么。

Incidentally, that was terriﬁc of Regis Philbin to do something like that.I mean, all of those appearances [in the video shown to shareholders] are nonpaid, I can assure you.(Laughter) 顺便说一下，Regis Philbin做出类似的事情真是太了不起了。我的意思是，所有那些出现在[向股东展示的视频]中都是无偿的，我可以向你保证。（笑声）

And those people are good — very, very, good sports.And I thank them. 那些人很好 - 非常非常好的运动。我感谢他们。

15. We'll "never have a conventional dividend policy" 15.我们“永远不会有传统的股息政策”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll go to zone 5. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们将去5区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Monte Lefholtz from Omaha, Nebraska. 观众：我的名字是来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的Monte Lefholtz。

I have a two-part question.What is Berkshire's philosophy on paying dividends and under what circumstances would Berkshire pay a dividend in the future? 我有一个由两部分组成的问题。伯克希尔在支付股息方面的理念是什么？在什么情况下，伯克希尔将在未来支付股息？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, that's a good question.We paid a dividend in — what, 1969, Charlie? At 10 cents a share.The — I can't remember it, but it's in the records. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，这是一个很好的问题。我们支付了股息 - 什么，1969年，查理？每股10美分。 - 我不记得了，但它在记录中。

We would pay — we would be very likely to pay either very large dividends or none at all, because our test is whether we think we can use money at a rate — in a way — that it creates more than a dollar of market value forevery dollar we retain. 我们会支付 - 我们很可能会支付非常大的股息或根本不支付股息，因为我们的测试是我们是否认为我们可以以某种方式使用资金 - 在某种程度上 - 它创造了超过1美元的市场价值我们保留的每一美元。

Obviously, if we can keep a dollar and it becomes, on a present-value basis, worth more than a dollar, it's foolish to pay it out. 显然，如果我们可以保留一美元，并且在现值基础上变得价值超过一美元，那么支付它是愚蠢的。

Forget all about taxes.Assume it's a tax-free society.We would have exactly the same dividend policy up to this point, whether there was any tax on dividends, capital gains, or anything else, or whether we were entirely tax-free. 忘掉税收的一切。假设它是一个无税的社会。到目前为止，我们会有完全相同的股息政策，是否对股息，资本收益或其他任何事项征税，或者我们是否完全免税。

Because we have retained money because, to date, we have felt that if we keep a dollar and use it in buying other businesses, or whatever it may be, that it becomes worth more than a dollar on a present-value basis — I mean, not that it's going to be worth a dollar-ten four years from now — but that it's worth more than a dollar when we look at what it'll be four years from now. 因为我们保留了资金，因为到目前为止，我们已经感到如果我们保留一美元并将其用于购买其他业务或其他任何业务，那么它在现值基础上变得超过一美元 - 我的意思是并不是说从现在起四年后价值一美元 - 但是当我们看看它将在四年后的价值时它的价值超过一美元。

That's subjective, but any given decision like that is subjective.Over time, you get an objective test as whether that's met by — whether we do indeed create more value than — each dollar retained earnings, we create an extra dollar-plus of value. 这是主观的，但任何给定的决定都是主观的。随着时间的推移，你会得到一个客观的测试，无论我们是否确实创造了更多的价值 - 每一美元的留存收益，我们创造了额外的美元加价值。

If that changed — and it could change — then we would give the money to the shareholders.And it might be done through repurchases or it might be done through dividends, but we would — there's no reason to keep a dollar in the business that's worth 90 cents if you keep it in the business. 如果这改变了 - 它可能会改变 - 那么我们就会把钱交给股东。它可能是通过回购来完成的，也可能是通过股息来完成的，但我们会 - 如果你把它留在业务中，没有理由在价值90美分的业务中保留一美元。

And there are companies that do that, but they don't — they're not necessarily intentionally doing it.They may have higher aspirations as they go along, but they're not realized. 并且有些公司会这样做，但他们没有 - 他们不一定是故意这样做的。随着他们的进展，他们可能有更高的愿望，但他们没有意识到。

We, I think, would be fairly objective about trying to ﬁgure out whether we are indeed creating value or destroying value by retaining earnings. 我认为，对于试图弄清楚我们是否确实通过保留收益来创造价值或破坏价值，我们是相当客观的。

We would never have a conventional dividend policy.I mean, the idea of paying out 20 percent of your earnings, or 10 percent, or 30 percent of earnings in dividends strikes us as nuts.I mean, you may get yourself in a position where you have to do it because you build these expectations in people's minds, but it is — there is no logic to it whatsoever. 我们永远不会有传统的股息政策。我的意思是，支付20％的收入，或10％，或30％的股息收益的想法让我们感到疯狂。我的意思是，你可能会让自己处于一个你必须这样做的位置，因为你在人们的脑海中建立了这些期望，但事实是 - 它没有任何逻辑。

The logic is basic.If you create more than a dollar value for a dollar retained, why in the world would you pay it out, because the people who want to get that dollar as a dividend can instead get a dollar-ten by selling the stock for — or whateverit may be — a dollar-twenty— for the value that was maintained — or retained. 逻辑是基本的。如果你为保留的美元创造了超过1美元的价值，那么为什么世界上你会支付它，因为想要将这美元作为股息的人可以通过出售股票来获得1美元 - 或者其他它可能是 - 维持 - 或保留的价值的二十美元。

So, that — it's a very simple dividend philosophy, and one, I think, that's in one of the past annual reports.We explain the logic of it.And I see no — nothing that would change, in terms of the principles of it. 所以，这是一个非常简单的股息理念，我认为，这是过去年度报告中的一个。我们解释它的逻辑。我认为没有 - 就其原则而言，没有任何改变。

Evaluating whether that's the case — I mean, obviously we aren't going to make a decision every week based on whether we can employ money that week at a higher rate of return, or every month. 评估是否是这种情况 - 我的意思是，显然我们不会每周做出决定，这取决于我们是否可以以更高的回报率或每个月的那一周雇佣资金。 But in terms of a reasonable expectancy over a couple-year period, whether we think we can use retained earnings advantageously, that's our yardstick. 但就几年期间的合理预期而言，我们是否认为我们可以有利地使用留存收益，这是我们的标准。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what's interesting about what Warren is saying about logical dividend policy is that if you went to all the leading business schools of the United States, all the leading economics departments, all the professors of corporate ﬁnance — this wasn't — wouldn't be the way they teach the subject. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，沃伦关于合理分红政策的说法有趣的是，如果你去了美国所有领先的商学院，所有主要的经济学系，所有的公司财务教授 - 这不是 - 不会是他们教导这个主题的方式。

In other words, we're basically saying we're right and all the rest of academia is wrong. (Laughter) 换句话说，我们基本上说我们是对的，所有其他学术界都是错的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We love it when we do that.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：当我们这样做时，我们喜欢它。（笑声）

16. We never sell a business and rarely sell a stock 我们从不出售业务，也很少出售股票

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll go to 6. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们会去6。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm Mark Chere (PH) from Hong Kong. 听众：我是来自香港的Mark Chere（PH）。

And Mr. Buffett, I'd like to ask you a couple of questions.The ﬁrst one is how many insurance companies does Berkshire Hathaway own? 巴菲特先生，我想问你几个问题。第一个是Berkshire Hathaway拥有多少家保险公司？

WARREN BUFFETT: Let me — WARREN BUFFETT：让我 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can't ﬁgure out the total. 观众：我无法弄清楚总数。

WARREN BUFFETT: Let me answer that and then you go on to your second one. WARREN BUFFETT：让我回答一下，然后再继续你的第二个问题。

We have a great number of companies because, in many cases, a given strategy or a given operation operates through multiple companies. 我们拥有众多公司，因为在许多情况下，特定战略或特定业务通过多家公司运营。

The company we announced the purchase of the other day is really one business, but it has three companies. 我们宣布购买前几天的公司真的是一家公司，但它有三家公司。

I wouldn't be surprised — I've never looked at the number — but it wouldn't surprise me if we have 20 insurance companies or something.Maybe 25 or 30, who knows? 我不会感到惊讶 - 我从来没有看过这个数字 - 但如果我们有20家保险公司或其他什么我也不会感到惊讶。也许25或30，谁知道？

We have about nine or 10 basic insurance operations for which a given management has responsibility, but there's a lot of state laws applicable to insurance companies and different regulations. 我们有大约九到十个基本保险业务，特定管理层负有责任，但有很多州法律适用于保险公司和不同的法规。

It's often advantageous to have a number of companies operating under one management to achieve one operational goal. 让一些公司在一个管理层下运营以实现一个运营目标通常是有利的。

The big operations are General Re, and GEICO, and the National Indemnity reinsurance operation run by Ajit [Jain]. 大型业务是General Re和GEICO，以及由Ajit [Jain]运营的国家赔偿再保险业务。

And then we have a group of about ﬁve different operations that are all very decent businesses, but are not as big as the three I mentioned.Go ahead. 然后我们有一组大约五个不同的业务，都是非常体面的业务，但没有我提到的三个大。前进。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.Yeah, my main question is this.Much has been written by you, and a lot more by other people, about your criteria, or the criteria you use when you make a purchase of a company, either in full or in part. 听众会员：谢谢。是的，我的主要问题是这个。您和其他人撰写的内容很多，关于您的标准，或您在购买公司时使用的标准，无论是全部还是部分。

But almost nothing has been written by you, at any rate as far as I can tell, on your criteria for selling a company that you have already — you have previously purchased. 但是，据我所知，你几乎没有任何关于出售你已经购买过的公司的标准的任何信息。

And I wonder if you could outline the criteria you might apply today to a sale of a company, and whether you would go — well, the simplest way to put it is this: Would you agree with Philip Fisher, who said there were two reasonsto sell a company — or a stock? 我想知道你是否可以概述你今天可能适用于出售公司的标准，以及你是否愿意 - 最简单的方法就是这样：你是否赞同菲利普·费舍尔，他说有两个原因出售公司 - 或股票？ One was when you'd discovered you've made a mistake in your analysis and the company was not what you thought it was. 一个是当你发现你在分析中犯了一个错误时，公司并不是你想象的那样。

And the second when — was when the — something within the company had changed, the management had changed or so on, so it no longer met your original criteria. 第二次 - 当公司内部的某些事情发生变化，管理层发生了变化等等，因此它不再符合您的原始标准。

Would you — are those the principles that you apply or would you say there are different ones or others?Thank you. 你是 - 那些你应用的原则还是你说有不同的或其他原则？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: I'm glad you brought up Phil Fisher, because he is a terriﬁc mind and investor.He's probably in his 90s now, and — but his — WARREN BUFFETT：我很高兴你带来了Phil Fisher，因为他是一个了不起的头脑和投资者。他现在可能已经90多岁了，而且 - 但他的 -

A couple of books he wrote in the early '60s are classics and I advise everybody here who's really interested in investments to read those two books from the earlier '60s. 他在60年代早期写的几本书都是经典着作，我建议这里的每个人真正对投资感兴趣，阅读60年代早期的那两本书。

And he's a nice man.I went out to — 40 years ago, I dropped into his ofﬁce in San Francisco, a tiny ofﬁce.And he was kind enough to spend some time with me.And I'm a huge admirer of his. 他是一个好人。我出去了 - - 40年前，我去了旧金山办公室，一个小办公室。他很善良，可以和我共度时光。而且我是他的崇拜者。

The criteria that we use for selling a business that we own control of are articulated in the annual report, under the ground rules. 我们用于出售我们拥有控制权的业务的标准在年度报告中根据基本规则明确阐述。

So in terms of businesses that we own, we have set forth — and I direct you there — we've written those same ground rules every year since 1983. And actually, we had those in our head for decades before that. 因此，就我们拥有的业务而言，我们已经提出 - 我指导你 - 我们自1983年以来每年都写出相同的基本规则。事实上，在那之前我们已经掌握了数十年。

And we have this quirk, which you should understand, and we want our shareholders to understand it, that even though we got offered a price that was far above its economic value, as we might calculate it going in — but if we got offered aprice for that for a business that we have now, we have no interest in selling it. 我们有这个怪癖，你应该理解，我们希望我们的股东能够理解它，即使我们得到的价格远高于其经济价值，我们可能会计算它的价格 - 但如果我们得到了对于我们现在拥有的业务的价格，我们没有兴趣出售它。 You know, we just — we don't break off the relationships that we develop simply because we get offered a fancy price for something.And we've had a chance to do that sometimes. 你知道，我们只是 - 我们不会因为我们得到一些奇特的价格而中断我们发展的关系。我们有时候有机会这样做。

That may help us, actually, in acquiring businesses, because both of the companies that I've committed to buy in the last few weeks, both of them are very concerned about whether they have found a permanent home or not. 实际上，这可能有助于我们收购业务，因为我在过去几周内承诺购买的两家公司都非常担心他们是否找到了永久性住宅。

And people who build their businesses lovingly over 30, or 40, or 50 years, frequently care about that.A lot of people don't care about that. 那些在30年，40年或50年之间建立业务的人经常关心这一点。很多人不关心这一点。

And that's one of the things we evaluate when buying a business.We look at the owner, and we say, "Do you love the — " in effect, we ask ourselves, "Does he love the business or does he love the money?" 这是我们在购买企业时评估的事情之一。我们看着主人，我们说，“你喜欢 - ”实际上，我们问自己，“他喜欢这个行业还是他喜欢这笔钱？”

Nothing wrong with liking the money.In fact, we'd be a little disappointed if most of them didn't like the money.But in terms of whether the primacy is loving the money or loving the business, that's very important to us. 喜欢这笔钱没什么不对。事实上，如果大多数人不喜欢钱，我们会有点失望。但就首要任务是爱钱还是热爱业务而言，这对我们来说非常重要。

And when we ﬁnd somebody that loves their business — and likes the money — but loves their business, we are a very, very desirable home for them, because we're just about the only people that they can deal with, of size, wherewe can commit that they are going to be part of this operation, really, forever, and be able to deliver on that promise. 当我们发现有人喜欢他们的业务 - 并且喜欢这些钱 - 但他们喜欢他们的业务时，我们对他们来说是一个非常非常理想的家，因为我们只是他们可以处理的唯一人，他们的规模，我们可以承诺，他们将成为这项行动的一部分，真的，永远，并能够实现这一承诺。

I tell sellers that the only person that can double-cross them is me.I can double-cross them.But there's never going to be a takeover of Berkshire.There's never going to be a management consultant come in and say, "I think you'd better do this." 我告诉卖家，唯一能够跨越他们的人就是我。我可以双重交叉。但是，永远不会收购伯克希尔。管理顾问从来都不会说，“我认为你最好这样做。”

There's never going to be a response to Wall Street saying, "Why aren't you a pure play on this or that and therefore you ought to spin this off the—?"None of that's going to happen. 永远不会对华尔街的回应说：“为什么你不是这个或那个纯粹的游戏，因此你应该把它从 - ？”这些都不会发生。

And we can tell them, with a hundred percent assuredness, that for a very long time — that if they make a decision to come with Berkshire, they — that decision will be the ﬁnal decision as to where their company resides. 我们可以百分之百地保证，在很长一段时间内 - 如果他们决定与伯克希尔一起决定，他们 - 这个决定将是他们公司所在地的最终决定。

So, unless those couple conditions, which are extremely unusual, that are described in the ground rules prevail, we will not be selling operating businesses, even though someone might offer us far more than, logically, they're worth. 因此，除非在基本规则中描述的那些非常不寻常的夫妻条件占上风，否则我们不会出售经营业务，即使有人可能提供给我们远远超过逻辑上他们的价值。

The question about stocks is, we're not quite with Phil Fisher on that, but we're very close.We love buying stocks where we think the businesses are so solid, have such economic advantage, that we can essentially ride with them forever. 关于股票的问题是，我们与Phil Fisher并不完全相同，但我们非常接近。我们喜欢购买我们认为业务非常稳固，具有这样的经济优势的股票，我们可以永远与他们一起乘坐。

But you've heard me talk about newspapers earlier today.We would have thought newspapers — 20, 25 years ago, I think Charlie and I probably thought a daily newspaper, you know, in a single newspaper town — which practically all are — is probably about the solidest investment you could ﬁnd. 但是你今天早些时候听说我在谈论报纸。我们原本以为报纸--20年前，25年前，我认为查理和我可能认为，在一个报纸城镇 - 几乎所有的报纸 - 都可以找到一份日报，这可能是你能找到的最实惠的投资。

We might have thought a network TV-afﬁliated station was about as solid as you could ﬁnd.And they were very solid. 我们可能认为网络电视附属电台的确如你所能找到的那样稳固。他们非常坚实。

But events have, over the last 20 or 25 years, have certainly changed that to some degree and maybe to a very, very big degree. 但是，在过去的20年或25年中，事件确实在某种程度上改变了这一点，也许在非常非常大的程度上。

So we will occasionally reevaluate the economic characteristics that we see 10 years out from the ones that we saw 10 years ago and maybe come to a somewhat different conclusion. 因此，我们偶尔会重新评估我们从10年前所看到的10年后看到的经济特征，并可能得出一个不同的结论。

The ﬁrst 20 years of investing for me — or maybe more — my decision to sell almost always was based on the fact that I found something else I was dying to buy. 为我投资的前20年 - 或许更多 - 我的销售决定几乎总是基于我发现了一些我渴望购买的东西。

I mean, I sold stocks at — you know, at three times earnings to buy stocks at two times earnings 45 years ago, because I was always running out of money.Now, I run out of ideas.I've got a lot of money but no ideas, and — (Laughter) 我的意思是，我卖了股票 - 你知道，三倍于45年前以两倍的收益买入股票，因为我总是没钱了。现在，我已经没想完了。我有很多钱，但没有想法，而且 - （笑声）

You know, I'd — I'm not sure which is better.What do you think, Charlie?(Laughter) 你知道，我 - 我不确定哪个更好。你觉得怎么样，查理？（笑声）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think you were way better off when you had 50 years ahead of you — (laughter) — and less money. CHARLIE MUNGER：我觉得你比你提前50年好多了 - （笑声） - 而且钱少了。

WARREN BUFFETT: I still think I have 50 years ahead of me, Charlie.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我仍然认为我比我早50年，查理。（笑声）

You want to elaborate any more on selling? 你想详细说明销售情况吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.We almost never sell an operating business.And when it does happen, it's usually because we've got some trouble we can't ﬁx. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。我们几乎从不出售经营业务。当它确实发生时，通常是因为我们遇到了一些我们无法解决的麻烦。

17. Compensation based on stock price is a "lottery ticket" 17.基于股票价格的补偿是“彩票”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 7. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，7号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, I'm Martin Wiegand from Chevy Chase, Maryland. 听众：你好，我是来自马里兰州Chevy Chase的Martin Wiegand。

And, though you've given yourself a D in capital allocation, on behalf of the shareholders, we would like to give you an A-plus in honesty and accounting, temperament for a long-term investing view, and hosting an annual meeting. 而且，虽然你已经代表股东给了自己一个D资本分配，但我们希望给你一个诚实和会计的A +，长期投资观点的气质，以及举办年会。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thanks.(Applause) 沃伦巴菲特：谢谢。（掌声）

I went to school with Martin's father.Good to see you here. 我和马丁的父亲一起上学。很高兴在这里见到你。 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.Now my question.Do General Re's competitors pay their employees with a rational incentive plan aimed at growing ﬂoat and reducing its cost, or do they use something similar to General Re's old plan, and is this a new, sustainable, competitive advantage for General Re? 听众会员：谢谢。现在我的问题。 General Re的竞争对手向员工支付合理的激励计划，旨在增加浮动并降低成本，或者他们是否使用类似于General Re的旧计划，这对于General Re来说是一个新的，可持续的竞争优势吗？

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think a rational compensation plan — and I think we have rational compensation plans — we certainly aim at that, and we don't care what convention is. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我认为一个合理的薪酬计划 - 我认为我们有合理的薪酬计划 - 我们当然是以此为目标，而我们并不关心什么是惯例。

Over time, we'll select for people who are rational themselves, who have conﬁdence in their abilities to deliver under a rational plan, and who really appreciate operating in that kind of an environment. 随着时间的推移，我们将选择那些理性的人，他们对自己在理性计划下提供能力的信心，以及真正欣赏在这种环境中运作的人。

Now, who wouldn't want a lottery ticket, you know?I mean, if anybody here wants to buy a few lottery tickets at the lunch break and come up and present them to me, I'll be glad to take them. 现在，谁不想要彩票，你知道吗？我的意思是，如果这里有人想在午休时间买几张彩票然后出现给我，我很乐意接受他们。

I don't think it will have anything to do with, you know, my performance at Berkshire Hathaway or anything in the future. 我不认为这与我在Berkshire Hathaway的表现或未来的任何事情有任何关系。

And so, we try to make plans that are very rational.And incidentally, we've never had any real problems at all in working with managements to do just that. 因此，我们试图制定非常合理的计划。顺便说一下，我们在与管理层合作时从来没有遇到任何实际问题。

The two operations that I've just recently agreed to buy, we will have rational compensation plans at those places.And they'll be somewhat different, perhaps, than the ones they've had in the past, although not much different, as I think about it. 我刚刚同意购买的两项业务，我们将在这些地方制定合理的补偿计划。他们或许会比他们过去的那些有所不同，尽管没有太大的不同，正如我想的那样。

I think it's been a huge advantage at GEICO to have a plan that is far more rational than the one that preceded it.And I think that advantage will do nothing but grow stronger over time because, in effect, compensation is our way of speaking to employees, generally. 我认为GEICO的一个巨大优势是制定一个比之前更加合理的计划。而且我认为这种优势只能随着时间的推移而变得更强大，因为实际上，薪酬通常是我们与员工交谈的方式。 And with a place as large as GEICO, you can't speak to them all directly.But it speaks to them all the time.It says what we think the rational measurement of productivity and performance in the business is. 有了像GEICO这样大的地方，你不能直接和他们说话。但它一直对他们说话。它说我们认为对业务生产力和绩效的合理衡量是。

And over time, that gets absorbed by thousands and thousands of people.And it's the best way to get them to buy into their goals. 随着时间的推移，这会被成千上万的人吸收。这是让他们购买目标的最佳方式。

Whereas, if you use as your test what the stock market is going to do, people, I think, inherently know they got a lottery ticket.I mean, you've seen that in a lot of tech stocks in the last three or four months. 然而，如果你使用股票市场将要做的测试，我认为人们天生就知道他们有彩票。我的意思是，你在过去的三四个月里看到很多科技股。

You will ﬁnd all kinds of options being repriced, or issued in great abundance at lower prices without repricing them because they don't want to have the accounting consequences.Those people know they're getting lottery tickets, basically. 你会发现各种选择被重新定价，或以较低的价格大量发行而不重新定价，因为他们不想有会计后果。那些人基本上都知道他们正在获得彩票。

And, you know, the market's attitude toward tech stocks is what's going to determine results far more than their own individual results. 而且，你知道，市场对科技股的态度决定的结果远远超过他们自己的个人结果。

So, it's silly to think of somebody working very hard at some very small job at Berkshire, with our aggregate market value of 90 billion, thinking that their efforts are going to move the stock. 因此，想到有人在伯克希尔的一个非常小的工作岗位上工作非常愚蠢，我们的总市值为900亿，认为他们的努力将会推动股票的发展。

But their efforts may very well move the number of policy holders we gain or the satisfaction of policy holders.And if we can ﬁnd ways to pay them based on that, we are far more in sync with what they can do.And they know it makes more sense. 但他们的努力可能会很好地改变我们获得的保单持有人数量或保单持有人的满意度。如果我们能够找到基于此的方式来支付它们，我们就会更加与他们能做的事情保持同步。他们知道这更有意义。

So, I hope our competitors do all kinds of crazy things on comp and everything else.I mean, the more dumb things they do, the better life is for us.And I think that — 所以，我希望我们的竞争对手在comp和其他所有事情上做各种疯狂的事情。我的意思是，他们做的事情越愚蠢，我们的生活就越美好。我认为 -

Well, we've had incredible success at keeping managers.I don't think there's probably any company in the United States of size that has had better luck on that than Berkshire. 好吧，我们在保持经理方面取得了令人难以置信的成功。我不认为美国的任何一家公司可能比伯克希尔有更好的运气。

And partly, it's because we appreciate, in terms of the comp plan, and partly because we just appreciate, generally, managers that do a terriﬁc job for us.And we've got the best group in the world. 部分原因是因为我们赞赏comp计划，部分原因是我们只是欣赏那些为我们做出了不错工作的经理人。我们拥有世界上最好的团队。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, here again, we're very much out of step with the conventions of the world. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，在这里，我们与世界的惯例非常不一致。

When I read annual reports, and I read a lot of them, I'm very frequently irritated by the presence of things that are totally absent from the Berkshire Hathaway annual report. 当我阅读年度报告，并且我阅读了很多年报时，我常常对伯克希尔哈撒韦年度报告中完全没有的事情感到恼火。

I think promising people free medical care forever, between age 60 and the grave, and maybe for a younger spouse after the grave, but the ﬁrst one, regardless of what's invented and regardless of what it cost, I don't see how anybody whocared about the shareholders would be making promises like that. 我认为有希望的人永远免费医疗，60岁到坟墓之间，也许是坟墓后的年轻配偶，但是第一个，无论发明什么，无论花费多少，我都看不出有谁关心股东会做出这样的承诺。

There's a lot of insanity in conventional corporate conduct on the pay front.And — but if convention determined what was sane and what was insane, we're the oddballs.I mean, we're the unusual example. 在薪酬方面，传统的公司行为有很多疯狂。并且 - 但如果惯例确定什么是理智和什么是疯了，我们就是古怪的。我的意思是，我们是一个不寻常的例子。

WARREN BUFFETT: I think per — and I think it's very subconscious, but I think, sometimes, that the desires of the top person to get an outrageous amount gets pyramided through the organization. WARREN BUFFETT：我认为 - 并且我认为它是非常潜意识的，但我认为，有时候，最高人获得一个令人发指的金额的欲望会在组织中被金字塔化。

Because if they're going to have some scheme that rewards them based on a lottery ticket, they feel they have to give lottery tickets to everybody else, although on a much-reduced scale. 因为如果他们要有一些根据彩票奖励他们的计划，他们觉得他们必须给其他人提供彩票，尽管规模大大减少。 And they really do.I mean, it's just — it becomes accepted in the course.And then you hire consultants who come around and say, "Well, you're getting more lottery tickets at someplace else. And we've got some added new schemes."It becomes very, very reinforcing. 他们确实这样做了。我的意思是，它只是 - 它在课程中被接受了。然后你聘请了一些顾问，他们说：“好吧，你在其他地方获得了更多的彩票。我们还有一些新的计划。”它变得非常非常强化。

But what has happened at the top level is really unbelievable.I mean, it — if an executive said to his company, "I want an option on 300 — just for working here — I want an option on $300 million worth of S&P futures for the next 10 years," you know, people would regardthat as outrageous.They'd say, "What have you got to do with that?" 但在顶层发生的事情实在令人难以置信。我的意思是，如果一位高管对他的公司说，“我想要一个 300的选择 - 只是为了在这里工作 - 我想在未来10年选择价值3亿美元的标准普尔期货，”你知道，人们会认为那太离谱了。他们会说，“你有什么关系？”

But in effect, if they get one on their own stock and it goes up based on the fact the S&P appreciates over 10 years, they think that that's perfectly acceptable to have that kind of a ride. 但实际上，如果他们在自己的股票上获得一个并且基于标准普尔指数超过10年的事实而上涨，他们认为这样做是完全可以接受的。

So I would say that, you know, there's been a lot of talk about the huge gap between, you know — that exists in pay.But it seems to me that the primary gap that is eating at American CEOs is the gap between the rich and the super-rich.That seems to be motivating the adoption of many plans. 所以我想说，你知道，关于薪酬存在的巨大差距，已经有很多话题。但在我看来，美国首席执行官们面临的主要差距是富人与超富人之间的差距。这似乎激励了许多计划的采用。

It's really — it's gotten out of hand, but it isn't going to change.The CEO has his hand on the switch as a practical matter.I know people, and I've been on them myself, but on comp committees.And as a practical matter, you don't stand a chance. 它真的 - 它已经失控了，但它不会改变。作为一个实际问题，首席执行官将他的手放在开关上。我认识的人，我自己一直在这些人，但在comp委员会。而作为一个实际问题，你没有机会。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, a lot of the corporate compensation plans of the modern era worked just about the way things would work for a farmer or if you put a rat colony in the grainery.It — (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，现代时代的许多公司薪酬计划只是关于事情对农民的影响方式，或者如果你把老鼠的殖民地放在农业中。它 - （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Put him down as undecided.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：犹豫不决。（笑声）

Good to see you, Martin. 很高兴见到你，马丁。 18. We ignore book value for our stock investments 18.我们忽略了股票投资的账面价值

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, let's go to 8. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们去8。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.My name is Ram Tarecard (PH) from Sugar Land, Texas. 观众：巴菲特先生和芒格先生，早上好。我的名字是来自德克萨斯州Sugar Land的Ram Tarecard（PH）。

I've been a Berkshire shareholder since 1987 and always battling with the idea of what really is the intrinsic value for the company. 自1987年以来，我一直是伯克希尔的股东，并且一直在与公司内在价值的真正想法作斗争。

We have seen that, over time, a change in book value is a big indicator of the change in intrinsic value of Berkshire.Although in absolute terms, you have said again and again, that intrinsic value far exceeds book value. 我们已经看到，随着时间的推移，账面价值的变化是伯克希尔内在价值变化的一个重要指标。虽然从绝对意义上说，你已经一次又一次地说过，但这种内在价值远远超过账面价值。

In calculating the book value of Berkshire, our partly-owned businesses, like Coke and Gillette, are valued at their market value.This component of book value ﬂuctuates, often irrationally, depending on the mood of the market. 在计算伯克希尔的账面价值时，我们的部分所有业务，如可口可乐和吉列，都按其市场价值计算。账面价值的这一部分根据市场情绪波动，通常是非理性的。

Do you think that using a look-through book value, just like you used look-through earnings, is a superior measure for tracking changes in intrinsic value? 您是否认为使用外观账面价值，就像您使用外观收益一样，是跟踪内在价值变化的一种更好的衡量标准？

In fact, I had written a letter to you last August and I was very pleased to get a response from you personally saying that this approach makes sense. 事实上，我去年八月写了一封信给你，我很高兴收到你个人的回复，说这种方法是有道理的。

My question is, does this approach really give you a better measure for tracking intrinsic value? And if so, would you consider publishing it in the annual report?Thank you. 我的问题是，这种方法真的能为您提供更好的衡量内在价值的方法吗？如果是这样，您会考虑在年度报告中发布吗？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, thanks for the question.I would say that — I'm not sure how you phrased it when you wrote me and how I phrased it going back, but look-through book value would not mean much, actually. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，谢谢你的提问。我会这么说 - 我不确定你写这篇文章时你是怎么说的，以及我怎么说它会回来，但实际上看书的价值看起来并不多。

The very best businesses, the really wonderful businesses, require no book value.They — and we are — we want to buy businesses, really, that will deliver more and more cash and not need to retain cash, which is what builds up book value over time. 最好的企业，真正精彩的企业，不需要账面价值。他们 - 我们是 - 我们想要购买企业，真的，这将提供越来越多的现金，而不需要保留现金，这是随着时间推移建立账面价值的原因。

Admittedly, the prices of marketable securities, at any given time, are not a great indication of their intrinsic value.They are far better, though, than the book value of those companies in indicating intrinsic value. 无可否认，在任何特定时间，有价证券的价格都不是其内在价值的重要标志。然而，它们比那些表明内在价值的公司的账面价值要好得多。

Berkshire's book — Berkshire's intrinsic value, in a very general way, and trends in it, are better reﬂected in book value than is the case at a very high percentage of companies.It's still a very — it's not a great proxy. 伯克希尔的着作 - 伯克希尔的内在价值，以及其中的趋势，在书籍价值中比在很高比例的公司中更好地反映出来。它仍然非常 - 它不是一个伟大的代理。

It's the best — it's a proxy that is useful in terms of direction, in terms of degree, in a general way over time.But it's not a substitute for intrinsic value. 这是最好的 - 它是一个代理，在程度方面，在程度方面，在一般方面随着时间的推移是有用的。但它不能代替内在价值。

It — in our case, when we started with Berkshire, intrinsic value was below book value.Our company was not worth book value in early 1965. You could not have sold the assets for that price that they were carried on the books, you could not have — no one could make a calculation, in terms of future cash ﬂows that would indicatethat those assets were worth their carrying value. 它 - 在我们的案例中，当我们从伯克希尔开始时，内在价值低于账面价值。我们的公司在1965年初不值得账面价值。你不可能按照它们账面上的价格出售资产，你不可能 - 没有人可以计算，就未来的现金流而言那些资产值得他们的账面价值。

Now it is true that our businesses are worth a great deal more than book value.And that's occurred gradually over time.So obviously, there are a number of years when our intrinsic value grew greater than our book value to get where we are today. 现在，我们的业务确实比账面价值更有价值。随着时间的推移，这种情况逐渐发生。显而易见，多年来，我们的内在价值增长超过了我们的账面价值，以达到我们今天的目标。

Book value is not a bad starting point in the case of Berkshire.It's far from the ﬁnishing point.It's no starting point at all of any kind in — you know, whether it's The Washington Post or Coca- Cola or Gillette. 伯克希尔的账面价值并不是一个糟糕的起点。这远远不是终点。无论是华盛顿邮报还是可口可乐还是吉列，它都不是任何一种起点。

It's a factor we ignore.We do look at what a company is able to earn on invested assets and what it can earn on incremental invested assets.But the book value, we do not give a thought to. 这是我们忽略的一个因素。我们确实研究了公司能够通过投资资产获得的收益以及它可以通过增量投资资产获得的收益。但是书的价值，我们没有考虑到。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think that's obviously correct.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为这显然是正确的。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.He'll come back next year. WARREN BUFFETT：哦。他明年会回来。

19. Markets: "Wild things create their own truth for a while" 19.市场：“野生事物在一段时间内创造了自己的真理”

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 1. (Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：第1号。（笑声）

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, gentleman.My name's Dan Sheehan.I'm from Toronto, Canada. 观众：你好，先生。我叫Dan Sheehan。我来自加拿大多伦多。

First of all, I'd like to thank you for this weekend.It's become more and more important to me as it's become more and more difﬁcult to ﬁnd a rational discussion about the stock market.And this weekend really is a breath of fresh air for most of us, I think. 首先，我要感谢你们这个周末。这对我来说变得越来越重要，因为找到关于股票市场的理性讨论变得越来越困难。我想，这个周末对我们大多数人来说真的是一股清新的空气。

One of the places I refer to a lot is Benjamin Graham.And what worries me now is what he referred to — is a period in 1929, in the early '30s — as a lab experiment that — where normal intrinsic values and margins of safety broke down, or seemed to, anyway. 我经常提到的其中一个地方是本杰明格雷厄姆。我现在担心的是他所提到的 - 在1929年，即30年代初期 - 作为一个实验室实验 - 正常的内在价值和安全边缘无论如何都会破坏或者似乎。

And I wonder how much you think that might happen now or in the next few years, and how much you worry about that with the investments you're making. 我想知道你认为现在或未来几年可能会发生多少，以及你对你正在进行的投资有多担心。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we generally believe you can just see anything in markets.I mean, just extraordinary what happens in markets over time.It gets sorted out, you know, eventually. WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，我们一般认为你可以在市场上看到任何东西。我的意思是，随着时间的推移市场发生的变化非同寻常你知道，它最终会被整理出来。 But, I mean, we have seen companies sell for tens of billion dollars that are worthless.And at times, we have seen things sell for 20 percent — a number of things, not hard to ﬁnd, perfectly decent running them — sell for literally 20 percent or 25 percent of what they were worth. 但是，我的意思是，我们已经看到公司出售价值数百亿美元的公司，这些公司毫无价值。有时候，我们看到的东西卖了20％ - 很多东西，不难找到，非常体面的运行 - 卖出的价格几乎是它们价值的20％或25％。

So we have seen and will continue to see everything.It's just the nature of markets.They produce wild, wild things over time. 所以我们已经看到并将继续看到一切。这只是市场的本质。随着时间的推移，它们产生野生的野生物

And the trick is, occasionally, to take advantage of one of those wild things and not to get carried away when other wild things happen. 偶尔，诀窍是利用其中一种狂野的东西，而不是在其他野生事物发生时被带走。

Because the wild things create their own truth for a while and you have to — you know, you — that's the reason they're happening, and people are getting pleasant experiences and all that.You'll see everything if you're around markets for a reasonable period of time. 因为狂野的事物在一段时间内创造了自己的真理，你必须 - 你知道，你 - 这就是他们发生的原因，人们正在获得愉快的经历和所有这些。如果你在市场上呆了一段合理的时间，你会看到一切。

We don't see any great cases of dramatic undervaluation by this market.So it isn't like we're seeing — because there's this — perhaps this speculative mania in a particular area of the market, we do not see that creating incredible undervaluation other places. 我们认为这个市场没有任何大幅低估的大案例。所以它不像我们所看到的那样 - 因为就是这样 - 也许是市场特定领域的这种投机狂热，我们看不到在其他地方创造令人难以置信的低估。

What's happening there may lead to undervaluation, you know, a few years from now.Or it may not, I don't know that, but we're — 你知道，那里发生的事情可能会在几年之后导致低估。或者它可能不会，我不知道，但我们 -

It isn't like you can ﬁnd things that are worth double or thereabouts what you're paying because, frankly, there's so much money sloshing around that if you found such a thing, it would be very likely corrected by some buyout types. 这并不是说你可以找到值得双倍或者左右的东西，因为坦率地说，如果你发现了这样的东西，就会有如此多的钱晃动，很可能会被一些买断类型纠正。

I mean, we would love to find businesses that are selling for half of what they're intrinsically worth.We don't find that.We do find a lot of cases where we think the evaluations on the high side are just — are unbelievable. 我的意思是，我们希望找到销售价值一半的商家。我们没有找到。我们发现很多情况下我们认为高端评估只是 - 令人难以置信。 We have been in periods in the past where we felt almost everything was being given away, too.So you'll get those extremes.Most of the time the market's in a position where there's a little of both, but every now and then, it gets into a position where there's a lot of one or the other. 我们过去曾经感觉到几乎所有东西都被送走了。所以你会得到那些极端。大多数情况下，市场处于两者兼而有之的位置，但时不时地，它会进入一个存在很多其中一个的位置。

And we would — you know, we would love it if we could ﬁnd a lot of reasonable-sized companies that were selling at what we thought were half of the intrinsic value.We're not ﬁnding them. 我们会 - 你知道，如果我们能找到许多合理规模的公司，而我们认为这些公司的内在价值只有一半，我们就会喜欢它。我们找不到它们。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I do think that the present time is a very unusual period.It's hard to think of a time when residential real estate, and common stocks, and so on, rose so rapidly in price and there was so much easy money ﬂoating around.I mean, this is a very unusual period. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我认为现在的时间非常不寻常。很难想象住宅房地产，普通股等等价格上涨如此之快，而且还有那么多宽松的资金浮动。我的意思是，这是一个非常不寻常的时期。

WARREN BUFFETT: What's fascinating — and I'm sure you've thought of it — is that you can now have a business — we saw a few of them, you know, earlier this year we'll say — that might've beenselling for $10 billion where the business itself could not have borrowed, probably, a hundred million dollars in debt, with an equity evaluation of 10 billion. WARREN BUFFETT：有什么吸引人的 - 我相信你已经想到了 - 你现在可以开展业务了 - 我们看到其中一些，你知道，今年早些时候我们会说 - 这可能是以100亿美元的价格出售该公司本身无法借入的资金，可能是一亿美元的债务，其股权评估为100亿美元。

But the business itself would not — as a private business — would not have been able to borrow a hundred million.But the owners of that business, because it's public, can borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper, because they have this market valuation. 但是，作为私营企业，企业本身不会借入一亿美元。但该业务的所有者，因为它是公开的，可以在他们的小纸上借了数十亿美元，因为他们有这个市场估值。

If it's a private business, the company itself couldn't borrow one-twentieth or so of what individuals could borrow. 如果是私营企业，公司本身就不能借用个人借款的二十分之一左右。

That's happened, to a degree, before.But this has probably been as extreme as anything that's happened, probably, including the '20s.That doesn't mean there's a parallel to it, but it's been pretty extreme. 在某种程度上，这种情况发生在此之前。但这可能与发生的事情一样极端，可能包括20世纪20年代。这并不意味着它与它平行，但它非常极端。 Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it probably is the most extreme that has happened in modern capitalism.In my lifetime, I would say the '30s were the — it created the worst recession in the English-speaking world in 600 years. CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为这可能是现代资本主义中最极端的事情。在我的一生中，我会说'30 年代 - 它创造了600年来英语世界最严重的经济衰退。

And it was very extreme.You could buy a "all-you-can-eat" in Omaha through the '30s for a quarter from Henderson's Cafeteria. 这非常极端。你可以在20世纪30年代从亨马德的自助餐厅购买奥马哈的“吃到饱”的四分之一。

And now we're seeing the other face of what capitalism can do.And this is almost as extreme as the '30s were, but in a different direction. 而现在我们正在看到资本主义可以做的另一面。这几乎和30年代一样极端，但方向不同。

It's zero unemployment, rampant speculation, et cetera, et cetera.It's an amazing period. 这是零失业，猖獗的猜测，等等。这是一个了不起的时期。

WARREN BUFFETT: That does not make it easy to predict, however, the outcome. WARREN BUFFETT：然而，这并不容易预测结果。

It says to us, though, certain things we want to stay away from.I mean, basically that's — it's precautionary to us.It does not spell opportunity. 但它告诉我们，我们想要远离某些事情。我的意思是，基本上就是这样 - 这对我们来说是预防性的。它没有拼出机会。

Although, there's no question that the — in the last year, the ability to monetize shareholder ignorance has never been exceeded, I think.Wouldn't you say so, Charlie?(Laughter) 尽管如此，毫无疑问，在过去的一年里，我认为从未超过股东无知的能力。你不是这么说的，查理？（笑声）

20. "It's so easy to copy in the internet" 20.“在互联网上复制这么容易”

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, number 2. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，2号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman.David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. 观众：早上好，先生。大卫温特斯，新泽西州高山湖泊。

Thanks again for Berkshire Fest 2000 and having it on Saturday, for those of us who tap dance to work on Monday.(Buffett laughs) 再次感谢Berkshire Fest 2000并于星期六举行，感谢我们这些星期一踢踏舞的人。（巴菲特笑） You know, over the previous 30 years or so, Berkshire has been a tactical participant in the insurance business.With the acquisition of Gen Re and the broadening of GEICO's scope, the company's been transformed into a mainstream activity. 你知道，在过去30年左右的时间里，伯克希尔一直是保险业务的战术参与者。随着Gen Re的收购和GEICO范围的扩大，该公司已经转变为主流活动。

How will this transformation result in growth and low cost ﬂoat over time?I.e., how do you avoid becoming average? 随着时间的推移，这种转变将如何导致增长和低成本浮动？即，你如何避免成为平均水平？

And to follow on with the very perceptive 10-year-old from California's question, will Berkshire's newspaper interest be able to make the successful transformation to the new electronic world, especially the unique content of the Washington Post?Thank you. 继续从加利福尼亚州的问题中看到十分敏感的10岁的人，伯克希尔的报纸是否能够成功转型到新的电子世界，特别是华盛顿邮报的独特内容？谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: Those are both good questions.I think, to answer your second one, I think the Buffalo News will do just as well as, if you take the top 50 papers in the country, in making a transition.How well the top 50 will do is really an open question. WARREN BUFFETT：这些都是好问题。我想，为了回答你的第二个，我认为布法罗新闻的做法和你在国内排名前50位的论文一样，都可以做到过渡。前50名的表现真的是一个悬而未决的问题。

And — but there is — you know, the industry factors will, in my view, just overwhelm any speciﬁc strategy.Because any strategy is — 并且 - 但是有 - 你知道，在我看来，行业因素将压倒任何具体的战略。因为任何策略是 -

It's so easy to copy in the internet.That's one of the problems of the internet.It's one of the problems of capitalism. 在互联网上复制很容易。这是互联网的问题之一。这是资本主义的问题之一。

I mean, if you open a restaurant that's successful, somebody's going to come in and ﬁgure out what your menu is and how — you know, the whole thing.And then they're going to try to do it in a little bit better location, or at a lower price, or whatever.That's what capitalism's all about and it's terriﬁc for consumers. 我的意思是，如果你打开一家成功的餐馆，有人会进来找出你的菜单是什么以及如何 - 你知道，整个事情。然后他们会尝试在更好的位置，或以更低的价格，或任何其他方式做到这一点。这就是资本主义的全部意义，对消费者来说非常棒。

The internet accentuates that process.I mean, it gives everybody in the world real estate.You know, there are no prime locations to speak of.I mean, I can give you the argument for how you develop one and all of that, but it really changes the world in a big way. 互联网强调了这一过程。我的意思是，它给了世界上所有人的房地产。你知道，没有黄金地段可言。我的意思是，我可以为你提出如何发展其中一个和所有这一点的论点，但它确实在很大程度上改变了世界。

You know, if you were at 16th and Farnam in Omaha in the '20s, with Woolworth — that's the place where the streetcar tracks crossed, you know, and a whole bunch of them were going north/south there and east/west — andthere wasn't any better real estate in town. 你知道，如果你在20世纪20年代在奥马哈的第16和Farnam与Woolworth一起 - 这就是有轨电车轨道交叉的地方，你知道，其中有很多人在那里向北/向南和东/西 - 和 - 镇上没有更好的房地产。

I'm not sure if that's worth as much now in nominal dollars as it was in the 1920s.But — and that looked permanent, incidentally.Who was going to rip up the streetcar tracks or — in 1910 or whenever it was? 我不确定现在的名义美元是否与20世纪20年代相同。但是 - 这看起来是永久的，顺便说一句。谁将要撕毁有轨电车轨道或 - 在1910年或任何时候？

So now, you rip up the tracks every day.You know, and so the ﬂuidity is incredible, in terms of moving economic resources around compared to what it was. 所以现在，你每天都会扯掉赛道。你知道，所以流动性是不可思议的，就经济资源的流动而言，与其相比。

The newspaper industry is going to try and ﬁgure out how to be a very important information source in a new medium.And it may solve that problem, to a degree, and still have lousy economics.That's — you know, that's — unfortunately, the newspaper industry's always — 报业将试图弄清楚如何成为新媒体中非常重要的信息来源。并且它可能在某种程度上解决了这个问题，并且仍然有糟糕的经济学。那是 - 你知道，那是 - 不幸的是，报业始终 -

Historically, the way the industry structure worked, once you got into the majority of households and everything, somebody else could bring out a way better paper, but it wasn't going to go any place against you. 从历史上看，行业结构的运作方式，一旦你进入大多数家庭和一切，其他人可以带出更好的纸张，但它不会去任何地方反对你。

I mean, you had such structural advantages that you could, you know — you could put your idiot nephew in and he would do ﬁne — wonderfully — you know.And nothing could happen to him except when this different medium came along. 我的意思是，你有这样的结构优势，你可以，你知道 - 你可以把你的白痴侄子放进去，他会做得很好 - 奇妙 - 你知道。除非这种不同的媒体出现，否则什么都不会发生在他身上。

Now you can put in a genius and whether that will make any difference is an open question.I would say that it's quite doubtful.If you own a newspaper, you want to do everything that you can think of and, fortunately, everything anybody else can think of, because you can copy them so fast. 现在你可以投入一个天才，这是否会产生任何不同是一个悬而未决的问题。我会说这很值得怀疑。如果你拥有一份报纸，你想要做你能想到的一切，幸运的是，其他任何人都能想到的，因为你可以快速复制它们。

And it may work in terms of product and it may not work in terms of product.And it may work in terms of product and still not work in terms of economics very well.And I don't know the answer to that question. 它可能在产品方面起作用，但在产品方面可能不起作用。它可能在产品方面起作用，但在经济方面仍然不能很好地发挥作用。我不知道这个问题的答案。

I know that we will play it out — at the Buffalo News, for example — as strongly as we can.I don't think other people are going to get way better results than we are.I don't know what the other people are — what their results are going to be and how it will work. 我知道我们会尽可能地在布法罗新闻中播放它。我不认为其他人会比我们获得更好的结果。我不知道其他人是什么 - 他们的结果是什么以及它将如何运作。

It would be crazy to sit on the sidelines and simply ignore what's going on.So we will do our darnedest to have good economics when this is all through.But nobody knows how it's going to play out, in my view. 坐在场边并简单地忽略正在发生的事情将是疯狂的。因此，当这一切都结束时，我们将尽最大努力获得良好的经济效益。但在我看来，没有人知道它会如何发挥作用。

21. "Average is going be terrible in insurance" “保险的平均水平很糟糕”

WARREN BUFFETT: The question about insurance, about whether we become average — average is not going to be good [in] insurance.Average is going be terrible in insurance over time.It's not — WARREN BUFFETT：关于保险的问题，关于我们是否达到平均水平 - 保险并不好。随着时间的推移，保险的平均水平将会很糟糕。不是 -

It's a commodity businesss, in many respects.And if you are average, you're going to have a very poor business.You may limp along because you got a lot of capital that's supporting the lousy business, but it's not — it won't be a good business, per se. 在很多方面，它都是商品业务。如果你是平均水平，你将会有一个非常糟糕的业务。你可能会跛行，因为你有很多资金支持糟糕的业务，但事实并非如此 - 本身并不是一件好事。

But I think in GEICO, and in General Re, and some — and our other operations as well — we do not have average businesses, and there is nothing about the way the industry is going that would force us or lead us to have average operations. 但我认为在GEICO和General Re以及其他一些业务 - 以及我们的其他业务 - 我们没有平均业务，而且行业的发展方式没有任何因素会迫使我们或引导我们进行平均业务。

I mean, we have special things we bring to the party in both cases I've named, and actually, in other cases as well.We have things we bring to the party that should make us considerably better than average. 我的意思是，在我命名的两种情况下，我们都会为聚会带来特殊的东西，实际上，在其他情况下也是如此。我们为聚会带来的东西应该让我们比平均水平更好。

It'll show more in some periods than others, and it'll be different in the way it is applied at GEICO or at General Re or at National Indemnity's reinsurance operation.But none of those, in my view, will be average. 它会在某些时期显示出比其他时期更多，并且它在GEICO或General Re或National Indemnity的再保险业务中的应用方式会有所不同。但在我看来，这些都不是平均水平。

But average — and there will be a lot of average, by deﬁnition — average is not going to be good. 但是平均水平 - 根据定义，平均水平将会很高，平均水平并不会很好。

The other problem about it is average is not going to go away, either.So that is an anchoring effect, to some extent, on what even the skillful operator can achieve.I think insurance will be a very good business for us over time. 关于它的另一个问题是平均值也不会消失。因此，在某种程度上，即使是熟练的操作员也可以实现这种锚定效果。我认为随着时间的推移，保险对我们来说将是一件非常好的事。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.Every once in a while, we have a business sort of die under us.Trading stamps is now off 99 3/4 percent from its peak volume, and we were able to do nothing to prevent that except wring all the money out and multiply it by about 100. (Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。每隔一段时间，我们就会有一种商业模式。交易邮票现在比其峰值交易量减少了99 3/4％，除了将所有资金拧出并将其乘以约100之外，我们无能为力。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We actually did about, what, 120 million, in the late '60s, per year in trading stamps, far more dominant in our area than S&H was nationally. WARREN BUFFETT：我们实际上在60年代后期的每年1.2亿美元的交易邮票方面，在我们这个地区远比S＆H在全国范围内更具优势。

And we have — by skillful management, Charlie and my constant attention to detail — have taken that business from 120 million a year down to, what, about 300,000 a year or so? 我们 - 通过熟练的管理，查理以及我对细节的不断关注 - 已经将这项业务从每年1.2亿减少到每年大约30万左右？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Oh, way less than that.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：噢，比那还少。（笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We thought of having the sales chart here and turning it upside down to impress you, but it wouldn't have worked very well. WARREN BUFFETT：我们考虑过在这里制作销售图表并将其颠倒过来给你留下深刻印象，但它不会很好。 CHARLIE MUNGER: I think it's the nature of things that some businesses die.It's also in the nature of things that, in some cases, you shouldn't ﬁght it.There is no logical answer, in some cases, except to wring the money out and go elsewhere. CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为这是一些企业死亡的本质。事情的本质也是，在某些情况下，你不应该反对它。在某些情况下，没有合理的答案，除了把钱拿出来去其他地方。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and that's very tough for managements, too.In fact, they almost never face up to that.It's very, very rare. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，管理层也很难。事实上，他们几乎从不面对这一点。这是非常非常罕见的。

And it's logical that it'd be rare.In a private business, you can understand why people face up to it.In a public company, if you take the equation of the manager, he or she may be far better off ignoring that reality than accepting it. 它很少见，这是合乎逻辑的。在私人企业中，您可以理解为什么人们会面对它。在一家上市公司，如果你采取经理的等式，他或她可能会更好地忽视这个现实而不是接受它。

22. Competitive advantage is more important than short-term proﬁts 22.竞争优势比短期利润更重要

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's go to number 3. WARREN BUFFETT：我们来看3号。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentleman.My name's Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia. 观众：早上好，先生。我的名字来自澳大利亚墨尔本的Marc Rabinov。

You've emphasized the importance of the moat around a business, or the sustainable competitive advantage.My question really relates to learning more about that. 您已经强调了护城河对企业的重要性，或者可持续的竞争优势。我的问题确实与学习更多相关。

Professor Michael Porter at Harvard has made a detailed study of this.Did you ﬁnd his work useful and can you recommend any other sources of information on this? 哈佛大学的迈克尔波特教授对此进行了详细研究。您是否发现他的工作有用，您能否就此建议任何其他信息来源？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I've never really read Porter, although I've read enough about him to know that we think alike, in a general way.So I can't refer you to speciﬁc books or anything.But my guess is that what he writes would be very useful for an investor to read. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我从来没有真正读过Porter，虽然我已经阅读了足够多的关于他知道我们一般都认为我们一样的想法。所以我不能把你推荐给特定的书籍或任何东西。但我的猜测是，他所写的内容对投资者来说非常有用。

I mean, I — again, I've never — I've just seen him referred to in some commentary.But I think he talks about durable or sustainable competitive advantage as being the core of any business.And I can tell you that that is exactly the way we think. 我的意思是，我 - 再次，我从来没有 - 我刚刚在一些评论中看到过他。但我认为他将持久或可持续的竞争优势作为任何企业的核心。我可以告诉你，这正是我们思考的方式。

I mean, that — in the end, you — if you are evaluating a business year-to-year, you want to — the number one question you want to ask yourself is whether the — could the competitive advantage have been made stronger and moredurable before — and that's more important than the P&L for a given year. 我的意思是， - 最后，你 - 如果你正在评估每年的业务，你想 - 你要问自己的第一个问题是 - 是否可以使竞争优势变得更强大和更多以前是耐用的 - 这比特定年份的损益更重要。

So I would suggest that you read anything that you ﬁnd that's helpful or — 所以我建议您阅读任何您认为有用的内容或 -

Actually, the best way to do it is study the people that have achieved that and ask yourself how they did it and why they did it.I mean, why is it that in razor blades, which could — 实际上，做到这一点的最好方法是研究已经实现这一目标的人，并问问自己他们是如何做到的，以及他们为什么这样做。我的意思是，为什么剃刀刀片可以 -

I mean, everybody grows up in business school hearing that as a great example of a product that's very proﬁtable and why — 我的意思是，每个人都在商学院成长，听说这是一个非常有利可图的产品的典范 - 为什么 -

With it obvious that there's going to be no reduction in demand for the next hundred years for the product, why are there no new entrants into the ﬁeld?What it is that gives you that moat around the razor blade business? 很明显，对于该产品，未来一百年的需求不会减少，为什么没有新进入该领域？是什么让你在剃刀刀片业务的护城河？

Normally, if you've got a proﬁtable business, you know, a dozen people want to go into it.If you've got a dress shop here in town and it looks like it's doing well, you know, a couple of other people are going to want to open up a shop next door to it. 通常，如果你有一个有利可图的业务，你知道，有十几个人想要进入它。如果你在镇上有一家服装店，看起来它表现得很好，你知道，其他几个人都想在隔壁开一家店。

And here's a worldwide business, nothing can go wrong with the demand, to speak of.And yet, people don't go into it. 这是一项全球性的业务，可以说没有任何问题可以解决。然而，人们不会进入它。

So, we like to ask ourselves questions like that.We like to ourselves, "Why was State Farm successful, you know, against people that had incredible agency plants and lots of capital?" 所以，我们想问自己这样的问题。我们喜欢自己，“你知道，为什么州立农场能成功地对付拥有令人难以置信的代理工厂和大量资金的人？” And here's some farmer out in Bloomington, Illinois named George Mecherle , you know, who's in his forties.And he sets up a company that deﬁes capitalistic imperatives. 这里有一些农民在伊利诺伊州布卢明顿的名字叫乔治梅切尔，你知道，他已经四十多岁了。他成立了一家违背资本主义要求的公司。

I mean, it has no stock, it has no stock options, it has no big rewards.It's, you know, it's kind of half socialistic.And all it does is take 25 percent of the market away from all of these companies that had all these characteristics. 我的意思是，它没有股票，它没有股票期权，它没有大的回报。你知道，这是一种社会主义的一种。它所做的一切就是将25％的市场从具有所有这些特征的所有这些公司中拿走。

We believe you should study things like that.We think you should study things like Mrs. B out at the Nebraska Furniture Mart, who takes $500 and turns it, you know, over time, into the largest home furnishing store in the world.There has to be some lessons in things like that.What gives you that kind of a result and that kind of competitive advantage over time? 我们相信你应该研究这样的事情。我们认为你应该在内布拉斯加家具市场学习B女士这样的事情，他们花500美元，随着时间的推移，把它变成世界上最大的家居用品商店。这样的事情必须有一些教训。什么样的结果和那种竞争优势随着时间的推移？

And that is the key to investing.I mean, if you can spot that — particularly if you can spot it when others don't spot it so well — you're on the — you know, you will do very well.And we focus on that. 这是投资的关键。我的意思是，如果你能发现 - 特别是当别人没有发现它时你能发现它 - 你就是 - 你知道，你会做得很好。我们专注于此。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it — these factors — every business tries to turn this year's success into next year's greater success.And they all use pretty much every advantage they have in every direction from this year to make next year's better. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，它 - 这些因素 - 每个企业都试图将今年的成功转化为明年的更大成功。从今年开始，他们都在各方面都利用了各种优势，使明年更好。

Microsoft did exactly that, year after year after year and happened to win big. 微软确实做到了这一点，年复一年地碰巧赢了大奖。

And it's hard to see — for me at least — to see why Microsoft is sinful because they tried to improve the products all the time and make next year's business position stronger than last year's business position.(Applause) 而且至少对我来说很难看出为什么微软有罪，因为他们一直试图改进产品，并使明年的业务地位比去年的业务地位更强。（掌声）

If that's a sin, every subsidiary at Berkshire is a sinner, I hope.(Laughter) 如果这是一种罪，我希望伯克希尔的每个子公司都是罪人。（笑声） WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah, yeah.We declare ourselves for sin.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，是的，是的。我们宣称自己是为了罪。（笑声）

23. Promo for See's Candies Barbie doll 23. See's Candies芭比娃娃的促销活动

WARREN BUFFETT: At this moment, I think we have a small interruption in the program here. WARREN BUFFETT：此时此刻，我认为我们的计划中断了一小段时间。

Charlie, on your left.(Laughs) 查理，在你的左边。（笑）

It's just a sample of what it's like to be an ofﬁcer at Berkshire.(Laughter) 这只是成为伯克希尔军官的样本。（笑声）

Oh, OK. 哦好的。

This is the new See's Barbie doll.And — never before seen, it will be in the exhibitors section, lower level. 这是新的See's Barbie娃娃。并且 - 从未见过，它将在参展商部分，更低层次。

And believe it or not, we've come up with three more just like this young woman.And they will be down there to take your orders.We can't ship them now, we won't charge your credit card until they — until they're available for shipment, which will probably be, I guess, around September or so. 不管你信不信，我们已经提出了三个就像这个年轻女人一样。他们将在那里接受你的命令。我们现在无法发货，我们不会向您收取信用卡 - 直到它们可以发货，我猜这可能是9月左右。

But we wanted our shareholders to be the ﬁrst ones to have a shot at this new product, and — 但我们希望我们的股东成为第一批对这款新产品有所了解的股东，并且 -

The model is not included in the — (laughter) — delivered price. 该模型不包含在 - （笑声） - 交付价格中。

Sat, Apr 29 2000 • 9:00 AM