THE ROLE of Psas in ASSESSING SAFETY

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THE ROLE of Psas in ASSESSING SAFETY This report has been prepared by the Dutch Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, ANVS. 2/243 CONTENTS CONTENTS LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................. 9 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................17 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................23 PART I REGULAR CNS-TOPICS ....................................................................23 Changes to legislative and regulatory framework .............................................23 Regulatory body - developments ....................................................................24 Recent considerations on regulatory and safety issues ......................................25 Results of international peer review missions and implementation of their findings .................................................................................................................27 Drills, exercises and lessons learned ..............................................................28 Actions on transparency and communication with the public ..............................28 Important issues identified in previous report and follow-up ..............................28 PART II POST-FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI MEASURES ............................................30 Participation of the Netherlands in international self assessment exercises ..........30 Tabulated lists of post-Fukushima Daiichi actions .............................................30 Response on ‘Observations and lessons – DG’s Report on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident’. ....................................................................................................30 PART III VIENNA DECLARATION .................................................................33 CHAPTER 2(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS ..................................................................35 ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS ...............................................35 6.1.a Existing installations .............................................................................35 6.1.b Borssele NPP .......................................................................................35 6.1.c Dodewaard NPP ...................................................................................36 6.1.d Research Reactors: High Flux Reactor (HFR) ...........................................36 6.1.e Research Reactors: HOR in Delft ............................................................36 6.1.f Plans for new Research Reactor: PALLAS .................................................37 6.1.g Project for upgrading of Research Reactor HOR: OYSTER ..........................37 6.2 Overview of safety assessments and other evaluations ................................37 6.2.a Borssele NPP .......................................................................................37 6.2.b HFR RR ...............................................................................................38 6.2.c Challenges from plans for new-build, upgrading and other activities of LHs .39 CHAPTER 2(B) LEGISLATION AND REGULATION .....................................................41 ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ..................................41 7.1 Legislative and regulatory framework ........................................................41 7.1.a Overview of the legal framework ............................................................41 7.1.b Primary legislative framework: laws .......................................................43 Nuclear Energy Act ......................................................................................44 Environmental Protection Act (Wm) ................................................................46 General Administrative Act (Awb) ..................................................................46 Act on the liability for nuclear accidents (‘Wet Aansprakelijkheid Kernongevallen’, WAKO) .......................................................................................................47 Water Act (‘Waterwet’, Ww) ..........................................................................47 Environmental Permitting (General Provisions) Act (Wabo) ...............................47 Dutch Safety Region Act (‘Wet veiligheidsregio’s’, Wvr) ....................................48 Act on Government Information (‘Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur’, WOB) ...........48 7.1.c Ratification of international conventions and legal instruments related to nuclear safety ................................................................................................48 7.1.d Special agreements ..............................................................................50 7.2 Provisions in the legislative and regulatory framework.................................51 3/243 CONTENTS 7.2. (i) National safety requirements and regulations ........................................51 Governmental Decrees (‘Besluiten’) ...............................................................51 Ministerial Decrees or Ordinances (‘Ministeriële Regelingen, MR’); ......................55 Adopted foreign nuclear codes and standards ..................................................57 Adopted industrial standards .........................................................................57 7.2. (ii) System of licensing ...........................................................................58 7.2. (iii) Regulatory assessment and inspections ..............................................59 7.2. (iv) Enforcement ...................................................................................61 ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY .......................................................................63 8.1.a General ..............................................................................................63 8.1.b Entities of the RB .................................................................................64 8.1.c Regulatory Body – tasks .......................................................................65 8.1.d Organisation of the ANVS ......................................................................65 8.1.e Coordination of activities for managing nuclear accidents and incidents ......67 8.1.f Development and maintenance of Human Resources at the ANVS ...............67 8.1.g Financial resources ...............................................................................69 8.1.h Quality management system of the RB ...................................................69 8.1.i Openess and transparency of regulatory activities .....................................69 8.1.j Publication of (summaries) of inspection reports.Future and current challenges for the Regulatory Body...................................................................70 8.1.k External Technical Support ....................................................................71 8.1.l Advisory Committees ............................................................................72 8.2 Status of the Regulatory Body ..................................................................73 8.2.a Governmental structure ........................................................................73 8.2.b Future development of the Regulatory Body ............................................73 8.2.c Reporting obligations ............................................................................73 8.2.d Separation of protection and promotion ..................................................74 ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER ......................................75 CHAPTER 2(C) GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ...............................................79 ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY ...................................................................79 10.1 Policy on nuclear safety .........................................................................79 10.1.a Regulatory requirements and implementation ........................................79 10.1.b Licence Holder’s (EPZ’s) policy and organisation ....................................79 10.1.c Supervision of priority to safety............................................................80 10.2 Safety culture .......................................................................................81 10.2.a Requirements ....................................................................................81 10.2.b Safety culture at Borssele NPP .............................................................81 10.2.c Supervision of safety culture. ...............................................................82 10.3 Management of safety (including monitoring and self-assessment) .............82 10.3.a Requirements ....................................................................................82 10.3.b Self-assessment by LH (EPZ of Borssele NPP) ........................................82 10.3.c Supervision of safety management (including monitoring and self- assessment) ..................................................................................................83 10.4 Safety culture at the Regulatory Body .....................................................83 ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES .............................................85 11.1 Adequate financial resources ..................................................................85 11.1.a Economic background .........................................................................85
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