Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Quasi-Experimental Test during the Great Terror1 Ivan Katchanovski, Ph.D. Kluge Post-Doctoral Fellow John W. Kluge Center Library of Congress 101 Independence Ave, SE Washington, DC 20540 Tel. (202) 707-0247
[email protected] Presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia, August 28 - August 31, 2003. Copyright by the American Political Science Association Abstract This study provides an empirical assessment of the prisoner’s dilemma model. It examines political prosecution and behavior of intellectuals during the Great Terror in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. This paper analyzes whether political prisoners confessed voluntarily as the prisoner’s dilemma model predicts. It focuses on the prosecution of Mykhailo Krawtchouk, an internationally renowned Ukrainian mathematician, and more than 100 other political prisoners, who were connected to his case. Krawtchouk’s case is selected because of its unintended effects on the invention of the electronic computer in the United States and the development of rocket technology in the Soviet Union. This study shows that only a small fraction of political prisoners confessed voluntarily. However, rational choice theory, on which the prisoner’s dilemma model is based, is helpful in solving a puzzle pertaining to the electronic computer invention and patent. 2 Classic prisoner’s dilemma model This paper investigates behavior of prisoners who were arrested on political charges in the Soviet Union during the Great Terror in the 1930s. It analyzes the role of prisoner’s dilemma incentives to confess in the mass terror. By examining the Great Terror, which affected millions of people, this study provides a unique empirical test of the prisoner’s dilemma model that now gains wide currency in the social sciences.