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Proceedings Ofthe Danish Institute at Athens VI Proceedings ofthe Danish Institute at Athens VI Edited by Erik Hallager and Sine Riisager Athens 2009 © Copyright The Danish Institute at Athens, Athens 2009 Proceedings ofthe Danish Institute at Athens Volume VI General Editor: Erik Hallager. Graphic design: Erik Hallager. Printed at Narayana Press, Denmark Printed in Denmark on permanent paper conforming to ANSI Z 39.48-1992 The publication was sponsored by: NQRDEA FONDEN ISSN: 1108-149X ISBN: 978-87-7934-522-5 Distributed by: AARHUS UNIVERSITY PRESS Langelandsgade 177 DK-8200 Arhus N www.unipress.dk Gazelle Book Services Ltd. White Cross Mills, Hightown Lancaster LAI 4XS, England www.gazellebooks.com The David Brown Book Company (DBBC) P.O. Box 511 Oakville, CT 06779, USA www.davidbrownbookco.u k Cover illustration: Reconstruction ofthe city ofKalydon Graphics by: Mikkel Mayerhofer Mitradates VI: Rome's perfect enemy1 Jesper M. Madsen King Mithradates VI's charisma and his consid The role playedby Roman aristocratsand gener erable impact on the history of ancient Asia Mi als in stirring up the conflict in Asia Minor has been nor, the Black Sea area as a whole and the Greek acknowledged by scholars,3 but the dominant view mainland is evident to those who study his life and has been that Mithradates provoked the First War4 deeds. Apart from being a successful Hellenistic as a result ofan expansionist policy and that he was ruler, Mithradates is often mentioned as the man responsible for the outbreak of the Third War as a who resistedRome for almost thirty years, an effort response to the Roman inheritance of Bithynia in that has given him significant space in both ancient 74 bc.5 and modern accounts. A second explanation of the Wars is the idea of As a young man around 113 bc Mithradates took Mithradates as a Hellenistic king who challenged over the throne from his father, Mithradates V. Rome in order to liberate the Greek world from From his accession to the late 90s bc, Mithradates Roman rule.6 This view tends to see the Pontic VI gained defacto control ofthe central and eastern king as a representative ofGreek culture and there parts ofAnatolia, Kolchis and the Crimea as well as by emphasises Greek cultural influence in the Pon the northern and northwestern coast of the Black tic Kingdom. Whether Mithradates isseen as a king Sea region. As a result, the territory under Pontic with imperialistic ambitions or as the protector of influence moved closer to Roman interests and re Greek culture, he is still generally viewed as the ag lations between Rome and the young Pontic king gressor who challenged the Roman order. This is grew more and more tense. a point of view that tends to focus mainly on the This paper will concentrate on Roman policy political agenda in Pontos but at the same time ig in Anatolia and the personal ambition of Roman nores Rome's part in the conflict. aristocrats involved in the wars against Mithradates. This approach to the conflict has been influ Based on the narrative and biographical sources, it enced by the notion ofRome's defensive imperial will be argued that personal agendas in the Ro ism, and by the whole idea that, in order to protect man aristocracy were a significant factor in all three her interests in Anatolia or the interests ofher allies. wars and that Mithradates was far more reluctant to wage war on Rome than is usually suggested by modern scholarship. Regardless of the different ap 1This study was initiated at the time I was employed at the proaches to Mithradates' life and the history ofthe Danish National Research Foundation's centre for Black Sea Pontic Kingdom, attention has generally focused studies Aarhus University. I am grateful to the foundation and the centre for their help and support I received during the on the wars between Rome and Mithradates, the completion of this paper. I would also like to thank Tonnes so-called Mithradatic Wars. Here the king is gener Bekker-Nielsen and Brian McGing for having read and dis ally seen as the aggressive party challenging Rome cussed earlier drafts. All errors are my own. by conducting a policy which, partly out of hatred 2Reinach 1895, 294-5; Bengtson 1975, 252. and partly out ofan ambition to create a large Pon 3Badian 1958, 289; Glew 1977, 404; Strobel 1996, 145-8. 4McGing 1986, 86. tic Kingdom, aimed at a direct confrontation with 5McGing 1986, 144-5; Sherwin-White 1994, 233-4. Rome.2 6Duggan 1974, 9; Antonelli 1992, 7. Mitradates VI: Rome's perfect enemy 223 Rome was forced to wage wars on a notorious ofabout 6,000 soldiers led by Diophantos to rescue ly aggressive Mithradates. The theory of Rome's the Greek cities, Mithradates was able to extend his defensive imperialism was subjected to substantial influence in the northern Black Sea region. After criticism, first by William Harris's influential con a number of campaigns on the Crimean peninsula, tribution War and Imperialism in Republican Rome Pontic forces managed to defeat the Scythians north 327-70 bc: (1979), and then by the more balanced of Chersonesos and to overcome resistance in the views of John North's article 'The development kingdom of Pantikapaion. Like Chersonesos, soon of Roman Imperialism' in JRS (1980) and later by other Greek Black Sea colonies such as Olbia and John Rich's Fear, greed and glory: the cause of Roman Apollonia found themselves asking for Pontic as war-making in the middle republic (1993) and Robert sistance. Once more Mithradates helped the Greek Morstein Kallet-Marx Hegemony to empire: The de cities. Pontic political and military influence was velopment of the Roman Imperium in the east from 148 further extended and by the end ofthe 2nd century to 62 B.C (1995) In spite of these arguments for a bc it included the northern and northwestern part more aggressive Roman stance, Rome's role in the of the Black Sea area and its southern shores from Mithradatic Wars is still seen by most commenta Amastris in the west to Trapezous in the east as well tors as defensive. as large parts of Armenia Minor. Mithradates took It is obvious that Mithradates was not simply a no direct part in the Crimean campaigns. Instead victim of Roman imperialism or personal ambi the different campaigns and the following adminis tions. His persistent attempts to turn the balance tration of Crimea he entrusted to members of the ofpower in Asia Minor in his favour by promoting Pontic aristocracy.7 several coups d'etat in the neighbouring kingdoms, At the time of Mithradates' accession, the kings or by repeatedly invading Kappadocia, Paphlago- of northern and central Anatolia were competing nia and Galatia obviously brought him closer to to enlarge and consolidate their kingdom on behalf war with Rome. The aim of this paper is therefore of their neighbours. After the Seleucid Kingdom not to minimise Mithradates' role in the wars, but had lost its power in the western part ofAsia Minor merely to give a more detailed account of the Ro following the war with Rome in 190 bc, and the man part in the conflict. In this respect it will be kingdom of Pergamon had been transformed into argued that Mithradates did not consistently follow the Roman province ofAsia sometime during 120s an aggressive strategy against Rome or Roman in bc,8a new situation emerged in Asia Minor. At first terests in the region, but instead conducted a poli Rome saw no need to enlarge its Asian domains. tic aimed at maximising his influence in Anatolia, As Rome had not conquered, but inherited, the without engaging in a military conflict with Rome. Kingdom of Pergamon, there had been no con This strategy proved to be naive, but the repeated frontation with potential resistance both within and defensive manoeuvres carried out by Mithradates outside the new province, and the number ofRo when Rome was ready to back her demands with man soldiers stationed in Asia could not provide force, testify to a reluctance to conduct open war. the necessary force for a further enlargement. The unsettled situation in northern and central Anatolia invited minor powers to extend their in Pontic politics before the fluence into the vacuum left by the fall ofthe larger Hellenistic dynasties and by Rome's reluctance to Mithradatic Wars (113-89 bc) fill it. As a direct result, competition between king During his first twenty years as king, Mithradates' doms such as Bithynia, Pontos and Kappadokia in influence grew stronger in both Asia Minor and creased and their effort to gain the upper hand was on the Black Sea coast. Immediately after his ac cession, the Greek colony Chersonesos asked Si- 7 For a more detailed account to Pontic activities in the north nope, then the capital of Pontos, for help against ern Black Sea Region, see Hind 1994, 139-40. Scythian and Taurian tribes. By sending an army x Kallet-Marx 1995, 122. 224 Jesper M. Madsen closely tied to the personalities of their kings and their newly won territories and their ambitions their ability to form alliances both inside and out grew; as a consequence the competition intensified side Asia Minor as well as to navigate in the con and became directed towards control ofthe weakest stantly changing political situation in the region. kingdom of the three —Kappadokia. Mithradates VI was now the strongest of the By the end of the 2nd century bc, the kingdom Anatolian kings. Not only had he the resources of Pontos had long had a significant influence on to mount large expeditions in Crimea and occupy affairs in the kingdom ofKappadokia, and in many pacified areas afterwards, but compared to the king ways they shared a common heritage from Irani of Bithynia Nikomedes III, Mithradates control an culture.
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