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The Long-Term Effect of the Gender Balance Law

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The Long-Term Effect of the Gender Balance Law Camilla Sjøberg Silje L. Johnsrud Master Thesis BI Norwegian Business School - The Long-Term Effect of the Gender Balance Law - Hand in date: 01.09.2015 Supervisor: Siv J. Staubo Campus: BI Oslo Examination code and name: GRA 19003 – Master Thesis Program: Master of Science in Business and Economics This thesis is a part of the MSc programme at BI Norwegian Business School Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between the gender balance law (GBL) and firm performance, which is measured by return on assets. The GBL were mandated in 2005 and required a share of 40 percent of each gender on board in ASA firms. The law led to major changes that dramatically increased the share of female directors in ASA firms compared to the unaffected AS firms. The analysis is based on 322 unique Norwegian ASA firms and 50 759 Norwegian AS firms in the time period 2003-2013. The results regarding all the firms suggest that an increase in female directors on boards will increase firm performance. Further, when separating the sample by organizational form, the results show that the fraction of female directors on board do not contribute in explaining the performance of the ASA firms. Hence, suggesting that the GBL has neither harmed nor benefited the performance of ASA firms. We want to thank our supervisor Siv J. Staubo, who has been very generous with her time and knowledge, for input, comments and support in each step to complete our thesis. We also want to thank the Centre for Corporate Governance for helpfully providing us with the data that was necessary to conduct our research. Page 2 Table of Content Abstract .................................................................................................................. 2 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 4 2. Literature Review .............................................................................................. 6 2.1 Corporate Governance in Norway ......................................................................... 6 2.2 ASA and AS ............................................................................................................. 6 2.3 The Gender Balance Law ....................................................................................... 7 2.4 Cost and Benefits of Compliance ........................................................................... 8 2.5 Short-Term Declines in Performance .................................................................. 11 Outline .......................................................................................................................... 12 3. Research Question and Objective of the Thesis ............................................ 13 3.1 Research Question ................................................................................................. 13 3.2 Objective of the Thesis .......................................................................................... 13 3.3 Practical Importance ............................................................................................. 14 4. Methodology ..................................................................................................... 15 4.1 Panel Data .............................................................................................................. 15 4.1.1 Fixed Effects versus Random Effects .............................................................. 16 4.2 Base Case Model .................................................................................................... 17 4.2.1 Endogeneity Problem ....................................................................................... 18 4.3 Difference-in-Difference Analysis ........................................................................ 18 5. Data ................................................................................................................... 20 5.1 Data Description .................................................................................................... 20 5.2 Data Filter .............................................................................................................. 20 5.3 Data Variables ....................................................................................................... 21 Firm Performance ..................................................................................................... 21 Female Size ............................................................................................................... 22 Firm Size ................................................................................................................... 22 Leverage .................................................................................................................... 23 Firm Age ................................................................................................................... 23 Ownership Concentration ......................................................................................... 24 Growth ...................................................................................................................... 24 5.4 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................. 24 6. Empirical Findings .......................................................................................... 31 6.1 Results from the Regression Analysis .................................................................. 32 6.1.1 The Base Case Model ...................................................................................... 32 6.1.2 Model 1 – Base Case ASA ............................................................................... 34 6.1.3 Model 2 – Base Case AS ................................................................................. 36 6.1.4 Comparing Model 1 and Model 2 .................................................................... 37 6.2 Results from Regression Analysis with Pre- and Post- Event Periods ............. 38 6.3 Results from Difference-In-Difference Analysis ................................................. 40 6.4 Summary of Empirical Findings .......................................................................... 42 6.5 Robustness .............................................................................................................. 43 6.5.1 Robustness of the Base Case Regression Analysis .......................................... 43 6.5.2 Robustness of the Difference-in-Difference Analysis ..................................... 45 6.5.3 Summary of the Robustness ............................................................................. 46 7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 47 7.1 Limitations ............................................................................................................. 48 8. References ......................................................................................................... 48 9. Appendix ........................................................................................................... 51 Page 3 1. Introduction In 2005, the Norwegian Government decided to introduce a mandatory gender balance law (GBL), which required ASA firms to have a minimum share of 40 percent female directors on boards. The Norwegian Governments main objective of the law was to ensure equality between the genders on corporate boards without harming the firm performance. In the compliance period, 2005-2008, the share of female directors on board increased drastically, ending at a stable, required share of 40 percent. This development is clearly unique for the ASA firms affected by the GBL, when we compare their development to the unaffected AS firms. Numerous researchers have studied the relationship between the GBL and firm performance. Their findings suggest that the GBL and an increase in the fraction of female directors have had a negative impact on the firm performance in ASA firms in the years after compliance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012 and Matsa and Miller, 2011). The GBL led to changes in the board dynamics, and companies had to employ a higher share of females over a short time period, and were required to adapt to the situation and establish new structures. By using data obtained from the Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) that contains information about the ASA firms and AS firms, we are able to focus our analysis on a longer time period than previously conducted. We examine a ten year time period from 2003 to 2013. Based on earlier research and an extended time period at hand, this paper aims at revealing whether the GBL has negatively affected the performance of the affected ASA firms in a long term perspective. Findings from the descriptive analysis show no statistical difference in performance between ASA firms and AS firms in the sample period, 2003-2013, even though the average fraction of female directors on boards is much larger in ASA firms. Further, results from the regression analyses indicate that the fraction of female directors does not significantly impact firm performance of ASA firms. Hence, it would not matter whether the ASA boards consist of females or males, as long as they do the job that is required of them. The additional difference-in- difference analysis discover that the ASA firms performed better relative to the
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